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  4. Ollenburg v State of Queensland (Department of Education) - [2025] QIRC 159

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Ollenburg v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2025] QIRC 159

Ollenburg v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2025] QIRC 159

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Ollenburg v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 159

PARTIES:

Ollenburg, Eugenia

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Education)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2025/76

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal – Fair treatment

DELIVERED ON:

23 June 2025

MEMBER:

O'Neill IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the internal review decision dated 9 April 2025 is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – Public Sector Appeal – appeal against a directive pursuant to s 132 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) – where appellant is a Senior Experienced Teacher at the Redcliffe Special School – where appellant seeks reimbursement of long service leave – where there was a school closure due to Cyclone Alfred – where appellant seeks special leave for days of school closure – appellant lodge grievance against refusal to grant her special leave – appellant sought internal review of grievance decision – internal review decision was that the grievance decision was fair and reasonable – appeal against internal review decision – whether internal review decision was fair and reasonable – internal review decision was fair and reasonable – decision appealed against confirmed

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld)

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld)

Directive 11/20: Individual Employee Grievances

Directive 10/24: Long Service Leave

Directive 12/24: Special Leave

CASES:

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245

Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2) [2022] QIRC 16

Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Ms Eugenia Ollenburg ('the Appellant') has been employed as an Experienced Teacher at Redcliffe Special School since 1 July 2017. She commenced employment with the Department of Education ('the Respondent') on 14 August 2000.
  1. [2]
    On 6 December 2024, the Appellant applied to access Long Service Leave at half pay for the period of 28 January 2025 to 4 April 2025.
  1. [3]
    That request was subsequently approved by the Respondent.
  1. [4]
    On 5 March 2025, Ms Leanne Nixon, the Executive Controller of the Emergency Response Team, Department of Education, advised employees:

Schools in the South East, Metro North and Metro South Regions, and some schools in the North Coast and Darling Downs South West will be closed Thursday 6 March and Friday 7 March due to safety concerns and transport networks not operating.

  1. [5]
    Following this, due to ongoing concerns in relation to Cyclone Alfred, Redcliffe Special School remained closed on Monday 10 March 2025.
  1. [6]
    Between the dates of 11 March 2025 and 17 March 2025, the Appellant made six requests for her pre-approved long service leave to be revoked for the dates 6 March 2025, 7 March 2025 and 10 March 2025. She requested to instead be placed on discretionary special leave for those dates. These requests were subsequently denied by the Respondent.
  1. [7]
    On 18 March 2025, the Appellant lodged an Individual Employee Grievance in relation to the decision to deny her multiple requests for Special Leave.
  1. [8]
    On 26 March 2025, Ms Nicole Whitelaw, HR Manager, provide the Appellant with the Local Action Decision which found that the decision to decline Ms Ollenburg's applications for Special Leave was fair and reasonable.
  1. [9]
    On 30 March 2025, the Appellant requested an Internal Review of the Local Action Decision (`the Internal Review Decision'). On 9 April 2025, the decision-maker confirmed that the Local Action Decision was fair and reasonable.
  1. [10]
    The Appellant, on 29 April 2025, filed an Appeal Notice in the Industrial Registry, appealing the decision on 9 April 2025.
  1. [11]
    The question for my determination is whether the Internal Review Decision, and the decision‑making process, was fair and reasonable.[1]
  2. [12]
    For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that the Internal Review Decision was fair and reasonable.

Appeal Principles

  1. [13]
    Section 562B(2) and (3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') provides that the appeal is decided by reviewing the decision appealed against "to decide whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable".
  1. [14]
    The appeal is not conducted by way of re-hearing,[2] but rather involves a review of the decision arrived at by the decision-maker and the associated decision-making process.[3] The word 'review' is defined with reference to the context in which it appears.[4]
  1. [15]
    Findings made by the decision-maker, which are reasonably open to them, should not be disturbed on appeal.

Is the Appellant entitled to appeal?

