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  4. Dawson v State of Queensland (Department of Primary Industries) - [2025] QIRC 164

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Dawson v State of Queensland (Department of Primary Industries)[2025] QIRC 164

Dawson v State of Queensland (Department of Primary Industries)[2025] QIRC 164

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Dawson v State of Queensland (Department of Primary Industries) [2025] QIRC 164

PARTIES:

Dawson, Karen

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Primary Industries)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2025/56

PROCEEDING:

Public Sector Appeal – Application to allow appeal to be started within a longer period

DELIVERED ON:

27 June 2025

HEARD AT:

On the papers

MEMBER:

Pidgeon IC

ORDER:

  1. The Appellant’s application to allow her appeal to be started within a longer period is refused.
  1. Pursuant to s 566(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the stay of the disciplinary findings decision appealed against is revoked.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – appellant appeals a disciplinary finding decision – one day out of time – appellant taken to have made application to allow her to start her appeal within a longer period – consideration of whether, in the circumstances, the appellant should be allowed to start her appeal within a longer period – merits of the substantive appeal weigh against exercising discretion to allow appeal to be started within a longer period – application to allow appellant to start appeal within a longer period refused

LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 539 and 564

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ss 129, 131, 133

CASES:

Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258

Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd [1995] QIRC 216; (1995) 149 QGIG 777

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1995) 149 QGIG 777

Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited (1995) 67 IR 298

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Ms Karen Dawson ('the Appellant') is an Executive Manager (AO8.3) in the Fisheries and Forestry section of Department of Primary Industries ('the Respondent').
  1. [2]
    On 13 March 2025, Ms Dawson was issued with a Decision on Disciplinary Findings and Proposed Disciplinary Action. In this decision, Ms Justine Clark, Deputy Director-General Corporate, Department of Primary Industries, informs Ms Dawson that four allegations against her have been substantiated and give rise to grounds for disciplinary action.
  1. [3]
    On 4 April 2025, Ms Dawson filed a Form 89 Appeal Notice. The Respondent has raised a jurisdictional objection to the appeal noting that the appeal was filed one day outside the 21-day statutory timeframe for lodging an appeal. I will deal with that matter below.
  1. [4]
    Ms Dawson's appeal notice requests, among other things, 'reversal of the disciplinary finding and its proposed disciplinary action'. As there has been no decision made regarding disciplinary action, the proposed disciplinary action of a reduction in increment is not something Ms Dawson may appeal.
  1. [5]
    This appeal is confined to the question of whether the decision to find that each of the four allegations was substantiated and gives rise to grounds for discipline was fair and reasonable. However, the appeal will only be heard if I decide to extend time.

Jurisdictional Objection – Appeal filed outside of 21-day statutory timeframe

  1. [6]
    In its submissions filed on 23 April 2025, the Respondent submits that the application was lodged out of time with the length of delay being one day.
  1. [7]
    The Respondent notes that the Appellant has not made an application for an extension of time and that such an application is necessary before the Commission may exercise discretion to hear the matter outside of the appeal timeframe.
  1. [8]
    The Respondent submits that Ms Dawson received the correspondence on 13 March 2025 and made a conscious decision to not attend to it until she returned to the workplace on 1 April 2025 following a period of leave.[1]
  1. [9]
    Ms Dawson filed her submissions in reply on 7 May 2025. Ms Dawson provides a response to the alleged delay in filing her appeal. Section 539(e) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act') provides that I may correct a defect or irregularity in the proceedings, whether substantive or formal. I will take Ms Dawson’s submissions addressing the delay in filing her appeal as an application for an extension of time.
  1. [10]
    Ms Dawson submits that she had 'assumed the extension granted to provide my show cause response also included an extension to the 21-day appeal window as there was no clear communication to the contrary'.[2]
  1. [11]
    Ms Dawson says that following her meeting with Ms Luck at 3.30pm on 13 March 2025, she did not check her emails further that day. Ms Dawson says that she had been advised by her director, out of concern for her wellbeing, to pack up her things and take time off and enjoy her leave. Ms Dawson says that she did not review the correspondence in the time that she was on leave.[3]
  1. [12]
    Ms Dawson submits that this was 'an honest misunderstanding' and not a deliberate delay. Ms Dawson submits that 'focus should remain on the substantive fairness of the disciplinary findings, not a minor technical delay which causes no prejudice to the Department'.[4]
  1. [13]
    In its reply submissions filed on 14 May 2025, the Respondent addresses some of the matters which are routinely considered by the Commission in deciding whether to exercise discretion to extend time for filing an appeal.[5]
  1. [14]
    The Respondent addresses its own conduct and says that in both the disciplinary decision and the notification email accompanying the decision, Ms Dawson was informed of the 21-day appeal period. The Respondent notes that Ms Dawson was directed to the QIRC website and phone numbers for advice about public service appeals. The Respondent says that Ms Dawson was again informed of the 21-day appeal timeframe on 2 April 2025.
  1. [15]
    Regarding Ms Dawson's reasons for delay, the Respondent notes that Ms Dawson made the decision not to attend to the matter until she returned from leave and on that basis, she still could have lodged her appeal in time.
  1. [16]
    The Respondent says that information provided to Ms Dawson has been clear and unambiguous and that the information regarding any 'extension of time' only applied to the timeframe to respond to the proposed penalty (the second show cause notice reply).
  1. [17]
    The Respondent submits that Ms Dawson's prospects of success on a hearing of the appeal are limited due to the documentary evidence, Ms Dawson's admissions and that a complaint was made by an external company.
  1. [18]
    The Respondent submits that the delay gives rise to a general assumption of prejudice and Ms Dawson retains an avenue of appeal if a decision is made to take disciplinary action against her. The Respondent says that Ms Dawson has had two opportunities to respond to the disciplinary findings and has also lodged an industrial dispute. The Respondent says that another opportunity to disturb the disciplinary finding will cause it further prejudice
  1. [19]
    In reply, Ms Dawson says that she formally requested, and was granted, an extension of time by the Department and that she 'acted promptly upon returning from approved leave on 1 April 2025'. Ms Dawson says it is inaccurate to say that she chose not to attend to the matter. Ms Dawson submits that the 'initial correspondence regarding the appeal deadline was sent to my work email while I was on leave and not accessing that account'. Ms Dawson says that she 'acted in good faith and within the timeframe allowed by the extension granted'.[6]
  1. [20]
    Ms Dawson disputes the Respondent's submissions regarding her prospects of success. With regard to the documentary evidence the Respondent refers to, Ms Dawson says that this evidence has been 'selectively extracted and presented without full context'.[7]

