Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2)
[2024] QIRC 240
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- Unreported Judgment
- Appeal Discontinued (QCA)
- Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2)[2024] QIRC 240
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Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2)[2024] QIRC 240
Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2)[2024] QIRC 240
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: | Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council (No.2) [2024] QIRC 240 |
PARTIES: | Mutonhori, Simon Applicant v Mount Isa City Council Respondent |
CASE NO: | GP/2024/20 |
PROCEEDING: | Application for extension of time |
DELIVERED ON: | 4 October 2024 |
MEMBER: | Pratt IC |
HEARD AT: | On the papers |
ORDER: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | INDUSTRIAL LAW – GENERAL PROTECTIONS – EXTENSION OF TIME – where applicant was a manager employed by the respondent – where applicant made bullying allegations – where applicant suspended by respondent – where respondent advised the applicant there were allegations of misconduct against him – where the respondent substantiated the allegations against the applicant – where respondent dismissed applicant – where applicant alleges the suspension and the dismissal were each a breach of general protections – where application relating to the dismissal was filed prima facie out-of-time – consideration of extension of time under section 310 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) – whether pursuing other remedies in different proceedings, filing incorrectly, a respondent defending its position or being unaware of the law are exceptional circumstances regarding whether to extend time – where applicant also alleges representative error – held, no representative error and no exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time – application to extend time for the dismissal component of the claim refused. |
LEGISLATION: | Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 285(1)(a)(ii), s 310, pt 1 ch 8 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 366(2) |
CASES: | Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Christine Smith v Express Excavation QLD Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 2436 Clark v Ringwood Private Hospital (1997) 74 IR 413 Davidson v Aboriginal and Islander Child Care Agency (1998) 105 IR 1 Dickson v Mornington Shire Council [2020] QIRC 106 Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 89 Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [2007] FCA 388 Long v Keolis Downer [2018] FWCFB 4109 Naidoo v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2024] QIRC 134 Nichols v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) [2023] QIRC 182 Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975 Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 2728 Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd (t/as Richmond Oysters) [2018] FWCFB 901 Thornton v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2020] QIRC 393 |
Reasons for Decision
- [1]This is an application for an extension of time for the filing of the substantive matter by Mr Mutonhori ('Applicant'), who was employed as Manager, Environment, Regulatory Services and Land Use with the Mount Isa City Council ('Respondent'). The Applicant was suspended and was then dismissed from that position. He subsequently filed proceedings alleging various breaches of the general protections provisions contained within Part 1 of Chapter 8 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('IR Act').
- [2]The application was filed on 24 May 2024. The dismissal took effect on 20 December 2023. Section 310(1)(a) of the IR Act relevantly provides that applications of this nature must be filed within 21 days after the dismissal took effect. Not counting the day of the dismissal itself,[1] the application needed to be filed on or before 10 January 2024 if it was to be filed within the prescribed time limit. The application was filed on 24 May 2024, which is 134 days outside of the prescribed time limit. The Respondent opposes the granting of extra time.
Relevant background
- [3]The essence of the Applicant's claim is that his suspension and dismissal were each carried out because of complaints that he made about being bullied. I surmise the Applicant alleges that those complaints were the exercise of workplace rights pursuant to the IR Act, and that his suspension and dismissal therefore contravened section 285(1)(a)(ii) of the IR Act.
- [4]The Applicant commenced working for the Respondent after signing a contract on 7 July 2023. On or around 8 November 2023, the Applicant complained that he had been bullied in the workplace. The complaints, broadly speaking, can be summarised as challenging the policy concerning the recruitment of staff, questioning management enquiries of staff working with the Applicant about the Applicant's conduct, alleging unreasonable demands to produce a comprehensive report in a short timeframe despite having a heavy workload, alleging mishandling by the Respondent of a disciplinary process initiated by the Applicant against another employee and alleging that management was not supporting the Applicant's work.
- [5]On 15 November 2023, the Respondent instructed the Applicant to undertake alternative work while it investigated his complaints. At that stage, the Applicant was advised that there were some allegations made against him, which would be elaborated on in the coming days. The Applicant declined to undertake alternative work and, on 16 November 2023, the Respondent advised the Applicant by letter that he would be stood down until the completion of an investigation into his complaints because he declined to undertake the alternative work.