  1. [16]
    The Appellant lodged an individual employee grievance pursuant to Directive 11/20: Individual employee grievances ('the Grievance Directive') dated 18 March 2025. In the grievance form the Appellant identifies that she was aggrieved by an administrative decision that was unfair and unreasonable. Effectively, that administrative decision was that the Appellant was not able to withdraw her long service leave for the three days in question and was not able to access special leave on full pay for those three days.
  2. [17]
    A 'Stage 1 – Local Action Decision' was issued on 26 March 2025 by Nicole Whitelaw, Manager, Human Resources, Metropolitan North Region outlining that the decision not approving the Appellant's request for special leave was fair and reasonable.
  3. [18]
    The Appellant, in accordance with the Grievance Directive, lodged a Stage 2 – Internal review request of the Local Action Decision. On 9 April 2025, Damien Cricchiola. Executive Director, Integrity & Employee Relations. Human Resources provided the Internal Review Decision which confirmed that the Local Action Decision was fair and reasonable.
  1. [19]
    In the Notice of Appeal, the Appellant has indicated that she is appealing a directive decision. The decision that the Appellant notes she is appealing is the internal review decision dated 9 April 2025.
  1. [20]
    The Respondent in its submissions filed on 28 May 2025 refers to the Appellant filing a fair treatment appeal pursuant to s 131(d) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('the PS Act')
  1. [21]
    Section 131(1)(b) of the 'the PS Act' provides  that an appeal can be made against a directive decision.
  1. [22]
    Section 133(b) of the PS Act provides that for directive decisions, a public sector employee aggrieved by the decision can appeal, if the employee is entitled to appeal under a directive. (emphasis added)
  1. [23]
    In the grievance the Appellant has made reference to both Directive 10/24: Long Service Leave and Directive 12/24: Special Leave. Neither of those directives make provision for an appeal by an employee aggrieved by a decision made under the Directives.
  2. [24]
    I am therefore satisfied that the Appellant's correct appeal ground is via a fair treatment appeal.
  3. [25]
    Section 131(1)(d) of the PS Act provides that an appeal may be made against a fair treatment decision. Section 133(d) of the PS Act provides that for fair treatment decisions, it is the public sector employee who is aggrieved by the decision who may appeal.
  4. [26]
    I am satisfied that the Appellant was aggrieved by the Internal Review Decision and therefore has an entitlement to appeal pursuant to s 131(1)(d) and s 133(d) of the PS Act.

Time limit for appeal

  1. [27]
    Section 564(3) of the IR Act requires that the appeal be lodged in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission within 21 days after the decision being appealed against is made.
  2. [28]
    In the Notice of Appeal Ms Ollenburg notes that she received the decision on 10 April 2025. The appeal was lodged on 29 April 2025 and therefore within 21 days.
  3. [29]
    I am satisfied that the Appellant is a person who may appeal the Internal Review Decision and that she lodged her appeal within the relevant timeframe.

What decisions can the Commission make?

  1. [30]
    Section 562C(1) of the IR Act prescribes that the Commission may determine to either:
  • confirm the decision appealed against;
  • set the decision aside and return the matter to the decision maker with a copy of the decision on appeal and any directions considered appropriate; or
  • set the decision aside and substitute another decision.

