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  4. Soysa v Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd - [2024] QIRC 215

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Soysa v Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd[2024] QIRC 215

Soysa v Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd[2024] QIRC 215

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Soysa v Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 215

PARTIES:

Soysa, Vidanalage Priyantha Jayamani

(Applicant)

v

Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

B/2024/18

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

3 September 2024

MEMBER:

Gazenbeek IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

  1. 1.The Applicant’s application for proportionate payment of long service leave in proceedings B/2024/18 is dismissed, pursuant to section 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – RECOVERY OF PRO RATA LONG SERVICE LEAVE – APPLICATION IN EXISTING PROCEEDINGS – application in existing proceedings by respondent to dismiss substantive application – where applicant had under seven years of continuous service with respondent prior to termination – where parties filed submissions addressing whether substantive application should be dismissed pursuant to section 541(b)(i) or (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – consideration of the public interest – consideration of entitlement to proportionate payment of long service leave – consideration of continuity of service provisions – consideration of relevance of continuity of service provisions to long service leave provisions – consideration of whether applicant’s termination broke continuity of service – where applicant is not entitled to proportionate payment of long service leave – held that Commission should refrain from hearing application pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 because further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest – substantive application dismissed

LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 93, 94, 95, 121, 123, 124, 131, 134, 451, 475(1), 541(b)(ii)

CASES:

Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 018

Ferris v Woodlands H.R. Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 172

Gill v WBC Investments Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 153

GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin [2010] FWAFB 5343

Johns v Flight Centre Travel Group Limited [2020] QIRC 055

Quaedvlieg & Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 180 QGIG 1209

Quinlan v Rothwell & Anor [2001] QCA 176

Spears v Quantum Trading Enterprises Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 081

Reasons for Decision

Background

  1. [1]
    Vidanalage Priyantha Jayamani (Jay) Soysa (‘the Applicant’) commenced employment with Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd (‘the Respondent’) on 3 January 2017, initially in the position of Finance Officer.[1]
  2. [2]
    On 27 November 2023, the Applicant was notified that her position (by then, Finance Manager) was being considered for potential redundancy, as several roles within the Respondent’s finance department were to be consolidated “into a single senior position, with the title of Financial Controller.”[2]
  3. [3]
    The Applicant was encouraged to apply for the new role of Financial Controller, but her application was unsuccessful. On 7 December 2023, the Applicant was informed that her employment was terminated due to redundancy, effective 8 December 2023.[3]
  4. [4]
    On 7 March 2024, the Applicant filed an application for proportionate payment of long service leave, pursuant to s 475(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (‘the Act’). 
  5. [5]
    A conciliation conference was held before another Member of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (‘the Commission’) on 18 March 2024, but the matter failed to resolve and was subsequently referred to me for hearing.
  6. [6]
    The matter was mentioned before me on 18 April 2024, at which I expressed to the parties my preliminary concerns with the application, should the matter proceed to hearing. In particular, I alerted the Applicant to her apparent lack of entitlement to long service leave:[4]

COMMISSIONER:  … Your length of service with the Brisbane Powerhouse as you put in your application is 6 years, 11 months and 7 days. Under [section] 95(3) … there’s no entitlement. You don’t actually receive an entitlement of long service leave … until you’ve reached seven years of employment …

So the fact that you’ve completed 6 years, 11 months and 7 days means that you’re actually three weeks premature of … [that] entitlement … I just wanted to make that clear to you from the outset that, if this was to proceed to hearing … there’s no entitlement to the long service leave and proportionate payment on the basis that you don’t meet the requirements under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act.

  1. [7]
    I then provided the parties with my preliminary view of the matter:[5]

COMMISSIONER: … My preliminary view is, if you’re looking at the Act as it sits … there is no entitlement.

Now, unfortunately there are timeframes, but there may have been other opportunities for you to pursue other matters. I can’t advise you on that. But unfair dismissal is one. And a general protections application for adverse action may have been another course of action for you. Obviously, there’s a 21-day timeframe. And that has passed.

