Steenson v State of Queensland (Department of Education)
[2024] QIRC 242
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- Unreported Judgment
- Steenson v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2024] QIRC 242
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Steenson v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2024] QIRC 242
Steenson v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2024] QIRC 242
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: | Steenson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 242 |
PARTIES: | Steenson, Jacqueline Alyce Appellant v State of Queensland (Department of Education) Respondent |
CASE NO: | PSA/2022/728 |
PROCEEDING: | Public Sector Appeal – Disciplinary Decision |
DELIVERED ON: | 4 October 2024 |
MEMBER: | Pratt IC |
HEARD AT: | On the papers |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | INDUSTRIAL LAW – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – where appellant teacher at a distance education school – where appellant failed to follow direction from respondent to receive COVID-19 vaccinations – where respondent disciplined appellant for failing to follow direction (reprimand and docked a pay grade for 18 weeks) – whether Commission should refrain from hearing the appeal under section 562A(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – consideration of s 101(1), 134, s 324, and ch 3 pt 10 of the Public Sector Act 2022 – consideration of s 562A(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 – where appellant argues: the respondent did not adequately consider alternative arrangements, appellant did not give full consent to the vaccine or delegate her consent, that it is "double jeopardy" to suspend the appellant without pay and then discipline for same act, that there is no greater risk to school than vaccinated staff, that it was not a requirement to be vaccinated when the appellant began her job as a teacher – whether the appellant's appeal raises claims that have been unsuccessfully put before Commission before – whether appeal of the suspension without pay decision is out of time – whether decision was procedurally fair – held appellant's arguments had previously failed before Commission – compelling reason to not hear the appeal – appeal dismissed |
LEGISLATION: | Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 562A Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld), s 101(1), s 134, s 324, ch 3 pt 10 |
CASES: | Knight v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) [2022] QIRC 283 Nuske v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 199 Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 121 Rossiter v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 25 Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 262 Winter v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 350 |
Reasons for Decision
- [1]Miss Jacqueline Alyce Steenson ('Appellant') filed a public service appeal on 30 August 2022 against a decision issued on 22 August 2022 by the State of Queensland (Department of the Education) ('Respondent') to reprimand the Appellant and reduce her remuneration from B02-04 to B02-03 for 18 weeks ('Decision'). The decision-maker was Ms Anne Crowley, Assistant Director-General, Human Resources, Department of Education.
- [2]His Honour, Vice President O'Connor, called this matter on for mention alongside other matters that were of a similar nature on 18 April 2024. The purpose of that mention was to ascertain whether the Appellant still wished to proceed (now that relevant test cases have been decided). The Appellant indicated that she wished to continue pursuing the appeal. Orders were subsequently issued requiring the parties to address whether the Commission should refrain from hearing the appeal pursuant to section 562A(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act').
Issue
- [3]The issue before me is whether I should refrain from hearing the Appellant's appeal having regard to section 562A(3)(b) because the appeal is either frivolous or vexatious, misconceived, or lacking in substance, or should not be heard for another compelling reason.
Background
- [4]The Appellant is a teacher employed by the Respondent and works at a distance education school. The Respondent issued Employment Direction 1/21 – COVID-19 Vaccinations on 15 December 2021 ('Direction 1/21'). Direction 1/21 required the Respondent's workers, including the Appellant, to receive a first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by 17 December 2021 and all prescribed doses by 23 January 2022. Direction 1/21 also required the Appellant to provide documentation of having received the first dose by 7 January 2022 and all prescribed doses of COVID-19 vaccines by 24 January 2022. The Appellant failed to comply with Direction 1/21. The Respondent revised Direction 1/21 on 10 March 2022 which resulted in Employment Direction 1/22 – COVID-19 Vaccinations ('Direction') and which was relevantly identical to Direction 1/21.
- [5]On 10 January 2022, the Appellant was suspended on full pay. That was converted to suspension without pay on 27 January 2022.
- [6]On 10 June 2022, David Miller, Executive Director, Early Learning and Development, Department of Education, invited the Appellant to show cause as to why the Respondent should not discipline her for breaching the Direction by failing to receive the required vaccines or show documentation proving she had received the required vaccines. The Appellant was given 14 days to respond.
- [7]On 24 June 2022, the Appellant replied to the show cause notice. The Appellant said that she did not need the Respondent to make decisions about whether she should have the COVID-19 vaccine administered to her because she was "of sound mind to make medical decisions about [her] own body." The Appellant also alleged that her attempts to ask the Respondent's Covid Compliance Team for information about the vaccine fell on deaf ears and so she was not prepared to be vaccinated.