Consideration – Jurisdictional objection as appeal filed out of time

Legal framework

  1. [21]
    A member of the Commission may allow an appeal to be started within a longer period.[8]
  1. [22]
    In exercising discretion to extend time to lodge an application or appeal, there are principles that have been used for guidance. Those principles are commonly:
  • special circumstances need not be shown, but an applicant for extension must show an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time;
  • action taken by the applicant, other than by making an application under the relevant Act, is relevant to the consideration of the question of whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;
  • any prejudice to the respondent, including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay, is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension;
  • the merits of the substantive application are taken into account when considering whether an extension of time should be granted;
  • consideration of fairness as between the applicant and other persons in a like position are relevant to the exercise of discretion.[9]
  1. [23]
    In Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd,[10] Hall P noted the following matters to consider when deciding whether or not to extend time:
  • the length of the delay;
  • the explanation for the delay;
  • the prejudice to the Appellant if the extension of time is not granted;
  • the prejudice to the Respondent if the extension of time is granted; and
  • any relevant conduct of the Respondent.
  1. [24]
    The application of statutory time limits was addressed by McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor:[11]

A limitation period should not be seen therefore as an arbitrary cut off point unrelated to the demands of justice or the general welfare of society. It represents the legislature's judgment that the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within the limitation period notwithstanding that the enactment of that period may often result in a good cause of action being defeated. Against this background, I do not see any warrant for treating provisions that provide for an extension of time for commencing an action as having a standing equal or greater than those provisions that enact limitation periods. A limitation provision is the general rule; and extension provision is the exception to it.

  1. [25]
    The Appellant bears the onus of convincing the Commission to depart from the ordinary time limitations and hear the appeal out of time.[12]
  1. [26]
    I will now consider the submissions of the parties regarding Ms Dawson's appeal being filed outside of the statutory time period.