So dealing with this application as it is, which is an application before me for a proportionate payment of long service leave, if [this matter] proceeded to hearing … I can’t preclude what the decision by me would be, but on the face of it, looking at the evidence before me as we sit today, you don’t meet the threshold of seven years’ continuous service. So therefore, there would be no payment that would be applicable in those circumstances. … Is there any prospect that you think you may be able to resolve this if it went to a further conference rather than going to hearing?

  1. [8]
    Following this mention, I directed that the Applicant advise the Registry how they wish to proceed with the matter, electing either that:[6]
  1. a.the matter is reallocated to another Member of the Commission, who will assist the parties in attempting to conciliate the matter at a further conference; or
  2. b.the matter is arbitrated and listed for hearing before Industrial Commissioner Gazenbeek.
  1. [9]
    In correspondence to the Registry of 26 April 2024, the Applicant advised that they wished to reattempt conciliation.[7] The Respondent consented to this course of action in correspondence of 29 April 2024.[8]
  2. [10]
    The matter was accordingly reallocated to a third Member of the Commission. The matter  underwent conciliation on 20 May 2024, but it again failed to resolve.

Application in existing proceedings

  1. [11]
    Following the second conciliation conference, the Applicant indicated that she would seek legal advice before determining how to proceed with her application.[9] The matter was accordingly returned to the Registry, pending an update from the Applicant within six weeks.
  2. [12]
    However, the matter was promptly returned to me after the Registry received correspondence from the Respondent on 21 May 2024, requesting that the proceedings be “terminated”.[10] After being informed by my Chambers of the formal requirements for making an interlocutory application,[11] the Respondent filed a ‘Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings’ on 27 May 2024. This interlocutory application was filed on the basis that:[12]
  • the Applicant did not complete seven years of continuous service pursuant to s 95(3) of the Act;
  • the Applicant was not entitled to proportionate payment of long service leave upon the termination of her employment;
  • the Applicant received all statutory entitlements due upon her redundancy;
  • no remaining matters of fact or law require further deliberation; and
  • the continuation of these proceedings “is not in the public interest, as it would not yield any further resolution or benefit to the involved parties or the public” and will “lead to unnecessary expenditures of time and resources for both the Commission and the parties involved”.
  1. [13]
    I subsequently issued directions on 28 May 2024 for the filing of written submissions by both parties addressing whether the Commission should dismiss this matter pursuant to section 541(b) of the Act.[13]
  2. [14]
    Submissions were filed by both parties in accordance with these directions. I have not endeavoured to provide an exhaustive summary of the parties’ submissions in my decision below. Instead, having carefully considered all of the material before me, I have opted to refer to the key positions of both parties throughout my consideration below.
  3. [15]
    Pursuant to s 451(1) of the Act, no hearing was conducted in deciding this application, and this matter was decided on the papers.

Issue for determination

  1. [16]
    The issue for my present determination is whether the Commission should refrain from hearing Ms Soysa’s application pursuant to section 541(b) of the Act, which stipulates:

The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following –

…

  1. (b)
    dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers –
  1. (i)
    the cause is trivial; or
  2. (ii)
    further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest …

(emphasis added)

  1. [17]
    In their written submissions, the Respondent specifically submitted that the substantive application should be dismissed under s 541(b)(ii) of the Act,[14] adding that:[15]
  1. 21.As there is no cause of action by which the Applicant would be entitled to proportionate long service leave on termination of her employment, the Commission should be satisfied that it is not in the public interest to hear the matter.
  1. [18]
    The Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin (‘GlaxoSmithKline’) noted the following in respect to the ‘public interest’:[16]
  1. [26]
    … The expression ‘in the public interest’, when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question.