- [8]The Appellant also said that she thought that it was "completely unreasonable" for the Respondent to discipline her when the Respondent had not contacted her to discuss alternative arrangements. This was said to be of particular concern because the school that the Appellant worked at offered flexible work arrangements and had allowed vaccinated staff to work from home during terms 1 and 2 of 2022. It was, the Appellant said, "incomprehensible" that unvaccinated staff members could not have worked from home. The Appellant also further noted that the Respondent allowed the Appellant to work from home from week 2 of term 3 of 2022 after it revoked the requirement to be vaccinated post-pandemic. The Appellant said that in light of these facts, and the fact that the "whole situation has been completely irrational and unacceptable", she should be compensated for the time she was suspended without pay.
- [9]Ms Crowley replied to the Appellant's show cause response on 1 August 2022. Ms Crowley concluded that the Appellant contravened the Direction without reasonable excuse by failing to receive the prescribed doses of a COVID-19 vaccine or produce evidence of such. Ms Crowley then proposed to reprimand the Appellant and reduce the Appellant's remuneration from B02-04 to B02-03 for 20 weeks. Ms Crowley gave the Appellant 7 days to respond to the proposed discipline.
- [10]In her response dated 8 August 2022, the Appellant disagreed with the proposed discipline. The Appellant advanced several arguments in support of her disagreement. First, the Appellant noted that she had lost roughly $36,000 from 27 January 2022 to 30 June 2022 by being suspended without pay for not receiving the COVID-19 vaccinations. Such a loss, the Appellant argued, placed an immense burden on her as a single parent of one. The Appellant argued that this burden could have been avoided had a flexible work arrangement been organised.
- [11]Second, the Appellant said that the Respondent did not adequately consider reasonable alternatives to suspension, as the Respondent had previously allowed the Appellant to work from home under a flexible work arrangement.
- [12]Third, the Appellant said that the Respondent had infringed her rights. The Appellant said that the Respondent's threats of "further financial consequences" for not receiving the COVID-19 vaccinations directly violated her basic human rights. The Appellant also argued that she had not given her full, free and informed consent to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or delegated authority to the Respondent to give such consent. The Appellant said that her concerns about the risks of COVID-19 vaccines, combined with the lack of information about those vaccines from the Department of Education, disinclined her from receiving the COVID-19 vaccine.
- [13]Fourth, the Appellant said that the contents of COVID-19 vaccines conflicted with her spiritual beliefs and so she could not have received the vaccine. The Appellant also claimed that the Respondent failed to provide the Appellant adequate information about the relevant vaccines.
- [14]Ms Crowley then issued the Decision on 22 August 2022. The appeal presently before the Commission was filed on 30 August 2022.
Relevant law
Relevant legislation
- [15]The Public Sector Act 2022 ('PS Act') commenced on 1 March 2023 and replaced the 2008 legislation that was in force at the time this appeal was filed. The effect of s 324 of the PS Act is that this appeal must be heard and decided under Chapter 3, Part 10 of the PS Act, even though this appeal was brought under the previous legislation. Hence, pursuant to section 134 of the PS Act, this appeal must be heard and determined in accordance with Chapter 11 of the IR Act.
- [16]Section 101(1) of the PS Act says:
(1) A public sector employee’s chief executive may, by notice, suspend the employee from duty if the chief executive reasonably believes—
(a) the employee is liable to discipline under a disciplinary law; or
(b) the proper and efficient management of the entity might be prejudiced if the employee is not suspended.
- [17]Section 562A(3) of the IR Act says:
(3) The commission may decide it will not hear a public service appeal against a decision if—
(a) the appellant has made an application to a court or tribunal relating to the decision, whether or not the application has been fully decided; or
(b) the commission reasonably believes, after asking the appellant to establish by oral or written submissions that the appellant has an arguable case for the appeal, that the appeal—
(i) is frivolous or vexatious; or
(ii) is misconceived or lacks substance; or
(iii) should not be heard for another compelling reason.
