Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QIRC
  3. 2025
  4. Webber v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning) - [2025] QIRC 256

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Webber v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning)[2025] QIRC 256

Webber v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning)[2025] QIRC 256

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Webber v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning) [2025] QIRC 256

PARTIES:

Webber, Richard

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2023/205

PROCEEDING:

Public Sector Appeal – Appeal against a fair treatment decision

DELIVERED ON:

22 September 2025

MEMBER:

Dwyer IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

Pursuant to s 562A of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) I decline to hear the appeal

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – consideration under s 562A of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) whether to decline to hear appeal – where the appellant filed a fair treatment appeal – where grievance related to failure to secure a promotion – where appellant contends policy and procedure flaws prevented his promotion – where appellant contends flaws gave rise to unfairness – where no promotion appeal filed – where substantial delay progressing appeal – where there is no practical utility in dealing with the appeal – appeal will not be dealt with.

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562A, s 562B

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 131

CASES:

Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018)

McNeil v State of Queensland (Electoral Commission of Queensland) [2023] QIRC 308

Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Disciplinary Decision) [2024] QIRC 252.

Venables v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 137

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Mr Richard Webber is employed by the Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning (‘the respondent’) as a Principal Project Officer (AO7).
  1. [2]
    On 12 May 2023, Mr Webber lodged an individual employee grievance ('the grievance') regarding in essence, the process undertaken for:
  1. an Expression of Interest for a temporary Project Manager role within the Land Services and Projects Team (AO8) that closed on 15 September 2022; and
  1. the recruitment and selection for a permanent Project Manager role (AO8) that closed on 29 May 2023.
  1. [3]
    On 23 June 2023, Mr Webber received correspondence informing him that the allegations he had made as part of his grievance were unsubstantiated ('the original decision'). Mr Webber then requested an internal review of the original decision on 9 July 2023.
  1. [4]
    On 17 August 2023, Mr Michael McKee informed Mr Webber that he was satisfied the original decision was fair and reasonable in the circumstances, based on the information that was before the decision maker of the original decision at the time of her decision ('internal review decision'). 
  1. [5]
    In response to the internal review decision, Mr Webber filed a Notice of Appeal in the Industrial Registry on 19 October 2023.
  1. [6]
    The conduct of the appeal has been the subject of significant delay caused by numerous factors including Mr Webber filing another appeal in early 2024 in relation to a related matter. This necessitated a mention to ascertain the proper management of both appeals. Additionally, the proceedings were adjourned for a lengthy period. The matter remained in abeyance at Mr Webber’s request for a period of approximately 12 months.
  1. [7]
    At the insistence of the Commission Mr Webber eventually filed his submission in respect of this appeal on 22 April 2025, 18 months after he had filed his appeal. The respondent filed their submission on 20 May 2025. Mr Webber filed his reply submissions on 3 June 2025.
  1. [8]
    Having taken the opportunity to review the submissions of the parties I formed a preliminary view that there was no practical utility in hearing the appeal. Consequently, I contemplated not hearing the appeal in accordance with the discretion afforded to me by s 562A of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act').
  1. [9]
    Before exercising that discretion, s 562A of the IR Act requires me to hear submissions from the appellant as to why he says he has an arguable case. The matter was listed for Mention on 16 June 2025 in order to raise these matters with Mr Webber.    

Utility of Appeal in doubt

  1. [10]
    The function prescribed by s 562B of the IR Act is restricted to a review of the decision under review. In those circumstances it is generally the approach of the Commission to confine its consideration to the decision under review and the materials available to, and relied on, by the decision maker at the time of making the decision. More particularly, the nature of the review excludes a consideration of the merits of the decision under review.[1]
  1. [11]
    Notwithstanding this confined consideration when hearing a public sector appeal, the discretion conferred by s 562A of the IR Act is founded upon much broader considerations. While s 562A(3) of the IR Act provides examples of grounds for the discretion to be exercised, it additionally includes ‘another compelling reason’ as ground to exercise the discretion. This language is sufficiently broad that it contemplates a range of practical and merit-based considerations that might legitimately trigger the discretion to not hear a public sector appeal. One such consideration is the practical utility of a determination of the appeal.[2]
  1. [12]
    To evaluate the practical utility of hearing an appeal it can often assist to identify the source of the appellant’s grievance. The multiple layers of process and decision making that accompany the simplest of decisions within the public sector invariably cause simple disputes on confined facts to metastasize into vast volumes of material which will, in turn, give rise to further dispute about the application of the processes to deal with the simple dispute.[3] It is often the case that by the time parties get to the Commission, the original grievance of the appellant has become wholly obscured by the subsequent controversies that have erupted. 
  1. [13]
    Having reviewed the submissions filed by Mr Webber on 22 April 2025 it was apparent to me that there may be no practical utility in hearing the appeal. To assist my understanding of this, I listed the matter for mention. At the Mention on 16 June 2025 the following exchange took place:

