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Zarin Amavand v Kanjini Co-Op Ltd[2025] QIRC 86

Zarin Amavand v Kanjini Co-Op Ltd[2025] QIRC 86

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Zarin Amavand v Kanjini Co-Op Ltd & Anor [2025] QIRC 086

PARTIES:

Zarin Amavand, Teresa Gabriela

(Complainant)

v

Kanjini Co-Op Ltd

(First Respondent)

&

Freitag, Svargo Klaus

(Second Respondent)

CASE NO:

AD/2023/143

PROCEEDING:

Application in existing proceeding

DELIVERED ON:

24 March 2025

MEMBER:

Gazenbeek IC

HEARD AT:

On the papers

ORDERS:

  1. Pursuant to Rule 46 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld), the Complainant produce to the Respondents, within 14 days of the date of this decision, the following:
    1. the document identified by the parties as the Complainant’s ‘Centrelink Contracted Doctor Disability Medical Assessment 2024’ in full;
    2. all medical records or documents relating to the Complainant’s psychological injury/injuries, from 2010 to the present; and
    3. all documents relating to the Complainant’s employment history, from 2015 to the present.
  2. The Second Respondent’s applications for disclosure in respect of documents falling within categories (c), (d), (f) and (g) of the interlocutory application filed on 14 October 2024, are dismissed.
  3. The Second Respondent’s application for the renaming of the Complainant’s fourth Statement of Facts and Contentions, is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION – DISCRIMINATION AND VICTIMISATION IN THE WORKPLACE – application in existing proceedings – application for disclosure – where the second respondent seeks orders that the complainant disclose documents falling within seven categories – where the application is opposed – duty, and principles, of disclosure – whether disclosure should be ordered in the circumstances

LEGISLATION AND INSTRUMENTS:

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ss 7, 10, 119, 204

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 451

Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) rr 41, 46

CASES:

Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1952) 72 WN 250

CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No. 2) (2011) 212 IR 313

Commonwealth v Evans (2004) 81 ALD 408

DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd v Rogers & Anor [2014] ICQ 010

Golding v Sippel and the Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] QIRC 074

Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] ICQ 14

Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60

Huyghe v State of Queensland (Mackay Hospital and Health Service) [2022] QIRC 014

Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 6) [2018] QIRC 115

Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurant & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276

Mohr-Edgar v Legal Aid Queensland [2023] ICQ 025

Peng v Bak10Cut Pty Ltd AND Anor [2020] QIRC 115

State of Queensland (Department of Health) v WorkCover Queensland [2020] QIRC 113

Watton v TAFE Queensland (No. 2) [2021] QIRC 299

Weston and Parer v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (No. 4) [2016] QIRC 075

Wissmann v Nugent [2022] QIRC 058

Xstrata Queensland Ltd v Santos Ltd & Ors; Santos Ltd & Ors v Xstrata Qld Ltd [2005] QSC 323

Reasons for Decision

  1. [1]
    On 14 October 2024, Mr Svargo Klaus Freitag (‘the Second Respondent’) filed an ‘Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings’ (‘the Application’) in the Industrial Registry, seeking that Ms Teresa Gabriela Zarin Amavand (‘the Complainant’) be ordered to disclose the following documents:[1]
  1. copies of missing pages three to six of the Government-contracted Doctor Disability Medical Assessment (assessment date 22-02-2024);
  1. all and any medical records from 01-01-2000 until 05-10-2024 not yet disclosed and related in any way to Ms Amavand’s psychological health issues;
  1. copies of Ms Amavand’s report to Fair Work and all other communication to and form the Fair Work Commission relating to the alleged unwanted conduct in the workplace;
  2. copies of Ms Amavand’s declarations to Centrelink of the income she received from Kanjini Co-Op Ltd;
  3. Ms Amavand’s employment history for the last ten years, including payments received;
  4. a complete record of emails and text messages between Ms Amavand and her sister between 14-05-2022 and 21-07-2022; and
  5. a complete record of Ms Amavand’s outgoing phone calls to the Second Respondent between 10-05-2022 and 31-07-2022.
  1. [2]
    The Second Respondent also sought an order that the Complainant “immediately file her further, further, further amended Statement of Facts and Contentions … and name it either ‘4th amended statement of facts and contentions’ or ‘3rd further amended statement of facts and contentions.’”[2]
  2. [3]
    On 25 October 2024, I issued directions requiring written submissions with respect to the Application, specifically addressing r 46 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld) (‘the Rules’).[3]
  3. [4]
    Having carefully reviewed all submissions filed by the parties, I have proceeded to determine this application on the papers, pursuant to s 451 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).

Relevant principles

  1. [5]
    Rule 46 of the Rules stipulates the following:

46 Duty of disclosure

  1. (1)
    If a directions order requiring disclosure of documents is made, a party must disclose any document that –
  1. (a)
    is directly relevant to the proceeding or a matter in issue in the proceeding; and
  1. (b)
    is in, or comes into, the possession of the party.
  1. (2)
    A party must act under subrule (1) until the proceeding is concluded or the matter in issue is admitted, withdrawn, struck out or otherwise disposed of.
  1. (3)
    Subrule (1) does not apply to a document in relation to which there is a valid claim to privilege from disclosure.

(emphasis added)

  1. [6]
    The Commission may make an order requiring such disclosure of documents pursuant to r 41(2)(o) of the Rules.
  2. [7]
    In Huyghe v State of Queensland (Mackay Hospital and Health Service), Industrial Commissioner Knight usefully summarised principles relevant to determining whether a document is ‘directly relevant’ as set out in CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No. 2):[4]
  1. whether a document is directly relevant to an issue in the proceeding is a question of fact in the circumstances of the case;
  2. ‘directly’ should not be understood to mean that which constitutes direct evidence, to the exclusion of circumstantial evidence. Rather, ‘directly relevant’ means something which tends to prove or disprove the allegation in issue; and
  3. a document will not be ‘directly relevant’ if, rather than tending to prove an issue in dispute, it merely tends to prove something that may be relevant to a disputed issue.
  1. [8]
    As observed by McMurdo J in Xstrata Queensland Ltd v Santos Ltd & Ors, a document is directly relevant “only if it tends to prove or disprove an allegation in issue in the proceedings.”[5] Similarly, when considering the question of relevance in Mohr-Edgar v Legal Aid Queensland, President Davis stated that:[6]

To be relevant, a document does not have to in itself prove the case of the party seeking production of it. It is sufficient if the document tends to prove or disprove an allegation in issue in the proceedings.