Relevant Legislation and Directives

  1. [31]
    Directive 10/24: Long Service Leave ('the Long Service Leave Directive') relevantly states:
  1. 6.1An employee who completes 10 years continuous service is entitled to long service leave on full pay of:
  1. 6.5 working days for each year of continuous service; or
  2. 1.3 calendar weeks for each year of continuous service; and
  3. a proportionate amount for an incomplete year of service. 6.2 It is at the chief executive’s discretion whether the leave is calculated in working time or calendar time.
  1. [32]
    Directive 12/24: Special Leave ('the Special Leave Directive') relevantly states:
  1. 5.Entitlement
  2. 5.1An employee, as defined in this directive:
  1. may be granted special leave either on full pay or without pay as provided for in clause 6;
  1. must be granted special leave of absence either on full pay or without pay as provided and where indicated in Schedule One.
  1. 5.2Unless otherwise indicated, leave entitlements apply to part-time employees on a pro-rata basis.
  2. 5.3Certain parts of this directive apply to public service officers only. Where this occurs, the word ‘officer’ will be used instead of ‘employee’.
  3. 5.4Leave prescribed in this directive may be converted to an hourly basis for the purpose of entitlement, granting and recording of leave. Leave is based on the number of hours that the employee would have worked. Schedule Three provides conversion formulas.
  4. 5.5If an employee is rostered to work a specific number of hours on a day and the employee is absent from duty on that day, or part of it, the period of leave will be the number of hours that the employee was rostered to work on that day but did not work. This applies even though the period of leave may be different to the employee’s daily hours (as defined).
  5. 5.6Where a public holiday or substituted day under the Holidays Act 1983 occurs, during an absence on special leave without pay, employees are not entitled to be paid for the public holiday.
  6. 6.Discretionary leave
  7. 6.1A chief executive may approve paid leave for employees for any purpose, with duration appropriate to the purpose of the leave.
  1. Leave approved under clause 6.1 must not exceed more than five (5) working days per year per reason unless the chief executive considers that circumstances warrant the granting of additional paid leave. Any additional leave must be reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances.
  1. Examples of reasons could include, but are not limited to, those specified in Schedule Two.
  1. 6.2A chief executive may approve unpaid leave for employees for any purpose and for any duration.
  2. 6.3A chief executive may approve purchased leave, a form of unpaid leave, for any period determined by the chief executive in accordance with Queensland Government policy, guidelines and/or industrial instruments.
  3. 6.4A chief executive may approve a combination of paid and unpaid leave under this directive.
  4. 6.5In determining an application for leave under clause 6.1 or clause 6.2, a chief executive must consider:
  1. the reason the leave is requested;
  1. the duration of the requested leave;
  1. if applicable, for fixed term temporary employees, the duration of the person’s employment (including end date);
  1. the impact on the employee if the requested leave is not approved.
  1. [33]
    In relation to Floods, Cyclones, Bushfires, etc, Schedule 2 of the Special leave Directive states:

An employee who is prevented from attending the employee's normal place of employment because of floods, cyclonic disturbances, severe storms or bushfires may be granted leave in the following circumstances –

  1. it is not practicable for the employee to attend for duty at another Government office;
  1. the employee is absent from their usual place of residence on approved leave or during a weekend and is unable to return in sufficient time to attend the normal place of employment or it is not practicable to attend duty at another Government office;
  1. where the employee is required to return home before the employee’s usual ceasing time to ensure personal safety, the protection of the employee’s family and property or the availability of transport facilities which may be disrupted or discontinued because of weather or environmental conditions;
  1. where the employee must, of necessity, remain at home to safeguard the employee’s family or property;
  1. where the employee remains at home to have temporary repairs effected, restore belongings, clean up etc;
  1. where the employee is travelling on transfer and is unavoidably delayed from arriving at the destination. (An officer may also be allowed reasonable expenses necessarily incurred for accommodation and meals for the officer and family.)

Proceedings in the Commission

  1. [34]
    The Appeal Notice was filed by the Appellant on 29 April 2025.
  1. [35]
    On 30 April 2025, I issued a Directions Order to the parties requesting submissions be made in support or response of the Appeal. On the same day, the Appellant sent an email to the Registry acknowledging receipt of the Directions Order.
  1. [36]
    As per the Directions Order, the Appellant was to file her submissions in the Registry and serve on the Respondent by 4:00pm on 14 May 2025.
  1. [37]
    On 15 May 2025, the Registry received correspondence from the Respondent querying whether the Appellant had filed her submissions in the Registry.
  1. [38]
    The Appellant responded to this email as below:

Thank you very much for your email!

To be honest, I don't know what is going on. It looks like you expect something from me: "Ms Ollenburg had filed submissions in accordance with the attached Directions Order". 

Was I supposed to file any submission? The last email I received about this matter was from HUMANRES (see below). My understanding is that now I will be waiting for the decision to be made.

  1. [39]
    The Appellant then sent a further email to the Industrial Registry on the same day as follows:

Dear Registry Officer!

Due to some misunderstanding, I did not submit my appeal by the designated time. This is all new to me, and my understanding was that I submitted it on 29th April. Straight after I emailed it to QIRC, I received a conformation that my email was received and filed. I know that I was emailed 'Public Sector Appeal Guide' consisting of 38 pages, but it really would have been nice if somebody just told me what to do with my submission. Because, at this stage, I still don't know. It looks like somebody wants me to spend half a day reading 'Public Sector Appeal Guide' to find out what I should do with my appeal after I have already emailed it to QIRC.

If I have to submit it again, then who did I emailed all my documents and 'Form 89 - Appeal Notice' on 29th of April?

…

To me, it was clear that I needed to submit my appeal by 1st May on the QIRC's email. And this is what I did.

After that, I received an email from the QIRC's Registry with the 'Directions Oder'. Of course, I read it, but I couldn't understand that I had to file my appeal again. And to whom.

And, of course, now I missed the due date and time. I would like to ask for the extension and clear instructions of what I should do. Please. If it's possible. I will do this today.

Thank you for your time and understanding!

  1. [40]
    The Registry responded to Ms Ollenburg's email on 19 May 2025 as follows:

Ms Ollenburg’s appeal has been filed within time.

In accordance with the directions order issued on 30 April 2025 the Appellant, Ms Ollenburg, was to file and serve on the Respondent submissions in support of her public sector appeal by 4:00 pm on Wednesday, 14 May 2025. The Appellant has failed to comply with that direction.

… If the Appellant wishes to apply for an extension of time for the filing of her submissions, it is open for her to do so.

  1. [41]
    The Appellant made no further contact with the Registry and no request for an extension was received.
  1. [42]
    In compliance with the above-mentioned Directions Order, the Respondent filed their submissions on 28 May 2025.
  1. [43]
    The Appellant failed to file Reply Submissions by the deadline outlined in the Directions Order. Therefore, in order to afford Ms Ollenburg procedural fairness, I called the matter on for mention on 9 June 2025. 
  1. [44]
    The Appellant was served with a Notice of Listing and sent multiple emails advising her of the requirement to attend the mention.
  1. [45]
    The mention commenced on 9 June 2025 however, the Appellant failed to appear. The Respondent did not make any applications to strike the matter out and advised they were satisfied for me to decide the matter on the material before me.

Notice of Appeal and Appeal Grounds

  1. [46]
    As mentioned above, the Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on 29 April 2025. Within her Appeal Notice, the Appellant sets out the following Grounds to support her appeal:
  • The Appellant submits that her case was not treated with a personal approach and the decision instead was based solely on the Department of Education's policy documents.
  • Although she was on pre-approved leave at the time, the Appellant states that she paid her own Long Service Leave entitlements to not come to work. As nobody was required to work on the days in question, the Appellant submits that she should not have to pay for those days.
  • The Appellant contends that the Special Leave Directive does not explain how Long Service Leave and Special Leave interact when there is a total school closure and that the decision is made on the basis that she was not rostered to work. The Appellant contends that the Respondent refused to take into consideration that no employees were rostered to work during the relevant three days.
  • The Appellant submits that there being no definite instructions or laws as to how Long Service Leave and Special Leave interact is the reasonable ground which supports her appeal.
  • The Appellant contends that 'everything which is not forbidden is allowed' is a legal maxim and is the concept that any action can be taken unless there is a law against it.
  • The Appellant contends that the decision fails to acknowledge that Long Service Leave is an award and should therefore be treated like one. The Appellant explains that she believes where there is a total school closure and nobody is required to work, staff on Long Service Leave should be treated like everyone else as those staff are paying for their Long Service Leave out of their own pocket.