COMMISSIONER:…Mr Webber, from my understanding of the material that I’ve read so far,.. This has its origins back in May 2023, so over two years ago now, in relation to, firstly, an expression of interest for fulfilling a temporary AO8 role and then a subsequent recruitment process around the recruitment to that AO8 role, and all of that was in May of 2023. That’s the issue – that’s the event, really, that gave rise to everything we’re dealing with today. Is that right?

APPELLANT: Yes, I think that’s fair to say that.

COMMISSIONER: And the nub of the issue, I presume, leaving aside all of the allegations and accusations, etcetera, etcetera, around the way in which the processes were conducted, etcetera, etcetera, the nub of the issue, I presume, is that you were not selected for either the temporary or the permanent role?

APPELLANT: It wasn’t really the – I suppose you could say that’s the nub of issue, but it’s the process that was followed in relation to that that I feel was very unfair. I would like to just say - - -

COMMISSIONER: No, no. No, no. No, no, no, Mr Webber. I don’t want you talking at large at the moment. I’m trying to establish some facts. I’ll give you an opportunity to talk in a moment. Well, put it another way: if you’d got the AO8 role, we wouldn’t all be sitting here today looking at this appeal, would we?

APPELLANT: I think that’s a – a fair assumption, yes.

COMMISSIONER: Yes. So the nub of the issue is that you missed out on the AO8 role by – through some flaw, you would say, in the process or some other means, you missed out on the AO8 role back in May of 2023.

APPELLANT: It was an expression of interest initially and then - - -

COMMISSIONER: Okay.

APPELLANT: - - - it went to a permanent role, but - - -

COMMISSIONER: Okay.

APPELLANT: - - - the expression of interest was material to the permanent role.

COMMISSIONER: And so the underlying – underpinning, if you like, grievance in all of this is that through all of these issues that you point to in respect of the process, etcetera, you’ve been deprived the opportunity to get that AO8 role?

APPELLANT: I think it was unfair, yeah.

….

COMMISSIONER: All right. Well, the AO8 role that you didn’t get back in May 2023, I presume that’s been permanently filled?

APPELLANT: To the successful applicant that had the relieving opportunity the majority of it, which was nearly a – which was over a – over a year, basically.

COMMISSIONER: Did you get an opportunity to apply for that role?

APPELLANT: Yes, that was the – the – sorry, are we talking about the expression of interest which was - - -

COMMISSIONER: Yes. So you went…through all of that. You applied for the role, you went through the interview process, etcetera?

APPELLANT: There was no interview process. The process was flawed, as I said. There was no interview process. It was just by submission. So that was the expression of interest with the relieving opportunity, which lasted about 12 months, of which I got six weeks.

Then the permanent role, yes, I was – yes, I did make an application for the permanent role, but because of the issues with the other role, it – I felt it prejudiced the situation. By going along with that process, I was already at a distinct disadvantage because the other applicant, who was in the EOI process, had already been relieving for 12 – for approximately 12 months as opposed to my six weeks, so it’s completely – just completely geared up for the role. So it just seemed to – to me a complete waste of time and I was endorsing an unfair process by continuing on with the application for the permanent role. So I withdrew it and I gave the reasons why I withdrew it.

…

COMMISSIONER: Okay. Well, in any event, I previously outlined to you that in public service appeals, I have limited powers in terms of what I can do with this appeal. I can confirm the decision, which is - - -

APPELLANT: Yeah.

COMMISSIONER: - - -... I can set the decision aside and substitute it with a new decision but that, obviously, is constrained by the matter, or I can set the decision aside and send it back to the decisionmaker.

