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Fletcher v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) & Ors[2025] QIRC 234

Fletcher v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) & Ors[2025] QIRC 234

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Fletcher v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) & Ors [2025] QIRC 234

PARTIES:

Alexander Fletcher

Complainant

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)

First Respondent

&

Jaya Ganasan

Second Respondent

&

Katrina Elisha Lewis

Third Respondent

&

Kent Andersen

Fourth Respondent

CASE NO:

AD/2024/38

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

5 September 2025

HEARING DATE:

6 June 2025

MEMBER:

Pratt IC

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

ORDERS:

  1. The application in existing proceedings is granted.
  1. Mr Jaya Ganasan, Ms Katrina Elisha Lewis and Mr Kent Andersen are struck out as respondents in the matter of AD/2024/38.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – PARTIES – PROPER OR NECESSARY PARTY – complainant worked for the first respondent and alleged  contraventions of the Anti‑Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ('AD Act') – first respondent brought an application in existing proceedings seeking an order pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act'), striking out the second, third and fourth respondents – consideration of s 26C of the Public Service Act 2008 ('PS Act 2008'), s 269 of the Public Sector Act 2022 ('PS Act 2022'), and s 10.5 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 ('Police Administration Act') – held that s 26C of the PS Act 2008 meant second, third and fourth Respondent could not incur civil liability for engaging in, or for the result of engaging in, conduct that allegedly breached the AD Act – consideration of orders that can be made under s 209 of the AD Act –consideration of errors in affidavit – held errors in affidavit inconsequential – consideration of whether complainant would be denied fair hearing if second, third and fourth respondents were struck out – held complainant would not be denied fair hearing – consideration of power to strike out respondents – held that second, third and fourth respondents ought to be struck out as respondents in the substantive proceedings – application granted.

LEGISLATION:

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 20(2)

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 174B, s 174C, s 209

Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) s 27(9)

Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth) s 206

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 531, s 539

Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) s 2.5, s 10.5, s 11.14

Proclamation - Public Service and Other Legislation (Civil Liability) Amendment Act 2014 (commencing remaining provisions) (Qld)

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 13, s 14, s 268, s 269, s 289, s 295, s 296, s 270, s 365, sch 3

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 8, s 9, s 24B, s 26C, s 288

Public Service and Other Legislation (Civil Liability) Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) s 2, s 8

CASES:

ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel (2014) 254 CLR 1

Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings [1992] FCA 446

Drayton v Martin (1996) 67 FCR 1

Graafland v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) [2025] QIRC 34

Lane v Dive Two Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 104

Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261

McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors [2022] QSC 081

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469

Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1987) 16 FCR 465

Selected Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 286

Wood v State of Queensland [2023] QSC 221

APPEARANCES:

Mr A Fletcher, the Complainant by telephone.

Mr G Carthew, Queensland Police Service, for the Respondents.

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    This is an application in existing proceedings brought by the First Respondent, the State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) ('First Respondent', 'State' or 'QPS'). The application seeks orders pursuant to s 539(b)(iv) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act'), striking out the second, third and fourth respondents. They are Mr Jaya Ganasan, Ms Katrina Lewis and Mr Kent Andersen ('Individual Respondents').
  1. [2]
    By way of background, the substantive matter involves allegations by the Complainant, Mr Fletcher, that the State, by virtue of the conduct of the Individual Respondents, contravened the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ('AD Act'). There are several alleged contravening acts that are said to have occurred in mid-to-late 2020 ('relevant time').
  1. [3]
    I have read and considered all of the evidence and submissions in this matter. However, there were some six rounds of submissions and a further oral hearing. For the sake of brevity, I have summarised the key points in the submissions below and considered issues as they arise.

Indemnification

  1. [4]
    The State's main argument supporting the removal of the Individual Respondents is that the Individual Respondents are protected from civil liability for engaging in conduct in an official capacity. The State submits that there are three relevant sources of protection. The first is s 26C of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) ('PS Act 2008'), which commenced on 31 March 2014,[1] and says:

26C  Civil liability of State employee for engaging in conduct in official capacity

  1. A State employee does not incur civil liability for engaging, or for the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity.
  1. If subsection (1) prevents liability attaching to a State employee, the liability attaches instead as follows—
  1. if paragraph (b) does not apply—to the State;
  1. if, at the time the State employee engaged in the conduct, the person did so as a member of a body corporate or the governing body of a body corporate, or as a person who was employed by, appointed by or a delegate of, a body corporate—the body corporate.
  1. If liability attaches to the State under subsection (2) (a) , the State may recover contribution from the State employee but only if the conduct was engaged in—
  1. other than in good faith; and
  1. with gross negligence.
  1. If liability attaches to a body corporate under subsection (2) (b) , the body corporate may recover contribution from the State employee but only if the conduct was engaged in—
  1. other than in good faith; and
  1. with gross negligence.
  1. In a proceeding under subsection (3) or (4) to recover contribution, the amount of contribution recoverable is the amount found by the court to be just and equitable in the circumstances.
  1. In this section—

"civil liability", of a State employee for engaging, or for the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity, means liability of any type for the payment of an amount by the State employee because of—

  1. a claim based in tort, contract or another form of action in relation to the conduct or result, including, for example, breach of statutory duty or defamation and, for a fatal injury, includes a claim for the deceased’s dependants or estate; or
  1. a complaint made under a law that provides a person may complain about the conduct or result to an entity established under the law, other than a complaint to start criminal proceedings, including, for example, a complaint under the Justices Act 1886 ; or
  1. an order of a court to pay costs relating to a proceeding for an offence against a law in relation to the conduct or result, unless the proceeding was for an offence by the State employee.

Examples of types of liability—

• a liability because of an agreement or an order under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 or the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cwlth) requiring payment of an amount to a complainant (however described) under the Act

•  a liability because of an obligation under an agreement to settle a proceeding, or an order of a court or tribunal, to do something that involves paying an amount, including an obligation to rectify damage to a building or to publish an apology in a newspaper

"conduct" means an act or an omission to perform an act.

"engage in conduct in an official capacity" means engage in conduct as part of, or otherwise in connection with, a person’s role as a State employee, including, for example, engaging in conduct under or purportedly under an Act.

