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Self and Bishop v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2024] QIRC 271

Self and Bishop v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2024] QIRC 271

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Self and Bishop v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2024] QIRC 271

PARTIES:

DETECTIVE SERGEANT ANDREW SELF

(applicant)

v

STATE OF QUEENSLAND (QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE)

(respondent)

AND

DETECTIVE SENIOR SERGEANT MICHAEL BISHOP

(applicant)

v

STATE OF QUEENSLAND (QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE)

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

D/2023/127

D/2024/1

PROCEEDING:

Application

DELIVERED ON:

25 November 2024

HEARING DATE:

22 July 2024, 28 October 2024

MEMBER:

Davis J, President; O'Connor, VP; Pratt, IC

ORDER:

  1. The Full Bench determines that the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear the matters raised by the Notices of Industrial Dispute.
  2. There shall be no order as to costs of the application.
  3. Within 7 days, the parties file written submissions as to what other orders should be made following the determination that the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear the matters raised by the Notices of Industrial Dispute.
  4. The question of the final orders be determined on any written submissions received and without further oral hearing.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – where two police officers were the subject of disciplinary proceedings – where the disciplinary proceedings were pursued pursuant to the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) – where no disciplinary decision has yet been made – where the officers considering the disciplinary proceedings sought to rely on covertly recorded conversations – where the police officers challenge the use of the recordings in the disciplinary proceedings – where, by provisions of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), any review of a disciplinary decision lies to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) – whether QCAT has exclusive jurisdiction over “matters” referred to it under the Crime and Corruption Act – where the police officers made application to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) for orders staying the disciplinary proceedings or excluding the covert recordings from consideration by the prescribed officers – whether the question of stay or exclusion is a “matter” within the exclusive jurisdiction of the QCAT – whether the QIRC has jurisdiction to hear the applications

COURTS AND JUDGES – PRECEDENTS – GENERALLY – DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS – where two police officers made application for orders from the QIRC – where the applications were heard by a Full Bench of the QIRC – where the President of the QIRC and the Industrial Court of Queensland (ICQ) sat on the Full Bench – where the police officers relied upon a decision of the ICQ – where the police officers submitted that decision was binding precedent upon the Full Bench – where appeals from the QIRC of an Industrial Commissioner sitting alone lie to the ICQ – where appeals from a Full Bench of the QIRC lie to the ICQ – where when the President is a member of a Full Bench of the QIRC, appeal does not lie to the ICQ – where the President is a member of the Full Bench, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal – whether a decision of the ICQ is binding upon a Full Bench of the QIRC where the President is a member of the Full Bench

Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld), s 15, s 47, s 48, s 219BA, s 219C, s 219E, s 219F, s 219FA, s 219G, s 219O, s 219Q 

Criminal Code (Qld), s 590AA

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 9, s 409, s 429, s 432,   s 448, s 486, s 554, s 557

Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld)

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 11, s 12, s 13, s 14

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)

Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld), s 1.3, s 4.9, s 6A, s 7.4, s 7.25, s 7.26, s 7.27, s 7.28, s 7.29, s 7.30, s 7.31, s 7.32

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, s 157

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41, cited

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; [1990] HCA 33, cited

AZC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 674; [2023] HCA 26, cited

Bacon v Rose [1972] 2 NSWLR 793, cited

CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley (2016) 259 CLR 339; [2016] HCA 2, cited

Civil Service Association of Western Australia (Incorporated) v Director General, Ministry of Justice [2001] WAIRComm 4470, cited

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194; [2000] HCA 47, cited

Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570; [1983] HCA 12, followed

Flori v Commissioner of Police [2015] 2 Qd R 497; [2014] QSC 284, considered

Ganly v Queensland Audit Office [2015] QIRC 108, considered

Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA 7, cited

Hurley v Stewart [2016] QSC 154, considered

Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408; [1993] HCA 56, cited

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564; [2000] FCA 1572, cited

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1, considered

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32, cited

Lamb v Moss (1983) 49 ALR 533; [1983] FCA 264, cited

Langerak v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 327, cited

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40, cited

Minister for Police v Western Australian Police Union of Workers (1995) 75 WAIG 1504, cited

Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478; [2017] HCA 5, followed

Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457; [1981] HCA 7, cited

Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcast Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28, cited

R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507; [2019] HCA 35, followed

R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228; [1933] HCA 30, cited

Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 117; [1987] HCA 28, considered

Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511; [1999] HCA 27, cited

Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363; [1981] FCA 191, cited

Simpson v Queensland Police Service [2002] ICQ 47, cited

South Australia v Victoria (1911) 12 CLR 667; [1911] HCA 17, followed

Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332; [1990] HCA 8, cited

The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45; [1979] HCA 62, cited

Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88; [1978] HCA 9, followed

WDR Delaware Corporation v Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd (2016) 245 FCR 452; [2016] FCA 1164, cited

Willmott v Carless [2024] QCA 115, cited

Witthahn v Chief Executive, Hospital and Health Services (2021) 9 QR 642; [2021] QCA 282, considered

COUNSEL:

M Black for each applicant

S A McLeod KC for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Gnech and Associates for each applicant

Queensland Police Service Solicitor for the respondent

  1. [1]
    These proceedings raise a jurisdictional issue arising from legislation governing police discipline.  Detective Sergeant Self and Detective Senior Sergeant Bishop (together “the applicants”) are each the subject of disciplinary proceedings and have each filed a Notice of Industrial Dispute which the respondent (to whom we will refer as “the QPS”) says that the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) has no jurisdiction to entertain. 
  2. [2]
    It is common ground that any review of a disciplinary decision ultimately made against either of the two applicants lies to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).  No disciplinary decision has yet been made.  Disputes have arisen in the disciplinary process and the applicants seek to engage the jurisdiction of the QIRC to resolve these disputes.  The QPS submits that:
    1. the QIRC has no jurisdiction to resolve the disputes;
    2. the QCAT does not have jurisdiction to resolve the current dispute, as at this stage, no disciplinary decision has been made;
    3. once a disciplinary decision has been made the current disputes can be resolved by QCAT as part of its review of any disciplinary decision; and
    4. at this point the applicants can only seek to litigate the current disputes in the Supreme Court in exercise of its inherent supervisory jurisdiction.
  3. [3]
    On 1 May 2024, the jurisdictional question was listed to be heard before the Full Bench[1] on 22 July 2024. That hearing proceeded but on 11 September 2024, the Full Bench called for further written submissions, which were received in due course.  At the request of the parties, further oral submissions were heard on 28 October 2024.

Background

  1. [4]
    Each of the applicants are police officers against whom disciplinary proceedings have been commenced under the provisions of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (the PSA Act). 
  2. [5]
    Both police officers were, at relevant times, stationed at the Bundaberg Criminal Investigation Branch (Bundaberg CIB).  It is alleged that DS Self made unprofessional and sexist remarks in the workplace, viewed pornographic and inappropriate images and presented these images to other members of the QPS working in the office.
  3. [6]
    It is alleged that DSS Bishop witnessed DS Self committing the misconduct alleged against him and failed to report that conduct.  Section 6A of the PSA Act casts an obligation upon members of the QPS to report misconduct or conduct that could be grounds for disciplinary action.
  4. [7]
    Also working in the Bundaberg CIB were Sergeant Zanko, his wife Detective Sergeant Zanko and Senior Constable May. 
  5. [8]
    Sergeant Zanko covertly recorded conversations with DSS Bishop.  Senior Constable May covertly recorded conversations with DS Self.  The QPS says that these conversations are relevant evidence against DS Self and DSS Bishop in their respective disciplinary proceedings.
  6. [9]
    Disciplinary proceedings were commenced against DS Self by a Disciplinary Proceeding Notice[2] dated 27 September 2023, issued by Acting Assistant Commissioner Lowe.  Disciplinary proceedings were commenced against DSS Bishop by a Disciplinary Proceeding Notice dated 11 October 2023, issued by Assistant Commissioner Johnson. 
  7. [10]
    Each of the two applicants filed a Notice of Industrial Dispute in the QIRC.  Each applicant seeks orders:

“13.  The Applicant seeks relief to the effect that:

a.  The discipline proceedings be stayed, or

b.  The Respondent be prohibited from using the recordings in any current or future disciplinary proceedings against the Applicant.” 

On grounds, relevantly:

“7.  This correspondence[3] specifically requested the Recordings be removed from the proceedings on two primary grounds:

a.  Firstly, that the Recordings were made in breach of Part 4 of the Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) (“IP Act”). The Applicant submits that the content of the Recordings is a “private conversation” as defined in the IP Act and the Recordings were made contrary to s 43(1) of the IP Act, because Senior Constable May was not a party to the “private conversation”. Further, the dissemination of the Recordings by Senior Constable May to the QPS was contrary to s 44 of the IP Act.

b.  Secondly, Senior Constable May’s conduct in making covert recordings of colleagues in the workplace was improper. In particular, his actions were “misconduct” as defined in the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) or “corrupt conduct” as defined in the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld). This type of conduct has been described as “potentially corrosive of a healthy and productive workplace environment” and tribunals have said “the secret recording of conversations with colleagues in the workplace is to be deprecated”. “Recording individuals within the workplace without their knowledge is ... in most cases, underhanded and unacceptable.”