Now, those are the three things I can do. Your concern – your real grievance is that you believe that through the actions of the various players relevant to the expression of interest process, you were deprived the opportunity to apply for the – or to achieve the acting role, and - - -

APPELLANT: Yeah, and the - - -

COMMISSIONER: Yes. Hang on. Let me finish, Mr Webber. You were deprived of that opportunity and as a consequence, the real grievance is that you thereby missed out on the opportunity to act in the role and ultimately secure the role permanently, and that role has now been permanently filled and there is an incumbent in that role and that position will not be disturbed in any shape or form by these proceedings or in any other way unless that person relinquishes that role, but it won’t be as a result of this appeal. It won’t be as a result of any order this Commission can make. What can I do with this appeal, Mr Webber, that is of any material benefit to anyone?

….

COMMISSIONER: …I can do one of three things: I can confirm the decision. You won’t be happy with that. I can overturn the decision and substitute it with another decision. I won’t be doing that because there is no practical decision that I can substitute it with. I can overturn the decision and send the matter back to the respondents for more consideration. What would that consideration be?

…

…You’ve missed out on a role and you – and it may be due to the unfair actions of other people. It may be that you’re right about that, but what can I do about it? I’ve got very limited powers in a public service appeal. What can anyone do about it, Mr Webber? Because you took yourself out of the running for the permanent role, you took yourself out of the running for that role, and so thereby undermined any prospect you had at all of challenging that appointment. You could have made a – you could have filed a promotions appeal under the Public Sector Act if you didn’t believe that the process had been fair. You could have done that, but you’re two years out of time for that, I suspect, or, at the very least, one year out of time. So that’s gone. This isn’t a promotions appeal. This is a fair treatment appeal, and honestly, what is the utility in me revisiting the fairness or otherwise of the actions of these people? What can I do with that? Even if I agree with you 100 per cent that they were unfair, what powers do I have to do anything of any material benefit to anyone off the back of that?

APPELLANT:…Turning to the question that you’ve asked, what can you do? I feel that the processes that were – things like the – having the panel selection. There’s a number of processes that can be referred back, which I make quite clear in the submissions, that would actually improve the situation so that there aren’t issues in the future for other people, other employees, and myself. So when you said you could refer it – this – this matter back to the respondent, I was hoping that that was the option that you would do mainly to address these issues which I’ve clearly demonstrated were incorrect. So that’s what I’d like to do, and then there will be a positive result for this for all employees, for example, having a panel – selection panel consisting of two people on adjacent desks, that doesn’t accord with the - - -

…

COMMISSIONER: Mr Webber, I’m going to interrupt you because I have limited time this morning and it is very, very clear to me the depth of the misconception you have as to what process you are currently involved in. This is an appeal to a court. We address grievances and we don’t make any orders unless those orders address, for example, a finding of unfairness. I’m not here to conduct a review of the practices of this particular department in relation to recruitment and to write some sort of report for you to take back there and say ‘now do it differently next time’. That can sometimes be a coincidental side effect of a decision, but when we say overturn the decision and send the matter back for further consideration, that is premised on a finding that there was unfairness that needs to be addressed…

…There is nothing impacting on you now that can be addressed by me sending the matter back. I’m not here to conduct…a review of practices in the department. The Commission’s resources are not for those purposes…

…And where this is all leading to, Mr Webber, is this: it seems to me that there is absolutely nothing of any material utility that can be achieved by this appeal. I understand your grievance, and I am not dismissing the basis for your grievance in circumstances where I haven’t considered it. I’m not dismissing your concerns or your allegations, but what I’m saying is that even if that is all correct, even if you are absolutely, 100 per cent right that these people were unfair to you, there is nothing that can be achieved from that finding that addresses what aggrieves you. Nothing.

So this is where we’re at, Mr Webber: there is a section in the Industrial Relations Act, and I’m going to ask you to provide me with a short submission as to why … I should not apply my discretion to dismiss these proceedings. Section 562A…of the Industrial Relations Act, subparagraph 3….

So when you read section 562A, when you read subparagraph (3), you will see that before I exercise that discretion, you have to be given an opportunity to tell me why you say you have an arguable case, and that’s not an opportunity for you to put in submissions restating everything that you’ve already told me. You need to address, in those submissions, the points that I’ve made here today, that is to say, yes, you might be right about everything but what can the Commission do of any substance to address what aggrieves you?

