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Talbot v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2025] QIRC 200

Talbot v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[2025] QIRC 200

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Talbot v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2025] QIRC 200

PARTIES:

Talbot, Danielle

Applicant

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

Respondent

CASE NO:

GP/2025/10

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

1 August 2025

DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

Amended Application (26 February 2025)

Response to the Amended Application (14 March 2025)

Respondent's application in existing proceedings (19 March 2025)

Respondent's submissions (22 April 2025)

Applicant's submissions (7 May 2025)

Respondent's submissions in reply (15 May 2025)

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

Pidgeon IC

On the papers

ORDER:

  1. Pursuant to s 541(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, GP/2025/10 is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – GENERAL PROTECTIONS – where the Respondent seeks dismissal of the matter – where the matter is dismissed as further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary and not in the public interest – where the applicant has failed to make out a cause of action – where the applicant has failed to establish that there has been adverse action – where the adverse action alleged is excluded by operation of s 282(6) of the IR Act

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 28, 282, 284, 285, 541(b), Ch 8, Part 1, Div 3

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) s 19

CASES:

Gilbert v Metro North Hospital and Health Service and Ors [2021] QIRC 255

Murray v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 339

Pennington v Jamieson [2022] ICQ 022

Sloan v Tafe Queensland [2024] QIRC 139

Triplow v Leidos SAR Services Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 012

Watton v Tafe Queensland (No. 3) [2023] QIRC 303

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    Ms Danielle Talbot ('the Applicant') filed an application on 24 February 2025 which sought remedies for alleged breaches of the general protections provisions pursuant to Part 1 of Chapter 8 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act'). Ms Talbot makes this application against the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) ('the Respondent'). Ms Talbot filed an amended application on 26 February 2025.
  1. [2]
    The Respondent filed a response to Ms Talbot's amended application on 14 March 2025. Therein, the Respondent submits the following:[1]

The Respondent respectfully opposes the relief sought by the Applicant on this basis. The Respondent also respectfully submits the Complainant has failed to make out a cause of action, that this case falls within the category of 'irretrievably unmeritorious' described in Triplow, that those considerations regarding the public interest and the expenditure of public funds apply here, and accordingly notes its intention to file a Form 4 Application in Existing Proceedings requesting this Commission consider exercising the power under Section 451(b) (sic) of the IR Act to dismiss the proceedings, as the cause of action has no prospects of success, is misconceived, and further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

(my emphasis)

  1. [3]
    On 19 March 2025, prior to any conciliation of the matter, the Respondent filed a Form 4–Application in existing proceedings with an accompanying affidavit of Mr C S Jamieson of the Respondent, which submits that Ms Talbot has failed to establish a prima facie case and has failed to make out a cause of action and that, as a consequence, the Respondent seeks that I exercise my power to dismiss a matter pursuant to s 541(b) of the IR Act.
  1. [4]
    Following a mention of the matter on 24 March 2025, I issued directions to the parties seeking further submissions on the Respondent's application in existing proceedings.
  1. [5]
    The parties have filed extensive submissions addressing the application.[2] I have considered all of the submissions, but I have not set out the vast majority of those submissions because for the reasons set out below, I have found that the actions Ms Talbot identifies as the basis of her claim are not adverse actions due to the operation of s 282(6) of the IR Act.
    1. [6]
      For the reasons which follow, I have determined to dismiss the application as I consider further proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

    Relevant Legislation

    Adverse action

    1. [7]
      Section 285 of the IR Act sets out the protections afforded under the IR Act:
    1. A person must not take adverse action against another person—
    1. because the other person—
    1. has a workplace right; or
    1. has, or has not, exercised a workplace right; or
    1. proposes to or proposes not to, or has at any time proposed to or proposed not to, exercise a workplace right; or
    1. to prevent the exercise of a workplace right by the other person.

    Note—

    This subsection is a civil penalty provision.

    1. A person must not take adverse action against another person (the second person) because a third person has exercised, or proposes to or has at any time proposed to exercise, a workplace right for the second person's benefit or for the benefit of a class of persons to which the second person belongs.

    Note—

    This subsection is a civil penalty provision.

    1. [8]
      Section 282 of the IR Act sets out the meaning of adverse action:
    1. Adverse action is taken by an employer against an employee if the employer–
    1. dismisses the employee; or
    1. injures the employee in the employee's employment; or
    1. alters the position of the employee to the employee's prejudice; or
    1. discriminates between the employee and other employees of the employer.

    …

    1. Adverse action includes–
    1. threatening to take action covered by subsections (1) and (4); and
    1. organising to take action covered by subsections (1) and (4).
    1. Adverse action does not include action that is authorised under–
    1. this Act or any other law of the State; or
    1. a law of the Commonwealth.

    …

    (my emphasis)

    1. [9]
      Section 284 of the IR Act states the meaning of workplace right:
    1. A person has a workplace right if the person—
    1. has a right to the benefit of, or has a role or responsibility under, an industrial law, industrial instrument or order made by an industrial body; or
    1. is able to start, or participate in, a process or proceedings under an industrial law or industrial instrument; or
    1. is able to make a complaint or inquiry—
    1. to an entity having the capacity under an industrial law to seek compliance with that law or an industrial instrument; or
    1. if the person is an employee—in relation to the person's employment.
    1. In this section—

    industrial body means—

    1. the commission; or
    1. the court, or another court or commission (however called), exercising industrial law functions and powers corresponding to the commission's functions and powers.

    Section 541(b)(ii)

    1. [10]
      Section 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act refers to decisions generally:

    The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following—…

    1. dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers—…
    1. further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;…

    Background

    1. [11]
      Ms Talbot made an application for a Flexible Working Arrangement ('FWA'). At the time she made that application, she was working under a previously approved FWA. There were ongoing negotiations regarding the FWA application and the matter was eventually escalated to the Respondent's Flexible Work Committee ('FW Committee') for  determination. The outcome of Ms Talbot's FWA application was that it was approved, in part and subject to conditions, and that instead of being required to work two night shifts per roster, she would need to work three night shifts per roster.
    1. [12]
      Specifically, the decision of the FW Committee dated 9 October 2024 noted:[3]

    By way of background, I understand you are an AO4 Client Service Officer (CSO) with Policelink. Policelink operates 24 hours, seven days per week. You are currently working part-time following your return to work from maternity leave in 2023. You are currently working on a shift work basis, including two night shifts per roster period that commence between 6pm and 10pm. You are seeking to amend your part-time agreement to limit the start time of your night shifts to 6pm (where ordinarily, shift workers in Policelink would work what is referred to as 'open bracket' night shifts, which commence at a time between 6pm and 10pm).