(emphasis added)

  1. [19]
    In Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (‘Campbell’), his Honour, Martin J, adopted the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia’s approach in GlaxoSmithKline when considering the ‘public interest’ in the context of s 541(b)(ii) of the Act, and relevantly noted that:[17]
  1. [29]
    As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials …
  1. [20]
    While “the value judgement incorporated in s 541(b)(ii) is a broad one”[18] and a decision-maker is afforded considerable latitude in choosing what evidence to consider when exercising the power in s 541, such a power should nonetheless be exercised with caution and only after having considered all of the relevant circumstances.[19]
  2. [21]
    Further, his Honour, Martin J, provided useful guidance for my approach to, and focus in, this decision, when noting in Campbell that:[20]
  1. [30]
    In considering the public interest, regard must be had to the legislative basis of the principal relief sought and the evidence before the Commission …

(emphasis added)

  1. [22]
    I also note the relevance of efficiency and fairness in a consideration of whether matters should be dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii). In this regard, I have been guided by Hall P’s decision in Quaedvlieg & Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd,[21] particularly his citation of Thomas JA’s reasoning in Quinlan v Rothwell & Anor, extracted below:[22]
  1. [29]
    There is now a consciousness of the need for some level of efficiency in the use of the courts as a public resource. That, of course, must not displace the need for reasonable access to the courts and the provision of justice according to law in each matter, but it highlights that the former laissez faire attitude by courts towards the leisurely conduct of actions at the will of the parties has ended …

Consideration

Entitlement to a proportionate payment of long service leave

  1. [23]
    Given the need to consider the legislative basis of the relief sought in considering the public interest, it is instructive to consider whether Ms Soysa is entitled to the proportionate payment of long service leave she seeks in her application.
  2. [24]
    Section 95 of the Act relevantly provides for an entitlement to long service leave in the following terms:
  1. 95
    Entitlement – employees other than seasonal employees
  1. (1)
    This section applies to an employee, other than a seasonal employee.

…

  1. (2)
    The employee is entitled to long service leave, on full pay, of –
  1. (a)
    if the employee has completed 10 years continuous service – 8.6667 weeks; and
  2. (b)
    after 10 years service, if the employee has completed at least a further 5 years continuous service – a period that bears to 8.6667 weeks the proportion that the employee’s further period of continuous service bears to 10 years.
  1. (3)
    An employee who has completed at least 7 years continuous service is entitled to a proportionate payment for long service leave on the termination of the employee’s service.
  2. (4)
    However, if the employee’s service is terminated before the employee has completed 10 years continuous service, the employee is entitled to a proportionate payment only if –
  1. (a)
    the employee’s service is terminated because of the employee’s death; or
  2. (b)
    the employee terminates the service because of –
  1. (i)
    the employee’s illness; or
  2. (ii)
    a domestic or other pressing necessity; or
  1. (c)
    the termination is because the employer –
  1. (i)
    dismisses the employee because of the employee’s illness; or
  2. (ii)
    dismisses the employee for another reason other than the employee’s conduct, capacity or performance; or
  3. (iii)
    unfairly dismisses the employee …
  1. [25]
    In summary, the Act gives employees an entitlement to long service leave on full pay after 10 years of continuous service. However, the Act also entitles an employee, after continuous service in excess of 7 years but less than 10 years, to a proportionate payment of long service leave upon the termination of their employment, where other specific conditions are met.
  2. [26]
    For completeness, I note that the Applicant submitted she is entitled to a proportionate payment of long service leave, as her employment was terminated prior to completing 10 years of continuous service, pursuant to s 95(4)(c)(ii)-(iii) of the Act.[23] However, s 95(3) and s 95(4) must be read together; an employee who was terminated prior to completing 10 years of continuous service, is only (potentially) entitled to a proportionate payment of long service leave if they had surpassed 7 years of continuous service. To read s 95(4) in isolation and conclude that, for example, a person with 2 years of continuous service prior to termination may be entitled to a proportionate payment, would clearly contradict the long service leave entitlements set out in the provisions immediately above.  
  3. [27]
    It is not in dispute that the Applicant did not complete 10 years of continuous service with the Respondent. To establish that she is entitled to proportionate payment of long service leave under the Act, the Applicant must therefore demonstrate both that:
  1. (a)
    she was terminated by the Respondent;
  2. (b)
    she completed at least 7 years of continuous service with the Respondent prior to her termination, pursuant to s 95(3); and
  3. (c)
    she meets the specific conditions outlined in s 95(4).

