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Ondrich v ASM Global Convex Pty Ltd & Ors[2025] QIRC 80

Ondrich v ASM Global Convex Pty Ltd & Ors[2025] QIRC 80

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Ondrich v ASM Global Convex Pty Ltd & Ors [2025] QIRC 080

PARTIES:

Melanie Ondrich

Complainant

v

ASM Global Convex Pty Ltd

First Respondent

AND

Davyd Whitney

Second Respondent

AND

Ruta Berzkalns

Third Respondent

CASE NO:

AD/2024/62

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceedings

DELIVERED ON:

24 March 2025

MEMBER:

Caddie IC

HEARD AT:

On the Papers

  ORDERS:

  1. That AD/2024/62 is dismissed pursuant to section 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) on the basis that an agreement was reached in conciliation, resolving the matter entirely.
  2. That, within 5 days of this order, if the Complainant does not execute the deed and return it to the solicitor for the Respondents in accordance with the agreement reached in conciliation, the Industrial Registrar is authorised to execute it on behalf of the Complainant and do all other things necessary to perfect the agreement, pursuant to section 541(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).
  3. Each party to bear their own costs.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – ANTI-DISCRIMINATION – application that matter be dismissed under s 541(b)(ii) of Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) – application to dismiss sought on basis that agreement was reached in conference – where the Applicant and Respondent reached agreement at conference – where following conference the Applicant did not sign the deed – where the Applicant disputes that they were bound by agreement reached at conference – consideration of a Masters v Cameron agreement – consideration of the public interest – application dismissed. 

LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS:

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 s 174C, s 189

Industrial Relations Act 2016 s 541, s 548, Sch 2

CASES:

Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service and Anor [2025] QIRC 032

Farrell v Super Retail Group [2024] FCA 1515

Isermann v Professional Property Inspections Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QIRC 064

Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    Ms Melanie Ondrich is the Complainant in substantive proceedings alleging two contraventions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 ('AD Act') by her employer ASM Global Convex Pty Ltd ('ASM Global') and two others. ASM Global filed an application within existing proceedings on 25 November 2024,[1]  seeking to have the Complainant’s substantive claim dismissed on the grounds that a settlement had been made between the parties in accordance with s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the Act').[2] For clarity in this decision, I will refer to the Applicant as ASM Global and the Respondent as Ms Ondrich.
  2. [2]
    In support of their application ASM Global broadly submits:
  1. 3.
    In the first QIRC conference held on 16 October 2024 at 10.00am (First Conference), the parties reached an agreement to resolve the matter. The terms of this agreement were to be encapsulated in a deed. These terms included, among other things, that the First Respondent would pay to the Complainant a settlement payment of (agreed amount)[3] and review its onboarding practices and confirm they contain an explanation of the prevention and reporting of sexual harassment and the escalation process, and that the Third Respondent would provide the Complainant with a written private apology (the Agreement).
  1. 4.
    Despite the Respondents providing the Complainant with a deed encompassing the terms of the Agreement, the Complainant refused to execute the deed on the basis that the Agreement was not binding.[4]
  1. [3]
    ASM Global seeks the following orders:
  1. that the matter be dismissed pursuant to section 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) (the IR Act) on the basis that an agreement was reached in conciliation, resolving the matter entirely;
  2. that, within 5 days of this order, if the Complainant does not execute the deed and return it to the solicitor for the Respondents in accordance with the agreement reached in conciliation, the Industrial Registrar is authorised to execute it on behalf of the Complainant and do all other things necessary to perfect the agreement, pursuant to section 541(a) of the IR Act; and
  3. that the Complainant pay the Respondents' costs incurred in preparing for this application to dismiss proceedings pursuant to section 548 and Schedule 2 of the IR Act.[5]
  1. [4]
    In response Ms Ondrich broadly submits:
  1. (a)
    That she was at a disadvantage without legal representation at the Conference and believed neither party would be legally represented.
  1. (b)
    She felt rushed to consider the offer and had understood the agreement was not binding until it had been signed by the parties.
  1. (c)
    While some terms were explained it was still a vague agreement. It seemed like "common sense that a contract or Deed of this nature would [only] be binding once all parties had been provided with and signed the contract."[6]
  1. (d)
    It was following the conference on 17 October 2024, Ms Ondrich realised she could not accept the offer and communicated via the Industrial Registry that she would require further negotiation.
  1. (e)
    It is in the public interest that her substantive claim be allowed to proceed due to its subject matter.[7]

Was an Agreement reached by the parties at the 16 October 2024 conference?