    1. [13]
      The FW Committee decision notes the following:[4]

    Agreement has been reached with the responsible Policelink delegate with regards to your part-time agreement continuing, with the exception of your request to limit the commencement time of your night shifts to 6pm, and their request that you complete three night shifts, in lieu of your current two. The delegate would like you to continue to work night shifts on an 'open bracket' basis.

    1. [14]
      Following a discussion of the basis of Ms Talbot's FWA request, observations about the negotiation process and the operational needs of the Respondent, the decision states:[5]

    After consideration of your personal circumstances, the operational requirements of the work unit to provide adequate coverage of night shifts commencing at 10pm and the risks associated with not filing those shifts including the impacts on other members of the team, the FWC determined:

  • one of your night shifts in the roster period is to commence at 10pm (as required by Policelink), to support the operational requirements of the work unit in a 24/7 work environment
  • the remaining night shift/s to commence at 6pm
  • that this arrangement be reviewed at 3, 6 and 12 months to assess its viability for you and the work unit.
  1. [15]
    The decision informed Ms Talbot that if she remained dissatisfied with the decision, she may file a dispute or a Public Sector Appeal with the Commission.
  1. [16]
    Ms Talbot remained dissatisfied with the outcome and lodged a Public Sector Appeal regarding the outcome of her FWA request. That appeal remains undecided.[6]
  1. [17]
    Following the outcome of her FWA request, Ms Talbot lodged a WorkCover claim 'due to experiencing serious physical symptoms from extreme stress'. Ms Talbot says that the claim was denied on the basis of 'reasonable management action'.[7] Ms Talbot provided the employer with a workers’ compensation work capacity certificate dated 10 October 2024.
  1. [18]
    On 9 October 2024, Ms Talbot sent an email with a proposed roster arrangement to implement the FW Committee's decision regarding her FWA. She requested an urgent response to the email given stress she was experiencing which was being managed by her GP and stating that failure to resolve the matter was impacting her health.
  1. [19]
    On 14 October 2024, Ms Talbot sent another email asking about 'getting a response in regards to the roster I have proposed'.

Ms Talbot's General Protections Application

  1. [20]
    Ms Talbot filed her originating application on 24 February 2025. On 26 February 2025, she filed an amended application in which she identifies an additional cause of action. I do not intend to reproduce the amended application in full. I have extracted parts of that application here to identify the workplace rights Ms Talbot says she exercised and the adverse action she alleges was taken against her on the basis of the workplace rights she says she exercised.
  1. [21]
    It appears that Ms Talbot seeks to expand and add to her application by way of her written submissions in this interlocutory matter. I have taken some of this to simply be by way of providing further information of matters Ms Talbot would seek the Commission to consider at a hearing of the substantive matter. Other submissions appear to be intended to further amend the application. This is clearly not the appropriate course when one is seeking to amend an application, however, I took all submissions into account and there was nothing raised by Ms Talbot which would serve to change the conclusion I have reached that the actions taken against her were not adverse actions for the purposes of Ch 8, Part 1, Div 3 of the IR Act.

The adverse actions Ms Talbot says were taken or threatened to be taken

  1. [22]
    Ms Talbot identifies the following adverse actions she says were taken against her pertaining to the FWA:[8]
  1. Threatening to alter my position to my prejudice by increasing my required night shifts from two to three
  1. Threatening to discriminate between myself and other employees by requiring me to work a higher percentage of night shifts compared to my rotational shift-working colleagues
  1. [23]
    Ms Talbot identifies a further adverse action she says was taken against her.
  1. [24]
    Ms Talbot says that she did not receive a response to the email referred to at paragraph [18] above. Ms Talbot says that when she followed up with her Team Leader, she was informed that she would not be receiving a response because she had lodged a WorkCover claim. It is the refusal to respond to her email which Ms Talbot identifies as the adverse action taken against her.

Are the actions Ms Talbot identifies above 'adverse action/s' for the purposes of s 282?

  1. [25]
    An initial jurisdictional matter to be dealt with in determining whether to grant the Respondent's application to dismiss the proceedings is whether Ms Talbot has identified adverse actions taken against her to enliven a consideration of the protection provided for in s 285.

Is the action of granting Ms Talbot's FWA in part and subject to conditions exempted by the operation of s 282(6)?

  1. [26]
    As can be seen above, Ms Talbot identifies the first adverse action as the decision to approve her FWA in part and add a condition that she work three night shifts per roster rather than the two she was working under the previous FWA.
  1. [27]
    Section 282(6) states that adverse action does not include action that is authorised under the IR Act or any other law of the state.
  1. [28]
    In Pennington,[9] President Davis J, in considering the operation of the adverse action provisions in the IR Act said:[10]

[93] Section 282(1) defines "adverse action". The "action" is constituted by an "act", i.e. to "dismiss", to "injure", to "alter the position of the employee", or to "discriminate". Such acts are not "adverse action" if "authorised" by a "law of the state", of which s 74(4)(c) of the HHB Act is.

[94] Section 285 of the IR Act prohibits the taking of adverse action if the act constituting the adverse action is motivated by prescribed reasons.

[95] Section 74(4)(c) authorises the act, namely the dismissal. The motivation for the dismissal does not render the dismissal "adverse action" The motivation renders the adverse action unlawful. Therefore, if the dismissal is "authorised", it is not "adverse action".

  1. [29]
    Before the protection provided for by s 285 is enlivened, an applicant must demonstrate that an adverse action has been taken. If an adverse action has been taken, there is then a consideration of whether the person has a workplace right. If these matters are demonstrated, then the task moves to considering whether the adverse action was taken because the person has a workplace right.
  1. [30]
    In practical terms, applying President Davis J's reasoning set out at paragraph [28], if an act is authorised by law and excluded by operation of s 282(6), the motivation behind the act need not be considered. The motivation for an act is only considered if an adverse action exists. If the motivation for taking the adverse action was for the reasons set out in s 285, then it is an unlawful adverse action and the protection is invoked. The Commission has no jurisdiction to consider s 285 in circumstances where no adverse action exists.
  1. [31]
    The right to request a flexible work arrangement is contained in Chapter 2 of the IR Act. With regard to decision making following a request being made, s 28 states the following:

28 Decision about request for flexible work arrangements

  1. The employer may decide to–
  1. grant the request; or
  2. grant the request in part or subject to conditions; or
  3. refuse the request.
  1. The employer may grant the request in part or subject to conditions, or refuse the request, only on reasonable grounds.
  1. The employer must give the employee written notice about its decision within 21 days after receiving the request.
  1. If the employer decides to grant the request in part or subject to conditions or to refuse the request, the written notice about the decision must state –
  1. the written reasons for the decision, outlining the reasonable grounds for granting the request in part or subject to conditions or for the refusal; and
  1. that the commission has jurisdiction to hear and decide a dispute over the request under chapter 6.