Example of a State employee engaging in conduct in an official capacity—

A State employee makes a decision in relation to an application for a licence.

"State employee" see section 26B(4).

  1. [5]
    Continuing the above protection, the second relevant civil liability protection is contained in s 269 of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act 2022'), which replaced the PS Act 2008, and says:

269  Civil liability of prescribed person for engaging in conduct in official capacity

  1. A prescribed person does not incur civil liability for engaging, or for the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity.
  1. If subsection (1) prevents liability attaching to a prescribed person, the liability attaches instead as follows—
  1. if paragraph (b) does not apply—to the State;
  1. if, at the time the prescribed person engaged in the conduct, the person did so as a member of a body corporate or the governing body of a body corporate, or as a person who was employed or appointed by, or a delegate of, a body corporate—the body corporate…

(6) In this section—

"civil liability", of a prescribed person for engaging, or for the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity, means liability of any type for the payment of an amount by the prescribed person because of—

  1. a claim based in tort, contract or another form of action in relation to the conduct or result, including, for example, breach of statutory duty or defamation and, for a fatal injury, includes a claim for the deceased’s dependants or estate; or
  1. a complaint made under a law that provides a person may complain about the conduct or result to an entity established under the law, other than a complaint to start criminal proceedings, including, for example, a complaint under the Justices Act 1886 ; or
  1. an order of a court to pay costs relating to a proceeding for an offence against a law in relation to the conduct or result, unless the proceeding was for an offence by the prescribed person.

Examples of types of liability—

1 a liability because of an agreement or an order under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 or the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cwlth) requiring payment of an amount to a complainant, however described, under the Act

2 a liability because of an obligation under an agreement to settle a proceeding, or an order of a court or tribunal, to do something that involves paying an amount, including an obligation to rectify damage to a building or to publish an apology in a newspaper

"conduct" means an act or an omission to perform an act.

"engage in conduct in an official capacity" means engage in conduct as part of, or otherwise in connection with, a person’s role as a prescribed person, including, for example, engage in conduct under or purportedly under an Act.

Example of a prescribed person engaging in conduct in an official capacity—

a prescribed person making a decision in relation to an application for a licence

  1. [6]
    Generally speaking, the effect of both s 26C of the PS Act 2008 and s 269 of the PS Act 2022 was, and is, to protect employees and appointees in the public service from incurring civil liability for engaging in, or for the results of engaging in, conduct in an official capacity. The earlier Act used the general term of "State employee" to define the class of people covered by this protection whereas the current Act uses the term "prescribed person".
  1. [7]
    In the earlier PS Act 2008, s 26C defined a "State employee",[2] by reference later in that section, to s 26B(4) as a "person to whom this division applies".[3] That division, which included this and other relevant sections, was stated to apply to "public service employees",[4] which was defined in s 9 to include a "public service officer".[5] The effect being that whilst there were differences elsewhere between rights and obligations of public service "officers" and public service "employees", all were "State employees" who were captured by the protections of s 26C.
  1. [8]
    In the current PS Act 2022, the protections in s 269 apply to a "prescribed person",[6] which is relevantly defined in s 267, by reference to ss 268(1) and (2), as a person who is, or was at the time of engaging in conduct in an official capacity, a "public service employee". A "public service employee" is relevantly defined by s 13 as a person employed under chapter 4 or 5 of the PS Act 2022 as a general employee, an officer, a senior executive, a senior executive, or a chief executive. The definition of "public service employee" includes all public service "officers" so the protections under s 269 for "prescribed persons" capture them too.
  1. [9]
    The PS Act 2022 contains transitional provisions that have the effect of ensuring that those who enjoyed protections under the PS Act 2008 continue to do so under the PS Act 2022. Sections 295 and 296 effectively transition existing public service employees and public service officers from the PS Act 2008 to the PS Act 2022. Thus, anyone employed as a public service employee or public service officer under the PS Act 2008 became a public service employee or public service officer under the PS Act 2022.

Which civil liability protection operated and when?

  1. [10]
    In Maxwell v Murphy ('Murphy'), his Honour, Dixon CJ, observed that the general rule of the common law was that:[7]

…a statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events.

  1. [11]
    Section 289 of the PS Act 2022 repealed the PS Act 2008. However, s 20(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ('Acts Interpretation Act') has the effect that the repeal of the PS Act 2008 does not affect a right, privilege or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the PS Act 2008.
  1. [12]
    During the relevant time, the PS Act 2008 was in force. The parties have focused a good deal of argument on the operation of the PS Act 2022, however, seemingly because it was that Act which was in operation when these proceedings were commenced. The relevant provisions of the PS Act 2022 really only changed in phrasing, not in substance, the effect of the cognate provisions in the PS Act 2008. Even so, the correct approach to take, in my opinion, is that the applicable legislation is that which was in force at the time of the relevant facts or events, being when the relevant rights to indemnity allegedly accrued. I see no contrary intention in the later Act and the parties have not pointed to one.
  1. [13]
    The State further submits that ss 10.5(1)-(3) of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) ('Police Administration Act') also applied to the Individual Respondents at times. That section says:

10.5 Civil liability of police officers and others for engaging in conduct in official capacity

  1. This section applies to each of the following—
  1. an officer;
  1. a staff member;
  1. a recruit;
  1. a volunteer;
  1. a person who, at the time the person engaged in conduct in an official capacity, was a person mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (d) .
  1. A person to whom this section applies does not incur civil liability for engaging, or the result of engaging, in conduct in an official capacity.
  1. If subsection (2) prevents liability attaching to a person, the liability attaches instead to the Crown.
  1. [14]
    As can be seen, s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act relevantly provides a protection from civil liability to someone who is, or was, an "officer" or a "staff member". Officers are defined as generally being a "police officer", which makes that irrelevant to this matter. There is no suggestion that any of the Individual Respondents were police officers.
  1. [15]
    At the time of the alleged contraventions of the AD Act, "staff members" were relevantly defined by s 2.5 of the Police Administration Act as "officers of the public service assigned to perform duties in the police service" or "persons appointed as staff members by the commissioner under the Public Service Act 2008". That definition was later amended to simply change the reference to the Act to "Public Sector Act 2022, chapter 4, part 2".[8]
  1. [16]
    The State submits that the Individual Respondents were public service officers and therefore public service employees pursuant to ss 8 and 9 of the PS Act 2008. It says that Mr Ganasan and Mr Andersen were appointed as public service officers when they entered into contracts of appointment in 2020 to work within the Public Safety Business Agency ('PSBA'). The PSBA became part of the QPS in 2021. The State also says that Ms Lewis was employed to work within the PSBA as a public service officer in 2013 and remained so when the PSBA transitioned to QPS in 2021. The State submits that the employer of all three of Individual Respondents at the relevant time was the State of Queensland, regardless of whether each employee worked under the banner of the PSBA or the QPS. The primary submission is that the protection within each of those Acts applied to each Individual Respondent at relevant times. They were public service officers under the PS Act 2008 when the alleged contraventions of the AD Act are said to have occurred. They became public service officers under the PS Act 2022 by virtue of s 296(2) of that Act prior to when these proceedings were commenced against them. And if there was any doubt, they were also covered by the protection under the Police Administration Act to the extent they were employed by the QPS as a staff member as defined in that Act.
  1. [17]
    Mr Fletcher concedes that the Individual Respondents were staff members under the Police Administration Act at some point in time. However, Mr Fletcher argues that the protection afforded by s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act did not apply to the Individual Respondents because they were not employees of QPS at the relevant time. As I surmise, Mr Fletcher's point here is that the Individual Respondents did not become employees covered by the Police Administration Act until 2021, which was after the relevant time.
  1. [18]
    I accept Mr Fletcher's submission on this point. On the State's own submissions and evidence, the Individual Respondents were not employees of QPS until 2021. It was only after then that the civil liability protections within the Police Administration Act, which applied to "staff members" captured by the definition of such, became relevant. Prior to that, on the State's submissions, the Individual Respondents do not appear to have been covered by the Police Administration Act. Accordingly, I conclude that the Police Administration Act did not apply to the Individual Respondents at the relevant time.
  1. [19]
    The PS Act 2022 was not in force at the relevant time either and so does not apply. However, there is nothing to suggest that any right to indemnity from civil liability that accrued under s 26C of the PS Act 2008 was retrospectively done away with by the PS Act 2022. Considering the combined effect of s 20(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act and his Honour, Dixon CJ's statement of the key principle in Murphy, I conclude that the protections within the PS Act 2008 were the ones operating at the relevant time.

Meaning of 'acting in an official capacity'

  1. [20]
    Mr Fletcher also argues that regardless of which of the statutory protections from civil liability were operating at the relevant time, none of them come to the rescue of the Individual Respondents. That is because each civil liability protection only covers conduct of persons acting in an "official capacity".[9] Mr Fletcher argues that the Individual Respondents were not acting in an "official capacity" at the relevant time and therefore their alleged conduct fell outside of the protection of whatever provision or provisions applied.
  1. [21]
    The State submits that the definition of "official capacity" is generic in all three pieces of legislation with some minor variances that are inconsequential to this matter. It says that at all relevant times the Individual Respondents were engaging in conduct in an official capacity within the meaning of each Act. That is because, the State argues, that even if their conduct contravened the AD Act, which is denied, all three of the Individual Respondents were engaged in functions, responsibilities, tasks and duties associated with their positions within the PSBA and the QPS at all relevant times.
  1. [22]
    In support of these arguments the State refers to the decisions in Graafland v State of Queensland (Department of Premier and Cabinet) ('Graafland'),[10] Wood v State of Queensland ('Wood'),[11] and McEwan v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Australian Taxation Office and Ors ('McEwan').[12]
  1. [23]
    In Graafland, his Honour, Merrell DP, dealt with an application to remove respondents from proceedings. The relevant respondents were either employed as ministerial staff members or public service employees and were alleged to have discriminated against and victimised the complainant in contravention of the AD Act.[13] His Honour ordered the removal of those respondents on the basis that any liability sheeted home to their employer, not to them, as they were public service employees whose alleged conduct was conduct done in an official capacity within the meaning of s 269 of the PS Act 2022.[14]
  1. [24]
    In Wood, his Honour, Kelly J, dealt with a matter where the plaintiff sought to join individual defendants to the proceedings because the plaintiff alleged he had a claim in tort against them.[15] His Honour held that s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act provides "statutory immunity from civil liability to individual police officers for their conduct in an official capacity and transfers liability to the State". His Honour concluded that any potential tortious liability attached to the State, not the individual defendants.[16] His Honour subsequently declined to join the individual defendants.[17]
  1. [25]
    The matter in McEwan concerned, among other things, an allegation by the plaintiff that a police officer was liable for his role in the charging and prosecuting of the plaintiff on charges of fraud.[18] His Honour, Martin SJA, found that a police officer within the QPS was protected from civil liability by s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act, and so any civil liability attaching to that police officer's role in the charging and prosecuting of the plaintiff attached to the State.[19]
  1. [26]
    Mr Fletcher argues that QPS has not established that the Individual Respondents were "engaging in conduct in an official capacity" for the purposes of attracting the protections under any Act. Mr Fletcher argues that this is a question of fact and a hearing is required before a view can be concluded as to whether any of the impugned conduct of the Individual Respondents falls within "engaging in conduct in an official capacity". Consequently, he submits that none of the Individual Respondents should be removed as a respondent.
  1. [27]
    Mr Fletcher says that Graafland is not on point because that matter was premised on the acceptance of the relevant persons acting in an official capacity. In the present case, Mr Fletcher submits, that premise is a contested question of fact. Mr Fletcher further submits that liability only attaches to the State for conduct not done in good faith or done with gross negligence because those terms are used with reference to the State's right to recover contribution from employees whose conduct has caused liability to sheet home to the State.
  1. [28]
    At the hearing of this matter on 6 June 2025, Mr Fletcher developed the argument about what constitutes engaging in conduct in an official capacity. Mr Fletcher referred to part of the State's written submissions filed 30 May 2025 which said that the Individual Respondents' roles were "drawn from" the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) ('Civil Aviation Act') and the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Cth) ('Civil Aviation Regulations'). The gist of this argument was that the Individual Respondents were not acting in an official capacity at relevant times because the flight operation they, and Mr Fletcher, were engaged in should never have held an Air Operation Certificate as required by s 27 of the Civil Aviation Act. Therefore, Mr Fletcher argued, everything the Individual Respondents did was not authorised by law and consequently lacked official authority.
  1. [29]
    Air Operation Certificates are to be issued for a "prescribed purpose" pursuant to the Civil Aviation Act. And so this argument hinged upon what was a "prescribed purpose" referred to in s 27(9) of the Civil Aviation Act. Some guidance is provided in s 206 of the Civil Aviation Regulations, which relevantly says (my emphasis):

