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Thomas v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2025] QIRC 153

Thomas v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2025] QIRC 153

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Thomas v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2025] QIRC 153

PARTIES:

Thomas, Alicia

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2025/31

PROCEEDING:

Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a disciplinary decision

DELIVERED ON:

10 June 2025

DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

Notice of Appeal (27 February 2025)

Appellant's submissions (1 April 2025)

Respondent's submissions (1 May 2025)

Appellant's further submissions (9 May 2025)

HEARD AT:

On the papers

MEMBER:

Pidgeon IC

ORDERS:

  1. The decision appealed against is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – appeal against a disciplinary decision – where the decision appealed against is confirmed – consideration of reasonable excuse – consideration of whether the conduct occurred – consideration of whether the decision was fair and reasonable

LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS:

Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service cls 1.1, 3.1, 4.1

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 562B, 562C

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ss 40, 91, 129, 131, 133

Public Sector Ethics Act 1994 (Qld) s 12H

CASES:

State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Ms Alicia Thomas ('the Appellant') is employed by the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) ('the Respondent') as a Legal Officer (PO4).
  1. [2]
    On 29 October 2024, Ms Thomas was invited to show cause as to whether disciplinary findings should be made in respect of the allegation:

That on 30 January 2024 at Brisbane [Ms Thomas'] conduct in an official capacity was improper in that [she] instructed and/or permitted an unqualified person to witness an affidavit which was submitted to the Federal Circuit Court in support of an application for a Telephone Inception Warrant.

  1. [3]
    With respect to the allegation, the following particulars were put to Ms Thomas:[1]
  1. On 29 January 2024, Detective Senior Constable Michael Blenkinsopp (DSC Blenkinsopp) commenced duty at the Crime and Intelligence Legal Services (CILS) to undertake his Practical Legal Training placement.
  1. At the time in question, you were performing duties as a PO4 Legal Officer within CILS.
  1. On 30 January 2024, you took DSC Blenkinsopp with you to the office of Detective Inspector Kerry Lofdahl.
  1. Detective Inspector Lofdahl signed and affirmed the two affidavits you had prepared in the presence of DSC Blenkinsopp and yourself.
  1. You instructed DSC Blenkinsopp to sign the affidavits as a witness and to rule out 'Justice of the Peace' under his name, indicating he was a 'Lawyer'.
  1. You were aware that DSC Blenkinsopp was not a lawyer and consequently was not qualified to witness the affidavit under the Oaths Act 1867.
  1. On 31 January 2024, the affidavits witnessed by DSC Blenkinsopp were presented to the Federal Circuit Court resulting in the issuing of three Telephone Interception Warrants and the consequent interception of telephone communications.
  1. On 19 April 2024, it was identified DSC Blenkinsopp had inappropriately witnessed the two affidavits of Detective Inspector Lofdahl. The Public Interest Monitor and relevant judges were consequently advised, and the lawfulness of the intercepted telephone communications is in doubt.
  1. [4]
    On 6 February 2025, Mr Steve Wyatt APM ('the decision-maker') wrote to Ms Thomas' legal representatives advising her that he had decided to substantiate the allegation and was giving serious consideration to imposing disciplinary action of a reprimand and 6 months mentoring by Mr Greg Obst. The proposed disciplinary action is not something I am required to consider in this appeal.
  1. [5]
    Following a consideration of Ms Thomas' submissions and the available evidence, the decision-maker goes on to say:[2]

My Decision

  1. 27.
    Your conduct, subject to this proceeding, demonstrated to me that you were not focussed on the task at hand when you instructed DSC Blenkinsopp to witness the affidavit. Your actions on this particular day were careless and incompetent and failed to comply with your obligation to ensure diligence in public administration as required by section 4.1 of the Code of Conduct. However, a finding of misconduct requires more than mere carelessness, or failing to apply due care in your work. A finding of misconduct requires:

'a deliberate departure from accepted standards, serious negligence to the point of indifference, or an abuse of privilege and confidence enjoyed by a public service employee.'[3]

  1. 28.
    After carefully considering all aspects of this matter I am satisfied the particulars of the allegation are substantiated. In turning my mind to whether the allegation amounts to misconduct, I have considered:
  • The cases provided in your response;
  • Your personal circumstances including health, workload and concerns for your sister's welfare;
  • The lack of intent to cause a detriment or obtain a benefit;
  • The damage to the reputation of the Service caused by the error; and
  • It was a single incident with no evidence on ongoing conduct.
  1. 29.
    Given the evidence before me I am not satisfied your conduct reaches the threshold to be classified as misconduct. Instead, pursuant to section 91(1)(h) of the Act, I find your conduct contravened, without a reasonable excuse, a relevant standard of conduct in a way that is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action.
  1. [6]
    It is this decision which Ms Thomas appeals.

Appeal principles

  1. [7]
    Section 562B(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') provides that a public sector appeal is to be decided by reviewing the decision appealed against and 'the purpose of the appeal is to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable'.
  1. [8]
    Findings made in the decision which are reasonably open on the relevant material or evidence before the decision-maker should not be expected to be disturbed on appeal.
  1. [9]
    A public sector appeal is not an opportunity for a fresh hearing, but a review of the decision arrived at by the decision-maker.
  1. [10]
    In deciding this appeal, s 562C(1) of the IR Act provides that the Commission may:
  1. confirm the decision appealed against; or

…

  1. For another appeal— set the decision aside, and substitute another decision or return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate.

Legislative framework

  1. [11]
    Section 131 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act') lists various categories of decisions against which an appeal may be made. Section 131(1)(c) provides that an appeal may be made against a disciplinary decision.
  1. [12]
    Section 129 of the PS Act relevantly states:

129  Definitions for part

…

disciplinary decision means a decision under a disciplinary law to discipline—

  1. a person (other than by termination of employment), including the action taken in disciplining the person; or
  2. a former public sector employee by way of a disciplinary declaration made under section 95, including if the disciplinary action that would have been taken was termination of employment.
  1. [13]
    Section 133 of the PS Act explains who may appeal a disciplinary decision:

 133  Who may appeal

…

  1. for a disciplinary decision—a public sector employee or former public sector employee aggrieved by the decision if the employee is entitled to appeal under a directive
  1. [14]
    Section 562B of the IR Act states for an appeal against a promotion decision or a disciplinary decision under the PS Act, the Commission must decide the appeal having regard to the evidence available to the decision-maker when the decision was made;[4] but may allow other evidence to be taken into account if the Commission considers it appropriate.[5]
  1. [15]
    I am satisfied that the decision is one that may be appealed against and that the appeal was lodged within the required time.

Ms Thomas' reasons for appeal

  1. [16]
    In her Notice of Appeal filed in the Industrial Registry on 27 February 2025, Ms Thomas provides the following grounds of appeal:[6]
  1. It was not open to the decision maker to be reasonably satisfied of the substantiated disciplinary finding.
  1. It was not open to the decision maker to be reasonably satisfied that [Ms Thomas'] conduct amounted to a ground of discipline under s 91 of the Public Sector Act 2022
  1. The decision maker failed to take into account relevant evidence and placed undue weight on certain evidence
  1. The decision maker erred in finding the allegation was substantiated.

Ms Thomas' written submissions filed 1 April 2025

  1. [17]
    In accordance with my directions, Ms Thomas filed written submissions in the Industrial Registry on 1 April 2025. Ms Thomas has ordered her submissions to initially address her third ground of appeal and then moves to her first and second grounds of appeal. As the question of whether the conduct is substantiated is a necessary consideration prior to determining whether a ground of discipline arises under s 91 of the PS Act, I will consider Ms Thomas's submissions in the order she has adopted.

Third ground of appeal – the decision-maker failed to consider relevant evidence

  1. [18]
    With respect to Ms Thomas' third ground of appeal, she says that the decision-maker did not 'consider all of the evidence before making factual findings', in particular, that the decision-maker did not consider particular (e), which Ms Thomas rejects, and particulars (f) and (h) which Ms Thomas admits with qualifications.[7]
  1. [19]
    In her submissions, Ms Thomas reiterates the findings of the decision-maker that:[8]
  1. 4.4.1
    [she] did instruct DSC Blenkinsopp to rule out the words 'Justice of the Peace';
  1. 4.4.2
    DSC Blenkinsopp's evidence was 'clear' in both his statement and disciplinary interview that [Ms Thomas] 'instructed him to sign as a witness' and told him to rule out 'Justice of the Peace' under his signature so as to indicate he was a lawyer;
  1. 4.4.3
    DSC Blenkinsopp's evidence was 'consistent and credible for an officer who was on his third day of a placement working under [Ms Thomas'] supervision'. DSC Blenkinsopp was correct when stating in hindsight he should have questioned [Ms Thomas] further about his eligibility to witness the affidavit. This statement was consistent with the rest of his version;
  1. 4.4.4
    Detective Superintendent Lofdahl's ('DS Lofdahl') evidence was unhelpful;
  1. 4.4.5
    [Ms Thomas] did not intend to have an unqualified person sign the affidavit as [she] was multitasking and was not thinking at the time

(citations omitted)

  1. [20]
    Ms Thomas addresses her rejection of particular (e) of the Allegation stating that Ms Thomas instructed DSC Blenkinsopp to sign the affidavits as a witness and rule out 'Justice of the Peace' under this name, indicating that he was a 'lawyer'.
  1. [21]
    Ms Thomas says that as noted in his disciplinary interview on 30 May 2024, DSC Blenkinsopp asserted that:[9]
  1. 4.5.1
    he did question his qualifications to strike out the words 'Justice of the Peace' at the time, I then said, 'you're a solicitor now' and he crossed out the words.
  1. 4.5.2
    he did not question his qualification to strike the words 'Justice of the Peace' out because he didn't 'wanna come across as a smart ass';
  1. 4.5.3
    he did not believe he was qualified to be a government lawyer or a lawyer;
  1. 4.5.4
    he was not under any pressure to sign the affidavits;
  1. 4.5.5
    he did not perceive any ramifications if he refused to sign the document;
  1. 4.5.6
    he should have questioned his qualifications to witness the affidavits; and
  1. 4.5.7
    through this process DS Lofdahl was silent.
  1. [22]
    Ms Thomas notes that DSC Blenkinsopp also gave evidence that he was sworn into the QPS in August 2011; had been working in the State Drug Squad since 2019; completed his law degree in 2022; and was undertaking his PLT placement.
  1. [23]
    Ms Thomas submits that it was not fair and reasonable to find DSC Blenkinsopp's evidence was 'consistent and credible' in circumstances where it had significant inconsistencies and was contradicted by the evidence of both Ms Thomas and DS Lofdahl.
  1. [24]
    Ms Thomas notes DS Lofdahl's statement via email on 21 May 2024 that she did not recall any direct or specific conversation with 'the male that was present' and that she recalled discussing the affidavits with Ms Thomas. DS Lofdahl's statement was that 'There was nothing remarkable about the procedure or process that was adopted on the morning of 30 January 2024 that would cause it to remain as unusual in my memory'. Ms Thomas submits that it is not fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to reject the entirety of DS Lofdahl's evidence on the basis that she would have no reason to doubt DSC Blenkinsopp's qualifications to witness the affidavit.
  1. [25]
    Ms Thomas refers to her own evidence regarding DSC Blenkinsopp being asked to witness the affidavit:[10]

… as to whether DSC Blenkinsopp was instructed to witness the affidavit or questioned his qualifications to do so, I stated, 'Uh, the process of issuing the oath or affirmation and having someone else signed is a normal practise in the CILS. In private practise. I would've signed any affidavit or witnessed it that I had done myself. … There have been occasions where if no one is around early in the morning or something, if you get permission from the manager, you can sign your own … It was properly issued. It's just that I honestly just didn't think about the fact that Michael wasn't properly qualified.' When asked why DSC Blenkinsopp accompanied me to DS Lofdahl's office on 30 January 2024, I stated, 'I was thinking steps ahead with other applications, I just wasn't thinking. Um, it's not as if there weren't other lawyers in the office. There is no explanation for it. I just wasn't thinking.