…

  1. [32]
    Ms Talbot’s request was granted in part and subject to conditions. She received a written decision outlining the grounds for the decision. The decision also informed Ms Talbot that she was able to take the matter to the Commission. Applying His Honour's reasoning in Pennington to the matter before me, the decision to grant Ms Talbot's FWA in part and subject to conditions is explicitly authorised by s 28 of the IR Act and is therefore not an adverse action pursuant to the operation of s 282(6).
  1. [33]
    That Ms Talbot has not demonstrated a cause of action under s 285 of the IR Act does not deprive her of the ability to dispute the FWA decision or question whether it was fair and reasonable. If Ms Talbot believes the grounds for the decision are not reasonable, it is open to her to lodge a dispute over the request under Chapter 6 of the IR Act or a fair treatment appeal pursuant to the Public Sector Act 2022. In fact, Ms Talbot has done so by way of lodging a Public Sector Appeal.
  1. [34]
    The adverse action claim as it relates to the decision on Ms Talbot's FWA request is dismissed on the basis that the decision of the FW Committee was authorised by the IR Act and is therefore not an adverse action.
  1. [35]
    As a result, I will not consider submissions as to whether Ms Talbot exercised a workplace right and what she says were the motivations of the Respondent which give rise to the protection under s 285.

Alleged adverse action relating to a refusal to respond to an email Ms Talbot sent regarding the implementation of her FWA

  1. [36]
    The second cause of action set out in Ms Talbot's amended application is that the Respondent refused to respond to an email she sent proposing a roster arrangement because Ms Talbot had exercised a workplace right by lodging a WorkCover claim.
  1. [37]
    The timeline for this sequence of events commences with an email Ms Talbot writes on Wednesday 9 October 2024 at 7.58pm. In that email, Ms Talbot refers to the decision of the FW Committee, notes that the decision advises that the Operations Leader is open to assisting with placement of night shifts to manage fatigue and support the care arrangements she has available at home. Ms Talbot provides a recommendation of how the night shifts might work and asks for a response as soon as possible. Importantly, that email also notes that Ms Talbot has found the process regarding coming to agreement for her FWA request to be 'very prolonged and stressful' and discloses that she has sought the support of her GP 'in relation to stress directly attributed to this process and have identified and raised this as being a psychosocial hazard'.
  1. [38]
    On 10 October 2024, Ms Talbot provided the Respondent with a work capacity certificate dated that same day. The doctor certifies that Ms Talbot is suffering 'mental stress due to work stress' and recommends that Ms Talbot undertake suitable duties consisting of 'off phone work' and that she can undertake 'data entry (digital contacts)'. This appears to have prompted an email to be sent from Ms Bethany Baker to Ms Luisa Vaiaso-Etuale informing her that a 'Notification and Record of Incident Report' had been assigned to her.
  1. [39]
    Later that same day, Ms Vaiaso-Etuale replies to Ms Baker stating that she will 'verify the report this afternoon' and asks Ms Baker to forward the email and attach the medical certificate to Ms Tayla Harper who she says will 'either keep the case or reassign it to an Injury Management Specialist'.[11]
  1. [40]
    On Friday 11 October 2024, Ms Bethany Baker actions Ms Vaisao-Etuale's request and at 06.06 that same day, she sends an email to Ms Harper informing her that:
  • Ms Talbot has lodged an injury management report;
  • the injury is in relation to stress caused by ongoing negotiations into her flexible work hours arrangement where an agreement has been unable to be met;
  • Ms Talbot would prefer a suitable duties plan;
  • Ms Baker also notes that Ms Talbot has lodged a WorkCover claim; and
  • Ms Talbot's medical certificate is for two weeks initially with a plan for her to return to her GP at the end of the period.
  1. [41]
    In an affidavit affirmed on 3 April 2024, Ms Vaiaso-Etuale states, among other things, that:[12]

…

  1. I received the medical certificate and provided it to Injury Management as the best unit of the Service to deal with these kinds of issues.
  2. I did not wish to exacerbate Danielle's medical condition by continuing the discussions which were causing her extreme levels of stress.
  3. I did not refuse to engage in the discussions with Danielle due to her applying for Workcover (sic). My actions were entirely due to the concerns for Danielle's health and not wanting to make Danielle's condition worse.

Respondent's position regarding the second allegation of adverse action

  1. [42]
    In its response to the application, the Respondent submits:[13]

the reason for not responding to the Applicant’s correspondence around the FWA was due to the medical advice from the Applicant’s treating practitioner that negotiating the flexible work agreement (was) causing her excessive stress, and the Respondent’s Injury Management Unit was best placed to liaise with the Applicant (with a request being made on 10 October 2024 for Bethany Baker of the Respondent’s Policelink Unit to provide the information to Tayla from the Respondent’s Injury Management Unit to deal with this matter due to the nature of the injury involved). Policelink Management did not wish to exacerbate the Applicant’s purported excessive stress caused by the negotiation process by continuing to engage in this process. Furthermore, as the Applicant was on a suitable duties plan with the Respondent’s Injury Management Unit, it was not an appropriate time to be engaging in these discussions. This is evidence(d) by the email from Luisa Vaiaso-Etuale of the Respondent’s Policelink Management team.

  1. [43]
    In its application in proceedings the Respondent relies on the reasoning of Deputy President Hartigan in Watton.[14] In that part of the decision, Her Honour was considering the reverse onus of proof provided for in s 306 of the IR Act. While the reverse onus is not applied at this interlocutory stage in determining whether Ms Talbot has established a prima facie case, the paragraphs the Respondent directs me to are helpful in considering the onus on Ms Talbot to demonstrate a cause of action. It is convenient for me to set out the relevant excerpt of that decision here:

7.4 Onus of proof

[185]Section 306 imposes a reverse onus of proof as follows:

Reason for action to be presumed unless proved otherwise

  1. Subsection (2) applies if –
  1. in an application in relation to a contravention of a provision of this part, it is alleged that a person took, or is taking, action for a particular reason or with a particular intent; and
  1. taking that action for that reason or with that intent would be a contravention of the provision.
  1. It is presumed that the action was, or is being, taken for that reason or with that intent, unless the person proves otherwise.
  1. Subsection (2) does not apply in relation to orders for an interim injunction.

