CITATION: | State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees [2024] QIRC 289 |
PARTIES: | State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Applicant) v Together Queensland, Industrial Union of Employees (Respondent) |
CASE NO: | D/2023/61 |
PROCEEDING: | Industrial Dispute - Application in existing proceedings |
DELIVERED ON: | 6 December 2024 |
MEMBER: HEARD AT: | McLennan IC On the papers |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | INDUSTRIAL LAW – INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE – where Respondent filed application pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) to dismiss the substantive matter – application to dismiss the substantive matter is granted |
LEGISLATION: | Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act s 44 Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 3, s 261, s 262, s 426, s 531, s 541 Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 130 Circular No: 01/22 – Public sector employees contesting elections Circular No: 03/14 – Public sector employees contesting elections Queensland Public Health Sector Certified Agreement (No. 10) 2019 cl 4 |
CASES: | Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18 Department of Corrective Services v The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees [2006] ICQ 27 Fardon v Attorney-General of Queensland [2004] HAC 46 Hennessy v Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service [2020] QIRC 081 Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd t/a Ray White Surfers Paradise v Percival (2003) 174 QGIG 643 Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees (for Leslie Rojas-Carranza) v Brisbane City Council [2018] QIRC 042 Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Council of the City of Gold Coast [2024] QIRC 43 Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Council of the City of Gold Coast [2023] QIRC 181 State of Queensland (Metro South Hospital and Health Service) v Andrew Misiura [2015] QIRC 030 State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006 State of Queensland v The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees [2003] ICQ 8 The Australian Workers' Union of Employees, Queensland v State of Queensland [2012] QCA 353 Together Queensland Industrial Union of Employees v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] ICQ 16 Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v J W Alexander Ltd [1918] 25 CLR 434 |
Reasons for Decision
Summary of industrial dispute
Relevant Legislation
130Right of reappointment
(1)This section applies if –
(a)a person held an office of service with the State and the office was permanent (the former office); and
(b)the person resigned from that office to become a candidate for election as any of the following –
(i)a senator or a member of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth Parliament;
(ii)a member of the Legislative Assembly; and
(c)the person was a defeated candidate at the election.
(2)The person is entitled to be –
(a)reappointed to the former office; or
(b)appointed to another service with the State, whether of the same classification level or a lower classification level as the former office.
…
… who has resigned to participate in federal or state election and was not elected to:
…
Where a person has been reappointed, the continuity of the person's service if taken not to have been broken by their resignation.
Chronology
Date | Event |
4 April 2022 | Mr Kerrigan resigned from his AO5 AODS role with CWHHS, to be a candidate in the 2022 Federal Election.[6] |
15 April 2022 | Mr Kerrigan's AO5 AODS role "became permanently vacant."[7] |
21 May 2022 | Federal Election held. Mr Kerrigan was not elected. |
23 May 2022 | Mr Kerrigan requested reappointment to the AO5 AODS role.[8] He was then informed "the position no longer existed, and a meeting would be arranged with CWHHS to explore suitable vacant positions."[9] |
On or around 26 May 2022 | Mr West[10] (CWHHS) and Mr Kerrigan discussed possible options for reappointment, in a telephone discussion.[11] |
9 June 2022 | Mr West emailed Mr Kerrigan "advising of the vacant roles at Barcaldine Hospital and their wage rates, which included a role as a CA3 Medical Imaging Clinical Assistant …"[12] |
30 June 2022 | Mr Kerrigan emailed Mr West "requesting a meeting to discuss the proposal that [he] be appointed to the Medical Imaging Clinical Assistant position."[13] (Mr Bernie[14] and Mr Abbott[15] were amongst the five people copied into that email).[16] |
8 July 2022 | A meeting occurred between Mr West, Ms Coombe,[17] Mr Kerrigan and Mr Bernie.[18] At the meeting "Ms Coombe offered to seek Director-General approval for an above award payment for the position of CA3 Medical Imaging Clinical Assistant for a set period, to be paid at Mr Kerrigan's rate of his previous role as AODS Coordinator (AO 5.4) and said a new letter of offer would be issued for the Medical Imaging Clinical Assistant role."[19] |
