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  4. Morgan v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development) - [2025] QIRC 243

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Morgan v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development)[2025] QIRC 243

Morgan v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development)[2025] QIRC 243

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION

Morgan v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development) [2025] QIRC 243

PARTIES:

Morgan, Margaret

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2025/74

PROCEEDING:

Public Service Appeal – Appeal against a fair treatment decision

DELIVERED ON:

9 September 2025

DATES OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

Appeal Notice (22 April 2025)

Respondent's submissions (19 May 2025)

Appellant's submissions in reply (16 June 2025)

Respondent's submissions in reply (27 June 2025)

HEARING DATE:

8 September 2025

MEMBER:

Pidgeon IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

  1. Pursuant to s 562C of the IR Act, the Internal Review Decision dated 1 April 2025 is set aside.
  1. The matter is returned to the decision-maker with a copy of this decision.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – PUBLIC SECTOR APPEAL – where the Appellant appeals a decision to deal with the PID as an IEG – where the decision-maker did not have delegation to deal with the PID as an IEG – consideration of s 30 of the PID Act – where the Appellant was not provided with written reasons pursuant to s 30 of the PID Act – where the decision is set aside – where the matter will be returned to the decision-make with a copy of this decision

LEGISLATION AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562C

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 30

Reasons for Decision

Background

  1. [1]
    Ms Morgan ('the Appellant') is presently employed by the State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development) ('the Respondent') as a Manager within the Government Land Acquisitions Team, Land Services.
  1. [2]
    On 10 January 2023, Ms Morgan lodged information with the then-Director-General of the Department. Ms Morgan considered this disclosure to be a public interest disclosure pursuant to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 ('the PID Act').
  1. [3]
    Ms Morgan's disclosure was considered and referred to Ms Cooper for decision-making. An outcome was issued to Ms Morgan on 18 September 2024. Ms Morgan sought an internal review of that decision and received the Internal Review Decision dated 1 April 2025.
  1. [4]
    On 22 April 2025, Ms Morgan filed a Form 89: Notice of Appeal in the Industrial Registry. This appeal is against the Internal Review Decision dated 1 April 2025 made by Ms Vivienne Van Der Laak, Chief Human Resources Officer and PID Coordinator, Department of the Environment, Tourism, Science and Innovation who was delegated to undertake an internal review on behalf of the Respondent.

The decision

  1. [5]
    The Internal Review Decision dated 1 April 2025 is nine-pages long. On the first page of the decision, Ms Van Der Laak states:

Decision Summary

For the reasons that follow I have determined that:

  • the assessment as to whether your grievance/disclosure of 10 January 2023 constituted a public interest disclosure (PID) was invalidly made and is set aside and substituted with a finding that the grievance/disclosure of 10 January 2023 was a public interest disclosure.
  • the decision of the Executive Director, Georesources Policy dated 18 September 2024 on the substantive matters raised in your grievance/disclosure is confirmed.

Ms Morgan's reasons for appeal and submissions

  1. [6]
    Ms Morgan says:[1]

This appeal to the Commission is to set aside the second decision by the second decision maker in so far as this confirmed the first decisionmakers (sic) findings on the 'substantive issues'. The second decision was legally invalid as well as unreasonable and unfair.

My PID should fairly and reasonably now be remitted for proper consideration under valid PID processes and procedures.

  1. [7]
    In Ms Morgan's Appeal Notice, she sets out several grounds of appeal. Namely, that:[2]
  • Once the first decision was decided to be invalid, the whole of the decision should have been set aside by the second decision-maker;
  • When the second decision-maker determined that Ms Morgan's PID was valid, it should have been referred for further consideration in line with all valid processes and procedures under the PID Act;
  • Further consideration could have included a decision to investigate or a decision under s 30 of the PID Act to treat Ms Morgan's PID as a grievance provided s 30(2) was complied with;
  • The second decision-maker erred in determining to 'cherry-pick parts of the findings in the first decision made for one purpose (to establish a possible PID threshold) and then use these parts seemingly for another purpose (purportedly being the review of a grievance decision when there was no grievance or grievance decision in the first place)';
  • Adverse findings should not have been made against Ms Morgan without a proper process;
  • The second decision-maker has erred in treating Ms Morgan's PID as a grievance and her response as a request for a review of a grievance;
  • The first decision-maker did not state that she was treating Ms Morgan's PID as a grievance;
  • In confirming the findings of the first decision maker on the substantive issues, the second decision-maker seems to have treated and relied upon certain of the matters as being a review by her of a grievance.
  • The second decision-maker did not consider Ms Morgan's PID afresh;
  • The second decision-maker's review was made on the basis as if the PID had been a grievance (and ignoring her previous finding that the first decision should be set aside);
  • Once Ms Morgan's PID was determined to have met the threshold for a PID, it could only be treated as a grievance if s 30(2) of the PID Act was complied with and that it was not;
  • The PID could only be treated as a grievance if a decision had been separately made about this by a properly delegated officer and the first and second decision-makers were not properly delegated officers for the purpose of s 30 of the PID Act;
  • Ms Morgan's PID was not a grievance and to treat it as such at any time is invalid, unfair and unreasonable;
  • Neither decision-maker considered the information provided by her in her PID, or considered it without discernment or wrongly rejected it;
  • Neither decision-maker afforded Ms Morgan a right to respond or natural justice;
  • Ms Morgan should have been provided with copies of all responses and material, not just the redacted undated summaries by the first decision maker who refused that request;
  • The first and second decisions had sufficient materiality that Ms Morgan should have been given procedural fairness and the right to reply before the decisions were made;
  • Ms Morgan should have been given access to all adverse statements concerning her and her PID.