- [6]On 17 November 2023, the Respondent wrote to the Applicant inviting him to show cause in relation to allegations which can be broadly summarised as:
- Allegation One – directing staff to disregard practices that they are required to follow by legislation, personally disregarding duties and responsibilities of the Applicant's position and engaging in bullying behaviour. Examples of such instances included directing staff to abandon the use of a particular form for certifying compliant asbestos management, several times directing an employee to euthanise animals with a firearm knowing that the employee was not licenced to do so and that doing so was in contravention of legislation and a Workplace Health and Safety Queensland Prohibition Notice regarding the same, incorrectly dealing with the execution of a lease and being dismissive of concerns regarding same and stating in a discussion about limits to his authority that he had authority to do what he liked;
- Allegation Two – engaging in bullying, the particulars of which were, in summary, pressuring staff to not impound cats and dogs, but rather, to classify them as "feral" animals so they could be euthanised immediately, instructing employees to shoot impounded animals and becoming agitated when they refused on the basis of stating that it was unlawful to do so unlicensed, making snide remarks about an employee's age and yelling aggressively at an employee causing significant distress;
- Allegation Three – refusing to follow reasonable directions from management, the particulars of which can be summarised as responding to a request to report on an animal management facility by saying that doing so was a waste of time, that the Applicant was not there to pander to the person requesting the report and refusing to provide another report regarding local laws;
- Allegation Four – attempting to procure a firearm to unlawfully euthanise impounded animals, the particulars of which can be summarised as texting an employee seeking that he provide his firearm to another council employee in order for that other employee to euthanise animals where that other employee was not appropriately licensed, had not been trained appropriately and no risk assessment had been carried out;
- Allegation Five – soliciting unlicensed individuals to euthanise impounded animals, the particulars of which can be summarised as directing an employee to euthanise animals on 13 October 2023 and expressing disappointment with that employee when he refused and, on 14 October 2023, directing another employee to euthanise dogs and cats where that employee was not licensed to do so and in circumstances where the Applicant was alleged to have described it as a "covert operation" and requested that employee not tell senior management;
- Allegation Six – euthanising animals in breach of the relevant procedures and legislation, the particulars of which can be summarised as having euthanised animals over the weekend of 14 and 15 October 2023 in breach of the Biosecurity Act 2014;
- Allegation Seven – unreasonable management action taken by the Applicant against a particular employee, the particulars of which can be summarised as reprimanding in a threatening and aggressive manner an employee for statements that the employee made at a team meeting regarding the correct procedure for dealing with impounded animals.
- [7]On 26 November 2023, the Applicant responded to the allegations, denying them and arguing that they were frivolous, vexatious and lacked merit and substance. On 30 November 2023, the Applicant filed an industrial dispute with the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission ('Commission') that did not resolve the issues in dispute.
- [8]On 20 December 2023, the Applicant was dismissed by way of a letter, which set out findings as to the abovementioned allegations. In summary, the bulk of the allegations were found to be substantiated. It was on that basis that the Respondent summarily dismissed the Applicant.
- [9]On 21 December 2023 the Applicant filed an application in the Commission seeking reinstatement. On 10 January 2024, the Applicant filed an application in an existing proceeding seeking interlocutory orders staying his dismissal and reinstating him. That application was refused.[2] A conciliation conference that was carried out for this matter but the matter did not resolve.
Issue
- [10]The relevant issue immediately before the Commission is whether time to file the proceedings should be extended pursuant to section 310(2) of the IR Act.
Relevant law
- [11]Section 310 of the IR Act says:
310Time for application
- (1)An application relating to dismissal must be made within—
- (a)21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
- (b)if the commission allows a further period under subsection (2) —the further period.
- (2)The commission may allow a further period if the commission is satisfied there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account—
- (a)the reason for the delay; and
- (b)any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
- (c)prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
- (d)the merits of the application; and
- (e)fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.
- (3)An application relating to a contravention of this part (other than dismissal) must be made within 6 years after the contravention occurs.
- [12]In Nichols v State of Queensland (Department of Transport and Main Roads) ('Nichols'),[3] his Honour, Deputy President Merrell, considered an application under section 310 of the IR Act where the application was filed 62 days out of time. His Honour referred to judgements falling from consideration of section 366(2) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which was virtually identical to section 310 of the IR Act.[4] His Honour observed that in Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd t/as Richmond Oysters,[5] a full bench cited favourably the observations of another full bench in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd ('Nulty')[6] as follows:
- [13]In summary, the expression "exceptional circumstances" has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe "exceptional circumstances" as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural "circumstances" as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of "exceptional circumstances" includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.
- [14]Mere ignorance of the statutory time limit in s 366(1)(a) is not an exceptional circumstance.
- [13]The Full Bench in Nulty cited and followed the observations of his Honour, Justice Rares, in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295:[7]
- [26]Exceptional circumstances ... can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. Thus, the sun and moon appear in the sky everyday and there is nothing exceptional about seeing them both simultaneously during day time. But an eclipse, whether lunar or solar, is exceptional, even though it can be predicted, because it is outside the usual course of events.