  1. [5]
    The first question to be determined is whether an agreement had been reached between the parties to resolve the complaint.
  2. [6]
    The following factual background is uncontested and verified by filed documents and the official transcript of the proceedings.
  • The substantive complaint was referred to the Commission on 13 September 2024. The file was allocated to McLennan IC who listed the matter for conference on 16 October 2024.
  • On 15 and 16 October before the conference, there was correspondence from the Registry and the parties in relation to legal and other representation.
  • At conference McLennan IC asked the parties to outline their respective positions in relation to the substantive matter and for Ms Ondrich to indicate on what basis settlement might be able to be reached. These matters are captured in the transcript.
  • After hearing from the parties, the Commissioner ceased the recording at 10.46 a.m to hold private discussions.
  • McLennan IC resumed the recording at 12.20 p.m where she summarised the outcome from those discussions as follows:

COMMISSIONER: The recording has been resumed and I would like to thank the parties for their preparedness to discuss their respective positions and, importantly, reach agreement themselves on the matter today. The agreement has been reached in these terms. I am just going to dot point, explain the agreement, and then ask each party to confirm that that is what they have agreed to. Okay?

The points of agreement will be encapsulated in a formal written deed. The respondent will take charge of preparing the draft deed in the usual terms, including full and final settlement of all matters pertaining to Ms Ondrich's employment other than worker's compensation and superannuation that it cannot contract out of.

The deed will also contain mutual confidentiality and mutual non-disparagement and I have explained to Ms Ondrich what that means.

The deed will provide for these things: the respondent will pay to Ms Ondrich the sum of (agreed amount), characterised as general damages, which is important for tax treatment, within seven days after the deed has been executed, which means signed by both parties. So the deed has to be prepared by the respondent, provided to Ms Ondrich, both people have to sign it and then the (agreed amount) that characterises general damages will be paid to Ms Ondrich within seven days of the signing.

Three days after the money has been paid to Ms Ondrich, Ms Ondrich agrees to file a Form 27 in the Industrial Registry, which is a notice to discontinue this proceeding.

The other thing is Ms Berzkalns will, through the respondent, provide to Ms Ondrich, a private apology. And how soon after the deed executed will you be in a position to do that through the respondent, to write the private apology and provide it to Ms Ondrich?

MS BERZKALNS: I think soon after.

COMMISSIONER: Three days after execution? Okay. So to be clear, three days after both parties have signed the deed of agreement, Ruta will provide via the respondent to Ms Ondrich the written private apology.

The respondent also commits within the deed of settlement to revisit its onboarding practices regarding preventing sexual harassment, reporting of it and explaining how to escalate a complaint, so to HR then beyond to the HR director and then to the Brisbane head office person in the position of People and Culture Director (Asia-Pacific) and that will be, that escalation process, how to, will be contained in the revised on-boarding practices.

Ms Ondrich will be able to see that change has been made and to confirm that the change has been made so the change will be provided to her within six months of the execution of the deed. They are the terms of the agreement as I have recorded it. Ms Ondrich, is that the arrangement that you agree to, to resolve your complaint?

MS ONDRICH:   Yes. I agree to that arrangement.

COMMISSIONER:  Thank you. And the Respondent?

MS MIGANI:  Yes. I agree to that arrangement.

COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thank you very much. The matter is resolved. Thank you.[8]