So if you still think that you have an arguable case. Put it in those submissions, serve it and file it and I’ll consider your position, but I’m putting you on notice that I am giving serious thought…to exercising my discretion to not deal with this appeal. How long do you need to file those submissions? They’re not to be any longer than five pages.

…

APPELLANT: Just thinking about the things I’ve got on. What’s a normal timeframe? Is it four weeks?

COMMISSIONER: Four weeks is fine, and if you need longer, I’m okay with that, as well, but I’ll – let’s start with four weeks, shall we?

APPELLANT: Yeah, that’s fine. I’ll have a look at that section of the Act, Commissioner, and I’ll – am I allowed to say anything or?

COMMISSIONER: Yes, go ahead.

APPELLANT: I – I – I just think – in summary, I do think there is a – if this matter is referred back highlighting those areas that I’ve highlighted, it would be beneficial to employees of the government as a whole to have these issues I’ve raised cleared up - - -

COMMISSIONER: But Mr Webber - - -

APPELLANT: - - - and it would [indistinct] the opportunity to - - -

COMMISSIONER: Mr Webber, this is - - -

APPELLANT: - - - to improve policy.

COMMISSIONER: Mr Webber, this is where you don’t understand. I can agree with you. I can say ‘they were terribly unfair to Mr Webber’. ‘Look what they did here’. ‘That’s wrong, that’s wrong, that’s wrong. I’m sending it back for them to have a good hard think about that’. That’s all I can do. I can’t make them change their processes, and the fact that I agree – just say, for example, I agree with you entirely and I say it was terribly unfair and I … write that decision and … the respondents read it. They’re not obliged to do a single thing. …

…So I could agree with you entirely, Mr Webber. I could write a decision saying you were right about everything and I could send it back to the department and guess what? Nothing. They don’t have to do anything. They go, ‘right, thanks, Commissioner’. ‘Well, we don’t really agree with you’. ‘We’re not going to do anything’, and that’ll be the end of it. So what’s the point in all of this? I don’t have the power to order them to change things, so what is the point?...

…You’ve got four weeks to address essentially what I’ve observed today. I want you to give some long, hard thought, Mr Webber, to what it is – I want you to have a look at the provisions of section 562A and around that, you’ll see the other provisions of the Industrial Relations Act that deal with public service appeals, including the provisions dealing with the limited nature of my powers. I want you to reflect on all of that.

You don’t have to put these submissions in. The alternative is you could discontinue the appeal if you want to. If you reflect on what I’ve said today and you think, ‘yes, you know what? Maybe there’s no point in all of this’, you are at liberty to file a notice of discontinuance, but if you wish to press this case, you’re going to have to convince me you’ve got an arguable case…

…

COMMISSIONER: All right. Anything further, Mr Webber, before we adjourn?

APPELLANT: Yes. What – okay. You’re saying I’ve got two options: notice of discontinuance or to persuade you to refer this matter back under the section of the Act. Is that correct?

COMMISSIONER: No. No, you’ve got two options…I will be sending this out to you in writing. I am directing you to provide me with submissions in four weeks’ time as to why you have – pursuant to section 562A of the Industrial Relations Act, you are to give me submissions as to why you say you have an arguable case, and I want to stress that is not an invitation for you to repeat everything you’ve already sent to me….

APPELLANT: I understand that.

COMMISSIONER: You need to address the matters I’ve raised with you this morning: the absolute lack of utility in dealing with this matter, even if I agree with everything you say. So you need to convince me. I’m giving you the opportunity, but please, Mr Webber, don’t treat it as a sporting challenge, okay?

(Emphasis added)

  1. [14]
    Consistent with the requirements of s 562A(3) of the IR Act, Mr Webber was then directed in writing to provide submissions outlining that he has ‘an arguable case for the appeal’ by 14 July 2025.

