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Churchward v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2025] QIRC 6

Churchward v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[2025] QIRC 6

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Churchward v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2025] QIRC 006

PARTIES:

Churchward, Troy Darren 

(Appellant)

v

State of Queensland (Department of Education)

(Respondent)

CASE NO:

PSA/2024/170

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

13 January 2025

MEMBER:

O'Neill IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

  1. 1.The application in existing proceedings filed on 13 November 2024 is allowed.
  2. 2.Pursuant to s 562A(3)(b)(iii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, I decline to hear the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

PUBLIC SECTOR – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – appellant employed as a teacher at a State School – where appellant charged with serious criminal offences – where appellant was suspended without remuneration during disciplinary process – where appellant filed an appeal arising from refusal of sick leave – appeal by appellant as a disciplinary decision – where respondent filed an application in existing proceedings – where respondent applied for the appeal to be dismissed and not heard for want of jurisdiction or the appeal being out of time – whether the appeal lodged out of time – whether extension of time should be granted – application in proceedings is allowed – decline to hear the appeal

LEGISLATION:

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 562A, s 562B, s 562C, s 564

Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 92, s 110, s 129, s 131, s 143, s 222

Directive 06/20: Sick Leave, cl 7.2, cl 8.1

Directive 09/24: Sick Leave, cl 5.2, cl 6.1

Directive 06/23: Suspension, cl 4.7

Directive 11/20: Individual Employee Grievances

Directive 04/23: Appeals

CASES:

A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations) [2019] ICQ 16

Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 349

Chapman v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 172

Chase v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 140

Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 030

Lui v State of Queensland (Department of Energy and Public Works) [2023] QIRC 031

May v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 176

Merrett v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 023

Neophytos Foundadjis v Collin Bailey [2007] ICQ 10

Schimke v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 136

White v State of Queensland (Department of Education [2021] QIRC 259

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

  1. [1]
    Mr Troy Churchward ('the Appellant') is permanently employed by the Department of Education, State of Queensland ('the Respondent') as a Teacher at Wamuran State School.[1]
  2. [2]
    The Respondent became aware that an allegation had been raised relating the Appellant’s private conduct and that the Appellant had been charged with criminal offences in a private capacity during his period of employment as a Teacher at Wamuran State School.[2]
  3. [3]
    In correspondence dated 15 July 2024, the Respondent confirmed that it had become aware that:
  1. the Appellant had been charged by the Queensland Police Service with serious criminal charges under the Criminal Code Act 1899;
  2. the charges were next listed for mention in the Maroochydore Magistrates Court on 29 July 2024; and
  3. the Queensland College of Teachers ('QCT') had suspended the Appellant’s registration pursuant to section 48 of the Education (Queensland College of Teachers) Act 2005.[3]
  1. [4]
    In the correspondence dated 15 July 2024 the Appellant was further advised of the decision to suspend him from duties with remuneration from the date that the Appellant received the letter to 10 January 2025. The correspondence further asked the Appellant to show cause as to why he should not be suspended from duty without remuneration.[4]
  2. [5]
    On 26 July 2024, the Appellant’s solicitors on behalf of the Appellant provided a response to the proposed suspension without remuneration.[5]
  3. [6]
    On 28 August 2024, the Respondent provided correspondence from Ms Lucy Morgan, Acting Executive Director, Integrity & Employees Relations, advising the Appellant of the Respondent’s decision to suspend him without remuneration pursuant to s 101(1)(a) and 101(4) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (('PS Act'). The Appellant was placed on suspension without remuneration from 28 August 2024.[6]
  4. [7]
    On 10 September 2024, the Appellant provided the Respondent with two medical certificates from the Beerwah Family Clinic certifying him as unfit for work and requested that his leave records be amended to reflect a period of sick leave between 8 July 2024 and 30 September 2024.[7]
  5. [8]
    On 13 September 2024, the Respondent sent correspondence to the Appellant advising him that his sick leave records would be amended to reflect the approved sick leave from 8 July 2024 to 30 September 2024. The correspondence relevantly provided:

By email dated 10 September 2024, your representative requested that your leave records be amended to reflect a period of sick leave between 8 July 2024 and 30 September 2024, on the basis of two medical certificates provided to the Department of Education prior to my decision.

I have considered this request, and I have determined to rescind my decision that your suspension without remuneration should commence on your receipt of the letter.

I instead determine that your suspension without remuneration will commence on 1 October 2024, being the first day after the end of your sick leave. I confirm that I will instruct Payroll Services to amend your records to reflect you being on sick leave until 30 September 2024.

You should be aware that if you do not have sufficient paid sick leave entitlements, your period of sick leave may include sick leave without pay. Payroll Services will calculate this.

I confirm that all other components of my decision with regard to your suspension without remuneration remain unchanged. The only change is my decision to amend the commencement date of your suspension without remuneration.[8]

  1. [9]
    On 27 September 2024, the Appellant requested a further period of unpaid sick leave by providing the Respondent with a new medical certificate that covered dates from 1 October until 13 December 2024.
  1. [10]
    On 9 October 2024, Ms Peta Boticario, Senior Injury Management Consultant emailed the Appellant and confirmed that the suspension without pay decision had taken effect from 1 October 2024. The email correspondence relevantly stated:

I confirm my phone conversation with you just now, that we have received advice from the Discipline Advisory and Resolutions (DAR) team that an employee who is suspended without remuneration is not eligible for sick leave.

Therefore, your leave records will remain that you are suspended without remuneration for the period 1 October 2024 to 10 January 2025.

I confirm the claims team will send the Part B back to Qsuper, but it will not reflect that you are on sick leave, and it will be QSuper’s decision to determine your claim.

The DAR team have also advised that the previous decision to amend your sick leave to 30 September 2024 was, because you had provided those medical certificates prior to the decision on suspension without remuneration.[9]

  1. [11]
    On 18 October 2024, the Appellant filed his Public Sector Appeal indicating that the decision being appealed against was a disciplinary decision made on 9 October 2024.