[186]However, before the reverse onus is engaged, the Applicant bears the onus of first proving the factual existence of the circumstances which are said to give rise to the adverse action. Relevantly, the Applicant must prove:[15]

  1. the conduct that he alleges was taken in fact occurred;
  1. the workplace right alleged exists (or he was relevantly protected);
  1. the conduct constitutes adverse action for the purposes of s 282;
  1. the alleged proscribed reason for that conduct is within one or more of the relevant proscribed categories; and
  1. the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the respondent was actuated by a proscribed purpose.

[187]The equivalent provision in the Fair Work Act 2009 is s 361. In Gilbert,[16] his Honour O'Connor VP cited United Firefighters Union of Australia v Easy[17] where Ross J stated:[18]

. . . [I]t is important to note that s 361 does not obviate the need for the applicants to prove the existence of the objective facts which are said to provide the basis of the respondent's conduct. The onus does not shift from the applicant to the respondent until the applicant establishes the elements of each of the general protections upon which it seeks to rely. It is not enough for the applicants to merely make assertions regarding these elements, they must be determined objectively.

[188]Before the presumption operates it is a pre-condition that the allegation precisely and distinctly identifies the particular alleged reason or intent for the contravening action.[19] Procedural fairness demands no less.[20] Precision is required:[21]

Allegations of contravention of the general protections provisions are inherently serious and should, as a matter of fairness, be pleaded with sufficient precision for a respondent to know the case against it.

[189]If the reverse onus in s 306 of the IR Act is engaged, the issue to be determined is whether the evidence is sufficient for the Commission to be satisfied that none of the reasons of the decision maker for the alleged adverse action included a proscribed reason.[22] The central question of fact is 'why was the adverse action taken?', which must be answered in light of all the facts established in the proceeding.[23] Direct testimony from the decision-maker which is accepted as reliable is capable of discharging the burden upon an employer.[24] In assessing the evidence said to discharge the reverse onus, the reliability and weight of the employer's evidence is to be balanced against evidence adduced by the employee and the overall facts and circumstances of each case.[25]

[190]The authorities indicate that the focus of the general protections is to prevent conscious and deliberate victimisation: if there was none, the reverse onus (if engaged) will be discharged.[26]

  1. [44]
    The Respondent's written submissions set out a number of what it calls 'defects' in Ms Talbot's application. The matter of the non-response to Ms Talbot's email is dealt with at Defect 8:[27]
  1. The Applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case that the Respondent took adverse action by not responding to her correspondence due to the lodging of a Workcover application. It is abundantly clear from the evidence of Lusia Vaiaso-Etuale of the Respondent's Policelink Management Team [Annexures Seven and Eight] that Policelink Management did not continue to further engage with the Applicant after receipt of the medical certificate, due to the medical advice of the Applicant's treating practitioner that negotiating the flexible work agreement causing her excessive stress, and the Applicant required suitable duties at the time, making an FWA inappropriate as the suitable duties plan takes precedent. [Annexure Nine].
  1. [45]
    The Respondent points to the affidavit of Ms Vaiaso-Etuale as clearly establishing the reasons for the decision not to respond to the Applicant's correspondence. The Respondent says that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale was acting on the medical advice indicating that Ms Talbot was not medically fit to engage in the discussions. The Respondent says that the affidavit is clear and cogent evidence the decision maker was not actuated by any proscribed purpose, and even if the reverse onus was engaged, it is clearly discharged.[28]
  1. [46]
    The Applicant submits that Ms Talbot is 'evidently attempting to have her cake and eat it too' by providing a medical certificate indicating a medical inability to engage in the FWA negotiation process and a requirement for suitable duties, and then suggesting the Respondent taking action in good faith on the basis of this medical information in accordance with its paramount duty to ensure workplace health and safety is somehow adverse action.[29]
  1. [47]
    The Respondent also argues that Ms Luisa Vaiaso-Etuale acted in good faith and in accordance with s 19 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 ('WHS Act'). The Respondent says that following the reasoning in Gilbert,[30] Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's actions are authorised by law and are jurisdictionally barred from founding a claim of adverse action pursuant to s 282(6). It is convenient to set out the relevant excerpt of Gilbert here:

[240] If the Commission was to accept the reasoning of Flick J in Rio Tinto, s 282(6) of the IR Act ought to be construed as excluding from the definition of adverse action not only action which is 'expressly' authorised, by a law of the State, but also action which is 'sanctioned or approved by a provision' of a law of the State then it must be accepted that the taking of disciplinary action under the PS Act is a necessary anterior step that is "authorised".

[241] Section 187(1) of the PS Act empowers a chief executive (or a relevant person such as the Second Respondent) to discipline an employee. The Show Cause Notice commenced the disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary proceedings were, in my view, expressly authorised by a law of the State or was an action which was sanctioned or approved by a provision of a law of the State.

[242] It must follow that the Show Cause Notice was issued exercising the power in s 187 of the PS Act and was therefore "authorised" pursuant to s 282(6) of the IR Act.