Consideration

  1. [8]
    One of Ms Morgan's reasons for appeal is that having determined that the matter was not properly assessed under the PID Act, the internal reviewer, Ms Van Der Laak should have determined that the entire decision was void. Ms Morgan says that the first decision-maker, Ms Cooper, did not clearly or fairly identify that the PID was being treated as a grievance.
  1. [9]
    Ms Morgan argues that, as set out in s 30 of the PID Act, if a decision was made not to investigate or deal with her PID because the Department reasonably considered the disclosure could be dealt with by another appropriate process, she was to be provided with written reasons for this decision and an opportunity to apply to the chief executive for a review of that decision.
  1. [10]
    As I understand the Internal Review Decision and the submissions, the argument of the Respondent was that s 30 of the PID Act contemplates that a public sector entity may decide to deal with a public interest disclosure as an Individual Employee Grievance ('IEG'). While Ms Cooper did not have delegation or authority to properly assess Ms Morgan's PID, she does have delegation to deal with an IEG. Ms Cooper dealt with the matter according to the IEG process and therefore, according to the Respondent, while her decision assessing the PID was not valid, the part of her decision relating to the grievance was valid and it was fair and reasonable for Ms Van Der Laak to confirm it.
  1. [11]
    A lot of time has passed since Ms Morgan first lodged what is now accepted to be a PID in January 2023. It is certainly the case that an entity may decide it will not take action on a PID in particular circumstances, one of which may be when it determines to address the matters raised in the PID by another appropriate process, for example as an IEG.[3] I can see why the Department may be of the view that as long as Ms Cooper properly undertook that process and provided Ms Morgan with a decision, that decision is open to be upheld on internal review.
  1. [12]
    It is not open to me to find that Ms Van Der Laak's decision was fair and reasonable in circumstances where it was confirming a decision that a) was not validly made by Ms Cooper as she had no delegation to determine to take no action on the PID and instead deal with it as an IEG and/or b) even if Ms Cooper had been directed to deal with the matter as an IEG and had delegation to do so, pursuant to s 30 of the PID Act, Ms Morgan was required to be informed of this and given an opportunity to seek a review of that decision. In either of these scenarios, I believe the correct outcome of this appeal is to set aside the Internal Review Decision and return this matter to the decision maker with a copy of these reasons for decision.
  1. [13]
    Once a decision was made to deal with Ms Morgan's PID as an IEG, the Department was required to give Ms Morgan written reasons for this decision. Ms Morgan would then have 28-days from receiving those written reasons to apply to the chief executive for a review of that decision. As is clear from the submissions of both parties, this did not occur. The decision to deal with the PID as an IEG did not comply with s 30 of the PID Act. On that basis, it was not fair and reasonable for Ms Van Der Laak to confirm the decision of Ms Cooper dated 18 September 2024.
  1. [14]
    I am setting the decision aside and returning the matter to the Department for reconsideration in light of the Department's acknowledgement at the oral hearing of the matter on 8 September 2025 that the entity did not comply with s 30 of the PID Act when deciding to deal with the matter as an IEG.
  1. [15]
    If it is determined that the matters subject of the PID are to be dealt with by way of an IEG or otherwise pursuant to s 30(1) of the PID Act, Ms Morgan will be given written reasons and will have an opportunity to seek a review of that decision pursuant to s 30(3) of the PID Act.
  1. [16]
    Further, if the matter is to be dealt with as an IEG, it is advisable that someone other than Ms Cooper, the initial decision-maker, should undertake that process.
  1. [17]
    As can be seen above at paragraph [7], Ms Morgan nominates several other reasons why she says the decision is unfair. However, as I have decided to set the decision aside, it is not necessary to consider these reasons in this decision.

Order

  1. [18]
    I make the following orders:
  1. Pursuant to s 562C of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, the Internal Review Decision dated 1 April 2025 is set aside.
  1. The matter is returned to the decision-maker with a copy of this decision.

Footnotes

[1] Schedule to Appeal Notice, 4.

[2] Ibid 2–4.

[3] PID Act s 30(1)(b).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Morgan v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Morgan v State of Queensland (Department of Natural Resources Mines, Manufacturing, Regional and Rural Development)

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 243

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Pidgeon IC

  • Date:

    09 Sep 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

No judgments cited by this judgment.

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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