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  4. Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services) (No. 2) - [2024] QIRC 261

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Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services) (No. 2)[2024] QIRC 261

Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services) (No. 2)[2024] QIRC 261

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services) (No. 2) [2024] QIRC 261

PARTIES:

NICHOLLS, Jim Andrew

(Applicant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

GP/2023/19

PROCEEDING:

Application in proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

8 November 2024

MEMBER:

Caddie IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. 1.Mr Nicholls' application to amend his statement of facts and contentions is allowed in part. Schedule 1 sets out the decision on each amendment sought.
  2. 2.Mr Nicholls is directed to file a marked up and a clean copy version of the approved amended statement within 7 days of this decision.
  3. 3.The Department is directed to file any amended statement of facts and contentions in response within 14 days of this decision.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – GENERAL: PROTECTIONS – INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS – application to amend statement of facts and contentions – where the proposed amendments are substantial and significantly widen the scope of the case – where some amendments are opposed – where relevance of some proposed amendments is not established – where amended statement of facts and contentions is allowed in part.

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 282, 284, 287, 289, 539.

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) ss 13, 17.

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ss 91, 92.

CASES:

Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175.

Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278.

Belal Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 4.

Bond v State of Qld & Ors (No.2) [2020] QIRC 078.

Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 205.

Gilbert v Metro North Hospital Service [2021] QIRC 255.

Kelsey v Logan City Council (No. 8) [2021] QIRC 114.

Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia Pty Ltd) (1991) 217 ALR 171.

Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety) [2024] QIRC 171.

Tattsbet Limited v Morrow [2015] FCAFC 62.

United Firefighters Union of Australia v Easy [2013] FCA 763.

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    Mr Jim Nicholls claims his employer, the Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services, took adverse action against him when it ceased his opportunity to act in a higher level position and to seek permanent appointment at the higher level. He contends this was because of his age and sex. Butler IC (as she then was) described Mr Nicholls' claim as 'narrow' going to alleged 'specific incidences of adverse action', taken for discriminatory reasons.[1]
  1. [2]
    Mr Nicholls seeks leave to amend his Statement of Facts and Contentions. He broadly describes the changes as minimal for the purpose of clarity and not to substantially alter the scope of his case.  He wishes to highlight the alleged adverse actions taken against him including:
  • Coercion and misrepresentation after he made complaints;
  • Discrimination and unconscionable conduct in the recruitment process;
  • Adverse action arising from the exercise of various workplace rights;
  • Indirect discrimination in the form of assumed wealth linked to age; and
  • Workplace injury in the form of stress and anxiety, leading to leave and loss of salary.
  1. [3]
    The Department has greatly assisted the parties and the Commission by providing a full marked-up version of the proposed amendments.[2] Mr Nicholls has raised no objection regarding this version. The marked-up version highlights the amendments are indeed substantial, and on any objective view alter the current scope of the case.
  1. [4]
    The Department, while not satisfied with the extent and substance of the proposed changes has provided a summary table identifying the amendments which they do and do not object to. The parties' specific submissions in relation to the amendments will be discussed as relevant to my decision.

What considerations should guide my decision on whether to grant Mr Nicholls leave to amend?

  1. [5]
    The Commission has power incidental to the exercise of jurisdiction to allow claims in the proceedings to be amended on terms that are fair and just.[3]
  1. [6]
    There are no mandated considerations for the exercise of the discretion. As a general principle, material facts contained within the Statement must be pleaded with the degree of specificity necessary to define the issues and inform the parties of the case they must meet.[4] The parties' statements set the boundaries of the application.[5]
  1. [7]
    A just resolution to the proceedings remains the paramount consideration,[6] and the Commission should not be punitive in exercising its discretion. However, just resolution of disputes should not accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification.[7] Irrelevant and unnecessary allegations may rightly be struck out as they expand the scope of the matter beyond what needs to be tried.[8]
  1. [8]
    Other factors which the Commission may consider include the effect of any delay and costs, the point the proceedings have reached, the nature and importance of the amendments to the applying party, whether the amendments are brought in good faith, and the explanation given by the party seeking the amendments.[9]

Should I allow the amendments not opposed by the Department?