Ms Talbot's submissions

  1. [48]
    Ms Talbot's submissions seek to expand upon the matters set out in her originating application. I have considered those to the extent that they are matters she may seek to raise in evidence at the hearing of the substantive matter. Ms Talbot says that she exercised a workplace right when she submitted a WorkCover application and provided medical documentation regarding her condition.[31]
  1. [49]
    Ms Talbot says that the following specific adverse actions were taken against her by Ms Vaiaso-Etuale:[32]
  1. i)
    Categorically refusing to provide any internal way forward regarding my FWA;
  1. ii)
    Deliberately ceasing all communication with me following my WC application;
  1. iii)
    Failing to seek advice or refer the substantive matter to appropriate personnel when she claimed she felt unable to engage directly;
  1. iv)
    No attempt to establish if there was a way to communicate without harm, such as gaining a medical clearance;
  1. v)
    Reiterating to my TL that she would not be responding, even after being informed this silence was causing additional distress;
  1. vi)
    Discriminating between me and other staff who have not lodged WC claims, as these other staff continued to receive engagement from Luisa surrounding their flexible work requests; and
  1. vii)
    Limiting the shifts I could work once my SDP was in place, despite there being:
  • No advice from myself, my doctor, or Injury Management for such restrictions
  • No communicated internal policy requiring shift changes for suitable duties
  • No operational reason such as lack of supervision or insufficient workload.
  1. [50]
    While Ms Talbot says that these are adverse actions taken against her, that list of seven adverse actions does not appear in Ms Talbot's amended application. The amended application is clearly focused on the Respondent's refusal to respond to her email. Ms Talbot's amended application cannot be further amended or supplemented by written submissions in this interlocutory application. However, it seems to me that with the exception of (vii), the other matters listed are results of the decision Ms Vaiaso-Etuale made not to engage in the email communication about the roster. Regarding (vii), there is a reference to seeking additional monetary compensation as a result of the roster Ms Talbot is working under the suitable duties plan, however, this is set out as a remedy rather than pleaded as an adverse action.
  1. [51]
    Ms Talbot says that the evidence demonstrates on the balance of probabilities that adverse action was taken against her because she exercised her workplace rights. Ms Talbot says the timing demonstrates that all contact ceased immediately following her WorkCover application. She also says that any claim that the action was taken 'due to medical advice' cannot account for a 'categorical refusal to provide any pathway forward…'.[33]
  1. [52]
    Ms Talbot claims the cessation of contact contradicted health and safety obligations under s 19 of the WHS Act. Ms Talbot says that even after being informed that the lack of response was causing further distress, Ms Vaiaso-Etuale reiterated that she would not be responding. Ms Talbot says that others who had not filed WorkCover applications continued to receive engagement and this demonstrates that her treatment was based on her WorkCover claim.
  1. [53]
    Ms Talbot makes further submissions about the imposition of shift restrictions following her suitable duties plan and says that these lacked any medical, policy or operational basis. It does not seem that these matters are included in the amended application and as they do not form part of the application, I will not address them.
  1. [54]
    Ms Talbot then goes on to list what she says are 'logical assumptions' which can be drawn regarding Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's actions. These include that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale 'harboured personal opinions and biases against me'; had been 'influenced by conformity bias and organisational culture pressure'; were consistent with a woman in a leadership role 'seeking to fit into the "boy's club environment"'; had a personal opinion that she had fabricated or exaggerated her stress injury; taken offense to her legitimate exercise of workplace rights 'possibly viewing my actions as somehow challenging her authority or position'; approached the situation as if it were a competitive or adversarial scenario. Ms Talbot believes Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's prior involvement in the negotiation process 'may have coloured her judgment and influenced her approach toward my situation'.
  1. [55]
    Ms Talbot rejects the Respondent's reliance on the medical advice that the negotiation of the flexible work agreement was causing her excessive stress. Ms Talbot says that this is a 'selective and inaccurate interpretation of my medical certificate'.[34]
  1. [56]
    Ms Talbot accepts that her medical certificate said the FWA negotiation was causing excessive stress, but she says the certificate did not recommend complete cessation of all communication. Ms Talbot says 'there is a significant difference between pausing negotiations to seek advice on proceeding in good faith and leaving me without any pathway forward by refusing to engage and withholding internal resolution pathways'.[35]

Respondent in reply

  1. [57]
    The Respondent says that Ms Talbot's submissions about the actions taken by Ms Vaiaso-Etuale are a mischaracterisation of the decision she made not to exacerbate the reported medical condition by continuing the circumstances which gave rise to the condition. The Respondent says that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale is not a trained expert in the rehabilitation of workplace injuries.
  1. [58]
    The Respondent reiterates that even if Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's decision was wrong (which it denies), as long as the reasons she had provided in her affidavit were the genuine reason for the decision, it is not adverse action.
  1. [59]
    The Respondent says that as Ms Talbot was on a suitable duties plan, and was under the workforce management of the Injury Management Unit (based on the recommendation of her medical practitioner), the proposed roster arrangement was inapplicable at this time as she was not going to be operating under that arrangement.
  1. [60]
    The Respondent completely rejects the submissions made as to Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's motivation for her actions and says they are not supported by any evidence.
  1. [61]
    With regard to submissions that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale did not act properly to protect her under the WHS Act, the Respondent points out that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale referred the matter to the Injury Management Unit.
  1. [62]
    With regard to Ms Talbot's submissions that the negotiations regarding her flexible working arrangement and the roster should have continued, the Respondent says such submissions are misconceived.
  1. [63]
    The Respondent says that it had already made and communicated its determination and a review process had been finalised. The Respondent says:[36]

…Asserting that in circumstances where the application for a flexible work agreement had been considered with a decision being made, and a medical certificate had been issued noting the Applicant was experiencing extreme stress in engaging in such negotiation, Luisa, who is not trained in medical rehabilitation and injury management, should have personally continued this negotiation process in direct contravention of the medical advice, is a self-serving, and completely illogical assertion.

Consideration

The decision to not continue email communication with Ms Talbot about the roster is authorised by law

  1. [64]
    As has been discussed above, s 282(6) of the IR Act provides that an action is excluded from the definition of adverse action if the action 'is authorised' under the IR Act or another law of the State.
  1. [65]
    Based on the material before me, I am of the view that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's action in declining to respond to Ms Talbot's correspondence regarding the roster and referring the matter to an injury management specialist was authorised by law and is therefore excluded pursuant to s 282(6).
  1. [66]
    Section 19 of the WHS Act provides as follows:

19  Primary Duty of Care

  1. A person conducting a business or undertaking must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of –
  1. workers engaged, or caused to be engaged by the person; and
  1. workers whose activities in carrying out work are influenced or directed by the person;

while the workers are at work in the business or undertaking.

  1. A person conducting a business or undertaking must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the health and safety of other persons is not put at risk from work carried out as part of the conduct of the business or undertaking.

…

  1. [67]
    Applying the reasoning of Vice President O'Connor in Gilbert, set out in the passage above at [47],  I am of the view that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's action in determining that it was not appropriate to discuss the roster arrangements with Ms Talbot following receipt of medical information and noting Ms Talbot had lodged a WorkCover application were authorised by law. The Respondent has a duty under s 19 of the WHS Act to ensure Ms Talbot's health and safety. My review of both the correspondence and Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's affidavit make it clear that actions were being taken on the basis of the medical information provided. This means that actions such as determining not to respond to the email and referring the matter to the Injury Management Unit while not 'expressly' authorised by a law of the state, are actions which are 'sanctioned or approved by a provision of the law'. They are steps being taken on the basis of medical information to ensure the health and safety of a worker.
  1. [68]
    On that basis, the actions of Ms Vaiaso-Etuale are excluded because of s 282(6) and this aspect of the General Protections Application is dismissed.