Respondent Submissions

  1. [47]
    The Respondent filed their submissions on 28 May 2025 and can be summarised as follows:
  • In response to the Appellant's contention that her personal circumstances were not taken into consideration, the Respondent submits that no personal circumstances were raised by the Appellant outside of her belief that Long Service Leave is an award. Further, the Respondent submits that an employee's entitlement to special leave in circumstances of a school closure due to a natural disaster does not depend on and is not affected by their 'personal circumstances'.
  • The Respondent contends that the Appellant made herself unavailable to work by virtue of accessing the long service leave and was accordingly provided with paid time away from the workplace. For this reason, the Respondent submits that it is not unfair or unreasonable that the Appellant should have to have her Long Service Leave balance reduced during a period where no employees were required to attend the workplace.
  • The Respondent submits that they have afforded the Appellant procedural fairness throughout the grievance process and complied with both the Long Service Leave Directive and Special Leave Directive.
  • The Respondent contends that the closure of a school does not automatically result in all its employees being placed on discretionary leave with pay. Rather it is at the discretion of the respective delegates to place employees on this type of leave.
  • In the relevant circumstances involving the Appellant, the Respondent submits that all employees rostered to attend the closed schools on 6, 7 and 10 March 2025 were directed to access discretionary special leave. Any employees that were not rostered to work those days, were not directed to access the discretionary special leave and any pre-existing leave arrangements were not disturbed.

Consideration

  1. [48]
    To determine this appeal, I am required to assess whether the decision appealed against was fair and reasonable.
  2. [49]
    Deputy President Merrell in Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No 2)[5] ('Colebourne') considered the meaning of 'fair and reasonable' and concluded that it should be construed within the ordinary meaning of the phrase as used in the context of s 562B of the IR Act.[6]
  3. [50]
    In Colebourne his Honour further noted that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' is not an assessment of whether the decision was unreasonable only by reference to the legal standard.[7] His Honour concluded that assessing whether a decision was 'fair and reasonable' permitted a review of both the factual merits and legal reasonableness of both the decision itself and the process of making that decision.[8]

Personal circumstances not taken into account

  1. [51]
    The Appellant contends that her personal circumstances were not taken into account in the Local Action Decision and the Internal Review Decision. In setting out the grounds of appeal in the Notice of Appeal, the Appellant does not identify what the personal circumstances were that she says were not taken into consideration by the decision-makers.
  2. [52]
    In the Grievance Submission Form the Appellant has cut and pasted excerpts of relevant email communications between the Appellant and various employees of the Respondent. From my perusal of that information, it appears that the only personal circumstances raised by the Appellant are that she was on long service leave at half pay (at her request) during the period from 6 to 10 March 2025.
  3. [53]
    The Respondent in its submission contends that an employee's entitlement to special leave in circumstances of a school closure due to a natural disaster does not depend upon, and is not affected by, their 'personal circumstances'.
  4. [54]
    The Respondent further acknowledges that the provision of long service leave is intended to recognise time served in the public sector. However, the Appellant made herself unavailable to work by virtue of accessing the leave and was accordingly provided paid time away from work.
  5. [55]
    In the Internal Review Decision dated 9 April 2025 it is clear that the decision-maker has recognised and considered that the Appellant was on pre-approved long service leave (and had been for some time). Indeed, that was basis for the Appellant's grievance, that is, that she could not convert her approved long service leave to paid (discretionary) special leave.
  6. [56]
    The fact that the outcome of the grievance was not to the Appellant's liking, does not mean that the decision was unfair or unreasonable. I am satisfied that the Appellant's personal circumstances were considered by Mr Cricchiola in determining that the Local Action Decision was fair and reasonable.

Interaction between the Long Service Leave Directive and Special Leave Directive where there is a school closure

  1. [57]
    The Appellant's primary contention through the grievance process and this appeal has been that it is unfair that she should have her long service leave balance reduced (and be paid half-pay), during a period when no employees were required to attend the school due to the weather-related closure.
  2. [58]
    The consistent advice provided to the Appellant when she was requesting that her long service leave be converted to special leave, was that if her leave had already been approved, it would remain in place. As an example of this, the Appellant received an email from Ms Kath Simon, Deputy Principal from Redcliffe Special School (on or about 12 March 2025) which relevantly provided:

I followed up your enquiry about accessing Special Leave following a disaster or emergency events with the senior Human Relations manager in regional office. Her advice to me was that you would not be able to withdraw your leave after an event has occurred. As your leave was approved before the event it falls into this category as shown below in her response.

Please see the below snip out of the 'Accessing Special Leave following disaster or emergency events':

7.  If I am currently on leave, can this be changed to special leave?

Where an employee's leave has already been approved then that leave application stands.

