Inglis v State of Queensland[2015] QLAC 3

LAND APPEAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   THE COURT: On 14 December 2007, the State resumed land owned by the parties who were the applicants in the proceedings in the Land Court (Inglis parties). The land was resumed for prison purposes. Compensation for the value of the land was assessed in the Land Court at $2,250,000 and the costs of the Inglis parties attributable to disturbance at $189,645.09. Interest was awarded on these amounts, subject to any advance payment of compensation.
2. [2]
   Both the Inglis parties and the State have appealed. The Inglis parties contend primarily that the Land Court Member failed to recognise that the land had additional value by reason of the interest (or potential interest) of an adjoining owner. The State contends that the evidence of its valuer should have been accepted; that a greater allowance should have been made for risk associated with the potential subdivision of part of the land; and that the amount awarded for disturbance items is excessive. It also appeals against the award of interest.

Background

3. [3]
   The resumed land comprised two parcels, Lot 238 on registered plan CA 31519, with an area of 258.898 hectares; and Lot 242 on registered plan CA 31612, with an area of 101.171 hectares. Lot 242 was located generally to the south-west of Lot 238, and was offset from it. An unmade road separated the lots for a short distance towards the northern end of the eastern boundary of Lot 242 and the southern end of the western boundary of Lot 238^[1].  The resumed land is located approximately 16 kilometres north west of Gatton. Both parcels have frontage to Millers Road.
4. [4]
   A short distance south of the resumed land, and in one location contiguous with Lot 242, is land owned by Golden Egg Producers Pty Ltd. This company was described as a member of the Darwalla Group of companies, and was itself referred to as Darwalla in the Land Court, a practice which will be followed in these reasons. For many years, Darwalla has conducted an operation associated with the production of chicken meat on this land. In addition to the land so used, Darwalla owned a parcel immediately to the west, Lot 4 on RP 206331^[2] (Lot 4), with an area of 182.4 hectares^[3], but undeveloped at the resumption date.
5. [5]
   The Darwalla Group conducts what was described as a fully integrated chicken farming organisation. Thus it has a breeding hen operation, producing fertilised eggs; a chicken growing operation; and a processing operation, producing chicken meat for commercial sale. It also operates a feed mill to produce feed for its chicken flocks. It trades under the name “Golden Cockerel”. It operates about two dozen farms in various locations around south east Queensland and northern New South Wales.^[4]
6. [6]
   The Group’s head office and a feed mill and processing plant are located at Mt Cotton. It employs approximately 500 people. It produces some 35.5 million kilograms of chicken meat per annum^[5].
7. [7]
   The Darwalla land at Gatton has an area of some 258.08 hectares, with 40 sheds on it^[6]. It has operated this farm for many years, and purchased Lot 4 in 1989 for “land banking”^[7].
8. [8]
   Generally to the west of Lot 238 and the north of Lot 242 is other land, also taken for prison purposes, and referred to as the Weaver land.

Evidence relevant to the Inglis appeal

9. [9]
   Mr Knight gave valuation evidence on behalf of the Inglis parties. He considered the highest and best use to be “as a ‘greenfield site’ broiler farm”^[8]. Its value on that basis was the amount that Darwalla would pay, above market value, for its other likely use, being a “mixed lifestyle/rural home site with some associated grazing and/or cultivation’^[9].
10. [10]
    There are 12 reasons which Mr Knight identified for these views. They were set out in his report as follows^[10]:-

“(i) ‘Darwalla’ was, at the date of resumption, an adjoining owner of the subject property and as such fell within the category of buyers who potentially would have been seeking to purchase the subject property;

2. (ii)
   ‘Darwalla’ was, at the date of resumption, a large, established, long term operator within the poultry industry;

3. (iii)
   ‘Darwalla’ has been in expansion mode since at least 2004 (refer comments Section 7);

4. (iv)
   in or about 2004, Mr David Bray, then employed by ‘Darwalla’ as its Technical Services Manager had, on behalf of the company, approached the dispossessed owners to see if they would sell their land to the company in order to expand the existing operation which adjoined the subject property to the south. Whilst the dispossessed owners immediately rejected the expression of interest, and no sale later occurred, the approach by Mr Bray clearly confirms that, historically, ‘Darwalla’ had been interested in purchasing the subject property in order to expand its Gatton operation;

5. (v)
   ‘Darwalla’, because of the scale of their existing operation, had, as at 14 December 2007, existing end markets already in place;

6. (vi)
   ‘Darwalla’ could have readily developed the subject lots to fit in with their existing operations on the adjoining land to the south of the property;

7. (vii)
   to allow for the expansion, town water was readily accessible to Lot 238 and Lot 242 as it was already available to ‘Darwalla’s’ land adjoining the subject property to the south having been connected in ‘early 2007’;

8. (viii)
   a purchase by ‘Darwalla’ would have resulted in lower overall costs of production as there would have been only a minimal requirement to increase their number of employees;

9. (ix)
   the subject property is located within approximately 1 hour’s travel of ‘Darwalla’s processing plant situated at Mt Cotton;

10. (x)
    as at the date of resumption there was ‘onsite’ staff accommodation on ‘Darwalla’s land which adjoins Lot 242. Accordingly, there would have been no immediate imperative for the company to establish further ‘onsite accommodation’. In addition, the subject property is in close proximity to the town of Gatton which allows daily commuting for employees;

9. (xi)
   there was, at the date of resumption, no major dams in close proximity to the proposed locations of the broiler sheds on Lots 238 and 242 (Annexure 9) which is an advantage in reducing the risks of wild birds/ducks using those water storages and, in turn, mitigates the risk of disease outbreaks.

10. (xii)
    The large size and the adjoining location of the subject Lots 238 and 242 were special characteristics to these lands that allowed ‘Darwalla’ to readily adapt the subject property to a use as a broiler farm. The large size of the subject lots allowed separation distances for odour and bio security to be readily achievable.”

11. [11]
    In determining the value to be attributed to the resumed land on this basis, Mr Knight adopted two methods of valuation. One involved a “direct comparison” approach, relying on sales of properties which Mr Knight considered to be comparable; but taking into account his opinion that Darwalla was prepared to pay a premium above market value. The other was to assume that Darwalla would develop the resumed land for a chicken farm with a capacity of 1,440,000 birds.
12. [12]
    To determine the premium which Mr Knight adopted for his approach based on land sales evidence, he examined five purchases made by Darwalla (or, perhaps, the Darwalla Group) between 2004 and 2011. One of these, purchased in 2006, was located at Killarney. The other four were located near Allora^[11]. Based on his analysis, Mr Knight concluded that had Darwalla purchased the resumed land in December 2007, it would have paid a premium of 30 per cent above what would otherwise have been the market value, yielding, in his view, a value for the resumed land slightly in excess of $2.9 million^[12].
13. [13]
    For his second approach, Mr Knight analysed five purchases of property by Darwalla. This indicated to him that an overall rate of $2 per bird could be adopted, resulting in a valuation of the resumed land at $2.9 million.^[13]
14. [14]
    Accordingly, he adopted a value for the resumed land of $2.9 million.
15. [15]
    Mr Woodbridge gave valuation evidence on behalf of the State. His valuation approach did not make any allowance for the potential interest of Darwalla in the resumed land, and can be ignored for the purposes of the Inglis appeal.
16. [16]
    There is some additional evidence of particular relevance for this appeal. Mr Bray was the Development Manager for the Darwalla Group. He gave evidence that on the farm at Gatton, Darwalla had conducted a “breeder hen” operation until 2003, which produced fertile eggs, taken elsewhere for hatching. From 2003, the Darwalla Group was looking to acquire other properties in south east Queensland to expand its operation^[14]. He was involved in the purchase of the five properties, the subject of Mr Knight’s analysis. The Gatton property was converted “from breeders to broilers”^[15].
17. [17]
    Mr Bray also gave evidence that three factors were important to the Darwalla Group, when acquiring land for chicken farming. One was access to large volumes of water. Another was described as “separation distances”; relating to the distances between the chicken farm, and neighbours (particularly people living in residential areas), as well as separation from other flocks of birds, and separation of sheds on the farm, to reduce the risk of “bio security contamination”. The third was “a supportive local government”^[16].
18. [18]
    He also gave evidence that he made approaches to Mr Robert Inglis, relating to the potential purchase of the resumed land, and to Mr Doug Weaver, relating to the potential purchase of the Weaver land. In his statement^[17], Mr Bray said these approaches were made in the late 1990s^[18]. In his oral evidence he said that the approach to Mr Weaver was made “in the 2000s”^[19]. The Weaver land was sought for “(f)uture land banking”^[20].
19. [19]
    Mr Bray gave evidence that the supply of water was important for chicken farming operations, both for drinking and for cooling. The property purchased at Killarney had access to town water. The four properties purchased near Allora had ground water allocations^[21]. Since 2006, the availability of water had become more significant, because the State Government had imposed a moratorium on the issue of ground water allocations, making it virtually impossible to obtain a new allocation. The Darwalla farm at Gatton had a water allocation of 120 megalitres per year^[22].
20. [20]
    The Darwalla property at Gatton also had access to town water. That came about as a result of actions taken in 2005. An agreement was reached with two other land owners and the Council, under which Darwalla provided $185,000 towards the construction of a water main to Tallaringa Drive. It would appear the other land owners also contributed to this construction, and Council funds amounting to $200,000 were also made available^[23]. Darwalla was limited in the times at which it could draw water from the town supply. It was required to maintain a reservoir, no doubt so that it could draw water at periods of low demand on the town water supply system, and store it pending the need for its use on the Darwalla farm. In his oral evidence, Mr Bray estimated the length of the main at 7 kilometres, though he also said that the main which had been constructed as a result of the agreement, extended about four kilometres back to the Warrego Highway^[24]. He gave evidence to the effect that the main would have to be upgraded. Mr Bray gave evidence that the water line into the Darwalla farm at Gatton was a two-inch line, which was too small to extend to a chicken farm on the Inglis properties^[25].
21. [21]
    Mr Bray gave evidence that on the Darwalla farm at Gatton, town water was mixed with dam water, in about equal proportions^[26]. There were, on the Darwalla farm at Gatton, two reservoirs each with a capacity of 125,000 litres^[27]. Mr Bray also expressed a preference to have a ground water allocation for the chicken farming activities, because town water has to be paid for at the rate applicable to potable water^[28].
22. [22]
    Darwalla made an application for a development approval to expand its farming operation on to Lot 4 in 2007^[29]; though the correct date was on about 14 March 2008^[30].
23. [23]
    Mr Bray gave evidence that in December 2007, Darwalla “probably would not have been interested in purchasing” the resumed land^[31].
24. [24]
    Mr Benfer was described as a director of Darwalla^[32]. Mr Benfer did not give evidence. In Mr Knight’s report, Mr Benfer is recorded as saying that, if the resumed land “had been put on the open market in 2007, (Darwalla) certainly would have expressed an interest” in it^[33]. On a number of occasions, Counsel for the Inglis parties in the Land Court made it very clear that he did not rely on the statement attributed to Mr Benfer^[34].