  1. [9]
    In determining whether each of the documents sought by the Second Respondent is directly relevant to a matter in issue in the substantive proceedings, I have followed the approach of Industrial Commissioner Hartigan in Watton v TAFE Queensland (No. 2) (‘Watton’):[7]
  1. [9]
    By operation of r 46 of the Tribunals Rules, the obligation in respect of disclosure applies to documents relevant to an allegation in issue in the proceedings. Where disclosure has been made by a party, another party seeking further disclosure must establish that there are documents in the possession or power of the other party which are relevant to an issue in dispute which have not been disclosed by that other party.

…

  1. [11]
    The purpose of the Statement of Facts and Contentions is to allow each party to properly set out and particularise the relevant facts and legal contentions raised in order to place the Commission and other party on notice as to what the parties’ respective case will be. Whilst not formally recognised as such, the Statement of Facts and Contentions have a function akin to pleadings.
  1. [12]
    Accordingly, when determining whether a document, or category of documents is directly relevant, I will do so by considering whether the document or category of documents is directly relevant to an allegation in issue as identified in the [Appellant’s] SOFC and [Respondent’s] SOFC. The “directly relevant” test set out in r 46 of the Tribunals Rules is intended to impose a threshold on the process of discovery.

(emphasis added)

Complainant’s Statement of Facts and Contentions

Background

  1. [10]
    As will become apparent below, it is first necessary to clarify which version of the Complainant’s statement of facts and contentions (of the numerous versions filed to date) I will be referring to for the purposes of this decision, in line with the approach in Watton.
  2. [11]
    By way of background, Industrial Commissioner Dwyer issued a Directions Order on 9 February 2024 requiring the Complainant to file a Statement of Facts and Contentions by 22 March 2024. The Complainant accordingly filed her original Statement of Facts and Contentions in the Industrial Registry on 19 March 2024 (‘the first SOFC’). However, the Respondents were not served a copy of this document until the Complainant resent her Statement of Facts and Contentions to the Respondents and the Registry on 27 March 2024. This 27 March 2024 copy was refiled in the Industrial Registry as a result of this correspondence, but it is identical to the first SOFC.
  3. [12]
    On 23 April 2024, the matter was mentioned before Industrial Commissioner Dwyer, where it was noted that the first SOFC was not correctly served, did not correctly list the Second Respondent, and did not contain details in respect of the compensation sought by the Complainant.[8] A Further Directions Order was consequently issued on the same date granting the Complainant leave to refile their SOFC by 30 April 2024. On 30 April 2024, the Complainant therefore filed an amended Statement of Facts and Contentions (‘the second SOFC’). Somewhat confusingly, the Complainant also filed an ‘Amended Decision Sought’ document on the same date, using the Commission’s ‘Form 85A – Complainant’s statement of facts and contentions’ to do so. 
  4. [13]
    Following correspondence from the Complainant on 6 June 2024 and a further mention before Industrial Commissioner Dwyer on 18 June 2024, an Order was issued on 19 June 2024 granting the Complainant leave to file an amended SOFC by 25 June 2024. On 25 June 2024, the Complainant filed another Statement of Facts and Contentions in the Registry (‘the third SOFC’). This was followed by the filing of another ‘Amended Decision Sought’ document on 27 June 2024, which in short outlined that the Complainant sought (financial) compensation amounting to $1,416,000.
  5. [14]
    Following a mention before me on 9 September 2024, I issued a Further Directions Order (No. 2) on 10 September 2024 granting the Complainant leave to further amend their SOFC. The Complainant accordingly filed another Statement of Facts and Contentions on 30 September 2024. On 11 October 2024, the Complainant refiled this same document to be on the correct form (the Commission’s Form 85A), but its contents remained unchanged. The copy of this document as refiled on 11 October 2024 will therefore be referred to as ‘the fourth SOFC’.
  6. [15]
    It is the fourth SOFC of the Complainant that I will have reference to below. 

Complainant’s fourth SOFC

  1. [16]
    The Complainant is a “57-year-old Australian citizen of Chilean decent” and of “Native American and Spanish background.”[9]
  2. [17]
    The First and Second Respondents own a property of approximately 7000 acres in Mareeba, Queensland. On this property, sites are “advertised for long-term accommodation in Council approved, impermanent dwellings at $60 per week each…in exchange for 5-6 daily hours work/labour”. Engagement is based on the rules and values documented in the First Respondent’s “extensive, detailed website and contracts and agreements therein.”[10]
  3. [18]
    The First Respondent further owns a business called “Emerald Escape Camping”, which hires out “14 large forest campsites and 2 large cleared communal areas with sheltered stages for commercial purposes.”[11]
  4. [19]
    On or about 28 May 2022, the Complainant commenced work at the First Respondent, after having initially met its founder, the Second Respondent, on or about 14 May 2022.[12] However, the Complainant contends she was forced to resign on 21 July 2022 after several incidents between 14 May 2022 and 18 July 2022 alleged to amount to sexual assault, sexual harassment and sexual discrimination.[13] As a result of these incidents, the Complainant has “suffered severe exacerbation of existing conditions and added debilitating conditions and future economic loss and loss of joy of life.”[14]
  5. [20]
    The Complainant contends that the conduct towards her was direct discrimination within the meaning of s 10 of Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (‘the AD Act’). It is further contended that by engaging in the conduct alleged, the Second Respondent engaged in “sexual discrimination and sexual harassment” within the definition provided in s 119 of the AD Act.[15]
  6. [21]
    Based on the Complainant’s fourth SOFC, the substantive proceedings will therefore turn on, at minimum, the following questions to be decided at hearing:[16]
  1. in relation to sexual harassment:
    1. whether or not sexual harassment occurred;
  2. in relation to direct discrimination:
    1. whether the Complainant has a certain attribute, or has certain attributes, outlined in s 7 of the AD Act; 
    2. whether the Complainant was treated, or proposed to be treated, less favourably than another person (either a real or hypothetical comparator) without the identified attribute/s, in circumstances that are the same or not materially different; and
    3. if it is decided that a ‘less favourable’ treatment occurred, whether a substantial reason for that treatment was discriminatory.
  1. [22]
    Further, if the Complainant discharges her onus to prove the above on the balance of probabilities, the matter of compensation will be considered.[17]