Relevant case law
- [18]In Nuske v State of Queensland (Department of Education) ('Nuske'),[1] his Honour, Vice President O'Connor, considered a teacher's appeal against the decision of the Department of Education to discipline him for failing to comply with the Direction.[2] The appeal centred on whether the disciplinary process was procedurally fair.[3] The disciplinary process considered in Nuske is substantially the same as the disciplinary process in the matter currently before the Commission. His Honour found that the disciplinary process was fair, noting that:[4]
[85] The Respondent placed the Appellant on notice in writing with respect to the allegation, including the particulars relied on in support of the allegation. The Respondent provided the Appellant with an opportunity to respond to the allegation and to make submissions in respect of penalty…
[87] In considering whether there has been a lack of procedural fairness the Commission must ask: "has there been a practical injustice that could have materially affected the decision?" On any view of the evidence, the answer to that question must be, no.
- [19]In Winter v State of Queensland (Department of Education) ('Winter'),[5] the unvaccinated appellant argued that she should not have been suspended because she was able to attend the workplace while she was suspended.[6] His Honour, Deputy President Merrell, rejected that argument and held that the appellant's unvaccinated status meant that she was not available for work and that she was in that situation by choice.[7]
- [20]In Mackenzie v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) ('Mackenzie'),[8] the appellant's claimed excuse for not complying with the Direction was that the COVID-19 vaccines were unsafe and ineffective.[9] A full bench of this Commission found that the claimed excuse could be characterised as 'vaccine hesitancy' and was not a reasonable excuse.[10]
- [21]In Knight v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) ('Knight'),[11] the appellant argued that he could not give informed consent until he had received responses to his inquiries about COVID-19 vaccines and had consulted with his medical practitioners and religious figures.[12] The appellant also argued that he could not give free and informed consent.[13] Industrial Commissioner McLennan rejected those arguments. McLennan IC held that the appellant was free to not receive the COVID-19 vaccine as there was no obligation for the appellant to continue working for his employer.[14] McLennan IC also had regard to the views expressed in Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard,[15] where his Honour, Beech-Jones CJ, confirmed that consent is not vitiated by it being given in response to a condition of continued employment.[16]
- [22]In Rossiter v State of Queensland (Department of Education),[17] his Honour, Vice President O'Connor, considered an appeal of a decision to suspend a teacher without pay for not complying with the Direction.[18] His Honour found that the Direction was lawful and reasonable[19] and that failure to obey a lawful and reasonable direction of an employer is a serious matter.[20] His Honour held that the decision to suspend the teacher without pay for not complying with the Direction was fair and reasonable.[21]
- [23]In Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) ('Tilley'),[22] the appellant appealed the decision to deny her exemption to be vaccinated against COVID-19.[23] The appellant ran many arguments that had previously been run unsuccessfully before the Commission.[24] Industrial Commissioner Dwyer dismissed the appeal and found that the Commission's resources must be reserved for matters of genuine controversy and not for matters where no unique or novel arguments are made.[25]
Submissions
The appeal notice
- [24]The Appellant's appeal form rehearses many of the same arguments that she ran in her responses to the show cause notice and the proposed discipline, but I will briefly canvass them again. The Appellant first submits that the Respondent did not adequately consider whether there were any alternative arrangements to suspension. The Appellant argues that she works at a distance education school, had been allowed to work from home prior to suspension and has been allowed to work from home after the vaccine mandate was lifted. The Appellant also argues that vaccinated and unvaccinated staff with exemptions were allowed to work from home while she was suspended.
- [25]The Appellant also submits that she did not give full consent (without coercion) to have the COVID-19 vaccine, nor did she allow the Respondent to make such a medical decision of her behalf. The Appellant further submits that she provided the Respondent with concerns that have gone unaddressed.
- [26]The Appellant further submits that it is "double jeopardy" that the Respondent is imposing a financial penalty when it has already imposed a financial penalty by suspending the Appellant without pay.
- [27]The Appellant argues that she posed no greater risk to staff and the wider school community than anyone else did, adding that she has seen injuries caused by the vaccines, and questioning whether the COVID-19 vaccines truly stop the spread of COVID-19. The Appellant concludes that this means she is "being penalised for having a conscience and choosing not to be part of a vaccination trial."
- [28]The Appellant further submits that it was not a requirement to be vaccinated when she began her job as a teacher. The Appellant also submits that she feels discriminated against, arguing that if "the same consequences were transferred to an issue of race, gender or ethnicity, exclusion from the workplace and further financial penalties would be completely unacceptable."