  1. [9]
    The Department does not object to any deletion proposed by Mr Nicholls, as this refines the case being responded to. I agree and allow the deletions outlined in the marked-up version.
  1. [10]
    The Department does not object to a raft of other amendments even though they expand the case and, in some instances, seem contradictory. The Department notes their motivation is to expedite the proceedings while making clear they do not admit to or agree with the content of the changes. These amendments are as follows:

Paragraph amendments not opposed

[1]–[2]

[3](1) and [3](4)

[4]–[5]

[7]–[10]

[11] except for the last sentence of bullet point 6 and all of bullet point 7 in [11](d).

[14]

[16]–[24]

[25] except for the last two sentences.

[26]–[65]

[67]–[70]

[73]–[78]

[92]–[93]

[96]–[98]

[99](i)–[99](v)

  1. [11]
    These proposed amendments significantly widen the case from adverse action based on discrimination alone to include adverse action based on a selection of workplace rights. It is noted that the Department in its Statement of Facts and Contentions had already foreshadowed and responded to potential workplace rights aspects of the claim. These matters are reflected in the group of amendments not being opposed.
  1. [12]
    Given the desire of the parties to keep the matter moving and in the absence of any jurisdictional issue or prejudice arising from these amendments, I see no good reason not to allow them. They are allowed.

Should I allow the amendments opposed by the Department?

The Department also objects to amendments proposed by Mr Nicholls on grounds of lack of specificity, lack of jurisdiction, and lack of any objective basis for the claims. Mr Nicholls argues that these changes form a critical part of his claim, and he should have his opportunity to have those matters tested at trial. They should not be dismissed simply because the Department objects. The amendments are listed below:

Paragraph amendments opposed

[3] where it contains the words 'Professional Standards Unit.'

[3](2)–[3](3)

[3](5)–[3](6)

[6]

[11] at the last sentence of bullet point 6 and all of bullet point 7 in [11](d).

[25] at the last two sentences.

[66]

[71]–[72]

[79]–[91]

[94]–[95]

[99](vi)

  1. [13]
    I will consider related amendments together.

Professional Standards Unit and Report

  1. [14]
    Mr Nicholls had requested disclosure of the Professional Standards Unit Report in an earlier application.[10] In that application, Butler IC did not approve disclosure of the report because it had not been established it was relevant to an issue in dispute and that any opinions expressed by its author from a desktop review of compliance with internal processes was likely to be inadmissible.[11]
  1. [15]
    Mr Nicholls adding reference to the Professional Standards Unit in the proposed amendment to the opening of [3] and making assertions about conclusions in an undisclosed report in [11](d) bullet point 6 and [66] is not an appropriate shortcut to establish relevance. The Department reinforces these points in their objection to these amendments. I agree with the Department. These amendments are not allowed. 
  1. [16]
    Mr Nicholls will need to establish relevance to the substantive matters in issue in the final amended version of the Statement should he seek disclosure of the Report. Any request will need to align with the information about the Report that was established during the disclosure hearing before Butler IC.[12]