- [27]It is not correct to construe "exceptional circumstances" as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural "circumstances" as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of "exceptional circumstances" in s 106KA(2) includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon. And, the section is directed to the circumstances of the actual practitioner, not a hypothetical being, when he or she initiates or renders the services.
- [14]In Nichols, his Honour, Merrell DP, concluded that the Commission must be satisfied there are exceptional circumstances having regard to all of the circumstances of the given case and the considerations set out in section 310(2) of the IR Act.[8] His Honour also observed that it is a high hurdle to demonstrate 'exceptional circumstances'[9] and that even where exceptional circumstances are established, the power to extend time is still discretionary.[10]
- [15]The Applicant has raised representative error in this case, arguing that the advice he received did not disclose to him the limitation period. In Dickson v Mornington Shire Council ('Dickson'),[11] Industrial Commissioner Dwyer considered an extension of time claim under section 310 of the IR Act. Dwyer IC reviewed a line of authorities focused on whether representative error constituted an acceptable explanation for a delay in filing proceedings within the prescribed limitation period and set out his analysis at [33] (emphasis in original):
- [33]Representative error was considered by a Fair Work Commission Full Bench in Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd:[12]
- [24]The approach to representative error as an acceptable explanation for late lodgement has been considered by Full Benches of Fair Work Australia and its predecessors in the context of various Acts. The approach followed was first set out by a Full Bench in Clark's Case in the context of the exercise of a discretion to extend time under s. 170CE(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the WR Act). It was followed by a Full Bench in Davidson's Case in relation to s. 170CFA(8) of the WR Act. More recently, a majority of the Full Bench in McConnell's Case found that the approach remained apposite to the exercise of the discretion in s. 366(2) of the Act. We too think that the approach in Clark's Case provides appropriate guidance for consideration of representative error in the context of the exercise of the discretion within s. 366(2) of the Act. We think that representative error, in circumstances where the applicant was blameless, would constitute exceptional circumstances under s. 366(2), subject to consideration of the statutory considerations in ss. 366(2)(b) to (e) of the Act.
- [25]The approach in Clark's Case was summarised in Davidson's Case as follows:
'In Clark the Commission decided that the following general propositions should be taken into account in determining whether or not representative error constitutes an acceptable explanation for delay:
- Depending on the particular circumstances, representative error may be a sufficient reason to extend the time within which an application for relief is to be lodged.
- A distinction should be drawn between delay properly apportioned to an applicant's representative where the applicant is blameless and delay occasioned by the conduct of the applicant.
- The conduct of the applicant is a central consideration in deciding whether representative error provides an acceptable explanation for the delay in filing the application. For example it would generally not be unfair to refuse to accept an application which is some months out of time in circumstances where the applicant left the matter in the hands of their representative and took no steps to inquire as to the status of their claim. A different situation exists where an applicant gives clear instructions to their representative to lodge an application and the representative fails to carry out those instructions, through no fault of the applicant and despite the applicant's efforts to ensure that the claim is lodged.
- Error by an applicant's representatives is only one of a number of factors to be considered in deciding whether or not an out of time application should be accepted.'
- [34]I agree with the comments of the Full Bench in Robinson that representative error, where a litigant is blameless, would likely constitute an exceptional circumstance. The pivotal consideration in those circumstances will be the actions or inactions (as the case may be) of the litigant.
- [16]In Thornton v State of Queensland (Queensland Health),[13] Industrial Commissioner Hartigan, as her Honour then was, determined to deny an application for an extension of time in a case where the application was filed 36 days late. Hartigan IC held that following alternative avenues for redress was not a reasonable explanation for the delay.[14]
The parties' submissions
- [17]The Applicant submits that he has consistently challenged his dismissal and diligently pursued his grievances during the period of time where the limitation period was running. The Applicant says that there were several reasons for the delay. There was the abovementioned proceedings, the Respondent's conduct during them and a combination of not being able to afford to obtain legal advice and deficient legal advice. The Applicant submits that he diligently pursued his rights in good faith but that the Respondent "refused to engage in good faith by unhelpfully adopting pedantic and overly technical approach to all my previous applications". The Applicant argues that the Respondent "chose to overly use legal technicalities to avoid justice through jurisdictional objections at each and every stage of this matter", which is said to be at odds with the model litigant duty and principles of natural justice.