Length of delay, reasons for delay and actions taken by the Applicant

  1. [27]
    The length of the delay is short in that the appeal was filed one day outside of the statutory timeframe.
  1. [28]
    I understand Ms Dawson's explanation that she went on leave and left the decision letter unopened in her email inbox. Despite this, she went on leave understanding the nature of the decision that had been made. So much is demonstrated by her acknowledgement of the matter being raised with her just before she went on leave and stating that '(I)t was not exactly a pleasant send-off'. The timeline Ms Dawson sets out in her submissions also indicates that on 13 March 2025, she 'received confirmation that allegations were substantiated'.
  1. [29]
    I am satisfied that Ms Dawson understood the outcome of the disciplinary findings process before she commenced her period of leave. Ms Dawson specifically states that the 'decision was issued just two days before my 50th birthday – a milestone I had planned to spend with family, which was instead overshadowed by shock and anxiety.'
  1. [30]
    It may be that because she was commencing a period of leave, Ms Dawson chose to not immediately avail herself of the clear and unambiguous advice regarding the 21-day appeal period provided in the email of 13 March 2025 and the attached written decision. However, upon her return to work on 1 April 2025, she confirms in an email at 3.26pm that she had 'just read the email today' and requests an extension to respond to the second show cause notice.[13]
  1. [31]
    The following day 2 April 2025, at 11.08am, despite the very clear instruction given to her in the email of Ms Luck dated 13 March 2025, Ms Dawson seeks clarification about her right to appeal the decision to the QIRC.[14]
  1. [32]
    An hour later at 12.07pm, Ms Luck responds, clearly stating that if Ms Dawson chooses to appeal the disciplinary findings decision, she must do so within 21 days from 13 March 2025.[15]
  1. [33]
    It is difficult to accept Ms Dawson's submission that she assumed the extension granted to provide her show cause response also included an extension of the public sector appeal window. While Ms Luck wrote an email to Ms Dawson at 9.56am on 3 April 2025 granting a request for an extension to provide a response to the proposed disciplinary penalty,[16] she had already received clear and unequivocal advice from Ms Luck the previous day informing her of the 21-day appeal period for the QIRC appeal.
  1. [34]
    If Ms Dawson really did believe that she had been granted an extension for filing the Public Sector Appeal, this is not explained by her lodging the appeal by email and later by hand on Friday 4 April 2025 rather than sometime on or before 1 May 2025 based on the extension granted for her to respond to the second show cause notice.
  1. [35]
    It seems to me that Ms Dawson did understand that the 21-day appeal period commenced when she received the decision and that this is evidenced by her filing her appeal, albeit a day late, on 4 April 2025.
  1. [36]
    Ms Dawson was aware of the disciplinary decision on 13 March 2025. Ms Dawson had previously indicated an intention to appeal the disciplinary decision and has demonstrated a capacity to interact with the QIRC through her previous lodging of a dispute.
  1. [37]
    Ms Dawson describes the late filing as a 'minor technical delay',[17] however I echo the remarks of McHugh J set out above at [31] that a limitation provision is the general rule. The extension provision is an exception to the general rule and while special circumstances need not be shown, an acceptable explanation for the delay must be shown. 
  1. [38]
    Ms Dawson had received clear advice regarding statutory timeframes. Making an active choice to not deal with matters as one is commencing leave to celebrate a milestone birthday is not an acceptable explanation for delay. On those grounds, I do not accept that Ms Dawson has provided a satisfactory reason for the delay in filing her appeal.

Conduct of the Respondent

  1. [39]
    For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the late filing of Ms Dawson's appeal is not due to any actions of the Respondent. In my view, the Respondent has provided clear and unambiguous advice to Ms Dawson regarding the process and timelines for lodging a public sector appeal.

Prejudice to the Respondent

  1. [40]
    In circumstances where the Respondent has simultaneously filed submissions regarding the substantive appeal alongside its submissions raising a jurisdictional objection, on the face of it there is minimal prejudice to the Respondent if I were to extend time. Though I do note the Respondent’s submissions that an extension of time affords Ms Dawson an additional opportunity to disturb findings in circumstances where she has already had the matter reconsidered following conciliation of a dispute she filed in the Commission.

Prejudice to the Applicant

  1. [41]
    There is a clear prejudice to Ms Dawson if I do not extend time, given that the substantiated allegations have been found to give rise to grounds for discipline. However, if the decision remains undisturbed, the disciplinary process continues, and Ms Dawson will retain appeal rights if she disagrees with any decision made to impose disciplinary action.

Merits of the substantive application

  1. [42]
    Another issue to consider in determining whether to exercise discretion to extend time for filing the appeal are the merits of the substantive appeal. 
  1. [43]
    In considering the merits of the substantive appeal, I am assisted by the submissions of the parties and provision of various attachments. Ms Dawson has included in an addendum to her Form 89 Appeal notice a detailed schedule of reasons for appeal and a substantial number of relevant attachments. It is these reasons for appeal which will form the basis for my consideration of the merits of her appeal.
  1. [44]
    The disciplinary findings decision informs Ms Dawson that four allegations have been substantiated and that the conduct gives rise to grounds for discipline. I will set out those allegations and grounds for discipline here:[18]

Allegation 1: On 17 May 2024, you engaged in inappropriate, unprofessional and disrespectful conversations about [Employee B] with [Employee A].

Grounds for discipline Allegation 1: Pursuant to s 91(1)(b) of the Public Sector Act 2022 ('the PS Act'), misconduct that is inappropriate or improper conduct in an official capacity within the meaning of s 91(5)(a).

Allegation 2: On 21 May 2024, you inappropriately contacted a representative of [Employee B's] employment agency and made unprofessional comments about [Employee B].

Grounds for discipline Allegation 2: Pursuant to s 91(1)(b) of the PS Act, misconduct that is inappropriate or improper conduct in an official capacity within the meaning of s 91(5)(a).

Allegation 3: On 16 May 2024, following the announcement of [Employee C's] appointment as Director-General, you made inappropriate and unprofessional comments about him and [Employee D] to [Employee A].

Grounds for discipline Allegation 3: Pursuant to s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act, the Appellant contravened, without reasonable excuse, a relevant standard of conduct, that is a standard conduct applying to her under the Code of Conduct, in a way that is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action, specifically clause 1.5 of the Code of Conduct.

Allegation 4: On various occasions during 2024, you made inappropriate, offensive and unprofessional comments and/or engaged in inappropriate workplace behaviours in your communications with [Employee A], and broadly within the office.

Grounds for discipline Allegation 4: Pursuant to s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act, the Appellant contravened, without reasonable excuse, a relevant standard of conduct, that is a standard conduct applying to her under the Code of Conduct, in a way that is sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action, specifically clause 1.5 of the Code of Conduct.

