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Jackson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[2024] QIRC 222

Jackson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[2024] QIRC 222

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Jackson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 222

PARTIES:

Jackson, Andrew

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2024/24

PROCEEDING:

Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a Fair Treatment Decision

DELIVERED ON:

6 September 2024

MEMBER:

Caddie IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. Pursuant to section 562C(1)(a) Industrial Relations Act 2016 the decision appealed against is confirmed.
  2. The application for suppression of the Appellant's line manager's name in the decision and filed material relating to PSA/2024/24 is granted.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SERVICE – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – appellant employed as a supervising scientist at Pathology Queensland – where the appellant appeals an internal review decision upholding a local action decision relating to the appellant's Internal Employee Grievance – decision was fair and reasonable – appeal dismissed.

EVIDENCE – MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS – NON-PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE – PARTICULAR CASES – principles of open justice – consideration of circumstances where the Commission may exercise discretion to suppress the name of a non-party or evidence – discretion enlivened.

LEGISLATION:

Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) s 15.

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 451, 562B, 562C, 564

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) r 97.

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 13.

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ss 129, 131, 133.

Public Sector Commission Directive 11/20 – Individual Employee Grievances (25 September 2020).

Queensland Health HR Policy E12 – Individual Employee Grievances (August 2021).

CASES:

Attorney-General v Wood [2023] QSC 78.

Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263.

Cunningham v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 161.

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337.

Ehrlich v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 209.

GYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 97 ALJR 419.

Hutchison v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 317

Keyzer v La Trobe University [2019] FCA 646.

McNeil v State of Queensland (Electoral Commission of Queensland) [2023] QIRC 308.

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507.

Neil v Lee (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 149.

Santos WA Energy Ltd v Darren Whittaker [2024] FWCFB 231.

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Mr Andrew Jackson ('the Appellant') is a Supervising Scientist employed by the State of Queensland in Queensland Health. Mr Jackson is employed at the Central Lab of Pathology Queensland.
  1. [2]
    The Appellant filed a notice of appeal on 19 February 2024. A Directions Order was issued 20 February 2024, and submissions followed. The basis of the Appellant's appeal was unclear.
  1. [3]
    Within the notice of appeal, the Appellant referred to the matter as an appeal pursuant to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and HR Policy E12 – Individual Employee Grievances ('the Policy'). However, the decision attached was an internal review of an internal employee grievance.
  1. [4]
    Across the Appellant's application and submissions, a variety of remedies were sought; many of which are remedies not available for the Commission to make in public sector appeals. Section 562C of the IR Act relevantly provides:

562CPublic service appeals – decision on appeal

  1. In deciding a public service appeal, the commission may —
  1. confirm the decision appealed against; or

…

  1. for another appeal— set the decision aside, and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.
  1. [5]
    Remedies sought by the Appellant not available to the Commission included:
  • An endorsement that the Appellant was subjected to extenuating workload circumstances due to COVID-19;
  • A declaration that the Appellant was assaulted, coerced, and subject to deliberate bias and targeted malfeasance by his line manager and others;
  • A request that the Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) and disciplinary outcome that the Appellant was subject to be revoked;[1] and
  • Further remedies sought in submissions which I have since set aside due to non-compliance with directions regarding the volume and relevance of submissions.
  1. [6]
    The Appellant also sought in general terms for decisions of the Respondent to be set aside.
  1. [7]
    The Respondent submitted that the Appellant's appeal grounds were misconceived, and that the matter the Appellant sought to appeal – and in fact could appeal – was limited to the decision of Mr David Sinclair, Associate Director-General, Strategy, Policy and Reform Division, Queensland Health ('the decision-maker'). The impugned decision was that the internal review of the Appellant's Internal Employee Grievance ('IEG') conducted by Ms Sarah Prentice, Executive Director of Pathology Queensland, QPHaSS; and her resulting local action decision ('LAD'), was fair and reasonable.
  1. [8]
    In submissions in response, the Appellant rejected that the Respondent's characterisation of the appeal was correct. The Appellant noted that he had provided a submission to the ESU on 29 March 2023 to seek advice on the merits of making a Public Interest Disclosure ('PID'). In doing so, the Appellant advised that the ESU notified the Crime and Corruption Commission, who referred the matter back to Queensland Health for investigation. Queensland Health subsequently notified the Appellant that an IEG process had commenced following from the referral.
  1. [9]
    The Appellant in these submissions then went on to raise issues with how the IEG process was conducted and its findings. This indicated to me that the substantive matter on appeal indeed relates to the internal review of the IEG decision.
  1. [10]
    A mention was held before me on 15 April 2024 to clarify and discuss the scope of the appeal. The Appellant noted his position in relation to the appeal was as follows:

MR JACKSON: Thanks Commissioner. I think the root cause of the problem, from my perspective, is that my initial request went to the Ethical Standards Unit, which is a legitimate body of Queensland Health, in order to assess whether there was sufficient causative reason to have that submission forwarded to the Crime and Corruption Commission. That decision was not my decision. That was the decision of the Ethical Standards Unit. I guess, educationally, from my perspective, I was learning on the run, and it occurred – I found out later that the Crime and Corruption Commission refer these matters back to the public entity for investigation.

That came as a surprise to me because I did – I do not consider the public entity – in this case, Queensland Health – to be an unbiased adjudicator. Further to that, the IEG, as I pointed out in my submission, was not requested by me, wasn't authorised by me, it was written by Ms Curan from HR and, regardless of whether she wrote it on my behalf or not, it was unauthorised. I did not request it and I did not have anything to do with the writing of it, and I didn't sign it. So that is the – I guess that is the basis of my – you might call it confusion, really, because I had an idea about what would happen but subsequent to that, from my point of view, it went pear-shaped, if I can use that expression.[2]

  1. [11]
    I therefore decide that the scope of the appeal is a fair treatment appeal arising from the IEG review decision contained in the letter ('the decision letter') of Mr Sinclair. I must determine whether that decision was fair and reasonable.
  1. [12]
    I have noted these matters not in criticism of the Appellant, but rather to make clear the scope of the appeal and matters relevant to my decision.
  1. [13]
    At the mention held before me on 15 April 2024, two further matters were discussed:
  • Respondent submissions that certain submissions and attachments filed by the Appellant be set aside.
  • An application within proceedings filed by the Respondent on 26 March 2024 seeking suppression of the personal details of the Appellant's line manager.
  1. [14]
    With regards to the issue of the Appellant's submissions, Direction 4 of the Directions issued on 20 February 2024 provided that if required, parties were permitted to file further submissions of no more than five pages, plus any relevant attachments, by 26 March 2024. The Appellant filed seventeen pages of submissions along with further attachments on 22 March 2024, and a further two pages of submissions on 26 March 2024.
  1. [15]
    At the mention, the Appellant accepted that these submissions were not filed in accordance with the Directions issued on 20 February 2024. I set aside these submissions, however issued further Directions affording the Appellant another opportunity to file further submissions of no more than five pages, by 19 April 2024. These submissions were to be narrowed in scope and directed towards the decision letter and any underlying issues relating to that process, not the disciplinary process which is not the subject of this appeal.[3]
  1. [16]
    Reasons for my decision in relation to suppression follow my consideration of issues relevant to my decision in the substantive appeal.

The complaint letter

  1. [17]
    On 4 April 2023, the Appellant sent a complaint letter dated 29 March 2023 to the Ethical Standards Unit ('ESU').
  1. [18]
    In that letter, the Appellant describes that he was the subject of "targeted removal" from his position of supervising scientist, which commenced in May 2020. The Appellant alleges there was a confrontation with his line manager [name suppressed] in a May 2020 meeting about a new roster system:

… I was visited by her at my desk after she requested that I go through the draft rosters prepared in advance, as some staff had voiced their displeasure at the disruption to their established roster templates. She seemed perturbed, demanding to know why my team were being difficult. This culminated by her grabbing both my shoulders and shaking me, querying my loyalty to her … She uttered the following words …

"You will support me, won't you Andrew"

I was quite shocked at this behaviour and recoiled from her grasp. The meeting ended at that point. There were no witnesses to this assault?, so I did not report this incident, thinking it was my word against hers, and that I would not be believed. There were other one-on-one meetings where I was berated by my manager, and in which she used an angry, raised voice and slapped her hand on the table.

  1. [19]
    The Appellant then goes on to describe a "deliberate, targeted campaign" to remove him from his position, involving what he describes as intense scrutiny of his work performance, changes to his work resulting from the COVID pandemic, and frequent long review meetings which took time away from him completing his business-as-usual work, culminating in a PIP being implemented between July to October 2022. The Appellant then alleges that the PIP was "designed to fail," and was an excuse to remove him from his position.