  • On the morning of 17 October 2024 Ms Ondrich emailed the Registry and ASM Global to advise she sought additional discussion in settlement of the matter prior to any formalisation of discontinuance. That afternoon ASM Global sent to Ms Ondrich a deed that contained the terms of settlement as outlined by McLennan IC at the conference.
  • On 18 October Ms Ondrich emailed ASM Global to advise she did not agree to the deed.
  • On 21 October 2024 ASM Global emailed the Registry, copied to Ms Ondrich objecting to the matter being set down for hearing and outlining their view that an agreement had been reached at conference.
  • On 23 October 2024 the Registry advised the parties the matter had been listed before McLennan IC for a second conference to be held 24 October 2024.
  • At the 24 October conference McLennan IC advises the conference has been called in response to the email sent by Ms Ondrich on 18 October 2024 and asks Ms Ondrich to outline why she disagrees with the deed. The Commissioner reads to the parties the transcript of her summation of the outcome at the 16 October conference (reproduced in full above). McLennan IC advises her view that an agreement had been reached and cites Masters and Cameron as the recognised authority as to why she is of the view that a binding agreement exists.[9] Finally, McLennan IC asks Ms Ondrich to advise within 7 days whether she accepts a binding agreement had been reached or intended to seek that the matter proceed to hearing. The Commissioner foreshadows that ASM Global may seek to apply to have the matter struck out if her decision is to proceed to hearing. There may also be a request for an order for costs. These matters are all contained within the transcript.
  • On 31 October 2024 Ms Ondrich formally advised the Commission that she wished the matter to proceed to hearing.
  • The Registry issued standard directions to the parties on 4 November 2024.
  • On 22 November 2024 Ms Ondrich filed an application seeking an extension of time for the Directions Order and requesting a third conference be convened. Later that same day the Registry sent an order vacating the Directions.
  • On 25 November 2024 ASM Global filed the present application.

Relevant Legal Principles – Binding Agreements

  1. [7]
    As outlined by Power IC in Isermann v Professional Property Inspections Pty Ltd & Anor,[10] the AD Act at section 189 provides that an agreement between parties is enforceable as if it were an order of the tribunal after the terms of the agreement have been filed with the tribunal. In circumstances where this had not occurred, the purported settlement cannot automatically be enforced as an Order of this Commission. It is therefore necessary to consider whether a settlement has been reached in accordance with the principles in Masters v Cameron.[11]
  2. [8]
    When considering whether agreements made orally are binding on parties, Masters and Cameron remains the authoritative statement of principle.[12] In that case, the High Court explained there are three categories that agreements made orally may fall into (citations omitted):

Where parties who have been in negotiation reach agreement upon terms of a contractual nature and also agree that the matter of their negotiation shall be dealt with by a formal contract, the case may belong to any of three classes. It may be one in which the parties have reached finality in arranging all the terms of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those terms, but at the same time propose to have the terms restated in a form which will be fuller or more precise but not different in effect. Or, secondly, it may be a case in which the parties have completely agreed upon all the terms of their bargain and intend no departure from or addition to that which their agreed terms express or imply, but nevertheless have made performance of one or more of the terms conditional upon the execution of a formal document. Or, thirdly, the case may be one in which the intention of the parties is not to make a concluded bargain at all, unless and until they execute a formal contract.

In each of the first two cases there is a binding contract: in the first case a contract binding the parties at once to perform the agreed terms whether the contemplated formal document comes into existence or not, and to join (if they have so agreed) in settling and executing the formal document; and in the second case a contract binding the parties to join in bringing the formal contract into existence and then to carry it into execution.[13] Of these two cases the first is the more common. Throughout the decisions on this branch of the law the proposition is insisted upon which Lord Blackburn expressed in Rossiter v Miller 1878 3 App Cas 1124 when he said that the mere fact that the parties have expressly stipulated that there shall afterwards be a formal agreement prepared, embodying the terms, which shall be signed by the parties does not, by itself, show that they continue merely in negotiation.

…

Cases of the third class are fundamentally different. They are cases in which the terms of agreement are not intended to have, and therefore do not have, any binding effect of their own.[14]