206  Prescribed purpose--miscellaneous

For the purposes of subsection 27(9) of the Act, each of the following is a prescribed purpose:

…

  1. an aerial application operation (within the meaning of regulation 137.010 of CASR) to which Part 137 of CASR applies that is conducted for hire or reward;
  1. [30]
    Mr Fletcher argued that what he and the Individual Respondents were employed to work within fell outside the defined prescribed purpose because it was not a flight operation that was "conducted for hire or reward". On what constitutes an operation "that is conducted for hire or reward", Mr Fletcher initially argued that the operation must actually produce a profit in order to be captured by the definition. Mr Fletcher did not refer the Commission to any authorities on the point but summarised it this way:

It's only when you start, you know, making money or taking profit off the operation that it becomes a commercial operation.[20]

  1. [31]
    It was pointed out to Mr Fletcher that a flight operation might, at any given point in time, go from making a profit to not making a profit for a range of circumstances beyond its control; for example, because of bad weather or other unexpected events causing delays.  It was put to Mr Fletcher that such a meaning as he was advocating could never be practically applied because one would never know whether one was "making money" or "taking profit" at a particular point in time.
  1. [32]
    Mr Fletcher adjusted the argument to become that, so long as the intention was to clear a profit, then the operation was being conducted for hire or reward. Since there was no intention of the relevant operation to clear a profit, Mr Fletcher argued, the conduct of the operation, and that of the Individual Respondents, fell outside of a prescribed purpose.
  1. [33]
    There are several difficulties I have with accepting Mr Fletcher's proposition. Firstly, I cannot accept the argument that intending to make a profit is the threshold for whether an operation is conducted for hire or reward. There is nothing in the legislation that gives s 206(b) such a narrow and, in my opinion unworkable, construction. It would have been easy enough for Parliament to have created a definition where intent to make a profit (assuming the word "profit" was also defined) was the key to whether an operation was captured by the definition of a prescribed purpose. No such wording is present though. In any case, I am not satisfied that Mr Fletcher has established as a fact that the operation was conducted other than for hire or reward.
  1. [34]
    Somewhat eclipsing this issue as to construction of a prescribed purpose, the second reason I cannot accept Mr Fletcher's submission on this point is that Mr Fletcher has apparently misconstrued how broad the definition of "engage in conduct in an official capacity" is. As noted above, s 26C of the PS Act 2008 defined very broadly that "engage in conduct in an official capacity" means to:

engage in conduct as part of, or otherwise in connection with, a person’s role as a State employee, including, for example, engaging in conduct under or purportedly under an Act.

  1. [35]
    Even if Mr Fletcher were right that the flight operation he was engaged in with the Individual Respondents was not validly certified under the Civil Aviation Act, which I cannot accept, the alleged conduct was still clearly "conduct under or purportedly under an Act". But that is only an example provided by the drafters of the definition. Extending the reach of the definition even further than the example is the phrase "conduct as part of, or in connection with the person's role as a State employee". The phrase "in connection with" features in a long history of case law firmly settling that the phrase is one of "wide import" and with a meaning that can be as broad as one thing being involved with, or "having to do with", another, or one thing bearing a relationship to another.[21]
  1. [36]
    On Mr Fletcher's own Statement of Facts and Contentions, all of the conduct in question is clearly described as having occurred in the course of work carried out by the Individual Respondents as State employees. As the State pointed out, Mr Fletcher openly admitted in his Statement of Facts and Contentions that each of the Individual Respondents was acting as an agent of the organisation that is ultimately responsible for the actions in issue. On Mr Fletcher's case, all of the conversations alleged to have occurred have been at work, or about work, or in connection with the performance of that work, or about capacity to safely carry out work. Some of the alleged conduct said to have contravened the AD Act was unarguably directions to carry out work. Mr Fletcher also alleges as acts of discrimination the directions to him to submit to a sleep apnea test. But on Mr Fletcher's own case, those alleged directions, and others, were clearly given by the relevant Individual Respondents as part of the performance of work by them as State employees. The same can be said about alleged directions that Mr Fletcher submit for blood testing, the alleged changes to Mr Fletcher's rostered hours of work and the alleged directions and discussions about medical certificates and the adequacy of information therein.
  1. [37]
    Consequently, I have no difficulty in finding that all of what Mr Fletcher alleges each Individual Respondent to have done and said was at least conduct in the performance of their work as employees of the State. Even if some of that alleged conduct were found to have been outside the scope of the performance of their work, it was well and truly captured by the broad definition of being "in connection with" each person's role as a State employee. Consequently, I cannot accept Mr Fletcher's submission that Graafland is not on point. It is abundantly clear to me, even from this early vantage point, that on Mr Fletcher's case the Individual Respondents are alleged to have acted in ways that are captured by the broad definition of "engage in conduct in an official capacity". This is not a factual issue yet to be resolved in my opinion. What was in fact said or done may be. But whether any of that was in connection with each person's role as a State employee is not in issue on the case as pleaded.
  1. [38]
    It will be recalled that Mr Fletcher also argued that liability only sheets home to the State where the conduct in an official capacity is done in good faith and without gross negligence. However, I cannot accept this argument either. Section 26C(3) of the PS Act 2008 simply allows the State to seek to recover contribution from a State employee but only if the conduct was not in good faith and with gross negligence. Similar provisions appear in the other two Acts. The provision does not say, on any reasonable and objective reading of it, that conduct done other than in good faith and with gross negligence falls outside the protection of s 26C(1). The provision expressly contemplates that conduct done other than in good faith and with gross negligence will attract the protection of s 26C. That is the only way that liability for such conduct could sheet home to the State and therefore give rise to consideration by the State of whether to take advantage of s 26C(3) and seek to recover a contribution from the relevant employee. In reaching this conclusion, I draw support from the decisions of Graafland, Wood, and McEwan, where it was held that even allegedly unlawful conduct is covered by provisions like s 26C.
  1. [39]
    To conclude on this point, I find that the allegations are such that the conduct alleged was clearly conduct done in official capacity as defined. The alleged conduct also gives rise to civil liability as defined. In these circumstances, s 26C(2)(a) of the PS Act 2008 dictates that the liability attaches to the State. I have found that s 269 of the PS Act 2022 and s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act are not applicable here. However, if I am wrong about that, the foregoing reasoning applies to those Acts and the result is the same. That is because the relevant equivalent provisions within those Acts operate the same way as those in the PS Act 2008.