Proceedings before the Commission

  1. [12]
    On 31 October 2024, the Commission made an initial Directions Order requiring the parties to file submissions in relation to the substantive appeal.
  2. [13]
    On 13 November 2024, the Respondent in this matter filed an application in existing proceedings[10] (`the application’) seeking the following order –
  1. 1.The Commission determine that it will not hear the Appeal, and it will instead dismiss it, on the basis the Appeal cannot be heard for want of jurisdiction.
  1. [14]
    The parties filed and served written submissions in accordance with a further Directions Order issued by the Commission on 15 November 2024. I have considered all of the submissions and the attached evidence provided by the parties although it may not be specifically referenced in these reasons.
  2. [15]
    The Respondent submits that the Appeal cannot be heard for want of jurisdiction on the grounds that no disciplinary decision has been made by the Respondent in relation to the Appellant's alleged conduct, meaning no right to appeal exists pursuant to s 131(1)(c) of the Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) ('PS Act').
  1. [16]
    In the alternative, the Respondent submits that the application was lodged out of time in relation to the statutory time limit provided in sections 564(1) and 564(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('IR Act').
  1. [17]
    The issues that fall for my determination arising from the Respondent’s application in existing proceedings are as follows:
  1. 1. What is the operative decision?
  2. 2. Should the Appellant’s error in identifying the decision to be appealed be waived or corrected by the Commission?
  3. 3. Was the appeal lodged out of time?
  4. 4. If the appeal was lodged out of time, is the Appellant entitled to an extension of time?
  1. [18]
    This decision deals only with the Respondent’s application.
  2. [19]
    For the reasons that follow, I allow the Respondent’s application in existing proceedings and find that the appeal has been lodged out of time. Pursuant to s 562A of the IR Act I decline to hear the appeal. 

Relevant legislative provisions

  1. [20]
    Section 131 of the PS Act sets out decisions against which appeals may be made, as follows:
  1. 131Decisions against which appeals may be made
  1. (1)
    An appeal may be made against the following decisions—

…

  1. (c)
    a disciplinary decision;
  2. (d)
    a fair treatment decision;
  3. (e)
    a promotion decision;
  4. (f)
    a suspension without pay decision;

…

  1. (2)
    However, if an appeal may be made under this section against a decision, other than under subsection (1)(d), the appeal can not be made under subsection (1)(d).
  1. [21]
    Section 564 of the IR Act relevantly provides as follows:
  1. 564Time limit for appeal
  1. (1)
    An appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal must be started, as required under the rules, within the appeal period.
  2. (2)
    However, on an application made during or after the appeal period, the industrial tribunal may allow an appeal to be started within a longer period.
  3. (3)
    In this section—

appeal period, for an appeal against a decision to an industrial tribunal, means the period within 21 days after—

  1. (a)
    if the decision is given at a hearing—the announcement of the decision at the hearing; or
  2. (b)
    if the decision is given through the registrar—the release of the decision; or
  3. (c)
    if the decision is a promotion decision—the decision is publicly notified under the Public Sector Act 2022; or
  4. (d)
    if, under another Act, the decision is given in another way—the decision is given in the other way.

Respondent's Application

Ground 1: No disciplinary decision has been made

  1. [22]
    The Appellant lodged the Appeal Notice on 18 October 2024, seeking to appeal a disciplinary decision that took place on 9 October 2024.
  1. [23]
    The Respondent submits that no disciplinary decision has been made, meaning that there is no right to appeal pursuant to s 131(1)(c) of the PS Act.
  1. [24]
    The PS Act defines a 'disciplinary action' as section 92(1):
  1. (1)
    Disciplinary action is any action relating to employment, including, for example, any of the following actions—
  1. (a)
    termination of employment;
  2. (b)
    reduction of classification level and a consequential change of duties;
  3. (c)
    transfer or redeployment;
  4. (d)
    forfeiture or deferment of a remuneration increment or increase;
  5. (e)
    reduction of remuneration level;
  6. (f)
    imposition of a monetary penalty;
  7. (g)
    if a penalty is imposed, a direction that the amount of the penalty be deducted from the employee’s periodic remuneration payments;
  8. (h)
    a reprimand.
  1. [25]
    The Respondent submits that a decision relating to suspension without remuneration does not fall under this definition, therefore the decisions relating to the Appellant's entitlement to sick leave do not constitute disciplinary decisions. As a consequence, the Respondent contends that the appeal cannot be heard for want of jurisdiction.

Ground 2: The Appeal was lodged out of time

  1. [26]
    The Respondent submits that the Appeal was lodged outside of the 21-day time limit.
  1. [27]
    The Appeal Notice referenced a decision made on 9 October 2024, however, the only communication made on this date was the denial of the Appellant's request for sick leave, which the Respondent submits is an affirmation to their earlier decision on 13 September 2024. The Respondent submits that the correspondence on 9 October does not constitute an independent decision by the Respondent because Ms Boticario was simply confirming a component of the existing suspension decision.
  1. [28]
    The Respondent submits that the Appellant has not made an application, pursuant to section 564(2) of the IR Act to seek an extension of time.

What is the operative decision?

  1. [29]
    Any determination of the Respondent’s jurisdictional argument requires a decision to be made as to what is the operative decision which gives rise to the appeal.
  1. [30]
    The Respondent contends that the relevant decision is the decision made by Ms Morgan in the correspondence dated 13 September 2024.[11] The Respondent further contends that it has not made a disciplinary decision and therefore the Commission’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal has not been enlivened.
  1. [31]
    In the submissions provided in support of the Respondent’s application[12] the Respondent contends that the email from Ms Boticario on 9 October 2024 does not constitute an independent decision on the part of the Respondent because Ms Boticario was simply confirming a component of the existing suspension decision which had been varied on 13 September 2024.[13]
  1. [32]
    The Respondent further contends that the two substantive decisions made by the Respondent which have given rise to the appeal, are:
  • The decision of 28 August 2024 to suspend the employment of the Appellant, without remuneration; and
  • The  decision of 13 September 2024 to amend the commencement date of the suspension without remuneration to 1 October 2024.[14]
  1. [33]
    In compliance with the Further Directions Order dated 14 November 2024, the Appellant filed written submissions responding to the Respondent’s application on 29 November 2024.
  1. [34]
    In the submissions the Appellant concedes that no disciplinary decision has been made within the meaning of s 92 of the Act, but contends that the Appeal Notice clearly identified the decision being appealed was the email dated 9 October 2024 from Ms Boticario which advised the Appellant:

…advice from the Discipline Advisory and Resolutions (DAR) team that an employee who is suspended without remuneration is not eligible for sick leave.