Following the Mention

  1. [15]
    On 11 July 2025, at the request of Mr Webber, the deadline for filing his submissions was extended a further two weeks to 28 July 2025.
  1. [16]
    In the meantime, also on 11 July 2025, Mr Webber began a series of discussions with the respondent via email. Mr Webber included the Commission in these emails. I do not intend to catalogue the discussions as they are entirely irrelevant to my consideration. Suffice to say Mr Webber attempted to negotiate some form of policy review and discussion with the respondent.
  1. [17]
    The discussions between Mr Webber and the respondent culminated when Mr Webber sent the respondent an email on 14 July 2025 proposing details of policy reviews he considered to be ‘for the benefit of all employees’. He appeared to be doing this as a proposed alternative to filing his submissions as directed.   
  1. [18]
    Mr Webber failed to file his submissions by 28 July 2025. Instead, the Registry received an email from Mr Webber asking for ‘a further period of time’ on the basis that discussions were underway between the parties.
  1. [19]
    On 29 July 2025 the respondent sent an email to Mr Webber (and the Registry) confirming they had reached the limit of what they were prepared to agree to in respect of compromise between the parties. The email confirmed that if this was not acceptable to Mr Webber, then he should file his submissions as directed.
  1. [20]
    On 30 July 2025 Mr Webber enquired with the Registry about access to the transcript of the mention on 16 June 2025 and was given instruction about how to apply for a copy. 
  1. [21]
    On 2 August 2025 Mr Webber emailed the respondents again and asked them to reconsider his offer. On 4 August 2025 the respondent informed Mr Webber they would not reconsider and would not consent to any further extension on the directions.
  1. [22]
    On 4 August 2025 Mr Webber filed his submissions.

Submissions

  1. [23]
    Section 562A(3)(b) of the IR Act requires me to hear submissions from Mr Webber as to why he has ‘an arguable case’ before I can exercise the discretion not to hear his appeal. Mr Webber’s submission on this point was sufficiently brief that it is convenient to set out in full:

Submission to Respondent/QIRC as per latest Directions Order - section 562A Industrial Relations Act 2016 - (QLD)

1.0 My understanding was that Commissioner Dwyer was to provide an explanatory note in relation to the above following the latest Mention at the QIRC. I have not sighted this document but have requested the transcript but have not had the opportunity to view this to date.

2.0 I have lodged an accepted Appeal to the QIRC as per instructions from the Appeals Unit of the relevant Government Department.

3.0 I have tried on many occasions to address my concerns with initially, internal Management of my work area, then through the appropriate grievance process.

4.0 I have recently sought to agree a compromise with the Department directly on a without prejudice basis but I have been unable to obtain sufficient detail for the areas that require review.

5.0 Copy documentation in this regard has been provided to the QIRC.

6.0 My understanding is that the QIRC has restricted powers in relation to their decision in this regard.

7.0 I would like my main submissions and submissions on the Respondent's submissions to be fully considered.

8.0 I have clearly demonstrated that I have been unfairly treated. I am of the opinion that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate the balance of probabilities in favour of the Appellant in accordance with the ‘Briginshaw principle’. Reference is made to Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.

9.0 It is noted in particular that the Department is seeking to remove some evidence that I have gathered including the Right to Information (RTI process (paid for by myself) and through third parties The Department has been fully aware of the fact that I have been seeking additional information and at no time at QIRC mentions etc has it been indicated that this could not be used by the Department or the QIRC. This was only raised in the Department's formal submissions obviously drafted by the legal team who have not had the benefit of the history of this matter or day to day involvement.

10.0 At the very least I would like to see the QIRC support the following review with a sufficiently detailed timeframe and how this is to be managed. This should be carried out as soon as possible.

The practices/policies/procedures that should be reviewed by the Department for the benefit of all employees.

a. Make up/selection of panel for an EOI - needs clarification so a panel of 2 people on adjacent desks in the same team cannot occur in the future.

b. Conflict of Interest management needs tightening and Delegates and panel members to a recruitment process need to ensure that a perceived or actual conflict of interest does not exist. A candidate's views about a panel should be taken into consideration and addressed.

c. Feedback requested on a recruitment decision should be relevant to the position advertised and constructive, fair and reasonable. I believe this area needs further direction.

d. A consistent approach to relieving opportunities should be applied across all departments where all suitable applicants are provided equal opportunity.

e. Selection process - business cases and nomination reports need to be followed and need to be fair and reasonable.

f. The decision on a recruitment should be conveyed verbally initially as advised by the business unit to all short listed applicants/internal EOIs.

g. Improvement in communications from management responding to employee emails in a reasonable time frame and keeping team members abreast of changes in personnel and positions in a team.

h. The situation where a review of a grievance relies on incorrect information that has not been verified needs to be addressed. Both parties should be able to comment on new information that is relied on in the decision making process.