Consideration – document disclosure

  1. [23]
    Throughout my consideration below, I have had reference to the below filed submissions of the parties:
  1. Complainant’s response to the interlocutory application, filed on 17 October 2024;
  2. Respondent’s submissions, filed on 6 November 2024; and
  3. Complainant’s further submissions, filed on 11 November 2024.

Missing pages of Doctor Disability Medical Assessment

Complainant’s submissions

  1. [24]
    In respect of the missing pages of the Centrelink Contracted Doctor Disability Medical Assessment 2024 (‘the Assessment’) sought, the Complainant submits the following:

… I nominated to send 2 pages of 6 of Centrelink Contracted Doctor Disability Medical Assessment 2024, a Med Cert 2021 that specifies my conditions as perceived by my doctor at six months before I was working for Kanjini and Svargo Freitag and I sent other results of my condition prior to 2022 including a spine scan result and blood test results.

According to my doctor and psychologist I need not have sent all that and should have waited to be advised by legal aid as to what had to be sent. I am also concerned I do not have right to waive legal claim to privilege of that document as it belongs to Centrelink. I told the Respondents this by email.

My lawyer and barrister were pressing me to send the whole 6 pages (which I sent to them to check) and I stated that I feel ‘extremely distressed’ that my abusers would have this personal information and possibly do further harm to me with it. My lawyer emailed me that they admitted that he had not read it and did not know its contents but they continued to press me to send it because Svargo Freitag asked for it. I declined their instructions to send the whole 6 pages and was therefore cancelled from my Legal Aid grant.

I will send the 6 pages only if the Commissioner Gazenbeek reads Centrelink Contracted Doctor Disability Medical Assessment 2024 and tells me it is safe to send and that I am legally, lawfully and ethically required to send it to the Respondents … I have read the Privacy Act. It states that only court authorised people and experts can request that kind of medical information.

My list of documents submitted to the parties … states ‘Relevant Medical Records’ and does not specify any titles of documents and does not specify the entire 6 pages of the specific document Centrelink Contracted Doctor Disability Medical Assessment 2024. I do not believe I must send it if demanded by the Respondents due to their lack of proper authority and my reasonable expectation that they will show lack duty of care and respect for my privacy and human rights in handling it.

I also provided a report of my condition post the workplace abuse at Kanjini Co-Operative Ltd in 2022 from my counsellor and Med Cert 2023 from my current doctor. I understand that what I have provided is enough for them to base their case that the sexual harassment and sexual discrimination from Svargo Freitag at the workplace where I worked … did not cause my current state of debilitating PTSD because I already had PTSD. Mert Cert says I could work 12 hours at the time I worked for Kanjini Co-operative Ltd.

Respondents’ submissions

  1. [25]
    In respect of the missing pages of the Assessment sought, the Respondents submit that:

The Complainant claims in p51 C5SOFC: “as a result of the 18 July Incidents, the Complainant … was diagnosed with PTSD ineligible to work part-time”.

Matters at issue in this proceeding to be proved or disproved are whether the Complainant was diagnosed with PTSD as a result of the 18 July incidents, or for other reasons, and/or was diagnosed with other psychological or psychiatric conditions, and whether and to what extend [sic] such conditions were historic or were caused by Freitag’s alleged conduct.

Partial information provided in the DMAR introduces inconsistencies from the Job Capacity Assessment Report (JCAR), underscoring the need for discovery of the missing pages to confirm or dispel the claims made in this proceeding.

Page 2 of DMAR notes that it differs from a not yet disclosed Job Capacity Assessment Report (JCAR) “Reason: Difference with the JCAR: The JCAR: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The DMAR: Psycho/psychiatric disorder other. This decision was based on medical evidence, as noted.”

Pages 3-6 of DMAR are arguably detailing the medical evidence such differentiation is based on and thus will be able to prove or disprove some or all of the issues above and therefore are directly relevant to the proceedings.

Without these pages, the basis for and the full extent of the contributing factors to the DMAR diagnosis remains unclear, making a precise determination of causation elusive.

…

Further, the Respondents allege that the Complainant made up and embellished events.

The full DMAR report will arguably reveal historical mental health issues relevant to the credibility of the Complainant’s claims, including factors that can explain her embellishment and falsification of events.

(emphasis added)

Complainant’s further submissions

  1. [26]
    In reply submissions, the Complainant further submitted that:

The pages are not ‘missing’.

…

The Centrelink contracted psychologists and the Workcover claim assessment team, having full access to all my medical history and employment history, made their professional determinations which resulted in my being transferred from: eligible for Jobseeker payment with well-managed conditions of PTSD so that my medically certified capacity for part-time work was being fulfilled often and when possible, to having exacerbated symptoms after the abuse at Kanjini Co-operative’s workplaces, being unable to complete the requirements of part-time work capacity, being transferred to Disability Support Payment in March 2024 and having doctor and psychologist appointments, (to help manage symptoms and mitigate and avoid further exacerbation of symptoms throughout this process), covered by Workcover.