Alternatively, no cause of action established

  1. [69]
    If I am wrong about Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's action in not sending an email in reply regarding the roster being excluded by the operation of s 282(6), I am also of the view that Ms Talbot has not discharged the onus to identify the requisite matters to form the basis of a cause of action. The matters Ms Talbot is required to establish are set out in the passage from Deputy President Hartigan's decision in Watton, set out above at [43].

Did the conduct occur?

  1. [70]
    As discussed, the conduct Ms Talbot takes issue with is Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's decision not to respond to her email about rostering arrangements arising from the partially approved FWA. This conduct clearly occurred as evidenced in the correspondence before the Commission.

Did the employee have a workplace right?

  1. [71]
    I also accept that Ms Talbot had a workplace right to lodge a Workcover claim.

Does the conduct constitute an adverse action?

  1. [72]
    The next question is whether the conduct constitutes adverse action for the purposes of s 282. Ms Talbot says that the conduct altered her position to her prejudice. With regard to a consideration of this aspect of s 282(1), I am assisted by the reasoning of Vice President O'Connor in Gilbert:

[244] The Applicant contends that the conduct was adverse action because each aspect of it altered her position. However, the actions complained of can only constitute adverse action if they alter the Applicant's position in a meaningful and substantial way to her prejudice. The evidence before the Commission does not, in my view, support such a proposition.

[245] In Unsworth v Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Limited ('Unsworth'), Gyles J said the following:

A 'before and after' test is usually applied to see whether there has been any injury to, or prejudicial alteration of the position of the employee by reason of any act of the employer (e.g. per Evatt J in Blair v Australian Motor Industries Ltd (1982) 61 FLR 283 at 289, 3 IR 176; per Branson J in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finance Sector Union of Australia [2007] FCAFC 18; (2007) 157 FCR 329 at [127]). Applying what had been said by the Full Court in an earlier interlocutory appeal (BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430; (2000) 102 FCR 97 at [35]), it was succinctly put by Kenny J in Australian Workers' Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 3; (2001) 106 FCR 482 at [54] as follows:

Before s 298K(1) can apply, it must be possible to say of an employee that he or she is, individually speaking, in a worse situation after the employer's acts than before them; that the deterioration has been caused by those acts; and that the acts were intentional in the sense that the employer intended the deterioration occur.

Tracey J usefully summarised the authorities as to the former s 298K in Australian and International Pilots Association v Qantas Airways Ltd [2006] FCA 1441, (2006) 160 IR 1 at [13]-[22]. "Injury" is concerned with an adverse effect upon an existing legal right, or "compensable" injury. Prejudicial alteration of position goes beyond that concept. There are many examples in the cases. It is sufficiently to refer to Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) [1998] HCA 30; (1998) 195 CLR 1 per Brennan CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [37] and [38]; Community and Public Sector Union v Telstra Corp Ltd  [2001] FCA 267; 107 FCR 93 at [17]–[22]; Greater Dandenong City Council v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2001] FCA 349; (2001) 112 FCR 232; and Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finance Sector Union of Australia [2007] FCAFC 18; 157 FCR 329.

  1. [73]
    At the time Ms Talbot sought to put forward her proposed roster, the decision regarding her FWA had been made and was final from the perspective of negotiations to be had with the Respondent. I note that Ms Talbot had a right to appeal this to the Commission and later filed a Public Sector Appeal.
  1. [74]
    Because Ms Talbot had provided a medical certificate suggesting she undertake suitable duties, there was no immediate need to negotiate regarding the roster because Ms Talbot was not going to be working pursuant to her FWA while working on a suitable duties plan supported by the Injury Management Unit.
  1. [75]
    Ms Talbot's position was not altered to her prejudice because of Ms Vaiaso-Etuale referring her matter to Injury Management and ceasing discussions regarding the implementation of the FWA.
  1. [76]
    To the extent there was discrimination in that Ms Talbot was treated differently to other employees with an FWA because she had an injury, such discrimination would likely be authorised by law as it was necessary to protect her health and safety.
  1. [77]
    Ms Talbot's position before Ms Vaiaso-Etuale decided not to respond to her email about the proposed roster was exactly the same as her position after the decision. She has proposed a roster to implement the FWA and no decision has been made about the roster.
  1. [78]
    As Vice President O'Connor states in Gilbert:[37]

[247] It is to be remembered when determining whether an injury has occurred, an objective view must be taken: the employee's subjective view alone is insufficient to make out the injury.

  1. [79]
    Ms Talbot may believe that she should have received a response to her email. She may have a view about a preferred outcome or response to her suggested roster arrangements. However, she has not produced any evidence that would demonstrate that the decision not to respond to her email has resulted in detriment or injury to her position. Her position remains the same, a FWA exists as confirmed by the FW Committee and when it is time, a roster will be negotiated.
  1. [80]
    It seems to me that while Ms Talbot remains under the care of the Injury Management Unit and is participating in a suitable duties program, she is not working under the roster and the flexible working arrangement is not applicable. On that basis, there was no need for Ms Vaiaso-Etuale to progress discussions regarding the roster and Ms Talbot's suggested roster. The status quo remains and there is no injury, prejudice or discrimination within the meaning of s 282(1).
  1. [81]
    I am not satisfied that Ms Talbot has demonstrated that adverse action was taken against her.

Is the evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the respondent was actuated by a proscribed purpose?

  1. [82]
    On any reading of the material available to me via submissions, affidavits and exhibits, it was entirely reasonable for Ms Vaiaso-Etuale, or any other officer of the Respondent, to refrain from further discussions or negotiations regarding Ms Talbot's roster and the application of the FWA approved by the FW Committee in circumstances where a doctor has certified that participation in the process has caused her 'extreme stress' and an injury. Further, Ms Talbot has provided no evidence whatsoever to support her hypothesis. What she has included in her submissions are serious and purely speculative allegations regarding Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's motivations.
  1. [83]
    Even if Ms Talbot were to be able to produce evidence consistent with her hypothesis sufficient to invoke the reverse onus, I find it likely that the Respondent would have no issue in discharging its onus to demonstrate that the action was not taken for a proscribed reason.
  1. [84]
    The part of the amended application relating to the lack of response to the email is without merit and has poor prospects of success.