Consideration

  1. [9]
    It is clear based on the transcript of the 24 October conference that McLennan IC was of the ‘strong view’ that a binding agreement had been concluded between the parties. In stating that view she had the benefit of her own recollection, notes from private conferencing and the transcript of the first conference. Relying on Masters and Cameron she indicates the view that the nature of the agreement summarised on transcript was an agreement captured by either type 1 or type 2 and was therefore binding.
  2. [10]
    Having reviewed the transcript from the 16 October conference and the views expressed by McLennan IC as the presiding member at the two conferences I conclude that it is objectively correct that terms of the agreement to be incorporated into a deed, and as confirmed on the record by both parties, was an agreement consistent with the first two types identified in Masters and Cameron.[15] The fact that the timing and performance of some of the agreed terms were contingent on the execution of the deed means the agreement reached on the 16 October was the second type of agreement and is legally binding. My reasoning for this is as follows.
  3. [11]
    When McLennan IC lists out the terms of settlement, it is clear each of those agreed terms was to be incorporated into a deed to be drafted by ASM Global. The deed would specifically include ‘usual terms’ which is specified as a reference to –
  • the parties having reached full and final settlement of the matters arising from the employment.
  • Mutual confidentiality; and
  • mutual non-disparagement.
  1. [12]
    The Commissioner then continues to identify the matter-specific terms of agreement to be incorporated into the deed as-
  • An agreed amount to be paid as general damages within 7 days of executing the deed.
  • Ms Ondrich to discontinue the matter within three days of the payment having been made.
  • The third respondent to provide a written private apology to Ms Ondrich within three days of the deed being executed; and
  • ASM Global to review their onboarding processes and the changes to be advised to Ms Ondrich within 6 months of the execution of the deed.
  1. [13]
    There is no ambiguity in relation to these terms and it is clear the terms represent full and final settlement and were not subject to further negotiation. The terms were to be incorporated into a deed to be signed by the parties. The date of signing becomes the point from which the timing of the already agreed actions must commence. That is not the same as the agreement to undertake those actions not existing until the deed is signed.  Time limits linked to date of execution are common as the actual date of signing is often not yet known.
  2. [14]
    At the resumption of the recording at the 16 October conference McLennan IC thanked the parties for their preparedness to discuss their respective positions and, importantly, reach agreement themselves on the matter that day. She indicates she will verbally dot point out the terms of the agreement and then ask each party to confirm that it is what they have agreed to. The agreement became binding at the point both parties confirmed those terms as ‘settling the complaint’.

Are there factors to support it was not the intention of the parties to be bound?

  1. [15]
    Ms Ondrich submits that when she made that agreement, she did not understand that it had been finalised and that it was made in circumstances where she was not legally represented and was feeling rushed to decide. She argues the in-room agreement is not in effect until signed by both parties and no timeframe had been set for the signing to occur.  She states her belief that the negotiations were not conducted in good faith and there was a lack of transparency regarding representation.
  2. [16]
    Legal representation was first raised through an email dated 15 October 2024, sent to the parties by the Registry, advising that no forms had been received seeking legal representation. Further, the email advised that if either party was seeking to be legally represented then this would need to be attended to promptly. Ms Ondrich duly replied indicating her belief " … that we're able to come to an agreement tomorrow without requiring legal representation. I have engaged with a lawyer if that isn't the case."[16]
  3. [17]
    ASM Global replies on the morning of 16 October to indicate while they do not seek legal representation they would seek the attendance of a consultant adviser. The Registry responds to indicate if seeking representation by an agent the appropriate form would need to be filed before the conference. In the end neither party was legally or otherwise represented at the 16 October conference.
  4. [18]
    The Registry correspondence made clear that the timeframe for seeking representation had to occur prior to the conference. There is no confusion or lack of transparency in relation to that. Ms Ondrich’s email clearly indicated her belief that she did not require legal representation in order for a settlement to be reached. McLennan IC also makes this point at the 24 October conference in which Ms Ondrich explains her disagreement with the deed on the basis that she had no legal representation, that she wasn’t aware how formal it was going to be, and that she was underprepared and could have represented herself better[17]. After explaining that legal representation isn’t a right or a requirement, McLennan IC states that Ms Ondrich had been clear that she did not need to be legally represented.[18] 
  5. [19]
    The negotiations facilitated by the Commission were undertaken in private conferencing with each party between 10.46 a.m. and 12.20 p.m. (1hr and 34 minutes). The starting point for the negotiations was the opening position put by Ms Ondrich on the record following questioning by McLennan IC. Those matters related to improving training and processes regarding reporting and escalating sexual harassment complaints, a public apology from at least the third respondent and an amount of financial compensation.
  6. [20]
    Ms Ondrich submits that she felt rushed during shuttle negotiations and complains that ASM Global only made two offers, the second of which was their final offer.  At the 24 October conference McLennan IC refers to her notes from the private discussions and indicates that Ms Ondrich did fully participate in the process through considering offers and making counter offers. It was not the case that she was made an offer, she felt overwhelmed and had to accept it.[19]  The period of the private discussions over 1.5 hours suggests significant deliberation and discussion occurred.
  7. [21]
    Ms Ondrich says there were a number of factors at the tail end of the 16 October conference that led her to accept the offer.  In summary they are:
  • The second offer was presented as a take it or leave it final offer;
  • The offer contained the terms of the general damages amount, a private apology, an improved process and mutual non-disparagement;
  • McLennan IC responded to Ms Ondrich’s question that no document would be signed today.
  • McLennan IC explained a deed of settlement would be drafted, and having been involved in some conveyancing matters Ms Ondrich understood the special requirements for executing a deed;
  • She asked to have some time alone to consider the offer and the Commissioner advised her to use that time to make her decision as she had another matter coming up.
  1. [22]
    Any offer put as a final offer by a party is meant to convey to the other party that if accepted, there is an agreement, and if not accepted, no agreement will be reached. There is nothing sinister or unusual in an offer being presented in that way. The decision is for the party to make as to whether to accept or reject that offer. There is no loss of control or free will in that scenario.
  2. [23]
    The Commission advising someone to use their time to make that final decision given time restraints in the listing is also not unusual or sinister. Being advised to make a decision does not require a party to accept an offer they fundamentally do not agree with. In either scenario the Commission would have resumed the recording of the conference and summarised the outcome and outlined next steps.  The conference itself ran for 2.5 hours.
  3. [24]
    Any assumptions made by Ms Ondrich about the agreement not being binding based on her conveyancing knowledge are not supported by the actual terms of the agreement that were read out by Commissioner McLennan. The nature of the deed is said to be to contain the agreed terms and the signing to be the commencement point for certain actions to be taken. This was all relayed by the Commissioner, after which Ms Ondrich freely confirmed her agreement.
  4. [25]
    ASM Global in their submissions refer to 6 principles espoused in Farrell v Super Retail Group Ltd [2024] to assist in the objective determination of whether the parties intended to be bound by the agreement.[20] They have applied the principles to the circumstances of this case and submitted that "… the Complainant’s subjective beliefs are not relevant. The parties' intentions must be objectively ascertained. Having regard to those objective features … the Agreement is binding."[21] Ms Ondrich has not provided any response to this submission.
  5. [26]
    There is no evidence before me to demonstrate that either party did not intend to be bound by the terms of the agreement or that the agreement was conditional on the execution of the deed. The fact that Ms Ondrich upon further reflection determined she no longer wished to be bound by that agreement does not alter the nature of the contract she had entered into. Ms Ondrich is required to honour the terms of that agreement by signing the deed.