Regarding the Respondent’s claim that they can make determinations based on their own interpretation of the document Government-contracted doctor Disability Medical Assessment Report

The Respondents are not qualified to scrutinise somebody’s medical records of 24 years and make unbiased, viable determinations about whether they are being ‘truthful’ or not.

Anybody can lie, ‘embellish’, ‘fabricate’ and ‘falsify’ if they want to and ‘falsification’ is not a specific symptom of PTSD or any other health condition.

I am being truthful about what Svargo Freitag did to me at the workplaces of Kanjini Co-operative …

(emphasis added)

Consideration

  1. [27]
    The threshold issue is whether the missing Assessment pages sought are directly relevant to the proceeding or a matter in issue in the proceeding.
  2. [28]
    The Assessment does not seem to bear any relevance to the matters in issue in the substantive proceeding as outlined in paragraph [21] above.[18] However, the information it contains may well be relevant in the potential calculation of damages in the event that the complaint is proven, given the Complainant’s contentions in her fourth SOFC that:
  1. she has “suffered compensable non-financial damage” in part “incurred through causing and exacerbating her medical conditions”;[19] and
  2. as a result of the Second Respondent’s conduct, she is “unable to maintain fulfilling work of her choice and was diagnosed with PTSD” and that she, following assessments “by the Government contracted doctor’s disability medical assessment team, began receiving disability support payment [sic] in April 2024.”[20]
  1. [29]
    The matter of discerning an appropriate award of damages (in the event that a complaint is proven) is dependent on a complainant sufficiently evidencing loss or damage arising from a contravention that has occurred.[21] Where a complainant seeks compensation for the causation of medical conditions, it would be reasonable to expect that they adduce medical evidence of a no doubt sensitive and private nature at a hearing to this effect. That, inevitably, requires them to have disclosed such evidence to the other parties.
  2. [30]
    In response to the Complainant’s privacy concerns, I refer to His Honour, President Martin J’s observations in DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd v Rogers & Anor:[22]
  1. [18]
    The mere claim that a document to be produced is confidential is not a valid objection to its production. Much of what is disclosed to another party in court or tribunal proceedings of one kind or another may well be confidential. It has been held that where this is the case, “the risk to the confidentiality of the information must be tolerated in the interest of the administration of justice”. Where specific issues of privacy or a heightened concern for commercial confidentiality, for example, arise, arrangements may be made to ensure that the disclosure of material and information that is made does not go beyond what is strictly necessary in the circumstances. What has been said with regard to confidential information might equally be said to apply in the case of personal information that might in other circumstances be protected by privacy legislation. Accordingly, the mere fact that information to be produced might include “private” information, however defined, is an insufficient ground in law to justify the setting aside of a Notice or to issue a Notice.
  1. [19]
    Reference was made in the submissions before the Commission and in this Court to the provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The provisions of that Act do not restrict the powers of the Commission in this case. If that Act is relevant, Principle 11, contained in s 14, expressly exempts “disclosure … required or authorised by or under law” from the limits on disclosure of personal information.
  1. [20]
    The second concern identified in the Commission’s reasons was as to the use to which information incidentally disclosed as a result of the relevant Notice might be put. This concern is similar to that which centres upon notions of privacy or confidentiality. It is well established that parties to whom documents are discovered may not use the discovered documents or the information that they contain for a purpose other than the conduct of the proceedings in question. To do so would amount to conduct in contempt of the relevant court or tribunal, and this principle has been held to extend to material produced on subpoena. Accordingly, this concern does not justify the exercise of the Commission’s discretion.

(emphasis added)

  1. [31]
    I do not find the Complainant’s submissions in respect of the missing Assessment pages to be persuasive. However, I recognise that the Respondents’ submissions, including that the Assessment will likely assist in revealing “historical mental health issues relevant to the credibility of the Complainant’s claims”, are of concern.
  2. [32]
    The approach taken in recent matters in this jurisdiction is explicit in relation to such a submission. As observed by Industrial Commissioner Fischer in Weston and Parer v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (No. 4), orders for disclosure “should not be made for the purpose of enabling a party to attack credibility.”[23]
  3. [33]
    It has been made clear by their own submissions that the Respondents seek the Assessment pages at least in part to essentially embark on a search for ways they can undermine or attack the Complainant’s credibility. That the Second Respondent submits this to be a reason for seeking the disclosure of the Assessment, indicates that they presently possess a misguided understanding of the matters in issue in the substantive proceedings, and their role within them. I agree with the Complainant’s submission that the Respondents “are not qualified to scrutinise somebody’s medical records of 24 years and make unbiased, viable determinations about whether they are being ‘truthful’ or not”.
  4. [34]
    Despite these concerns, I still consider the remaining pages of the Assessment to be directly relevant to the Complainant’s claim for compensation; it is not apparent to me that this Assessment solely relates to credibility.[24] I therefore order the Complainant to disclose this Assessment to the Respondents in full.
  5. [35]
    However, I reiterate that it is wholly inappropriate for this assessment to be used in an attempt to attack the credibility of the Complainant, and disclosure of the Assessment is not being ordered to serve this purpose. In that regard, I direct the parties to the following comment of Industrial Commission Power in Wissmann v Nugent:[25]
  1. [41]
    The parties are not legally represented in this matter and as such it is appropriate to make clear the undertaking that applies in these circumstances. The Harman undertaking is an implied undertaking that documents obtained as a result of a compulsory process such as this will only be used for the purposes for which they were disclosed and will not be used for a collateral or ulterior purpose.

(emphasis added)

Medical records from 01-01-2000 until 05-10-2024

Complainant’s submissions

  1. [36]
    With regard to the list of medical records requested, the Complainant submits that:

… It is irrelevant. Further damage/injury can be done to me with my entire medical history in the hands of my abusers who have no authority as experts or sense of duty of care or respect for my human rights and I have reason to fear that they will abuse it. I call on the Privacy Act. Unless specifically authorised by QIRC I do not have to give my entire details medical records of the last 24 years to the abusers. I will provide it to the Commission if asked.