- [18]The Applicant also argues that there is a representative error behind why he filed the application so late. He says that he paid $550 for a 15-minute consultation with a lawyer "… in which [the lawyer] failed to give me any meaningful advice because he came unprepared". I construe that submission to be one where the Applicant claims fault lies with the lawyer because the lawyer did not provide fulsome advice in the form of the relevant limitation periods and that the Applicant is therefore blameless in the delay.
- [19]The Respondent rejects those submissions and points out that there were three separate proceedings commenced by the Applicant. Relying on Naidoo v Scenic Rim Regional Council,[15] the Respondent argues that the Commission rejected an application for extra time when it was 13 days out of time in similar circumstances where the applicant had incorrectly commenced proceedings with the Fair Work Commission and not the Commission. The Respondent argues that filing incorrectly, or in the wrong jurisdiction, or simply being unaware of the law is not an exceptional circumstance such that warrants the exercise of the discretion to grant extra time.[16]
- [20]The Applicant argues that there is no prejudice to the Respondent because it has already defended similar claims in different proceedings, but that there is prejudice to the Applicant because he would not be able to run his case and so there would be a real risk of a miscarriage of justice. The Respondent argues that it is entitled to rely on the limitation period set by Parliament to arrange its affairs accordingly.[17] The Respondent also argues that the delay has caused further prejudice to it because it has since filled the Applicant's role on the basis that keeping that position open conflicts with the Respondent's obligations as a local government.
- [21]The Respondent argues that the Applicant must show some merit in the substantive matter and has failed to do so.[18] The Respondent points out that contrary to the Applicant's assertions, he was provided notice of the allegations against him and the scope of the investigation, was invited to arrange contact with any witnesses relevant to the investigation, was given an opportunity to respond to the allegations and did so, was clearly dismissed because of the finding that he engaged in the relevant conduct as set out in the termination letter. The Respondent argues that the Applicant has failed to show that there was anything other than those reasons for the dismissal, let alone an unlawful reason.
- [22]The Applicant argues that his matter has strong merit. He bases that argument upon the allegation that his suspension and the dismissal were for raising a complaint against his supervisor, which was never investigated. The Applicant argues that he was not provided with an explanation as to why the matter has not been investigated and surmises that that constitutes a basis for alleging an unlawful reason behind all of the impugned conduct. The Applicant also argues that there was no procedural unfairness, as he alleges that the Respondent kept him unaware of key parts of the disciplinary process, and that the allegations against him were vexatious and frivolous.
- [23]As to fairness between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position, the Applicant argues that a holistic approach needs to be taken in determining fairness. He argues that granting an extension would not create a precedent or unfairness to employers in a similar position, that he gained no forensic advantage from the delay and that it was not deliberate or negligent on his part. The Respondent argues that there are no matters of fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position. As I understand this submission, the Respondent is arguing that this is a neutral consideration rather than one which swings the scales in favour of, or against, exercising the discretion.
Consideration
- [24]There are two distinct acts that the Applicant alleges constitute adverse action: his suspension on 16 November 2023, and his dismissal on 20 December 2023. As is plainly laid out in section 310(3) of the IR Act, the limitation period is 6 years for an application relating to adverse action taken in contravention of section 285 where that adverse action is not a dismissal. The Applicant had 6 years from 16 November 2023 to file an application alleging that the Respondent took adverse action in contravention of section 285 by suspending him. The application is therefore plainly within time insofar as it relates to whether the Respondent took adverse action in contravention of section 285 by suspending the Applicant. However, as noted above, a general protections application relating to dismissal must be filed within 21 days of the dismissal taking effect.
- [25]I accept that filing in the wrong jurisdiction or pursuing remedies elsewhere, misunderstanding the nature of the remedies available to the Applicant when filing the above-mentioned matters, or not knowing there is a limitation period, do not constitute "exceptional circumstances" that would warrant the exercise of the discretion in this case. I have had regard to the authorities referred to by the Respondent and I follow the same approach set out in those cases I have mentioned above on this issue. The pursuit of alternative proceedings by the Applicant, to the extent that doing so caused the Applicant to delay filing these proceedings, does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Nor does the Respondent exercising its right to take up a defence. That is did so in those other proceedings is irrelevant to this issue in my view.
- [26]As to the representative error argument, I have had regard to the solicitor's cost agreement that the Applicant has attached to his materials. I note that the date of that cost agreement is 16 November 2023. The dismissal was issued on 20 December 2023. I note also that the solicitor's cost agreement defines the scope of work as "advise and assist you in relation to your workplace investigation, with a view to preparing correspondence to be sent to Mount Isa City Council."