Should the substantive matter be dismissed?

  1. [27]
    Having found there was a binding agreement I must turn to the question of whether to exercise my discretion to dismiss the substantive matter in accordance with s 541(b)(ii) of the Act.
  2. [28]
    Section 541(b)(ii) of the Act provides as follows:

The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following –

  1. Make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause;
  2. Dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing , or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers –
  1. the cause is trivial; or
  2. the further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;
  1. Order a party to the cause to pay another party the expenses, including witness expenses, it considers appropriate.
  1. [29]
    In Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service ('Chilcott') Merrell DP considered that a proceeding under the AD Act for workplace discrimination constituted an 'industrial matter' for the purposes of s 541(b)(ii).[22]
  2. [30]
    Section 174C(1) of the AD Act, as highlighted by Merrell DP in Chilcott, relevantly states that if the AD Act confers jurisdiction on the Commission in relation to a complaint, the Commission may exercise the powers conferred on it under the AD Act or the IR Act.[23]
  3. [31]
    I can dismiss the cause if I consider further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest. ASM Global does not directly address the issue of the public interest.  Ms Ondrich does provide various references to the meaning of the public interest and concludes:
  1. 17.
    With respect to the facts and outlines in the Submissions, the Matter is of significant public interest. Which discusses three public interests: discrimination based on sex, victimisation based on the good faith reporting of discrimination within the workplace and the overall improvement of workplace and employee conditions. It is evident that the matters are of public interest due to the significant changes in legislation and government recognition of these subjects.
  1. [32]
    In Chilcott, Merrell DP explains ascertaining the public interest involves 'a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and will very much be a question of fact and degree'.[24]
  2. [33]
    Given a binding agreement exists to settle the entire matter, there is no ongoing cause of action to be pursued.[25]  This renders any further action in the proceeding unnecessary and undesirable. The public interest could not be served using Commission resources for this purpose. This is not a reflection on the importance of the subject matter raised in the substantive complaint.
  3. [34]
    The substantive matter AD/2024/62 is dismissed.

Should costs be awarded?

  1. [35]
    ASM Global seeks an order for costs pursuant to section 548 and schedule 2 of the Act. They make no submission in support of this order other than McLennan IC indicated to Ms Ondrich at conference it may be a possibility if some future strikeout application were to be made, considered by the Commission and granted. Ms Ondrich also makes no submission in relation to costs.
  2. [36]
    The general presumption is that each party usually bears their own costs. Under s 548, provisions for costs in Schedule 2 of the Act apply in respect of proceedings heard under the AD Act. There is a capacity to award costs in the interests of justice pursuant to Schedule 2 of the Act if a list of criteria is met.[26] However, none of those matters have been addressed by either party and no indication has been provided as to the estimated costs associated with this application.
  3. [37]
    While I have determined that there was an agreement made that was intended to be binding and that the substantive application should be dismissed there are no cogent arguments before me that would lead me to disturb the general presumption. I will not make the costs order sought.
  4. [38]
    I order accordingly.

Orders

  1. That AD/2024/62 is dismissed pursuant to section 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) on the basis that an agreement was reached in conciliation, resolving the matter entirely.
  2. That, within 5 days of this order, if the Complainant does not execute the deed and return it to the solicitor for the Respondents in accordance with the agreement reached in conciliation, the Industrial Registrar is authorised to execute it on behalf of the Complainant and do all other things necessary to perfect the agreement, pursuant to section 541(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).
  3. Each party to bear their own costs.

Footnotes

[1] ASM Global made the Application on behalf of itself and the Third Respondent.

[2] In the Application in existing proceedings filed on 25 November 2025 by ASM Global, they originally sought that the application be struck out pursuant to s 451(c) and s 452(b) of the Industrial Relations Tribunal Rules 2011. This was later rectified in submissions made 10 February 2025, where ASM Global sought the matter be dismissed pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the Act.

[3] For confidentiality reasons, throughout this decision I have replaced the specific dollar amount of the settlement agreement reached at Conference with '(agreed amount)'.

[4] Submissions of the Respondent, filed 10 February 2025, 1.

[5] Ibid, 1, [2].

[6] Affidavit of Melanie Ondrich, filed 24 January 2025, 4, [30].

[7] Submissions of the Applicant, filed 18 February 2025, [1] – [17]; Affidavit of Melanie Ondrich, filed 24 January 2025.

[8] T1 11 27-37.

[9]Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353.

[10] [2025] QIRC 064.

[11] Ibid, [20] (Power IC).

[12] Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353.

[13] Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353, 360 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan J and Kitto J).

[14] Ibid, 361.

[15] (1954) 91 CLR 353.

[16] Certificate of Exhibit to Affidavit of Melanie Ondrich, filed 24 January 2025, 2.

[17] T2 11 [16] – [17].

[18] T2 1 [17].

[19] T2 11 [38] – [40].

[20] FCA 1515.

[21] Submissions of the Respondent, filed 10 February 2025, 3, [10].

[22] Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service and Anor [2025] QIRC 032, [54] – [55].

[23] Ibid [51].

[24] Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service and Anor [2025] QIRC 032, 22, [36].

[25] Isermann v Professional Property Inspections Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QIRC 064, [32] (Power IC).

[26] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 548; Sch 2, 4.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Ondrich v ASM Global Convex Pty Ltd & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Ondrich v ASM Global Convex Pty Ltd & Ors

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 80

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Caddie IC

  • Date:

    24 Mar 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Chilcott v Townsville Hospital and Health Service [2025] QIRC 32
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2025] QIRC 32
Cite 2 - [2025] QIRC 32
Cite 3 - [2025] QIRC 32
Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 C.L.R 353
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1954) 91 C.L.R 353
Cite 2 - (1954) 91 C.L.R 353
Cite 3 - (1954) 91 C.L.R 353
Cite 4 - (1954) 91 C.L.R 353
Sebastian v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2025] QIRC 64
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2025] QIRC 64
Cite 2 - [2025] QIRC 64
Cite 3 - [2025] QIRC 64

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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