Respondents’ submissions

  1. [37]
    The Respondents submit the following in respect of the requested medical records:

Relevance to Matters in Issue

  1. a)
    At para 51 C5SOFC the Complainant claims “the non-financial damage otherwise labelled as general damages, has been incurred through causing and exacerbating her medical conditions, offence, hurt, humiliation, and intimidation within the meaning of section 209(1)(b) of the Act”.
  1. b)
    At para 30 C5SOFC the Complainant states she is “unable to maintain fulfilling work of her choice and was diagnosed with PTSD ineligible to work part-time and after assessments by the Government contracted doctor’s disability medical assessment team, began receiving disability support payment in April 2024”.
  1. c)
    The Respondents maintain that any PTSD or other medical conditions were preexisting and/or not caused by Freitag’s conduct and that her preexisting mental health conditions directly relate to the Complainant’s credibility, and falsifications and inconsistencies of her accounts of alleged events.
  1. d)
    Matters at issue to be proved or disproved in this proceeding are:
  1. whether or not Freitag's alleged misconduct, if in fact it occurred, has caused and exacerbated the Complainant's psychiatric conditions;
  2. whether psychological / psychiatric disorders or symptoms were more severe after 21-07-2022 than before 28-05-2022 and if they were more severe, whether or not there were any non-case-related factors, reasons or causes;
  3. whether the Complainant's preexisting psychological / psychiatric conditions could have caused or contributed to the Complainant's major behavioural change after 18-07-2022 from admiration for Freitag to revenge;
  4. whether the Complainant's preexisting psychological / psychiatric conditions have contributed to the Complainant making up events, embellishing innocent and consensual conduct, and repeatedly changing details, dates and quotes.
  1. e)
    The Respondents argue that complete medical records are necessary to assess the accuracy and causation of these matters as true or untrue.
  1. f)
    The assessments and reports … and comparisons between them will arguably tend to prove or disprove the matters in issue … and are thus considered directly relevant to these proceedings.
  1. g)
    The Complainant’s Medical history and mental health conditions are also directly related to the Complainant’s claims for damages and to the Respondents’ ability to respond to such claims.
  1. h)
    Additionally the medical reports requested below will arguably detail historical mental health issues relevant to the credibility of the Complainant’s claims, including factors that can explain her embellishments and falsifications of events.
  1. i)
    The inconsistency in the Complainant’s various statements and claims to date … further support the need for the Respondents to review all medical records.

(emphasis added)

  1. [38]
    Further, the Respondents provided a more specific list of requested documents:
  1. j)
    The Respondents herewith request for the following reports and/or assessments, as identified on page 2 DMAR, by:
  1. i.
    Ms Tracey Angel, psychologist in 2010;
  1. ii.
    Dr James Le Bas, psychiatrist in 2016;
  1. iii.
    Dr G Fotonchi, GP reported psychosomatic symptoms on 23-03-2016;
  1. iv.
    clinical psychologist Ms. Donna Eshuys who prescribed psychotropic medication and confirmed 15 sessions during 2017 and 2018;
  1. v.
    Dr S Cousins reported symptoms of mood instability on 29-09-2019;
  1. vi.
    Dr P. Johnson reported chronic and severe symptoms, including anxiety, fearfulness and past trauma on 29-09-2021 and 01-05-2022;
  1. vii.
    Noosaville 7 Day Medical Centre dated 30-11-2023.
  1. k)
    The Respondents also request a copy of the JCAR dated 24-01-2024 referred to at the top of page 2 DMAR. This report is required to understand the distinctions between the JCAR’s diagnosis of PTSD and the DMAR’s other psychiatric diagnosis (see para 1.e) above).
  1. l)
    The Complainant states in point 1 at para 6 of her RA241012 that she provided “Med Cert 2023 from her current doctor”. However, no such medical certificate dated 2023 has been provided to the Respondents and a copy thereof is herewith requested.
  1. m)
    The Respondents request any other mental health reports or assessments between 2010 and 2024.

Consideration

  1. [39]
    The Respondents’ submissions in respect of the medical records sought suffer from a similar deficiency to their submissions in respect of disclosure of the Assessment; they have once again clearly articulated their belief that the records “will arguably detail historical mental health issues relevant to the credibility of the Complainant’s claims, including factors that can explain her embellishments and falsifications of events.” This, by itself, is plainly an insufficient basis to order disclosure, and will not be considered further. 
  2. [40]
    However, as above, medical records may be directly relevant to the Complainant’s claim for compensation, given her contention that the Second Respondents’ alleged contraventions of the Act caused and/or exacerbated her medical condition/s. 
  3. [41]
    The Second Respondent originally sought disclosure of “all and any medical records from 01-01-2000 until 05-10-2024” relating in any way to the Complainant’s “psychological health issues”. I do not believe that the Second Respondent has sufficiently justified why records relating to such a significant period of time are required, and I therefore find this request to be too broad in scope. 
  4. [42]
    However, I find the Second Respondents’ amended request in their written submissions – namely, the disclosure of any medical records/documents relating to the Complainant’s psychological injury/injuries from 2010 onwards, including those referred to in the Assessment – to be sufficiently specific. I consider the disclosure of such medical records in such terms to be directly relevant to the Complainant’s claim for compensation, and therefore to the substantive proceedings.

Fair Work documents

Complainant’s submissions

  1. [43]
    The Complainant submits that:

… I don’t own a record of this phone call to Fairwork. No written or email report exists. I already told [the Respondents] this in June 2024.

  1. [44]
    In her further submissions, the Complainant re-emphasised that she does not have a record of this phone call to Fair Work, that there was never a written report of the call, and that she was regardless told that her matter was primarily a criminal matter, with police being the relevant contact point.