Was the Applicant’s employment terminated by the Respondent, and when did the termination take effect?

  1. [28]
    It is uncontroversial that the Applicant commenced her employment with the Respondent on 3 January 2017.[24] However, there remains some disagreement between the parties as to the date the Applicant’s employment was terminated.
  2. [29]
    The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s role was terminated due to redundancy on 8 December 2023, after 6 years, 11 months, and 5 days of service.[25] The Respondent further submitted that, upon their termination, the Applicant received 10 weeks’ redundancy pay, and payment for unused annual leave. As the Applicant was notified of the termination of her employment on 7 December 2023, she also received payment in lieu of the required four-week notice period.[26]
  3. [30]
    The Applicant’s position in respect to her date of termination largely reflects that of the Respondent. As the Applicant noted in her application, her employment with the Respondent “lasted for 6 years, 11 months, and 7 days until it was terminated due to redundancy”.[27] The Applicant also submitted that “on 8 December 2023, while [she] was on approved sick leave, Brisbane Powerhouse terminated [her] employment due to redundancy”, with her notice period was “paid forward” by the Respondent.”[28]
  4. [31]
    However, the Applicant has also queried in submissions whether “in fact [her] date of termination was 7 of January 2024 [sic]”, given that she was paid 4 weeks’ pay upon her termination.[29]
  5. [32]
    I do not accept the Applicant’s suggestion that she can both receive payment in lieu of 4 weeks’ notice, and still include those 4 weeks when calculating her total length of service with the Respondent. In the event that their employment is being terminated, an employee is entitled to receive either:[30]
  1. (a)
    notice of their termination (with that notice period contributing to their length of service); or
  2. (b)
    payment in lieu of notice (where termination is effective on the date stipulated by the employer).
  1. [33]
    As the Applicant had served over 5 years with the Respondent, she was entitled either to 4 weeks’ notice of the termination of her employment,[31] or to payment in lieu of being provided 4 weeks’ notice.[32] In opting to provide the Applicant with payment in lieu of notice, the Respondent terminated the Applicant’s employment effective 8 December 2023.
  2. [34]
    The Applicant was therefore employed by the Respondent from 3 January 2017 until 8 December 2023, for a total of 6 years, 11 months, and 5 days.

Did the Applicant complete at least 7 years of continuous service with the Respondent prior to her termination?

  1. [35]
    I note that it is not in dispute that the Applicant’s length service of 6 years, 11 months, and 5 days was continuous. Nonetheless, this period falls short of the threshold of 7 years of continuous service that must be met pursuant to s 95(3) of the Act.
  2. [36]
    However, the Applicant raised the following arguments in her submissions as to why her continuity of service was not broken upon her termination on 8 December 2023:[33]
  1. 38.Section 134 (3) of the Act, I had continuity of service with Brisbane Powerhouse is (sic) not broken by an absence, including through illness or injury,
  1. (a)
    on paid sick leave approved and partially paid by Brisbane Powerhouse…
  1. 39.Section 134(6) of the Act, I had continuity of service with Brisbane Powerhouse is (sic) not broken since my employment was interrupted and terminated by Brisbane Powerhouse with intent to avoid an obligation.
  1. [37]
    For completeness, the continuity of service provisions found in Chapter 2, Part 4 of the Act, to which the Applicant refers, are extracted below: 
  1. 131
    How part applies
  1. (1)
    This part applies for working out an employee’s rights and entitlements under this chapter, an applicable industrial instrument or a federal industrial instrument by prescribing when the employee’s continuity of service is not broken.
  2. (2)
    An employee is not entitled to claim the benefit of a right or entitlement more than once for the same period of service.