- [27]On the evidence, it is clear to me that the solicitor engaged by the Applicant, was engaged for the sole purpose of giving one 15-minute advice session as the Applicant described it. That was confined to advising on correspondence relating to the above-mentioned investigation, not these proceedings or the dismissal that inspired them. Indeed, the brief engagement predates the dismissal. I therefore find that the services provided by the solicitor were not such that the solicitor could be described as the Applicant's "representative" in these proceedings. By the time of the dismissal, the very brief engagement of the solicitor had ended and the solicitor was no longer acting for the Applicant. On the Applicant's own evidence, I find that there was no representative acting for the Applicant at the time of his dismissal or during the period of time that the limitation period ran its course. That finding is fatal to the argument of representative error. It cannot be accepted that the Applicant was entirely blameless for the delay. This is a long way from being one of those cases where the applicant put their matter in the hands of a solicitor or other representative who, whilst holding those instructions, failed to advise on or file the proceedings within the relevant time limit. The Applicant's submission regarding representative error must be rejected.
- [28]As to merit, it is impossible from this early vantage point to form a view that the Applicant's case is so lacking in merit as the Respondent suggests that it is devoid of prospects. Certainly, if the Respondent's assertions come up to proof at trial, the application is doomed to fail. But that all rests on findings of fact. For example, it is a question of fact as to whether the real reason for the dismissal substantially included proscribed reasons and therefore contravened the general protections within the IR Act. Findings of the relevant facts can only occur after hearing all of the evidence. Only then can there be a determination as to whether the Respondent has discharged what is commonly referred to as the "reverse onus of proof" at section 306 of the IR Act. Not being able to form a view as to the matter's prospects, I find this to be a neutral consideration.
- [29]I cannot accept the Applicant's submissions as to taking a holistic view of the fairness as between the Applicant and others in similar cases. The test to be applied is whether it would be unfair to persons in a similar position to the Applicant who have had their applications for extension of time refused. As the Respondent has pointed out, there are many instances where applicants have misunderstood which jurisdiction to file in, or not appreciated the time limitation period, or the nuances of the law around what they should allege and where they should file their claim. Those applicants had their applications for extra time refused in similar circumstances to the Applicant. It would be unfair to those applicants to allow extra time in this case where their applications were refused in similar circumstances. Accordingly, this part of the Applicant's submissions must be rejected.
Conclusion
- [30]The application as it relates to the suspension is within time. However, as it relates to the dismissal, the blame for this application being filed outside of the statutory time limit lies entirely with the Applicant. There was no representative error. Pursuing alternative avenues for remedy is not an exceptional circumstance that warrants extending time. Nor is not knowing of the limitation period itself. Nor is a respondent taking up its right to a defence in proceedings pursued by an applicant other than the proceeding that is the subject of an application for an extension of time. The Applicant has failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances exist in this case. There is obvious prejudice to the Applicant in refusing an extension of time. Against that needs to be weighed the clear intention of Parliament to impose the limitation period, upon which potential respondents are entitled to rely and manage their affairs accordingly. Whilst I cannot form a view as to merit of the claim, this is a case where it is clear that it would be unfair to extend time where others in similar circumstances have had such applications refused. Weighing up all of those considerations, and for the foregoing reasons, I am not persuaded that this is an appropriate case to exercise the discretion to extend time. On that basis, I order that the application for an extension of time, as it relates to the dismissal, is refused. I order accordingly.
Order
- The application for an extension of time to file that part of the application that relates to dismissal is refused.
- That part of the application that relates to dismissal is dismissed.
- That part of the application that relates to suspension from duties may proceed to further directions.
Footnotes
[1]Acts Interpretation Act 1954, s 38(1).
[2]Mutonhori v Mount Isa City Council [2024] QIRC 41.
[3][2023] QIRC 182 ('Nichols')
[4]Ibid [19].
[5][2018] FWCFB 901.
[6][2011] FWAFB 975 ('Nulty')
[7][2007] FCA 388.
[8]Nichols (n 3) [21].
[9]Nichols (n 3) [21], citing Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd (t/as Richmond Oysters) [2018] FWCFB 901
[10]Nichols (n 3) [22], citing Nulty (n 6) [15] and Thornton v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2020] QIRC 393, [41] ('Thornton').
[11][2020] QIRC 106.
[12]Robinson v Interstate Transport Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 2728.
[13]Thornton (n 10).
[14]Thornton (n 10) [55]-[58].
[15][2024] QIRC 134.
[16]citing Nulty (n 6) [13]–[14]; Christine Smith v Express Excavation QLD Pty Ltd [2015] FWC 2436, [9].
[17]citing Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 553.
[18]Citing Long v Keolis Downer [2018] FWCFB 4109, [71], cited with approval in Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 89, [38].