  1. [35]
    The Appellant rejects the Respondent’s characterisation of the 9 October 2024 email from Ms Boticario and contends that this is an appealable 'decision' for the purposes of the PS Act.
  2. [36]
    The Appellant cites the decision of Deputy President Merrell in Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[15] in which his Honour considered the meaning of the word 'decision' in s 194(1)(bb) of the repealed PS Act 2008 as follows:
  1. [25]
    Whether or not the outcome, conveyed by Mr De'Ath's letter dated 25 May 2022, is a 'decision' within the meaning of s 194(1)(bb) of the PS Act, must be answered with reference to the statutory  context in which the noun 'decision' appears in that section and the particular facts of each  case.
  2. [26]
    The ordinary meaning of the noun 'decision', in the context it appears in s 194(1)(bb) of the PS Act, is '… that which is decided; a resolution.'
  3. [27]
    Such an ordinary meaning accords with the way the word 'decision' has been generally construed in judicial review legislation, namely, a 'decision' is one which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration.
  4. [28]
    Further, the purpose or object of s 194 of the PS Act, as it appears in ch 7, pt 1 of the PS Act, is to confer on the relevant person referred to in s 194(1)(bb) of the PS Act - namely, a public service employee the subject of a suspension without pay decision - the right to appeal against such a 'decision' on the basis that the decision was not fair and reasonable.

…

  1. [31]
    It is equally obvious that Mr De'Ath's decision involved the exercise of power by him pursuant to s 137(4) of the PS Act and that, in exercising that power, Mr De'Ath took into account the matters referred to in s 137(3) of the PS Act and the matters referred to in cl 5.2 of the Directive.
  2. [32]
    In my opinion, the outcome conveyed by Mr De'Ath's letter dated 25 May 2022 is clearly a 'decision' because it is one that was operative and determinative or, in other words, resolved the issue of fact falling for consideration, namely, whether or not, pursuant to s 137(4) of the PS Act, Mr De'Ath would continue Mr Baskin's suspension without remuneration.

(Citations omitted)

  1. [37]
    The Appellant submits that unpaid sick leave is regulated by clause 5.2 of the Directive 09/24: Sick Leave[16] ('the Sick Leave Directive') which provides a discretion to agencies to grant unpaid sick leave, with the only prerequisite being that  'all sick leave on full pay has been exhausted
  2. [38]
    The Appellant further contends that the Respondent’s characterisation of the 9 October 2024 email as 'simply confirming a component of the existing suspension decision' mischaracterises the decision of 13 September 2024 and the request made by the Appellant on 27 September 2024.
  1. [39]
    The Appellant was on approved unpaid sick leave from 24 July 2024, and he contends that his request on 27 September 2024 was for a further period of unpaid sick leave.
  2. [40]
    Following the 28 August 2024 correspondence which suspended the Appellant without pay from that date, the Appellant on 10 September 2024 requested that his leave record for the period from 8 July 2024 to 30 September 2024 be amended in light of the medical certification which had been provided prior to 28 August 2024. The Appellant records that in response to that request, the Respondent rescinded the earlier decision and determined to commence his period of suspension without pay after the end of the period of certified illness.[17]
  3. [41]
    The Appellant submits that no request was made, no evidence was provided, and no consideration was given to, and no decision was made about his state of health or entitlement to sick leave without pay for the period after 30 September 2024. The Appellant contends that the 28 August 2024 correspondence did not assert that the Respondent would not or could not consider any further requests to access unpaid sick leave.[18]
  4. [42]
    The Appellant contends that given the very broad discretion provided by the Sick Leave Directive, it would be difficult if not impossible for the Respondent to have asserted its decision of 28 August 2024 precluded any further requests being made (for sick leave) and those requests being given due consideration based on the circumstances prevailing at any such future date.[19]
  5. [43]
    The Appellant submits that a further request for unpaid sick leave was made on 27 September 2024, by the provision of a new medical certificate certifying the Appellant as being unfit for work from 1 October 2024. The Appellant contends that as is made plain in Ms Boticario’s email dated 9 October 2024, the Respondent considered the request, determined to reject it, and communicated that rejection via the 9 October 2024 email.[20]
  6. [44]
    The Appellant concludes that the 9 October 2024 email resolved issues of fact that fell for consideration, those being his request for unpaid sick leave, and the refusal of that request by the Respondent. He further contends that the outcome conveyed in the 9 October 2024 email is a 'decision' within the meaning of s 131(1)(d) of the PS Act. The Appellant in his submissions contends that the decision of 9 October 2024 is amenable to appeal as a fair treatment appeal pursuant to s 131(1)(d) of the PS Act and he should be allowed to amend the Appeal Notice pursuant to s 539(e) of the IR Act.
  7. [45]
    In compliance with the Further Directions Order, the Respondent filed its Outline of Submissions on 6 December 2024.
  8. [46]
    In relation to the requirements of either version of the Sick Leave Directive, the Respondent submits that:
  • Sick leave without salary may be granted where all sick leave on full salary has been exhausted;[21]
  • There is still a requirement that the entitlement of the employee or officer to sick leave is conditional on them promptly notifying the employer of any illness that will cause them to be absent from work.[22] The Respondent notes that this requirement mirrors the notice for taking paid sick leave under the IR Act.[23]
  1. [47]
    The Respondent maintains its contention that an employee placed on suspension without pay is not eligible to take sick leave. The Respondent contends that in the context of the present appeal, the decision to stand the Appellant down from 1 October 2024 caused the Appellant to be absent from work for the period of the suspension. The Respondent further submits that any injury or illness suffered by the Appellant cannot be said to have 'caused' the Appellant to be absent from work.[24]
  2. [48]
    In support of that contention the Respondent cites the decision of Deputy President Merrell in Chase v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[25] ('Chase') in which his Honour dealt with a similar issue in the context of an industrial dispute.
  3. [49]
    In Chase, the Notifier, Senior Constable Chase had been suspended without salary and allowances from 19 November 2021 following her failure to comply with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination requirement.
  4. [50]
    The question that the Commission was required to arbitrate was whether Senior Constable Chase had a lawful entitlement to be paid sick leave as from the date of her suspension on 19 November 2021. His Honour determined that Senior Constable Chase did not have an entitlement to sick leave whilst suspended and provided the following reasoning:
  1. [56]
    In the present case, as from 19 November 2021, the real reason SC Chase is not at work is not because of illness. It is because of the decision of Acting Assistant Commissioner Nelson dated 11 November 2021, pursuant to the combined effect of s 6.1(1)(a)(ii) and s 6.3(1) of the PSAA, to suspend SC Chase without salary or allowances.
  2. [57]
    That is to say, the real reason SC Chase, from 19 November 2021, was and remains (as I understand it) not at work, is not because of illness, but because of her suspension without salary or allowances.
  3. [58]
    In those circumstances, SC Chase can have no legal entitlement under the combined effect of s 40 of the IR Act and cl 21 of the Award to paid personal sick leave from that date whilst her suspension without salary or allowances continues.