Reasons for judgment relevant to the Inglis appeal

25. [25]
    The reasons of the Land Court recorded matters relied upon by Mr Knight for his approach of valuing the resumed land as the site for a chicken farm, with which Mr Bray disagreed. They were that the purchase of the land by Darwalla, and an expansion of its operation onto it, would have only required a minimal increase in the number of employees^[35]; and that the existing staff accommodation would permit a saving in the cost of utilising the resumed land for chicken farming by Darwalla. The reasons also recorded that Mr Bray did not accept the cost referred to in Mr Knight’s report for providing town water to the subject land, of $21,729.
26. [26]
    The reasons contrasted the evidence of Mr Bray about Darwalla’s potential interest in the resumed land in December 2007, with the statement attributed to Mr Benfer^[36]. The learned Member stated that, were it necessary to choose between the two witnesses, he would have accepted the statement of Mr Benfer, as a director of the company^[37]; but went on to record that the Inglis parties did not place any reliance on that statement^[38]. He did, however, accept the evidence of Mr Bray “so far as it relates to his knowledge and experience within the company as distinct from the intentions of the company”^[39].
27. [27]
    The learned Member noted the conflict between Mr Bray’s evidence, that expansion onto the resumed land “would not have resulted in lower overall costs”; and Mr Knight’s view that there would have been a minimal increase in the number of employees. He also noted the conflict between their evidence in relation to saving on staff accommodation, and the cost of supplying water to the resumed land. The learned Member preferred Mr Bray’s evidence on these matters “(i)n view of his position in the company”. He stated, “financial feasibility is less established than Mr Knight believed it to be when he formed his opinion based, in part, on the aspects which have now been shown to be different from his appreciation of them”, and considered them to be of sufficient significance to invalidate Mr Knight’s opinion, as they went to the financial feasibility of the proposed land use^[40]. The learned Member was not prepared to adopt Mr Knight’s view as to the highest and best use of the land; and proceeded to value it on Mr Knight’s alternative basis, related to its use for mixed lifestyle/rural home sites with some associated grazing and /or agriculture (rural site use).

Submissions in Inglis appeal

28. [28]
    It was submitted for the Inglis parties that there was a body of evidence which demonstrated that as at 14 December 2007, Darwalla was likely to be interested in purchasing the resumed land, and accordingly its value was greater than the market value which would have applied, without reference to Darwalla’s interest. It is convenient to refer to the latter as the land’s rural site value.
29. [29]
    A matter primarily relied upon by the Inglis parties on the appeal was the statement by Mr Benfer. In addition, a number of factors set out in a document provided on behalf of the Inglis parties in the course of the hearing of the appeal (Inglis list) were said to support this submission. They included the fact that Darwalla was an adjoining owner; it was in “expansion mode” and for a long time had practised “land banking”; the earlier approaches to the Inglis parties and to Mr Weaver; the availability of town water; the proximity of the resumed land to Darwalla’s Mt Cotton processing facilities; that the resumed land would have enabled the achievement of economies of scale, because of its proximity to the adjoining Darwalla farm; that the resumed land was further from rural residential development than Darwalla’s existing farm; that its size and physical features made it suitable for use as part of Darwalla’s chicken producing operations; and that Darwalla had paid a premium when purchasing other sites.
30. [30]
    The Inglis parties submitted that the learned Member erred in rejecting Mr Knight’s view that an expansion of the Darwalla operations on to the resumed land would have resulted in savings in operational costs, both in relation to the number of employees, and the provision of staff accommodation. It was submitted that he also erred in his finding as to the cost of supplying water to the resumed land. It was further submitted that in any event, in the overall context, these matters were minor; and did not justify a conclusion that the value of the resumed land should have been determined without reference to the fact that Darwalla might have purchased it. In any event, the remaining grounds relied upon by Mr Knight justified that conclusion, but were not considered by the learned Member.
31. [31]
    The submissions for the Inglis parties made reference to four authorities in relation to the interest of an adjoining owner: Raja Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v The Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam^[41] (Raja’s case); Commissioner of Highways v Tynan^[42] (Tynan’s case); Phillipou v Housing Commission of Victoria^[43] (Phillipou’s case); and Purden v Minister for Lands and Works^[44] (Purden’s case). It was submitted that a consideration of these cases showed that the potential interest of Darwalla in purchasing the resumed land was sufficient to increase its value above the rural site value, if it were established that Darwalla would have been likely to offer more than the latter value if the land had been offered for sale at the date of resumption^[45]. It was submitted that such an inference should be drawn from the evidence in the present case. If this Court were not prepared to accept Mr Knight’s conclusion about the extent to which Darwalla would have been prepared to offer more than the rural site value, then it should form its own view about the matter rather than remit the case to the Land Court for further consideration.
32. [32]
    For the State it was submitted that the learned Member was correct to ignore the evidence of Mr Benfer’s statement, because the Inglis parties had expressly disavowed reliance on it in the Land Court. The evidence was that the last occasion on which Darwalla had expressed an interest in purchasing the resumed land was in the late 1990s (probably 1998^[46]). Darwalla’s interest in the resumed land had ceased by the date of resumption. One reason was because of the unavailability of water from underground sources (it is convenient to refer to this as ground water). The other was the cost of connecting to the local authority’s water supply system (it is convenient to refer to water from that source as town water), and the ongoing cost of the town water. Another was that it had, by the resumption date, commenced the process of obtaining local authority approval for the development of Lot 4. There were sound reasons for maintaining a substantial distance between the breeding operation on its farm, and any broiler operation, relating to controlling the spread of disease (referred to as bio-security). This was reflected in its expansion programme, which had resulted in the purchase of farms substantial distances from its farm near Gatton.
33. [33]
    For the State it was also submitted that the case of the Inglis parties in the Land Court had been based on the certainty that Darwalla would have purchased the resumed land for a price of $2.9 million, had it been available for purchase at the date of resumption^[47], a case for which there was a complete absence of factual support; or at least insufficient support for that to be reliably found. The authorities demonstrated that it was necessary to consider the actual intentions of the adjoining owner; but in the present case there was no evidence that Darwalla, at the date of resumption, intended to purchase the resumed land. There was no evidence of its interest in purchasing the land after 2006, when the State Government introduced a moratorium on permitting the establishment of new bores to give access to underground water. An adequate water supply was critical to the operation of a poultry farm. Of the five properties which Darwalla had purchased for the expansion of its operations, four had an existing water entitlement. There were no potential savings associated with an expansion of Darwalla’s operation under the resumed land by reference to staff accommodation, or the reduction of operating costs. Mr Bray’s evidence established that at the date of resumption, Darwalla had no actual intention of purchasing the resumed land. He also gave evidence that Darwalla did not purchase land on the basis of a rate per bird to be produced by a chicken farm established on such land. Nor did he consider that Darwalla had paid a premium above what would otherwise have been the market value, for the farms which it purchased for the expansion of its operations.
34. [34]
    As to the authorities, for the State, reliance was placed on Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Perry^[48] (Perry’s case). It was submitted that the authorities demonstrate the necessity of considering, at the date of resumption, the potential that a special purchaser may wish to purchase the resumed land, and that such a purchaser may be prepared to do so at a price above what would otherwise be the market value of the land. That was not the approach taken by the Inglis parties in the Land Court.
35. [35]
    For the State it was also submitted that, in any event, the Land Court Member was correct to find that the resumed land should not be valued by reference to its potential for use for the expansion of Darwalla’s operations^[49]. Thus it contended that the learned Member erred in expressing a preference for the statement of Mr Benfer over the evidence of Mr Bray. It also contended that Mr Knight’s view should not be accepted, it being beyond the scope of his expertise to express an opinion that Darwalla would have purchased the resumed land at the date of resumption for the price of which he gave evidence; and his analysis of other purchases by Darwalla, to determine a premium above what would otherwise have been the market value was invalid. The last-mentioned contention was supported by a number of submissions made to the Land Court, including a submission that Mr Knight’s determination of the value of water entitlements had no evidentiary basis and was accordingly inadmissible.