The Commission's discretion to dismiss Ms Talbot's application

  1. [85]
    The Respondent submits that in certain circumstances, a litigant's ordinary right to have their case heard and decided is displaced by the public interest. In support of this proposition, the Respondent cites Chilcott.[38] Further, the Respondent submits that in ascertaining whether the public interest outweighs these ordinary rights, the Commission is to weigh the lost opportunity on the Applicant against the lack of merit of the application, the likely delay in resolving the matter through a hearing, and the cost to the public should the matter proceed.
  1. [86]
    Citing Murray, the Respondent acknowledges that the discretion under s 541 is to be used sparingly.[39]
  1. [87]
    The Respondent states that the Commission is not required to take the case of the Respondent at its highest and, it is also not incumbent on the Commission to take the case at its lowest. The Respondent cites Sloan in support of this.[40]
  1. [88]
    Guided by previous decisions of the Commission when considering whether to exercise discretion, the Respondent submits that Ms Talbot's application could be considered 'irretrievably unmeritorious' and that the considerations set out in Triplow apply to the facts of Ms Talbot's case.[41]
  1. [89]
    In summary, the Respondent submits:[42]

Given the plainly apparent jurisdictional deficiencies in the Application, and the inferences of a proscribed intention of the Respondent that are entirely unsupported by the evidence, it would seem to be an extraordinary waste of public resources to allow the matter to continue. Accordingly, the Respondent further submits the balancing exercise weighs in favour of dismissal of the cause being in the public interest.

The Respondent respectfully submits this Commission consider exercising the power under Section 451 (b) of the IR Act to dismiss the proceedings, as the cause of action has no prospects of success, is misconceived, and further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

  1. [90]
    Ms Talbot submits that her matter should proceed. Ms Talbot says that the Respondent has not established grounds that are 'so special or extraordinary that the public interest requires that the Commission refrain from the ordinary exercise of its jurisdiction'.[43]
  1. [91]
    Ms Talbot says that significant questions of fact remain unresolved and dismissing the proceedings would not serve the public interest, rather, it would deny the chance for a proper and fair analysis of the factual issues at hand.[44]

Conclusion

  1. [92]
    The first part of Ms Talbot's claim is founded on the Respondent's decision to only grant her FWA in part and to impose a condition that she work three night shifts per roster instead of two. For the reasons given above from [32]–[34], I have found that the IR Act authorises the Respondent to make that decision. As such, the action is authorised by law and is excluded from the definition of adverse action by operation of s 282(6). On that basis, there is no cause of action and the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear that element of the general protections claim.
  1. [93]
    The second part of Ms Talbot's claim is founded on the Respondent's decision to not respond to her email proposing a roster arrangement to implement the FWA in circumstances where Ms Talbot had a) provided a medical certificate stating that the process of negotiating the FWA had caused her excessive stress and b) lodged a WorkCover claim. Section 19 of the WHS Act provides that the Respondent has a primary duty to ensure the health and safety of workers. As such, for the reasons set out above at [67], the action taken by Ms Vaiaso-Etuale is authorised by law and is excluded from the definition of adverse action by the operation of s 282(6). On that basis, there is no cause of action and the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear that element of the general protections claim.
  1. [94]
    I have also given consideration as to whether, if not excluded by s 282(6), the decision not to respond to the email Ms Talbot sent about rostering arrangements could be considered an adverse action for the purpose of s 282(1). I do not find that the absence of an email response has injured Ms Talbot in her employment or altered her position to her prejudice. I am also satisfied that there has been no discrimination between Ms Talbot and other employees in circumstances where I readily accept that the medical certificate and workplace injury claim called for steps to be taken to preserve her health and safety.
  1. [95]
    In circumstances where Ms Talbot has not been able to demonstrate that the decision of Ms Vaiaso-Etuale to not reply to her email about her roster was an adverse action for the purposes of s 282, she has not demonstrated that she has a prima facie case or cause of action.
  1. [96]
    Further, even if it was found that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale's failure to reply to the email was an adverse action for the purposes of s 282, Ms Talbot has failed to produce any evidence whatsoever, beyond speculation and suggestion, that Ms Vaiaso-Etuale took that action because Ms Talbot had filed a Workcover claim.
  1. [97]
    In an application of this nature, the Respondent is not relieved of any requirement to advance a case.[45] If this aspect of Ms Talbot's general protections application were able to clear the fundamental jurisdictional hurdles I have identified, such that there was a prima facie case for the Commission to consider, the material the Respondent has produced is sufficient to conclude that the Respondent would successfully discharge the reverse onus. Thus, if the matter of Ms Talbot's inability to make out a cause of action is put to the side, her prospects of success in the matter in the aggregate are exceedingly low.
  1. [98]
    The Commission has limited resources available to hear the large volume of matters filed each year. The capacity of the Commission to assist the parties with conciliation and hear and decide cases in a timely manner is significantly reduced when time is spent dealing with cases which plainly lack merit. Weighing whether the public interest favours the exercise of discretion to dismiss the matter turns on the facts of each case. On the material before me, I have determined that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter and further, that should those jurisdictional issues not exist, the substantive application has poor prospects of success.
  1. [99]
    Dismissing an application at a very early stage of proceedings, in this case, prior to a conciliation conference, should only be done in the clearest of cases where the Commission has considered the material and determined that the matter cannot succeed.[46] In my view, Ms Talbot's application is one of those cases.
  1. [100]
    I understand Ms Talbot's submission that there are factual matters in dispute between the parties, however, in circumstances where I have determined that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter, there is no utility in continuing to conciliation only for the matter to be dismissed later at hearing on those same jurisdictional grounds the subject of this decision.
  1. [101]
    I acknowledge and have given consideration to the fact that dismissing Ms Talbot's application is significant to the extent that Ms Talbot will not be permitted to run her general protections matter as filed. However s 541(b)(ii) recognises that in a particular case, the public interest may displace a litigant's right to have their case heard and determined.[47]
  1. [102]
    I note that Ms Talbot is not without other avenues to pursue her grievance regarding her FWA and roster. To this end, I find there is limited prejudice to Ms Talbot arising out of my decision to dismiss her application.
  1. [103]
    For the reasons given above, I will exercise the power afforded by s 541(b) to dismiss the matter on the grounds that further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

Order

  1. Pursuant to s 541(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, GP/2025/10 is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] Respondent's response filed in the Industrial Registry on 14 March 2025, [16].

[2] Respondent's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 22 April 2025; Applicant's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 7 May 2025; and the Respondent's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 15 May 2025.

[3] Respondent’s submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 22 April 2025 Annexure Six, [2].

[4] Ibid Annexure Six [5].