…

  1. 134
    Continuity of service – generally

…

  1. (3)
    An employee’s continuity of service with an employer is not broken by an absence, including through illness or injury –
  1. (a)
    on paid leave approved by the employer; or
  2. (b)
    on unpaid leave approved by the employer.

…

  1. (6)
    An employee’s continuity of service with an employer is not broken if –
  1. (a)
    the employee’s employment is interrupted or terminated by the employer with intent to avoid an obligation under this part, an applicable industrial instrument or contract of employment; or
  2. (b)
    the employee’s employment is interrupted or terminated by the employer as a direct or indirect result of an industrial dispute, and the employer re-employs the employee.
  1. [38]
    The long service leave provisions found in Chapter 2, Part 3, Division 9 of the Act make clear that an entitlement to long service leave (or the proportionate payment of it) is contingent on the length of an employee’s continuous service. Within this division, continuous service (for present purposes) is defined as “the employee’s continuous service with the same employer, whether wholly in the State or partly in and partly outside the State.”[34]
  2. [39]
    Further, section 94 of the Act clarifies that the continuity of service provisions in Chapter 2, Part 4 can be used to determine continuity of service for the purposes of determining an employee’s entitlement to long service leave:[35]
  1. 94
    Application of pt 4 for particular purposes

To remove any doubt, it is declared that the provisions of part 4 apply for working out an employee’s rights and entitlements to long service leave under this division, an application industrial instrument or a federal industrial instrument.

  1. [40]
    Ms Soysa’s submission that her continuity of service was not broken by her period of approved paid sick leave (which commenced on 27 November 2023),[36] is of no relevance to her present argument that her length of service continued beyond her termination on 8 December 2023. The effect of s 134(3)(a) is to ensure that periods of approved paid leave taken by an employee (following which they return to work) are included when determining their period of continuous service. Section 134(3)(a) does not afford an employee immunity from termination simply because they are on such leave, nor does it prevent an employer from terminating that employee by either providing the required notice or payment in lieu of such notice. The Applicant’s service with the Respondent continued beyond 27 November 2023 by virtue of s 134(3)(a), but only up to her termination on 8 December 2023.
  2. [41]
    The Applicant alternately contends that, pursuant to s 134(6)(a), her continuity of service was not broken upon her termination on 8 December 2023, because the Respondent terminated her with intent to avoid an “obligation to pay [her] long service leave entitlements.”[37]
  3. [42]
    I see two main issues with this line of argument. First, Ms Soysa would be required to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment was made for the purpose, or with the intent, of avoiding a (potential) obligation to pay the Applicant a proportionate long service leave entitlement.[38] Even on the basis of the Applicant’s own submissions, however, alternate motivations may have driven the Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment. As one example, having outlined several incidents of “bullying harassment” that occurred between December 2022 and November 2023,[39] the following was submitted by the Applicant:[40]
  1. 36.… Brisbane Powerhouse failed in its duty of care to its employees when I approached a senior member of the People and Culture Department raising concerns regarding work conditions and bullying allegations and was not offered support to understand the formal complaints process. Unfortunately, my loyalty to the employer and my naivety of the Brisbane Powerhouse’s ability to exploit this loyalty, has been my undoing. Having raised such serious concerns with a senior member of the People and Culture Department should have at a minimum, resulted in a formal record of the verbal conversations that were had. If I was unaware of how to create such records, the responsibility surely sits with the employee whose expertise is in this area, to guide me on how to do this. It can only be assumed that the lack of guidance or support provided was an attempt to cover up the work conditions and bullying or delay a formal record being made until I had been removed from the business. This is gravely concerning for culture of the Brisbane Powerhouse and the employees who continue to work within such a culture.