Simultaneous legislative indemnification?

  1. [40]
    The parties also brought into issue whether one or more of the civil liability protections between each Act can apply at the same time as alternatives for the Individual Respondents.
  1. [41]
    Whilst the PS Act 2008 was in operation, s 26B(3)(b) and s 288 of it relevantly said:

26B  Application of div 3

  1. Despite subsections (1) and (2) , this division does not apply to the following—…
  1. a person to whom the Police Service Administration Act 1990, section 10.5 applies;…

288  Relationship of ch 1, pt 3, div 3 if civil liability dealt with by another Act

  1. This section applies if—
  1. another Act states a person does not incur civil liability for conduct or the result of conduct (however expressed), including, for example, if the person acts honestly and without negligence; and
  1. the result of the application of the other Act to conduct, or the result of conduct, engaged in by the person after the commencement is that the person would not be protected from civil liability under the other Act for the conduct or result; and
  1. the person is a State employee who would not, under section 26C, incur civil liability for the conduct or the result of the conduct, but the State or a body corporate would be liable in relation to the conduct or result.
  1. Section 26C applies in relation to the conduct, or the result of the conduct, despite the other Act but does not limit the application of the other Act in relation to any other liability of the person.
  1. [42]
    When the PS Act 2022 took over from its predecessor, it relevantly provided at s 268 and s 270 the following virtually identical provisions:

268  Application of part

  1. However, none of the following is a prescribed person—…
  1. a person to whom the Police Service Administration Act 1990, section 10.5 applies;…

270  Civil liability of prescribed person if another Act provides for protection from civil liability

  1. This section applies if—
  1. another Act states a person does not incur civil liability for conduct or the result of conduct (however expressed), including, for example, if the person acts honestly and without negligence; and
  1. the result of the application of the other Act to conduct, or the result of conduct, engaged in by the person is that the person would not be protected from civil liability under the other Act for the conduct or result; and
  1. the person is a prescribed person who would not, under section 269, incur civil liability for the conduct or the result of the conduct, but the State or a body corporate would be liable in relation to the conduct or result.
  1. Section 269 applies in relation to the conduct, or the result of the conduct, despite the other Act but does not limit the application of the other Act in relation to any other liability of the person.
  1. [43]
    Section 11.14 of the Police Administration Act is in similar terms:

11.14  Relationship of s 10.5 if civil liability dealt with by another Act or provision of this Act

  1. This section applies if—
  1. another Act, or another provision of this Act other than new section 10.5, states a person does not incur civil liability for conduct or the result of conduct (however expressed), including, for example, if the person acts honestly and without negligence; and
  1. the result of the application of the other Act or other provision to conduct, or the result of conduct, engaged in by the person after the commencement is that the person would not be protected from civil liability under the other Act or other provision for the conduct or result; and
  1. the person would not, under new section 10.5, incur civil liability for the conduct or the result of the conduct but the Crown would be liable in relation to the conduct or result.
  1. New section 10.5 applies in relation to the conduct, or the result of the conduct, but does not limit the application of the other Act or other provision in relation to any other liability of the person.
  1. [44]
    Mr Fletcher argues that the Individual Respondents are not afforded simultaneous protection by both the Police Administration Act and the PS Act 2022, presumably also its predecessor. That is said to be because the effect of s 268(3)(b) of the PS Act 2022 is that a "prescribed person" is not one to whom the Police Administration Act applies. And only a "prescribed person" is entitled to the civil liability protections of the PS Act 2022. Mr Fletcher submits that the effect is that both the protections within the PS Act 2022 and Police Administration Act cannot apply to the same person at the same time.
  1. [45]
    The State submits that the effect of these provisions is that where both the Police Administration Act and the relevant PS Act provide protection from civil liability to the same person at the same time, the protections are available as alternatives. Each operates to catch the relevant employee should the indemnity under one Act fail to apply.
  1. [46]
    In my opinion, the effect of s 288 of the PS Act 2008 is to supplement the protections provided to a person by s 26C where that person also enjoys similar protections under another Act. For example, suppose an Act only provided that a person does not incur civil liability for engaging in, or for the result of engaging in, conduct in an official capacity, but only where that conduct was done honestly and without negligence. There are in fact several such Acts. Now suppose that person was covered by that theoretical Act and by s 26C which, by way of reminder, applies regardless of whether the conduct was done honestly or without negligence. In such a scenario, both the theoretical Act and s 26C would apply for conduct done honestly or without negligence, but only s 26C would apply for conduct that is not done honestly or that is done negligently. It is in this way that s 26C supplements other Acts providing similar protections. The same reasoning would apply if s 26C were substituted for either s 269 of the PS Act 2022 and s 11.14 of the Police Administration Act.
  1. [47]
    However, the present scenario contains a peculiarity that prevents s 26C of the PS Act 2008 or s 269 of the PS Act 2022 from applying simultaneously with s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act. As noted above, s 268(3) of the PS Act 2022 and the earlier counterpart, s 26B(3) of the PS Act 2008, provide that a person to whom s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act applies is respectively not a prescribed person or State employee. Consequently, s 26C of the PS Act 2022 and s 269 of the PS Act 2008 do not apply for any period of time where the civil liability protections of s 10.5 of the Police Administration Act applied.
  1. [48]
    This consideration is to resolve the arguments advanced under this heading by the parties. The point is moot, however. At the relevant time, the Individual Respondents were not employed by QPS. They only moved to QPS in 2021, some time after the alleged events occurred. The only civil liability protections that potentially applied to the Individual Respondents at the relevant time were those of s 26C of the PS Act 2008. So this decision does not turn on the question of the simultaneous application of multiple protections.

Controversy over affidavits

  1. [49]
    There were some errors in an affidavit put on by the State. One such error was the transposing of the words "sector" and "service" when referring to the PS Act 2022 and its predecessor. The affidavit also incorrectly stated that the Ms Lewis was no longer an employee of the Respondent. The State acknowledged the error and submits that it was obliged to remedy it upon discovery. It did so by way of immediately filing an amended affidavit. It submits that the mistakes were innocent and obvious and that, on the balance, the information in its first affidavit is true and correct.
  1. [50]
    Mr Fletcher points to the deponent of that affidavit having acknowledged in the affidavit that it was a criminal offence to provide "a false matter" in an affidavit. Mr Fletcher says that the affidavit contained false and/or misleading information in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.
  1. [51]
    Paragraphs 9 and 11 of the relevant affidavit state that "the only relief the Commission may order in respect of the allegations is to make an order for compensation", and "[i]t is therefore not necessary that the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents be respondents to this proceeding". Mr Fletcher says that these paragraphs are false because s 209(1) of the AD Act clearly contemplates other orders that a tribunal might make.
  1. [52]
    Mr Fletcher says it was also false to state in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 that the Individual Respondents had civil liability under the "Public Service Act 2022" because no such piece of legislation exists. This was in reference to the abovementioned error of incorrectly describing the current Public Sector Act 2022 as the "Public Service Act 2022".
  1. [53]
    Mr Fletcher seeks that the entirety of the relevant affidavit be deemed invalid and that the application it supports should be dismissed on the basis of this false and misleading information in the affidavit.
  1. [54]
    I am not persuaded that the mistaken reference to "Public Service Act 2022" amounted to a "false matter" that warrants disregarding the entire contents of the affidavit and dismissing the application. I accept the State's evidence and submissions that this was a simple drafting error; an innocent and obvious mistake of no prejudice to either Mr Fletcher or the proceedings.
  1. [55]
    It is true that one of the Individual Respondents is still an employee of the State. That mistaken reference was, as with the one mentioned above, corrected by subsequent affidavit. I am satisfied with the evidence put on by the State that it was an innocent drafting error. The evidence has been corrected and so this is not an instance where the Commission has received evidence that has proven to be false in a material way.
  1. [56]
    The part of those paragraphs in the relevant affidavit that refer to remedies that are available concerning former employees of the State is a submission, not evidence. Mr Fletcher argues that non-financial remedies do exist, even in regard to respondents who are no longer employees of the State. Examples cited included compelling such a respondent to make a public or private apology to a successful complainant. I accept that this was an error present in the affidavit. I am not, however, satisfied that this error amounts to a false matter in an affidavit such that warrants disregarding the entire affidavit, and therefore dismissing the application which the affidavit was filed in support of. That is what Mr Fletcher has proposed. Mr Fletcher has not referred me to any authority that prescribes such an approach should be taken for a situation like this. That is, a minor drafting error that is an innocent mistake and which effects only a small portion of the evidence, has since been corrected and explained, did not prejudice the other side or the hearing of the matter, and in some respects, relates to material that is not even evidence. I therefore find that the errors in the relevant affidavit are of no consequence.

Fair hearing

  1. [57]
    Mr Fletcher further argues that to grant the application would mean that he would be denied the opportunity to contest certain issues at a future hearing. The State submits that Mr Fletcher will not be denied the ability to present his case on the substantive issues because the Individual Respondents will be witnesses in the main proceedings. The State further submits that the removal of those people as respondents will not affect any line of argument Mr Fletcher would wish to adopt either. I accept that submission. Not having the Individual Respondents as parties to the matter makes no difference to any line of argument Mr Fletcher has raised or may want to press at hearing.
  1. [58]
    The State also says that it is unnecessary to have the Individual Respondents as respondents in circumstances where the State has all the evidence necessary to respond to Mr Fletcher's allegations. I accept that submission too. Whether the Individual Respondents are parties does not affect the availability of any evidence in the State's possession that might go to resolving the facts in issue in the proceedings in my opinion. Mr Fletcher has not identified how it might.
  1. [59]
    I am unable to accept Mr Fletcher's submission that he will be denied a fair hearing of the matter if he cannot prosecute a case against the Individual Respondents personally. I consider that his matter can be run just as efficiently and fairly if the Individual Respondents are removed. The allegations of fact and contentions would remain entirely intact without the Individual Respondents remaining respondents.

Liability for non-monetary orders

  1. [60]
    The State submits that any orders which could be made against it would be limited. It argues that the effect of any non-monetary orders that could be made would be constrained. That is by virtue of the fact that Mr Fletcher, as well as two of the Individual Respondents, are no longer employed by QPS. The State points to s 209 of the AD Act, which says:

209  Orders the tribunal may make if complaint is proven

  1. If the tribunal decides that the respondent contravened the Act, the tribunal may make 1 or more of the following orders—
  1. an order requiring the respondent not to commit a further contravention of the Act against an affected person specified in the order;
  1. an order requiring the respondent to pay to an affected person, within a specified period, an amount the tribunal considers appropriate as compensation for loss or damage caused by the contravention;
  1. an order requiring the respondent to do specified things to redress loss or damage suffered by an affected person because of the contravention;
  1. an order requiring the respondent to make a private apology or retraction;
  1. an order requiring the respondent to make a public apology or retraction by publishing the apology or retraction in the way, and in the form, stated in the order;
  1. an order requiring the respondent to implement programs to eliminate unlawful discrimination;
  1. an order requiring the respondent to pay interest on an amount of compensation;
  1. an order declaring void all or part of an agreement made in connection with a contravention of this Act, either from the time the agreement was made or subsequently.
  1. [61]
    Mr Fletcher argues that he is seeking more than just monetary compensation as relief; he seeks orders for things which the State cannot accept or bear liability for. Specifically, Mr Fletcher seeks orders requiring the Individual Respondents to apologise. Section 209(1)(d) of the AD Act provides for such orders being made. Mr Fletcher also seeks orders requiring the State to apologise on behalf of the Individual Respondents, to implement programs to eliminate unlawful discrimination and to place heavy penalties on those who engage in unlawful discrimination.
  1. [62]
    Having regard to s 26C(6) of the PS Act 2008, it is clear that the definition of "civil liability" within the PS Act 2008 is confined to a liability of any type for the payment of an amount of money, as opposed to liability in general. The definition of civil liability in this context does not extend to being ordered to apologise.
  1. [63]
    So it is fair to say that removing the Individual Respondents from the matter may mean that the orders Mr Fletcher seeks compelling the Individual Respondents to apologise could not be made if the case succeeds. However, the orders Mr Fletcher seeks that would compel the State to apologise on behalf of any relevant Individual Respondent could still be made if the case succeeds, as would any orders that would compel the State to implement programs eliminating unlawful discrimination.

What orders should be made

  1. [64]
    Having considered the arguments presented by the parties, I turn to the key question: what orders as to striking out the Individual Respondents should be made?
  1. [65]
    Section 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act contains the power for the Commission to strike out parties to proceedings:

539  Powers incidental to exercise of jurisdiction

Except as otherwise provided for by this Act or the rules, the court, commission or registrar may—…

(b) direct, for proceedings—…

(iv) parties to be joined or struck out; …

  1. [66]
    Section 531(3) of the IR Act provides guidance:

531 Decisions of the commission and magistrates

  1. Also, the commission or Industrial Magistrates Court is to be guided in its decisions by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case having regard to the interests of—
  1. the persons immediately concerned; and
  1. the community as a whole.
  1. [67]
    Sections 174B(a)(iv) and 174C of the AD Act state the effect of the jurisdiction of the Commission:

174B  Functions of industrial relations commission

The industrial relations commission has the following functions—

  1. in relation to complaints about contraventions of this Act that are referred, or to be referred, to the commission under this Act—…
  1. to hear and decide the complaints;…

174C  Powers of tribunal under relevant tribunal Act

  1. If this Act confers jurisdiction on the tribunal in relation to a complaint or other matter, the tribunal may exercise the powers conferred on it under this Act or the relevant tribunal Act.
  1. Nothing in this Act limits the industrial relations commission’s powers under the IR Act, section 539.
  1. [68]
    In Graafland, his Honour, Merrell DP, said of the operation of the abovementioned provisions (citations omitted):

[19] Having regard to ch 7, pt 2, div 1, sub-div 1 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, which confers certain powers on the Commission as part of the pre-hearing process, but which does not contain an express power for the Commission to strike out a party from a proceeding, then the power of the Commission to strike out a party from a proceeding under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 may be derived from s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act…

[22] Section 531(3) of the IR Act provides that in proceedings, the Commission is to be guided in its decisions by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case having regard to the interests of the persons immediately concerned and the community as a whole. In the present case, the statutory context of this provision is in respect of the function of the Commission, under s 174B(a)(iv) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, to hear and decide complaints of unlawful discrimination referred to it by the QHRC. Having regard to s 531(3) of the IR Act, it seems to me that the Commission, in exercising its discretion under s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act, should not depart from established principles of the general law.

[23] In Agar v Hyde, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ relevantly stated (citation omitted):

  1. It is, of course, well accepted that a court whose jurisdiction is regularly invoked in respect of a local defendant (most often by service of process on that defendant within the geographic limitations of the court's jurisdiction) should not decide the issues raised in those proceedings in a summary way except in the clearest of cases. Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.

[24] This approach has been applied in determining whether a respondent should be removed as a party to a proceeding…

[40] For the reasons I have given earlier, s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act confers an unfettered discretion on the Commission to strike out a party to a proceeding. That is, unlike r 69 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, the exercise of the discretion is not dependent on the Commission finding that the party was improperly or unnecessarily included as a party.

  1. [69]
    The State seeks an exercise of the discretionary power contained in s 539(b)(iv). It relies on Graafland for the proposition that the power in s 539(b)(iv) gives the Commission an "unfettered discretion" to remove parties from a proceeding, and that this applies to proceedings for contraventions of the AD Act.[22] The State submits that the relevant factors that the Commission should consider when deciding to exercise its jurisdiction under s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act are said to be:

a. At the time of the events of the Complainant’s allegations the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents were employees of the State of Queensland,

b. Each of the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents were public service employees and pursuant to s. 268(1) of the PSA were ‘prescribed persons’,

c.  Although the Second and Fourth Respondents are no longer employed by the State of Queensland, under s. 268(2) PSA they cannot incur civil liability, by virtue of s. 269 PSA in respect of conduct in which they engaged in an official capacity as employees of the State.

d.  The Third respondent remains a public service employee and is also indemnified from civil liability in respect of conduct in which they engaged in an official capacity as an employee of the State.

e. Any order available to the QIRC under s. 209 of the ADA considering, the Complainant is no longer employed with the State and the Second and Fourth Respondents are no longer employed with the State, would be confined to orders that could only affect the First Respondent, i.e. the State of Queensland.

f.  Having the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents joined to the action is needless as any relief against them has no practical effect.

g.  The Complainant’s allegations can be heard and determined without the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents joined as the First Respondent has sufficient interest in the relief being claimed.

h. The First respondent possesses all the necessary documentary evidence to respond to the allegations and reserves the right to call the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents as witnesses in defence against the allegations.

i.  The Complainant is not denied the opportunity to have his matter heard before the QIRC and to provide and deduce evidence.