…

8.  In circumstances where the Recordings have been obtained via unlawful and/or unfair means, those Recordings should not be permitted to be used in disciplinary proceedings on grounds of fairness.”[4] (footnotes omitted)

The statutory context

  1. [11]
    The object of the PSA Act is to provide for the maintenance, development and administration of the QPS and for its membership.[5]  This is achieved by establishment of an administrative structure, sitting at the apex of which is the Commissioner of Police (the Commissioner). 
  2. [12]
    Part 7 of the PSA Act provides for the discipline of police officers.  Various provisions identify the grounds for disciplinary action,[6] administrative provisions concerning the process for determining the charge, and the imposition of sanctions. 
  3. [13]
    In addition, there are various manuals and protocols dealing with the disciplinary process.  These are issued by the Commissioner by power bestowed through s 4.9.  By that section, the Commissioner may make both specific and general directions in discharge of what is identified by s 4.8 as “the prescribed responsibility”.[7] In broad terms, the prescribed responsibility, which falls upon the Commissioner, is to manage and administer the QPS.[8] 
  4. [14]
    Section 7.1 of the PSA Act provides:

“7.1 Main purposes of part

The main purposes of this part are—

  1. (a)
    to provide for a system of guiding, correcting, rehabilitating and, if necessary, disciplining officers; and
  1. (b)
    to ensure appropriate standards of discipline are maintained within the service to—
  1.  protect the public; and
  1.  uphold ethical standards within the service; and
  1.  promote and maintain public confidence, and officers’ confidence, in the service.”
  1. [15]
    Section 7.2 provides:

“7.2   Application of part

This part applies in relation to a complaint about an officer (the subject officer) if—

  1. the complaint is received by the commissioner or the CCC;[9] and
  2. the CCC has not assumed responsibility for investigating the complaint under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 47 or 48.”[10]
  1. [16]
    Section 7.2 is one of various provisions which recognise the involvement in police discipline of the Crime and Corruption Commission (the CCC).
  2. [17]
    Section 7.3 of the PSA Act provides various definitions for Part 7, including an inclusive but not exhaustive definition of “complaint”.  That definition is of no relevance here.  All that is relevant is that disciplinary proceedings are instituted by complaint which can be made to either the Commissioner or the CCC.
  3. [18]
    By s 7.4, “Grounds for disciplinary action” are prescribed.  Section 7.4 provides:

“7.4 Grounds for disciplinary action

  1.  The subject officer may be disciplined under this part if the subject officer has—
  1. committed misconduct; or
  1.  been convicted—
  1.  in Queensland of an indictable offence; or
  1.  outside Queensland of an offence that, if it were committed in Queensland, would be an indictable offence; or
  1.  performed the subject officer’s duties carelessly, incompetently or inefficiently; or
  1.  been absent from duty without approved leave and without reasonable excuse; or
  1.  contravened, without reasonable excuse—
  1.  a provision of this Act or the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000; or
  1.  a code of conduct that applies to the subject officer; or
  1.  a direction given to the subject officer by the commissioner under this Act or by a senior officer with authority to give the direction.
  1.  For subsection (1)(b), the subject officer is convicted if a court makes a finding of guilt, or accepts a plea of guilty, whether or not a conviction is recorded.”
  1. [19]
    “Misconduct” under the PSA Act is defined as:

“misconduct means conduct that–

  1.  is disgraceful, improper or unbecoming an officer; or
  1.  shows unfitness to be or continue as an officer; or
  1.  does not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expects of a police officer.”[11]
  1. [20]
    Before disciplinary proceedings are commenced, there must be consideration of diversion from the disciplinary process and the imposition of professional development strategies.[12]
  2. [21]
    Section 7.6 concerns “corrupt conduct” which, for the purposes of the PSA Act, bears the same meaning as prescribed by s 15 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (the CC Act), which provides:

“15 Meaning of corrupt conduct

  1.  Corrupt conduct means conduct of a person, regardless of whether the person holds or held an appointment, that—
  1.  adversely affects, or could adversely affect, directly or indirectly, the performance of functions or the exercise of powers of—
  1.  a unit of public administration; or
  1.  a person holding an appointment; and
  1.  results, or could result, directly or indirectly, in the performance of functions or the exercise of powers mentioned in paragraph (a) in a way that—
  1.  is not honest or is not impartial; or
  1.  involves a breach of the trust placed in a person holding an appointment, either knowingly or recklessly; or
  1.  involves a misuse of information or material acquired in or in connection with the performance of functions or the exercise of powers of a person holding an appointment; and
  1.  would, if proved, be—
  1.  a criminal offence; or
  1.  a disciplinary breach providing reasonable grounds for terminating the person’s services, if the person is or were the holder of an appointment.
  1.  Corrupt conduct also means conduct of a person, regardless of whether the person holds or held an appointment, that—
  1.  impairs, or could impair, public confidence in public administration; and
  1.  involves, or could involve, any of the following—
  1.  collusive tendering;
  1.  fraud relating to an application for a licence, permit or other authority under an Act with a purpose or object of any of the following (however described)—
  1.  protecting health or safety of persons;
  1.  protecting the environment;
  1.  protecting or managing the use of the State’s natural, cultural, mining or energy resources;
  1.  dishonestly obtaining, or helping someone to dishonestly obtain, a benefit from the payment or application of public funds or the disposition of State assets;
  1.  evading a State tax, levy or duty or otherwise fraudulently causing a loss of State revenue;
  1.  fraudulently obtaining or retaining an appointment; and
  1.  would, if proved, be—
  1.  a criminal offence; or
  1.  a disciplinary breach providing reasonable grounds for terminating the person’s services, if the person is or were the holder of an appointment.”
  1. [22]
    Section 7.6 of the PSA Act provides:

“7.6  Corrupt conduct

  1.  Nothing in this part prevents the CCC or the commissioner starting a corrupt conduct proceeding against the subject officer instead of a disciplinary proceeding.
  1.  Subsection (3) applies if—
  1.  a corrupt conduct proceeding is started against the subject officer; and
  1.  a disciplinary proceeding relating to the corrupt conduct has been started against the subject officer but has not been finally dealt with.
  1.  The disciplinary proceeding is taken to have been withdrawn and is of no effect.
  1.  In this section—

corrupt conduct proceeding means a proceeding for corrupt conduct under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001, section 219F.”

  1. [23]
    If the imposition of professional development strategies are considered inappropriate and, assuming no corrupt conduct proceeding is commenced, the complaint is referred to a prescribed officer pursuant to s 7.10, which provides:

“7.10 Referral of complaint to prescribed officer

  1.   This section applies if—
  1.  the complaint mentioned in section 7.2 has been received by the commissioner; and
  1.  the commissioner has considered under section 7.9 whether to impose a professional development strategy.
  1.  The commissioner must decide whether to refer the complaint to a prescribed officer, having regard to the following matters—
  1.  any professional development strategy, or other management action, that has been implemented in relation to the subject officer;
  1.  whether implementation of any other professional development strategy would be sufficient to achieve the purposes mentioned in section 7.1(b);
  1.  the subject officer’s disciplinary history and service history;
  1.  the seriousness of the conduct to which the complaint relates;
  1.  whether it is necessary to take disciplinary action against the subject officer to achieve the purposes mentioned in section 7.1(b).”
  1. [24]
    Section 7.11 of the PSA Act authorises the commencement of disciplinary proceedings by a prescribed officer.  The term “disciplinary proceeding” is defined in s 7.3 as:

“disciplinary proceeding means a proceeding against the subject officer under division 3 or 4.”

  1. [25]
    Division 3[13] is headed “Abbreviated disciplinary proceedings” and provides a procedure whereby a prescribed officer may offer a penalty which can then be accepted by the officer against whom the proceedings have been commenced.
  2. [26]
    Division 4 of Part 7 of the PSA Act concerns disciplinary proceedings taken otherwise than in the abbreviated way provided by Division 3.
  3. [27]
    Section 7.25 provides that disciplinary proceedings are commenced by issue of a disciplinary proceeding notice as defined:

“7.25  How disciplinary proceeding is started

A prescribed officer may start a disciplinary proceeding under this division by giving the subject officer a notice (a disciplinary proceeding notice) stating—

  1.  particulars of the alleged ground for disciplinary action (the disciplinary charge); and
  1.  that the subject officer may, within a stated period of at least 28 days, give the prescribed officer a written submission and other materials to show why disciplinary action should not be taken in relation to the disciplinary charge. ”[14]
  1. [28]
    Section 7.26 of the PSA Act provides for the subject officer to make submissions in answer to the charge in the disciplinary proceeding notice.  Section 7.26 provides:

“7.26  Subject officer’s right to make written submission

  1.  The subject officer may, within the required period, give the prescribed officer a written submission and other materials to show why disciplinary action should not be taken in relation to the disciplinary charge.
  1.  The prescribed officer may, by agreement with the subject officer, extend the period stated in the disciplinary proceeding notice under section 7.25(b).
  1.  In this section—

required period means—

  1.  the period mentioned in the disciplinary proceeding notice under section 7.25; or
  1.  if the period mentioned in paragraph (a) has been extended under subsection (2)—the extended period.”
  1. [29]
    Section 7.27 provides that the prescribed officer must consider relevant materials and submissions and decide whether the disciplinary charge is proved.  A QCAT Notice must be given to the officer and the CCC.[15]  This advises of a right of review by QCAT.
  2. [30]
    By s 7.28, a process for the imposition of a sanction based on a finding of a disciplinary ground pursuant to s 7.27 commences.  Section 7.29 permits the officer to make written submissions, s 7.30 provides for a decision on sanction and s 7.31 provides for the provision of a QCAT notice which must contain certain information.[16]  The notice must inform the officer of their right to have QCAT review the decision.[17]
  3. [31]
    The CC Act and its predecessors are the legislative response to the findings of the Fitzgerald Inquiry into police corruption.  Unsurprisingly, the CC Act contains specific provisions which impact upon the discipline of police officers.  The scheme allows the CCC to bring and/or monitor disciplinary proceedings against police.
  4. [32]
    “Corruption” is defined by the CC Act as:

“corruption means corrupt conduct or police misconduct.”[18]

  1. [33]
    “Police misconduct” is defined as:

“police misconduct means conduct, other than corrupt conduct, of a police officer that—

  1. is disgraceful, improper or unbecoming a police officer; or
  2. shows unfitness to be or continue as a police officer; or
  3. does not meet the standard of conduct the community reasonably expect of a police officer.”[19]
  1. [34]
    The definition of “police misconduct” in the CC Act corresponds precisely with the definition of “misconduct” in the PSA Act.[20]
  2. [35]
    The term “corrupt conduct” is defined by s 15 of the CC Act.[21]
  3. [36]
    Sections 47 and 48 show how the CC Act interacts with other statutes which provide for investigation into the conduct of government employees.  Those provisions provide:

“47 Commission’s monitoring role for police misconduct

  1.  The commission may, having regard to the principles stated in section 34—
  1.  issue advisory guidelines for the conduct of investigations by the commissioner of police into police misconduct; or
  1.  review or audit the way the commissioner of police has dealt with police misconduct, in relation to either a particular complaint or a class of complaint; or
  1.  assume responsibility for and complete an investigation by the commissioner of police into police misconduct.
  1.  The commissioner of police must give the commission reasonable help to undertake a review or audit or to assume responsibility for an investigation.
  1.  If the commission assumes responsibility for an investigation, the commissioner of police must stop the commissioner’s investigation or any other action that may impede the investigation if directed to do so by the commission.
  1.  In this section—

complaint, about police misconduct, includes information or matter involving police misconduct.

48  Commission’s monitoring role for corrupt conduct

  1.  The commission may, having regard to the principles stated in section 34—
  1.  issue advisory guidelines for the conduct of investigations by public officials into corrupt conduct; or
  1.  review or audit the way a public official has dealt with corrupt conduct, in relation to either a particular complaint or class of complaint; or
  1.  require a public official—
  1.  to report to the commission about an investigation into corrupt conduct in the way and at the times the commission directs; or
  1.  to undertake the further investigation into the corrupt conduct that the commission directs; or
  1.  assume responsibility for and complete an investigation by a public official into corrupt conduct.
  1.  The public official must—
  1.  give the commission reasonable help to undertake a review or audit or to assume responsibility for an investigation; and
  1.  comply with a requirement made under subsection (1)(c).
  1.  If the commission assumes responsibility for an investigation, the public official must stop the official’s investigation or any other action that may impede the investigation if directed to do so by the commission.
  1.  In this section—

complaint, about corrupt conduct, includes information or matter involving corrupt conduct.”

  1. [37]
    Chapter 5 of the CC Act is entitled “Offences and disciplinary proceedings in relation to corruption etc”.  Part 1 of Chapter 5 concerns criminal offences and Part 2 concerns “Disciplinary proceedings in relation to corruption etc – particular prescribed persons”.
  2. [38]
    Part 2 of Chapter 5 draws a distinction between “disciplinary proceedings” and “reviewable decisions”.  The “disciplinary proceedings” referred to in Part 2 are proceedings brought in QCAT to try allegations of “corrupt conduct”.[22]  The term “reviewable decision” is defined by s 219BA(1) as follows:

“219BA Meaning of reviewable decision

  1.  A reviewable decision means—
  1.  a decision made in relation to an allegation of corruption against a prescribed person, other than a decision—
  1.  made by a court or QCAT; or
  1.  made by a prescribed officer under the Police Service Administration Act 1990, part 7; or
  1.  a decision under the Police Service Administration Act 1990, part 7A to make a disciplinary finding or disciplinary declaration against a former officer; or
  1.  a decision under the Police Service Administration Act 1990, part 7A to do neither of the following in relation to a former officer—
  1.  give the former officer a written notice under section 7A.3(1)(a) of that Act;
  1.  hold a disciplinary hearing under section 7A.3(1)(b) of that Act.”
  1. [39]
    It can be seen that decisions made by a prescribed officer under Part 7 of the PSA Act are excluded from the definition of “reviewable decision”[23] which applies for Part 2 of Chapter 5 of the CC Act.[24]
  2. [40]
    Part 3 of Chapter 5 of the CC Act is entitled “Review of particular police disciplinary decisions”.  In that part, the term “reviewable decisions” is defined by s 219O as:

“219O Reviewable decisions

  1. A reviewable decision is a decision made under the Police Service Administration Act 1990 that is mentioned in schedule 1, column 1.
  2. However, a decision under part 7, division 4 of that Act that a disciplinary charge, or another ground for disciplinary action, has been proved in relation to an officer is a reviewable decision only if the officer is entitled to be given a QCAT information notice for the decision under section 7.27(4) or 7.31(1) of that Act.
  3. In this section—

disciplinary charge see the Police Service Administration Act 1990, section 7.25(a).”

  1. [41]
    The decisions defined in s 219O as “reviewable decisions” for the purposes of Part 3 of Chapter 5 are only those that are mentioned in Schedule 1 column 1.  They are:

“Reviewable decision

a decision under the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (the PSAA), part 7, division 4 that a disciplinary charge, or any other ground for disciplinary action, has not been proved in relation to an officer

subject to section 219O(2), a decision under part 7, division 4 of the PSAA that a disciplinary charge, or any other ground for disciplinary action, has been proved in relation to an officer

a decision under part 7, division 4 of the PSAA to impose a disciplinary sanction or professional development strategy on an officer

a decision under part 7, division 4 of the PSAA not to impose a disciplinary sanction or professional development strategy on an officer

a decision under section 7.36 of the PSAA to dismiss, or not to dismiss, an officer

a decision under section 7.41 of the PSAA to give effect to a disciplinary sanction or to continue the suspension of the disciplinary sanction

a decision not to start a disciplinary proceeding against an officer in relation to whom a complaint mentioned in section 7.2 of the PSAA has been made”

  1. [42]
    By s 219P “an aggrieved person”, which is defined by s 219N and Schedule 1 as the officer and the CCC, may apply for a review of a decision made on discipline under part 7 of the PSA.
  2. [43]
    Division 2 of Part 2 of Chapter 5 contains a provision which defines QCAT’s “jurisdiction”.  It provides:

“219C Jurisdiction

QCAT has jurisdiction to conduct disciplinary proceedings.

219D Jurisdiction relating to allegations of corrupt conduct against prescribed persons is exclusive

  1.  An allegation of corrupt conduct against a prescribed person may only be heard and decided by QCAT.
  1.  Subsection (1) applies to the exclusion of authority given by law to any other person or tribunal to hear and decide, at first instance, an allegation of corrupt conduct made against a prescribed person.

219DA QCAT hearing in relation to prescribed person whose employment or appointment has ended

To remove any doubt, it is declared that QCAT may hear and decide, or continue to hear and decide, an allegation of corrupt conduct brought against a prescribed person defined in section 50(3), definition prescribed person, paragraph (a)(ii) or (b)(ii), despite the person’s employment or appointment having ended—

  1.  before or during the QCAT hearing; or
  1.  after hearing and before QCAT makes its decision.

219E Relationship with Industrial Relations Act 2016

The industrial court and the industrial relations commission do not have jurisdiction in relation to a matter that QCAT may decide for this Act even though it may be, or be about, or arise out of, an industrial matter.”

  1. [44]
    The QIRC was established long before the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (IR Act) was enacted.  By s 429, it is re-established by way of “continuance”:

“429 Continuance

The Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (the commission), is established as a court of record in Queensland.”

  1. [45]
    The QIRC is a court of record but one of limited jurisdiction.  It is therefore an inferior court.  Its jurisdiction is defined by s 448, where:

“448  Commission’s jurisdiction

  1.  The commission may hear and decide the following matters—
  1.  a question of law or fact brought before it or that it considers expedient to hear and decide for the regulation of a calling;
  1.  all questions—
  1.  arising out of an industrial matter; or
  1.  involving deciding the rights and duties of a person in relation to an industrial matter; or
  1.  it considers expedient to hear and decide about an industrial matter;
  1.  an industrial dispute referred to the commission under this Act or another Act by a member who has held a conference at which no agreement has been reached;
  1.  all appeals properly made to it under this Act or another Act;
  1.  all matters referred to the commission under this Act or another Act.
  1.  The commission may regulate a calling by an award—
  1.  on application by an organisation, an employer, or 20 employees (who are not members of an employee organisation and not covered by an award) in a calling; or
  1.  on application by the Minister; or
  1.  on its own initiative.
  1.  The commission—
  1.  may hold an inquiry into or about an industrial matter on application by an interested person or on its own initiative; and
  1.  must hold an inquiry into or about an industrial matter if the Minister, by notice, directs.
  1.  The commission must report the result of the inquiry, and make recommendations, to the Minister.
  1.  The commission may consolidate into 1 award all awards that apply to or affect an employer or class of employer in a calling, or the members of an organisation employed by the same employer or class of employer—
  1.  on application by an organisation or an employer; or
  1.  if the Minister, by notice, directs.
  1.  When exercising power under subsection (5), the commission may make the amendments it considers necessary or convenient to give effect to the consolidated award.
  1.  No provision of this Act or another Act limits, by implication, the commission’s jurisdiction.
  1.  In this section—

class includes a section of a class.”