13 July 2022 | Mr Kerrigan was given a Letter of Offer for the Medical Imaging Clinical Assistant role, that provided "This appointment is subject to [CWHHS] receiving approval from the Director-General (of Queensland Health) for the provision of salary maintenance for a period of 12 (twelve) months at the same pay level of your previous pay level (AO 5.4)."[20] |
21 July 2022 | Mr Bernie emailed Ms Coombe "requesting minutes of the meeting held on 8 July 2022", whereby he noted "we all came to an Agreement of Salary maintenance for 12 months."[21] |
25 July 2022 | Mr Kerrigan signed the Letter of Offer.[22] |
4 August 2022 | The Acting Chief Operating Officer "officially approved the appointment of Mr Kerrigan to a CA3 Medical Imaging Clinical Assistant" role "with salary maintenance, at the rate of an AO 5.4 for 12 months, which was backdated to 30 May 2022."[23] |
11 August 2022 | Mr Kerrigan was advised of the decision to approve the above award payment.[24] |
16 May 2023 | CWHHS received correspondence from Together Union advising that the parties would be in dispute unless Mr Kerrigan's "position is reinstated, or he is deployed into an AO5 or equivalent position".[25] |
26 May 2023 | CWHHS responded to Together Union advising that it did not agree to reinstate Mr Kerrigan's previous position or redeploy him elsewhere.[26] |
19 June 2023 | Together Union filed an industrial dispute seeking "that our member be reinstated into his position …"[27] |
Background
Application in existing proceedings filed
An order under section 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act to dismiss the Notice of Dispute on the basis that it would not be in the public interest.
Section 541(b)(ii)
541Decisions generally
The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following-
(b)dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers-
(i)the cause is trivial; or
(ii)further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;
(c)order a party to the cause to pay another party the expenses, including witness expenses, it considers appropriate.
Submissions
Respondent's submissions
1. Remedies sought are not available via an industrial dispute pathway - or ought to have been sought under other provisions
… reliance on C/2003/7 – State of Queensland and the Public Sector Union of Employees and C/2006/18 – Department of Corrective Services and the Queensland Public Sector Union for Employees. However, it submits these decisions of President Hall were respectfully, not sound and the more recent decision of Vice President Linnane is to be preferred. Further, as set out below, a distinguishing factor here is the attempt to avoid the time limitations of a Public Service Appeal.[44]
… ought to have been brought under the reinstatement provisions of the IR Act (noting that the time to do so has since expired), by making application under s 475 for unpaid wages, or by seeking a declaration under s 463 by an application under s 464 of the IR Act.[45]
2. Remedies sought unavailable via the 'General Powers' provision of the IR Act
3. Subject matter of dispute has already been resolved
… the matter of Mr Kerrigan's reemployment has already been resolved … Importantly, Mr Kerrigan has already been provided with a remedy in circumstances where he signed and accepted reappointment at a lower classification but with salary maintenance for 12 months.[58]
4. Model Litigant
Notifier's submissions
… whether Mr Kerrigan's rights can be eroded by the unjust actions of an employer which contravened provisions of an industrial instrument and whether the employer's failure to employ a failed candidate at the same classification level is consistent with the legislative purposes of the provision.[62]
1. It is in the public interest to hear the case
What is in the public interest requires a value judgement, relevant to this case, is whether the employer should be allowed to benefit from a contravention of an industrial instrument to the detriment of an employee, whether the employer has acted in a fair and just way when considering the legislative rights of Mr Kerrigan to be restored in employment after participating in our democratic processes of contesting a federal election.[63]
[37]As President Hall has indicated every litigant should have matters of fact and law determined via the normal rules of procedure, unless the case is so obviously untenable that it cannot succeed. The need to rely upon witness evidence which is contested indicates that there are disputed facts and the Commission cannot draw conclusion on the contested facts without recourse to the normal rules of procedure. Hence the Commission cannot draw the conclusion that the case is obviously untenable and therefore cannot dismiss the matter or determine no further are warranted in the public interest.
[38]One of the grounds of the application relates to the contested issues of fact that can only be resolved by witness evidence and cross-examination, hence the tendered affidavit. We dispute the conclusions of the witness affidavit.