Principles applicable where an adjoining owner may wish to purchase resumed land

36. [36]
    Raja’s case commenced with the proposition that compensation “must be determined … by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser”^[50]. That proposition may be seen as related to the formulation of Griffith CJ in Spencer v Commonwealth^[51], referring to a person desiring to buy the land on the one hand, and a vendor willing to sell it for a fair price but not desirous to sell, on the other; or as later expressed by his Honour, “a desirous purchaser”, and “a not unwilling vendor”. The propositions subsequently stated in Raja’s case are directed to the determination of market value, although in particular circumstances.
37. [37]
    The judgment in Raja’s case then records that the fact that some particular purchaser might desire the land more than others is not to be disregarded^[52]. Nor is the possibility of the land’s being used for a particular purpose^[53]. Nevertheless, where such a potentiality is to be taken into account, any addition to the value may need to be reduced by reference to the possibility that the land might never be required for that purpose, or might not be required for it for a considerable time^[54]. Such a potentiality of the land is to be taken into account even if there is only one possible purchaser to whom the potentiality is of value, such as an adjoining land owner^[55]. Raja’s case decided that such a potentiality had to be considered, even where the only purchaser to whom it might be of value was the authority compulsorily acquiring the land^[56]. There is no reason to doubt the continuing authority of Raja’s case^[57].
38. [38]
    In Phillipou’s case, it was held that the potentiality of resumed land, the likelihood of an adjoining owner buying the land, and the likelihood that that owner would be willing to pay something more than what would otherwise be the market value of the land, were factors to be taken into account in assessing its value^[58]. Offers which had previously been made by the adjoining owner were not to be taken into account as proof of its value; but they demonstrated the interest of the adjoining owner in purchasing the land^[59]. Such offers were not decisive^[60]. How much additional value should be attributed to the interest of the adjoining owner in purchasing the land was a question of fact^[61].
39. [39]
    In Purden’s case Crawford J applied Raja’s case. However, his Honour held that the value of the land could be increased above what it would otherwise be, only if the fact it was needed by, and thus had a higher value to, an adjoining owner were known to the vendor^[62]. In such a case, the vendor might make that known to a potential purchaser, being relevant to the amount which a vendor would be prepared to accept for the land.
40. [40]
    In Spencer’s case, Isaacs J^[63] stated that it was necessary to suppose that both the vendor and purchaser were “perfectly acquainted with the land, and cognizant of all circumstances which might affect its value, either advantageously or prejudicially …”. A literal reading of his Honour’s formulation might suggest that regard is to be had to factors not necessarily known to the vendor; and that Crawford J has unduly limited circumstances in which an adjoining owner’s interest in purchasing the land might be taken into account. However, Crawford J’s approach is consistent with the view expressed by McHugh J in Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd^[64], adopted by the Court in Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority^[65], expressed in the following statement:

“The market for the property is, therefore, assumed to be an efficient market in which buyers and sellers have access to all currently available information that affects the property.” (emphasis added)

41. [41]
    The approach taken by Crawford J in Purden’s case would seem to be orthodox. It may however result in unfairness to a landowner whose land is compulsorily acquired, where evidence demonstrates that an adjoining owner would have been prepared to pay more than the value of the land to the general market, by reason of information not generally available at the date of resumption. It is unnecessary to consider this question further in the present case; and it is sufficient to assume Crawford J to be correct.
42. [42]
    On that basis, a number of propositions relevant to the present case might be identified from these authorities. In determining the market value of resumed land at the date of resumption, any potentiality of the land is to be taken into account, even where that potentiality is only of value to a single purchaser, such as an adjoining owner. Offers to purchase the land by an adjoining owner, may demonstrate that owner’s interest; and accordingly that the land has a special value to that owner. However, the cases do not establish that evidence of such offers is essential^[66]. To be relevant, factors which would point to a conclusion that an adjoining owner would pay more than what would otherwise be the market value of the land at the relevant date must be among the information available at least to the land owner. In determining the significance of such interest, regard is to be had to the possibility that the adjoining land owner might never require the land to take advantage of its special potentiality, or might not require it for that purpose for a considerable time.
43. [43]
    The submissions for the Inglis parties referred to Tynan’s case in support of the proposition that a valuer might give evidence of the value which land might have, by reason of the fact that an adjoining land owner would have been prepared to pay a higher amount than other purchasers for the land. In Tynan’s case Wells J held that a valuer might give evidence of the value of the land, taking into account the special value the land might have to its owner^[67]. In doing so, his Honour expressed the view that such a special value requires the application of principles which are virtually the same as those laid down in Spencer’s case. Similar considerations arise in the case of an adjoining owner, although the party for whom the land has some special potentiality is different. There is no reason to think that a valuer might not express an opinion about the amount which an adjoining owner might be prepared to pay, representing a premium above what might otherwise be the land’s market value.

Statements relating to Darwalla’s interest in the resumed land

44. [44]
    There can be no doubt that Counsel for the Inglis parties made it plain that those parties did not rely on the statement made by Mr Benfer that Darwalla would have been interested in purchasing the resumed land at the date of resumption. The position taken by Counsel for the Inglis parties was recorded by the learned Member^[68]. As previously mentioned, the learned Member stated that he would accept the evidence of Mr Benfer, where it is in conflict with that of Mr Bray, “were there a need to make that choice”^[69].
45. [45]
    The language used by the learned Member in relation to Mr Benfer’s statement reflected the position taken by Counsel for the Inglis parties in the course of the hearing in the Land Court. It does not amount to a finding that the learned Member accepted the evidence of Mr Benfer. The submission made on behalf of the Inglis parties that he did so, should not be accepted.
46. [46]
    For the Inglis parties, the position was taken that even if their Counsel had disavowed reliance on Mr Benfer’s statement at the Land Court hearing, they could change their position in this appeal, this Court being required to act according to equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case^[70].
47. [47]
    For the State, it was submitted that, had the Inglis parties not abandoned reliance on the statement from Mr Benfer, he might have been required for cross-examination. Those parties should not be permitted to resile from the position they adopted in the Land Court. In reply, it was submitted for the Inglis parties that it was unlikely that cross-examination would lead Mr Benfer to resile from his statement.
48. [48]
    At the Land Court hearing, the Inglis parties were represented by Counsel of considerable experience. The fact that Counsel chose to conduct the case for them in a particular way is a matter of some significance in determining whether it would be in accordance with equity, good conscience, and the substantial merits of the case, to permit them to depart from that course. Account must also be taken of the prospect that the State conducted its case, by reference to the way in which the case was conducted for the Inglis parties. Notwithstanding the provisions of s 55, these matters provide good reason not to permit the Inglis parties to depart from the course taken in the Land Court. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider whether such evidence would have any evidentiary value.