(emphasis added)

  1. [43]
    Further, at the mention on 18 April 2024, the following exchange occurred:[41]

COMMISSIONER: Are you suggesting that the … lodging of the psychosocial bullying complaint led to your termination of employment?

APPLICANT: Yes.

  1. [44]
    Second, and more significantly, even assuming that the Applicant could successfully demonstrate at a hearing that the Respondent terminated her employment for the purpose, or with the intent, of avoiding such an obligation, she will regardless be unable to meet the specific conditions outlined in s 95(4) of the Act. The completion of at least 7 years of continuous service does not automatically entitle an employee to long service leave; it only entitles an employee whose service has been terminated after having reached 7 years of continuous service to a proportionate payment of long service leave in limited circumstances.
  2. [45]
    Even if Ms Soysa’s termination on 8 December 2023 did not have the effect of breaking her continuity of service, thus allowing her to reach 7 years of continuous service with the Respondent in early January 2024, she remains unable to establish that her employment would have subsequently been (again) terminated, and for one of the reasons listed in s 95(4). This Commission cannot grant Ms Soysa’s application for proportionate payment of long service leave based on speculation, or on a prediction of how events may have unfolded in different circumstances that failed to actually eventuate. I am sceptical of the prospects of success for the argument that Ms Soysa’s termination did not break her continuity of service, but it is clear, even allowing that argument, that Ms Soysa cannot retrospectively state that her employment would have been terminated after 7 years of continuous service had elapsed.
  3. [46]
    Ms Soysa’s attempt to overcome the obstacle presented by s 95(3), by contending her length of continuous service extends past her termination date, can only (at best) result in falling short before the conditions stipulated in s 95(4). I am therefore not satisfied that Ms Soysa’s application has any prospect of success. Further proceedings by the Commission will not alter the insurmountable deficiencies of the substantive application, rendering the hearing of the application or the conducting of further proceedings neither necessary, nor in the public interest. 

Concerns with the Applicant’s redundancy

  1. [47]
    Despite the above consideration, it is concerning that the Applicant’s employment was terminated due to genuine redundancy while on paid sick leave that had been approved on the basis of a work capacity certificate issued by her general practitioner.[42] Despite that certificate detailing that she had “no functional capacity for any type of work” until 11 January 2024 due to workplace stress, the Applicant was requested to provide feedback on the proposed redundancy, to confirm her interest in applying for the new Financial Controller role, and to interview for that role, all in quick succession during this period of leave.   
  2. [48]
    I also note that, had the Applicant been given 4 weeks’ notice of the termination of her employment instead of receiving payment in lieu of such notice, she would have reached 7 years of service with the Respondent, such that the Commission may have been able to consider whether she meets the specific conditions outlined in s 95(4) of the Act.
  3. [49]
    Submissions of this nature may well have had weight in an application of a different nature filed by the Applicant, such as an unfair dismissal application in the Commission.[43] However, the nature of an application for proportionate payment of long service leave, where the Applicant did not have 7 years of continuous service prior to termination,[44] is such that the Applicant’s concerns surrounding her termination cannot be considered further in this matter.

Conclusion

  1. [50]
    For the above reasons, I find that Ms Soysa’s application for proportionate payment of long service leave has no prospect of success, and that further proceedings in the Commission are unnecessary. Given this, I further conclude that it cannot be in the public interest for further public resources to be expended were this matter be allowed to proceed to hearing.  Accordingly, I have determined to exercise my discretion to dismiss the substantive application in its entirety, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld). 

Orders

  1. [51]
    The Commission orders that:
  1. 1.The Applicant’s application for proportionate payment of long service leave in proceedings B/2024/18 is dismissed, pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).

Footnotes

[1] Application for proportionate payment of long service leave, filed 7 March 2024, 20.