Workplace Rights

  1. [17]
    Workplace rights are pleaded very broadly by Mr Nicholls. While the Department has not opposed other workplace rights amendments, they question whether the workplace rights asserted in the nominated sections of [3] are workplace rights within the meaning of the Act. 
  1. [18]
    They argue there is no workplace right to participate in a competitive process for 'his own position', to be rewarded for achievement through an application for permanent appointment at the higher level, or to exercise his 'Public Interest Disclosure Responsibilities'.
  1. [19]
    The Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) provides a person has a workplace right if they have:
  • A right to the benefit of an industrial law, industrial instrument or order of an industrial body; or
  • The ability to start or participate in proceedings under an industrial law or instrument; or
  • The ability to make a complaint or inquiry to an entity with the capacity under an industrial law to seek compliance with that law or instrument; or in relation to the person's employment.[13]
  1. [20]
    There is a legitimate question about the extent to which Mr Nicholls should be allowed to expand his case if the conduct or right he complains of does not meet the threshold of falling within the statutory definition. A workplace right is not a boundless concept where a person aggrieved by any outcome simply gets to assert that they had a workplace right to a different outcome. Likewise, where a person does not take an action, the consequences of their decisions not to act cannot simply be described as an adverse action for not exercising a workplace right.  The rights must originate from an industrial law.
  1. [21]
    Excluding the PID related amendments (considered below), it is also legitimate for Mr Nicholls to seek to establish the existence of a workplace right within the meaning of the IR Act at trial. The onus rests with him to establish the specific workplace rights he asserts underpin the alleged adverse actions.[14] He bears that onus for the workplace rights amendments the Department did object to and those they did not. The Department does not admit Mr Nicholls had any of the workplace rights he alleges.[15]
  1. [22]
    Weighing these considerations, I find on balance the amendments related to asserting workplace rights, except for those rights attached to PIDs, should be allowed. However, I put Mr Nicholls on notice that he needs to identify with much greater specificity the rights he is relying on, why they are rights within the meaning of the Act, and the alleged adverse action that was taken because of those workplace rights. There are a number of well-settled pre-conditions that must be met by Mr Nicholls before the reverse onus is engaged.[16]

Public Interest Disclosures

  1. [23]
    Mr Nicholls asserts he exercised workplace rights in relation to his PID responsibilities, through making a complaint.  At [81] of the Statement, he asserts 'I have a workplace right to make a public interest disclosure'. At [85] he contends he was threatened with disciplinary action because he was or was proposing to exercise his workplace rights, including raising complaints and exercising his 'public interest responsibilities'. At [91] he refers to the PID Act and the protection against reprisal available under that Act.
  1. [24]
    The status of PID disclosures for the purpose of s 284 of the IR Act is not a novel question. In Kelsey v Logan City Council (No. 8),[17] O'Connor VP concluded that ss 13 and 17 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) are not industrial laws as defined in the IR Act.[18] It is not an act 'regulating the relationships between employers and employees.'[19] Making a public interest disclosure is not a proceeding under an industrial law.[20] Making a public interest disclosure is not a workplace right.
  1. [25]
    I agree with the Department that amendments based on the proposition that making a PID is a workplace right are misconceived and should not be allowed. 