Respondents’ submissions

  1. [45]
    In reply, the Respondents submit that:

Freitag first verbally requested these [records] and other documents like her statement to police in the QIRC mention on 18-06-2024. When asked … the Complainant stated that she had never contacted Fair Work.

…

In para 67 of her disclosed sworn police statement the Complainant stated: “I did that, went to fair work, told them my story and they were of the opinion that my story did fit with having been sexually assaulted.”

Freitag is asking here for evidence to help decide the following matters:

  1. Did the Complainant contact Fair Work or not?
  2. If yes, what did the Complainant tell Fair Work and what claim did she make?
  3. Do those statements support or contradict her statements to this court?
  4. Why did Fair Work not action the claim by the Complainant?

If in fact no such record can be made available by the Complainant, then the Respondents are willing to withdraw this part of the application.

Consideration

  1. [46]
    I am not satisfied that the Respondents have sufficiently established the direct relevance of the Fair Work records sought to the matters in issue in the substantive proceedings. Rather, it appears this request is made merely to indulge the Second Respondent’s curiosity, which is plainly not a sufficient basis to order disclosure. Regardless, a party cannot disclose a document that is not in fact in their possession. I order accordingly.

Centrelink documents

Complainant’s submissions

  1. [47]
    The Complainant submits that:

No. Irrelevant. Declare only if you earn over $150 fortnight. I worked 9 weeks for $316.00 total from Kanjini Ltd. I do not have to supply the Respondents with a record of my declarations of income to Centrelink.

  1. [48]
    In reply submissions, the Complainant further submits, in brief, that the Respondents are “asking for proof that I declared income to Centrelink”, but that she does not believe that material relating to her declaration of income will “provide any conclusions that the Respondents are seeking to make.” In addition, she submits that:

Svargo Freitag cited my commitment to the training and my speed of learning the system for telling me to create and submit an invoice for the retainer plus the commissions for the month 4 June to 5 July at $1286.44.

I did create that invoice and submitted it to Kanjini Co-operative by email a couple of days later. I have the email record as evidence.

I did not receive the payment for that invoice as I was berated and humiliated with hovering over me angrily and denying those instructions and forcing me to issue a new invoice for the retainer of $200 only, on the evening of the worst sexual assault and sexual harassments at the workplace [on] 18 July.

Income that does not exist need not be declared.

Respondents’ submissions

  1. [49]
    The Respondents submit that:

The Complainant claims that she is owed payment of an allegedly outstanding June invoice of $1,286.44 [52d & e C5SOFC & p21b C5SOFC].

Freitag claims that that invoice was created for training purposes only.

If the Complainant believes she is still owed $1,286.44 or any other amount for the month of June, that amount should have been declared to Centrelink.

…

The Complainant was engaged as a contractor from 28-06-2022 until 21-07-2022, or in the alternative from 20-06-2022 until 21-07-2022.

Her own disclosed document [Kanjini pays AccountActivity_17062024 (2).pdf] shows the Complainant has been paid $716.00 for that period.

A major matter of issue in this proceeding is whether the Complainant is truthful or not, including but not limited to Government Organisations and this Court.

A declaration of income to Centrelink, or in the alternative a sworn statement by the Complainant that no such declaration was made and why it was not made will decide the matters at issue …above.

Consideration

  1. [50]
    Despite the Respondents’ submission to the contrary, the Complainant’s perceived ‘truthfulness’ is not a major matter of issue in these proceedings; that, again, is indicative of the Respondents’ intent  to use the material sought to attack the credibility of the Complainant. The Respondents have not otherwise articulated in any satisfactory manner how the Centrelink documents sought are directly relevant to the actual matters in issue in the substantive proceedings. The Respondents’ alternative request that the Complainant be ordered to provide a sworn statement about her declarations to Centrelink is equally half-baked, and will not be entertained.

Employment history

Complainant’s submissions

  1. [51]
    The Complainant submits: 

No. Only if the Commissioner and authorised experts can ask me to supply my employment history and payment history for the last ten years to the Respondents.

Respondents’ submissions

  1. [52]
    The Respondents submit that:

Pp 33, 40, 49 and 50 of C5SOFC claims: “economic loss” which in p50 is claimed to be “ongoing and cannot yet be accurately quantified.”

P 50 of C5SOFC further claims: “is unable to maintain fulfilling work of her choice and was diagnosed with PTSD ineligible to work part-time and after assessments by the Government contracted doctor’s disability medical assessment team, began receiving disability support payment in April 2024.

The matter at issue here is how any economic loss should be calculated, if the Complainant’s claim for economic loss should be successful.

The Complainant’s employment and income history will be able to do so.

Consideration

  1. [53]
    As observed by Industrial Commissioner McLennan in Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd, damages are foundationally “not awarded to punish a Respondent”, but rather “are awarded as compensation for a Complainant’s loss; to place a Complainant, insofar as money can, in the position they would have been in but for the act of unlawful discrimination.”[26]
  2. [54]
    While her fourth SOFC is ambiguous in this regard, it is clear that the Complainant intends to seek an award of damages for economic loss, including for loss of income due to being unable to maintain “fulfilling” employment because of the harassment and discrimination alleged. That loss must be sufficiently evidenced by the Complainant; it would therefore be reasonable to expect that the Complainant will adduce evidence at a hearing to demonstrate the impact of the unlawful discrimination alleged on her employment and income.[27] It is plainly insufficient for the Complainant to merely state in her fourth SOFC that the economic loss for which she seeks compensation “is ongoing and cannot yet be accurately quantified.” This ambiguity leaves the Respondents in the untenable position of being unable to even approximate what position the Complainant believes she would have been in but for the contravening conduct alleged, or what amount of money she believes to be appropriate to compensate for that loss.[28] Disclosure of material regarding the economic loss the Complainant contends she has suffered, is essential, not least to give any meaning or substance to the Complainant’s fourth SOFC.
  3. [55]
    I am satisfied that the Respondents have sufficiently linked their purpose in seeking disclosure of material relevant to the Complainant’s employment for the past ten years, to a matter in issue in the substantive proceedings, and order accordingly.