[2] Letter from Ms M. Prefol, Director of People and Culture, to Ms V. Soysa, 27 November 2023, 1.

[3] Letter from Ms M. Prefol, Director of People and Culture, to Ms V. Soysa, 7 December 2023, 1.

[4] T 1-2 l 36 – 1-3 l 4.

[5] T 1-5 ll 8-27.

[6] Further Directions Order, issued 18 April 2024, Order 1.

[7] Email from Ms V. Soysa to Industrial Registry, dated 26 April 2024.

[8] Email from Ms M. Prefol, Director of People and Culture, to Industrial Registry, dated 29 April 2024.

[9] Email from Ms V. Soysa to Industrial Registry, dated 24 May 2024.

[10] Email from Ms M. Prefol, Director of People and Culture, to Industrial Registry, dated 21 May 2024.

[11] Email from Industrial Registry to Ms M. Prefol, Director of People and Culture, dated 24 May 2024.

[12] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings, filed 27 May 2024, 3.

[13] Further Directions Order (No. 2), issued 28 May 2024.

[14] Respondent’s submissions, filed 17 June 2024, [6].

[15] Ibid, [21].

[16] GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin [2010] FWAFB 5343 [27]. 

[17] [2019] ICQ 18 [29].

[18] Ibid, [32].

[19] Spears v Quantum Trading Enterprises Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 081, [12].

[20] [2019] ICQ 18 [30].

[21] (2005) 180 QGIG 1209.

[22] [2001] QCA 176 [29].

[23] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, [40].

[24] Respondent’s submissions, filed 17 June 2024, [10]; Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, [10].

[25] Respondent’s submissions, filed 17 June 2024, [20].

[26] Ibid, [13], [19].

[27] Application for proportionate payment of long service leave, filed 7 March 2024, 30.

[28] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, [31].

[29] Ibid, [19].

[30] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 121(a).

[31] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 123(a)(iv).

[32] Ibid, s 124.

[33] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, [38]-[39].

[34] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 93(b).

[35] See also Hartigan DP’s decision in Johns v Flight Centre Travel Group Limited [2020] QIRC 055 [12]-[18]

[36] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, 11.

[37] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, [21].

[38] See Ferris v Woodlands H.R. Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 172 [97].

[39] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, [32].

[40] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, [36].

[41] T 1-6 ll 1-4.

[42] Applicant’s submissions, filed 9 July 2024, 8.

[43] I note that the Applicant submits she filed an unfair dismissal application in the Fair Work Commission on 29 December 2023, before withdrawing the application upon realising it was outside of the Fair Work Commission’s jurisdiction. No application, other than the application for proportionate payment of long service leave, has been filed in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission by the Applicant.

[44] As seen in Butler IC’s decision in Gill v WBC Investments Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 153, whether an employee’s dismissal was unfair can be considered pursuant to s 95(4)(c)(iii) of the Act, provided that the employee had 7 years of continuous service prior to their dismissal.

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Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Soysa v Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Soysa v Brisbane Powerhouse Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 215

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Gazenbeek IC

  • Date:

    03 Sep 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 18
Cite 3 - [2019] ICQ 18
Ferris v Woodlands H.R. Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 172
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 172
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 172
Gill v WBC Investments Pty. Ltd. [2024] QIRC 153
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 153
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 153
GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin [2010] FWAFB 5343
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] FWAFB 5343
Cite 2 - [2010] FWAFB 5343
Johns v Flight Centre Travel Group Limited [2020] QIRC 55
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 55
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 55
Quaedvlieg & Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd (2005) 180 QGIG 1209
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 180 QGIG 1209
Cite 2 - (2005) 180 QGIG 1209
Quinlan v Rothwell[2002] 1 Qd R 647; [2001] QCA 176
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] QCA 176
Cite 2 - [2001] QCA 176
Spears v Quantum Trading Enterprises Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 81
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 81
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 81

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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