The Appellant's submissions
- [29]The Appellant's main argument in her submissions is that the Decision was not fair and reasonable because it imposed additional financial penalties when the Appellant had already been unfairly financially penalised by the suspension without pay. In support of this argument, the Appellant submits that the Respondent did not account for her individual circumstances, such as working in a distance education setting that delivers online lessons. The Appellant submits that it was also unfair to not be provided the option to work from home when some unvaccinated staff members had their individual circumstances considered by the Respondent and were allowed to work from home. The Appellant also submits that she had worked from home prior to the suspension and continues to do so after the vaccine mandate had been lifted.
The Respondent's submissions
- [30]The Respondent submits that the Appellant's appeal raises claims that have all been decided against appellants previously and that the case does not warrant the Commission expending any further resources on it. The Respondent seeks an exercise the Commission's discretion under section 562A(3)(b)(iii) of the IR Act to not hear the appeal on the basis of it not being in the public interest to do so.
- [31]The Respondent notes that the Appellant, in her appeal form and her submissions, only addresses the decision to suspend her without pay. The decision to suspend the Appellant without pay was made on 27 January 2022 and any appeal of that decision had to be filed by 17 February 2022. Those arguments are therefore misconceived in the Respondent's submission.
- [32]The Respondent submits that the Appellant advanced only two grounds of appeal. First, the disciplinary action imposed was coercive and unreasonable. Second, the Respondent failed to consider alternative working arrangements, which was not fair and reasonable.
- [33]In response to the first ground of appeal, the Respondent submits that the Direction has repeatedly been found by the Commission to be lawful and reasonable.[26] The Respondent further submits that the Appellant does not have a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the Direction and that this failure to comply is serious.[27]
- [34]In response to the second ground of appeal, the Respondent submits that the Appellant could not reasonably expect that the Respondent would accommodate her working remotely on a full-time basis in the long term as an alternative to complying with the Direction.[28] This was especially so where the Appellant did not comply with the Direction because of vaccine hesitancy. The Respondent submits that flexible working arrangements were not a suitable alternative and were no basis for the Appellant declining to adhere to a lawful and reasonable direction.[29] The Respondent further submits that it was the Appellant's noncompliance with the Direction, by an exercise of choice, that made her unable to attend the workplace and which led to the Appellant's suspension and discipline.
- [35]All of the matters in the present appeal have already been extensively considered and determined in previous cases in the Respondent's submission.[30] It would consequently not be in the public interest to hear the appeal and so the Commission should exercise its discretion under section 562A(3)(b) of the IR Act[31] is the submission.
- [36]As to the claim about financial penalty, the Respondent submits that solely imposing a reprimand would fail to reflect the gravity of the Appellant's insubordination. As well, the Respondent points out that appeals arguing that a financial penalty is not fair and reasonable have been run without success before.[32]
- [37]On the claim of a human rights violation, the Respondent points out that Ms Crowley clearly did consider the Appellant's human rights but determined that it was in the public interest that the Appellant comply with the Direction. The Respondent also submits that directions to be vaccinated for COVID-19 have been held to not be inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 2019 and that this claim too has been unsuccessfully run in the past in this jurisdiction[33].
- [38]Additionally, the Respondent submits that the Decision was preceded by a procedurally fair process: the Appellant was placed on notice of the allegations and proposed discipline while also being given the opportunity to respond to those allegations and the proposed discipline. Pointing out that the disciplinary process just described was examined in Nuske, and found to be fair and reasonable,[34] the Respondent submits that this too is an argument that has been run in the past and failed.
Consideration
- [39]As the Respondent correctly points out, any appeal against the decision to suspend the Appellant without pay for failing to comply with the Direction without a reasonable excuse needed to have been filed by 17 February 2022. On my assessment, that is a separate decision to the one imposing the discipline of a reprimand and an 18-week reduction in pay, which is the Decision presently on appeal[35].
- [40]The Appellant is therefore out of time by 194 days and cannot challenge the finding that she breached the Direction without a reasonable excuse. The Appellant makes no application for an extension of time, nor offers any argument as to why the Commission should extend the time to file an appeal against the earlier decision. Compounding that, appeals of the decision to suspend employees without pay because they breached the Direction without a reasonable excuse have been run before and failed. I rely on the decision of his Honour, Vice President O'Connor, in Rossiter where his Honour considered effectively the same decision to suspend a teacher without pay in the same circumstances as those in this case and found that it was fair and reasonable.