[5] Respondent's response (n 1) Attachment Four, [10].

[6] Amended Application filed in the Industrial Registry on 26 February 2025 Schedule [2].

[7] Ibid Schedule [3].

[8] Ibid Schedule [7].

[9] Pennington v Jamieson [2022] ICQ 022 ('Pennington').

[10] Ibid [93] – [95] (citations omitted).

[11] Appellant's submissions (n 2) Annexure 8, 2.

[12] Respondent's submissions (n 3) Annexure 10.

[13] Respondent's response (n 1) [11].

[14] Watton v Tafe Queensland (No. 3) [2023] QIRC 303 [186]-[190] ('Watton').

[15] Gilbert v Metro North Hospital and Health Service and Ors [2021] QIRC 255 [35]. See the review of authorities in Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses' Union of Employees [2019] FCAFC 215 [64]–[74]; See also Tattsbet Ltd v Morrow (2015) 233 FCR 46 [119]; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd (2015) 238 FCR 273 [76]; Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2018) 277 IR 75 (ABCC v Hall) [13]-[19].

[16] Gilbert (n 15) [37].

[17] [2013] FCA 763.

[18] United Firefighters Union of Australia v Easy [2013] FCA 763 [41].

[19] ABCC v Hall [2018] FCAFC 88, [13]-[14].

[20] See Sabapathy v Jetstar Airways [2021] FCAFC 25, [39]-[41].

[21] Celand v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 222; 256 FCR 306; 274 IR 420, [102].

[22] Gilbert (n 15) [32].

[23] Gilbert (n 15) [38] citing Barclay [44]-[45].

[24] Gilbert (n 15) [38] citing Barclay [44]-[45].

[25] Gilbert (n 15) [40] citing Barclay, [127].

[26] Gilbert (n 15) [43].

[27] Respondent's submissions (n 3) [23].

[28] Ibid [24].

[29] Ibid [27].

[30] Gilbert (n 15) [240].

[31] Applicant's submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 7 May 2025 [56].

[32] Ibid [57].

[33] Applicant's submissions (n 31) [58(a)].

[34] Ibid [67].

[35] Ibid [69].

[36] Respondent's submissions in reply filed in the Industrial Registry on 15 May 2025 [26].

[37] Gilbert v Metro North Hospital and Health Service and Ors [2021] QIRC 255.

[38] Respondent's submissions (n 3) [39] citing Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service and Anor [2025] QIRC 32 [53] ('Chilcott').

[39] Respondent's submissions (n 3) [40] citing Murray v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 339 [22] ('Murray').

[40] Respondent's submissions (n 3) [43] citing Sloan v Tafe Queensland [2024] QIRC 139 [90] ('Sloan').

[41] Respondent's submissions (n 3) [47] citing Triplow v Leidos SAR Services Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 012 [126] ('Triplow').

[42] Respondent's submissions (n 3) [49]–[50].

[43] Treanor v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2019] QIRC 146 [110].

[44] Applicant's submissions (n 31) [71]-[73] citing Tapfield v Ipswich City Council [2021] QIRC 069 [43] and Sloan v Tafe Queensland [2024] QIRC 139 [95].

[45] Murray v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 339 [23] citing Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18.

[46] Ibid [22].

[47] Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service and Anor [2025] QIRC 32 [53] citing Amerena and Ors v Queensland Teachers Union of Employees and Ors [2023] QIRC 302.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Talbot v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Talbot v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 200

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Pidgeon IC

  • Date:

    01 Aug 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
ABCC v Hall [2018] FCAFC 88
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] FCAFC 88
Amerena and Ors v Queensland Teachers Union of Employees and Ors [2023] QIRC 302
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 302
Australian and International Pilots Association v Qantas Airways Ltd [2006] FCA 1441
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] FCA 1441
Australian and International Pilots Association v Qantas Airways Ltd (2006) 160 IR 1
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 160 IR 1
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Hall (2018) 277 IR 75
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2018) 277 IR 75
Australian Red Cross Society v Queensland Nurses' Union of Employees [2019] FCAFC 215
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] FCAFC 215
Australian Workers Union v BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd (2001) 106 FCR 482
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 106 FCR 482
AWU v BHP Iron Ore [2001] FCA 3
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] FCA 3
BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union (2000) 102 FCR 97
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 102 FCR 97
BHP Iron-Ore Pty Ltd v Australian Workers' Union [2000] FCA 430
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] FCA 430
Blair v Australian Motor Industries Ltd (1982) 61 FLR 283
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1982) 61 FLR 283
Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 18
Celand v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 222
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] FCAFC 222
Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service [2025] QIRC 32
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2025] QIRC 32
Cite 2 - [2025] QIRC 32
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finance Sector Union (2007) 157 FCR 329
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2007) 157 FCR 329
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finance Sector Union of Australia [2007] FCAFC 18
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] FCAFC 18
Cite 2 - [2007] FCAFC 18
Community and Public Sector Union v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2001] FCA 267
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] FCA 267
Gilbert v Metro North Hospital Health Service [2021] QIRC 255
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 255
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 255
Cite 3 - [2021] QIRC 255
Greater Dandenong City Council v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union (2001) 112 FCR 232
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 112 FCR 232
Greater Dandenong City Council v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2001] FCA 349
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] FCA 349
Mining and Energy Union v Anglo Coal (Dawson Services) Pty Ltd (2015) 238 FCR 273
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2015) 238 FCR 273
Murray v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2023] QIRC 339
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 339
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 339
Cite 3 - [2023] QIRC 339
Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 195 CLR 1
Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [No 3] [1998] HCA 30
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] HCA 30
Pennington v Jamieson [2022] ICQ 22
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] ICQ 22
Cite 2 - [2022] ICQ 22
Sabapathy v Jetstar Airways [2021] FCAFC 25
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] FCAFC 25
Sloan v TAFE Queensland [2024] QIRC 139
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 139
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 139
Cite 3 - [2024] QIRC 139
Tapfield v Ipswich City Council [2021] QIRC 69
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 69
Tattsbet Ltd v Morrow (2015) 233 FCR 46
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2015) 233 FCR 46
Treanor v State of Queensland [2019] QIRC 146
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QIRC 146
Triplow v Leidos SAR Services Pty Ltd [2024] QIRC 12
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 12
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 12
United Firefighters Union of Australia v Easy [2013] FCA 763
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] FCA 763
Cite 2 - [2013] FCA 763
Watton v TAFE Queensland (No. 3) [2023] QIRC 303
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 303
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 303

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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