  1. [45]
    In the Schedule attached to her Form 89 Appeal notice, Ms Dawson sets out an extensive set of reasons for her appeal. Ms Dawson sets out four concerns regarding the decision: Procedural Fairness and Privacy; Inconsistent Treatment and Accountability; Insufficient and Misinterpreted Evidence; Bias and Retaliatory Implications. Ms Dawson also addresses 'mitigating context', 'relevant context regarding reporting structure', 'impact to [her] career and financial standing' and 'Commitment to Growth and Learning'.
  1. [46]
    I will briefly consider each of the matters Ms Dawson raises in her appeal notice in considering the merits of the substantive matter. Ms Dawson makes various submissions regarding the appropriateness of the proposed disciplinary action. That is not a matter that can be appealed at this stage and I will give no consideration to those submissions.

Reason for appeal: Procedural fairness and privacy

  1. [47]
    Ms Dawson says that there is 'ambiguity around how my private Microsoft Teams messages were accessed and used in this disciplinary process'. Ms Dawson submits that 'Teams, in practice, has become a space where colleagues informally connect, debrief and share support – particularly in high pressure environments'. Ms Dawson requests copies of authorisation, timelines and decision-making relating to the access of her messages as she wishes to 'assess whether appropriate procedures were followed and whether this action aligns with privacy obligations and workplace policy'.[19]
  1. [48]
    Ms Dawson says that there was no 'direct instruction personally issued to me' regarding the Acceptable Use of IT Policy. Ms Dawson says that she was never 'warned or advised that her conduct in a private Teams conversation could trigger disciplinary consequences'.[20]
  1. [49]
    I do not know why Ms Dawson was of the view that her messages on Microsoft Teams which lists her username as her full name and her DAF email address were private or would not be subject to search. It is true that she was interacting with only one other person, but I cannot accept that Ms Dawson was unaware that communication via Microsoft Teams could be monitored or accessed or that things she said via that platform could be subject to scrutiny. Even if Ms Dawson were unaware of this fact, it is reasonable to believe that she was aware of the Code of Conduct and the level of conduct expected of her as a public servant, particularly when communicating with a subordinate employee about other employees.
  1. [50]
    I understand that Ms Dawson considered Microsoft Teams to be a space where people can informally connect, debrief and share support. Certainly, daily across the world, employees may interact in an informal way using Microsoft Teams. It seems to me based on the available material that the issue was not Ms Dawson using the platform to 'informally connect, debrief and share support', the issue was the nature of the content of her communications and the fact that those communications were entirely inappropriate.
  1. [51]
    Given the operation of the Use of ICT Services, Facilities and Devices Policy[21] which allows for monitoring of communications and requires that ICT use complies with the Code of Conduct, this ground of appeal is unlikely to succeed.

Reason for Appeal: Inconsistent Treatment and Accountability

  1. [52]
    In her appeal notice, Ms Dawson acknowledges that as an AO8 she holds a leadership role. Ms Dawson says however, 'it is important to note that these conversations were not one-sided'. Ms Dawson points out that Employee A, who she notes reported to her directly, 'actively participated in the exchange'.[22]
  1. [53]
    Ms Dawson says that despite Employee A participating in the conversations, 'only I have been subject to prolonged disciplinary investigation and career consequences'. Ms Dawson submits that the Code of Conduct applies equally to all staff and says that accountability must be 'proportionate and consistent'.[23]
  1. [54]
    This is a matter that Ms Dawson raised in her show cause response to the allegations. I note that page 2 of the decision states that 'decision-makers are required to exercise managerial discretion under the PS Act in response to the unique set of facts of each case'. The letter states that 'The conduct that is subject of this disciplinary process relates to your personal conduct, including the standards of conduct applying to you as an AO8 Executive Manager and Allegation 2 which are unique to you only'.
  1. [55]
    It seems to me that in circumstances where Ms Dawson is employed as an AO8 Manager and Employee A is an AO5 who is a direct report to Ms Dawson, it is open to the decision-maker to take a differentiated approach to the conduct of the two. I also note that Employee A is not implicated in the conduct subject of Allegation 2.
  1. [56]
    I agree with the Respondent's submission that Ms Dawson's references to Employee A as a 'colleague' and a 'peer' and to herself as a 'junior manager' downplay her seniority and leadership responsibilities as an AO8 Manager, of Employee A who is three classifications lower (AO5).[24]
  1. [57]
    Based on the available material, I find that this second ground of appeal is unlikely to succeed.
  1. Reason for Appeal: Insufficient and misinterpreted evidence
  1. [58]
    Ms Dawson says that the interpretations of her Teams messages 'do not reflect the context or my intent'. Ms Dawson accepts that her remarks were emotionally charged, but says that they were 'private, situational, and expressed during a period of heightened pressure, without malice or intent to harm'. Ms Dawson says much of the disciplinary finding 'relies on second-hand assumptions rather than a fair reading of the actual content'.[25]
  1. [59]
    I have reviewed the decision letter. It seems to me that the decision-maker has carefully considered Ms Dawson's disagreement about the characterisation of comments and conversations she had with Employee A on Teams. I have reviewed the Teams messages sent between Ms Dawson and Employee A. I am of the view that the messages speak for themselves. I do not intend to reproduce any or all the messages here as I do not wish to cause unnecessary distress to those who were subject of the discussions. It is likely that in the substantive appeal of the matter, it would be found to be fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to determine that the contents of the Teams messages were inappropriate, improper, unprofessional and disrespectful.[26]