Costs associated with supply of water to resumed land

49. [49]
    In the written submissions for the Inglis parties in their appeal dated 2 June 2014 (IOS1) it was submitted that the learned Member erred in accepting Mr Bray’s evidence about the cost of operating water for a chicken farm on the resumed land in a sum “very close to $250,000”, as establishing the cost of connexion to town water^[71]. It was submitted that this evidence related to the cost of connecting town water to the existing Darwalla farm, and not the cost of extending the connection from that farm to the resumed land^[72]. The cost of connecting the Darwalla farm to town water was in fact $185,000^[73]. It was submitted that Mr Bray resiled in cross-examination from his evidence-in-chief about the need to upgrade the water main “all the way back along the Warrego Highway”, accepting that water could be supplied by pumping it from the reservoir on the Darwalla farm, located a distance of about 1.6 kilometres from the resumed land^[74]. It was also submitted that Mr Bray’s estimate was “lay evidence”. It was also submitted that his evidence was based only on an assumption, relying on Mr Bray’s evidence to that effect^[75]. It was submitted that the learned Member erred when allowing the evidence to be admitted over objection, and he further erred in preferring it to the evidence on which Mr Knight relied.
50. [50]
    For the Inglis parties it was also asserted, as mentioned earlier, that even if the cost of connecting town water to the resumed land had been in the order of $250,000, that would not have been of significance^[76]. This submission was supplemented orally by reference to the total cost of establishing a chicken farm; and the gross annual turnover and operating costs. It was also submitted in the Inglis list that the cost of Darwalla’s use of town water was only a small fraction of its revenues, the cost for two years (from July 2010 to July 2012) being only $32,106.74^[77].
51. [51]
    For the State reliance was placed on Mr Bray’s evidence about the cost of connection to the town water supply being “around $250,000”^[78]. Reliance was also placed on his evidence to the effect that the water main extension constructed in 2007 would have to be, in effect, duplicated^[79]. It was submitted that cross-examination of Mr Bray went no further than to establish that water for a chicken farm, if one were established on the resumed land, would have to be pumped into the reservoir on the existing Darwalla farm^[80]; he did not resile from his evidence that the main would have to be duplicated. Reliance was also placed on Mr Bray’s oral evidence, said to be that the existing two inch pipe into the existing farm was not sufficient for a farm with a capacity of 1.4 million birds, which was why the duplication back to the Warrego Highway, a distance of four kilometres, would be necessary^[81]. It was submitted that Mr Bray’s evidence that the existing two inch pipe would not have a sufficient capacity to service such a farm on the resumed land was not challenged^[82].
52. [52]
    The State’s list of factors relevant to establishing any interest of Darwalla in the resumed land (State’s list) pointed out that the invoices for the two year period from July 2010 to July 2012 for the supply of town water to the existing farm showed a cost of $302,439.08^[83].
53. [53]
    The correspondence between Gatton Shire Council and Mr Bray, commencing on 2 March 2005, demonstrates that the Council agreed to the construction of a water main to Tallaringa Drive on condition that three entities (described as the interested parties) provided funding for the project. Darwalla was required to pay an amount of $185,000 towards the project, and a further sum of $10,000 for the installation of telemetry to permit monitoring and control of the flow of water to Darwalla’s reservoirs. Darwalla was not required to pay headworks charges, on the basis that water would be taken from the town water supply only when not required by customers who have paid headworks charges. The Council intended to provide the sum of $200,000 towards the cost of the project^[84].
54. [54]
    Although not explained in the submissions, it is apparent that Tallaringa Drive runs into the Darwalla farm, connecting it to the Gatton-Esk Road to the east, which in turn connects to the Warrego Highway to the south^[85].
55. [55]
    It is correct to say that when giving evidence in relation to the cost of providing a water supply to a poultry farm on the resumed land, Mr Bray stated that he “would assume that it would be very close” to a figure of $250,000^[86]. It is self-evident that when a witness identifies a proposition as an assumption, that evidence does not establish that the assumption is correct. The submissions for the State do not show any reason for treating Mr Bray’s evidence as being anything other than the identification of an assumption. On that basis, it was an error to act on it.
56. [56]
    The learned Member appeared to treat the evidence as opinion evidence, as to the need to duplicate the water connection back to the Warrego Highway. Ordinarily, evidence of an opinion of that kind could only be given by a person with sufficient expertise, typically an engineer. There was no suggestion that Mr Bray had such expertise. However, the opinion would only carry weight if based on proven facts, such as the capacity of the existing pipeline connecting to the Warrego Highway, and the extent to which that capacity was taken up by the demands of other properties served by the pipe. There was no evidence of that kind.
57. [57]
    The sparse evidence which is available does not tend to suggest that the pipe would have to be duplicated, in order to provide at least some supply to a chicken farm on the resumed land. A prudent Council might well have taken the view that it would be desirable, when installing a new pipeline, to make it of sufficient capacity to serve properties in addition to the particular properties envisaged at the time to be connected to it. The fact that the Council decided itself to make a contribution to the cost of constructing the pipeline is consistent with it taking that approach. It can at least be said that the documents do not support the view that there was no available capacity in the existing connection back to the Warrego Highway.
58. [58]
    It follows that the learned Member erred in concluding that, on the basis of Mr Bray’s evidence, it would cost “very close” to $250,000 to connect the resumed land to town water.
59. [59]
    Mr Bray may have been in a position to give evidence that the “line into the farm” with (it would appear) a diameter of two inches would not have sufficient capacity to supply water for a chicken farm on the resumed land^[87], based on his experience, if that were a reference to the pipe from the pipeline constructed by the Council, to the storage facilities on Darwalla’s farm^[88]. The basis for the opinion, however, is not clear. The quotation relied upon by Mr Knight^[89] indicated that the cost of a 100 millimetre pipeline for a distance of 1.6 kilometres was a little over $20,000. If it were necessary to duplicate the connection from the storage facilities on Darwalla’s farm, to the main constructed to Tallaringa Drive, this evidence might provide some guidance as to the order of cost involved. If, notwithstanding the difficulty previously identified, any weight were to be given to this evidence, it would suggest that the cost of providing an adequate supply to a chicken farm on the resumed land, by a connection through the Darwalla site, would not have been much greater than the amount referred to by Mr Knight. In the context identified in the submissions made for the Inglis parties, such a cost would not materially affect the overall cost of establishing a chicken farm on the resumed land, nor the amount which Darwalla, if it were interested in purchasing the resumed land, would have been willing to pay for it.
60. [60]
    The costs of the supply of water to the Darwalla farm in the period from 2010 to 2012 were incorrectly identified in the list provided for the Inglis parties. It would appear to have been correctly identified in the State’s list. However, the submissions for the State did not establish any basis in principle for having regard to these costs, relating to a period some years after the date of resumption. These costs are quite different from the cost of supplying water to the Darwalla farm in the period from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2006, referred to in material relied upon in the written submissions for the Inglis parties^[90]. Although Mr Bray’s evidence placed some reliance on the fact that water from a town water supply would be more expensive than water from underground sources^[91], he did not suggest that at the date of resumption, the cost was at the level reached in these years; nor that it was expected to rise to such a level. Accordingly, the costs in this period may be ignored.

Staff accommodation and overall cost of production

61. [61]
    Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal for the Inglis parties contended that the learned Member erred in rejecting Mr Knight’s list of reasons for concluding that Darwalla would have paid an amount in excess of what would otherwise have been the market value for the resumed land at the time of the resumption^[92]. The only additional reasons which were rejected by the learned Member were those relating to lower overall costs of production, particularly relating to the number of employees which would be required; and savings relating to staff accommodation. The written submissions for the Inglis parties relied on Mr Knight’s evidence about these reasons^[93]. The oral submissions made brief reference to obvious commercial benefits said to be associated with the establishment of a chicken farm by Darwalla on the resumed land.
62. [62]
    The learned Member accepted Mr Bray’s evidence about these matters^[94]. Mr Bray’s knowledge of the operations of Darwalla, and what would be required for an expansion of them, meant that he was well placed to give such evidence. Mr Bray gave reasons for his conclusions which are not shown to be unsatisfactory. There is no reason to disturb the findings of the learned Member about these matters.

Overall conclusions relating to interest of Darwalla in the resumed land

63. [63]
    The primary thrust of the submissions made for the Inglis parties was that a number of the reasons identified by Mr Knight were not rejected by the Member; but he failed to consider them, and on the basis of them, to determine whether there should have been some increase in the value of the land by reason of Darwalla’s interest in it. The effect of the submissions for the Inglis parties was that these matters demonstrated that it would have been appropriate to assess the value at a higher amount than what would be the case without reference to any interest by Darwalla.
64. [64]
    For the Inglis parties, it was also submitted that, at least by reference to Darwalla’s practice of “land banking”, the value should have been assessed at a higher level than what it would otherwise have been.
65. [65]
    For the State it was submitted that a number of the matters set out in Mr Knight’s reasons were speculative, and for that reason inadmissible^[95]. Reference was also made to Mr Bray’s evidence that Darwalla made an application for a development approval for a poultry farm on Lot 4, which it was unlikely to have abandoned^[96]. It was also submitted that the reasons of the learned Member sufficiently identified why he did not accept Mr Knight’s conclusion that the value of the land should have been affected by Darwalla’s interest in it^[97].
66. [66]
    The learned Member briefly stated Mr Knight’s conclusion about the value of the land, by reference to the potential interest of Darwalla, and gave recognition to Mr Knight’s reasons for reaching that conclusion^[98]. He then identified three of those reasons which were contentious. In respect of those matters, he found in favour of the State and considered that his finding was sufficient to mean that Mr Knight’s conclusion relating to Darwalla’s potential interest in the land should not be accepted. He also noted Mr Knight’s statement that the financial feasibility of a poultry farm on the land was relevant, and that the matters on which he found in favour of the State meant that this financial feasibility was “less established” than Mr Knight had concluded^[99]. Having first referred to Mr Knight’s reasons, and having identified that he rejected Mr Knight’s conclusion because he did not accept some of them, it inevitably follows that the learned Member considered that the remaining reasons identified by Mr Knight were not sufficient to support a conclusion that the land should be valued by reference to its potential use as a poultry farm. Although not elaborate, the reasons sufficiently identify the basis for the finding.
67. [67]
    It is convenient at this point to discuss the reasons identified by Mr Knight, said by the State to be speculation. The first of these is that Darwalla had been in expansion mode since at least 2004. That seems to be an accurate reflection of known facts about its conduct.
68. [68]
    The second is that Darwalla had historically been interested in purchasing the resumed land, to expand its operations. Again, that seems to be a reasonable reflection of the fact that at an earlier point in time Darwalla had expressed an interest in purchasing the resumed land, and the response of Mr Inglis had discouraged any further expression of interest.
69. [69]
    The fifth of Mr Knight’s reasons relates to the availability of markets for poultry. It seems to reflect an appropriate inference, bearing in mind the size of Darwalla’s business, and the fact that it was at the date of resumption planning to expand its operations by developing Lot 4.
70. [70]
    The sixth of Mr Knight’s reasons was that Darwalla could have readily developed the resumed lots in a way which would “fit in” with the existing poultry farm. Why this should be regarded as speculation was not explained. It appears to reflect the proximity of the properties, the physical characteristics of the resumed land, and the (no doubt likely) ability of Darwalla to arrange the development of a poultry farm on the resumed land in a way that would relate appropriately to its existing poultry farm.
71. [71]
    The remaining question is whether the circumstances would have indicated, at least to the Inglis parties if considering a sale of the resumed land at the date of resumption, that Darwalla would have been prepared to pay a price for that land greater than what would otherwise have been its market value. Of some significance is the fact that at that time, Darwalla was taking steps to develop a poultry farm on Lot 4. Although an application for a development approval was not made until 14 March 2008^[100], it is apparent from the application that it was accompanied by reports and other documents which inevitably would have taken some time to prepare^[101]. Mr Bray gave evidence that the application was prepared in late 2007^[102]. Mr Knight’s enquiries are consistent with work having commenced on the application prior to the resumption date^[103].
72. [72]
    The circumstances result in a real doubt about whether Darwalla’s potential interest in the land would result in it having an increased value. A number of the matters relied upon by Mr Knight point to a conclusion that it would have been attractive to Darwalla. On the other hand, Darwalla already held Lot 4. It may be a matter for argument whether the fact that Darwalla was in the course of preparing an application for its development was information available to the Inglis parties and a potential purchaser, though it seems relatively likely that such information would have been available on enquiry; and in any event, this was not a matter relied upon for the Inglis parties. The submissions for the Inglis parties did not seek to establish that the resumed land enjoyed advantages over Lot 4 for the establishment of a poultry farm at about the date of resumption. Although Mr Knight gave evidence that, by the date of resumption, it was becoming apparent that an approval for the development of Lot 4 was unlikely^[104], he resiled from that evidence in cross-examination^[105].  On balance, Darwalla’s interest in the expansion of its operations at about the date of the resumption does not seem to provide a sufficient basis for concluding that, for that reason, the resumed land would have had an increased value.
73. [73]
    Darwalla’s previous conduct shows that it was interested in acquiring land for “land banking”. For that reason, had the resumed land been put on the market at the date of resumption, it may have been interested in purchasing it. It by no means follows that the premium calculated by Mr Knight, which appears to be derived from the purchase of properties to be developed for poultry farming in the short term, would be applicable to such a purchase. Nor has it been shown that, for the purpose of land banking, there was a real prospect that Darwalla would be prepared to pay a price above what would otherwise be the market value of the land.