Queensland Health's response

  1. [20]
    On 23 May 2023, Ashley Macfarlane, Principal Complaints Officer, Ethical Standards Unit ('ESU'), attached a letter on behalf of Jess Byrne, Director of the ESU, advising of the recent assessment of information identified by the Appellant as raising concerns.
  1. [21]
    In the letter, Ms Byrne determined that the concerns raised regarding the Appellant's alleged assault by his supervisor amount to a Public Interest Disclosure ('PID'). The letter notes that Mr Jackson was not wishing to pursue a criminal matter through the Queensland Police Service, however notes that because the disclosure contained information regarding an alleged assault by a supervisor, the ESU has reported it to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) in accordance with the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld).
  1. [22]
    Ms Byrne however also determined in the letter that the 'other matters' put forward by Mr Jackson; namely the "alleged coercion, deliberate bias and targeted malfeasance as a result of the processes undertaken by management" consisted of reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. Ms Byrne noted the material showed the Appellant was afforded natural justice through adequate opportunities to respond to identified performance deficiencies, which would not be considered a maladministered process under s 13(1)(a)(ii) of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld). Ms Byrne further noted that the information did not amount to corrupt conduct under s 15(1) of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld). Ms Byrne subsequently noted:

While the concerns in relation to this process have not been assessed as amounting to suspected corrupt conduct and/or a public interest disclosure, you may consider additional avenues in escalating any concerns in relation to this matter. I understand your appeal and review rights have been provided to you in the relevant notice to show cause correspondence.

  1. [23]
    Following from receipt of Ms Byrne's letter, the Appellant responded by email, stating:

… If I may venture an opinion, it is difficult for me to accept the fact that the principles of natural justice could be upheld in circumstances where a person who has assaulted you is also then given the opportunity to act as your convenor in a PIP process. The stress and anxiety alone would be enough reason, let alone the harassment and intimidation that accompanied the process.

…

  1. [24]
    The Appellant's email was replied to by Ashley Macfarlane, who on 26 May 2023 relevantly stated in response;

… The ESU considered there was insufficient information to establish any nexus between the alleged assault and the subsequent scrutiny of your work performance that would raise a conflict of interest or establish that reasonable management action to address any performance issues was unreasonable (including maladministration).

It was a relevant consideration to our assessment that you had not previously raised any concerns of the alleged assault incident that occurred in 2020. Specifically, you stated "There were no witnesses to this assault, so I did not report this incident, thinking it was my word against hers, and that I would not be believed."

The assessment may have differed in the event you raised concerns at the time of the alleged assault by [the subject officer]. In this scenario there may have been an argument that [the subject officer] was potentially conflicted in relation to any further involvement in processes you are involved in, knowing you had raised concerns against her. However, in this scenario, there would still need to be sufficient information to suggest that addressing performance issues was unfair and/or that you were not provided adequate opportunity to respond.

The material shows you have been afforded natural justice through adequate opportunities to respond to identified performance deficiencies which would not be considered a maladministered process or inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. Again, I would encourage you to consider additional avenues in escalating any concerns in relation to the performance process, including the appeal and review rights that have been provided to you in the relevant notice to show cause correspondence.

  1. [25]
    The Appellant's complaints were subsequently forwarded from the ESU to Queensland Public Health and Scientific Services ('QPHaSS'). This is confirmed in an email dated 7 June 2023, sent on behalf of Mr Nick Steel, General Manager of QHPaSS.
  1. [26]
    The email sent on behalf of Mr Steel relevantly sets out:

Concern 1 – bullying/harassment/maladministered processes

The complainant has alleged he has been removed from the position of supervising scientist as a result of a maladministered PIP process. The complainant alleged the processes undertaken by management in removing him involves coercion, deliberate bias and targeted malfeasance by [the subject officer] and others.

Assessment

You have been provided feedback from the ESU that the conduct and examples put forward by you appear to be reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way. You have been afforded natural justice and adequate opportunities to respond to identified performance deficiencies and this could not be considered a maladministered process. The information does not amount to suspected corrupt conduct under section 15(1) of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001.

Concern 2 – alleged assault

The complainant has further alleged, that in 2020 he was physically touched by [the subject officer], by grabbing both his shoulders and shaking him while querying his loyalty to her. The ESU queried if the complainant wanted to pursue the alleged assault as a criminal matter. The complainant stated:

"the assault did not result in physical injury, I do not believe the police would consider it worthy of criminal charges. It was, however, totally inappropriate behaviour for the workplace, and should be an incident that the dept of Health would be wishing to prosecute"

Assessment

ESU have assessed this matter as suspected corrupt conduct and referred back to QPHaSS to manage the complaint process. …

  1. [27]
    The email further explains that the next steps would be for Mr Jackson's grievance to be managed in accordance with HR Policy E12 and its Attachments. It noted that a decision was expected to be made within 28 calendar days, with the possibility of extension by mutual agreement.
  1. [28]
    On 6 December 2023, Ms Sarah Prentice, Executive Director of Pathology Queensland, issued a LAD to the Appellant in relation to his grievance. The LAD provided that the Appellant had 14 days to make an internal review request (IRR) of the decision.
  1. [29]
    On 13 December 2023, the Appellant requested an extension of time to make an IRR to 30 January 2023. While not contemplated by the Public Sector Commission Directive 11/20 – Individual Employee Grievances ('the Directive') Mr Sinclair granted an extension until 14 January 2024 and indicated he would be the decision-maker for the internal review if it was requested.
  1. [30]
    The Appellant made an IRR by way of a letter sent on 14 January 2024. The Appellant set out in his letter the reasons for seeking a review were that, in summary:
  • The Appellant did not agree with the version of events set out in the LAD, as he contended its conclusions were not consistent with what he had set out in his statement – particularly noting that the description of a "reassuring gesture" was inconsistent with the Appellant's description of being "shocked and recoiled";
  • The LAD stated no evidence was provided to support the contention that the subject officer questioned the Appellant's loyalty; however the Appellant did in fact provide evidence in the form of his detailed description; and
  • The Appellant provided further evidence of alleged malfeasance by the subject officer which fell short of the highest standard in the Code of Conduct,[4] which should be accepted and result in "the misdemeanour [being] upgraded to "official misconduct""
  1. [31]
    The Appellant also sought in the IRR a review of matters related to his PIP and discipline process.
  1. [32]
    Following from the IRR, on 28 January 2024, Mr David Sinclair wrote to the Appellant, issuing an internal review decision.
  1. [33]
    The decision letter set out that it considered the following documentation and information:
  • The Stage 1 complaint email dated 4 April 2023, sent to the ESU;
  • The LAD of Ms Prentice, dated 6 December 2023;
  • The Appellant's IRR, dated 14 January 2024;[5] and
  • The IEG Directive and HR Policy E12.
  1. [34]
    The decision-maker found it was open to Ms Prentice, as the delegate authorised to accept, act, and respond to employee complaints, to determine the appropriate options for resolution. The decision-maker noted that Ms Prentice complied with the procedure set out in cl 9.1 of the IEG Directive, thoroughly considered all information, and provided Mr Jackson with the reasons for her decision in writing.
  1. [35]
    With regards to Ms Prentice's decision, the decision letter sets out in general terms:

It is clear to me that Ms Prentice gave due consideration to your concerns, and desired outcomes, and provided you with a written decision in relation to the same. Specifically, 

  • careful consideration was given to all information provided by you in your grievance.
  • review of additional information sought from [the subject officer] and yourself was undertaken.
  • consideration of additional information that was provided by HRAS.
  1. [36]
    The decision letter further notes that Ms Prentice was required to determine on the balance of probabilities whether the subject officer assaulted the Appellant. In the absence of any other witnesses to the alleged event, the decision-maker found Ms Prentice preferred the subject officer's version of event's over the Appellant's, having regard to the extensive lapse since the alleged event occurred, no reports of the alleged incident being made to any other party at the time, and the nexus between the Appellant's allegations against the subject officer and the other matters related to his employment arising.
  1. [37]
    With regards to the alleged inconsistencies between the accepted version of events and the Appellant's, the decision letter notes:

… To clarify, the decision maker concluded, it was possible that you may have been 'shocked and recoiled' due to [the subject officer] placing her hands on your shoulders, as this action is uncommon in a workplace setting, however the mere placing of hands on another employee's shoulders does not amount to the criminal definition of assault or misconduct as defined by the Public Sector Act 2022.

  1. [38]
    Mr Sinclair concludes that it was open for Ms Prentice to arrive at her decision, and that the decision made by her was reasonable in the circumstances.
  1. [39]
    It is this internal review decision of Mr Sinclair, to affirm Ms Prentice's decision on the IEG, that is the subject of this appeal.

The appeal notice

  1. [40]
    The Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on 19 February 2024. It in summary sets out the following grounds of appeal under broad headings:
  1. Bullying and Harassment
  • Repeated unreasonable conduct and assault on my person occasioned by my manager and the allegations of "targeted removal and deliberate malfeasance" have been made out.
  1. Denial of natural justice
  • Management involved in the IEG process were not disinterested and unbiased adjudicators and were in fact biased against the Appellant.
  1. Denial of procedural fairness
  • The Appellant was denied procedural fairness as he granted the Department extensions of time to consider his IEG but was denied an extension of time himself even though the decision was issued after many months and adjacent to the Christmas holidays. This afforded him insufficient time to properly respond.
  1. Improper Stage 2 Review response
  • The IEG review did not reference or contest the Appellant's additional information provided in his IRR and provided no substantive evidence to justify its conclusions. This was not a review but rather an endorsement of policy.
  1. Improper administration of dispute
  • Inconsistent with the IEG Directive, the Appellant was not made aware of his line manager's response to his allegations in a timely manner, and it was unreasonable for the Department to refuse to disclose the transcript of an internal interview conducted with his line manager.
  1. Malfeasance in line manager's role
  • The Appellant's line manager failed to perform a Performance Development Plan ('PDP') review before instigating the PIP he was subject to; and
  • Management failed to acknowledge extenuating circumstances before instigating the PIP process. These circumstances included loss of staffing resources due to COVID-19, lab redevelopment, increased workload, new systems implemented at work, and the additional time burdens of the Appellant undergoing the positive performance management and PIP processes.