  1. [70]
    Mr Fletcher also relies on Graafland.[23] He draws attention to the fact that despite the discretion to strike out parties being unfettered, the Commission should nonetheless have regard to the need to be guided by equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case, the need to grant these applications in only the clearest of cases, and to not depart from established principles of law. Mr Fletcher further submits that it is not intended, nor a regular course of action, to strike out a party because the power to strike out respondents is found in the IR Act and not the AD Act.
  1. [71]
    In weighing this matter up I am guided by what his Honour, Merrell DP, observed in Graafland,[24] which is excerpted above. I accept that the unfettered discretionary power to strike parties out of proceedings exists under s 539(b)(iv) of the IR Act. That is not in issue here. I accept that an exercise of this discretion should, like any other exercise of discretion by the Commission pursuant to s 531 of the IR Act, be guided by equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case having regard to the interests of the persons immediately concerned and the community as a whole. In Graafland, his Honour also observed that the unfettered discretion is not dependent on the Commission finding that the relevant party was improperly or unnecessarily included as a party.[25]
  1. [72]
    I have found that the Individual Respondents are not exposed to civil liability for any monetary compensation orders; that civil liability sits with the State. But what weight does one place on Mr Fletcher being able to seek an order that is not confined to monetary compensation orders, such as compelling an apology from an individual? An order of that sort is clearly of some importance to Mr Fletcher, and an order could be made against the State to compel it to apologise on behalf of the Individual Respondents. While striking out respondents would deprive Mr Fletcher of the opportunity for the Individual Respondents to personally apologise to him, in my view the continued availability of an order for the State to make an apology on behalf of the Individual Respondents substantially mitigates any possible injustice arising from such a deprivation. Consequently, in deciding whether to strike out the Individual Respondents, this is a small consideration that leans slightly in Mr Fletcher's favour.
  1. [73]
    I also accept that the State's evidence will include the Individual Respondents as witnesses. Whatever value or importance Mr Fletcher places on being able to directly face his alleged wrongdoers in a hearing remains intact if the application is granted. Furthermore, the availability of the Individual Respondents as witnesses means that the case Mr Fletcher seeks to run is not affected if the application is granted.
  1. [74]
    I am also influenced greatly by the lack of practical utility in keeping the Individual Respondents in the matter as respondents. They attract no civil liability for the conduct alleged by Mr Fletcher. The decisions in Wood, Graafland and McEwan make it abundantly clear that where the protections for civil liability are enlivened, there is no practical utility in keeping those protected as parties to the matter. I respectfully agree with and follow that line of authority.
  1. [75]
    It is true that if the Individual Respondents were kept in the matter, it leaves open the possibility of Mr Fletcher obtaining orders compelling each to apologise to him. Against that I weigh the fact that those persons bear no civil liability and the fact that Mr Fletcher is able to seek such an apology from the State and is doing so. I also weigh against that the fact that the State bears civil liability and the striking out of the Individual Respondents does not otherwise impact any part of, or prospects of, Mr Fletcher's case in my opinion. It is for those reasons that I find that this is an appropriate case to exercise the discretion as sought by the State.

Conclusion

  1. [76]
    I conclude that this is one of those 'clearest of cases' such that striking out of the Individual Respondents is justified. I find that whatever potential utility might attach to keeping the Individual Respondents on as parties is outweighed by the absence of any real practical utility in doing so. Consequently, the application in existing proceedings is granted and I strike out the Individual Respondents as respondents to this matter.

Orders

  1. The application in existing proceedings is granted.
  1. Mr Jaya Ganasan, Ms Katrina Elisha Lewis and Mr Kent Andersen are struck out as respondents in the matter of AD/2024/38.

Footnotes

[1] Public Service and Other Legislation (Civil Liability) Amendment Act 2014, ss 2, 8; Proclamation - Public Service and Other Legislation (Civil Liability) Amendment Act 2014 (commencing remaining provisions).

[2] Public Service Act 2008 (Qld), s 26C(1) ('PS Act 2008').

[3] Ibid s 26C(6).

[4] PS Act 2008 (n 2) s 26B(1).

[5] A "public service officer" was defined by s 8 as a person employed under the PS Act 2008 as a chief executive, senior executive, or an officer of another type.

[6] Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld), s 269(1) ('PS Act 2022').

[7] (1957) 96 CLR 261, 267, approved by the High Court in ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel (2014) 254 CLR 1, [27], [50].

[8] Amended by the PS Act 2022 (n 6) s 365.

[9] Note that the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) definition is the same as the PS Act 2008 and PS Act 2022 definition except that it does not contain the word "for".

[10] [2025] QIRC 34 ('Graafland').

[11] [2023] QSC 221, [22]-[23] ('Wood').

[12] [2022] QSC 081 ('McEwan').

[13] Graafland (n 10) [1]-[3], [33]-[34].

[14] Ibid [33], [40]-[42].

[15] Wood (n 11) [1]-[19].

[16] Wood (n 11) [23].

[17] Ibid.

[18] McEwan (n 12) [31].

[19] Ibid [55]-[57].

[20] T 1-12, ll 47-49.

[21] Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239, 280, citing Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1987) 16 FCR 465, 479-480; see also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469, [28]-[29], Lane v Dive Two Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 104, [68],

Selected Seeds Pty Ltd v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 286, [22], citing Drayton v Martin (1996) 67 FCR 1, 32.

[22] Graafland (n 10) [19], [40].

[23] Ibid [22]-[23].

[24] Graafland (n 10) [20].

[25] Ibid [40].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Fletcher v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Fletcher v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) & Ors

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 234

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Pratt IC

  • Date:

    05 Sep 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel & Anor (2014) 254 CLR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2014) 254 CLR 1
Cite 2 - (2014) 254 CLR 1
Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings (1992) 110 ALR 239
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 110 ALR 239
Claremont Petroleum NL v Cummings [1992] FCA 446
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1992] FCA 446
Drayton v Martin (1996) 67 FCR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1996) 67 FCR 1
Cite 2 - (1996) 67 FCR 1
Graafland v State of Queensland (Department of the Premier and Cabinet) (No. 2) [2025] QIRC 34
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2025] QIRC 34
Cite 2 - [2025] QIRC 34
Lane v Dive Two Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 104
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] NSWSC 104
Cite 2 - [2012] NSWSC 104
Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1957) 96 CLR 261
Cite 2 - (1957) 96 CLR 261
McEwan v Commissioner of Taxation [2022] QSC 81
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QSC 81
Cite 2 - [2022] QSC 81
Minister for Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 98 FCR 469
Cite 2 - (2000) 98 FCR 469
Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1987) 16 FCR 465
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1987) 16 FCR 465
Cite 2 - (1987) 16 FCR 465
Selected Seeds Pty Ltd L v QBEMM Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 286
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QCA 286
Cite 2 - [2009] QCA 286
Wood v Queensland [2023] QSC 221
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QSC 221
Cite 2 - [2023] QSC 221

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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