Reason for Appeal: Bias and Retaliatory Implications

  1. [60]
    Ms Dawson says that the sequence of events which occurred 'warrants independent review'. Ms Dawson repeats her request for confirmation of the 'exact timeline and method used to retrieve [her] Teams messages and when they were accessed and reviewed by Ms. Jacob'.[27]
  1. [61]
    I note that in her submissions, Ms Dawson complains of a denial of her complaints of mistreatment and says that there has been no acknowledgement of her stress-induced withdrawal from the office.[28]
  1. [62]
    The Respondent says that the matter of Ms Dawson's complaint of mistreatment was dealt with on page 2 of a previous disciplinary finding decision issued on 15 September 2024. The Respondent also notes that Ms Dawson's claims of verbal abuse were the subject of a workers' compensation application.[29]
  1. [63]
    If Ms Dawson believes retaliatory action has been taken against her, there are avenues for her to pursue such a claim. However, based on the material before me, I find it unlikely that this ground of appeal would serve to displace to the decision to substantiate the allegations and determine that disciplinary grounds exist.

Other matters raised in the appeal notice

  1. [64]
    Ms Dawson provides 'mitigating context', stating, among other things, that in the months leading up to the event, she was leading the Office of the DDG without a DDG or Executive Assistant for support. Ms Dawson says that this left her 'in a vulnerable position, navigating sensitive matters alone and with an additional workload'.[30]
  1. [65]
    Ms Dawson adds to this 'mitigating context' in her written submissions, stating that in the absence of 'proactive management and support', her 'only outlet was a trusted colleague'. Ms Dawson refers to Employee A as a 'peer' and to herself as a 'junior manager'.[31] I note that the Respondent has provided a response on this point which I have included above at [56].
  1. [66]
    It seems to me that the decision-maker has considered matters raised by Ms Dawson addressing the context and mitigating factors but found that these matters did not excuse the conduct. Throughout the decision, reference is made to Ms Dawson's reasoning and explanations for her conduct. While it is at the end of the decision letter by way of giving an explanation for the proposed disciplinary action to be taken, I find page 13 is a good example of the decision-maker's consideration of the mitigating context raised by Ms Dawson:

…

  • You have managerial responsibilities to set the tone and standard for all employees, and to model behaviour consistent with applicable workplace laws including WHS, discrimination and bullying and DPI's policies.
  • It is extremely concerning to me how poorly you think of your colleagues. You take little accountability and prefer to justify your behaviour. You have generally shown little remorse for your behaviour and the impact you had on others. You have displayed a distinct lack of awareness of your own behaviour. As an Executive Manager, ODDG, your work may at times become more stressful. As such I reasonably expect that you would have been able to respond on all of the alleged occasions in a professional manner, not in an emotive, inappropriate way. I have also considered your submissions you have been seeking treatment to manage your stress and perimenopause.
  • The fact that you, as an Executive Manager, saw fit to make so many repeated inappropriate comments about your direct report(s), colleagues, another senior officer, and the incoming Director-General reflects a significant failure in judgment.
  1. [67]
    Considering the documentary evidence, Ms Dawson's admissions as to the comments she made and conversations on Teams, I find it unlikely that Ms Dawson's arguments regarding mitigating context would succeed on the appeal of the substantive matter.
  1. [68]
    However, Ms Dawson will have an opportunity to raise matters of 'mitigating context' in arguing that any disciplinary action the Respondent determines to take against her is not fair and reasonable.
  1. [69]
    Ms Dawson makes some submissions in her appeal notice regarding the impact the process has had on her wellbeing and the financial impact of a delay in delivering her incremental pay rise. These are also matters Ms Dawson may raise in her show cause response regarding disciplinary action to be taken or in an appeal against a disciplinary action decision.
  1. [70]
    Similarly, Ms Dawson's submissions regarding her commitment to growth and learning and the purpose of discipline being to 'foster reflection and growth – not punishment that erases years of service and integrity', are best kept for her show cause on disciplinary action or an appeal against a disciplinary action decision.