…

  1. [61]
    For the reasons I have given, the Commissioner, or more properly, the Commissioner's authorised delegate, in making the decision to not pay SC Chase paid sick leave as from 19 November 2021 while she remains suspended without salary and allowances, is not acting inconsistently with the QES and the Award in that, in the circumstances, SC Chase does not have an entitlement to paid personal sick leave.[26]
  1. [51]
    I also note the decision of Industrial Commissioner Hartigan (as her Honour then was) in Merrett v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service)[27] which involved a public service appeal from a suspension without pay decision once again arising from a failure to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination direction. Relevant to the present appeal Industrial Commissioner Hartigan observed in response to a submission from the Appellant that she should have been permitted to access her own leave:
  1. [42]
    Ms Merrett further contends that the Respondent should have allowed her to access her own leave instead of determining to suspend her without remuneration.
  2. [43]
    In this regard, I accept the Respondent's submissions that an employee cannot be simultaneously on approved leave and be suspended under the PS Act. In the circumstances of this matter, there is a reasonable factual basis to support a conclusion that a suspension without remuneration is appropriate in the circumstances. Further, Ms Merrett has not identified any matters which support a conclusion that the suspension was not in accordance with s 137 of the PS Act. In such circumstances, where there is a basis for a suspension to occur, it is not appropriate for an employee to instead be offered to undertake a period of leave in lieu of being suspended without pay.[28] (Emphasis added)
  1. [52]
    I summarise the Respondent’s further submissions on this issue as follows:
  • The effect of the suspension decision was that the Appellant was precluded from taking sick leave, from 1 October 2024, with the suspension decision being made on 28 August 2024 and varied on 13 September 2024.[29]
  • In response to the Appellant’s submissions citing the Baskin[30] decision, the Respondent submits that the issue of fact to be determined by the Commission, is the status of the Appellant’s employment from 1 October 2024 to 10 January 2024. The Appellant submits that this issue was determined finally in the Respondent’s letter of 13 September 2024[31] where the Appellant was advised:

I instead determine that your suspension without remuneration will commence on 1 October 2024, being the first day after the end of your sick leave. I confirm that I will instruct Payroll Services to amend your records to reflect you being on sick leave until 30 September 2024.[32]

  • The Respondent then notes that in the letter of 28 August 2024, the Appellant was advised:

Given my decision to suspend you without remuneration, I clarify that effective from the date you receive this letter, you will be placed on suspension without remuneration instead of sick leave.[33]

  • The Respondent submits that the context and nature of Ms Boticario’s email of 9 October 2024 suggests that a decision regarding the Appellant’s eligibility for sick leave had already been determined prior to this email exchange. The Respondent notes that whilst the Appellant is able to continue to request unpaid sick leave, the decision with respect to the Appellant’s employment status for the period of 1 October 2024 to 10 January 2025, including the Appellant’s eligibility to take further sick leave, had been determined.[34]
  • The Respondent concludes with an argument that if the Commission accepts the contentions of the Appellant, an employee could re-enliven their appeal right in relation to any decision simply by submitting a new request (for example a leave request or internal review request) on an identical basis. The Respondent submits that this could be the case even where a decision had previously been finalised by the employer and would preclude any fair treatment decision of an employer being a final decision for the purposes of a Public Sector Appeal, rendering the 21-day limitation period redundant.[35]
  1. [53]
    The Appellant filed short reply submissions on 12 December 2024 which reiterate his earlier submissions.
  2. [54]
    The Appellant contends that the third decision (of 9 October 2024) is amenable to appeal and the Appellant made a valid application to appeal that decision within time.
  3. [55]
    The Appellant further contends that there is no floodgates issues as suggested by the Respondent because there is no 're-enlivening' involved. The Appellant contends that the Appellant supplied new information, requested a new decision based on that new information, and that new request was rejected. The Appellant concludes that his appeal solely calls into question whether the third decision was fair and reasonable and does not 're-enliven' the first or second decision.
  4. [56]
    The Appellant was clearly placed on notice by the initial correspondence from Ms Morgan dated 28 August 2024 that despite his application for sick leave being approved, effective from the date he received the suspension without remuneration letter, he was placed on suspension without pay instead of sick leave.
  5. [57]
    That decision was then rescinded, but only in regard to the commencement date of the suspension, by the further correspondence from Ms Morgan dated 13 September 2024 which relevantly provided (emphasis added):

In my letter, I advised you that the suspension without remuneration would commence on your receipt of my letter and continue until 10 January 2025.

By email dated 10 September 2024, your representative requested that your leave records be amended to reflect a period of sick leave between 8 July 2024 and 30 September 2024., on the basis of two medical certificates provided to the Department of Education prior to my decision.

I have considered this request, and I have determined to rescind my decision that your suspension without remuneration should commence on your receipt of the letter.

I instead determine that your suspension without remuneration will commence on 1 October 2024, being the first day after the end of your sick leave. I confirm that I will instruct Payroll Services to amend your records to reflect you being on sick leave until 30 September 2024.

You should be aware that if you do not have sufficient paid sick leave entitlements, your period of sick leave may include sick leave without pay. Payroll Services will calculate this.

I confirm that all other components of my decision remain unchanged. The only change is my decision to amend the commencement date of your suspension without remuneration.