  1. 4.11
    When asked what would have happened if DSC Blenkinsopp had questioned his qualifications to strike out the words 'Justice of the Peace' at the time, I stated, 'I would've realised I was being a fucking idiot. <Yeah> and I would’ve apologised to Lofdahl and um, would've gone straight back to the office and got somebody else. If no one else was there, I would've rung the manager and said, do you mind if I witness it?.
  1. [26]
    Ms Thomas says that it was not fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to place limited weight on her evidence. Ms Thomas submits that the decision-maker ignored evidence supporting her credibility, such as holding a practising certificate when not required to as a legal officer for the Queensland public service; no previous disciplinary proceedings or complaints; and teaching PLT ethics workshops at the College of Law. Ms Thomas also says that it was not fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to not address the assertion that she said to DSC Blenkinsopp, 'you are a solicitor now'. Ms Thomas also submits that it was not fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to assert that her statement that 'there was no explanation for it. I just wasn't thinking' is evidence that she instructed DSC Blenkinsopp to sign the affidavit and rule out 'Justice of the Peace' when it was in fact a response to the question why DSC Blenkinsopp accompanied her to DS Lofdahl's office.
  1. [27]
    Ms Thomas submits that it would have been fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to find that:
  • she permitted DSC Blenkinsopp to witness the affidavit and rule out the words Justice of the Peace beneath his signature;
  • that this was not a deliberate act to have an unqualified person witness the affidavit as she was multi-tasking and focussed on other matters; and
  • DSC Blenkinsopp did not question his qualifications to witness the affidavit and strike out the words 'Justice of the Peace' at that time or afterwards.
  1. [28]
    With regard to particular (f), 'You were aware that DSC Blenkinsopp was not a lawyer and consequently not qualified to witness the affidavit under the Oaths Act 1867', Ms Thomas says that she has qualified this particular by saying that it was not an issue she considered at the time.
  1. [29]
    With regard to particular (e), Ms Thomas says that it was not fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to find that she was acting in a supervisory capacity for DSC Blenkinsopp.
  1. [30]
    Ms Thomas notes that particular (h) relates to the fact that as a result of the inappropriately witnessed affidavits, the Public Interest Monitor and relevant judges were consequently advised and the lawfulness of the intercepted telecommunications is in doubt. Ms Thomas notes that she qualified this particular by stating that in light of Bunning v Cross,[11] the chances of the evidence being excluded is 'miniscule'.
  1. [31]
    Ms Thomas notes that the decision-maker found that the lawfulness of the intercepted telecommunications remained in doubt and was a question for another jurisdiction. Ms Thomas submits that the lawfulness of the intercepted telecommunications was relevant to the decision-maker's finding pursuant to s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act. Ms Thomas also says the decision was 'based on a presumption that the targets were going to be prosecuted and the resulting information had evidential value to be relied on in those prosecutions'.
  1. [32]
    Ms Thomas says that the QPS have not obtained or provided any evidence in support of the abovementioned presumptions and that such evidence is relevant in determining whether her conduct was improper under s 91(1)(h) and whether the contravention was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action.
  1. [33]
    With reference to Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health),[12] Ms Thomas says that it was unfair and unreasonable for the decision-maker to fail to inquire as to the significance of the likelihood that the evidence would be admissible.
  1. [34]
    Ms Thomas also notes that she was directed not to discuss the matter with work colleagues or anyone with information relevant to the allegations against her. Ms Thomas submits that the decision-maker failed to consider relevant evidence and placed undue weight, or no weight, on the evidence of DS Lofdahl and herself as material witnesses.

First and second grounds of appeal

  1. [35]
    Ms Thomas submits that the 'prosecution' has failed to prove the elements of s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act to the relevant standard, so as to permit disciplinary action under s 92 of the PS Act.

Contravention of a relevant standard of conduct

  1. [36]
    With respect to Ms Thomas' first and second grounds of appeal, Ms Thomas submits that 'as a matter of statutory interpretation, section 91 of the PS Act must be read as a whole which relevantly includes subsections (1)(h), (4) and (5)'.[13]
  1. [37]
    Ms Thomas submits that the decision-maker was 'silent as to whether [her] conduct on 20 January 2024 also contravened ss 1.1 and 3.1 of the Code of Conduct ('the Code') or ss 2 and 4 of the QPS Standard for Professional Practice'.[14]
  1. [38]
    Ms Thomas submits that her conduct was found not to have been 'a deliberate act to have an unqualified person sign the affidavit', and that she was 'not being untruthful in [her] submissions'. Furthermore, she submits that there is 'a lack of intent to cause a detriment or obtain a benefit and that it is assumed [her] ability to commit to the highest ethical standards, honestly and integrity are not in question'.[15]

Reasonable excuse

  1. [39]
    Ms Thomas submits that the Respondent has 'not obtained or provided any evidence regarding the ethics training undertaken by DSC Blenkinsopp as a police officer and when obtaining his Detective qualifications, during his undergraduate law degree or as part of his PLT before commencing his PLT placement'.[16]
  1. [40]
    Ms Thomas says that this evidence was relevant to the extent that it aided:[17]

… in assessing whether it was reasonable to expect DSC Blenkinsopp to question his qualification to witness the affidavit and therefore, whether [she] had a reasonable excuse for the purposes of s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act. The unfairness and unreasonableness of the decisionmakers (sic) failure to make these inquiries was exacerbated by the direction that prevented me from making such inquiries as detailed above. Given the Briginshaw principle, it was incumbent upon the decision-maker to obtain this evidence to prove the elements of a contravention against s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act.

Sufficiently Serious

  1. [41]
    Ms Thomas submits that the allegation is not sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action in circumstances where '… the decision-makers (sic) findings that this was unintentional isolated incident (sic)'.[18]

Failed to satisfy the work performance and personal conduct principles

  1. [42]
    Ms Thomas submits that one of the work performance and personal conduct principles listed in s 40(1) of the PS Act relevantly includes complying with an approved code of conduct' under s 12H of the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994 (Qld) ('PSEA'). Ms Thomas says that the Code is an approved code of conduct for the purposes of s 12H of the PSEA and therefore, for the purposes of s 91 of the PS Act.
  1. [43]
    Ms Thomas says that 'a discipline ground does not arise only because a public sector employee's work performances failed to satisfy the work performance and personal conduct principles'.[19]
  1. [44]
    Finally, Ms Thomas makes several submissions as to why it is not fair and reasonable for the Respondent to seek to take disciplinary action against her. I am of the view that those submissions are more relevant to be included in a show cause response to proposed disciplinary action should this appeal be dismissed.

The Respondent's submissions

Scope of the Appeal

  1. [45]
    The Respondent filed submissions in reply in the Industrial Registry on 1 May 2025. The Respondent notes that the scope of the appeal is whether the decision to find Ms Thomas liable for discipline pursuant to s 91 was fair and reasonable. As I have noted above, the proposed disciplinary action is not a matter to be considered in this appeal.
  1. [46]
    The Respondent submits that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to form the reasonable belief that the allegations against the Appellant were substantiated and that the grounds for discipline pursuant to s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act were made out with respect to the conduct of the Appellant.[20]

Decision-making process was fair and reasonable

  1. [47]
    With respect to the decision-maker's decision to consider Ms Thomas liable for discipline, the Respondent says that this process was fair and reasonable as 'it complied with the requirements of the PS Act and the mandatory considerations outlined in the Discipline Directive'.[21]
  1. [48]
    The Respondent submits that Ms Thomas was afforded 'an abundance' of procedural fairness throughout the process, highlighting:[22]
  • Ms Thomas being provided with a show cause notice as to why a discipline finding should not be made against her;
  • Ms Thomas being provided a reasonable opportunity to respond;
  • Ms Thomas was provided with a copy of the evidence against her;
  • The Respondent's genuine consideration of the response provided by Ms Thomas to the show cause notice prior to making the determination that the discipline allegations were substantiated.
  1. [49]
    The Respondent notes Ms Thomas' concession that she breached cl 4.1 of the Code by allowing DSC Blenkinsopp to witness the Affidavit. Furthermore, the Respondent submits that this is an agreed fact that the decision-maker could be reasonably satisfied that Ms Thomas breached s 4.1 of the Code.[23]
  1. [50]
    With regard to Ms Thomas' submissions addressing the operation of s 91(4) of the PS Act, the Respondent submits that s 91(4) of the PS Act does not bar the Respondent from substantiating a disciplinary finding based on a breach of the Code.[24] Instead, the Respondent says, s 91(4) of the PS Act merely provides that a mere breach of the principles in s 40 of the PS Act is insufficient to establish a ground of discipline and requires the decision-maker to be reasonably satisfied that the provisions of Section 91(1)(h) are made out with respect to the breach of the Code.[25]
  1. [51]
    The Respondent submits that Ms Thomas did not produce any evidence of an 'intervening or emergent factor excusing the conduct'. Further, the Respondent submits that 'even on [Ms Thomas'] own version of events, the conduct occurred as a result of the lack of care and not thinking'. The Respondent submits that this is not a reasonable excuse, and thus, it was open and fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to make a finding that the Code has been breached without reasonable excuse.[26]
  1. [52]
    With respect to Ms Thomas' assertion that all the evidence was not appropriately considered prior to a determination being made, the Respondent submits that the evidence of Mr Steven Wyatt 'establishes that this in fact occurred'.[27]
  1. [53]
    Furthermore, the Respondent submits that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to determine that management action was not suitable. The Respondent submits this on the basis that the matter was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action, and that managerial action would not sufficiently address the issues and potential for reputational damage to the Respondent.[28]
  1. [54]
    With respect to Ms Thomas' lack of disciplinary history, the Respondent says that this does not preclude the Respondent from making a finding the allegations against the Appellant were substantiated, from deciding that [Ms Thomas] was liable to discipline, or from imposing a disciplinary penalty as it was warranted in the circumstances. Further, the Respondent submits that Ms Thomas' experience and obligations owed, ensured that Ms Thomas was aware of the appropriate procedures. The Respondent says that rather than this being a mitigating factor, this is a circumstance of aggravation tending towards a conclusion that the breach of the Code was sufficiently serious to warrant discipline.[29]
  1. [55]
    In circumstances where DSC Blenkinsopp provided his version of events consistently to Anderson Wilson during questioning for the discipline investigation, and the version provided on 30 May 2024, the Respondent submits that it was open to the decision-maker to believe and give weight to this evidence.[30] The Respondent further supports this position with reference to the evidence of Ms Alicia Ziser which reiterates DSC Blenkinsopp's evidence.[31]
  1. [56]
    The Respondent submits that it was open to the decision-maker not to find the evidence of DS Lofdahl convincing or helpful given she had indicated that she did not recall the events in question with any level of detail. The Respondent notes that this corresponds with the evidence of Denise Darwin that DS Lofdahl had told her she did not know who DSC Blenkinsopp was and had no memory of him.[32]
  1. [57]
    The Respondent says that even if DSC Blenkinsopp's evidence was not corroborated, a lack of corroboration is not a sufficient reason to disturb the decision.[33] The Respondent also notes that given Ms Thomas' remarks about the events in question, 'it is erroneous to assert her evidence of the events in question should have been accepted by the decision-maker over that of DSC Blenkinsopp, or that greater weight should have been placed on her evidence:[34]
  1. ANDERSON:
    Um, when did you form the idea to invite Michael to witness the document?
  1. THOMAS:
    I think it was just off the spur. Um, I think it was sometime, I don't recall when I asked him if he wanted to see in chamber's application. It would've been just before. Um, but I don't recall
  1. ANDERSON:
    Yep. Did you have to prompt Michael to strike out either one of those title of Justice of the Peace of lawyer.
  1. THOMAS:
    I don't think I did.
  1. ANDERSON:
    Do you clearly remember?
  1. THOMAS:
    I remember I was concentrating on making sure pages weren't skipped. Okay. But I don't remember.
  1. [58]
    The Respondent acknowledges that the Briginshaw principle is applicable, however it submits that on the evidence available to the decision-maker, they were able to be satisfied to the requisite standard, that the evidence supported the allegation being substantiated.[35]
  1. [59]
    The Respondent submits that it is not for Ms Thomas to make a judgment on behalf of the Federal Court as to whether the improperly witnessed Affidavit will prejudice the case of the Respondent. The Respondent says that it was required to notify the Public Interest Monitor and Federal Court judges which has the potential to prejudice the reputation of the QPS and the Queensland Public Service, bringing it into disrepute.[36]
  1. [60]
    The Respondent also submits that the conduct put the status of the investigation into serious criminal activity in jeopardy.[37]
  1. [61]
    The Respondent reiterates that the mandatory considerations of Section 7 of the Directive were considered in determining the conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action and this included consideration that management action would not be sufficient to address the results of Ms Thomas' conduct.[38]
  1. [62]
    The Respondent submits that Ms Thomas' admitted breach of the Code is made more serious in circumstances where the circumstances constituting the breach also arguably constitutes a breach of professional conduct rules.[39]
  1. [63]
    The Respondent says that while Ms Thomas argues that the professional consequence of the disciplinary finding weighs in favour of the requirement for stronger evidence to substantiate the allegation, this consideration is substantially reduced by Ms Thomas' self-referral of the matter. The Respondent says it is a matter for the Regulator to conduct their own investigation into the matter, regardless of the determination of the Respondent or this Commission.[40]

Ms Thomas' further submissions

  1. [64]
    On 9 May 2025, Mr Thomas filed further submissions in reply in the Industrial Registry. I note that she attached several documents that she omitted from her prior submissions. Within her further submissions in reply to the Respondent's submissions, Ms Thomas makes submissions with respect to the scope of the appeal and the Respondent's assertion that the decision-maker was fair and reasonable.
  1. [65]
    Ms Thomas notes Merrell DP's consideration of the terms 'fair' and 'reasonable' with regard to s 562B of the IR Act in State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3):[41]

The word "fair" in the context in which it is used in 562B(3) of the IR Act, means "free from bias, dishonesty, or injustice' and the word 'reasonable' means "agreeable to reason or sound judgment. Whether a decision the subject of a public service appeal is "fair and reasonable" is a question of fact.

  1. [66]
    Ms Thomas responds to the Respondent's submissions by saying the decision was not fair and reasonable because:[42]
  • The decision-maker says that he considered all the evidence before making formal findings, however the Decision on Discipline Finding and Proposed Action did not address 'numerous significant pieces of evidence' (as addressed in her previous submissions).
  • Relying on PO5 Wilson's evidence assumes he is qualified to give evidence and presumes the intercepted information had any evidential value.
  • The decision-maker failed to make enquiries of relevant witnesses where Ms Thomas had been directed not to discuss the matter.
  1. [67]
    Ms Thomas reiterates that the task of the decision-maker is not only to determine whether the conduct occurred but also to consider whether there was a reasonable excuse and the conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant discipline. Ms Thomas says a consideration of these matters was 'critical' in determining whether the finding that disciplinary grounds existed was fair and reasonable.[43]
  1. [68]
    Ms Thomas says that the evidence does not support the assertion that she did not know the appropriate procedures under the Legal Profession Act 2007, Oaths Act 1867 and Code. Ms Thomas says that to accept evidence that 'she thought the affidavit could be signed by anyone as a witness' would undermine the finding that her conduct did not amount to misconduct.[44]
  1. [69]
    Ms Thomas maintains that DS Lofdahl's evidence that there was nothing remarkable about the procedure or process is difficult to reconcile with her 'apparent proclamation that DSC Blenkinsopp was now a solicitor'. [45]
  1. [70]
    In response to the Respondent's assertion that her conduct brought the QPS into disrepute and put the investigation in jeopardy, Ms Thomas says:[46]
  • Telecommunications warrants are issued upon reasonable satisfaction that the information likely to be obtained, would likely assist in the investigation;
  • There is no guarantee the evidence will be obtained or have any probative value; and
  • There is no evidence that the investigation was jeopardised.
  1. [71]
    Ms Thomas says that the decision-maker found that it was an unintentional isolated incident and the court and Public Interest Monitor were promptly notified upon discovery of the mistake. Ms Thomas accepts that her conduct caused embarrassment but says that it did not bring the QPS into disrepute.[47]
  1. [72]
    Ms Thomas reiterates that she is subject to the Barristers' Conduct Rules and under the Legal Profession Act 2007, she is required to disclose disciplinary matters. Ms Thomas says that the QPS disciplinary investigation and findings will be relied upon by the Bar Association of Queensland as part of their investigation. Ms Thomas repeats that the gravity of the personal consequences flowing from the disciplinary findings significantly increases the strength of the evidence required to be satisfied that Allegation 1 is substantiated and the conduct was grounds for discipline under s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act.[48]

The Respondent's submissions in reply

  1. [73]
    The Respondent filed submissions in reply in the Industrial Registry on 15 May 2025. The Respondent disputes the matters as outlined in Ms Thomas' reply submissions.
  1. [74]
    The Respondent submits that Ms Thomas has proceeded on a misapprehended interpretation of 'fair and reasonable'. With reference to a recent Commission decision which references Hume, the Respondent states that 'fair and reasonable' is to be given its ordinary meaning. The Respondent submits that it is 'peculiar' for Ms Thomas to continue to assert the legal standard of fair and reasonable applies.
  1. [75]
    The Respondent says that Executive Director Carolyn Harrison did consider the necessary matters before referring the matter for the purpose of the disciplinary process. The Respondent says Ms Thomas has provided no evidence that this did not occur.
  1. [76]
    The Respondent asserts that the decision-maker considered all the evidence when making the decision on disciplinary finding and proposed action and that an absence of an express mention of certain evidence is not prima facie proof it was not considered.
  1. [77]
    The Respondent says that in circumstances where admissions were made by Ms Thomas during the investigation into the conduct, it was open to the decision-maker to rely on those admissions, combined with the evidence of relevant witnesses and to be satisfied to the requisite standard that the conduct occurred.
  1. [78]
    The Respondent refers to its earlier submissions and the available evidence to repeat that it was fair and reasonable to form the conclusions regarding Ms Thomas not providing a reasonable excuse and that the conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action.
  1. [79]
    The Respondent says that it 'is not difficult to reconcile the fact that DS Lofdahl did not recall anything remarkable about the procedure or process' with Ms Thomas allegedly stating that DSC Blenkinsopp is now a solicitor. The Respondent says that there is no reason for DS Lofdahl to care about this fact.
  1. [80]
    The Respondent says that it is not up to Ms Thomas to deliberately downplay the seriousness of the potential consequences of her conduct or to declare that the conduct would not have brought the QPS into disrepute.
  1. [81]
    The Respondent says that Ms Thomas' actions constitute a breach of the requirement to act skilfully with competence and diligence and submits that the conduct of presenting the affidavit to the Court is, at minimum, capable of constituting recklessly misleading the court.

Ms Thomas' further submissions in reply

  1. [82]
    Ms Thomas provides further submissions about the meaning of 'fair and reasonable' and the task before the Commission. I do not intend to reproduce those submissions here. I will deal with the task before the Commission and the application of 'fair and reasonable' below.
  1. [83]
    Ms Thomas says that the decision does not, in accordance with Section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, 'set out the findings on material questions of fact and refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based'. Ms Thomas points to relevant sections of the Discipline Directive which set out matters the decision-maker should address in making the decision and says that these have not been set out in the decision.
  1. [84]
    Ms Thomas says that while she accepts her conduct contravened s 4.1 of the Code and the decision-maker found that the conduct was an unintentional isolated incident, the decision does not discuss whether she had a reasonable excuse for the contravention due to:
  1. 4.1.1
    my personal circumstances at the time;[49]
  1. 4.1.2
    the acceptance that I was multitasking at the time; and/or
  1. 4.1.3
    a finding the DSC Blenkinsopp did or did not question his qualifications to witness the affidavit or strike out the words 'Justice of the Peace'.[50]
  1. [85]
    Ms Thomas says that similarly, the decision does not discuss whether she had contravened the Code in a way sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action because the chief executive forms the view that management action is not like to adequately address or resolve the work performance matter.
  1. [86]
    Ms Thomas repeats her earlier submissions that it is critical to consider as separate tests the matter of 'reasonably satisfied'; 'reasonable excuse'; and 'sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action'. Ms Thomas repeats that these matters should have been addressed in the decision.
  1. [87]
    Finally Ms Thomas says:

Notwithstanding clause 7.2h of the Discipline Directive detailed above, since becoming aware of my mistake on 29 April 2024, the overall seriousness of the potential consequences of my conduct for the Queenland Police Service has been inescapable and often overwhelming. Whilst the Bar Association of Queensland will make their own determination as to my fitness to hold a practising certificate, I am grateful that unlike other public sector employees, I have the knowledge and skills to require the chief executive to act in a way that is compatible with the main purpose of the PS Act, including the fair treatment of public sector employees.

Consideration

The task of the Commission and the scope of the appeal

  1. [88]
    As has been addressed above, the scope of the appeal is limited to a review of the disciplinary decision that conduct is substantiated and that it gives rise to a ground for discipline. While the decision contains proposed disciplinary action, no decision has yet been made regarding that matter and so this is not a matter for my consideration.
  1. [89]
    The appeal involves a review of the decision to determine whether the decision is fair and reasonable. In the context of a public sector appeal, fair and reasonable are taken to carry their ordinary meanings.[51]
  1. [90]
    While the test of reasonableness in a public sector appeal does not involve the technical legal test of reasonableness as set out in Wednesbury and Li,[52] it does not mean that the review undertaken by the Commission occurs without reference to the legal framework the decision-maker was required to comply with and/or consider when making the decision under appeal.
  1. [91]
    The task before the Commission is to consider the evidence and any other material which was available to the decision-maker when they made the decision within the context of the relevant statutory provision/s, directives, guidelines or policies pertaining to the decision and to determine whether the decision was fair and reasonable.

The show cause process and procedural fairness

  1. [92]
    I note the Respondent's submission that the decision-making process complied with the requirements of the PS Act and the mandatory considerations outlined in the Discipline Directive.
  1. [93]
    I understand that Ms Thomas argues that the decision has not properly addressed each of the necessary considerations to establish that the conduct gives rise to a disciplinary ground. This will be considered below.
  1. [94]
    Ms Thomas has not complained that she has not been afforded procedural fairness or an opportunity to respond to the allegation.
  1. [95]
    I therefore note, for completeness, that the Respondent has properly followed the show cause process and Ms Thomas has been afforded procedural fairness.

Was the disciplinary finding decision fair and reasonable?

  1. [96]
    As has been identified by the parties, s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act contains several matters the decision-maker must consider. The decision-maker must consider: whether the alleged conduct occurred; if it contravened a relevant standard of conduct; if there is a reasonable excuse for the conduct; and if the conduct has contravened the standard of conduct in a way sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action.

Did the alleged conduct occur?

  1. [97]
    It is not in dispute that, as alleged, Ms Thomas permitted an unqualified person to witness an affidavit. Ms Thomas' own submissions state that it would be fair for the decision-maker to determine that she permitted DSC Blenkinsopp to witness the affidavit and rule out the words Justice of the Peace beneath his signature.
  1. [98]
    There is some dispute between the parties as to the particulars of how DSC Blenkinsopp came to sign the document and what was said by both Ms Thomas and DSC Blenkinsopp, however, where Ms Thomas admits the conduct, albeit with some qualifications, I am satisfied that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to be satisfied to the requisite standard that the conduct occurred.

Did Ms Thomas have a reasonable excuse for the conduct?

  1. [99]
    Ms Thomas has made submissions to the effect that she was at a disadvantage in establishing her reasonable excuse for the conduct because she was directed not to discuss the matter with work colleagues or people who might have relevant information. I do not accept this submission. The show cause letter issued to Ms Thomas on 29 October 2024 provided for appropriate arrangements to be made if she or her representative wished to approach colleagues to assist with her response. To that extent, I am satisfied that no unfairness has arisen from the direction to keep matters confidential and not to discuss the matter with work colleagues.
  1. [100]
    Based on the available material, it appears that Ms Thomas submitted to the decision-maker that at the time she permitted an unqualified person to witness the affidavit, she was experiencing personal circumstances including health, workload and concerns for her sister's welfare. The decision-maker notes these submissions at [28] of the decision, albeit in concluding that Ms Thomas' actions did not constitute misconduct. I am satisfied that these matters were considered by the decision-maker.
  1. [101]
    The decision-maker found it was not Ms Thomas' intention to have an unqualified person sign the affidavit and that she had been multi-tasking and was not thinking at the time. Ms Thomas's evidence in the investigation interview was to this effect (which I have canvassed at paragraph [25] of this decision).
  1. [102]
    Ms Thomas' submissions are to the effect that at the time the affidavit was being signed, she did not consider whether DSC Blenkinsopp was qualified or not.
  1. [103]
    Ms Thomas maintains that DSC Blenkinsopp did not question his qualifications to witness the affidavit and strike out the words 'Justice of the Peace'.
  1. [104]
    I accept that Ms Thomas was not DSC Blenkinsopp's 'supervisor' for the purpose of his PLT placement. However, the evidence demonstrates that DSC Blenkinsopp was on the third day of his placement, and it seems uncontroversial that the way he ended up in DS Lofdahl's office was that Ms Thomas had invited him to accompany her.
  1. [105]
    It was open to the decision-maker to accept DSC Blenkinsopp's recollection. Despite any doubts he had and the fact that, in hindsight he should have questioned his eligibility to sign the document, in the circumstances, he accepted that he was able to sign the documents because Ms Thomas invited him to do so. Further, based on the available evidence it was open to the decision-maker to accept his evidence that it was indicated that he should rule out Justice of the Peace, thereby representing that he is a lawyer.
  1. [106]
    Ms Thomas' evidence was that she was not actively thinking about the meeting or the signing. DS Lofdahl's evidence was that she did not even recall meeting DSC Blenkinsopp or recall anything unusual about the signing of the documents. On this basis, and in circumstances where what eventually occurred was that the documents were signed under Ms Thomas' supervision and 'justice of the peace' was crossed out, it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to determine that on the balance of probabilities Ms Thomas had 'failed to apply the correct amount of diligence to her duties at the time'.
  1. [107]
    There is no doubt that DSC Blenkinsopp also carries some responsibility for his own signing of the document in circumstances where he was not qualified to do so. However, in circumstances where he was on his third day of placement in the office, and Ms Thomas was significantly the more experienced and qualified of the two, I find it was open to the decision-maker to determine that any fault on the part of DSC Blenkinsopp did not outweigh the responsibility on Ms Thomas to ensure the affidavit was being signed by a qualified person.
  1. [108]
    The issue appears to be that Ms Thomas, for reasons of multi-tasking and being focussed on other matters, simply did not turn her mind to the matter of DSC Blenkinsopp's qualifications.
  1. [109]
    The decision-maker has clearly considered Ms Thomas' submissions concerning multi-tasking and being focused on other matters at the time the affidavit was signed. The decision-maker concludes that Ms Thomas is not being untruthful, and she did not act deliberately. The decision-maker considered Ms Thomas' conduct in the context of her duty as a member of QPS 'to act in a professional manner which sets an example for other members'. Having considered these matters, the decision-maker determined that the matters relied upon by Ms Thomas did not reasonably excuse Ms Thomas' actions in allowing an unqualified person to witness a document to be presented in the Supreme Court and described the conduct to be 'at best careless, and at worst, reckless'.
  1. [110]
    I find it was open to the decision-maker to determine that Ms Thomas had not provided a reasonable excuse for the conduct.

Does the conduct contravene a relevant standard of conduct?

  1. [111]
    The decision-maker clearly identifies the relevant standard of conduct as section 4.1 of the Code. This section states:

4.1 Ensure diligence in public administration

We have an obligation to seek to achieve high standards of public administration and perform our duties to the best of our abilities.

We will:

  1. (a)
    apply due care in our work, and provide accurate and impartial advice to all clients whether members of the public, public service agencies, or any level of government
  1. (b)
    treat all people equitably and consistently, and demonstrate the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice when making decisions
  1. (c)
    exercise our lawful powers and authority with care and for the purpose for which these were granted, and
  1. (d)
    comply with all reasonable and lawful instructions, whether or not we personally agree with a given policy direction.
  1. [112]
    The decision-maker specifically addresses why he believes that Ms Thomas' conduct does not constitute misconduct pursuant to s 91(1)(b) of the PS Act. He explains his finding that Ms Thomas was not focused on the matter at hand and identifies that those actions were careless and incompetent and a failure to comply with s 4.1 of the Code.
  1. [113]
    I note that in her final submissions, Ms Thomas accepts that her conduct breached s 4.1 of the Code (see paragraph [84] above).
  1. [114]
    Having established that the conduct occurred and determining that it represented a failure to exercise due care in her work, I find it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to determine that Ms Thomas' conduct contravened a relevant standard of Conduct.

Was the contravention sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action?

  1. [115]
    There are several parts of the reasons for decision where the decision-maker addresses the seriousness of the contravention.
  1. [116]
    The decision-maker identifies that the document being witnessed 'was to be presented to the Supreme Court in support of a Telephone Interception warrant'. The decision-maker goes on to properly note that the lawfulness of the intercepted telephone communications and whether they will be admissible is a question for another jurisdiction.
  1. [117]
    The decision-maker notes Ms Thomas' submission that there is a low chance of the evidence being excluded. However, the decision-maker states that he is satisfied that the lawfulness is in doubt. This is a reasonable conclusion for the decision-maker to draw.
  1. [118]
    It is implicit in the consideration of the lawfulness of the evidence that the matter is one which will need to be considered in the necessary jurisdiction. The decision-maker also refers to consideration of the damage to the reputation of the Service caused by the error.
  1. [119]
    I have read Ms Thomas' submissions (canvassed above from paragraphs [30]–[33]) regarding the intercepted telecommunications. I do not accept any suggestion that it was not open to the decision-maker to determine that the matter was sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action in the absence of concrete knowledge that the 'targets were going to be prosecuted' and that the 'resulting information had evidential value' or that in light of Bunning v Cross the chances of the evidence being excluded is 'miniscule'.
  1. [120]
    Ms Thomas argues that the decision-maker's failure to enquire as to the eventual impact of the incorrectly signed affidavits has resulted in an unreasonable exercise of his power.[53] However, such a submission overlooks that her conduct created a risk that in the event the 'targets' were going to be prosecuted, information with evidential value may be precluded. Further, even if a successful legal argument may be made to admit the information, her conduct may have necessitated such an argument needing to be made in the first place. Not only did the conduct have the capacity to undermine the results of the investigation, it also led to the need for the relevant authorities to be informed of the inappropriately witnessed affidavits. This is what gave rise to potential embarrassment and the reputational damage the decision-maker refers to in his reasons for decision.
  1. [121]
    I understand that Ms Thomas believes the conduct is not sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action where it was an unintentional and isolated incident. However, where the potential ramifications of even an isolated and unintentional incident are of a serious nature, it is open to a decision-maker to find that the contravention warrants disciplinary action.

Conclusion and Order

  1. [122]
    I have had regard to Ms Thomas' submissions and the Respondent's reply regarding the operation of s 91(4) of the PS Act. Ms Thomas is right to point out that a breach of the principles in s 40 of the PS Act is insufficient, on its own, to establish a ground of discipline. However, I agree with the Respondent's submission that this does not preclude the Respondent from substantiating a disciplinary finding in circumstances where it is satisfied that the provisions of s 91(1)(h) are made out.
  1. [123]
    That the decision dated 6 February 2025 may not set out the decision-maker’s reasons and findings using discrete sub-headings related to the matters he needed to be satisfied of under s 91(1)(h) does not mean it is not fair or reasonable. I have reviewed the decision considering the submissions of the parties and the matters the decision-maker was required to be satisfied of to the requisite standard. I am satisfied that the decision addresses the required considerations to make a finding under s 91(1)(h).
  1. [124]
    For the reasons given above from [88]–[123], I find that it was open to the decision-maker to find that Ms Thomas' conduct contravened the relevant standard of conduct, without reasonable excuse, in a way sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action. I find that the decision dated 6 February 2025 was fair and reasonable. Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the IR Act, the decision appealed against is confirmed.

Orders

  1. [125]
    I make the following orders:
  1. The decision appealed against is confirmed.

Footnotes

[1] Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 1 May, Annexure three: Show cause letter dated 29 October 2024.

[2] Decision on Disciplinary Finding and Proposed Disciplinary Action, 6.

[3] Ball v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2021] QIRC 116 [86], citing Coleman v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2020] QIRC 032, 13.

[4] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B(4)(a).

[5] Ibid, s 562B(4)(b).

[6] Notice of Appeal filed in the Industrial Registry on 27 February 2025, 4.

[7] Appellant's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 1 April 2025, [4.2].

[8] Ibid, [4.4].

[9] Ibid [4.5].

[10] Ibid [4.10]–[4.11].

[11] (1978) 141 CLR 54.

[12][2024] QIRC 097, [181] citing Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2 [25].

[13] Appellant's submissions (n 7) [4.24].

[14] Ibid [4.26].

[15] Ibid [4.27].

[16] Ibid [4.31].

[17] Ibid [4.32].

[18] Ibid [4.33].

[19] Ibid [4.35].

[20] Respondent's submissions (n 1) [2].

[21] Respondent's submissions (n 1) [8].

[22] Ibid [9].

[23] Ibid [16]

[24] Joyce v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2024] QIRC 279 [63].

[25] Respondent's submissions (n 1) [12].

[26] Ibid [17].

[27] Ibid [18]; annexures 2, 5.

[28] Ibid [19].

[29] Ibid [20].

[30] Ibid [21].

[31] Ibid [22].

[32] Appendix 9.

[33] Sime v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2023] QIRC 327 [62].

[34] Ibid [26], [27].

[35] Ibid [28].

[36] Ibid [29], [30].

[37] Ibid [31].

[38] Ibid [32].

[39] Ibid [33], the Respondent refers to the Solicitor’s Conduct Rules, however in her reply submissions, Ms Thomas clarifies that she is a Barrister and is subject to the Barrister’s Conduct Rules.

[40] Ibid [34].

[41] [2024] ICQ 3 [49] ('Hume').

[42] Appellant's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 9 May 2025, section 2.

[43] Ibid section 3.

[44] Ibid 3.5.

[45] Ibid 3.6.

[46] Ibid 3.7.

[47] Ibid 3.7.

[48] Ibid 3.8.

[49] Decision letter [28].

[50] Appellant's submissions (n 7) [4.13].

[51] Hume (n 41).

[52] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332.

[53] See above [33] with reference to Malcom citing Ismail.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Thomas v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Thomas v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 153

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Pidgeon IC

  • Date:

    10 Jun 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B., 223
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1948) 1 K.B., 223
Ball v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2021] QIRC 116
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 116
Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1978) 141 CLR 54
Coleman v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2020] QIRC 32
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 32
Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] HCA 2
Joyce v State of Queensland (Department of Environment and Science) [2024] QIRC 279
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 279
Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 97
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 97
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2013) 249 CLR 332
Sime v State of Queensland (Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships) [2023] QIRC 327
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 327
State of Queensland (Queensland Health) v Hume (No. 3) [2024] ICQ 3
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] ICQ 3
Cite 2 - [2024] ICQ 3

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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