Conclusion on appeal by Inglis parties

74. [74]
    The Inglis parties have failed to establish that the learned Member erred, because he has not attributed a greater value to the land by reason of its attractiveness to Darwalla.

State’s appeal against valuation of resumed land

75. [75]
    Although Mr Knight valued the resumed land by reference to the fact that it would have a higher value to Darwalla than to any other potential purchaser, he provided an alternative valuation of it on what was described as a “rural use basis”^[106]. This was based on the view that the highest and best use of the land was for what were described as “mixed lifestyle/rural home sites with associated grazing and/or cultivation.”  In addition, Mr Knight, relying on evidence from a town planner, Mr Higginson, concluded that a reasonable prospective purchaser would be satisfied there were good prospects of subdividing the larger of the two resumed parcels, Lot 238, into two allotments of equal size^[107]. The learned Member rejected the valuation presented by Mr Woodbridge, called for the State; and adopted the alternative valuation of Mr Knight. In its appeal against the determination of the value of the land, the State has contended that the learned Member erred in rejecting Mr Woodbridge’s valuation; and that he also erred in accepting the evidence as to the prospects of a subdivision of Lot 238.

Land Court’s reasons for rejecting Mr Woodbridge

76. [76]
    The learned Member recorded that Mr Woodbridge valued the land on the basis of sales of properties within the immediate locality of the resumed land. The sales occurred between August 2005 and December 2006. Those sales were said to have been “indexed” to account for the passage of time, by reference to what was described as “the internal statistical documentation known as the State Valuation Service Market Survey Report 2006 (Esk Shire, Laidley Shire, Gatton Shire) and State Valuation Service Market Survey Report 2007 (Esk Shire, Laidley Shire, Gatton Shire)”^[108]. The index factor for the 12 month period from October 2005 to October 2006 was 1.3; and for the following 12 months to October 2007 was 1.1. The combined index factor for the two periods was 1.43^[109].
77. [77]
    The learned Member recorded Mr Woodbridge’s reason for using the earlier sales was that sales of single large lots, comparable to Lot 238 were “scarce within the immediate area”^[110]. The learned Member stated that Mr Woodbridge had “for no good reason” limited the sale evidence to that area^[111]. He then referred to authority to the effect that special consideration should not be given to sales within a specified area over and above sales outside that area, provided that the lands are truly comparable^[112], observing that “comparability cannot be reduced in its contents to mere propinquity”. In the learned Member’s view, Mr Woodbridge’s approach had the consequence that “an error in method was brought in at the commencement of the process in valuation”^[113].
78. [78]
    With respect to the adoption of the earlier sales, the learned Member referred to a statement in Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue^[114] to the effect that “(t)he traditional, and usually unexceptionable, method is to seek out relatively contemporaneous sales of comparable properties” as the basis for the determination of value. He noted that where adjustments of 43 per cent were required simply to account for the passage of time, sales would not be likely to be regarded as “relatively contemporaneous”^[115].
79. [79]
    The learned Member also referred to a statement of Mason J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v St Helens Farm ACT Pty Ltd^[116], where his Honour said “valuation is a matter of estimation, not of precise mathematical calculation.”  He referred to the appearance of authority which the arithmetic precision of the indices in the Market Survey Reports appeared to convey^[117]. One of those had become exhibit 41, and his Honour inferred from its contents, it would appear correctly, that it was produced for the purposes of s 37 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (Qld) (repealed). Such a report was something that the Chief Executive could take into account in deciding not to make an annual valuation of land in an area, which that Act would otherwise have required.
80. [80]
    Of the Market Survey Report put in evidence, the learned Member noted that the author or authors were not identified, nor were they called to give evidence; and none of the material on which it was based was able to be tested. Its purpose was simply to enable the Chief Executive to consider whether an annual valuation should not be undertaken for the particular year, and the conclusion was that such a valuation should be undertaken. He observed that it was not itself a valuation of specific land. It also referred to the “variable market of the nature experienced in Gatton to date”, which would require “significant manual input into differentiating between categories of significant increases and those to be increased to a lesser degree or rewritten where sales information and support may be scarce”^[118]. He concluded that the report was of no assistance for the present case, and the factors applied to the sales adopted by Mr Woodbridge “cannot be considered to have any reliability at all”^[119].
81. [81]
    The learned Member then referred to the fact that in 2009, Mr Woodbridge had prepared a valuation of the subject land (as at the date of resumption), based on the same six sales as Mr Woodbridge used in his trial report^[120]. He observed that in that report, Mr Woodbridge adopted the same value ($1,876,177) for the resumed land, as in his trial report. The 2009 report made no reference to indexing, though this was described in the trial report as “required when comparing sales to Lot 238”^[121]. The learned Member noted the absence of any explanation for the “very substantial adjustments” from the sale evidence to the adopted value.^[122]
82. [82]
    In Mr Woodbridge’s trial report, he referred to the seven sales relied upon by Mr Knight. He expressed the view that these sales supported his valuation^[123]. The learned Member stated that he did not accept Mr Woodbridge’s method of adjusting sales^[124]. He stated that the use by Mr Woodbridge of the index factors had the effect of contaminating his use of the sales used by Mr Knight, and accordingly he was unable to rely upon Mr Woodbridge’s valuation of the land on the basis of rural uses, whether or not it had a potential for subdivision^[125].

Submissions relating to the adopted value

83. [83]
    For the State it was submitted that it was a matter of valuation judgment to determine which, out of the possible range of sales which might be regarded as comparable to the land to be valued, were the most appropriate; and a determination that sales in closer geographical proximity to the subject were more appropriate “is not a threshold error in methodology”^[126]. By reference to a valuation text book^[127], it was submitted that market movement indices based on the analysis “of a broader basket of sales” are an accepted way of assessing market movement. Mr Woodbridge gave evidence that the conclusions in the Market Survey Reports were based on actual market sales data; and he was not cross-examined about the underlying information^[128]. It was submitted that to the extent that the learned Member considered the magnitude of the adjustment to be fatal to Mr Woodbridge’s approach, that was wrong in law^[129]. In any event, Mr Woodbridge’s reliance on the sales used by Mr Knight was not “contaminated” by his approach to sales in the immediate vicinity of the resumed land. In particular, regard should have been had to his comparison of the resumed land to sales referred to as Sale 5 and Sale 6, of those relied on by Mr Knight^[130].
84. [84]
    Mr Brown, a town planner called by the State, considered that a subdivision of Lot 238 would be in conflict with a provision of the Reconfiguration of a Lot Code of the Gatton Planning Scheme, P 41. That provision is as follows:

“New lots proposed to be located on or adjacent to good quality agricultural land do not impact on the ongoing operational efficiency of that agricultural land”^[131].

85. [85]
    It was submitted that the learned Member rejected Mr Brown on the ground that he did not explain why subdividing Lot 238 was likely to result in a reduced operational efficiency of the land; and he erred in doing so, Mr Brown having provided such an explanation^[132].
86. [86]
    It was also submitted that Mr Higginson was wrong to rely on what was said to be a development commitment under the SPP Guideline; and in his approach to the question whether the ongoing operational efficiency of the land would be adversely affected by its subdivision. The learned Member erred by failing to analyse Mr Higginson’s opinion^[133].
87. [87]
    Orally, these submissions were supplemented by reference to Crompton v Commissioner of Highways^[134] and Leichhardt Municipal Council v Seatainer Terminals Pty Ltd^[135].
88. [88]
    For the Inglis parties, it was submitted that the State had not identified any appealable error in the reasoning of the learned Member which led to his adoption of the evidence of Mr Knight. In particular, it was submitted orally that Mr Woodbridge’s valuation was based on sales within the immediate area^[136]; and that he had not used Mr Knight’s sales for the purpose of “undertaking a full comparable sales” valuation^[137].
89. [89]
    With respect to the rejection of Mr Brown’s evidence, reference was made to his oral evidence about expectations about how the land might be used after it was subdivided^[138]. It was submitted, however, this provided no explanation as to how it was said that the subdivision itself would impact upon “the ongoing operational efficiency of … agricultural land”^[139].