- [41]However, as noted above, this challenge to the Direction is really a challenge to the decision finding that the Appellant breached the Direction without a reasonable excuse. Any appeal of that decision is out of time. That is a misplaced submission in these proceedings, which are an appeal of the decision to impose a reprimand and an 18-week reduction in pay as discipline. Even so, I accept the Respondent's submissions and respectfully concur with and adopt his Honour's, reasoning in Rossiter - that the Direction was lawful and reasonable. The claims in this matter that are predicated on the notion that the Directive was not a lawful or reasonable one have been run and failed numerous times.
- [42]The Appellant's claim that the Decision was not fair and reasonable because her concerns about the safety and efficacy of the vaccines constituted a reasonable excuse for not complying with the Directions are misplaced for the same reasons as noted above. They are a challenge to the earlier decision finding the Appellant breached the Direction without a reasonable excuse. They have no bearing on this appeal. These arguments have failed in the past also. As found in Mackenzie, that excuse amounts to 'vaccine hesitancy'. The Commission has on numerous occasions found this to not constitute a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with a direction to be vaccinated.
- [43]The Appellant's claim that she could have worked from home instead of being suspended without pay is misconceived. Any challenge to the suspension decision is not within jurisdiction. Yet, the claim would fail even if there was jurisdiction to hear it. The decision to suspend without pay in these circumstances has been found previously by the Commission to be fair and reasonable. Applying the holdings of his Honour, Deputy President Merrell, in Winter, the Appellant's choice to not be vaccinated caused her to not be able to work. The Appellant was truly the architect of her own demise when it came to being suspended without pay. I am also persuaded by the Respondent's submission that one could not reasonably expect the Respondent to accommodate the Appellant working remotely on a full-time basis as a viable long-term alternative to compliance with the reasonable and lawful Direction.
- [44]The Appellant also makes the claim that the Decision was not fair and reasonable because it was not a requirement to be vaccinated when she began her job as a teacher. This too is a misplaced argument attacking the earlier finding that the Appellant breached the Direction without a reasonable excuse. That decision is not one that can be considered as part of this appeal. Even so, it is a deeply embedded principle of the employment relationship that employees must follow the lawful and reasonable directions of their employer and that failing to do so is a serious matter.[36] The necessary corollary of such a principle is that circumstances impacting on or arising from the employment relationship will change over time. The unforeseen COVID-19 pandemic is an example of such a circumstance impacting on the employment relationship in this case. The fact that the Appellant was originally not required to be vaccinated against COVID-19 when she began her employment is irrelevant.
- [45]The claim that the Decision is not fair and reasonable because the Respondent did not consider the unique circumstances of the Appellant working at a distance education school does not withstand scrutiny. As well, this too is a misplaced submission arguing the merit of the earlier finding that the Appellant breached the Direction without a reasonable excuse. Regardless, distance education schools, despite being places where teachers have less frequent contact with others compared to traditional schools, are still workplaces. People physically work together and can transmit COVID-19 to each other at those workplaces. The fact that the Appellant works at a distance education school is therefore irrelevant.
- [46]The Appellant's claim that the Decision is not fair and reasonable because the Respondent was effectively coercing her into receiving a vaccine that she did not give her full consent to receive is also misplaced. It is a claim challenging the finding decision that exposed the Appellant to the discipline imposed by the Decision that is the subject of these proceedings. It is also a claim that has been run and failed before in this jurisdiction. Many times. As McLennan IC held in Knight, consent is not vitiated simply because the employer requires the consent as a condition of continued employment. And like the appellant in Knight, the Appellant was under no obligation to continue working for the Respondent.
- [47]In Tilley, the appellant also claimed that she could not receive the vaccinations because she was unable to give informed consent to do so. In observing that this was a well-worn path, Dwyer IC said that appellant's claim "traverse[d] familiar propositions that have been considered and dismissed by the Commission on multiple occasions".[37] Dwyer IC concluded that to be a compelling reason not to hear the matter.
- [48]There is no case for coercion made out, even on the Appellant's own materials. The Respondent simply told the Appellant that she needed to be vaccinated as a condition of her employment. The Appellant was free to leave the employ of the Respondent at any time. At no point did the Respondent force the Appellant to receive the vaccine. This is the same claim that failed in Knight and in Tilley and all of the other cases cited by Dwyer IC in Tilley when determining that to be a compelling reason not to hear that appeal.
- [49]The Appellant's claim that the Respondent effectively punished her twice by first suspending her without pay and then disciplining her by lowering her remuneration is based on the suspension being unfair. That claim too has been unsuccessful in the past as noted above.