Reasons for Appeal: Response to Specific Allegations

Allegation 1

  1. [71]
    Regarding Allegation 1, Ms Dawson's reasons for appeal reiterate that the discussion with Employee A was 'private, reactive and not intended to be disrespectful'. Ms Dawson says that it was an 'honest debrief in response to workplace events'. Ms Dawson describes her comments as 'factual and relevant to the circumstances at the time'. Ms Dawson says her comments were 'often in response to Employee A's comments'.[32]
  1. [72]
    The Respondent says that the decision regarding Allegation 1 was fair and reasonable based on the available evidence which included a complaint detailing what was overheard, the Microsoft Teams messages and Ms Dawson admitting to the conduct. The Respondent reiterates that the Teams chat and telephone conversations on 17 May 2024 were 'inappropriate, improper, unprofessional and disrespectful' noting that this is particularly so in circumstances where Ms Dawson made 'disparaging, insulting and offensive comments about a subordinate to another subordinate, repeatedly'. The Respondent also states that it was totally improper for Ms Dawson to have constructed a version of events with her subordinate about the events of the day.[33]
  1. [73]
    The Respondent submits that the decision maker gave appropriate weight to Ms Dawson's level of involvement in the conversations with a subordinate employee and her explanations for her conduct. The Respondent says that those circumstances do not justify nor excuse the inappropriate and unprofessional comments and conduct, particularly when having regard to the managerial position the Appellant holds in the public sector.
  1. [74]
    As I said earlier, the evidence speaks for itself. Ms Dawson claims her remarks were 'factual'. While Ms Dawson may have believed what she was saying to be true, her remarks about Employee B being made to Employee A were completely inappropriate. I understand that Ms Dawson says she was involved in a 'private debrief', however the problem with this is not only the content of the communications but that the 'debrief' was being had with a person Ms Dawson was responsible for managing and the inappropriate remarks were being made about another person Ms Dawson was responsible for managing. Ms Dawson shares screenshots of conversations she was having with Employee B in the Teams chat she is having with Employee A. This undermines her submission that she thought that the chat she was having with Employee A was 'private'. Additionally, in the Teams messages Ms Dawson makes remarks to the effect that if a complaint was made regarding any conversation overheard, that she will 'say we weren't talking about her. we were talking about GB becoming DG', to which Employee A says, 'that's it…we could have said that too'. This undermines her truthfulness and demonstrates an understanding that the remarks she had made may need to be defended.
  1. [75]
    With regard to the grounds for discipline identified for Allegation 1, given the decision-maker's determination that the conduct represented a serious breach of professional boundaries and demonstrated a clear disregard for the relevant standard of conduct expected of Ms Dawson in her role as a line manager, I find it unlikely that Ms Dawson would be successful in her appeal against the finding that she is guilty of misconduct within the meaning of s 91(5)(a).
  1. [76]
    Having reviewed the available material and the detailed reasons provided by the decision-maker regarding Allegation 1, I find it unlikely that Ms Dawson would be successful in her appeal against the disciplinary finding.

Allegation 2

  1. [77]
    Regarding Allegation 2, Ms Dawson 'categorically' denies making any unprofessional or inappropriate contact with Employee B's agency. Ms Dawson says that she was acting in her capacity as the responsible officer for Employee B's contract and her 'remarks were factual'. Ms Dawson says this is supported by her witness's affidavit evidence.[34]
  1. [78]
    The Respondent submits that the decision to substantiate the allegation was fair and reasonable based on the evidence before it including a complaint from Employee B's employment agency, Ms Dawson's medical certificate stating she was unfit for work and her admissions and personal views.[35]
  1. [79]
    With reference to the affidavit of Ms Dawson's witness, the Respondent says the affidavit 'provided generalised and vague information in relation to what they recalled some seven months earlier'.[36]
  1. [80]
    The Respondent does not dispute that it was ordinarily within Ms Dawson's authority to contact the employment agency but says that the conversation with the employment agency 'was a significant departure from what was reasonable and necessary in the circumstances, and that the Appellant failed to appropriately and professionally represent the Department'.[37]
  1. [81]
    I have reviewed the email the Respondent received from the employment agency. I have also read the affidavit of the person who was sharing Ms Dawson's work-from-home space and who says they overheard the conversation. It is difficult to reconcile the two and I find it was open to the decision-maker to give limited weight to the affidavit in circumstances where the email has been sent from an external third party only hours after the conversation with Ms Dawson occurred. Further to this, the content of the email appears to corroborate issues Ms Dawson had with Employee B and which she says were 'factual'. I also note that the decision-maker referred to Ms Dawson's show cause response which stated that it is inappropriate to assert that she made the comments attributed to her by the employment agency representative when no-one else was present for the conversation and that this conflicts with her production of the affidavit of someone she says overheard the conversation.
  1. [82]
    It seems to me that the decision-maker took into account Ms Dawson's response including that she had become distressed and upset following a conversation with Employee C, had left the workplace and had a medical certificate, that she disputed the content of the conversation reported by the employment agency and the demeanour with which she was said to have made the comments.
  1. [83]
    The decision-maker determines that Ms Dawson’s conduct was a deliberate departure from accepted standards and a serious abuse of the confidence placed in her as an employee. Having regard to the available evidence and the reasons provided by the decision-maker, I find it unlikely that Ms Dawson would be successful in setting aside the finding that with regard to Allegation 2, she is guilty of misconduct in an official capacity within the meaning of section 91(5)(a).
  1. [84]
    Based on the material before me, I find it unlikely that Ms Dawson's appeal would be successful as it relates to the disciplinary finding regarding Allegation 2.