  1. [58]
    It is clear that the only basis upon which Ms Morgan varied the commencement date of the suspension without pay decision from that outlined in the original decision letter dated 28 August 2024, was that there had been medical certificates certifying the Appellant as being unfit for work prior to the suspension decision and Ms Morgan as the decision-maker was not aware of the medical certificates.
  2. [59]
    Specific power is provided to public sector decision-makers by s 101 of the PS Act to suspend public sector employees either with or without pay. A decision to suspend is an administrative action, taken for administrative necessity and is not a form of punishment.[36]
  3. [60]
    The Appellant contends that the 28 August 2024 correspondence did not assert that the Respondent would not or could not consider any further requests to access unpaid sick leave.[37] I do not accept the Appellant’s characterisation of the 28 August 2024 decision letter by Ms Morgan in circumstances where the decision letter states:

… Your application for leave was approved, however, your sick leave balance was exhausted on 24 July 2024. Given my decision to suspend you without remuneration, I clarify that effective from the date you receive this letter, you will be placed on suspension without remuneration instead of sick leave. However, the Department has noted that you are not fit for duty until 30 September 2024 in accordance with the advice of Dr Ahmed.[38] (emphasis added)

  1. [61]
    I consider that the 28 August 2024 decision letter is clear that the decision to place the Appellant on suspension without pay would override any period of sick leave or an application for further sick leave.
  2. [62]
    As noted above, this fundamental position was not altered by the later decision of Ms Morgan dated 13 September 2024, other than by varying the commencement date of the suspension to be 1 October 2024.
  3. [63]
    I accept the Respondent’s contention that the issue of fact for the purposes of this appeal, is the status of the Appellant’s employment from 1 October 2024 to 10 January 2025. I am satisfied that this factual issue was settled (at least until 10 January 2025) by the decision letter dated 13 September 2024. Once he was suspended on 1 October 2024 the Appellant no longer had a lawful entitlement to access sick leave (whether paid or unpaid) in substitution for being suspended without remuneration. As a consequence, the decision that has brought about his inability to access personal leave is the decision of Ms Morgan dated 13 September 2024.
  4. [64]
    The Respondent’s characterisation of the email from Ms Boticario dated 9 October 2024 as being one that was simply confirming a component of the existing suspension decision and not an independent decision appears to be correct in the circumstances. The real reason why the Appellant was not at work from 1 October 2024 was because of his suspension without remuneration, and not because of illness.
  5. [65]
    This conclusion is consistent with the two decisions of the Commission cited earlier in these reasons which confirm that from the date of suspension, a suspended employee does not have a lawful entitlement to personal leave nor is it appropriate for an employee to take personal leave in lieu of being suspended.[39]
  6. [66]
    The Chase decision dealt specifically with an application for paid sick leave, however, the fact that the Appellant in the present case was seeking unpaid sick leave will not alter the fundamental conclusion from that decision that once suspended, it was not appropriate for the Appellant to utilise personal leave to avoid the suspension.
  7. [67]
    Although the Chase and Merrett decisions are decisions of fellow members of the Commission and therefore not binding upon me, I am satisfied that the reasoning behind the conclusions of both members is correct and should be applied in determining this appeal.
  8. [68]
    I do not believe that it could have been intended that a decision by a public sector decision-maker to suspend an employee without remuneration pursuant to s 101 of the PS Act, and taken in compliance with the Suspension Directive, could be continually frustrated and delayed, and thereby rendered nugatory, by an employee continuing to submit medical certification certifying that the employee was unfit for work.
  9. [69]
    The Respondent’s contention that a decision to suspend an employee pursuant to s 101 of the PS Act could be delayed if the employee is on sick leave and provides an additional medical certificate would not be a proper construction of either s 101 of the PS Act, the Suspension Directive or the Sick Leave Directive, or of the intended interplay between the two Directives and s 101 of the PS Act.
  10. [70]
    As a consequence, I do not accept the Respondent’s contention that the operative decision was the email from Ms Boticario dated 9 October 2024 and that this decision was one that is amenable to a fair treatment appeal.
  11. [71]
    I am therefore satisfied that the operative and relevant decision for the purposes of this appeal was the decision of Ms Morgan dated 13 September 2024 and not the email from Ms Boticario dated 9 October 2024.

Should the error/defect in the Appeal Notice be waived?

  1. [72]
    In the Respondent’s application it is contended that there has been no disciplinary decision made by the Respondent in relation to the Appellant’s conduct, and as a consequence, no right of appeal exists pursuant to s 131(1)(c) of the PSA.[40]
  2. [73]
    As noted above in paragraph [34], the Appellant accepted that no disciplinary decision has been made however submits that the Appeal was clearly intended to be a fair treatment appeal and the Appellant should be granted leave to amend his notice of appeal to reflect this.[41]
  1. [74]
    The Appellant submits that the fact he misunderstood the character of the decision and incorrectly ticked the wrong box does not deprive the Commission of jurisdiction to consider his appeal of a fair treatment decision.[42]
  1. [75]
    The Appellant submits that the Commission is empowered by section 539(e) of the IR Act to 'correct, amend or waive an error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings whether substantive or formal'.[43]
  1. [76]
    The Appellant cites the decision of his Honour Deputy President Merrell in Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health):[44]

The reality is that Ms Higgins' appeal against the decision is against a decision she believes is unfair and unreasonable, namely, a fair treatment decision as referred to in s194(eb) of the PS Act. Accordingly, today I gave Ms Higgins leave to amend her appeal notice to reflect the correct nature of the basis of her appeal.

  1. [77]
    The Appellant also refers to two other decisions of the Commission in Schimke v State of Queensland (Department of Education)[45] and May v State of Queensland (Queensland Health)[46] in which the Commission has effectively waived the error in correctly identifying the nature of the appeal for a public sector appeal.[47]
  2. [78]
    The Appellant submits that it is open to the Commission to waive the error or defect and treat the appeal as an appeal against a fair treatment decision.
  1. [79]
    The Respondent in its submissions contends that the Commission should not exercise a discretion to grant leave for the Appellant to correct the error on the Appeal notice.[48] The Respondent submits that the cases cited in the Appellant's submissions are distinguishable as the nature of the Appellant's application could not easily be discerned, unlike the case of Schimke v State of Queensland (Department of Education).[49]
  1. [80]
    In summary, the Respondent submits:
  • The Appellant has not provided any submissions specific to the email of 9 October 2024 or any detail on the fairness or reasonableness of the Respondent’s position.[50]
  • Whilst the email of 9 October 2024 was annexed to the application, no context was provided with respect to this email, nor was it referenced in Part 7 – Reasons for Appeal, in the Appeal Notice.[51]
  • As a consequence, it could not be said that the Appeal was clearly intended to be a fair treatment appeal regarding the email of 9 October 2024. The Appellant provided no context regarding the significance or relevance of the email in the Appeal Notice, nor did the Appellant make any reference to the fairness or reasonableness of the Department’s position regarding the Appellant’s eligibility to take sick leave, during the period of the suspension.[52]
  • The amendment sought by the Appellant goes beyond simply being an 'error, defect or irregularity'. The Respondent contends that the Appellant has sought to redefine the nature of the email of 9 October 2024 and the nature of the appeal so as to allow the Appellant to fall within the Commission’s timeframes and therefore the Commission should not allow the amendment.[53]
  1. [81]
    I accept the validity of the criticisms made by the Respondent about the Appeal Notice. It is by no means clear what the Appellant is challenging or the basis of that challenge. In making those observations, the Appellant does clearly identify that it is what he maintains as being the 'decision', that is, the email of 9 October 2024 that he is seeking to challenge.
  2. [82]
    The Commission is given a broad discretion by s 539(e) of the IR Act to waive or correct an error or defect, including not only a procedural error but a substantive error.
  3. [83]
    The Appellant has made a simple error in ticking the wrong box and selecting the type of appeal as relating to a disciplinary decision. Given the context in which the Appellant was being suspended without remuneration, his error is understandable.
  4. [84]
    I accept the Appellant’s submission that his error in ticking the wrong box on the Form 89 Appeal Notice should not deprive the Commission of jurisdiction to further consider his appeal.[54]
  1. [85]
    The Respondent has not identified any prejudice it would suffer from the Commission waiving or correcting the Appellant’s error pursuant to s 539(e) of the IR Act.
  2. [86]
    Section 131 of the PS Act provides that an appeal may be made against:
  1. a fair treatment decision pursuant to s 131(1)(d) of the PS Act; and
  2. a suspension without pay decision pursuant to s 131(f) of the PS Act.
  1. [87]
    The Appellant submits that he should be given leave to correct the formal defect in the Form 89 Appeal Notice. As indicated in the authorities cited in paragraph [15] of the Appellant’s submissions[55], the Commission in other public sector appeals where a similar error has occurred, has exercised the discretion under s 539(e) of the IR Act to waive or correct the error.
  2. [88]
    I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances for the Appellant’s error in the Appeal Notice to be waived. For the reasons given above, I consider the relevant decision to be the decision of Ms Morgan dated 13 September 2024, as a consequence, the appeal is against  a suspension without pay decision. Section 131(f) provides a specific right of appeal in relation to a suspension without pay decision and as a consequence it is not appropriate to consider the Appellant’s appeal as a fair treatment appeal. I will deal with the Appellant’s appeal as an appeal against a suspension without pay decision.

Fair Treatment decision

  1. [89]
    If I am wrong about the operative decision being the decision from Ms Morgan dated 13 September 2024, and the email from Ms Boticario dated 9 October 2024 is the relevant decision, the Appellant faces additional difficulties in pursuing an appeal of this decision as a fair treatment appeal.
  2. [90]
    Section 129 of the PS Act defines a 'fair treatment decision' to mean 'a decision a public sector employee believes is unfair and unreasonable'.
  3. [91]
    Section 131(1)(d) of the PS Act confirms that an appeal may be made against a fair treatment decision.
  4. [92]
    Section 110(1) of the PS Act provides that the commissioner must make a Directive about how public entities must deal with grievances of employees of the entity about decisions made by employees of the entity or the conduct of employees of the entity.  Section 110(2)(c) of the PS Act provides that a directive made under s 110 of the PS Act may apply to a decision mentioned in s 131 of the PS Act.
  5. [93]
    A directive regarding individual employee grievances had been made by the chief executive of the public service commission pursuant to s 218A of the now repealed Public Service Act 2008 (Qld). That directive was 11/20 Individual Employee Grievances ('the grievance directive') and remains current.
  6. [94]
    Clause 6 of the grievance directive relevantly provides as the heading “Matters that cannot be the subject of an individual employee grievance”.
  7. [95]
    Subclause 6.2 of the grievance directive provides:

Under the PS Act an employee seeking to lodge a fair treatment appeal is generally required to have used their agency individual employee grievance mechanism prior to lodging an appeal.

  1. [96]
    Subclause 6.3 of the grievance directive provides:

An employee may choose not to use their agency’s complaint mechanism where they are seeking to appeal a finding by the chief executive under section 187 of the PS Act that a disciplinary ground exists for an employee. Section 195(3A)(b) of the PS Act allows the employee aggrieved by this decision to lodge a public service appeal in relation to the decision.

  1. [97]
    Section 143(1) of the PS Act provides that the Commissioner must make a directive about appeals by public sector employees. Section 143(2) relevantly provides:
  1. (2)
    The directive—
  1. (a)
    must make provision for—
  1. (i)
    the decisions, if any, against which an appeal may be made; and
  2. (ii)
    the persons who are entitled to appeal against a decision mentioned in section 131(1); and
  3. (iii)
    the directions, if any, the IRC may give under the Industrial Relations Act 2016, section 562C(1)(b); and
  1. (b)
    may, for section 132(5), definition non-appealable appointment, declare an appointment or employment to be an appointment or employment against which an appeal may not be made.
  1. [98]
    The Commissioner has made Directive 04/23: Appeals ('the appeal directive') and in clause 1.1 of that directive it states that the purpose of the directive is to provide information on the appeal rights of public sector employees under the PS Act.
  2. [99]
    Clause 9 of the appeals directive deals with fair treatment appeals.
  3. [100]
    Pursuant to clause 9.3, a public sector employee aggrieved by the decision may appeal a fair treatment decision.
  4. [101]
    Clause 9.4 of the appeal directive provides:
  1. 9.4Further to clause 9.3, a public sector employee must first comply with their entity's procedures under the directive relating to individual employee grievances (where the individual employee grievance directive applies to the entity), unless:
  1. a.the fair treatment decision was made by the chief executive of that entity, or
  2. b.where the fair treatment decision relates to a finding under section 91 of the Act that a disciplinary ground exists for the person.
  1. [102]
    The Form 89 - Appeal Notice as it relates to a fair treatment decision reflects the above provisions in that it requires the Appellant to indicate whether he had used the employer’s individual grievance process before lodging the appeal, or whether this was not required (for example because the decision relates to a disciplinary finding).
  2. [103]
    In the present case there is no evidence currently before the Commission that the Appellant has complied with the Department of Education’s grievance process.[56]
  3. [104]
    The matter was called on for mention on Thursday, 19 December 2024. At that mention I raised two concerns with the Appellant, one of those being the issue of whether he had complied with the Department’s grievance process.
  4. [105]
    At that mention, the Appellant had the benefit of an advisor attending with him from the Queensland Teachers’ Union. I raised the issue with the Appellant about whether he had lodged a grievance under the grievance process prior to filing the appeal and what the consequences may be for the appeal if he had not done so.
  5. [106]
    The matter was then stood down for thirty minutes to allow the Appellant to consult with his union representative.
  6. [107]
    When the matter was called back on, the Appellant did not provide submissions in any meaningful way to address the issue of his compliance with the grievance process or why the Commission should hear the appeal if he had not so complied.
  7. [108]
    Subsequent to that mention the Appellant has not provided any additional written submissions addressing these issues.
  8. [109]
    In White v State of Queensland (Department of Education[57], his Honour Deputy President Merrell in hearing a public service appeal involving a similar issue, made the following pertinent comments:

… In my opinion, where the chief executive of the public service commission has made directives relevant to appeals about a decision not involving disciplinary finding grounds which an employee believes is not fair and reasonable, then the employee should comply with the procedures set out in those directives. Relevantly to Ms White appeal, she should have, as she has appeared to have done in any event, used the relevant grievance policy or procedure of her employer in relation to all of her complaints about Mr Cornish’s decision prior to lodging her appeal to this Commission.[58]

…

Given the position of the department that the matters the subject of Ms White’s grievance dated 21 May 2021 and her other complaint dated 5 July 2021 will be the subject of the internal grievance process contemplated in the grievance directive, then Ms White’s complaints about all of those matters must be genuinely considered by the department as part of that internal grievance process.  If, at the end of that process, Ms White is still aggrieved, then she has the right to appeal the final decision on the grievance process as a fair treatment decision to this Commission.  However, for the reasons given above, the result is that pursuant to section 562A, subsection (3), paragraph (b), subparagraph (iii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, Ms White’s appeal should not be heard for the compelling reason that she has not used the individual grievance mechanism or complaints process prior to lodging her appeal.[59]

  1. [110]
    A similar conclusion was reached by Industrial Commissioner Pidgeon in Lui v State of Queensland (Department of Energy and Public Works).[60]
  2. [111]
    If I am in error, and the email of 9 October 2024 is a decision that can be appealed pursuant to s 131(1)(d) of the PS Act, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has utilised the internal grievance procedure available from the Department. Further, I consider that it would not be unreasonable to require the Appellant to do so prior to filing his appeal. As a consequence, I would not have heard the appeal pursuant to s 562A(1) of the IR Act.

Was the appeal lodged out of time?

  1. [112]
    The decision letter which varied the commencement date of the suspension without pay is dated 13 September 2024 and on its face was served by email on the Appellant’s union at the email address [email protected].
  1. [113]
    It can therefore be presumed that the decision was received on either 13 September 2024 or by the latest on 14 September 2024.
  2. [114]
    Pursuant to s 134 of the PS Act, appeals under the PS Act are to be heard and decided under the IR Act, Chapter 11.
  3. [115]
    Sections 561 and 564 of the IR Act impose a 21-day limitation period for the commencement of an appeal.
  4. [116]
    An appeal of the 13 September 2024 decision therefore had to be lodged on or before 4 October 2024.
  5. [117]
    The appeal was lodged with the Industrial Registry on 18 October 2024. As a consequence, I am satisfied that the appeal has been lodged out of time by two weeks.

Is the Appellant entitled to an extension of time?

  1. [118]
    The Commission is empowered with a discretion to extend time by s 564(2) of the IR Act.
  2. [119]
    In the submissions attached to the Respondent’s application in existing proceedings,[61] the Respondent cites the decision of President Martin J in A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty Ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations)[62] where his Honour stated:

On an application to extend time, the approach of this Court was described by President Hall in the Neophytos Foundadjis v Collin Bailey in the following way:

"This Court has traditionally adhered to the view that s. 346 of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 represents a legislative assessment that in the ordinary category of cases, justice will best be served by adhering to a 21 day limitation period, though on occasion the limitation may defeat a perfectly good case and that the discretion to extend time should be exercised only where the applicant for an extension of time discharges a positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires the indulgence of a further period."

I note that s 346 of the 1999 Act is reproduced at s 564 in the current Act. In applying those principles, this Court will not grant leave unless it is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so. I will consider the merits of the appeal before finally determining the application for extension. As was said in Chapman v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 172:

“In determining whether it is proper to grant the extension, it is appropriate to consider the merits of the substantive application … An extension of time will not be granted if the court considers the appeal to be plainly hopeless.”

…

  1. [120]
    The Respondent submits that pursuant to s 564(2) of the IR Act, the Appellant is required to make an application for an extension before the Commission can exercise its discretion to consider the matter outside of the appeal timeframe. The Respondent contends that as the Appellant has not sought an extension of the limitation period, no application has been made by the Appellant for the appeal to be started outside of the 21-day timeframe.[63]
  2. [121]
    Given the failure by the Appellant to either apply for an extension of time, or to provide any submissions detailing why the extension should be granted, the Respondent submits that the Appellant has failed to discharge the positive burden to demonstrate that the Commission should consider the matter out of time.
  3. [122]
    As earlier noted, the matter was called on for mention on Thursday, 19 December 2024. At the mention I also raised with the Appellant that he had not, as an alternative argument, sought an extension of time, but had instead relied solely on his argument that the operative decision was contained in the email dated 9 October 2024.
  4. [123]
    The Appellant out of an abundance of caution was afforded the opportunity to consider whether he would make further submissions addressing whether he was entitled to an extension of time. The mention was stood down for thirty minutes to allow the Appellant to consult with his union representative.
  5. [124]
    Following the adjournment, the Appellant confirmed that he did not intend to make any submissions regarding an extension of time.[64]
  6. [125]
    Given that there has been no application made by the Appellant for an extension of time, and he has apparently made a forensic decision to not provide any submissions in support of an extension of time when he was specifically afforded the opportunity by the Commission, I am satisfied that the discretion to allow an extension time provided by s 564(2) of the IR Act has not been enlivened.
  7. [126]
    Given that I have found that the appeal has been lodged out of time, and there has been no application by the Appellant for an extension of time, I am satisfied that the appeal should not be heard, and I will decline to hear the appeal pursuant to s 562A(3)(b)(iii) of the IR Act because it has been lodged out of time.

Orders

  1. 1.The application in existing proceedings filed on 13 November 2024 is allowed.
  2. 2.Pursuant to s 562A(3)(b)(iii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016, I decline to hear the appeal.

Footnotes

[1] Attachment 2 to the Appeal Notice filed 18 October 2024 - Correspondence from Ms Lucy Morgan, Acting Executive Director, Integrity & Employee Relations, Department of Education dated 28 August 2024.

[2] Form 4 Application in existing proceedings filed 13 November 2024, Attachment A – correspondence dated 15 July 2024.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid, Attachment B – correspondence from Holding Redlich dated 26 July 2024.

[6] Ibid, Attachment D – correspondence from Ms Lucy Morgan, Acting Executive Director dated 28 August 2024.

[7] Ibid, Attachment C – medical certificates from the Beerwah Family Clinic

[8] Ibid, Attachment E, correspondence from Ms Lucy Morgan dated 13 September 2024.

[9] Ibid, Attachment F, email correspondence from Ms Peta Boticario, Senior Injury Management Consultant, dated 9 October 2024.

[10] Form 4 Application in existing proceedings filed by the Respondent on 13 November 2024.

[11] Ibid, Attachment E – Correspondence from Ms Morgan to the Appellant dated 13 September 2024.

[12] Ibid, Schedule A.

[13] Ibid, [18].

[14] Ibid, [19].

[15] [2022] QIRC 349  'Baskin '.

[16] The Appellant notes that Directive 06/20: Sick Leave was current at the time the Appellant made his request on 27 September 2024, but it was replaced by Sick Leave Directive 09/24 on 30 September 2024. He further notes that there is no substantive difference between the two Directives for current purposes.

[17] Appellant’s Outline of Submissions filed 29 November 2024, [26].

[18] Ibid, at [27].

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid, at [28].

[21] Clause 7.2 of the Sick Leave Directive 06/20 and clause 5.2 of the Sick Leave Directive 09/24.

[22] Clause 8.1 of the Sick Leave Directive 06/20 and clause 6.1 of the Sick Leave Directive 09/24.

[23] Section 41 of the IR Act; Respondent’s Outline of Submissions filed 6 December 2024, [14] to [17].

[24] Respondent’s Outline of Submissions filed 6 December 2024, [14] and [18].

[25] [2022] QIRC 140.

[26] Chase v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 140, [56] to [58] and [61] (Merrell DP).

[27] [2022] QIRC 023.

[28] Merrett v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 023, [42] to [43] (Hartigan IC).

[29] Respondent’s Outline of Submissions, 6 December 2024, [20].

[30] [2022] QIRC 349.

[31] See (n8).

[32] Respondent’s Outline of Submissions, 6 December 2024, [22].

[33] Ibid, [23] quoting from the correspondence dated 28 August 2024, (n 6).

[34] Ibid, [25] and [26].

[35] Ibid, [27].

[36] Directive 06/23: Suspension ('the Suspension Directive'), clause 4.7.

[37] Appellant’s submissions, at [27].

[38] Respondent’s Application in existing proceedings – Attachment D, (n 6).

[39] Chase v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 140, [56] to [58] and [61] (Merrell DP); Merrett v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 023, [42] to [43] (Hartigan IC).

[40] Respondent’s Application (n 10), Schedule A.

[41] Appellant’s Outline of Submissions filed 29 November 2024, [11].

[42] Ibid, [13].

[43] Ibid, [15].

[44] [2022] QIRC 030, [12].

[45] [2022] QIRC 136, [13] – [15] per McLennan IC.

[46] [2024] QIRC 176, [22] and [38] per Pratt IC.

[47] Appellant’s submissions (n 38), [15].

[48] Respondent’s submissions (n 24), [7]-[8].

[49] [2022] QIRC 136.

[50] Respondent’s submissions, [8].

[51] Ibid, [9].

[52] Ibid, [10].

[53] Ibid, [11].

[54] Appellant’s submissions (n 38), [15].

[55] See paragraphs [75]-[76] above, (n 45), (n 46), and (n 47).

[56] Individual employee grievances procedure, Version 4.3, effective from 22 January 2024.

[57] [2021] QIRC 259.

[58] Ibid, 1-29, ll.30-36.

[59] Ibid, 1-30, ll.28-39.

[60] [2023] QIRC 031, [29]-[32].

[61] Schedule A to the Application in existing proceedings filed on 13 November 2024, [21].

[62] [2019] ICQ 16, [2].

[63] Schedule A to the Application in existing proceedings, [22].

[64] TR1-4, LL30-49; TR1-5, LL1-5, (PSA/2024/170).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Churchward v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Churchward v State of Queensland (Department of Education)

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 6

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    O'Neill IC

  • Date:

    13 Jan 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
A1 Rubber (Aust) Pty ltd v Chapman (Office of Industrial Relations) [2019] ICQ 16
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] ICQ 16
Cite 2 - [2019] ICQ 16
Baskin v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 349
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 349
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 349
Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 349
Chapman v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 172
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2003] QCA 172
Cite 2 - [2003] QCA 172
Chase v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 140
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 140
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 140
Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 140
Cite 4 - [2022] QIRC 140
Foundadjis v Bailey [2007] ICQ 10
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] ICQ 10
Higgins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 30
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 30
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 30
Lui v State of Queensland (Department of Energy and Public Works) [2023] QIRC 31
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] QIRC 31
Cite 2 - [2023] QIRC 31
May v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 176
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2024] QIRC 176
Cite 2 - [2024] QIRC 176
Merrett v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 23
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 23
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 23
Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 23
Cite 4 - [2022] QIRC 23
Schimke v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 136
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 136
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 136
Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 136
White v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 259
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 259
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 259

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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