  1. [46]
    No party suggested either that the Notice of Industrial Dispute raised questions of the “regulation of a calling” or arose out of an award or was the subject of jurisdiction specifically vested by the PSA Act or any other legislation.  If jurisdiction existed, it did so by force of s 448(1)(b) which concerns an “industrial matter”. 
  2. [47]
    Section 9 of the IR Act defines “industrial matter” as:

“9 What is an industrial matter

  1.  An industrial matter is a matter that affects or relates to—
  1.  work done or to be done; or
  1.  the privileges, rights or functions of –
  1.   employers or employees; or
  1.  persons who have been, or propose to be, or who may become, employers or employees; or
  1.  a matter the court or commission considers has been, is, or may be a cause of contributory cause of an industrial action or industrial dispute.
  1.  However, a matter is not an industrial matter if it is the subject of a proceeding for –
  1.  an indictable offence; or
  1.  a public service appeal.
  1.  Without limiting subsection (1) or affecting subsection (2), a matter is an industrial matter if it relates to a matter mentioned in schedule 1.”
  1. [48]
    Section 9(3) refers to Schedule 1 and prescribed “industrial matters”.  Relevantly Schedule 1 prescribes as industrial matters:

“…

16 a claim to dismiss or to refuse to employ a particular person or class of person, or whether a particular person or class of person, ought to be continued or reinstated in the employment of a particular employer, considering the public interest, despite common law rights of employers or employees

17 the right to dismiss, or to refuse to employ, reinstate or re-employ a particular person, or class of person, in a particular calling

…

21 what is fair and just, considering the interests of the persons immediately concerned and the community, according to the standard of the average good employer and the average competent and honest employee in all matters relating to the relations of employers and employees, whether or not the relationship of employer and employee exists or existed –

  1.   at or before the making of a relevant application to the court or commission; or
  1.  at the making or enforcement of a decision of the court or commission

22 the regulation of relations between employer and employee or between employees, and to that end the imposition of conditions on –

  1.  the conduct of a calling; and
  1.  the provision of benefits to persons engaged in a calling

…

25 the surveillance of employees in the workplace

26 sexual harassment or sex or gender-based harassment of an employee in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the employee’s employment …”

  1. [49]
    Section 449 of the IR Act, which is relevant to the operation of s 219E of the CC Act, provides as follows:

“449 Limitations on jurisdiction

The commission does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide a matter about which another Act excludes –

  1.  the jurisdiction of the commission about the matter; or
  1.  the application of a decision under this Act about the matter.”
  1. [50]
    The QIRC’s jurisdiction is made exclusive by s 450:

“450 Commission’s jurisdiction is exclusive

The original and appellate jurisdiction conferred on the commission by this Act or another an Act is exclusive of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or another court or tribunal, unless otherwise prescribed under this Act or the other Act.”[25]

  1. [51]
    The QCAT is established by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (the “QCAT Act”).
  2. [52]
    Jurisdiction of QCAT is derived from two sources namely the QCAT Act itself and any “enabling Act”.[26]  An enabling Act is an Act which confers jurisdiction upon QCAT.[27]  The jurisdiction may be original jurisdiction or, relevantly here “review jurisdiction”.[28] 
  3. [53]
    Section 20(2) of the QCAT Act prescribes the nature of a review by QCAT as:

“20 Review involves fresh hearing

…

  1.  The tribunal must hear and decide a review of a reviewable decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.”
  1. [54]
    Section 219Q of the CC Act modifies the operation of s 20(2) of the QCAT Act.  Section 219Q of the CC Act provides:

“219Q QCAT to decide review on evidence before decision maker

  1.  A review of a reviewable decision is by way of rehearing on the evidence (original evidence) given in the proceeding before the original decision-maker (original proceeding).
  1.  However, QCAT may give leave to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence (new evidence) if satisfied-
  1.  the person seeking to adduce the new evidence did not know, or could not reasonably be expected to have known, or its existence at the original proceedings; or
  1.  in the special circumstances of the case, it would be unfair not to allow the person to adduce the new evidence
  1.  If QCAT gives leave under subsection (2), the review is-
  1.  by way of rehearing on the original evidence; and
  1.  on the new evidence adduced.”
  1. [55]
    Section 219Q was held in Willmott v Carless[29] to require QCAT to identify error before interfering with a disciplinary decision against a police officer made under the PSA Act.[30] The QCAT does not conduct a hearing de novo.
  2. [56]
    It is common ground that:
    1. a decision made “on the way”[31] to the making of a disciplinary decision[32] is not a “reviewable decision” under s 219O of the CC Act;[33] and
    2. no jurisdiction is vested in QCAT to determine the question identified in the Notices of Industrial Dispute, at least until a disciplinary decision is made.

The questions

  1. [57]
    As already observed, the QIRC is a court of limited jurisdiction.  Apart from specific jurisdiction vested by the IR Act or by particular statutes, the QIRC’s jurisdiction is limited to the determination of “industrial disputes” or questions “arising out of an industrial matter”.  An “industrial dispute” is, relevantly here, a dispute about “an industrial matter”.
  2. [58]
    Therefore, the first question is whether the dispute between the parties as to whether the covert recordings could or should be used in disciplinary proceedings is “about an industrial matter” or whether it is a question “arising out of an industrial matter”.  If so, then prima facie, the QIRC has jurisdiction over that “industrial matter”. 
  3. [59]
    If the answer to the first question is “no” then no further question arises.  If the answer to the first question is “yes”, then a second question arises as to whether there is some exclusion of the QIRC’s jurisdiction.  If the answer to that question is “yes” then the third question is as to the extent of the exclusion.
  4. [60]
    As earlier observed,[34] Mr McLeod KC for the QPS accepted that QCAT does not have jurisdiction to resolve what he described as “interlocutory challenges” to a disciplinary proceeding notice.  That concession is obviously correctly made.  Division 4 of Part 7 of the PSA Act provides for the making of two decisions: a finding that disciplinary grounds are proved;[35] and for the imposition of sanction.[36]  The jurisdiction of QCAT in relation to the review of decisions about police discipline is limited to those decisions within Schedule 1 of the CC Act.  Those two decisions are, relevantly, the only decisions which appear in Schedule 1.[37]
  5. [61]
    Mr McLeod submitted that the Supreme Court had previously exercised jurisdiction to resolve disputes which had arisen during, but not upon conclusion of, disciplinary proceedings under the PSA Act.  As far as it goes, that submission should be accepted.  The Supreme Court has exercised jurisdiction to intervene in decisions made in various cases even though in some cases an alternative statutory path for review may have existed.  A few examples make the point. 
  6. [62]
    In Flori v Commissioner of Police[38], disciplinary proceedings were undertaken against a police officer.  A search warrant had been issued under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000. The stated purpose of the warrant was to obtain evidence in the investigation of criminal offences.  The warrant was executed and things were seized but no prosecution for any criminal proceeding eventuated.  Disciplinary proceedings were commenced and the Commissioner of Police sought to rely upon the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.  Atkinson J declared that the Commissioner was not entitled to use the material in the disciplinary proceedings, having found that to do so was an abuse of process.[39] 
  7. [63]
    In Hurley v Stewart[40], an application for statutory review of a decision to suspend a police officer was brought and succeeded, even though the decision, which was made under s 6.1 of the PSA Act, could have been the subject of review by the Commissioner of Police Service Reviews.[41] 
  8. [64]
    In a case not involving police discipline, Witthan v Chief Executive, Hospital and Health Service[42], the Court of Appeal held that s 450 of the IR Act did not exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review a decision under the Judicial Review Act 1991.  There, the decision was to issue a mandatory vaccination direction pursuant to provisions of the Hospitals and Health Boards Act 2011.
  9. [65]
    As explained in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW)[43], the Supreme Court of each State maintains a supervisory jurisdiction which “at federation, and remains, the mechanism for the determination and the enforcement of the limits on the exercise of State executive and judicial power by persons and bodies other than the Supreme Court”.[44]  Statutory attempts to remove that jurisdiction may be invalid as removing one of the defining characteristics of a State Supreme Court.[45]
  10. [66]
    Mr McLeod submitted that the fact that access could be had to the Supreme Court to argue whether the covert recordings could be relied upon in disciplinary proceedings brought under the PSA Act meant that the jurisdiction of the QIRC was excluded.  That submission should be rejected.  It misunderstands the nature of the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  The supervisory jurisdiction regulates the exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior court or tribunal.  It does not nullify or exclude the jurisdiction.  If the question of the use of the covert recordings is an “industrial matter” and is therefore prima facie within the jurisdiction of the QIRC, the QIRC maintains jurisdiction in relation to that matter, and the Supreme Court maintains its supervisory jurisdiction over the QIRC.  The real question is whether there is some statutory provision which removes the current disputes from the jurisdiction of the QIRC.
  11. [67]
    No party has pointed to any provision which is said to limit or remove the jurisdiction of the QIRC except s 219E of the CC Act.  The second question for determination in these proceedings is therefore whether s 219E of the CC Act removes or restricts any jurisdiction which would otherwise be vested in the QIRC to determine the “industrial dispute” or the question “arising out of an industrial matter”, which are the current controversies as to whether the covert recordings could or should be used in the disciplinary proceedings against DS Self and DSS Bishop.

The first question:  Is the controversy an “industrial matter”?