Allegation 3

  1. [85]
    Similarly to Allegation 1, Ms Dawson states that the remarks she made regarding the newly appointed Director-General and another senior employee in the Office of the Director-General were in a 'private conversation' with Employee A. Ms Dawson says that the comments exchanged were 'based on our professional knowledge and experience' and were not intended to be 'inappropriate or unprofessional'. Ms Dawson says the conversation was 'informed by observable workplace dynamics' and that it was never her intention for her 'remarks have been taken out of context and misrepresented'.[38]
  1. [86]
    The Respondent submits that it was fair and reasonable for the decision-maker to find the allegation is substantiated based on the evidence before them, including the Microsoft Teams messages and Ms Dawson admitting to the conduct. The Respondent says that the decision-maker gave appropriate weight to Ms Dawson's 'various explanations and context' for making the comments.[39]
  1. [87]
    The Respondent says that the decision-maker determined that Ms Dawson's Teams discussion with a subordinate employee were 'inappropriate, unprofessional and improper' and that the nature of the comments was a 'serious breach of the professional boundaries with a direct report and not aligned with building and maintaining positive relationships, including with the Office to the Director-General and incoming Director-General.[40]
  1. [88]
    The Teams messages speak for themselves. It was open to the decision-maker to determine that Ms Dawson's interactions with a subordinate regarding the appointment of the Director-General and a senior officer in the Office of the Director-General were a serious breach of professional boundaries and the expectations of her role as Employee A's manager.
  1. [89]
    I find it likely that the decision-maker's finding that the conduct subject of Allegation 3 amounted to a contravention of the Code of Conduct would be upheld in the hearing of the appeal. It is unlikely that Ms Dawson's appeal against the finding regarding Allegation 3 would be successful.

Allegation 4

  1. [90]
    Regarding Allegation 4, Ms Dawson rejects that she engaged in inappropriate workplace behaviour 'broadly within the office'. Ms Dawson says that her comments 'were made in a closed setting with one colleague'. Ms Dawson says that if her comments were overheard or later shared, this was 'not intentional and does not constitute broad misconduct'.[41]
  1. [91]
    Ms Dawson expands her response on page 5 of the Schedule stating that any comments she made 'were reactions to specific circumstances and were never intended to be offensive, inappropriate, or unprofessional'. Ms Dawson acknowledges 'expressing frustration at times' but says that 'these discussions were not directed at individuals in a malicious manner but rather reflected honest reactions to workplace dynamics'. Ms Dawson says that the allegation that her comments were made 'broadly within the office' is inaccurate as she and Employee A 'typically spoke privately or in Teams. Our workspace was just our team in a private space. If any remarks were overheard or misinterpreted that was unintentional'. Ms Dawson also questions how the information about an overheard conversation was obtained and says that it appears that there has been a 'deliberate effort to obtain additional negative information' about her.[42]
  1. [92]
    The Respondent says that the decision to find that the allegation is substantiated is fair and reasonable based on the evidence before them including conduct that had been witnessed, MS Teams messages and Ms Dawson admitting to the conduct. The Respondent says that the decision-maker gave appropriate weight to Ms Dawson's explanations and the context she provided for making the various comments to Employee A, either in an open plan office or through MS Teams chat. The Respondent says there is no context in which:[43]
  1. i
    repeatedly making disparaging and derogatory comments about other employees to a subordinate is appropriate or acceptable
  1. ii
    disclosing complaint details to a subordinate employee, about other subordinate employees, is appropriate or acceptable as a manager
  1. iii
    talking about another employee's performance, in the context of their suitability to perform a role that they had applied for, in an open plan office in proximity of others is acceptable.
  1. [93]
    The Respondent submits that the decision-maker 'determined the nature of the comments and workplace behaviour is a serious breach of professional boundaries and the comments are demonstrative of a pattern of unacceptable attitudes towards Fisheries and Forestry staff and stakeholders'.[44]
  1. [94]
    I have reviewed the relevant part of the decision and the available evidence. There is no doubt that Ms Dawson made disparaging and derogatory comments about other employees to Employee A. It was open to the decision-maker to find that the conduct contravened the Code of Conduct and gives rise to a ground for discipline pursuant to s 91(1)(h) of the PS Act.
  1. [95]
    Based on the detailed findings the decision-maker sets out, including a consideration of Ms Dawson's show cause response, I find it unlikely that Ms Dawson would be successful in appealing the disciplinary finding regarding Allegation 4.

Procedural fairness

  1. [96]
    I am satisfied that Ms Dawson has received procedural fairness throughout the disciplinary process, including a change in decision-maker and the opportunity to provide new evidence for consideration. I am further satisfied that the available evidence taken in the context of Ms Dawson's submissions was sufficient for the decision-maker to be satisfied to the requisite standard that the conduct occurred as alleged. Reasons have been provided as to the determination that the conduct gives rise to grounds for discipline.       
  1. [97]
    The task before the Commission in deciding the substantive appeal is to determine whether the decision was fair and reasonable. Having considered the filed material and the evidence available to the decision-maker I find that Ms Dawson's appeal does not have a reasonable prospect of success.
  1. Ms Dawson's 'final appeal'
  1. [98]
    In conclusion to her reasons for appeal, Ms Dawson states that she remains committed to the public sector and to learning from the experience and that she only asks for the opportunity to move forward with fairness and dignity.
  1. [99]
    The substantive appeal does not relate to the disciplinary action to be taken as a result of the disciplinary findings. However, I do observe that despite the nature of the conduct and the disciplinary findings which have been arrived at by the decision-maker, there is no suggestion that Ms Dawson's employment with the public sector will not continue. The proposed disciplinary action is not termination of employment.
  1. Conclusion and Order
  1. [100]
    For the reasons given above from [27]-[38], Ms Dawson has not persuaded me that she has a satisfactory reason for filing her appeal beyond the 21-day appeal period.
  1. [101]
    I am satisfied that the conduct of the Respondent has not contributed to the late filing of the appeal. The only action Ms Dawson took regarding her appeal was to seek clarification that she was able to appeal. Having received that advice within the 21-day appeal period, Ms Dawson still did not lodge her appeal within time or seek an extension of time to do so upon lodging the appeal.
  1. [102]
    I accept that there is prejudice to Ms Dawson in not extending time to file the appeal, however, I note that the proposed disciplinary action is not termination of employment and therefore Ms Dawson will retain the right to appeal any disciplinary action taken against her. At that point, she will be able to raise a number of issues canvassed in her reasons for appeal regarding proportionality, mitigating context and circumstances, her commitment to improvement and dedication to the public service.
  1. [103]
    I have undertaken an extensive consideration of the merits of the substantive appeal and I have provided reasons above from [42]-[97] as to why I have concluded that the appeal has limited prospects of success. This factor weighs against granting an extension of time.
  1. [104]
    In the circumstances, I decline to exercise the discretion afforded to me to extend time for Ms Dawson to file the appeal.

Order

  1. [105]
    I make the following order:
  1. 1.
    The Appellant’s application to allow her appeal to be started within a longer period is refused.
  1. 2.
    Pursuant to s 566(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the stay of the disciplinary decision appealed against is revoked.

Footnotes

[1] Written submission by Respondent filed 23 April 2025 [4].

[2] Written submission by Appellant filed 7 May 2025 [3].

[3] Ibid [4].

[4] Ibid [5].

[5] Further written submission by Respondent filed 14 May 2025 [3]-[9].

[6] Further written submission by Appellant filed 21 May 2025 [1]-[2].

[7] Ibid [4].

[8] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 564(2).

[9] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344, 348 (Wilcox J); Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited (1995) 67 IR 298, 299-300 (Marshall J).

[10] Breust v Qantas Airways Ltd [1995] QIRC 216; (1995) 149 QGIG 777.

[11] (1995) 149 QGIG 777.

[12] Ibid 554; Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258 [35].

[13] Email of 1 April 2025, 3:26pm, attached to Respondent’s submissions filed 23 April 2025.

[14] Email of 2 April 2025 11:08am, attached to Respondent’s submissions filed 23 April 2025.

[15] Email of 2 April 2025 12.07pm, attached to Respondent’s submissions filed 23 April 2025.

[16] Email Thursday 3 April 2025 9:56am, Attached to Appellant’s submissions filed 7 May 2025.

[17] Written submissions of Appellant filed 7 May 2025 [5].

[18] Taken from Show Cause Notice dated 10/03/2025. Pursuant to r 97(3) I have decided to de-identify the employees named in the materials.

[19] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 1.

[20] Ms Dawson’s written submission 21 May 2025 [12].

[21] Ms Dawson's appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Attachment 3.

[22] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 1.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Respondent’s submissions 14 May 2025 [19].

[25] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 1.

[26] Language used throughout the disciplinary decision letter.

[27] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 1.

[28] Reply Submissions of Appellant filed 7 May 2025 [40].

[29] Further submissions of Respondent filed 14 May 2025 [20]-[21].

[30] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 1.

[31] Reply Submissions of Appellant filed 7 May 2025 [32].

[32] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 4.

[33] Respondent’s submissions 23 April 2025 [26].

[34] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 4.

[35] Respondent’s submissions 23 April 2025 [27].

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 5.

[39] Respondent’s submissions 23 April 2025 [28].

[40] Ibid.

[41] Appeal notice filed 4 April 2025, Schedule, page 1.

[42] Ibid, page 5.

[43] Respondent’s submissions 23 April 2025 [29].

[44] Ibid.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Dawson v State of Queensland (Department of Primary Industries)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Dawson v State of Queensland (Department of Primary Industries)

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 164

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Pidgeon IC

  • Date:

    27 Jun 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Breust v Qantas Airways Limited (1995) 149 QGIG 777
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 149 QGIG 777
Cite 2 - (1995) 149 QGIG 777
Cite 3 - (1995) 149 QGIG 777
Cite 4 - (1995) 149 QGIG 777
Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Ltd (1995) 67 IR 298
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 67 IR 298
Cite 2 - (1995) 67 IR 298
Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 258
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 258
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1994) 3 FCR 344
Cite 2 - (1994) 3 FCR 344

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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