11.0 Should 10 at least as above not be achievable via the QIRC I will be considering seeking alternative ways to progress via other means such as the Ombudsman or higher levels within the Department.

End of submission Richard J Webber Appellant

  1. [24]
    Despite having carefully (and repeatedly) explained to Mr Webber why I considered his appeal had no practical utility, it is plain from his submissions that he remains focused on his personal sense of injustice and his somewhat obsessive insistence on policy reform.
  1. [25]
    Given the paucity of meaningful content in Mr Webber’s submission, I subsequently excused the respondents from any requirement to file a submission.   

Legislation

  1. [26]
    Section 562A of the IR Act relevantly provides:

562A Commission may decide not hear particular public service appeals

…

  1. The commission may decide it will not hear a public service appeal against a decision if—
  1. the appellant has made an application to a court or tribunal relating to the decision, whether or not the application has been fully decided; or
  1. the commission reasonably believes, after asking the appellant to establish by oral or written submissions that the appellant has an arguable case for the appeal, that the appeal—
  1. is frivolous or vexatious; or
  1. is misconceived or lacks substance; or
  1. should not be heard for another compelling reason.

(Emphasis added)

Consideration

  1. [27]
    The submission filed by Mr Webber on 4 August 2025 demonstrates his lack of insight into the objective futility of his appeal. Mr Webber remains focused on his personal sense of injustice and his pursuit of the policy reforms that (he says) are necessary. Mr Webber makes no meaningful attempt to address the questions I raised with him at the mention on 16 June 2025 regarding the lack of practical utility that undermines his appeal. He merely restates his allegations of unfairness, and yet again presses for the Commission to consider his recommendations for policy reform.
  1. [28]
    What Mr Webber appears to envisage will happen in this appeal is that I will consider his contentions as to how (he says) he was unfairly deprived of the opportunity to act in or be awarded the AO8 role. Mr Webber then seems to envisage that, upon consideration of his submissions, he will be able to persuade me that the various persons responsible for the conduct of those processes back in 2022 – 2023 misapplied them in a variety of ways or alternatively, applied them in a way that reveals shortcomings in the policies themselves.
  1. [29]
    Thereafter, while it appears that even Mr Webber seems to accept he will not be stepping into the AO8 role as a consequence of this appeal, he still seems to envisage that any  findings of the Commission that uphold his criticism of the policies or their application will result in a remedial direction or even some form of binding precedent for the future application of those policies generally.
  1. [30]
    The power to make directions pursuant to s 562C(1)(c) of the IR Act is not unlimited. The section contemplates directions specific to the circumstances of the appeal and relevant to matters material to the decision under review e.g. to prescribe remedial action necessary to overcome the unfairness identified in the reasons for decision. It is not a power to make broad directions about how e.g. policies or directives ought to be interpreted or applied to other employees generally. Even if I were to accept the entirety of Mr Webber’s contentions, there are plainly no directions I can give within the confines of his appeal that will have any practical utility.
  1. [31]
    For example, I cannot direct the recruitment process for the AO8 role to commence again. This is quite obviously because inter alia it concluded in 2023, no promotions appeal was filed, and Mr Webber unilaterally removed himself from candidacy in any event.
  1. [32]
    Further, there is no utility (other than satisfying Mr Webber’s sense of grievance) in considering the conduct of persons who Mr Webber might contend misapplied the policies or misconducted themselves. The recruitment process is over, the role has been filled, and Mr Webber by his own choice was never in contention for the role. To whatever extent the impugned conduct might have contributed to the outcome that aggrieves Mr Webber now, he simply cannot contend he was unfairly deprived of an opportunity that he declined to pursue.
  1. [33]
    Public Sector Appeals are a review of a decision to ascertain whether that decision is unfair and unreasonable.[4] Sitting behind that primary function will invariably be a grievance of an appellant that arises from the decision under review. The function of the Commission when considering such appeals inevitably produces an outcome that either remedies an appellant’s grievance in some way or independently affirms the decision giving rise to the grievance.
  1. [34]
    For an appeal to warrant expending the time and resources of the Commission, it must produce a tangible result worthy of the use of those resources. Despite there being no remedy of any practical consequence for Mr Webber, he contends he wants policy change for the benefit of other employees. The time and resources of the Commission are not for the indulgence of appellants engaged in supposed acts of altruism.  
  1. [35]
    To be clear: There is no outcome to this appeal that would result in Mr Webber obtaining or having an opportunity to obtain the AO8 role that he claims was unfairly denied to him. Additionally, there is no outcome to this appeal that could produce the policy review now pressed by Mr Webber.
  1. [36]
    As I pointed out at the mention on 16 June 2025, even if I were to agree with all of the criticisms of the process and policy application raised by Mr Webber, there is no foreseeable benefit to returning the matter to the decision maker in the circumstances of this case.
  1. [37]
    In Venables v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) Deputy President Merrell held:[5]

Having considered the submissions of both Ms Venables and the Department, my view is that I should exercise my discretion and not hear Ms Venables' appeal. This is for the compelling reason that given that Ms Venables is no longer an employee, there can be no practical effect from any decision I make in respect of her appeal.

If I confirmed the decision appealed against, that decision can be of no effect on Ms Venables because her employment has been terminated.

Similarly, if I set the decision appealed against aside and substituted a new decision, namely, that Ms Venables should have been granted an exemption under the Directive, that decision can have no practical effect on Ms Venables because she is no longer an employee.

In my view, in general, the Commission's time should only be spent hearing and determining public service appeals where there will be some practical effect upon the employee's continued employment. In Ms Venables' case, any decision I make will have no practical effect on her continued employment.

This is a compelling reason not to hear Ms Venables' appeal.

  1. [38]
    Further, in Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Disciplinary Decision)[6] I observed at paragraph 28:

Yet again, I am compelled to remind Ms Tilley that the resources of this Commission are drawn from the public purse. While access to justice remains an important tenet of our society, such access does not extend to unreasonable individuals who refuse to accept the futility of their arguments and instead, seek to press stubbornly on. Such conduct is a serious abuse of the resources of the Commission at the expense of other litigants seeking the resolution of their genuine controversies.

  1. [39]
    While the circumstances of each of the appellants in Venables and Tilley differ from those of Mr Webber, the futility of their appeals is a common factor with his. 
  1. [40]
    Mr Webber has held on to this grievance for over two years. There has been more than one occasion where I have given Mr Webber some insight into the difficulties his appeal faced.[7] The last of these was the explicit statement to that effect that I made on 16 June 2025 that is set out above.
  1. [41]
    While I do not consider that Mr Webber’s conduct rises to the level of repeated unreasonableness demonstrated by the appellant in Tilley, it remains perplexing that he has persisted with this matter in all of the circumstances militating against it.
  1. [42]
    In my view this appeal is misconceived or, alternatively, it is devoid of any practical utility and as such there is a compelling reason not to hear it.   
  1. [43]
    In all of the circumstances I do not intend to deal with the appeal.

Order

Pursuant to s 562A of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) I decline to hear the appeal.

Footnotes

[1] Goodall v State of Queensland (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Dalton J, 10 October 2018), 5.

[2] Venables v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 137.

[3] See for example McNeil v State of Queensland (Electoral Commission of Queensland) [2023] QIRC 308 at [37].

[4] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562B.

[5] [2022] QIRC 137 at [20]-[24].

[6] [2024] QIRC 252.

[7] Mention 15 March 2024, T 1-7, ll 30-45; Mention 4 February 2025, T 1-4 to T 1-5; Mention 21 March 2025, T 1-3 to T 1-4; Mention 16 June 2025, T 1-7 to T 1-12.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Webber v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Webber v State of Queensland (Department of State Development, Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning)

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 256

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Dwyer IC

  • Date:

    22 Sep 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
McNeil v State of Queensland (Electoral Commission of Queensland) [2023] QIRC 308
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 308
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 308
Tilley v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) (Disciplinary Decision) [2024] QIRC 252
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 252
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 252
Venables v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 137
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 137
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 137
Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 137

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.