Coercion and Misrepresentation

  1. [26]
    Mr Nicholls seeks to plead new causes of action in relation to alleged coercion and misrepresentation. [3](6), [79]–[91], [95] and [99](vi) of his Statement are relevant to these claims.
  1. [27]
    Mr Nicholls asserts correspondence received from Ms Julie Etchells (Chief HR Officer) on 23 May 2024 (and subsequently on 3 June 2024) offends these sections, as it threatens him with disciplinary action for having or exercising several workplace rights. He further asserts that the letter misrepresents the content of his complaints and suggests he can be constrained in the exercise of his workplace rights.
  1. [28]
    Under s 287 of the IR Act, a person must not take or threaten to take any action against another person with intent to coerce them to exercise or not exercise, or propose to exercise or not to exercise a workplace right, or to do that in a particular way. Under s 289, a person must not knowingly or recklessly make a false or misleading representation to another person about a workplace right, or the exercise or effect of the exercise of a workplace right of the other person.
  1. [29]
    As determined above, making a PID is not a workplace right. To the extent these amendments rely on making a PID or otherwise exercising 'PID responsibilities,' they are misconceived and are not allowed. While the other asserted workplace rights are not specific, complaints about conditions of employment and proceedings in the QIRC may be established as specific rights linked to adverse action pleaded in his substantive general protections claim.
  1. [30]
    The impugned letter raises concerns regarding emails being sent by Mr Nicholls to various departmental employees disclosing information considered confidential, making claims considered misleading, and containing language and tone considered disrespectful and disparaging. The letter then outlines directions as to future conduct and communications and reminds Mr Nicholls of the requirement for him to comply with the Public Service Code of Conduct.
  1. [31]
    The specific directions are to:
  • Cease communicating with employees of the Department and of the (sic.) Director-General in rude, aggressive and disrespectful terms.
  • Cease engaging in your practice of writing the same or similar emails and letters to multiple recipients.
  • Not discuss the Professional Standards Unit's matter with your work colleagues or any person apart from your union, representative or support person.[21]
  1. [32]
    The letter then goes on to identify the nominated point of contact within the Department in relation to complaints about his employment. In relation to the QIRC proceedings it directs him to continue to communicate with Crown Law.
  1. [33]
    The 'coercive threat' relates to Ms Etchells' stated expectation that Mr Nicholls will comply with the directions, engage appropriately with the Department, 'including in relation to matters about which you might have a different view.' She goes on to state conduct that breaches his obligations under the Code of Conduct or the directions given 'will be viewed very seriously and consideration may be given to commencing a formal disciplinary process under Chapter 3 of the Public Sector Act 2022'.
  1. [34]
    The Department contends the letter in no way suggests Mr Nicholls cannot continue to communicate or engage in relation to asserted workplace rights. It simply requires that those communications do not divulge confidential information, are through single rather than multiple points of contact, and are respectful and professional. They further state these directions cannot be adverse actions as they are authorised under the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) and the IR Act.[22]
  1. [35]
    Considering the letter on its face it is not clear how the 'threat' of possible future commencement of a disciplinary process is linked to any remaining workplace right. However, as Mr Nicholls argues, that link, and any intent by its author to coerce, may be proved or disproved through examination of evidence at trial.
  1. [36]
    The proposed amendments also refer to Mr Nicholls' response and subsequent reply from Ms Etchells where it is indicated she 'doubles down' on her threats. While Mr Nicholls has filed his response to the 23 May correspondence, the June 3 correspondence from Ms Etchells was not filed. Mr Nicholls did however send it to the Commission by email on 3 June 2024 as part of an email sent to Ms Gray of Crown Law. Mr Nicholls claims in that email the correspondence from Ms Etchells makes "repeated and compounded threats of dismissal."  I note, neither letter contains any threat in relation to dismissal.
  1. [37]
    The letter of 3 June reiterates Ms Etchells' expectations from her earlier letter and objects to the tone and inference in Mr Nicholls reply that she may be in breach of s 92 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld).[23]
  1. [38]
    In relation to the coercion amendments, any reliance on an asserted workplace right regarding PID responsibilities are not allowed. Otherwise, those amendments are allowed.
  1. [39]
    Considering the amendments sought regarding misrepresentation, I cannot discern from the particulars how the conduct rises to the level required in the statutory provision. Mr Nicholls pleads at [86] that the misrepresentation relates to calling the contents of his complaints "Rude, aggressive, highly inappropriate, dictatorial, disparaging and disrespectful". Not agreeing with the characterisation of the tone and nature of his communications is not evidence of a knowing or reckless misrepresentation about his workplace rights.
  1. [40]
    Mr Nicholls goes on in [86] to allege it misrepresents "my contentions made to the QIRC regarding the Department's non-disclosure as being not appropriate."  On any objective reading of the letter, it does not do this. The letter does not refer to his contentions in the QIRC as being not appropriate, but rather, given the matter is yet to be determined by the QIRC, it is not appropriate for him to assert in email communications with colleagues the Department is in breach of its obligations. That is not the same thing.
  1. [41]
    The Department argues Mr Nicholls has failed to identify any false or misleading representation or that it was knowingly or recklessly made by Ms Etchells to mislead him.
  1. [42]
    I agree. The amendments regarding misrepresentation have not been sufficiently justified and are not allowed.

Exclusion from EOI processes and lack of professional and other support

  1. [43]
    Mr Nicholls seeks to add complaints to his general protections claim that the Department is failing to keep him informed about ongoing opportunities to act in higher level positions and is failing to provide him with support while he is on sick leave. The relevant amendments are [3](6), [6], [11](d) bullet point 7, the last sentence of [25], [72], and the last sentence of [94].
  1. [44]
    The Department describes these as 'bare complaints' not giving rise to a breach of either ss 285 or 295.
  1. [45]
    I agree, this application is not an opportunity for Mr Nicholls to raise every grievance he has with the Department without reasonable justification as to how they link to alleged adverse action.  These amendments are not allowed.

Conclusion

  1. [46]
    The amendments sought by Mr Nicholls in this application are substantial and significantly widen the scope of the case. In deciding which amendments to allow and which to dismiss, I have reviewed the proposed amendments, considered the submissions of the parties and the relevant threshold issues contained within the general protections provisions in Ch 8 Pt 1 of the IR Act. I have weighed the above considerations to determine the matter based on what I consider is fair and just. The application of my decision to all the proposed amendments is summarised in Schedule 1 to this decision.
  1. [47]
    Mr Nicholls foreshadows a likely separate application should the Commission not grant leave to amend, likely leading to further delay.[24] That is a matter for Mr Nicholls and is not relevant to the exercise of my discretion in this application.

Orders

  1. [48]
    It is ordered that:
  1. 1.
    Mr Nicholls' application to amend his Statement of Facts and Contentions is allowed in part. Schedule 1 sets out the decision on each amendment sought.
  1. 2.
    Mr Nicholls is directed to file a marked up and a clean copy version of the allowed amended Statement within 7 days of this decision.
  1. 3.
    The Department is directed to file any amended Statement of Facts and Contentions in reply within 14 days of this decision.

Schedule 1

Table outlining allowed amendments to the Applicant's Statement of Facts and Contentions as identified in Annexure A to the Respondent's submissions filed 2 August 2024.

SOFC Paragraph/Heading

Nature of amendment

Status

[1]

Insertion and Deletion.

Allowed.

Heading:

Facts

No amendment.

No amendment.

Heading:

Adverse Action

Replaced with 'S. 285 Protection of a Workplace Right.'

Allowed.

[2]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[3]

Insertion.

Allowed in part. The phrase 'Professional Standards Unit' is not allowed.

[3](1)

Insertion.

Allowed.

[3](2)

Insertion.

Not allowed.

[3](3)–[3](5)

Insertion.

Allowed.

[3](6)

Insertion.

Allowed in part. The phrase 'and to receive appropriate support as needed' is not allowed.

[4]–[5]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[6]

Insertion.

Not allowed.

Heading:

S. 295 Discrimination

Insertion.

Allowed.

[7]–[9]

Insertion.

Allowed.

Heading:

Adverse Action

Capitalisation.

Allowed.

[10]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[11]

Deletion.

Allowed.

[11](a)

Not numbered.

Not numbered.

[11](b)

Insertion.

Allowed.

[11](c)

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[11](d)

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed in part. The final sentence of bullet point 6, and bullet point 7, are not allowed.

[12]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[13]

No amendment.

No amendment.

[14]

Insertion.

Allowed.

Heading:

Background

Capitalisation.

Allowed.

[15]

No amendment.

No amendment.

[16]–[24]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[25]

Insertion.

Allowed in part. The second sentence is not allowed.

[26]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[27]

Deletion.

Allowed.

[28]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[29]–[31]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[32]

Not numbered.

Not numbered.

[33]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[34]–[35]

Deletion.

Allowed.

[36]

No amendment.

No amendment.

[37]

Deletion.

Allowed.

Heading:

Contentions

No amendment.

No amendment.

Heading: Gender

Replacement with 'Protection of Workplace Rights – Prohibited Reasons and Gender'

Allowed.

[38]

Deletion.

Allowed.

[39]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[40]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[41]

No amendment.

No amendment.

[42]–[65]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[66]

Insertion.

Not allowed.

[67]–[68]

Deletion.

Allowed.

[69]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[70]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[71]–[72]

Insertion.

Not allowed.

[73]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[74]

Deletion.

Allowed.

Heading:

Age & Wealth

No amendment.

No amendment.

[75]–[76]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[77]–[78].

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

Heading:

'S. 287 & S. 289 Coercion and Misrepresentation'

Insertion.

Allowed in part as 'S. 287 Coercion'

[79]

Insertion.

Allowed if this contention does not relate to a PID. Otherwise, not allowed.

[80]

Insertion.

Allowed in part. Reference to s 289 and misrepresentation not allowed.

[81]

Insertion.

Allowed in part. Reference to PID and misrepresentation not allowed.

[82]–[83]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[84]

Insertion.

Allowed in part. Reference to Professional Standards not allowed.

[85]

Insertion.

Allowed in part. Reference to exercising public interest responsibilities not allowed.

[86]

Insertion.

Not allowed.

[87]–[88]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[89]

Insertion.

Not allowed.

[90]

Insertion.

Allowed except to the extent that the phrase 'misrepresents the facts' alleges misrepresentation pursuant to s 289 of the IR Act.

[91]

Insertion.

Not allowed.

Heading:

Summary

Capitalisation.

Allowed.

[92]–[93]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

[94]

Insertion.

Not allowed.

[95]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[96]

No amendment.

No amendment.

[97]

Insertion.

Allowed.

[98]

Insertion and deletion.

Allowed.

Heading:

Orders Sought

Capitalisation

Allowed.

[99]

Insertion.

Allowed.

'[56]'

Deletion.

Allowed.

[100]

No amendment.

No amendment.

Footnotes

[1]Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety) [2024] QIRC 171, [21] ('Nicholls No. 1')

[2]Annexure A to the Respondent's submissions filed 2 August 2024. I rely on this document in the formulation of Schedule 1 to this decision.

[3]Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 539(d).

[4]Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia Pty Ltd) (1991) 217 ALR 171, 173 (French J).

[5]Belal Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 4, [11]–[15]; Gilbert v Metro North Hospital Service [2021] QIRC 255, [475]–[480].

[6]Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 213 ('Aon Risk')

[7]Bond v State of Queensland (No. 2) [2020] QIRC 78, [25].

[8]Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 205, [21].

[9]These factors are set out by Merrell DP in the context of amending an application in Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278 at [25], referring to Aon Risk (n 6).

[10]Nicholls No. 1 (n 1).

[11]Ibid [82]–[84].

[12]Ibid [80]–[99].

[13]Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 284.

[14]See e.g. Tattsbet Limited v Morrow [2015] FCAFC 62 at [119] as to analogous provisions in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).

[15]Respondent's submissions filed 2 August 2024.

[16]E.g. Gilbert v Metro North Hospital Health Service [2021] QIRC 255, [35]; United Firefighters Union of Australia v Easy [2013] FCA 763, [41].

[17][2021] QIRC 114 ('Kelsey')

[18]Ibid [35], [54]–[62].

[19]Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) sch 5, definition of 'industrial law'.

[20]Kelsey (n 17), [35], [54]–[62].

[21]Letter of Ms Etchells addressed to Mr Nicholls dated 23 May 2024, annexed to Mr Nicholls' application to amend his SOFC filed 27 May 2024.

[22]The Respondent refers to the discipline provisions in ss 91 and 92 of the PS Act, and s 282(6) of the IR Act.

[23]This provision relates to abuses of office, defined as arbitrary acts prejudicial to the rights of another, engaged by a person employed in the public service.

[24]Mr Nicholls' affidavit filed 27 June 2024, [42].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services) (No. 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Seniors and Disability Services) (No. 2)

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 261

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Caddie IC

  • Date:

    08 Nov 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2009) 239 CLR 175
Cite 2 - (2009) 239 CLR 175
Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 278
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 278
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 278
Belal Yousif v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2017] ICQ 4
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] ICQ 4
Cite 2 - [2017] ICQ 4
Bond v State of Queensland (No. 2) [2020] QIRC 78
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 78
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 78
Doorley v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2019] QIRC 205
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 205
Cite 2 - [2019] QIRC 205
Gilbert v Metro North Hospital Health Service [2021] QIRC 255
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 255
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 255
Cite 3 - [2021] QIRC 255
Kelsey v Logan City Council (No.8) [2021] QIRC 114
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 114
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 114
Kernel Holdings Pty Ltd v Rothmans of Pall Mall ( Australia ) Pty Ltd (1991) 217 ALR 171
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 217 ALR 171
Cite 2 - (1991) 217 ALR 171
Nicholls v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety) [2024] QIRC 171
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 171
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 171
Tattsbet Limited v Morrow [2015] FCAFC 62
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] FCAFC 62
Cite 2 - [2015] FCAFC 62
United Firefighters Union of Australia v Easy [2013] FCA 763
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] FCA 763
Cite 2 - [2013] FCA 763

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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