- [50]The Appellant's claim that she feels discriminated against is misconceived. The claim was stated as: "If the same consequences were transferred to an issue of race, gender or ethnicity, exclusion from the workplace and further financial penalties would be completely unacceptable". I understand this to be the Appellant likening herself to an employee who was suspended without pay and disciplined because of their race, gender or ethnicity. There is no legal basis upon which that comparison can rest. It is misconceived. The unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, gender or ethnicity is an entirely different legal construct to disciplining an employee who chooses to not follow a reasonable and lawful direction from their employer. I agree with the Respondent. It would be a pointless and wasteful exercise to hear and determine such a claim.
- [51]For completeness, I will briefly touch on the Respondent's submission that the Respondent afforded the Appellant procedural fairness throughout the disciplinary process. The Appellant makes no submissions on this point. As was revealed in Nuske, that process was applied to a large number of employees who had not complied with the direction to be vaccinated. The disciplinary process in this case was a facsimile of the one in Nuske, which the Vice President found to be procedurally fair. I consequently find that this argument has also been previously run and failed.
- [52]I also accept the Respondent's submission that the disciplinary decision itself was one like many others issued in the same circumstances that have been held to be fair and reasonable. The Appellant's insubordination was serious, and it was open to Ms Crowley to conclude that a reprimand would have been insufficient discipline on its own.
Conclusion
- [53]All of the Appellant's claims in this appeal have been comprehensively determined to be wrong by the Commission in the past. That is a compelling reason not to hear those claims[38]. Many of those claims are misplaced and without merit. That too is a proper basis for an exercise of the discretion to not hear a matter[39]. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate that she has an arguable case. I accept the Respondent's submission that this is a case where the discretion to not hear the appeal pursuant to s 562A(3) of the IR Act is enlivened and that the discretion should be exercised.
- [54]I order accordingly.
Orders
- The appeal shall not be heard.
- The appeal is dismissed.
- The Decision is confirmed.
Footnotes
[1] [2023] QIRC 199.
[2] Ibid [1]-[6].
[3] Ibid [5].
[4] Ibid [85], [87].
[5] [2022] QIRC 350.
[6] Ibid [10].
[7] Ibid [22].
[8] [2023] QIRC 121.
[9] Ibid [49].
[10] Ibid [52].
[11] [2022] QIRC 283 ('Knight').
[12] Ibid [41].
[13] Ibid [26].
[14] Ibid [49].
[15] [2021] NSWSC 1320.
[16] Knight (n 11) [50].
[17] [2024] QIRC 25 ('Rossiter').
[18] Ibid [1]-[7].
[19] Ibid [30]
[20] Ibid [33], citing Grant v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1374 ('Grant').
[21] Ibid [33].
[22] [2023] QIRC 262.
[23] Ibid [1]-[12].
[24] Ibid [30]-[33].
[25] Ibid [33].
[26] Citing Thorley v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 133; Schimke v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 136; Allison v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 152; Nicholas v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 157; Tadeo v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 177; Carr v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 188; Gorry v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 196; Tribe v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 203; Prentis v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 212; Currie (Murray) v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 269; Brailey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 401 ('Brailey'); Graf and Ors v State of Queensland (Department of Education] [2022] QIRC 451.
[27] Citing Huntington v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 290, [54]; Bakhash v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 362, [27] ('Bakhash').
[28] Citing Prentis v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 212, [57]-[58]; Radev v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 414.
[29] Brailey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 401 ('Brailey')
[30] Citing Mocnik v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 58 ('Mocnik'); Brailey (n 26); Nuske v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 199 ('Nuske').
[31] Citing Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 262 ('Tilley').
[32] Citing Bakhash (n 27) [27].
[33] Citing Bakhash (n 27); Elliott v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 332; Mocnik (n 30).
[34] Citing Nuske (n 30) [91].
[35] Carr v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 210; Stacey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 220; Radanovic v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2024] QIRC 225
[36] Rossiter (n 17) [33], citing Grant (n 20).
[37] Tilley (n 31) [15], citing Thorley v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 133; Schimke v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 136; Allison v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 152; Nicholas v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 157; Tadeo v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 177; Carr v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 188; Gorry v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 196; Tribe v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 203; Prentis v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 212; Currie (Murray) v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 269; Brailey v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 401; Graf and Ors v State of Queensland (Department of Education] [2022] QIRC 451.
[38] Industrial Relations Act 2016 s 562A(3)(b)(iii).
[39] Ibid s 562A(3)(b)(ii).