Text and email message history

Complainant’s submissions

  1. [56]
    The Complainant submits:

No, I call on the Privacy Act. I don’t have right to waive legal claim to privilege and cannot send entire text messages between my sister and I for the period I was working for Kanjini or the 3 months after that he asked for.

Respondents’ submissions

  1. [57]
    The Respondents submit that:

The Complainant lodged [a] claim … with Workcover to receive workers compensation, based on the same alleged incidences as in AD/2023/143.

In [that claim] the Complainant supplied some text messages between her and her sister as relevant evidence, however they were all dated 18-07-2022 or later.

One major matter at issue in these proceedings is which version of events is true:

  1. The Complainant’s allegations of ongoing discrimination and sexual harassment from the day she first met Freitag until the day they parted; or
  2. Freitag’s allegations that the Complainant praised and admired him and was romantically attracted to him until he clarified on 18-07-2022 that he was not interested, at which time she became vindictive and started to make up events or embellished innocent events in order to hurt him.

While all communications by the Complainant with any third party after Freitag’s alleged clarification on 18-07-2022 can be explained by either version of events above, text and email communication between the Complainant and her sister between 14-05-2022 and 21-07-2022 will be able to prove one or the other version and thus are directly relevant to the main matter in issue in this proceeding.

Complainant’s reply submissions

  1. [58]
    The Complainant further submits that:

I provided Workcover with two text messages with my sister which I believe were provided to Svargo Freitag, Suriya Freitag and the directors have access to. One message said I was in training at the time and could not answer her call, Monday 18 July 7pm, the night of the last assault and sexual harassments, and a consequent message a couple of days later said I had … tried to keep the job but had to quit the job because I reckoned that even after I told him to stop that he wouldn’t stop the violations.

Consideration

  1. [59]
    On the basis of the Respondents’ submissions, I am not satisfied that text messages between the Complainant and her sister over the relevant two-month period not yet disclosed have any particular relevance to the substantive proceedings. Rather, in seeking disclosure of such messages, it appears that the Respondents are embarking on a fishing expedition in the manner defined in Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd:[29]

A ‘fishing expedition’ in the sense in which the phrase has been used in the law, means, as I understand it, that a person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding out whether there are any there or not.

  1. [60]
    The Respondents’ request for the disclosure of such messages, if they indeed occurred at all, is not articulated with sufficient specificity or clarity. Rather than being motivated by a reasonable belief that the messages in question offer a “real probability of evidential materiality”,[30] the request seems to be solely motivated by a general curiosity unsupported by any confidence regarding the material’s likely contents or relevance. I am not convinced that the Complainant should be ordered to disclose such material on such weak grounds.

Phone call history with Second Respondent

Complainant’s submissions

  1. [61]
    The Complainant submits:

No. My phone call records go back only to 2023. For records of phone calls between myself and Svargo Freitag in 2022, check your own phone. Text messages go back to early 2022 and I have supplied the PDF Screenshots of text messages [between the Complainant and the Second Respondent] to the Respondents.

Respondents’ submissions

  1. [62]
    The Respondents submit that:

The Complainant claims to have called and first met Freitag on or about 14-05-2022 [pp6 & 9 C5SOFC], which is a matter at issue.

Freitag recalls the Complainant contacting him only in the last week of May and first meeting her during a cultural burn on or about Sunday 29-05-2022.

The requested phone records will prove or disprove the Complainant's pp 6 & 9C5SOFC and are thus directly relevant to the proceeding.

Additionally the Complainant has claimed that Freitag called her on occasions (05-07-2022 & 18-07-2022), of which Freitag has no record or recollection.

Phone records will establish whether the Complainant called Freitag instead.

The Complainant can simply request these records from her service provider.

Complainant’s reply submissions

  1. [63]
    The Complainant further submits that:

My phone has no records of calls going that far back (two years).

Since Svargo Freitag would often organise the next training, walk, or volunteering work-bee at the previous meeting and tell me verbally to text him on a certain day of his choosing to remind him of the meeting so that he could have a record on his phone of an arranged time as reminder, I agreed.

I have some emails and text message records of Svargo Freitag initiating walks and training times at the workplace throughout that period of time.

If he had previously verbally told me a specific time and date to turn up for training or volunteering or a walk I would just turn up but mostly I would check for confirmation with a text.

Therefore, a record of phone calls is no proof of whether he instructed me to go there for training or not.

Consideration

  1. [64]
    Rule 46 of the Rules is explicit in requiring the disclosure of directly relevant documents that are in, or that have come into, the possession of a party. In circumstances where the Complainant does not have phone records in the terms requested to disclose, an order to disclose them is clearly of no utility. Regardless, the Second Respondent is themselves presumably able to obtain phone records from their service provider, such that compelling the Complainant to provide them instead is unnecessary.

Consideration – renaming of the Complainant’s fourth Statement of Facts and Contentions

  1. [65]
    The Second Respondent also seeks orders that the Complainant refile the fourth SOFC to be properly titled as either “4th amended statement of facts and contentions” or “3rd further amended statement of facts and contentions.”[31]
  2. [66]
    It is unclear to me what benefit the Second Respondent will derive from this order being made. The Complainant’s filing and refiling of numerous statements of facts and contentions in these proceedings has already added some complexity and confusion to these proceedings; it seems counterproductive to order the Complainant to add to that number for such a trivial purpose. It is in the best interests of all parties for this matter to progress to hearing as expeditiously as possible; the seeking of such orders simply serves as a distraction.
  3. [67]
    This decision has regardless clarified that the Complainant’s SOFC of 11 October 2024 is to be referred to as the fourth SOFC filed, which should satisfy the Second Respondent that his point has been recognised. Further, should it be necessary in future for the Complainant to file a further amended SOFC, she should refer to it as her fifth amended statement of facts and contentions.

Orders

  1. [68]
    In light of the above, I make the following orders:
    1. Pursuant to Rule 46 of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld), the Complainant produce to the Respondents, within 14 days of the date of this decision, the following:
      1. the document identified by the parties as the Complainant’s ‘Centrelink Contracted Doctor Disability Medical Assessment 2024’ in full;
      2. all medical records or documents relating to the Complainant’s psychological injury/injuries, from 2010 to the present; and
      3. all documents relating to the Complainant’s employment history, from 2015 to the present.
    2. The Second Respondent’s applications for disclosure in respect of documents falling within categories (c), (d), (f) and (g) of the interlocutory application filed on 14 October 2024, are dismissed.
    3. The Second Respondent’s application for the renaming of the Complainant’s fourth Statement of Facts and Contentions, is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings, filed 14 October 2024, 3.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Further Directions Order (No. 3), issued 25 October 2024.

[4] [2022] QIRC 014 [20], citing CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No. 2) (2011) 212 IR 313 [34]-[37].

[5] Xstrata Queensland Ltd v Santos Ltd & Ors; Santos Ltd & Ors v Xstrata Queensland Ltd [2005] QSC 323, as cited in State of Queensland (Department of Health) v WorkCover Queensland [2020] QIRC 113 [23].

[6] [2023] ICQ 025 [42], citing Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurant & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276, 282-3 and Xstrata Queensland Ltd v Santos Ltd & Ors; Santos Ltd & Ors v Xstrata Queensland Ltd [2005] QSC 323 [45].

[7] [2021] QIRC 299 [9], [11]-[12].

[8] Transcript of 23.04.2024, 1-6 ll 15-23.

[9] Complainant’s Fourth Statement of Facts and Contentions, filed 11 October 2024,  [1], [34].

[10] Ibid [3].

[11] Ibid [4].

[12] I note at this juncture, for clarity, that I have frequently referred to the First and Second Respondents throughout my consideration as ‘the Respondents’. This is both for simplicity because the Second Respondent does so in his own submissions, and because of the inevitable overlap given the Second Respondent is the founder and director of the First Respondent, as well as a shareholder and the manager of the First Respondent’s workers/employees. 

[13] Complainant’s Fourth Statement of Facts and Contentions, filed 11 October 2024, [7].

[14] Ibid [33].

[15] Ibid [47].

[16] See Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] QIRC 074 [50]-[52].

[17] See Wissmann v Nugent [2022] QIRC 058 [13].

[18] See Peng v Bak10Cut Pty Ltd AND Anor [2020] QIRC 115 [14]-[16].

[19] Complainant’s Fourth Statement of Facts and Contentions, filed 11 October 2024, [49]-[51].

[20] Ibid [30].

[21] Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] QIRC 074 [222]-[223].

[22] [2014] ICQ 010 [18]-[20].

[23] [2016] QIRC 075 [4], cited with approval in Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No 6) [2018] QIRC 115.

[24] Peng v Bak10Cut Pty Ltd AND Anor [2020] QIRC 115 [39].

[25] [2022] QIRC 058 [41].

[26] [2021] QIRC 074 [227], citing Commonwealth v Evans (2004) 81 ALD 408 [80], and Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60, 63.

[27] See Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] ICQ 14 [32]-[38].

[28] Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] QIRC 074 [231].

[29] (1952) 72 WN 250, 254.

[30] Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No. 6) [2018] QIRC 115 [44].

[31] Form 4 – Application in existing proceedings, filed 11 October 2024, 3.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Zarin Amavand v Kanjini Co-Op Ltd & Anor

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Zarin Amavand v Kanjini Co-Op Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2025] QIRC 86

  • Court:

    QIRC

  • Judge(s):

    Gazenbeek IC

  • Date:

    24 Mar 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Associated Dominions Assurance Society Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1952) 72 WN 250
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1952) 72 WN 250
Cite 2 - (1952) 72 WN 250
CFMEU v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) (2011) 212 IR 313
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 212 IR 313
Cite 2 - (2011) 212 IR 313
Commonwealth v Evans (2004) 81 ALD 408
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 81 ALD 408
Cite 2 - (2004) 81 ALD 408
DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd v Rogers & Anor [2014] ICQ 10
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] ICQ 10
Cite 2 - [2014] ICQ 10
Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] QIRC 74
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 74
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 74
Cite 3 - [2021] QIRC 74
Cite 4 - [2021] QIRC 74
Cite 5 - [2021] QIRC 74
Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] ICQ 14
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] ICQ 14
Cite 2 - [2021] ICQ 14
Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 172 CLR 60
Cite 2 - (1991) 172 CLR 60
Huyghe v State of Queensland (Mackay Hospital and Health Service) [2022] QIRC 14
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 14
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 14
Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No.6) [2018] QIRC 115
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QIRC 115
Cite 2 - [2018] QIRC 115
Cite 3 - [2018] QIRC 115
Mohr-Edgar v Legal Aid Queensland [2023] ICQ 25
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2023] ICQ 25
Cite 2 - [2023] ICQ 25
Peng v Bak10Cut Pty Ltd [2020] QIRC 115
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 115
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 115
Cite 3 - [2020] QIRC 115
Queensland v WorkCover Queensland [2020] QIRC 113
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QIRC 113
Cite 2 - [2020] QIRC 113
Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd[2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] 1 Qd R 276
Cite 2 - [2001] 1 Qd R 276
Watton v TAFE Queensland (No.2) [2021] QIRC 299
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QIRC 299
Cite 2 - [2021] QIRC 299
Weston v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) (No. 4) [2016] QIRC 75
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QIRC 75
Cite 2 - [2016] QIRC 75
Wissmann v Nugent [2022] QIRC 58
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 58
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 58
Cite 3 - [2022] QIRC 58
Xstrata Queensland Ltd v Santos Ltd [2005] QSC 323
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QSC 323
Cite 2 - [2005] QSC 323
Cite 3 - [2005] QSC 323

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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