[39]We would indicate that if there were formal hearings in respect of this matter we would object to the admissibility of parts of the affidavit as it presents the subjective views of one party as to what was considered in the provision of salary maintenance and cannot be used as evidence of an agreement between the parties. If the provision of salary maintenance was meant to be settlement of all matters, the usual practice would involve the execution of a deed of settlement, this did not occur.[67]
2. ICQ interpretation binds QIRC
3. Reinstatement remedy not available under Part 2 of Chapter 8 of the IR Act
For those provisions to be enlivened there needs to be a termination of employment at the employer's initiative. There was no such termination. Mr Kerrigan resigned his position to enable him to participate in a democratic process of our society, namely contest a federal election. The Commonwealth Constitution prohibits certain public sector employees from contesting elections, hence they are required to resign such employment. The State of Queensland through legislative means enable unsuccessful candidates certain rights of re-employment.[73]
4. Remedy not available under PS Act
… the dispute is an attempt to seek resolution of the matter outside the time limitation of a Public Sector Appeal. This is a ludicrous claim, section 195(f) of the then Act precludes a Public Service Appeal about a decision about the classification level of employment. Disputes about the classification level of employment can only be determined pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 2016.[74]
5. General Powers can be used to provide relief
… the Industrial Court has made a specific interpretation of the provisions in the Act which provide the power to the Commission to exercise any of the General Powers available to it to resolve an industrial dispute and whether specific powers bestowed to the Commission by particular sections of the Act restrict the General Powers available to the Commission in resolving an industrial dispute.
C/2003/7 and C/2006/18 involved both our union and the State of Queensland, this the State of Queensland is unable to press the claim that the decision of President Hall was not sound due to the principle of issue estoppel.
The [State of Queensland] should not be able to rehash arguments it presented to the Industrial Court and lost.[75]
The parties should have the right to address the Commission on the appropriate remedies after the 4 questions are determined. If we are successful on any of the answers to the first four questions, it is logical that there may be a range of remedial outcomes to be determined after both parties have put before the Commission their arguments in support of the range of remedial action, it is worth noting that the Commission has within its general powers the ability to determine a remedial outcome even if not suggested by the parties.[76]
While relief is not available pursuant to Part 2 of Chapter 8 [of the IR Act], this does not prevent the Commission in a dispute proceeding to issue orders of a similar nature to a reinstatement decision utilising the General Powers available to the Commission.[77]
6. Dispute has not already been resolved
Mr Kerrigan has never waived the pursuit of the rights afforded to him by legislation.
Provision of salary maintenance was never conditional upon not pursuing any claim against the employer.
… [The Respondent] claims that Mr Kerrigan has been sufficiently compensated for any failure to consult and the Commission ought not order any further remedy.
In the affidavit material the [Respondent] was maintaining that they had not contravened the industrial instrument.
The [Respondent] maintained that position in the proposed question submitted to Commissioner Power on 19 September 2023.
The [Respondent] did not admit the contravention until the directions hearing on 16 January 2024.
One cannot claim retrospectively that the decision to pay salary maintenance was some form of compensation for contravening the industrial instrument, when the contravention was denied at the time of payment of salary maintenance.
The normal course involving payment of public monies as a settlement of disputed matters is to specify that settlement in a deed, this did not happen in this case, it is not permissible to represent actions based on the subject views of a party as evidence of an agreement between the parties.[78]
7. Model Litigant
Suggesting that the current matter be dismissed pursuant to section 541 because it could have or should have been pursued under Part 2 of Chapter 8 where there would be no jurisdiction for the Commission to entertain such an application is evidence that this application by the State of Queensland has been made vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or that it would have been reasonably apparent that the application had no reasonable prospect of success on this ground.[79]
To claim effectively an abuse of process as the basis to dismiss the matter without any foundation is further evidence that this application has been made vexatiously or without reasonable cause, or that it would have been reasonably apparent that the application had no reasonable prospect of success on this ground.[80]
Relevant cases
In O'Sullivan v Farrer, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ considered the expression 'in the public interest'. Their Honours wrote:
'Indeed, the expression, 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view.'
In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in considering what constitutes 'the public interest' wrote:
'Appeals have lain on the ground that it is in the public interest that leave should be granted in the predecessors to the Act for decades. It has not been considered useful or appropriate to define the concept in other than the most general terms and we do not intend to do so. The expression 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question.
Similarly, in Prange v Brisbane City Council, Hall P held at [3] that:
"The power to dismiss proceedings pursuant to s. 331 of the Act, on the ground that further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest, is a discretionary power. The discretion is not vested in this Court. The discretion is vested in the Commission. Only in limited circumstances may this Court intervene. In House v The King at 504 to 506, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ explained:
'The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.'
In the earlier case of Quaedvlieg & Ors v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd Hall P, in dealing with an application to strike out for want of prosecution, cited with approval the reasoning of Thomas JA in Quinlan v Rothwell as follows:
"There is now a consciousness of the need for some level of efficiency in the use of the courts as a public resource. That, of course, must not displace the need for reasonable access to the courts and the provision of justice according to law in each matter, but it highlights the fact that the former laissez faire attitude by courts towards the leisurely conduct of actions at the will of the parties has ended. At the same time the rules of court are not an end in themselves. They do not exist for the discipline of practitioners or clients, or for the protection of courts from inefficient litigants, but rather as a means of ensuring that issues will be defined in an orderly way and that parties have the opportunity of full preparation of their case before the trial commences. The rules also afford defendants the means of bringing to an end actions in which the other party will not abide by the rules."
…
The process for consideration of an application under s 541 does not require that the respondent's case be taken at its highest. The cognate provisions in federal legislation were frequently considered by Full Benches of the federal tribunal, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court of Australia. The accepted approach was that the applicant bore the onus of making the claim for relief. But the ascertainment in any particular case of where the public interest lay often depended on a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and was very much a question of fact and degree.
As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials. A "proper consideration" cannot be made where the case for the respondent is simply taken at its highest. While the onus remains on applicant, the requirement to consider the "public interest" cannot be satisfied if an artificial inflation of the respondent's case is applied. Indeed, to take a respondent's case at its highest would almost always result in the dismissal of an application under this section. On an application of this type, a respondent is not relieved of any requirement to advance a case.[84]
In Nugent v. Aromas Pty Ltd I accepted that in exercising the power at s. 331(b) (then the power at s. 90(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1990) respect should be given to the general principle enunciated by O'Connor J in Burton v. The President of the Shire of that:
"Prima facie, every litigant has a right to have matters of law as well as of fact decided according to the ordinary rules of procedure, which give him full time and opportunity for the presentation of his case to the ordinary tribunals, and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to protect its process from abuse by depriving a litigant of these rights and summarily disposing of an action that is frivolous or vexatious in point of law will never be exercised unless the plaintiff's claim is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.".
I continue to adhere to that view. I also accept that great care must be exercised to ensure that under the guise of achieving expeditious finality an applicant is not improperly deprived of the opportunity of having the case tried by the appointed Tribunal, compare General Steel Industries Inc v. Commissioner for Railways (NSW).
Should this proceeding be dismissed under s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act?
The main purpose of this Act is to provide for a framework for cooperative industrial relations that—
531Decisions of the commission and magistrates
…
(a)the persons immediately concerned; and
(b)the community as a whole.
What does the provision at s 130 of the PS Act require?
The Act enables a range of activities. It enables the employer to re-employ the person who contested the election back into the exact same role. It also has a discretion to enable the employer to put them into another role at the same level or at another – at a different or lower level. They are discretionary decisions. Just because they are in the Act doesn't mean that the employer can choose one of those without having to do so in a manner which was just. They are discretionary decisions, and it needs an examination of the purpose of the legislation, and we would say the purpose of the legislation is to ensure that a class of persons can participate in our democratic processes without fear of financial reduction in their living standards. The alternatives – and we would say that the scheme of the legislation is such that the legislation would place the highest – or the priority in the person maintaining their level of income so there is no financial penalty in participating in the democratic processes of our society.
So that's why we say its not just, well, the Act enables three different options and the employer can choose whichever one they want. The – the purpose of the legislation has to be taken into account to see if that a just outcome …[90]
When Mr Kerrigan sought reappointment to his position, he was told that the position had been abolished because it was no longer required. Mr Kerrigan was offered assistance from a friend who was an organiser in another Union and did not request assistance from his Union Together. Unfortunately, Mr Kerrigan was placed into a situation where he felt forced into accepting a lower position with a vague promise of salary maintenance for 12 to 24 months. Together has never previously had this occur to other members who have contested federal seats. Together's Union office would have disputed this situation immediately if we had been made aware.[91]
Did Mr Kerrigan's reappointment in an CA3 role, together with the twelve-month period of salary maintenance at his former AO5 classification level, constitute the agreed resolution of the matter?
When we had the consultation about the salary support for 12 months, in the meeting with now the current CE, Anthony West, I stated that I wasn't happy. I still didn't think – this was coming from me. I didn't think it was legal and I was advised that if I wanted to take it further, I could, and I said "I will."
All the way through, I've maintained that I didn't think the process was right and I didn't think it was legal.[94]
the AWU doesn't have any right to represent the employees doing the work that Mr Kerrigan was doing … it's an issue that … goes to whether or not there was a genuine agreement in respect of the situation that needs to be resolved, but that's a matter that will need … evidence on … and can't be dismissed summarily …[96]
I can confirm that CWHHS has met the agreed outcomes of this meeting, being:
…
On this basis, please find attached the following documents:
As a result of this situation, and in the spirit of cooperation, we would like to extend the terms under the attached letter of offer.
We request that David, if he is agreeable to these terms, sign and return this letter of offer no later than 5:00pm Wednesday, 27 July 2022.[102]
Can the "contested issues of fact" about the meeting that occurred (resulting in Mr Kerrigan's reappointment) "only be resolved by witness evidence and cross-examination", necessitating progress of the matter to hearing?
To what extent did CWHHS's decision to abolish the AO5 AODS role, contrary to the consultation process in the Certified Agreement, impact Mr Kerrigan?
… The objective of such consultation will be to minimise any adverse impact on security and certainty of employment.
After such discussions have occurred and it is determined that fewer employees are required, appropriate job reduction strategies will be developed that may include non-replacement of resignees and retirees and the deployment / redeployment and retraining of excess employees which will have regard to the circumstances of the individual employee/s affected. This will occur in a reasonable manner.
Where individuals unreasonably refuse to participate or cooperate in deployment / redeployment and retraining processes, the full provisions for managing redundancies will be followed. No employee will be redeployed against their will…[111]
Following expiry of salary maintenance arrangements, [where] an employee…[is] redeployed to a lower classification level in another salary stream, appointment is to be made to an equal or next highest pay point in the lower level, with normal incremental movement through the classification level, subject to industrial instrument requirements.[114]
Is the delay in filing the matter in the Commission relevant to whether or not it should be heard?
What is the prejudice to the Respondent if I proceed to hear the matter?
What is the prejudice to Mr Kerrigan if I do not proceed to hear the matter?
Are the remedies sought available, for this matter type?
Conclusion
Orders
[1] Mr Kerrigan resigned on 4 April 2022.
[2] As required under s 44 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act.
[3] Mention T 1-3, lines 2-7.
[4] Form 10 – Notice of industrial dispute filed 19 June 2023.
[5] The Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) has since been repealed and replaced with the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld).
[6] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [2].
[7] Ibid [3].
[8] Ibid [6].
[9] Ibid [7].
[10] General Manager, Primary Health Service, CWHHS.
[11] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [8].
[12] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [9].
[13] Ibid [10].
[14] Western District Secretary, The Australian Workers' Union Queensland.
[15] Union Organiser, Together Queensland.
[16] Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024, Exhibit AW-1.
[17] Executive Director, Workforce Services, CWHHS.
[18] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [11]; Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024, Exhibit AW-2.
[19] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [12]; Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024, Exhibit AW-2.
[20] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [13]; Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024, Exhibit AW-3.
[21] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [14]; Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024, Exhibit AW-4.
[22] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [2].
[23] Ibid [16].
[24] Ibid [17].
[25] Ibid [18].
[26] Ibid [19].
[27] Ibid [20].
[28] Mention T 1-10, lines 32-38.
[29] [2003] ICQ 8.
[30] [2006] ICQ 27.
[31] [2018] QIRC 042.
[32] [2004] HAC 46.
[33] David Ross Hall and KF Watson, Industrial laws of Queensland (Department of Employment and Labour Relations, 1981), 26-27.
[34] [2012] QCA 353.
[35] [2021] ICQ 16.
[36] [2024] QIRC 43.
[37] [2023] QIRC 181.
[38] [1918] 25 CLR 434.
[39] Although the index to the folder of documents referred to there being 27 documents, there was no document 12 listed in the index or included in the bundle.
[40] Folder of 23 documents handed up by Together.
[41] Page 2.
[42] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [33].
[43] [2018] QIRC 042; Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024 [34].
[44] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [35].
[45] Ibid [36].
[46] Ibid [35], [37].
[47] Ibid [36].
[48] Ibid [38].
[49] Respondent's reply submissions filed 15 February 2024.
[50] Ibid [2].
[51] Ibid [3]-[4].
[52] Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees (for Leslie Rojas-Carranza) v Brisbane City Council [2018] QIRC 42.
[53] State of Queensland (Metro South Hospital and Health Service) v Andrew Misiura [2015] QIRC 030.
[54] Respondent's reply submissions filed 15 February 2024, [5].
[55] Ibid; State of Queensland (Metro South Hospital and Health Service) v Andrew Misiura [2015] QIRC 030, [65]-[67].
[56] Respondent's reply submissions filed 15 February 2024, [6].
[57] Ibid [7].
[58] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [39].
[59] Ibid [40].
[60] Ibid [44]-[46].
[61] Ibid [42].
[62] Notifier's submissions filed 8 February 2024, [24].
[63] Ibid [6].
[64] Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd t/a Ray White Surfers Paradise v Percival (2003) 174 QGIG 643, 644.
[65] State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006, [21] followed in Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18, [24].
[66] Notifier's submissions filed 8 February 2024, [4]-[5].
[67] Ibid [37]-[39].
[68] [2003] ICQ 8.
[69] [2006] ICQ 27.
[70] Notifier's submissions filed 8 February 2024, [8], [10].
[71] Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees (for Leslie Rojas-Carranza) v Brisbane City Council [2018] QIRC 42.
[72] Notifier's submissions filed 8 February 2024, [9], [11]; Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 426.
[73] Notifier's submissions filed 8 February 2024, [20].
[74] Ibid [23].
[75] Ibid [14]-[16].
[76] Ibid [41].
[77] Ibid [21].
[78] Ibid [25]-[31].
[79] Ibid [22].
[80] Ibid [23].
[81] Ibid [32]-[36].
[82] State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006, [21]-[22] followed in Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18 [24].
[83] Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18 [25]-[26].
[84] Ibid [28]-[29].
[85] Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd t/a Ray White Surfers Paradise v Percival (2003) 174 QGIG 643, 644.
[86] [2020] QIRC 081.
[87] Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act s 44.
[88] Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 130(2)(b); Circular No: 01/22 – Public sector employees contesting elections.
[89] Mention T 1-10, lines 32-38.
[90] Mention T 1-9, lines 1-18.
[91] Form 10 – Notice of industrial dispute filed 19 June 2023, 2.
[92] Mention T 1-12, lines 41-42.
[93] Mention T 1-16, line 14.
[94] Mention T 1-16, lines 1-14.
[95] Mention T 1-12, lines 17-20.
[96] Mention T 1-14, lines 2-24.
[97] Mention T 1-15, lines 1-7.
[98] Exhibit 6; AW-1 to AW-5 attached to the Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024.
[99] AW-1 attached to the Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024.
[100] Ibid.
[101] AW-4 attached to the Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024; Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [14].
[102] AW-4 attached to the Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024.
[103] Ibid.
[104] AW-5 attached to the Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024.
[105] AW-4 attached to the Affidavit of Mr A. West filed 29 January 2024.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Mention T 1-10, lines 32-38.
[108] Queensland Public Health Sector Certified Agreement (No. 10) 2019 cl 4.1.10, cl 4.1.13.
[109] Ibid cl 4.1.4.
[110] Ibid cl 4.1.6.
[111] Ibid cl 4.1.10 – cl 4.1.12.
[112] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings filed 29 January 2024, [3].
[113] Department of Health Human Resources Policy ‘Employees requiring placement' B36 (QH-POL-237), cl 1.7.
[114] Ibid cl 1.7.1.
[115] Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/immediately>.
[116] [2020] 081.
[117] Ibid.