Is the appellant entitled to appeal?

  1. [41]
    Section 131 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act') lists the categories of decisions which may be appealed. Section 131(1)(d) provides appeals may be made against fair treatment decisions. Fair treatment decisions are defined in s 129 as being a decision that a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable. Section 133 of the PS Act provides that for a fair treatment appeal, a public sector employee aggrieved by the decision may appeal the decision.
  1. [42]
    Section 564(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act') requires an appeal to be lodged within 21 days after the day the decision appealed against is given.
  1. [43]
    I am satisfied that the decision is one that may be appealed against, that Mr Jackson is entitled to appeal, and that the appeal was lodged within the required time.

Appeal principles

  1. [44]
    Section 562B(3) of the IR Act provides that a public sector appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against. The purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable. Appeals under ch 11 pt 6 div 4 of the IR Act are not by way of re-hearing. 
  1. [45]
    As previously noted at [4], s 562C(1) of the IR Act provides that the Commission may confirm the decision appealed against or set the decision aside and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision-maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any direction considered appropriate.

Relevant instruments

The IEG Directive

  1. [46]
    Mr Jackson's grievance was commenced pursuant to the IEG Directive.[6]
  1. [47]
    Clause 4 of the Directive outlines the policy principles contemplated by the Directive's framework including;
  1. 4.Principles
  2. 4.1The Queensland Government is committed to creating positive and healthy workplace cultures, where employees, supervisors and managers:
  1. (a)
    make decisions and take actions that are fair and transparent, and take responsibility for the consequences of their decisions and actions
  2. (b)
    question actions that are inconsistent with the public service values and Code of Conduct for the Queensland public service
  3. (c)
    treat each other with respect independent of their status or disagreement
  4. (d)
    listen to understand and show empathy for others
  5. (e)
    work together to resolve issues early and as informally as possible.
  1. [48]
    With regards to the matters that can be the subject of an IEG, the Directive states:
  1. 5.Matters that can be the subject of an individual employee grievance
  2. 5.1An individual employee grievance under this directive is a grievance submitted by a current public service employee who has an honest belief, based on reasonable grounds, that:
  1. (a)
    an administrative decision, which they are aggrieved by, is unfair and unreasonable
  2. (b)
    the conduct or behaviour of an employee, agent or contractor is unfair and unreasonable
  3. (c)
    the conduct or behaviour of an employee, agent or contractor constitutes bullying in the workplace, sexual harassment, racial vilification, religious vilification or vilification on the grounds of gender identity or sexuality
  4. (d)
    the conduct or behaviour of an employee is a breach of the Code of Conduct
  5. (e)
    an act or decision is not compatible with human rights under the HR Act.
  1. 6.Matters that cannot be the subject of an individual employee grievance
  2. 6.1The following decisions, conduct or behaviour cannot be the subject of an individual employee grievance under this directive:

…

  1. (b)
    a decision made under Chapter 6, Part 2 of the PS Act relating to discipline decisions

…

  1. (d)
    a decision relating to a person's work performance, other than a decision about the person's work performance that is recorded in a formal way as part of a periodic performance review

…

  1. 6.2Under the PS Act, an employee seeking to lodge a fair treatment appeal is generally required to have used their agency individual employee grievance mechanism prior to lodging an appeal.

…

  1. [49]
    The Directive states the relevant IEG resolution principles and procedures as follows:
  1. 8.Individual employee grievance resolution principles
  2. 8.1Employees are required to ensure that individual employee grievances are submitted as soon as reasonably possible after the administrative decision, alleged conduct or alleged behaviour has occurred.
  3. 8.2Individual employee grievances are to be managed and resolved using a three-step process:
  1. (a)
    local action (the first stage of the individual employee grievance process)
  2. (b)
    internal review of a decision made following local action (the second stage of the individual employee grievance process), and
  3. (c)
    where applicable, external review of a decision made at internal review (the third stage of the individual employee grievance process).
  1. 8.3Agencies, including managers and supervisors, must manage individual employee grievances:
  1. (a)
    in accordance with principles of natural justice, including timely decisions and the provision of adequate reasons
  2. (b)
    in a manner that protects the privacy of the employee who has submitted the grievance subject to any legal disclosure obligations, such as the requirement to provide natural justice to the subject of the grievance, and
  3. (c)
    in accordance with the procedures in clause 9.
  1. 8.4All parties to an individual employee grievance:
  1. (a)
    must engage in the individual employee grievance process in good faith, and
  2. (b)
    be provided with regular and timely information by the decision maker in relation to the progress of the individual employee grievance.
  1. 8.5To assist in the resolution of individual employee grievances an employee who submits an individual employee grievance may be:
  1. (a)
    supported by a person of their choosing, and
  2. (b)
    represented by a union representative or member of a professional association.
  1. 9.Procedures for managing and resolving individual employee grievances
  2. 9.1Stage 1 – local action

...

  1. (b)
    An individual employee grievance submitted by an employee must be resolved in accordance with the agency's individual employee grievance policy and procedures. This action may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following:
  1. (i)
    conducting preliminary enquiries to determine appropriate options for resolution of the individual employee grievance
  2. (ii)
    ADR strategies, including, facilitated discussion, mediation, conciliation or negotiation
  3. (iii)
    gathering information, including from witnesses, and/or
  4. (iv)
    other reasonable action in the circumstances

…

  1. (d)
    A decision about an individual employee grievance should be made as soon as possible, but must be made within 28 calendar days of receipt of the individual employee grievance unless:

…

  1. (f)
    After a decision has been made about an individual employee grievance – including a decision to take no action under clause 9.1(c) – the agency must provide a written decision to the employee who submitted the grievance. The decision must:
  1. (i)
    outline the action taken to manage the individual employee grievance and the outcome of this action
  2. (ii)
    provide the reasons for the decision, or the decision to take no action
  3. (iii)
    outline any action that the agency proposes to take, or will take, as a result of the decision; and
  4. (iv)
    inform the employee of their internal review rights outlined in Stage 2 – internal review, including any relevant timeframes.
  1. 9.2Stage 2 – internal review
  1. (a)
    If an employee is dissatisfied with a decision made through local action, the employee may make a written request to the agency chief executive for an internal review.
  2. (b)
    A request for an internal review must:
  1. (i)
    be received by the chief executive within 14 days of the employee receiving a copy of the decision made through local action or a decision is taken to be made under clause 9.1(e
  2. (ii)
    clearly state the reasons for dissatisfaction with the decision made through local action, and not merely state a belief that the decision made through local action was unfair and unreasonable, and
  3. (iii)
    state the action the employee believes would resolve the grievance.
  1. (c)
    Once an agency receives a request for an internal review, the agency must notify the employee in writing:
  1. (i)
    that the request for an internal review has been received by the agency
  2. (ii)
    of the name and contact information for a contact person for the internal review, and
  3. (iii)
    of the 14 day timeframe for making a decision in clause 9.2(f).
  1. (d)
    An internal review is to be completed by the chief executive or their delegate. The chief executive or delegate is to determine whether the decision made through local action was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

…

  1. (f)
    A decision about internal review of a decision made through local action must be made as soon as possible and within 14 days of receipt of a written request from an employee for internal review. The 14 day period commences from the date the agency receives the request for internal review, in accordance with clause 9.2(b). This applies unless:
  1. (i)
    the timeframe has been extended by mutual agreement between the parties. A party to the individual employee grievance is not to unreasonably withhold their agreement or
  2. (ii)
    where the chief executive or delegate can demonstrate that reasonable attempts have been made to progress the individual employee grievance.

…

  1. (h)
    At the completion of internal review, including a decision to take no further action under clause 9.2(e), the chief executive or delegate must provide a written decision to the employee. This decision must:
  1. (i)
    outline the action taken to review the decision made through local action
  2. (ii)
    outline the reasons for the decision, or the decision to take no further action
  3. (iii)
    outline any action that the chief executive or delegate proposes to take, or will take, as a result of the internal review, and
  4. (iv)
    outline any avenues of external review that may be available to the employee, including any relevant timeframes.

The Policy

  1. [50]
    The Department of Health's HR Policy E12 – Individual employee grievances ('the Policy') relevantly provides:

1 Policy statement

…

Managers and supervisors are required to proactively identify workplace issues in accordance with the management principles set out in section 26(3) of the Public Service Act 2008. Regardless of whether an individual employee grievance has been submitted by an employee under this policy, managers and supervisors should manage workplace issues effectively by creating a safe environment to conduct courageous and supportive conversations and afford natural justice to all parties.

This policy does not replace, modify or revoke any legislative requirements that apply to the management of particular types of complaints, for example, corrupt conduct under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, public interest disclosures under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010, or complaints under the Human Rights Act 2019.

…

2.3 Making an individual employee grievance

…

Employees are required to ensure that employee grievances are made as soon as reasonably possible after the administrative decision, alleged conduct or alleged behaviour has occurred.

…

Individual employee grievances must be managed:

  • in accordance with the principles of natural justice, including timely decisions and the provision of adequate reasons
  • in a manner that protects the privacy of the employee who has submitted the grievance and any persons named in the complaint, subject to any legal disclosure obligations such as the requirement to provide natural justice to the subject of the grievance; and
  • in accordance with the relevant individual employee grievance process in Attachment One or Attachment Two.

…

All parties to an employee grievance must:

  • engage in the employee grievance process in good faith, and
  • be provided with regular and timely information by the decision maker in relation to the progress of the employee grievance.

…

2.8 Employee grievances involving suspected corrupt conduct

…

Supervisors and managers must ensure that in matters of suspected corrupt conduct no action is taken to resolve the employee grievance, either informally or formally, until the matter has been reported to the Crime and Corruption Commission through the appropriate process.

Refer to Requirements for reporting corrupt conduct HR Policy E9 (or equivalent policy) for further information.

Employee grievances involving criminal activity may require notification to the Queensland Police Service.

  1. [51]
    The Policy's definitions section further provides the following in relation to natural justice:

[Natural justice] Is a right recognised and defined by law that involves two key elements – the hearing rule (everyone is entitled to a decision by a disinterested and unbiased adjudicator), and the bias rule (the parties shall be given adequate notice of the case against them, and a right to respond). In the context of an employee grievance, this requires that when material is obtained that may reasonably be considered to be detrimental to an employee's interests, that employee is to be provided with access to the material as soon as practicable and given an opportunity to respond to such material.

Material provided is to include the factual information to be examined and is to be in sufficient enough detail to enable adequate preparation of a response. However, provision of material to a party to a grievance is to be in accordance with the relevant privacy obligations, including (but not limited to) the Information Privacy Act 2009, Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 and Access to Employee Records HR Policy F3.

Review Tribunals, such as the PSC and the QIRC, may overturn decisions if they are found to be procedurally flawed. Therefore, the role of decision-makers in ensuring all of the necessary steps in the process are followed is an extremely important one.

Approach to the appeal

  1. [52]
    This appeal requires the Commission to decide whether it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to uphold the Stage 1 LAD as being fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
  1. [53]
    This involves consideration of the decision arrived at, having regard to the information available to the decision-maker at the time the decision was made, and the process followed.

The Parties' submissions

Having narrowed the scope of the appeal I will confine myself to consideration of submissions related to matters within that scope and make no further comments in relation to the other matters already dealt with at the mention.

Respondent's Submissions

  1. [54]
    The Respondent states it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to confirm Ms Prentice's LAD on the basis that (in summary):
  • He appropriately considered the request and grounds for the internal review;
  • He concurred with the determination that on the balance of probabilities the appellant's concerns could not be substantiated based on available evidence;
  • Ms Prentice was an appropriate person to undertake action and respond to the grievance;
  • The requirements of the Directive and Policy were complied with;
  • It was appropriate for Ms Prentice to determine action for resolution;
  • The Appellant was provided written reasons for the decision;
  • The subject officer of the grievance was afforded an opportunity to respond;
  • Additional information was sought and provided by the Appellant; and
  • Due consideration was given to the Appellant's concerns and desired outcomes.
  1. [55]
    They further state it was reasonable for the decision-maker to confirm Ms Prentice's findings that in relation to the alleged assault she preferred the subject officer's account.
  1. [56]
    In response to the grounds for appeal, the Respondent states the purpose of the external review by the Commission is to determine whether the decision was fair and reasonable – not as a re-hearing of the merits in the matter. They contend a determination that the Appellant was bullied or overworked is beyond the scope of the appeal.
  1. [57]
    The Respondent submits it was appropriate for the decision-maker to confirm matters relating to the separate disciplinary process be excluded due to the exclusion within the Directive. Ms Prentice did consider the issue of bias on the part of the subject officer in the performance management process that preceded the disciplinary process, and found this concern was not supported by the available evidence. This finding was confirmed by the decision-maker.
  1. [58]
    In relation to unfair treatment regarding timeframes within the IEG process, the Respondent acknowledges the Appellant did provide several extensions as contemplated by the IEG Directive, however the timeframes for lodging an IRR are fixed without extension by mutual agreement. Despite this, they note the decision-maker did exercise discretion to grant an effective extension for the lodgement of the IRR by 25 days.
  1. [59]
    They state that the purpose of the internal review is to assess whether the LAD was fair and reasonable in the circumstances in which it was made. They support the process undertaken by the decision-maker to set aside additional information provided in the IRR.
  1. [60]
    In relation to the decision not to provide the full transcript of the subject officer's response to his grievance, the Respondent states there is no requirement under the IEG Directive or Policy to provide full details of the response, and that Ms Prentice considered all relevant materials in coming to her LAD.
  1. [61]
    The Respondent seeks confirmation of the decision appealed against on the basis that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Appellant's Submissions in reply

  1. [62]
    The Appellant states that he believes the LAD was not written by Ms Prentice, who was recently employed when the LAD was issued. He states he remains aggrieved that a longer extension was not granted to lodge the IRR, and rejects the decision-maker's contention that developing the request was "not an onerous task." In the absence of a longer extension, he states many of the LAD's conclusions go unchallenged.
  1. [63]
    The Appellant then discusses the importance of procedural fairness, including the fair hearing rule as relevant to the IEG Directive and Policy. He quotes part of an advice attributed to his Union:

…In the context of an employee grievance, this requires that when material is obtained that may reasonably be considered…detrimental to an employee's interests, that employee is to be provided with access to the material as soon as practicable and given an opportunity to respond to such material. Material provided is to include the factual information to be examined and is to be in sufficient enough detail to enable the adequate preparation of a response." (IEG E12 page 8 and 9)

The failure to provide full details of the response made by the subject officer clearly relevant to the LAD is, he submits, is a denial of natural justice and is unfair and unreasonable. The Appellant further submits the confirmation by the decision-maker is also unfair and unreasonable, as is the decision-maker's failure to engage with the Appellant's complete internal review submissions.

  1. [64]
    The Appellant contends the process did require provision of the subject officer's statement for transparency and fairness. He argues it was unfair that the subject officer was provided full details of his complaints against her, but he was not afforded the same opportunity in relation to her response.
  1. [65]
    Submissions then move to the question of scope of the Commission's review in this appeal. He argues that issues of bullying and harassment are matters that arise from the behaviour complained of in his original complaint to the ESU, and the subsequent review of that complaint as an IEG. These matters should therefore in the Appellant's submission be relevant to the Commission as central concerns underpinning the LAD, the internal review and by extension this appeal. Further, the Appellant believes the fact that some of those matters also preceded the separate discipline process should not make them out of scope in the present appeal.
  1. [66]
    The Appellant seeks that the appeal be allowed, and the internal review decision be set aside.

Respondent's submissions in reply

  1. [67]
    The reply submissions of the Respondent predominantly address contentions that the Appellant was denied natural justice through, inter alia, the failure to provide the subject officer's response. The Respondent denies the Appellant was not afforded natural justice for the following reasons:
  1. In her response to the Appellant's grievance, [the subject officer] made the following comment:

"… it is my view that by submitting a complaint alleging physical assault, Mr Jackson is intentionally seeking to either discredit me or retaliate against me for undertaking performance management actions against him, as required by my role."

  1. On 15 June 2023, on behalf of the (then) delegate… the Department wrote to the Appellant and invited him to provide a response to [the subject officer's] comment so it may be considered by Mr Lawrence.[7]
  1. On 31 August 2023, the Appellant provided a response to the comment made by [the subject officer].
  1. On 6 December 2023, [Ms Prentice] … who was now the delegate … provided the Appellant a grievance decision outcome letter (the grievance decision). In her grievance decision … Ms Prentice considered the comments by [the subject officer] together with the Appellant's response to [her] comments, and made the following determination:

"I do not accept [the subject officer's] comments that you have raised this concern against a background of a failed PIP that had been managed by [the subject officer] as being a reason for your complaint, because no evidence is provided to support this."

  1. The Respondent submits that the decisions made by Ms Prentice in her review of the Appellant's grievance and [the subject officer's] response were open to make and were fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
  1. … [T]here is no requirement under Queensland Health Human Resource Policy E12 Individual Employee Grievances (the Policy) or the Public Sector Commission Directive 11/20 Individual Employee Grievances (the Directive) to share with a complainant the details of a subject employee's response.
  1. Pursuant to clause 2.3 of the Policy, the subject of an employee grievance must be provided natural justice. The Respondent submits that the Appellant was the complainant and not the subject of the complaint. As the subject of the grievance [the subject officer] was provided natural justice by being given an opportunity to respond to the Appellant's allegations. [Her] response and all available information was considered by Ms Prentice. The Respondent confirms Ms Prentice had no prior involvement in the matter.
  1. [68]
    The Respondent reiterates it was appropriate for Ms Prentice to set aside matters outside the scope of the of the IEG process, and for the decision-maker to adopt the same approach in relation to material not before the local decision-maker when making his decision.

Appellant's final submissions

  1. [69]
    Following from the mention on 15 April 2024, the Appellant was invited to file final submissions pertaining to matters relevant to the Appeal. The Appellant submits (in summary):
  • His IRR was lodged as agreed on 14th January 2024;
  • The decision-maker did not acknowledge the failure of the Respondent throughout the IEG process to meet required or reasonable timelines.
  • The decision-maker did not acknowledge procedural compliance failure, caused by not advising the Appellant until December 2023 of their reliance on the subject officer's statement provided in June 2023. Furthermore, no opportunity was provided to respond to this new information, which the Appellant considers is a denial of natural justice as outlined in the Directive.
  • In the IRR, the Appellant sought to provide an arguable case for review of the LAD and its conclusions about the alleged assault. This included an argument that there was insufficient evidence to form a view on the balance of probabilities that the subject officer's version of events was the preferred version. In particular, the Appellant submitted it was unlikely that his 'shocked and recoiled' reaction would have followed physical contact intended to be a "positive reassuring gesture." In the alternative, the Appellant puts that he could not have known what the intention of the physical contact was. He argues his version of the interaction,  being an unprovoked, unwanted and threatening interaction, is most likely to have occasioned his response.
  • In contrast, the Appellant submits the decision-maker provided no substantive reasons for accepting the subject officer's version, and made no reference to the Appellant's arguments at all. He contends that he has met his requirement to explain why he takes issue with the LAD, and states the decision-maker has not. He states the decision letter does not outline the action taken to review the LAD or provide reasons for simply upholding it.
  • The subject officer's behaviour should rise to the level of misconduct and be treated as such.
  1. [70]
    The submissions then raise in some detail an argument of apprehended bias in relation to Ms Prentice as the local decision-maker. This relates to the earlier submission of her recent appointment to the role, and includes an assertion that she could not have written the report and could not have made the decision. He extrapolates that she must have relied on biased departmental advice. He states:
  1. 22.The principal of Natural Justice requires that decision makers be "disinterested and unbiased adjudicators".
  2. 23.Ms. Prentice would necessarily have been reliant on the department's advice regarding the report; understandably, Ms. Prentice could not be expected to be familiar with Queensland Health, or its documents/procedures, including the IEG grievance process.
  3. 24.The concern here is that the report was not authored by Ms. Prentice, and hence is subject to the inherent bias of the department, which pervades all decision making within the Human Resource Unit of the organisation.
  4. 25.The Apprehension of Bias Principle may be applied here, the consideration being that the decision-maker could not have approached the task with a sufficient level of impartiality. The decision-maker certainly was not the author of the report, and it follows that the decisions made within the report were not her own, but the departments [sic.].

Supreme Court of Queensland Vega Vega V Hoyle et al SCQ/2015/111(142-152) [sic.]

  1. [71]
    The submissions conclude by listing a range of matters the Appellant states should have been considered by the decision-maker but were not.

Respondent's final submissions in reply

  1. [72]
    These submissions focus on the Appellant's final submissions regarding the alleged assault and the claim of apprehended bias.
  1. [73]
    The Respondent submits the purpose of the internal review was to determine whether it was open to the local action decision-maker to accept the subject officer's version of events. It is argued that Ms Prentice's findings were based on a clear and detailed rationale in preferring the subject officer's version of events over the Appellant's.
  1. [74]
    The Respondent submits that it was entirely cogent for Ms Prentice to accept the Appellant was 'shocked and recoiled' while also accepting the intentions of the subject officer were positive. They note Ms Prentice also makes clear the subject officer's conduct of placing her hands on the Appellant's shoulders was not acceptable, showed poor judgement and was a possible breach of clause 1.5 of the Code of Conduct. The action to be taken would be providing advice to the subject officer regarding the appropriateness of physical interactions with employees, and possible other actions not able to be disclosed for confidentiality reasons. The Respondent submits this was reasonable management action, and the decision-maker made clear in his review he found Ms Prentice's decisions to be fair and reasonable.
  1. [75]
    The Respondent completely rejects the Appellant's allegations of Ms Prentice being inherently biased. They state this is completely speculative, no evidence is provided, and those concerns have been raised for the first time in this appeal and should be disregarded as out of scope.
  1. [76]
    They indicate the Appellant had previously raised issues of bias in relation to the earlier delegate, due to his involvement in previous performance management processes. This objection was accepted and responded to by the Department, who nominated Ms Prentice as the new Delegate for the local action process. The Respondent notes that no such concern was raised about Ms Prentice at the time of or during the internal review. Further they state Ms Prentice was the appropriately senior local officer without any involvement in any of the previous incidents or processes able to fulfil the role of local decision-maker. The concerns regarding apprehended bias are therefore entirely without foundation.

Consideration

Scope of Commission's review

  1. [77]
    The decision appealed against is the internal review decision of Mr Sinclair. That decision arises from his consideration of the LAD at Stage 1, according to the requirements of the Directive and the Policy. As Pidgeon IC reasons in Whitson v State of Queensland:[8]
  1. [79]
    I understand Mr Whitson's submission that the appeal relates to both the local action decision and the internal review. I understand the point Mr Whitson makes is that any consideration of whether the internal review decision was fair and reasonable necessitates a consideration of the local action decision. The approach I am taking in considering this appeal is to focus on the decision under review, that being the internal review decision of Ms Borger. However, it is clear that in considering the internal review decision, it is necessary to have regards to Mr Craig's local action decision.
  1. [78]
    I agree with this approach, particularly as Ms Prentice has provided very detailed reasons for the conclusions she reaches in the LAD, which are substantially relied upon and endorsed by the decision-maker. The grounds for appeal traverse both the internal review decision and the underlying LAD, so I will also have regard to the latter in my consideration of those grounds. In doing so, I reiterate that this appeal is not a fresh hearing of the underlying complaints, or an opportunity to raise matters not within the scope of the IEG.
  1. [79]
    This brings me to my consideration of the stated grounds for appeal, listed above at [40].

Appeal Grounds

Bullying and Harassment

  1. [80]
    This ground seeks to create a nexus between the alleged assault and other actions taken by the Appellant's line manager including the PIP, to demonstrate a course of conduct designed to harass, intimidate, and have the Appellant removed from his position. It is asserted that the Appellant has proven that case.
  1. [81]
    In the LAD, Ms Prentice considers in detail the two core aspects or 'concerns' of the Appellant's original complaint, including the 'maladministered PIP process' and 'targeted malfeasance'. Concern 1 consists of ten various events and management processes which the Appellant saw as culminating in his removal from his position of supervising scientist. The course of conduct was preceded in the Appellant's view by the alleged assault occurring in March 2020, which is Concern 2 in the complaint.
  1. [82]
    The conclusions reached in the LAD on both core concerns in the IEG were matters raised by the Appellant in the IRR, along with an objection to certain matters relating to the disciplinary process being ruled out of scope.
  1. [83]
    Ms Prentice reviews each of the ten specific matters for Concern 1, and sets out clearly the particulars she relies on in relation to her assessment of the matters and why she makes each determination. This includes consideration of any response from the subject officer relevant to the particular matter. She concludes:

Based on the available information, I confirm that there is no evidence to support the concern that the above processes, including the positive performance management process, the PIP, other non-disciplinary processes and management actions were maladministered.

No evidence is available to support your concern that there was a targeted campaign by [the subject officer] or others to remove you from your position.

I have, on the balance of probabilities, identified no evidence of wrongdoing; I am of the view that neither [the subject officer] or any other manager has a case to answer regarding Concern 1. Therefore, I will not be taking any further action in relation to this concern.

  1. [84]
    It is worth noting that Ms Prentice also addressed that no evidence was provided by the Appellant to support that it was inappropriate for the subject officer to have conducted the PIP, given that at the time she was unaware of any allegation in relation to assault. This is consistent with the earlier determination of the Ethical Standards Unit reproduced at [25].
  1. [85]
    The decision-maker acknowledges broadly from the IRR that the Appellant is dissatisfied with some aspects of the LAD. He states generally in support of the outcome:

It is evident that all information was thoroughly considered, and that you were advised of the outcome in writing. Further Ms Prentice provided you with reasons for her decisions …and that it was appropriate for Ms Prentice to determine the action for resolution.

  1. [86]
    It is correct that, as the Appellant contends, the decision-maker is not fulsome in his consideration in the decision-letter. However, having regard to the LAD and the consideration and details provided by Ms Prentice as part of her decision related to Concern 1, I concur with the view of the decision-maker that those conclusions were fair and reasonable. On that basis, in relation to Concern 1, I do not agree with the appeal ground that the case for targeted malfeasance has been made out.
  1. [87]
    In the LAD in relation to Concern 2, Ms Prentice sets out clearly the particulars she relies on in relation to her assessment of the matters raised and why she makes each determination. This includes consideration of any response from the subject officer relevant to the particular matter.  She concludes:
  • You advised that [the subject officer] grabbed your shoulders. [The subject officer] states that she placed her hands on your shoulders.
  • [The subject officer] does not respond to the question of whether she "shook" you by the shoulders.
  • I accept your statement that you were "shocked" and that you "recoiled".
  • [The subject officer] reports that the contact was intended to be a "positive reassuring gesture". I accept this also, as I have no reason to believe otherwise.
  • I have taken into consideration the following:
  • the event is alleged to have taken place around three years ago;
  • there were no witnesses;
  • Mr Hale's file note relates to another interaction that took place two years later, was not witnessed, and cannot be regarded as circumstantial or corroborative;
  • your comments regarding [the subject officer's] motives are speculative. No evidence is provided that [the subject officer] wanted you removed from the workplace to protect herself from retribution, noting [the subject officer] did not know that you were intending to make a complaint about her at some point in the future;
  • your comments regarding [the subject officer] "assaulting" you because of her having a heightened anxiety regarding being infected with COVID-19 is entirely without substance; and
  • no evidence is provided to support your concern that [the subject officer] questioned your loyalty to her, which she denies. Following a review of the extensive material provided by you in support of your complaint, I find no evidence that [the subject officer] had any interest in loyalty of employees towards her. [The subject officer's] interests appear to be exclusively to the efficient and effective delivery of a service, and to the welfare of her employees, including you.
  • I do not accept [the subject officer's] comments that you have raised this concern against a background of a failed PIP that had been managed by [the subject officer] as being a reason for your complaint, because no evidence is provided to support this.

Accordingly, I find that on the balance of probabilities, whilst [the subject officer] placed her hands on your shoulders, there is no evidence to support a concern that she grabbed your shoulders, shook you, or queried your loyalty to her.

Making deliberate physical contact with another employee without their consent could be considered as not meeting a standard of conduct set out in the Code of Conduct … namely clause 1.5, which states:

…

In relation to Concern 2, I find [the subject officer's] actions (placing her hands on your shoulders) to have been poor judgement on her part. Accordingly, advice will be provided to [the subject officer] regarding the appropriateness of her physical interactions with employees. For confidentiality reasons, I am unable to provide you with specific detail of the actions taken.

  1. [88]
    The decision-maker outlines that Ms Prentice was required to determine whether it was more probable than not that the alleged assault occurred in the manner described by the Appellant.  The decision-maker refers approvingly to the reasoning outlined in the LAD for the conclusion that the subject officer's version of events was to be preferred. The decision-maker made this finding noting the lack of any witnesses, the delay of almost three years in the allegation first being raised, the lack of any disclosure to any other person contemporaneous to the alleged incident, and the nexus between the allegations made by the Appellant and other matters relevant to his employment.
  1. [89]
    The decision-maker reiterates the view of Ms Prentice that:

… To clarify, the decision maker concluded, it was possible that you may have been 'shocked and recoiled' due to [the subject officer] placing her hands on your shoulders, as this action is uncommon in a workplace setting, however the mere placing of hands on another employee's shoulders does not amount to the criminal definition of assault or misconduct as defined by the Public Sector Act 2022.

  1. [90]
    In submissions, the Appellant states there was insufficient evidence to form a view on the balance of probabilities that the subject officer's version of events was the preferred version. In particular, he points to the unlikelihood that his 'shocked and recoiled' reaction would have followed physical contact intended to be a "positive reassuring gesture." In the alternative, he submits he could not have known what the intention of the physical contact was. He argues his perception of the interaction as being unprovoked, unwanted and threatening is most likely to have occasioned his response. He rejects the Respondent's submission that it was entirely cogent for Ms Prentice; as endorsed by the decision-maker; to accept the Appellant was shocked and recoiled whilst also accepting the intentions of the subject officer were positive.
  1. [91]
    As noted by Dwyer IC in Hardy v State of Queensland:[9]
  1. [7]
    The IR Act provides that appeals are dealt with by way of review. That is to say, it is not a rehearing of the matter in the form of a hearing de novo. The word 'review' is not defined and accordingly it must take its meaning from the context in which it appears. The task of the Commission is to review the decision of Ms Wells to determine if it was fair and reasonable.
  2. [8]
    It follows that if the Commission considers a decision was reasonably open to the decision maker, then the decision ought not to be disturbed regardless of whether the Commissioner hearing the appeal would have decided the matter differently.
  1. [92]
    The Appellant's account of events and submissions are just one form of evidence, which a decision-maker is open to either accept or reject, provided that they give reasons which are fair and reasonable in the circumstances.
  1. [93]
    While Ms Prentice did not agree with the Appellant's account, she also did not entirely accept the account of the subject officer. It is clear that Ms Prentice, and by extension the decision-maker, carefully considered both accounts and weighed them against the available evidence in the circumstances. I also note the subject officer's assertion that Mr Jackson's complaint was raised in the background of a failed PIP was not accepted, and further that management action was proposed in response to the subject officer having made physical contact. This was also open to the local decision-maker to determine based on her findings. The decision was both reasonably open to the decision-maker on the evidence before him, and was a fair decision to make.
  1. [94]
    In relation to Concern 2, I do not agree with the appeal ground that the case of repeated unreasonable conduct and assault has been made out. This appeal ground is dismissed.

Denial of natural justice

  1. [95]
    This ground relates to an allegation of apprehended bias on the part of Ms Prentice based on her purported reliance on the biased advice from the Department.
  1. [96]
    In Attorney-General v Wood,[10] Davis J relevantly stated:

Legal principles

  1. [13]
    It is well-established that the test for determination of applications for disqualification and apprehended bias is an objective one:

"[whether] a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide."[11]

  1. [14]
    The application of the test is a two-part process. Firstly, "it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge … to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits". Secondly, there must be a logical connection between that matter and the feared departure from the judge deciding the case on its merits.
  1. [97]
    The rule against bias, actual or apprehended, is directed to prejudgment incapable of being altered by evidence or argument. It is not directed to predisposition capable of being swayed by evidence or argument. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng,[12] Gleeson CJ and Gummow J said:

"Decision-makers, including judicial decision-makers, sometimes approach their task with a tendency of mind, or predisposition, sometimes one that has been publicly expressed, without being accused or suspected of bias. The question is not whether a decision-maker's mind is blank; it is whether it is open to persuasion. …

Natural justice does not require the absence of any predisposition or inclination for or against an argument or conclusion."[13]

  1. [98]
    In this case, the Appellant's stated reason for the apprehension of bias is the assertion that Ms Prentice was too new to have authored or decided the LAD, and was obviously required to rely on the biased advice provided by the Department.  The decision letter does not address this concern as it has only been raised as a ground in the current proceedings.
  1. [99]
    The Respondent rejects this assertion and states that the time to raise concerns regarding apprehended bias was at the time of Ms Prentice's appointment as the local decision-maker, or during stage one of the grievance process, or as part of the concern leading to the IRR at Stage Two. The Respondent argues that previous allegations of bias were appropriately responded to so there was no reason for the concerns not to have been raised at the appropriate time. They submit raising bias in the external review phase of the internal review decision without any evidence is too late and should be ruled out of scope in this appeal.
  1. [100]
    I agree with the Respondent's submissions, but also consider the assertion of apprehended bias to be objectively unfair and somewhat paternalistic towards Ms Prentice, who has clearly engaged in some detail with the material provided by the Appellant, both before and during the Stage 1 process. It could also be reasonably argued that as a new appointee to the Executive Director Pathology role, Ms Prentice was best placed to bring a mind capable of persuasion based on an objective assessment of all the material before her, unencumbered by any previous involvement in the matters relevant to the grievance. There is no evidence before the Commission that Ms Prentice's newness meant she was incapable of reaching a decision other than on its legal and factual merits.
  1. [101]
    This appeal ground is dismissed.

Denial of procedural fairness

  1. [102]
    The Appellant received the LAD on 6 December 2023. By email dated 13 December, the Appellant had sought an extension of time to lodge an IRR from 20 December 2023 (14 days following receipt of the LAD) to 30 January 2024, due to family commitments and the holiday period. By email dated 22 December 2023, the decision-maker advises he agrees an extension should be given, however due to the restriction in the Directive being 14 days he could only reasonably approve an extension to 14 January 2024.  The Appellant is aggrieved the full extension was not granted, given that the Appellant provided his own agreement to several extensions during the IEG process, and the time taken to issue the LAD.
  1. [103]
    The Respondent acknowledges that the Appellant did grant several extensions to the Department as contemplated under Stage 1 of the Directive. In the LAD, Ms Prentice acknowledges the patience displayed by the Appellant in relation to the time taken to reach the decision. However, when it came to the request of the Appellant to extend the time available to him to lodge his IRR, it is explained that the IEG Directive does not provide any discretion to extend the time beyond 14 days, even if there is mutual agreement:[14]

9.2 Stage 2 – internal review

…

  1. (b)
    A request for internal review must:
  1. (i)
    be received by the chief executive within 14 days of the employee receiving a copy of the decision made through local action or a decision is taken to be made under clause 9.1(e)
  1. [104]
    Despite the restriction, the decision-maker did exercise discretion to extend the time to 14 January 2024. Documentation before the Commission suggests the Appellant may misunderstand that while there is the capacity in other parts of the IEG process for timeframes to be extended by mutual agreement, that is not the case in relation to the timeframe for an IRR to be lodged.
  1. [105]
    The decision to provide an extension in those circumstances is a positive action by the Department to afford the Appellant additional time to develop the IRR. While the Appellant considers it was still insufficient time, it was more than the Directive allowed. I agree that the comment in relation to the IRR process not being onerous was unnecessary and may have diminished the positive outcome of any extension having been granted.
  1. [106]
    As the requirements of the Directive were exceeded to the Appellant's benefit, procedural fairness was not denied. This appeal ground is dismissed.

Improper Stage 2 review response

  1. [107]
    The requirements for an internal review are as set out in the Directive as reproduced above at [50]. In essence, the purpose is to determine whether the LAD was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. This requires the decision-maker to consider if the decision was fair, considering the decision-making process and the principles of procedural fairness. It is also for the decision-maker to consider if it was reasonable based on an objective assessment of the decision in the context of the evidence and relevant circumstances of the case. The test is not whether the decision could have been undertaken in a manner that was fairer or reached a decision that was more reasonable, simply whether it was fair or reasonable in the circumstances. Processes and decisions do not need to be perfect or ideal to be considered fair and reasonable.[15]
  1. [108]
    The Directive requires that the decision should be made within 14 days of receipt of the IRR[16]  (which occurred in this case), the decision must be communicated in writing, and the decision also must:
  1. (i)
    outline the action taken to review the decision made through local action
  2. (ii)
    outline the reasons for the decision, or the decision to take no further action
  3. (iii)
    outline any action that the chief executive or delegate proposes to take, or will take, as a result of the internal review, and
  4. (iv)
    outline any avenues of external review that may be available to the employee, including any relevant timeframes.
  1. [109]
    The decision-maker indicates the action taken to review the LAD was to review and consider all the information available, including the issues which were raised through the review request that were both within scope of the IEG and were before the local decision-maker. The decision-maker then considered the conclusions reached by Ms Prentice relevant to the core concerns raised in the IRR. Through his support of the conclusions reached by Ms Prentice as being fair and reasonable, the decision-maker endorsed the basis of those conclusions and the evidence relied upon.
  1. [110]
    The Appellant states that the decision-maker has provided no reasons for accepting the subject officer's version of events and makes no reference to the arguments raised by him that support his version of events. Furthermore, the Appellant submits the decision letter does not outline actions taken to review the LAD, or reasons for "just agreeing to it."
  1. [111]
    The Respondent supports the process undertaken by the decision-maker in coming to his view that the decisions were fair and reasonable, and that the proposed action was appropriate and available to Ms Prentice to make.  They confirm it was appropriate for Ms Prentice to set aside information excluded under the Directive for consideration in an IEG, and for the decision-maker to also do so and exclude information not before the local decision-maker.
  1. [112]
    As indicated above in relation to my consideration of the Appellant's first appeal ground, I concur there is limited explanation contained within the decision letter, in part due to its reliance on the comprehensive response of Ms Prentice. While technically the decision-maker could have expanded on the explanation of his conclusions, I do not consider this to be a deficiency leading to any identified or actual disadvantage to the Appellant that would render the decision unfair.
  1. [113]
    As relevantly determined by Dwyer IC in McNeil v State of Queensland:[17] 
  1. [68]
    The function of the Commission is to review a decision to determine whether it is fair and reasonable. While a failure to comply with an applicable directive might have the capacity to render a decision unfair or unreasonable in a particular set of circumstances, it is equally true that it may only amount to a technical defect in the process that otherwise produces no unfairness. A failure to conform with a directive will not, of itself, render a decision unfair and unreasonable.
  1. [114]
    This appeal ground is dismissed.

Improper administration of dispute

  1. [115]
    The Appellant in submissions discusses the importance of procedural fairness and quotes part of an advice attributed to his Union:

'…In the context of an employee grievance, this requires that when material is obtained that may reasonably be considered…detrimental to an employee's interests, that employee is to be provided with access to the material as soon as practicable and given an opportunity to respond to such material. Material provided is to include the factual information to be examined and is to be in sufficient enough detail to enable the adequate preparation of a response." (IEG E12 page 8 and 9)

  1. [116]
    The failure to provide full details of the response made by the subject officer clearly relevant to the LAD is, the Appellant states, both a denial of natural justice and unfair and unreasonable. The confirmation of that decision by the decision-maker is also in the Appellant's submission unfair and unreasonable. Mr Jackson puts emphasis on it being unfair that the subject officer was provided full details of his complaints about her, but he was not afforded the same opportunity in relation to her response.
  1. [117]
    The Respondent contends there is no requirement under the Directive or Policy to share with a complainant the details of a subject employee's response. The Respondent notes that pursuant to cl 2.3 of the Policy, the subject of an employee grievance must be provided natural justice. The Respondent submits that the Appellant was the complainant and not the subject of the complaint. As the subject of the grievance, the subject officer was provided natural justice by being given an opportunity to respond to the Appellant's allegations. The Respondent notes the subject officer's response and all available information was considered by Ms Prentice.
  1. [118]
    The requirements of the Directive and Policy are relevant to this appeal ground. Clause 2.3 of the Policy provides that individual employee grievances must be managed:
  • in accordance with the principles of natural justice, including timely decisions and the provision of adequate reasons
  • in a manner that protects the privacy of the employee who has submitted the grievance and any persons named in the complaint, subject to any legal disclosure obligations such as the requirement to provide natural justice to the subject of the grievance; and
  • in accordance with the relevant individual employee grievance process in Attachment One or Attachment Two.
  1. [119]
    The IEG process requires that the subject officer of a complaint be afforded the opportunity to respond. This should have been obvious to the Appellant, who was advised the next steps would be taken in accordance with HR Policy E12.[18] I concur that there is nothing in the Directive or Policy that requires the provision of full statements from subjects officers or witnesses in the process. It was appropriate in this case, where the subject officer in her response was impugning the motives of the Appellant regarding the alleged assault. This statement was provided to the Appellant, and he was afforded the opportunity to respond – which he did. Further, in the LAD, it was made clear which parts of the subject officer's response were considered relevant, with an explanation as to how the evidence was balanced in coming to the findings.
  1. [120]
    The process adopted and the decision reached at the local level, endorsed at the internal review level, were consistent with the requirements of natural justice required under the Policy. The Appellant outlined the details of his complaints against the subject officer, and the subject officer was afforded the opportunity to respond. The parts of the response considered detrimental to the Appellant as opposed to providing an alternate view of alleged facts were provided to the Appellant to respond. That response was weighed against the subject officer's assertion, and the assertion was not substantiated.
  1. [121]
    This appeal ground is dismissed.

Malfeasance in line manager's role

  1. [122]
    My determination in relation to my consideration of the first appeal ground is relevant here. I concluded it was reasonable for Ms Prentice, endorsed by the decision-maker, to form the view that the PIP process was not evidence of targeted malfeasance by the subject officer.
  1. [123]
    Mitigating factors in relation to the PIP and any resulting disciplinary process are matters outside the scope of the internal review.
  1. [124]
    This appeal ground is dismissed.

Conclusion on the substantive appeal

  1. [125]
    For the reasons outlined above, I find that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to confirm the decisions of Ms Prentice at Stage 1 of the IEG in the circumstances. The decision appealed against is confirmed.
  1. [126]
    I will now turn to my decision on suppression.

Suppression

  1. [127]
    On 26 March 2024, the Respondent filed an application in proceedings for suppression of the personal details of the Appellant's line manager, who I have referred to as 'the subject officer' or 'the line manager' throughout this decision. In its application, the Respondent noted that:
  • The Respondent reviewed the Appellant's grievance against the subject officer and found it was not substantiated. This was upheld on the IEG review decision subject to this appeal.
  • The subject officer is not party to the appeal.
  • The facts of the matter do not turn on the subject officer's involvement in the IEG.
  • A decision to suppress the subject officer's identity does not impact on the principles of open justice, whereas a decision not to suppress would be prejudicial to the subject officer, her wellbeing, and her future career prospects if the details of the unsubstantiated past grievances were published; particularly considering the actions subject to the IEG are four years old at the time of this appeal.
  1. [128]
    The general powers of the QIRC are set out in s 451 of the IR Act, providing the Commission with the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions, including making orders it considers appropriate.
  1. [129]
    Rule 97(3) of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) further provides the Commission with a power to de-identify judgments or redact information before publication where the Commission considers it appropriate in the public interest or for another reason, and the modification of the document does not affect the essence of the document.
  1. [130]
    In Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd ('ARBTU v Aurizon'),[19] O'Connor VP considered an application for the names of individual workers to be de-identified. O'Connor VP held:[20]
  1. [40]
    The starting point in considering an application to suppress or to withhold names of witnesses or parties is a fundamental principle of open justice; 'that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done'. This is a central feature of the administration of justice under the common law.
  2. [41]
    The open justice principle operates not only as an overarching principle guiding judicial decision-making and various aspects of procedure, it also gives rise to a number of substantive open justice rules that, in the usual course of events, a court must follow. Such rules include: first, that judicial proceedings are conducted, and decisions pronounced, in 'open court'; second, that evidence is communicated publicly to those present in the court; and third, that nothing should be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings, including by the media.
  3. [42]
    However, the rules to which the open justice principle gives rise are not absolute. Whilst the principles of open justice will usually require the publication of the names of those involved in the proceedings, there are numerous statutory exceptions.
  4. [43]
    The Commission has the power to de-identify judgments and redact information from judgments if there is a good reason to do so. Rule 97 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) recognises that power.

…

  1. [44]
    It is accepted that the discretion to anonymise a decision might be exercised in favour of not identifying persons who are the victim of sexual assault or discrimination, children, or persons whose private financial affairs are relevant to a decision. It is also accepted that the discretion may be exercised in circumstances where it is necessary to avoid prejudice to the administration of justice in particular proceedings or to avoid some other relevant harm.
  2. [45]
    In my opinion, the application to withhold the names of the two workers can be best explained on the basis that in the absence of a restriction on publicity, damage will be caused to the individuals to such an extent and of such a kind as requiring some relief, in the interests of justice.
  3. [46]
    As was observed by Mahoney J in John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v The Local Court of New South Wales, these are the 'unacceptable' consequences that sometimes arise in litigation. Of course, as observed by Pincus JA in J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2), 'there is a balancing exercise involved, with an initial heavy weighting in favour of publicity – an exercise involving considerations of fairness'.
  1. [131]
    O'Connor VP's observation in ARBTU v Aurizon that the discretion to anonymise may be exercised to 'avoid prejudice to the administration of justice in particular proceedings or to avoid some other relevant harm'[21] is particularly relevant. Mere embarrassment, inconvenience or annoyance will not suffice to ground an application for suppression or non-publication.[22]
  1. [132]
    More recently, the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission noted in Santos WA Energy Ltd v Darren Whittaker:[23]
  1. [31]
    We mentioned earlier that while the principle of open justice and the administration of justice are clearly relevant … the consideration are not applied in a vacuum. The statutory context is one consideration but there are others. For example, the significance that might attach to the consideration may be relevantly assessed by reference to the identity of the person, the extent to which the person is to be involved in the proceeding, or the nature of the interest that is to be protected by the orders sought. It is to be remembered that it is the parties to a proceeding which subject themselves to the open justice by bringing or defending the proceeding, rather than avoid that consequence by choosing to litigate their disputes by private arbitration. However, not all who are otherwise involved or who might be mentioned in litigation can do so – witnesses who will give evidence and persons who are unwilling to give evidence but whose allegations may be agitated in the litigation come to mind. The weight of the principle of open justice on the question [of] whether it is desirable to make an order protecting the identity of a person who will be mentioned in proceedings but who refuses and is not compelled to participate in them, take[s] on a different complexion when it is understood that such a person did not opt to subject themselves to the litigation process nor the open and transparent processes involved in open court or before a tribunal conducted publicly.
  1. [133]
    Parties were directed to file submissions after the mention on 15 April 2024 in relation to the Respondent's application within proceedings for suppression.

Respondent's submissions

  1. [134]
    The Respondent submits the order should be granted on the basis that the subject officer has no substantiated allegations against her and she is not a party or witness in relation to this appeal. Suppressing her identity would have no prejudicial impact in determining of the appeal that relates to the outcome of the internal review of the local action decision, whereas the potential prejudice to the line manager in terms of her reputation, future career prospects and psychological wellbeing could be significant.
  1. [135]
    The Respondent seeks an order for suppression of the line manager's name in the published decision of this appeal and from filed documents including the parties' submissions.

Appellant's Submissions

  1. [136]
    The Appellant submits that justice should be public. Suppression orders are only granted under exceptional circumstances and the Respondent carries the onus to demonstrate those exceptional circumstances exist and are sufficient to set aside well-established principles of open justice. Those exceptional circumstances do not include merely to save a party or witness from loss of privacy, embarrassment, distress, financial loss, or other collateral disadvantage.
  1. [137]
    The Appellant notes the Respondent submission that the subject officer is not a party or witness in this matter, is not represented and has no substantiated allegations against her. He counters that the subject officer's name appears twelve times in the decision letter subject to the appeal in a manner that is material and that she is ably 'represented' in these proceedings by the Respondent. The Appellant seeks that the application for suppression is dismissed.

Consideration and conclusion on the suppression application

  1. [138]
    This appeal relates to the decision at IEG Stage 2 internal review, to uphold the findings at Stage 1 that the allegations made by the Appellant of maladministration, malfeasance, and assault by his line manager were not substantiated. I have confirmed the internal review decision as fair and reasonable, dismissing the appeal.
  1. [139]
    The line manager is not a witness or a party to this proceeding, and despite the Appellant's submissions to the contrary, she is not represented. She is the subject officer in a complaint made by the Appellant, including an allegation of assault that was considered to be a PID, and referred back to the agency to consider as part of an IEG process. In these processes, confidentiality of subject officers is required to be protected. The allegations against the line manager have not been substantiated.
  1. [140]
    In considering this matter I note the views of O'Connor VP above, that the discretion may be exercised in circumstances where it is necessary to avoid relevant harm. I also note the recent views of the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission above, in remembering that it is the parties to the proceeding which subject themselves to the open justice principle by bringing or defending the proceeding.
  1. [141]
    I accept there may be relevant harm to the subject officer if in these proceedings the details of unsubstantiated allegations are published in a manner that identifies her, in circumstances where she has had no opportunity to respond. I do not agree that the number of times her name appears in the decision letter; given she is the subject officer of the IEG; is relevant to my determination. I am satisfied that the de-identification of the subject officer does not impede the capacity of the decision to be understood, and is not inconsistent with the principles of open justice.
  1. [142]
    I order accordingly.

Orders

  1. Pursuant to section 562C(1)(a) Industrial Relations Act 2016 the decision appealed against is confirmed.
  2. The application for suppression of the Appellant's line manager's name in the decision and filed material relating to PSA/2024/24 is granted.

Footnotes

[1] The Respondent clarified this matter in their submissions. The Appellant is subject to a separate discipline process that commenced on 19 January 2023. That process was delayed by the subsequent lodgement of an Internal Employee Grievance by the Appellant on 4 April 2023. The Appellant cannot appeal a decision to commence a disciplinary process: Hutchison v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 317. These matters also cannot be the subject of an IEG per cl 6.1(b) of the PSC IEG Directive and cl 2.2 of the Queensland Health Policy E12 Individual Employee Grievances.

[2] Transcript of mention dated 15 April 2024, p 1-5 line 48 – 1-6 line 16.

[3] This was explained to the Appellant during the mention: Transcript of mention dated 15 April 2024, p 1-10 lines 30-38.

[4] This appears to be a reference to cl 1.1 of the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service (1 January 2011).

[5] The decision letter mistakenly dates the IRR as 15 January 2024.

[6] Mr Jackson's complaint, after being referred from the ESU back to QHPaSS, was treated as a grievance.

[7] Mr Lawrence was the first local decision maker allocated to the stage 1 IEG. Following concerns regarding bias he was removed and replaced by Ms Prentice.

[8] Whitson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 202.

[9] Hardy v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2022] QIRC 480. Citations omitted. See also Ruberry v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 3, at [51].

[10] Attorney-General v Wood [2023] QSC 78.

[11] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6]. Note Kiefel CJ and Gageler J in GYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 97 ALJR 419 at [37]-[38] adopt the Ebner test, referring to it as a "double might" test.

[12] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507.

[13] Ibid at 531-532.

[14] Emphasis added.

[15] Cunningham v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 161 at [31].

[16] Unless extended by mutual agreement, as provided by cl 9.1(d)(i).

[17] McNeil v State of Queensland (Electoral Commission of Queensland) [2023] QIRC 308. See also Ehrlich v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 209, at [23].

[18] Noted above at [28].

[19] Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263 ('ARBTU v Aurizon').

[20] Citations omitted, original emphasis.

[21] Ibid at [44].

[22] Keyzer v La Trobe University [2019] FCA 646, [29]; Neil v Lee (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 149, [22]-[23].

[23] Santos WA Energy Ltd v Darren Whittaker [2024] FWCFB 231. Citations omitted, emphasis added.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Jackson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Jackson v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 222

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Caddie IC

  • Date:

    06 Sep 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Attorney-General v Wood [2023] QSC 78
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QSC 78
Cite 2 - [2023] QSC 78
Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees v Aurizon Operations Ltd [2021] QIRC 263
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 263
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 263
Cunningham v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 161
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 161
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 161
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 205 CLR 337
Cite 2 - (2000) 205 CLR 337
Ehrlich v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2024] QIRC 209
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 209
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 209
Hardy v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2022] QIRC 480
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 480
Hutchison v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 317
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 317
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 317
McNeil v State of Queensland (Electoral Commission of Queensland) [2023] QIRC 308
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 308
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 308
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] HCA 17
Cite 2 - [2001] HCA 17
Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 205 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (2001) 205 CLR 507
Neil v Lee (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 149
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 149
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 149
QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] HCA 15
Cite 2 - [2023] HCA 15
QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2023) 97 ALJR 419
Cite 2 - (2023) 97 ALJR 419
Ruberry v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 3
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 3
Whitson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 202
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 202

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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