The learned Member’s rejection of the evidence of Mr Woodbridge

90. [90]
    The submissions made on behalf of the State seek to present the findings of the learned Member as findings of law, which are then said to be erroneous. It is not correct to characterise the learned Member’s findings as findings of law; rather, they identify his reasons for rejecting the valuation approach taken by Mr Woodbridge in assessing the value of the resumed land; the major considerations related to his identification of relevant sales; and his method of applying those sales to assess the value of the land at the resumption date. While conceptually different, the two issues are inter-related.
91. [91]
    Notwithstanding his references to the sales relied upon by Mr Knight, it is clear that Mr Woodbridge assessed the value of the resumed land on the basis of his sales of properties he considered to be in the immediate area of the resumed land. They were the sales on which his 2009 valuation was based; and they again formed the basis for his trial report, resulting in an identical assessment of its value.
92. [92]
    On the approach taken by Mr Woodbridge, there appeared to have been significant movements in the market for relevant land over the period between his sales, and the resumption date. An increase in the value of land of the order of 43 per cent over a two year period is not something commonly encountered, anywhere, let alone across a rural shire. Such a change requires an adjustment in addition to adjustments required for differences between any sale property, and the property to be valued. Moreover, as the learned Member correctly noted, there were good reasons to doubt the applicability of the indices to the use of the sales identified by Mr Woodbridge to value the resumed land. There was no way to assess the reliability of each index factor. The report recorded considerable variability in market movement for different categories of land. Moreover, the purpose for which these reports were prepared was not irrelevant. They were not directed to a precise determination of market movements, notwithstanding the appearance of precision which the numbers gave. These considerations provide an appropriate basis for rejecting the approach taken by Mr Woodbridge.
93. [93]
    Mr Woodbridge also recorded the scarcity of relevant sales within the immediate area. Yet it is apparent that when deriving the value he adopted for the resumed land, he limited himself to such sales. There was no suggestion that, in reaching his conclusion as to value, he had considered sales of comparable properties, which occurred close in time to the resumption date. The approach taken by Mr Woodbridge is inconsistent with the statement of principle in Crompton, referred to in the oral submissions for the State^[140].
94. [94]
    It follows that the State has not shown that the learned Member was wrong to conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, Mr Woodbridge erred in the method he adopted at the commencement of the valuation process; nor that that had the consequence that in initially deriving his valuation, he proceeded in a way which was “inimical to the validity of the process”. He excluded from his consideration at that stage sales which may well have shed better light on the value of the resumed land at the date of its resumption. His subsequent reference in his trial report to the sales relied upon by Mr Knight demonstrates their relevance; and supports the conclusion that his initial approach was erroneous.
95. [95]
    Contrary to what appears to be suggested on behalf of the State, the learned Member did not take the view that it is never appropriate to rely on earlier sales, after making some adjustment for market movement. On analysis, he took the view that the method relied upon by Mr Woodbridge was, in the circumstances of this case, unreliable.
96. [96]
    The learned Member recorded that Mr Woodbridge’s 2009 report (yielding an identical valuation to the trial report) made no reference to indexing^[141]. He appeared to have regarded that as odd. However, he made no finding as to whether the 2009 report in fact was the result of the application of the indices. The basis for the rejection of Mr Woodbridge’s evidence was his restriction of sales initially considered to those of properties in the immediate locality of the resumed land; and his adoption of the indices derived from the Market Survey Reports. It cannot be said that his rejection of Mr Woodbridge’s valuation was erroneous, because Mr Woodbridge relied on the indexes in both his 2009 report, and his trial report.
97. [97]
    The learned Member noted Mr Woodbridge’s references to the sales relied upon by Mr Knight. He correctly recorded Mr Woodbridge’s view that those sales provided “support” for his valuation^[142]. It is apparent, however, that these sales did not form the basis of Mr Woodbridge’s assessment of value. Having rejected the basis, the learned Member was entitled to reject Mr Woodbridge’s valuation. It is apparent that he considered that Mr Woodbridge’s derivation of support from Mr Knight’s sales was unsatisfactory, because Mr Woodbridge had independently, and wrongly, reached his conclusion about the value of the resumed land, prior to the consideration of these sales^[143]. Again, no error has been shown in his approach.
98. [98]
    With respect to the prospect of obtaining approval which would result in the subdivision of Lot 238, the learned Member referred to the evidence of Mr Higginson^[144]. Mr Higginson expressed the view that a lot of 100 hectares would be more than adequate for farming purposes, having regard to average sizes in what he referred to as “the valley”, of lots used for agricultural activities. Mr Higginson noted that a study by Powell and others published by the Department of Natural Resources and Mines in 2002^[145] referred to average agricultural farm sizes of 25 to 40 hectares^[146]. It is apparent that the learned Member accepted this evidence^[147]. That being the case, the learned Member was correct to conclude that a purchaser would consider it likely that a subdivision of Lot 238 into two allotments would be approved, such a subdivision not being in conflict with P-41 of the Reconfiguration Code.

Conclusion on the State’s appeal against the determination of value

99. [99]
    It follows that the State has failed to establish that the learned Member erred in his assessment of the value of the resumed land.

Appeal against award for disturbance

100. [100]
     The learned Member awarded a sum of $189,645.09 for disturbance. The amount awarded was the total of the amount claimed for legal fees, and fees for other professionals.
101. [101]
     The State contended, in essence, that the learned Member failed to give independent consideration to the amount to be awarded, and relied improperly on the judgment of the solicitor for the Inglis parties who gave evidence in support of this part of their claim.

Relevant law

102. [102]
     Section 14 of the Acquisition of Land and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Qld) (Amendment Act) made amendments to s 20 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (Acquisition Act), which took effect from 23 February 2009. As a result of these amendments, s 20(1) of the Acquisition Act specifically required that, in assessing compensation for the resumption of land, regard is to be had to “the claimant’s costs attributable to disturbance”. Section 20(5) then defined the expression “costs attributable to disturbance”. It is unnecessary to set out that definition.
103. [103]
     Although the Amendment Act included some transitional provisions, there was no such provision in relation to the amendments to s 20 of the Acquisition Act.
104. [104]
     For many years prior to these amendments, it has been common to include in an award of compensation for the resumption of land, an amount of money allowed in respect of the cost incurred by a claimant, both for legal and other professional assistance, relating to the preparation of a claim for compensation. Until 23 February 2009, there was no statutory provision expressly authorising an award of compensation for such amounts. However, it has been held that when compensation is payable by reference to the value of land, that is not confined to the amount often described as the market value of the land, determined in accordance with the principles stated in Spencer v Commonwealth^[148]. Thus it extends to any additional amount associated with a special value the land might add to the owner; and to business and other losses resulting from the compensation^[149]. Although in England, the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919 introduced a rule for the determination of the market value of resumed land, and a rule which left unaffected “the assessment of compensation for disturbance or any other matter not directly based on the value of land”, that Act did not itself confer a right to claim compensation for disturbance^[150]; rather compensation for disturbance flowed from the statute which conferred a right to compensation by reference to the value of land. Disturbance reflected “any loss sustained by a dispossessed owner … which flows from a compulsory acquisition … provided, first, that it is not too remote and, secondly, that it is the natural and reasonable consequence of the dispossession of the owner”^[151]. To somewhat similar effect, in Horn^[152] Scott LJ said that the relevant statutory provisions showed

“… that a claim for disturbance connected with the land taken must be made as part and parcel of the claim for purchase money … the owner in a proper case … is entitled … to have that element of personal loss taken into the reckoning of the fair price of the land …”

105. [105]
     Thus the Court in Heavey Lex No 64 Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Transport^[153] was able to say

“Disturbance has long been held to include the cost of preparing a claim for compensation.”

106. [106]
     It then cited Brisbane City Council v Lamont^[154] where it was said

“This Court and the Land Court have held that valuation fees and legal fees incurred by a dispossessed owner up to the date of lodgement of a claim in the Court are properly allowable as items of disturbance.”

107. [107]
     By s 12(5) of the Acquisition Act, from the date of the publication in the Government Gazette of a resumption notice, the land the subject of the notice is vested in the Crown or the relevant constructing authority and the interest of the former owner is converted into a right to claim compensation under the Acquisition Act. Section 20 specifies how that compensation is to be determined. Before 23 February 2009, that right extended to an allowance for disturbance, of which legal and valuation fees form part. The right of the Inglis parties to compensation had accrued before 23 February 2009. Such a right was not affected by the Amendment Act^[155].
108. [108]
     Although neither party contended that the Amendment Act altered the law relating to the awarding of compensation for disturbance, the appeal was conducted as if the law prior to 23 February 2009 applied. That course would appear to be correct.
109. [109]
     In Heavey Lex, it was necessary for the Court to determine the correct approach to be taken to an award for disturbance, where legal and other fees were claimed by a dispossessed owner. The Court noted that disturbance covered “economic losses which result naturally, reasonably and directly from acquisition …”^[156]. It then referred to the statement of Romer LJ in Harvey, cited earlier in these reasons. Reference was then made to a passage from a judgment of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Director of Building and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd^[157] where his Lordship discussed the requirement that there be a causal connection between the resumption or acquisition, and the loss claimed. That passage included the following:

“… (i)f a reasonable person in the position of the claimant would not have incurred, or would not incur, the expenditure being claimed, fairness does not require that the authority should be responsible for such expenditure. Expressed in other words, losses or expenditure incurred unreasonably cannot sensibly be said to be caused by, or the consequence of, or be due to the resumption”.

110. [110]
     The Courts’ discussion of the authorities lead to the following statement^[158], with respect to the cost of preparing a claim:

“In our view a claimant can recover for work of a nature and within the scope of that which a reasonable person in the position of the claimant would have done or caused to be done. The fees and charges for the work must also be reasonable.”

111. [111]
     This passage was accepted by the parties as stating the law prior to the Amendment Act, and applicable to the present case.