  1. [59]
    The Appellant then escalated her case to the Minister for Education. On 17 March 2025 the Appellant received an email from Ms Megan Bradley, Director (Payroll Services), Human Resources, Department of Education which relevantly provided:

As discussed, you are currently on approved long service leave from 28 January 2025 to 8 August 2025, with approval granted on 6 December 2024. As outlined in the Accessing Special Leave following Disaster or Emergency Events Knowledge Base Article, pre-approved leave cannot be amended to special leave.

Further, in accordance with the Minister for Industrial Relations Directive: Special leave (12/24), Schedule 2 (5), discretionary special leave is granted to employees who are prevented from attending their normal place of employment due to floods, cyclonic disturbances, severe storms or bushfires. As you were on pre-approved leave you were not intending on attending your workplace when the school was closed so there is no entitlement to special leave.

  1. [60]
    Later the same day, the Appellant received an email from Courtney Calver-Malaschevsky from the HR Advisory Service, which relevantly provided as follows:

…

Natural Disasters & School Closures

The Special Leave Directive (12/24) provides guidance on leave for floods, cyclones, bushfires, and other severe weather events under Section 5, stating that an employee may be granted leave in certain circumstances.

However, the directive does not contain specific provisions for school closures and specific natural disasters. This means that while an employee may be granted leave under discretionary special leave provisions, it is not an automatic entitlement and is subject to approval by the delegated officer.

While all three types of 'unplanned' leave- sick leave, carer's leave, and special leave - share similarities in that they arise from unforeseen circumstances, they each have different rules and regulatory requirements. Unlike sick leave or carer's leave, which have clearer eligibility criteria, leave for school closures falls under discretionary special leave and must be assessed based on individual circumstances which require discretionary approval.

Delegates are encouraged to consider personal circumstances when reviewing applications; however, the final decision rests with the authorised delegate in accordance with the directive.

… (emphasis added)

  1. [61]
    The Respondent in its submissions contends that the Appellant, by arranging pre-approved long service leave, made herself unavailable to work during the period of 6 March 2025 to 10 March 2025.
  2. [62]
    The Respondent further contends that there is no provision in either the Long Service Leave Directive or the Special Leave Directive which entitles an employee to replace their (approved) long service leave with discretionary special leave with pay.
  3. [63]
    The Respondent further submits that the closure of a school does not automatically result in all of its employees being placed on discretionary special leave with pay. The Respondent notes that by definition it is at the discretion of the respective delegates to place employees on discretionary special leave with pay.
  4. [64]
    In this case, the delegates directed employees who were rostered on to attend the closed schools on 6, 7 and 10 March 2025 to access discretionary leave with pay. Those who were not rostered to work at the closed schools were not directed to access discretionary special leave with pay and any pre-existing arrangements which made an employee unavailable for work including long service leave were not disturbed.
  5. [65]
    In the Internal Review Decision, the decision-maker noted that the Appellant was not rostered for work in the period from 6 March to 10 March 2025, and that she was not due to attend a closed school because the Appellant had made herself unavailable for work by accessing pre-approved long service leave.
  6. [66]
    The decision-maker further notes that no alternative arrangements were required to be made for the Appellant and no legal direction was issued to her during this period. The decision-maker notes that whilst the Local Action Decision did not detail the lack of lawful direction issued for the school closures, this did not result in an unfair decision to decline the Appellant's request to have her long service leave reimbursed.
  7. [67]
    The decision-maker went on to find that the Appellant was not directed to stay home on those days, and nor was she rostered to work during that period. As a consequence, the decision-maker found that no alterations to the Appellant's current arrangements were required. The decision-maker concluded that it was fair and reasonable that the Appellant would not be approved to access paid discretionary leave under Schedule Two, Part 5 of Directive 12/24.
  8. [68]
    In light of the contents of both the Long Service Leave Directive and the Special Leave Directive, and the evidence before the decision-maker on the internal review, I am satisfied that each of those findings were open to the decision-maker and each finding was fair and reasonable.

Other matters

  1. [69]
    In her appeal grounds the Appellant contends that the relevant decision-makers do not want to take into consideration that nobody was rostered for work on those three days on 6, 7 and 10 March 2025.
  2. [70]
    This represents a fundamental misunderstanding by the Appellant. The Appellant had applied for an extended period of long service leave on half pay. On 6 December 2024, the Appellant requested, and was subsequently approved access to long service leave (at half pay) for the period from 28 January 2025 to 4 April 2025. As a consequence, the Appellant was not rostered to work at all during the period from 28 January 2025 to 4 April 2025. There was never an expectation or requirement for the Appellant to attend work on 6, 7 and 10 March 2025 as a consequence of her decision to take an extended period of long service leave.
  3. [71]
    This should be contrasted with the Appellant's colleagues at the Redcliffe Special School who were in fact rostered and expected to work on 6, 7 and 10 March 2025. The only reason for their non-attendance at work was the decision to close schools in the relevant area impacted by Cyclone Alfred as per the message from Ms Leanne Nixon, Executive Controller of the Emergency Response Team on 5 March 2025. There was in my view a clear distinction between the position of the Appellant and her colleagues who were in fact rostered to work.
  4. [72]
    The decision-maker went on to note in the Internal Review Decision that the Long Service Leave Directive provides employees with details of how long service leave is to be used and how it is affected by specific scenarios.
  1. [73]
    Mr Cricchiola noted that Clause 14 of the Long Service Leave Directive provides direction regarding how public holidays that fall during a period of approved long service leave, whilst clause 17 allows employees to be granted sick leave instead of long service leave, where leave had already been approved.
  1. [74]
    The decision-maker specifically noted that there was no provision in the Long Service Leave Directive for long service leave to be replaced by special leave or bereavement leave.
  1. [75]
    The decision-maker went on to conclude that there was no contravention of the Special Leave Directive in declining the Appellant's request and that there is no entitlement to access discretionary special leave.
  1. [76]
    The decision-maker further confirmed that there is not a mechanism under the Long Service Leave Directive for the Appellant to cancel her long service leave (after the event) to contrive a benefit to herself to be paid discretionary special leave under Directive 12/24. The decision-maker therefore found that it was fair and reasonable for the delegated decision-maker to maintain the Appellant's long service leave in effect for the period from 6 March 2025 to 10 March 2025.
  1. [77]
    Each of the findings of the decision-maker referred to in paragraphs [74] to [76] above, were not only open on the evidence before the decision-maker, but were in fact correct. I further find that:
  1. The Internal Review Decision considered and had regard for the Appellant's human rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
  2. The Appellant was afforded procedural fairness through the grievance process.
  3. The Appellant had no as of right entitlement to be paid discretionary special leave in the circumstances.

Conclusion

  1. [78]
    The question in this appeal was whether the Internal Review Decision was fair and reasonable.
  2. [79]
    For the reasons I have given above, the Appellant has not persuaded me that the decision-maker has erred in any way in the Internal Review Decision. I am satisfied that on the evidence before the decision-maker the Internal Review Decision was fair and reasonable.

Orders

  1. [80]
    I make the following orders:

Pursuant to s 562C(1)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the internal review decision dated 9 April 2025 is confirmed.

Footnotes

[1] Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203, [3]-[7].

[2] Goodall v State of Queensland (Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5; Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 567(1).

[3] Ibid; Industrial Relations Act 2016, s 562B(2).

[4] Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245, 261.

[5] [2022] QIRC 16.

[6] Ibid, at [25], citing Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446. 

[7] Colebourne at [21]-[22] and [25].

[8] Ibid, at [23] citing Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5 as to the former, equivalent provisions in s 201 of the Public Service Act 2008.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Ollenburg v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Ollenburg v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 159

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    O'Neill IC

  • Date:

    23 Jun 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Brandy v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 183 CLR 245
Cite 2 - (1995) 183 CLR 245
Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] HCA 10
Cite 2 - [1995] HCA 10
Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) (No. 2) [2022] QIRC 16
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 16
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 16
Morison v State of Queensland (Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women) [2020] QIRC 203
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 203
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 203
Pope v Lawler [1996] FCA 1446
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1996] FCA 1446

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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