  1. [68]
    The grant of jurisdiction upon the QIRC is to hear disputes over “industrial matters” or questions concerning “industrial matters”.  That term has been the subject of consideration in many cases, although not always in the statutory context of the IR Act or legislation equivalent to it.
  2. [69]
    In Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd,[46] the term “industrial matter” was held to catch matters that were “connected with the relationship between an employer in his capacity as an employer and an employee in his capacity as an employee in a way which is direct and not merely consequential …”.[47]  The definition of “industrial matter”[48] in the IR Act is wider than was considered in Cram.  In Minister for Police v Western Australian Police Union of Workers,[49] the Industrial Appeal Court of Western Australia considered a definition in similar terms to the IR Act.  That court considered, in determining whether a dispute was an “industrial matter”, that the first step was to identify the “work, privilege, rights or duties”[50], which are said to be affected by or related to the alleged “matter”.  Once that is identified, the second question is whether “the matter in issue does, as a matter of fact, affect or relate to the identified work, privilege, right or duty”.[51]  Here, the question is as to what material the QPS should have regard when determining a disciplinary matter against an officer. 
  3. [70]
    Section 7.32 of the PSA Act provides as follows:

“7.32  Principles for conducting disciplinary proceeding

In conducting the disciplinary proceeding, the prescribed officer—

  1.  must observe the rules of natural justice; and
  1.  must act as quickly, and with as little formality and technicality, as is consistent with a fair and proper consideration of the matters before the prescribed officer; and
  1.  is not bound by the rules of evidence; and
  1.  may get information on a matter in a way the prescribed officer considers appropriate; and
  1.  may decide the procedures to be followed for the proceeding, subject to any guidelines made under section 7.44.”
  1. [71]
    By s 7.32(c), the prescribed officer is not bound by the rules of evidence and may get information in a way they see appropriate.  However, there are limits.  Material that would not comply with the rules of admissibility may still only be relied upon if it is probative and relevant.  The rules of evidence are at least a guide in determining what material is considered .[52]  Material can also only be relied upon if there is no legal impediment to it being relied upon.  A police officer has a right to have disciplinary proceedings against them conducted in accordance with the PSA Act.  The admission into evidence on such a proceeding of material in breach of those provisions affects that right.
  2. [72]
    This analysis is consistent with what cases there are, some of which have assumed that a dispute over preliminary steps taken in a disciplinary process is an “industrial matter”.[53] In Ganly v Queensland Audit Office,[54] it was held that an employee’s application to restrain the employer from taking disciplinary action was an “industrial matter”, “because it affects or relates to the right of the Respondent as an employer to take disciplinary action against an employee”.[55]
  3. [73]
    Mr McLeod did not seriously contend that a dispute as to what material could or should be relied upon in disciplinary proceedings was not prima facie an “industrial matter”.  His real point was that the dispute was not relevantly an “industrial matter” because of the scheme of the PSA Act, which takes such a dispute away from the QIRC and vests it in QCAT.  During argument on 22 July 2024, this exchange occurred:

“THE PRESIDENT:  Your argument really is, it seems to me, not that conceptually a disciplinary proceeding is not an industrial matter; isn’t your real argument there’s no vesting of jurisdiction here because there’s a specific scheme under the Police Service Administration Act?

MR McLEOD:  Yes, it is. Look, I accept that what is going on here between the respondent and the applicant is a disciplinary process where an employer is exercising a right over an employee.

THE PRESIDENT:  Yes.

MR McLEOD:  I can’t get away from that. That’s commonsense when you look at the relationship of part 7.

THE PRESIDENT:  Yes. So are we really – isn’t this really the point: if you accept that a disciplinary proceeding will generally be an industrial matter it follows that, absent any legislation which excludes the jurisdiction of this tribunal, the disciplinary matter – the disciplinary process or the disciplinary action will be something that this tribunal has jurisdiction over? That’s got to be right, hasn’t it?

MR McLEOD:  In a general sense, yes.”

And later:

“THE PRESIDENT:  On a proper construction of the Act, a decision along the way to the final decision which is reviewable in QCAT is not an industrial matter on the proper construction of the Police Service Administration Act.”

  1. [74]
    The real question then turns on the construction of s 219E of the CC Act.

The second question:  Does s 219E of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 exclude relevant jurisdiction of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission?

  1. [75]
    Section 219E of the CC Act[56] has, as its obvious purpose, the exclusion of jurisdiction which the QIRC might otherwise enjoy over an “industrial matter”.  The jurisdiction which is removed from the QIRC is jurisdiction over certain “matters” described in the section.  Those matters are those “that QCAT may decide for this Act”.[57]
  2. [76]
    During argument on 22 July 2024, Mr McLeod eschewed reliance upon s 219E.  This exchange occurred with Industrial Commissioner Pratt:

“COMMISSIONER PRATT:  Two nineteen E says that:

The Commission doesn’t have jurisdiction in relation to a matter that QCAT may decide for this Act.

Now, “this Act” is the Crime and Corruption Act.  Doesn’t that only relate to QCAT’s power concerning corruption allegations? Sure, QCAT has power in addressing these disciplinary processes. But when the words are “for this Act” it sets out – this Act sets out QCAT’s powers in relation to corruption allegations. That’s not what we’re dealing with here, is it?

MR McLEOD:  No, we’re dealing here with misconduct.

COMMISSIONER PRATT:  Yes. So isn’t 219E something that’s not relevant to this process?

MR McLEOD:  I don’t rely upon it.

COMMISSIONER PRATT:  All right.”

  1. [77]
    In his written submission filed after the hearing, Mr McLeod withdrew that concession and submitted that s 219E operated to exclude from the QIRC, jurisdiction “in relation to [any] matter that QCAT may decide” under Part 3 of Chapter 5 of the CC Act.
  2. [78]
    The applicants, through Mr Black of counsel, conceded that s 219E applied to “matters” for which QCAT is given jurisdiction to hear by the provisions of Part 3 of Chapter 5 of the CC Act.
  3. [79]
    The respective positions adopted by the parties in their written submissions are correct.  Section 219E does have operation in relation to jurisdiction vested in QCAT under Part 3 of Chapter 5 of the CC Act.  Given that the issue is a jurisdictional one which has wide ramifications, we will explain why the parties are correct.
  4. [80]
    Mr McLeod’s concession was made initially upon an understanding that s 219E is located in Part 2 of Chapter 5.  Part 2 concerns allegations of corrupt conduct.  Part 2 confers upon QCAT jurisdiction to hear “disciplinary proceedings”.  “Disciplinary proceedings” is a term defined for the purposes of Part 2 as a proceeding under s 219F or a proceeding under ss 219FA or 219G for a “reviewable decision”.  Proceedings under s 219F are proceedings “to hear and decide an allegation of corrupt conduct …”.  A “reviewable decision” for Part 2 is “… a decision made in relation to an allegation of corruption” but excluding a decision made by a court or QCAT, or a decision under Part 7 of the PSA Act. 
  5. [81]
    Part 3 of Chapter 5 bestows upon QCAT jurisdiction to hear reviews from decisions made under Part 7 of the PSA Act.[58]
  6. [82]
    If s 219E only has operation in relation to proceedings brought under Part 2 of Chapter 5, then it does not exclude the jurisdiction of the QIRC in proceedings brought under Part 3.  The answer to whether that is so lies in the proper construction of s 219E.
  7. [83]
    The process of construction of statutory provisions involves the discernment of the meaning of the words of the text in their proper context[59] and with reference to purpose.[60]
  8. [84]
    The following can be observed about QCAT’s jurisdiction as it presently stands:
    1. “corruption” includes both “corrupt conduct” and “police misconduct”;
    2. “corrupt conduct” does not include “police misconduct” although police may commit “corrupt conduct”;
    3. QCAT has jurisdiction to hear disciplinary proceedings involving “corrupt conduct” which excludes “police misconduct”;
    4. by Part 2 of Chapter 5, QCAT has jurisdiction to hear reviews of “reviewable decisions” about “corruption” but which are not decisions under Part 7 of the PSA Act; and
    5. by Part 3 of Chapter 5, QCAT has jurisdiction to hear reviews of decisions made under Part 7 of the PSA Act.
  9. [85]
    Part of the context against which s 219E must be construed is the legislative history of the CC Act, although historical considerations cannot displace the clear meaning of the Act.[61] That history includes the amendments enacted by the Police Service Administration (Discipline Reform) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2019 (the “Discipline Reform Act”, with the amendments referred to as “the 2019 Amendments”). 
  10. [86]
    The 2019 Amendments altered various provisions of the CC Act and the PSA Act.  Prior to the 2019 Amendments, s 219BA of the CC Act defined “reviewable decision” as:

“219BA  Meaning of reviewable decision

  1.  A reviewable decision means—
  1.  a decision made in relation to an allegation of corruption against a prescribed person, other than a decision made by a court or QCAT; or
  1.  a finding mentioned in the Police Service Administration Act 1990, section 7.4(2A)(b) or 7A.5(1)(b) that corruption is proved against an officer …”
  1. [87]
    The term “corruption” was defined in the CC Act then, and still is, as including corrupt conduct and police misconduct.  A decision made under Part 7 of the PSA Act was a “reviewable decision” and the review lay to QCAT under s 219G.  Before the 2019 Amendments, the CC Act contained ss 219C, 219D, 219DA and 219E in their current form.
  2. [88]
    The PSA Act, before the 2019 Amendments, drew a distinction between a “breach of discipline” and “misconduct”.  As already observed, a decision on “misconduct” was reviewable, by force of the CC Act, by QCAT.  Reviews of decisions concerning a breach of discipline were made to the Commissioner for Police Service Reviews pursuant to Part 9 of the PSA Act.
  3. [89]
    Prior to the 2019 Amendments, Part 3 of Chapter 5 of the CC Act did not exist.  It was introduced by the Discipline Reform Act.  Section 219BA was amended so as to remove decisions made under Part 7 of the PSA Act from the definition of “reviewable decision”.  Part 3 of Chapter 5 was then added to give a right of review to all decisions made under Part 7, whether they were decisions in relation to “misconduct” or “breaches of discipline”.  Part 9A of the PSA Act was amended so as to remove the right of review to the Commissioner for Police Service Reviews in relation to findings concerning breaches of discipline. 
  4. [90]
    These various objectives were explained in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Discipline Reform Act as follows:

“The Bill amends the CC Act by amending the existing chapter 5, part 2 and inserting a new chapter 5, part 3 and new schedule 1. The existing schedule 1 will be relocated to schedule 2.

The current chapter 5, part 2 of the CC Act contains provisions relevant to the review of disciplinary decisions and proceedings in relation to corrupt conduct instituted by the CCC or the chief executive officer of a unit of public administration. These provisions apply not only to police officers, but also any prescribed person, as defined in the CC Act.

The Bill does not amend the provisions in relation to corrupt conduct proceedings being instituted against either police officers or other prescribed persons.

The Bill does however amend the provisions in chapter 5, part 2 that apply to the review of disciplinary decisions relating to police officers. The Bill omits police officers from the application of the existing part 2 provisions regarding the review of disciplinary decisions. However, the amendments do not diminish the ability of the CCC to overview and monitor QPS decisions in disciplinary proceedings.

In order to enhance the scope of the CCC’s ability to apply for review of PSAA disciplinary decisions and to cater for the updated and modernised disciplinary sanctions provided in new Part 7 of the PSAA, the Bill inserts new chapter 5, part 3 which specifically provides for rights of the CCC or subject officer to apply to QCAT for the review of a PSAA disciplinary decision. In doing so, the Bill does not affect the existing provisions in chapter 5, part 2 regarding prescribed persons other than police officers or former police officers.”

  1. [91]
    Division 2 of Part 2 of Chapter 5 is the division which contains ss 219C, 219D, 219DA and 219E and did so prior to the 2019 Amendments.  These provisions concern QCAT’s jurisdiction.  By s 219C, as it appeared before the 2019 Amendments, and appears now, jurisdiction was given to QCAT to conduct “disciplinary proceedings”.  By s 219B, “disciplinary proceedings” included both proceedings under s 219F for corrupt conduct and proceedings under s 219G “for a reviewable decision”.  A “reviewable decision”, prior to the 2019 Amendments, included decisions made under Part 7 of the PSA Act.[62]
  2. [92]
    Part 9 of the PSA Act, both before and after the 2019 Amendments, contained s 9.1A:

“9.1A  Relationship with Industrial Relations Act 2016

The Industrial Court and the Industrial Relations Commission do not have jurisdiction in relation to a matter that has been, is being, or may be reviewed under this part even though it may be, or be about, or arise out of, an industrial matter within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.”

  1. [93]
    Therefore, before the 2019 Amendments, by force of s 219E of the CC Act and s 9.1A of the PSA Act, the jurisdiction of the QIRC was removed as it related to decisions made under Part 7 of the PSA Act. 
  2. [94]
    Now, Part 3 of Chapter 5 grants jurisdiction to QCAT to review all decisions made under Part 7 of the PSA Act.  That includes both decisions on questions of misconduct and also on questions of disciplinary breaches.  As earlier observed, the distinction between those two forms of conduct has been dissolved.
  3. [95]
    There was clearly no intention to make substantive changes in relation to the rights of review of police officers facing “misconduct” allegations previously dealt with in Part 2 of Chapter 5.[63]  This view is supported by the ‘Explanatory Memorandum to the Discipline Reform Act’:

“As a result of providing the CCC with the ability to apply for review of a decision relating to any ground for disciplinary action, a separate review mechanism in the PSAA is not required for decisions in relation to grounds for disciplinary action other than misconduct. The right of an officer to apply for review of these decisions is not affected, other than relocating the relevant provisions to the CC Act. The ability of both officers and the CCC to apply for review of decisions that were previously classified as a ‘breach of discipline’ will be contained in the new chapter 5, part 3 of the CC Act. Therefore, the Bill also amends part 9 of the PSAA to omit the ability of officers to apply for review of decisions regarding ‘breaches of discipline’.”

  1. [96]
    There is no reason to think that Part 3 of Chapter 5 was to operate as a regime distinct from Part 2.  The explanatory memorandum suggests quite to the contrary:

“New chapter 5, part 3 also contains procedural provisions relevant to applications for review of disciplinary decisions under part 7 of the PSAA. In order to avoid confusion with the amended part 2, some provisions have been replicated in part 3 to ensure they remain applicable to applications for review of police disciplinary decisions and the operation of the remaining provisions in part 2 are not adversely affected by the new part 3.”

  1. [97]
    If s 219E is to be read so that the “matter that QCAT may decide” is limited to Part 2 matters, then the 2019 Amendments have effectively introduced a concurrent jurisdiction in the QIRC for reviews provided by Part 3, at least to the extent that these reviews are “industrial matters”.  That is not what was intended.

The third question:  What jurisdiction of the QIRC is excluded by s 219E?

  1. [98]
    Section 219E excludes the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and the QIRC “in relation to a matter that QCAT may decide for this Act”[64].  Part 3 of Chapter 5 is part of “the Act” and Part 3 provides for QCAT to decide matters.[65]
  2. [99]
    The QPS submits that the “matter” which the QCAT may decide “for [the CC Act]” is the review of a disciplinary decision described by s 219O of the CC Act as a “reviewable decision”.  The “matter”, the QPS submits, is the justiciable controversy between the parties.  That, it submits, includes and incorporates any sub issues required to be decided to review the decision.  That jurisdiction is vested in QCAT so is excluded from the QIRC.
  3. [100]
    The applicants submit that QCAT has no jurisdiction to decide, at an interlocutory stage, the point now raised, so that issue (whether the recordings can be relied upon by the prescribed officer) is “the matter”.  As the QCAT has no jurisdiction to hear it, the jurisdiction of the QIRC to do so has not been excluded by s 219E.
  4. [101]
    The term “matter” has been the subject of much jurisprudence as it is a constitutionally recognised term used to define the scope of judicial power.[66]  Where there is a division between Federal and State judicial power and where different Federal and State courts may have jurisdiction, there is a danger that one court may not have jurisdiction to determine the entire dispute.  These considerations are often critical in identification of the “matter”.[67]  Generally the “matter” will be the entire controversy which requires to be litigated.[68]
  5. [102]
    Here, the relevant “matter” is defined within the section (s 219E).  It is a “matter” that “QCAT may decide for this Act”.  Relevantly here, the “matter” is the review of the “reviewable decision” as defined by s 219O and Schedule 1 of the CC Act; a decision to find disciplinary grounds or a decision to impose a sanction under Part 7 of the PSA Act.  That “matter” is to be dealt with on the evidence before the decision-maker[69] and any other evidence which is adduced by leave.[70]  The review is of the nature of an appeal by way of rehearing as that concept is described in Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission,[71] and the person seeking review must show error.[72] 
  6. [103]
    The applicants submit that the powers of the QIRC to review the decision to rely upon the court recordings is wider than any power that QCAT might possess.  The QIRC, it is submitted, could substitute its own judgment of whether the recording should be relied upon but QCAT is limited only to the identification and correction of error of the decision maker (the prescribed officer) in making the decision to consider the recordings.[73]
  7. [104]
    As previously explained, the Supreme Court of a State has a supervisory power of review of the conduct of an inferior court or tribunal.  Any other right of review is a remedy given by statute.[74]  The nature and width of that remedy will depend upon the construction of the provision granting it.[75]
  8. [105]
    Parliament may limit, in whatever way it sees fit, an avenue of review that it has created by statute.  Here the statutory scheme is to remove the jurisdiction of the QIRC[76] and give a right of review to QCAT which is limited to the identification of error. That right of review is given in relation to a “matter” of a particular description.  Contrary to the applicants’ submission, it is no answer to the construction question as to the meaning and width of the “matter” that some decisions, if not caught within the “matter”, may be amenable to a broader review by another court or tribunal.
  9. [106]
    The applicants further submit that if the QIRC has no jurisdiction then they have no remedy (other than application to the Supreme Court) which they can now pursue.  Clearly, QCAT’s jurisdiction is only engaged once a disciplinary decision is made.  It does not follow from that fact that there must be some other statutory avenue available now to challenge the reception into the disciplinary proceedings of the recordings.
  10. [107]
    It is relatively common for statutes to provide a remedy only upon some particular point in the process being reached.  Under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (JR Act) an applicant for review may suffer many adverse decisions “along the way” to a final decision.[77]  The JR Act only gives a remedy to challenge a decision “made under an enactment” which is the ultimate decision which affects rights.[78]  By s 590AA of the Criminal Code, the Crown or accused may bring an application for a pre-trial ruling.  Any challenge to the ruling cannot be by way of interlocutory appeal but may be raised as a ground of appeal against conviction.[79]  There are many cases in which it has been said that it is undesirable to disrupt a criminal proceeding by interlocutory application for relief under the supervisory jurisdiction.[80]
  11. [108]
    At present, no review is on foot.  Indeed, no decision has yet been made which may be the subject of any review.  QCAT may therefore never be seized of any “matter”.
  12. [109]
    Mr Black, for the applicants, points to Division 3 of Part 7 of the PSA Act which concerns “abbreviated disciplinary proceedings”. As already observed[81] that provides a procedure where there can be agreement between the QPS and the officer that there are grounds for discipline and that the penalties should be as nominated by the prescribed officer.  Mr Black submits that the existence of such a procedure points to a legislative intention that the QIRC retain jurisdiction to determine interlocutory disputes which arise prior to the final decision by QCAT.  This is because, he submits, the matter may never reach QCAT.
  13. [110]
    This submission ought to be rejected.  Division 3 throws no light on the proper construction which should be placed on s 219E of the CC Act.  The reason abbreviated disciplinary proceedings would not reach QCAT is that if the officer accepts the prescribed officer’s offer, there is simply no controversy.
  14. [111]
    A controversy may arise in abbreviated disciplinary proceedings.   Taking the example of the current cases, the prescribed officer may, after taking into account the recordings, fashion grounds of discipline and a prescribed penalty.  If the officer disputed the taking into account of the recordings, then they could elect not to accept the offer and then the proceedings continue as disciplinary proceedings.[82]   Ultimately, the disciplinary proceedings would then be concluded and the officer would have a right of review to QCAT.
  15. [112]
    The “matter” is not the proceeding or any future proceeding.  It is the controversy between the parties.[83]  Generally, and dependent always upon the terms of the relevant statute, once the controversy is identified, all issues and claims encompassed within the scope of the controversy fall within the “matter”.[84]
  16. [113]
    The question arises in a jurisdictional sense.  The jurisdiction of QCAT is, for present purposes, limited to certain identifiable “matters”.  As explained by Griffith CJ in South Australia v Victoria[85], “matters” are “controversies which might come before a court of justice”.[86]  This is the terminology used in s 219E of the CC Act.  The jurisdiction which is removed from the QIRC is “in relation to a matter that QCAT may decide for this Act …”.[87] 
  17. [114]
    In Fencott v Muller[88], it was said that in identifying the justiciable controversy, “what is and what is not part of the one controversy depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships”.[89]  The controversy between the parties here is whether the applicants are liable to disciplinary action pursuant to the provisions of the PSA Act.  That controversy is initially sought to be settled by a decision of a prescribed officer and then, if necessary, on review to QCAT.  QCAT then “might” be seized of the question as to whether the determination by the prescribed officer is infected by error.
  18. [115]
    There is nothing to suggest that on a review pursuant to s 219O of the CC Act that QCAT would not have jurisdiction to consider whether there is error committed in relation to any decision by the prescribed officer to rely on particular material, relevantly here, the recordings.  We can identify nothing in the words of the statute to identify any statutory policy or purpose which would lead to such a result. 
  19. [116]
    It is well established that in the one controversy, there may be several distinct “matters”.[90]  That is not the case here.  The PSA Act and the CC Act set up a scheme whereby an officer is charged, the prescribed officer determines whether the charge is made out and what the penalty should be and then QCAT may correct any error.  An integral part of a decision maker’s function is to determine what they should or should not consider in order to make the decision.[91]  The legislation does not create any separate or distinct steps of selecting evidence to rely upon.  There are no separate statutorily prescribed limitations upon what material may be relied upon by the prescribed officer.  The selection by the prescribed officer of material upon which to make the disciplinary decisions is not a distinct “matter”.
  20. [117]
    It follows then that:
  1. whether the prescribed officer can or should rely on the recordings is part of the “matter” of which QCAT “might” be seized; and
  2. therefore, by force of s 219E, the QIRC does not have jurisdiction to decide that issue.
  1. [118]
    The applicants submit that there is “binding authority as to the interpretation and operation of s 91.A of the PSA Act”.  That authority may be contrary to the view we have formed.  Section 9.1A is in terms similar to s 219E of the CC Act and was held in Simpson v Queensland Police Service[92] to not exclude the jurisdiction of the QIRC to hear “industrial matters”.
  2. [119]
    The applicants submit that Simpson supports their construction of s 219E and that the decision, being a decision of the Industrial Court of Queensland (ICQ), is binding upon the Full Bench of the QIRC.  For reasons which follow, we do not consider ourselves bound by the decision in Simpson.
  3. [120]
    The QIRC may be constituted by a single Industrial Commissioner or by a Full Bench of three.[93]  The ICQ may be constituted by the President, the Vice President or one of the Deputy Presidents, all of whom are presidential members of the QIRC.[94] 
  4. [121]
    On appeal from a decision of an Industrial Commissioner sitting alone, whether or not that Commissioner is a presidential member, lies to the ICQ.[95]  From the ICQ, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.[96]
  5. [122]
    Where a Full Bench of the QIRC which does not include the President as a member decides a case, the appeal lies to the ICQ.[97]  Where a Full Bench which does include the President as a member decides a case, the appeal lies directly to the Court of Appeal.[98]
  6. [123]
    The general hierarchical structure established by the IR Act is three-tiered.  At the bottom is the QIRC, whether constituted as a single Industrial Commissioner or a Full Bench.  Above the QIRC is the ICQ, and above that is the Court of Appeal.  Decisions of the Court of Appeal bind the ICQ and the QIRC, however the QIRC might be constituted.  Where the QIRC is constituted either as a single member or a Full Bench where the President is not sitting, the QIRC will be bound by decisions of the ICQ.  The presently constituted Full Bench having the President as one of its members is not amenable to appeal to the ICQ.  Therefore, this Full Bench does not consider itself bound by decisions of the ICQ, although of course decisions of the ICQ are of high persuasive value.  A court is only bound by the decisions of another court where that other court has authority to correct the first court’s decision via appeal.[99]  As explained by Stephen J in Viro v The Queen:[100]

“The first duty of a court is to administer justice according to law. However in the case of an inferior court[101] operating within a system where the doctrine of precedent applies, the existence of authority binding upon it determines for it what it must understand to be the law. It must accept the law to be as that precedent authority has declared it to be, whatever may be its own inclinations in the matter. The sanction implicit in the doctrine of precedent is simple and effective: if an inferior court fails to observe the doctrine the superior court will correct its decision on appeal. Thus the existence of an appeal is inherent, in and essential to the doctrine.”[102]

  1. [124]
    Simpson was decided well before the 2019 Amendments and is not a decision concerning s 219E of the CC Act.  The decision concerns an analogous section in the PSA Act.  Even if decisions of the ICQ were binding upon this Full Bench, Simpson would be of only persuasive value in any event.
  2. [125]
    It is unnecessary to consider the correctness of Simpson.  To the extent that it is inconsistent with the analysis of the various provisions which we have considered, we will not follow Simpson.

Conclusions

  1. [126]
    The Full Bench has determined that the QIRC has no jurisdiction to entertain the questions raised by the Notices of Industrial Dispute lodged by the applicants.
  2. [127]
    Mr McLeod accepted that he would not seek costs if successful. Otherwise, the Full Bench has not heard submissions as to the form of the relevant orders and the parties should have an opportunity to make submissions about that aspect.
  3. [128]
    The Full Bench orders:
  1. The Full Bench determines that the Commission has no jurisdiction to hear the matters raised by the Notices of Industrial Dispute.
  2. There shall be no order as to costs of the applications.
  3. Within 7 days, the parties file written submissions as to what other orders should be made following the determination that the QIRC has no jurisdiction to hear the matters raised by the Notices of Industrial Dispute.
  4. The question of the final orders be determined on any written submissions received and without further oral hearing.

Footnotes

[1]  The proceedings were referred to the Full Bench pursuant to s 486 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016.

[2] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 7.25.

[3]  A letter from DS Self’s solicitors.

[4]  This extract is from the Notice of Industrial Dispute filed by DS Self.  The Notice of Industrial Dispute filed on behalf of DSS Bishop is in equivalent terms.

[5] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 1.3.

[6] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 7.4.

[7] Police Service Administration Act 1990, Sch 2, definition of ‘prescribed responsibility’.

[8] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 4.8.

[9]  Defined as the ‘Crime and Corruption Commissioner’.

[10]  Legislative notes omitted.

[11] Police Service Administration Act 1990, Sch 2.

[12] Police Service Administration Act 1990, ss 7.3, 7.4, 7.9.

[13]  Commencing at s 7.15.

[14]  Legislative notes omitted.

[15] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 7.27(4).

[16] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 7.31(2).

[17] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009, s 157(2)(c).

[18]  See Schedule 2.

[19]  See Schedule 2.

[20]  As appears in paragraph [19] of these reasons.

[21]  As appears in paragraph [21] of these reasons.

[22] Crime and Corruption Act 2001, ss 219C, 219F.

[23] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 219BA(1)(a)(ii).

[24] Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 219B.

[25]  See generally Witthahn v Chief Executive, Hospital and Health Services (2021) 9 QR 642.

[26] Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, s 9(1).

[27]  Section 6(2).

[28]  Section 9(2).

[29]  [2024] QCA 115.

[30]  Analogous to the type of appeal described in Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194, see Willmott v Carless [2024] QCA 115 at [38]-[42].

[31] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 339.

[32]  A decision appearing in Schedule 1, column 1 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001.

[33]  Which appears at paragraph [41] of these reasons.

[34]  Paragraph [56] of these reasons.

[35] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 7.27.

[36] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 7.30.

[37]  See paragraph [40] of these reasons.

[38]  [2015] 2 Qd R 497.

[39]  Following Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408 at 423-424.

[40]  [2016] QSC 154.

[41] Police Service Administration Act 1990, Part 9; and Judicial Review Act 1991 ss 11-14.

[42]  (2021) 9 QR 642.

[43]  (2010) 239 CLR 531.

[44]  At [98].

[45]  At [99]-[100].

[46]  (1987) 163 CLR 117.

[47]  At 133.

[48] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 9; reproduced at paragraph [47] of these reasons.

[49]  (1995) 75 WAIG 1504.

[50]  In the Industrial Relations Act 2016 it is “functions” not “duties”.

[51]  At 1508; followed in Civil Service Association of Western Australia (Incorporated) v Director General, Ministry of Justice [2001] WAIRComm 4470 at [25].

[52] R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256, followed in Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390 at [17].

[53] Langerak v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 327; and Simpson v Queensland Police Service [2002] ICQ 47.

[54]  [2015] QIRC 108.

[55]  At [77].

[56]  Which appears at paragraph [43] of these reasons.

[57] Crime and Corruption Act 2001.

[58] Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 219O; set out at paragraph [40] of these reasons.

[59] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69].

[60] R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507 at [31]-[37].

[61] Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47].

[62]  Parts 7 and 9 draw a distinction between “misconduct” and “breach of discipline”. Part 9 ???? “Reviewable decision” under s 219BA(1) of the CC Act was a decision made in relation to an allegation of “corruption” and police misconduct was “corruption”

[63] Crime and Corruption Act 2001, ss 291BA-219C.

[64]  Emphasis added.

[65]  Relevantly, Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 219BA.

[66]  It appears in Chapter 3 of the Commonwealth Constitution.

[67] Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 at 608; Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 at 585-586.

[68] Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457 at 512; and see the discussion by French J (as his Honour then was) in Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 at [83]-[88].

[69] Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 219Q(1).

[70] Crime and Corruption Act 2001, s 219Q(2).

[71]  (2000) 203 CLR 194.

[72] Willmott v Carless [2024] QCA 115.

[73] Willmott v Carless [2024] QCA 115.

[74] Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Sydney) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616 at 619.

[75] Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Sydney) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616 at 620; and see generally Turnbull v New South Wales Medical Board [1976] 2 NSWLR 281 per Glass JA at 297, describing various types of judicial review.

[76]  To review “industrial matters”.

[77] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 336.

[78] Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99.

[79] Criminal Code, s 590AA(4).

[80] Bacon v Rose [1972] 2 NSWLR 793 at 797-798; and Lamb v Moss (1983) 49 ALR 533 at 545.

[81]  Paragraph [25] of these reasons.

[82] Police Service Administration Act 1990, s 7.17A(2).

[83] Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478 at [26]; CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley (2016) 259 CLR 339 at [27]; and AZC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 674 at [31].

[84] Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478 at [26] following Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 at 603.

[85]  (1911) 12 CLR 667.

[86]  Emphasis added; South Australia v Victoria (1911) 12 CLR 667 at 675, followed in Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478 at [26].

[87]  Emphasis added.

[88]  (1983) 152 CLR 570.

[89]  At 608, followed in Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478 at [26].

[90] Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332 at 351 and the various authorities examined in WDR Delaware Corporation v Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd (2016) 245 FCR 452 at [102] and following.

[91] The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45 at 49, followed in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40, Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 375.

[92]  [2002] ICQ 47.

[93] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 432(2) and (3).

[94] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 409.

[95] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557.

[96] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 554.

[97] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 557(1) and (5).

[98] Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 554(1).

[99] Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 per Barwick CJ at 93, Gibbs J (as his Honour then was) at 120-121, Stephen J at 131, Mason J (as his Honour then was) at 135, Jacobs J at 151 and Murphy J at 166; Murphy J decided the point somewhat differently, page 158-166.

[100]  (1978) 141 CLR 88.

[101]  His Honour is there referring to any court which is not a court of final appeal.

[102]  At 129.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Self and Bishop v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Self and Bishop v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • MNC:

    [2024] QIRC 271

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Davis J

  • Date:

    25 Nov 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] HCA 41
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) (2009) 239 CLR 27
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2009) 239 CLR 27
Cite 2 - (2009) 239 CLR 27
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 170 CLR 321
Cite 2 - (1990) 170 CLR 321
Cite 3 - (1990) 170 CLR 321
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) HCA 33
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) HCA 33
AZC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affair (2023) 97 ALJR 674
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2023) 97 ALJR 674
Cite 2 - (2023) 97 ALJR 674
AZC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 26
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] HCA 26
Bacon v Rose [1972] 2 NSWLR 793
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1972] 2 NSWLR 793
Cite 2 - [1972] 2 NSWLR 793
Builders Licensing Board v Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1976) 135 CLR 616
Cite 2 - (1976) 135 CLR 616
CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley [2016] HCA 2
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] HCA 2
CGU Insurance Limited v Blakeley (2016) 259 CLR 339
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2016) 259 CLR 339
Cite 2 - (2016) 259 CLR 339
Civil Service Association of Western Australia (Incorporated) v Director General, Ministry of Justice [2001] WAIRComm 4470
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] WAIRComm 4470
Cite 2 - [2001] WAIRComm 4470
Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 203 CLR 194
Cite 2 - (2000) 203 CLR 194
Cite 3 - (2000) 203 CLR 194
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] HCA 47
Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1999) 198 CLR 511
Cite 2 - (1999) 198 CLR 511
Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570
4 citations
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Cite 1 - (1983) 152 CLR 570
Cite 2 - (1983) 152 CLR 570
Cite 3 - (1983) 152 CLR 570
Cite 4 - (1983) 152 CLR 570
Fencott v Muller [1983] HCA 12
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1983] HCA 12
Flori v Commissioner of Police[2015] 2 Qd R 497; [2014] QSC 284
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QSC 284
Cite 2 - [2015] 2 Qd R 497
Cite 3 - [2015] 2 Qd R 497
Ganly v Queensland Audit Office [2015] QIRC 108
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QIRC 108
Cite 2 - [2015] QIRC 108
Griffith University v Tang (2005) HCA 7
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) HCA 7
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 221 CLR 99
Cite 2 - (2005) 221 CLR 99
Hurley v Stewart [2016] QSC 154
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QSC 154
Cite 2 - [2016] QSC 154
Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 178 CLR 408
Cite 2 - (1993) 178 CLR 408
Johns v Australian Securities Commission [1993] HCA 56
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1993] HCA 56
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] FCA 1572
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v SO Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 104 FCR 564
Cite 2 - (2000) 104 FCR 564
Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (2010) 239 CLR 531
Cite 2 - (2010) 239 CLR 531
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of NSW (2010) HCA 1
1 citation
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Cite 1 - (2010) HCA 1
Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Ltd [2010] HCA 32
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] HCA 32
Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2010) 241 CLR 390
Cite 2 - (2010) 241 CLR 390
Lamb v Moss (1983) 49 ALR 533
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1983) 49 ALR 533
Cite 2 - (1983) 49 ALR 533
Lamb v Moss [1983] FCA 264
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1983] FCA 264
Langerak v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 327
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 327
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 327
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Cite 2 - (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1986] HCA 40
Minister for Police v Western Australian Police Union of Workers (1995) 75 WAIG 1504
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 75 WAIG 1504
Cite 2 - (1995) 75 WAIG 1504
Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478
5 citations
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Cite 1 - (2017) 259 CLR 478
Cite 2 - (2017) 259 CLR 478
Cite 3 - (2017) 259 CLR 478
Cite 4 - (2017) 259 CLR 478
Cite 5 - (2017) 259 CLR 478
Palmer v Ayres [2017] HCA 5
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] HCA 5
Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 7
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1981] HCA 7
Phillip Morris Inc v Adam Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1981) 148 CLR 457
Cite 2 - (1981) 148 CLR 457
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1998] HCA 28
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
Cite 2 - (1998) 194 C.L.R 355
R v A2 [2019] HCA 35
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [2019] HCA 35
R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
Cite 2 - (2019) 269 CLR 507
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1979] HCA 62
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1979] HCA 62
R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal and Anor; Ex Parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1933) 50 CLR 228
Cite 2 - (1933) 50 CLR 228
R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal and Anor; Ex Parte Bott [1933] HCA 30
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1933] HCA 30
R. v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1979) 144 CLR 45
Cite 2 - (1979) 144 CLR 45
Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors' Association Ltd [1987] HCA 28
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1987] HCA 28
Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 117
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1987) 163 CLR 117
Cite 2 - (1987) 163 CLR 117
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 27
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1999] HCA 27
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1981) 38 ALR 363
Cite 2 - (1981) 38 ALR 363
Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar [1981] FCA 191
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1981] FCA 191
Simpson v Queensland Police Service [2002] ICQ 47
3 citations
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Cite 1 - [2002] ICQ 47
Cite 2 - [2002] ICQ 47
Cite 3 - [2002] ICQ 47
South Australia v State of Victoria (1911) 12 CLR 667
3 citations
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Cite 1 - (1911) 12 CLR 667
Cite 2 - (1911) 12 CLR 667
Cite 3 - (1911) 12 CLR 667
South Australia v Victoria [1911] HCA 17
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1911] HCA 17
Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien (1990) 169 CLR 332
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (1990) 169 CLR 332
Cite 2 - (1990) 169 CLR 332
Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v O'Brien [1990] HCA 8
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1990] HCA 8
Turnbull v New South Wales Medical Board (1976) 2 NSWLR 281
1 citation
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Cite 1 - (1976) 2 NSWLR 281
Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88
3 citations
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Cite 1 - (1978) 141 CLR 88
Cite 2 - (1978) 141 CLR 88
Cite 3 - (1978) 141 CLR 88
Viro v The Queen [1978] HCA 9
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [1978] HCA 9
WDR Delaware Corporation v Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd (2016) 245 FCR 452
2 citations
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Cite 1 - (2016) 245 FCR 452
Cite 2 - (2016) 245 FCR 452
WDR Delaware Corporation v Hydrox Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1164
1 citation
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Cite 1 - [2016] FCA 1164
Willmott v Carless [2024] QCA 115
5 citations
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Cite 1 - [2024] QCA 115
Cite 2 - [2024] QCA 115
Cite 3 - [2024] QCA 115
Cite 4 - [2024] QCA 115
Cite 5 - [2024] QCA 115
Witthahn v Chief Executive of Hospital and Health Services and Director General of Queensland Health(2021) 9 QR 642; [2021] QCA 282
4 citations
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Cite 1 - [2021] QCA 282
Cite 2 - (2021) 9 QR 642
Cite 3 - (2021) 9 QR 642
Cite 4 - (2021) 9 QR 642

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Queensland Alumina Limited v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2025] QIRC 1821 citation
1

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