Land Court’s reasons relating to disturbance

112. [112]
     The learned Member noted that the claim for compensation was filed on 26 November 2012^[159]. His Honour then cited the passage from Heavey Lex set out earlier in these reasons, and stated that the Court “must show a basis of reasoning sufficient to indicate why one sum is selected rather than another”^[160]. He then referred to the affidavit of Mr Purcell, a solicitor called on the applicant’s behalf, and some matters which emerged from his oral evidence^[161].
113. [113]
     It is apparent that a range of uses was considered, for the determination of the highest and best use by reference to which the land was to be valued. As can be seen from these reasons, the Inglis parties presented alternative cases on this question in the Land Court. The learned Member stated that the State’s “suggestion that there was wasteful experimentation with possible highest and best uses other than that finally adopted is not assisted by any evidence of what savings could have been made by a different approach being adopted”; and observed that “the same situation exists in regard to the fees paid for town planning consultants”^[162].
114. [114]
     The learned Member then stated that Mr Purcell had “been cross-examined and has supported the claims made”^[163]. He noted that the State had not produced evidence of any “competing level of costs”. Although the State had presented a table suggesting that it accepted that $60,000 would be a reasonable allowance for legal and other professional fees associated with the preparation of the claim, his Honour noted that this was “not supported by any evidence”; and considered it would not be open to him to reject Mr Purcell’s evidence in favour of that table. He considered that there was no reason not to accept Mr Purcell’s contradicted sworn evidence, and allowed the amount claimed^[164].

Contentions on disturbance appeal

115. [115]
     The State’s grounds of appeal contend that the learned Member erred in law in holding that Mr Purcell’s evidence was conclusive on the question whether the costs were reasonably incurred, as the learned Member was required to undertake his own assessment of that question^[165]. It also contended that had he properly applied the law (identified as that found in s 20(5) of the Acquisition Act) he would have concluded that the legal and other professional costs reasonably incurred for the preparation and filing of the claim did not exceed $60,000^[166].
116. [116]
     The submissions for the State supported these contentions. Specific matters were raised to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the claim, including that there were 10 conferences between solicitor and Counsel; two site inspections of the resumed land by both solicitor and Counsel; the fact that Counsel settled what was described as “every day correspondence”; the fact that on four occasions, Counsel reviewed a draft report of a soil and water consultant and a valuer’s report on three occasions; the fact that the cost of drafting and settling letters of instruction to experts amounted to $3,000 (for both Counsel and solicitor). It was submitted that it was necessary for the Inglis parties to provide evidence demonstrating that it was reasonable for these steps to be taken. It was also submitted that the hourly rate charged by Counsel ($600, increasing at a later stage to $700, plus GST) was unreasonable; though it was accepted that a rate of $600 per hour (including GST) would be reasonable.
117. [117]
     For the Inglis parties, it was submitted that the State had failed to demonstrate any legal, factual or discretionary error in relation to the award for disturbance. It was apparent from his reasons that he had considered and applied the tests formulated in Heavey Lex. The learned Member had not treated Mr Purcell’s evidence as conclusive. The approach of the learned Member was correct and entirely convincing, as he referred to the applicable law, reviewed and considered the evidence, and made findings based on evidence, in accordance with the applicable law. It was submitted for the Inglis parties that, having put on evidence as to the costs which they had incurred, and the circumstances in which they were incurred, an evidentiary burden shifted to the State on the question whether the costs were reasonably incurred^[167], which was not discharged. Reference was made to the opinion evidence elicited from Mr Purcell during his cross-examination as to whether the fees were properly incurred and were reasonable in quantum^[168].
118. [118]
     The oral submissions for the Inglis parties referred to the complexity of the trial and appeal as indicative of the difficulties associated with the preparation of the claim. The learned Member accepted Mr Purcell’s views about his ability to prepare the claim without the assistance of Counsel and his explanations for the incurring of costs, about which he was challenged. The amounts charged were not, in the context of the case, excessive. It was a case where it was appropriate to have reports prepared and settled before the claim was lodged. Sufficient evidence was placed before the Land Court to enable the learned Member to form a view as to whether the steps taken relating to the preparation of the reports were appropriate and reasonable. The resulting claim was fundamentally the same as the case advanced in the Land Court.

Consideration of the award for disturbance

119. [119]
     It is clear that the learned Member identified the correct principles to be applied in determining this aspect of the case. It is also clear that he gave consideration to the evidence put before him that costs could not properly have been saved by not undertaking the second site inspection; the cost associated with the settling of the letters of instruction to the experts was not excessive; and that the costs claimed were necessarily and properly incurred, and were conservative. The evidence having been placed before him (indeed, it was elicited through cross-examination) the learned Member was entitled to take it into account in reaching his conclusion. Given the way the case was conducted on behalf of the State, he was entitled to follow this course. It is apparent from the learned Member’s reasons that he considered whether the fees claimed were of a nature, and within the scope, of that which a reasonable person in the position of the claimant would have done or caused to be done, by reference to the evidence put before him relevant to that question. The submissions for the State seemed to amount to an assertion that he was required to consider this question, without regard to such evidence; and that it was wrong for him to act on the evidence put forward in the Land Court. In assessing that evidence, there was no error in his noting the absence of evidence indicating how savings could have been made, if a different approach were adopted. Such evidence might have provided some assistance on the question whether it was reasonable for the claimant to have caused to be done the work which resulted in the amounts claimed. Likewise, had evidence been put forward to demonstrate that the amount which the State contended as being a reasonable amount for the preparation of the claim, that may have assisted the learned Member in his determination. There was no error in his observation that the State had not produced any such evidence.
120. [120]
     The claim plainly had its complexities. So much is apparent from the nature of the case advanced in the Land Court. It is also apparent from the evidence of Mr Purcell that, after the claim had been filed, the State raised issues which resulted in the Inglis parties expending very large sums of money on issues which ultimately turned out to be of no significance^[169]. In such a case, it was open to the learned Member to find that it was reasonable to incur costs for the preparation of reports, particularly in light of the size of the claim, and the real prospect that it would be litigated.
121. [121]
     No evidence was advanced in support of the challenge now made to Counsel’s hourly rate. The learned Member noted that Mr Purcell was a professional solicitor, and that notwithstanding his experience in relation to compensation matters, for the task of settling the claim he would engage Counsel with similar or greater experience than his own^[170]. Such evidence as was available to the learned Member provided a sufficient basis for him to conclude that the rate charged by Counsel was reasonable, given the nature of the case. The State has not identified any error in his doing so.
122. [122]
     It is incorrect to characterise the learned Member’s reference to the fact that the State might have called evidence from a cost assessor, as a suggestion that it was necessary for the State to do so. He was doing no more than identifying a matter relevant to his assessment of Mr Purcell’s evidence. The learned Member’s observation amounted to no more than a statement that, having heard Mr Purcell, his evidence should not be rejected without some reason, and none had been provided. The learned Member did not err in taking that approach.
123. [123]
     The State has failed to demonstrate that the learned Member erred in determining the amount to be allowed for disturbance. Its appeal on that matter fails.

Appeal against award of interest

124. [124]
     The learned Member allowed interest on compensation, so far as it related to the value of the land, from the date of the resumption; and in respect of the disturbance award, from the date of payment of the fees which resulted in the award^[171]. An advance against compensation in an amount of $1,875,000 was paid on 1 June 2012^[172], under s 23 of the Acquisition Act. The order for the payment of interest was moulded so that interest was not payable on this amount from that date.
125. [125]
     The learned Member gave short reasons for his award of interest. He referred to the State’s submission that “the passage of time without effective action by (the Inglis parties) to progress their claim ought to result in the reduction of the period for which interest is allowed”^[173]. He noted that while the solicitor for the State had referred the claim to the Land Court (5 November 2012) that could have been done earlier. He noted that the Inglis parties had twice changed solicitors, but said that there was no evidence to show that the Inglis parties had been “conducting themselves in relation to this matter in such a way that there should be an adverse effect on any award of interest”; and noted that the purpose of such an award “is to protect the compensation due to them from being eroded”^[174]. He made the interest order by reference to that purpose^[175].

Contentions

126. [126]
     The ground taken in the State’s Notice of Appeal is that the learned Member erred in not holding that the delay between the date of acquisition, and the date of delivery of the claim for compensation (the claim was filed in the Land Court on 26 November 2012^[176]); the refusal of the Inglis parties throughout that period to provide a valuation for the purpose of negotiations; the fact that it was necessary for the State to refer the matter to the Land Court; and the conduct of the Inglis parties between 2008 and 2012 constituted sufficient grounds for limiting an award of interest to a period of one year from the date of the resumption^[177]. The written submissions for the State referred to the delay in progressing the claim, described as “significant”; as well as the changes of solicitors and the refusal to provide a valuation. It was submitted that the reasons of the learned Member failed to address the submissions made at first instance particularly that an extraordinary length of time between the resumption and the claim was a relevant consideration. The submissions referred to the evidence from Mr Purcell that the firms previously representing the Inglis parties remained in existence, and that the change of solicitors was not the result of any form of legal or practical compulsion. It was submitted that a constructing authority should not be required to act as a source of “guaranteed investment return” for a number of years, by reason of delay on behalf of the claimant.
127. [127]
     For the Inglis parties, it was submitted that the award was discretionary, and no error of the kind identified in House v The King^[178] had been identified. The purpose of an award of interest is to compensate a claim for the loss of earning power of money from the date of resumption to the date of payment. A claimant should not be punished by withholding an award of interest for any period, without good reason^[179]. The discretion to award interest is unfettered; and should not be confined except by considerations derived from the context and scope of the statute which creates the power to award. The view taken in Alex Gow was that it was the practice of the Land Court to award interest with exceptions, one being where there had been an unreasonable delay by the claimant in lodging and/or pursuing a claim for compensation^[180]. There is no basis in the Acquisition Act for introducing a limitation on the discretionary power to award interest, so that it is not to be paid where there has been unreasonable delay. The fact that the State had not exercised its right under s 24(5) of the Acquisition Act to refer the matter to the Land Court, at any time after 14 March 2008 was relevant to the exercise of the discretion. Indeed, its failure to do so amounted to a waiver of its right to contend that any award of interest should be limited or reduced by reason of “unreasonable delay”. Its failure to refer the matter meant that it equally contributed to the delay. To the extent that Alex Gow determined that interest should not be awarded to a party guilty of unreasonable delay, it should be followed with respect to the State. Moreover, the legislation regulating the claim of the Inglis parties does not impose any time limit for making that claim.

Consideration of the appeal relating to interest

128. [128]
     The power to award interest, found in s 28 of the Acquisition Act, is discretionary. An appeal against the exercise of such a discretion can only succeed if the party appealing against the order establishes an error of the kind identified in House. The stated ground of appeal simply alleges error, in view of a number of factual matters. The first of those is that there was substantial delay between the resumption, and the delivery of the claim for compensation. The other factual matters refer to some aspects of events during that period.
129. [129]
     It is difficult to relate the ground of appeal to the matters identified in House. To allege that there were sufficient grounds to make a different order is not to identify an error in the exercise of a discretion. As was noted in House^[181] the case may well be one where the appellate Judges, had they been charged with the original exercise of the discretion, might have exercised it differently; but that did not demonstrate error on appeal.
130. [130]
     The written submissions in chief for the State appear primarily to record a complaint that notwithstanding lengthy submissions presented by the State in the Land Court, the learned Member’s reasons did not deal with them. That question will be considered later in these reasons. Otherwise those submissions are not directed at demonstrating that there was an appealable error in the learned Member’s exercise of the relevant discretion. The position is not further advanced by the State’s written submissions in reply.
131. [131]
     In the oral submissions for the State it was contended that if a party is so dilatory that for a period of five years it neither makes a claim for compensation or seeks an advance, the Court is entitled to infer the owner is not unduly concerned about being held out of its money^[182]. The delay by the Inglis parties was unreasonable because it was unexplained^[183]. The Inglis parties were unreasonable because they did not respond to an invitation to submit an alternative valuation, even if the State paid for it; and no valuation was supplied prior to the provision of the claim^[184]. At one point it was submitted that the State suffered financial disadvantage by reason of the delay (though it is unclear whether that was maintained)^[185]. In support of these submissions, the Court was taken through correspondence between the parties, which culminated in a submission that the delay was due to the decision of the Inglis parties to take no effective step to advance the claim over the period from the date of acquisition until at least the appointment of their present solicitors in March or April 2011^[186].
132. [132]
     For the Inglis parties, it was submitted that the State had not shown that there was unreasonable delay. The learned Member’s conclusion about delay was correct.
133. [133]
     A number of propositions may be derived from Alex Gow, as follows:

1. The purpose of an award of interest is to compensate a claimant for the economic damage resulting from the delay from the date of resumption and the date of payment^[187];

2. Interest should be awarded, unless there are proper reasons for withholding it^[188];

3. Unreasonable delay provides a reason for withholding interest^[189];

4. Mere delay is not a sufficient reason for withholding an award of interest^[190];

5. Not to award interest is punitive^[191].

134. [134]
     It might first be noted that although Alex Gow accepted that unreasonable delay is a ground for withholding an award of interest, it did not establish it to be a rule that interest must not be awarded for a period in which a claimant has been guilty of unreasonable delay in prosecuting its claim. That is demonstrated by the result. In the Land Court, interest was not awarded for the whole of the period from the date of resumption until compensation was paid^[192]. However, because both the claimant and the respondent had been equally responsible for delay, the Land Court erred in withholding interest^[193]. It is implicit in the decision in Alex Gow that, but for the fact that the respondent had equally been responsible for the delay, the delay by the claimant would have justified withholding interest.
135. [135]
     It is of some interest to note that the Court in Alex Gow derived some assistance in respect of the exercise of the discretion to award interest from the decision of Bennett v Jones^[194], a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal relating to interest on an award of damages for personal injury. In Alex Gow, the Court referred to the statement by Moffitt P^[195] that the power to award interest is compensatory and should not be used punitively. The Court then set out the following passages from the judgment of Moffitt P in Bennett^[196]

“I see no reason why the simple fact that a defendant does not have to pay money when his liability arises, and has the benefit of non payment for a period, should not provide a basis to make a discretionary order for payment of interest for the whole period. One has the money, and the other not.”

“Unless it can be seen that there is likely to have been some relevant detriment to the defendant, it will be irrelevant if the plaintiff does not proceed with complete promptness, or … has not promptly and fully complied with all Court procedures. Such cases … are to be distinguished from cases of deliberate delaying tactics of a plaintiff or a defendant, where it appears there is likely to be financial detriment to the other party. In these cases the conduct of the parties is relevant, because of its detriment to the opposing party.” (emphasis added)

136. [136]
     The compensatory nature of an award of interest is a powerful consideration when considering whether to exercise the discretion conferred by s 28 of the Acquisition Act. The land owner loses its land on the date of resumption. If compensation were paid immediately, the dispossessed land owner would have had the use of the sum paid, from that date. However, there is a sense in which it might be said that the loss of the land owner is potentially greater. Compensation is assessed by reference to the value of the land at the date of resumption. Not infrequently the value of land increases over time; but the dispossessed land owner is not given the benefit of that increase, from the date of resumption until the date when compensation is paid. The land owner has also been deprived of the use of the land over that period, usually a valuable right, reflected by the amount for which the property might have been rented, or its potential otherwise to be used profitably. Had compensation been paid at the date of resumption, the land owner would have had the opportunity to invest the money received, and to achieve both a capital gain and income. It is by no means inevitable that an award of interest fully compensates a land owner for the disadvantages suffered as a result of the resumption, from the date when it occurred until the date when compensation is paid.
137. [137]
     Bennett identifies, as a relevant reason not to award interest, the fact that delay may cause some relevant detriment, particularly financial detriment, to the party ultimately ordered to make a payment. More than the passage of time would need to be established to show such a detriment, as the State has the benefit of retaining the monies to be paid as compensation, over the period up to payment. Although the State’s oral submissions raise this matter, no such detriment was established.
138. [138]
     It is relevant to note, in any event, a constructing authority can take some action to protect itself, by referring the matter to the Land Court under s 24 of the Acquisition Act. The State’s conduct in this case, in making an advance payment of compensation in the sum of $1.875 million in June 2012^[197] demonstrates an additional way in which it might protect itself against such detriment.
139. [139]
     No authority was identified to support the submission made for the State that a constructing authority should not be required to act as a source of “guaranteed investment return” by reason of delay on the part of the claimant. The submission should not be accepted. It is inconsistent with the proposition that mere delay is not a reason to refuse an award of interest; and does not recognise that during the period between the resumption and the date when compensation is paid, the constructing authority has had the use of the money which reflects the value of the land.
140. [140]
     The oral submission made on behalf of the State that the Inglis parties were guilty of unreasonable delay is not borne out by an examination of the correspondence on which it relies. It is apparent from an examination of that correspondence that it does not include a record of all communications between the parties^[198]. Nevertheless, a number of observations may be made about the conduct of the Inglis parties as it appears from the correspondence. The first is that from a very early stage they were represented by solicitors. At times one of them was represented by one solicitor, and the others by a different solicitor. That was likely to have resulted in some delay but it does not demonstrate their conduct was unreasonable. At an early stage a valuer was retained. A without prejudice meeting, inevitably for the purpose of working towards a resolution of the claim, was held in April 2009. Even at an early stage, the claim had some complexities. The Inglis parties owned a third parcel; and consideration was given to a claim for injurious affection, both by reference to the proposed prison (not then constructed)^[199], and a loss of the advantages sometimes described as “economies of scale”^[200]. Some consideration was also given to the question whether the retained land would also be resumed^[201]. A valuer was retained at least by March 2009^[202]; and some delay resulted from personal difficulties experienced by the valuer. On two occasions a claim for compensation was formulated with some degree of specificity^[203]. On one occasion, the State expressed reluctance to participate in a meeting to consider the amount of compensation to be paid^[204]. Although a copy of a valuation report for the State had been provided to one of the solicitors representing some of the Inglis parties in August 2008, it is apparent that for a substantial period of time the solicitors subsequently representing those parties did not have a copy of that report^[205].
141. [141]
     There was considerable complexity to the claim. While all of the experts who were retained for the purpose of its consideration were not ultimately relied upon, that does not mean that the Inglis parties were guilty of unreasonable delay because they engaged them.
142. [142]
     The material, as has been indicated, does not establish that the Inglis parties were guilty of unreasonable delay in relation to the prosecution of this claim. The reasons of the learned Member are brief. Nevertheless they adequately record his finding in relation to the conduct of the Inglis parties, and the matters he considered relevant to the exercise of his discretion.
143. [143]
     The State has failed to demonstrate that the learned Member erred in relation to award of interest.

Conclusion

144. [144]
     Appeal LAC 001-14 is dismissed.
145. [145]
     Appeal LAC 002-14 is dismissed.

PETER LYONS J

CAC MacDONALD

PRESIDENT OF THE LAND COURT

PA SMITH

MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT