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Lamington Markets Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General[2021] QLC 41

Lamington Markets Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General[2021] QLC 41

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Lamington Markets Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General [2021] QLC 41

PARTIES:

Lamington Markets Pty Ltd as Tte

(applicant)

v

Valuer-General

(respondent)

FILE NO:

LVA007-21

PROCEEDING:

Jurisdiction – appeal against objection decision under the Land Valuation Act 2010

DELIVERED ON:

2 December 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARD ON:

Heard on the papers

Submissions closed 16 June 2021

HEARD AT:

Heard on the papers

JUDICIAL REGISTRAR:

GJ Smith

ORDERS:

  1. The application is allowed.
  2. The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.
  3. Any submissions seeking a costs order in this matter must be filed and served within 14 days of the publication of these reasons.

CATCHWORDS:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Failure to file Notice of Appeal in time – Land Valuation Act 2010 sections 157 and 158 –– where employee of applicant’s agent attended registry during closure period –– where employee then emailed Notice of Appeal to registry –– where agent believed emailed originating document would be accepted by the registry ––where registry advised agent that method of filing was not accepted –– whether actual cause particularised –– where executive assistant of agent attempted to fax notice after expiry of appeal period –– where facsimile malfunctioned –– adequacy of closure arrangements –– late filing –– whether slip by agent –– whether reasonable excuse­­

Land Valuation Act 2010

AG Russell v The Crown (1992-1993) 14 QLCR 202, distinguished

Body Corporate for Parklands CTS and Anor v Department of Natural Resources and Water (2009) 30 QLCR 50, applied

Branch v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2002] QLC 86, applied

Director-General, Department of Transport v Congress Community Development and Education (1998) 19 QLCR 168, applied

Hughes v Department of Natural Resources and Water [2007] QLC 129, cited

Loughnan v Valuer-General [2020] QLC 1, distinguished

Reid v Brett [2005] VSC 18, distinguished

Trust Company of Australia Limited v Department of Natural Resources and Water [2007] QLC 45, applied

APPEARANCES:

Not applicable

Background

  1. [1]
    In this matter the Court must determine if it has jurisdiction pursuant to s 158 of the Land Valuation Act 2010 (the LVA) to hear and determine an appeal by Lamington Markets Pty Ltd as Tte (the applicant) against the annual site valuation by the Valuer-General (the respondent) as at 1 October 2019. The subject property is situated at Lutwyche within the Brisbane City Council local government area.
  1. [2]
    On 28 October 2020 a decision on objection was issued by the respondent to Mr Neil Murphy (Mr Murphy), National Head of Advisory, Savills Valuations Pty Ltd (Savills) on behalf of the applicant.
  1. [3]
    Section 157(2) of the LVA requires that, subject to s 158 an appeal cannot be started after 60 days after the day of issue stated in the decision on objection. As the date for starting the appeal fell during the court closure period, the final date became Monday 4 January 2021.[1]
  1. [4]
    The proposed Notice of Appeal was filed on 5 January 2021, and therefore the Court will only have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal if “reasonable excuse” as required by s 158 of the LVA is established.
  1. [5]
    On 24 February 2021, Savills filed a Form 12 General Application and two supporting affidavits seeking directions for the filing of material and submissions and requesting that any hearing to determine the question of jurisdiction be dealt with “on the papers”.
  1. [6]
    On 10 May 2021, Colin Biggers & Paisley Lawyers filed in the registry a Form 21 Notice of Representation, thereby taking over the representation of the applicant in place of Savills. The respondent is represented by In-House Legal, Department of Resources.

Legislation

  1. [7]
    Section 157 (2) of the LVA provides:
  1. (2)
    Subject to section 158, an appeal cannot be started after 60 days after the day of issue stated in the objection decision notice (the appeal period).
  1. [8]
    Section 158 of the LVA provides:

158  Late filing

  1. This section applies if a valuation appeal notice is filed after the appeal period has ended.
  2. The Land Court can hear the appeal only if—
  1. the valuation appeal notice was filed 1 year or less after the objection decision notice was issued; and
  2. the appellant satisfies the court there was a reasonable excuse for not filing the notice within the appeal period.

Example of reasonable excuse

The notice of the Valuer-General’s decision or the valuation appeal notice was lost or delayed in the ordinary course of post.

The applicant’s initial affidavits

  1. [9]
    On behalf of the applicant, affidavits were initially filed by two Savills employees, Ms Vella-Neville, an administrative assistant and Ms Harmsworth, an executive assistant.
  1. [10]
    In her affidavit,[2] Ms Vella-Neville deposes that:
  • On 9 July 2020 Savills received correspondence from the Valuer-General confirming the receipt of the online objection lodgement.
  • On 30 October 2020 a decision on objection dated 28 October 2020 from the Valuer-General was received by Savills.
  • Instructions regarding the lodgement of an appeal were sought from the owner on 10 November 2021, and on 22 December 2020 Savills received instructions from the owner by way of a signed Attachment 1 to the Form 3 Notice of Appeal.
  • On 22 December 2020 she took a copy of the Notice of Appeal to the registry for filing and discovered that the registry was closed for Christmas. She then returned to the office and emailed[3] a copy of the appeal notice to the registry.
  1. [11]
    Ms Harmsworth’s first affidavit[4] deposes that:
  • The offices of Savills were closed and not staffed from 23 December 2020 to 18 January 2021.
  • She was on annual leave from 21 December 2020 to 15 January 2021 and the other Savills employees involved in the preparation and lodgement of Notices of Appeal, namely Mr Murphy and Ms Vella-Neville were on annual leave from 23 December 2020 to 15 January 2021.
  • At 2.24 pm on 4 January 2021, she received an email[5] from Acting Senior Registrar Grodecki advising that the Notice of Appeal had to be submitted in hardcopy and not via email and that 4 January 2021 was the last day for filing.
  • At 2.47 pm on 4 January 2021, she was copied into Mr Murphy’s[6] reply to Acting Senior Registrar Grodecki. At 3.14 pm on 4 January 2021 Acting Senior Registrar Grodecki advised that all appeals where the date falls outside court hours are taken to have been filed on the next business day and appeals may be delivered in person, by an agent or faxed to the court.
  • Shortly after receiving Acting Senior Registrar Grodecki’s email[7] of 3.14 pm on 4 January 2021, she exchanged emails[8] with Mr Murphy (who was at 1770 on annual leave until 15 January 2021).
  • She then attended the Savills office to fax the appeal to the registry. After multiple unsuccessful attempts at faxing the appeal she sent an email[9] to Acting Senior Registrar Grodecki advising of the fax errors and attached the error reports to the email. She advised that a hard copy of the appeal would be taken to the registry the next day.
  • On 5 January 2021 Ms Harmsworth filed a hardcopy of the appeal in the registry and was advised that the Court was considering the filing of the appeal and was requested to leave the hardcopies at the registry. At 3.09 pm that day, an email[10] was received from Deputy Registrar Oates advising that the Court was still considering the issue and that she would be advised of the result via email the next day.
  • On 6 January 2021 she received an email[11] from Deputy Registrar Oates advising that the Court had considered the circumstances and that the appeal would be accepted for filing as at 5 January 2021 and would be subject to a jurisdiction hearing. 
  • On 7 January 2021 a copy of the submitted appeal was provided to the Valuer-General.[12]

Receipt of further evidence on behalf of the applicant

  1. [12]
    On 7 June 2021 two further affidavits were filed on behalf of the applicant, one by Ms Harmsworth[13] and another by Mr AR Lonergan, solicitor for the applicant. As the respondent objected to this material being admitted into evidence, further orders were requested by the parties for the filing of submissions and the allocation of a review hearing if required.
  1. [13]
    The applicant contends that the additional material is required to provide the Court with clarification of a number of issues raised for the first time in the respondent’s submissions. The matters sought to be addressed are:
  1. (a)
    The respondent’s unwillingness to provide the applicant with a reason why the material initially filed does not demonstrate a reasonable excuse;
  1. (b)
    the reason Savills attempted to file the Notice of Appeal via email on 22 December 2020;
  1. (c)
    the reason that the first attempt to fax the Notice of Appeal was not until 4.35 pm on 4 January 2021; and
  1. (d)
    the processes Savills have in place to ensure that critical court dates (e.g. due dates for the filing of Notices of Appeal) are not missed.
  1. [14]
    The respondent contends that the receipt of the further materials should be guided by the principles in Reid v Brett[14] that is (a) do the interests of justice require the admission of the material; (b) would the further evidence affect the result of the case; (c) could the further evidence have been discovered earlier; and (d) would prejudice ensue from the later receipt of the material?[15]
  1. [15]
    The respondent objects to the affidavit of Mr Lonergan on the basis that it is irrelevant, and Ms Harmsworth’s affidavit on the basis that it is of limited probative value and hearsay. A final contention is that the applicant bears the onus of proof and appears to need to rely on the respondent’s analysis to prepare its case.
  1. [16]
    The contentions by the respondent based on the principles set out in Reid v Brett,[16] which concern the discretionary power to re-open, are not considered directly applicable to the current circumstances.  The Court is of the view that in order to properly determine the question of jurisdiction, the affidavits initially filed will need to be supplemented. Accordingly, the receipt of the further materials will be considered subject to questions of admissibility.
  1. [17]
    Item (a) of the additional material concerns the alleged unwillingness on the part of the respondent to provide a reason why the material initially filed did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse. This is not an issue that requires adjudication by the Court in order to resolve the question of jurisdiction and given the limited extent of the evidence initially filed, it would be difficult to make related findings in any event. Accordingly, it is not proposed to receive further evidence in relation to item (a) the affidavit of Mr AR Lonergan filed on 7 June 2021, and paragraphs 4 to 8 of the affidavit[17] of Ms Harmsworth filed on 7 June 2021 will not be admitted as evidence.
  1. [18]
    In her further affidavit[18] Ms Harmsworth also addresses item (b), the attempt to file the Notice of Appeal via email on 22 December 2020. The affidavit purports to explain why the Notice of Appeal was emailed to the registry by Ms Vella-Neville by reference to two earlier occasions when the Court had accepted Notices of Appeal filed by email. Ms Harmsworth also deposes that the signature block of earlier emails received from the Court had contained the words “from 15 June 2020 and until further notice……parties may attend at the Registry in person to file documents or make enquiries. However, the Court encourages parties to continue to use phone, mail or email wherever practicable”.[19]
  1. [19]
    The Court is prepared to receive the relevant paragraphs of Ms Harmsworth’s affidavit as evidence given in her capacity as executive assistant of Savills. The evidence will not be received as adding to the affidavit of Ms Vella-Neville.[20]
  1. [20]
    Item (c) of the further material concerns an explanation why the first attempt to fax the Notice of Appeal was not undertaken until 4.35 pm on 4 January 2021. A summary of the relevant paragraphs of Ms Harmsworth’s affidavit[21] follows:
  • The Land Court Registry did not advise that the Notice of Appeal could not be filed by email until 2.24 pm on 4 January 2021.
  • The Land Court Registry did not advise Savills that the Notice of Appeal could be filed by facsimile until 3.14 pm on 4 January 2021.
  • The Savills’s office was closed and Ms Harmsworth, who was on leave on 4 January 2021, was at home that afternoon (8 to 9 km from the Savills office).
  • Ms Harmsworth left home by car at around 3.55 pm on 4 January 2021 in order to get to the Savill’s office to send the Notice of Appeal by fax. This time was as soon as possible after receipt of the email sent by the registry at 3.14 pm. She did not arrive until after 4.00 pm due to the distance between her residence and the Savills office. This is why the first attempt to send the Notice of Appeal was not made until 4.35 pm. 
  1. [21]
    The Court is prepared to receive the paragraphs relating to item (c).
  1. [22]
    In relation to item (d), Savills’s processes, Ms Harmsworth’s affidavit[22] addresses the following: 
  • Savills has a process which it follows to ensure that critical dates are not overlooked or missed. Upon receipt of a decision on objection, the due date for filing is diarised in a general database and important dates database and the calendar of each staff members calendar. A reminder two days before the due date is also entered into the calendar.
  • A copy of the Valuer-General's decision on objection and a copy of the Attachment 1 to the Notice of Appeal is provided to the landowner as soon as is practical after receipt. The landowner is asked to confirm by returning a signed copy of the Attachment 1 as soon as possible if we are instructed to file a Notice of Appeal.
  • Databases are checked three to four times per week for upcoming due dates.
  • The Notice of Appeal is usually drafted a month after receiving the decision notice and at this time a follow up email is sent to the client if instructions have not been received to lodge the appeal.
  • Weekly reminders are sent and phone calls are made with the landowner about whether the landowner intends to file a Notice of Appeal. From about a week from the due date, the landowner is followed up daily.
  • Once they have received instructions to lodge an appeal, a final review of the Notice of Appeal is completed by Mr Murphy and changes are made if necessary. The Notice of Appeal is then signed and finalised for lodgement and a copy delivered in person to the registry within the 60-day timeframe.
  • Where a Notice of Appeal is due to be filed during the registry’s Christmas closure period, Savills prefer that the Notice of Appeal is filed prior to the closure to ensure there is no dispute that the notice has been filed on time.
  • In Ms Harmsworth’s capacity as executive assistant she has access to Savills’ files and records and reviewed the files and records and confirms the process was followed in this case.
  1. [23]
    The Court is prepared to receive the preceding paragraphs relating to item (d).

The respondent’s evidence

  1. [24]
    No evidence was called by or on behalf of the respondent.

Initial submissions on behalf of applicant[23]

  1. [25]
    A summary of points in support of a finding that reasonable excuse as required by s 158 of the LVA is established, is detailed below:
  • The Notice of Appeal was filed 5 January 2021 and was one day outside the appeal period.
  • Instructions were only provided by the applicant to Savills to file the Notice of Appeal on 22 December 2020.
  • The Land Court Registry was closed for the Christmas break from 21 December 2020 to 3 January 2021 and Savills mistakenly believed the registry was open on 22 December 2020.
  • Ms Vella-Neville’s reasonable belief that the Notice of Appeal could be filed by sending it by email to the Land Court.
  • Savills, on behalf of the applicant, took all reasonable steps to file the Notice of Appeal within the appeal period.
  • The lateness of the time at which Savills was advised on 4 January 2021 that the Notice of Appeal sent to the Land Court had not been accepted for filing.

Applicant’s relevant authorities

  1. [26]
    The applicant submits that the following cases support a finding of reasonable excuse:
  • Loughnan v Valuer-General [2020] QLC 1 concerned a Notice of Appeal filed 189 days after the expiry of the appeal period. As in this case, there was evidence in Loughnan that the applicant had attempted to file a Notice of Appeal via facsimile during the appeal period.  However due to some difficulty with the transmission, the Notice of Appeal was not received by the Land Court Registry.
  • In Loughnan the Land Court was satisfied that:

“The appellant’s attempt to lodge the notice of appeal has been frustrated by some failure of transmission by the facsimile on 12 March 2019.  On an objective view this failure is of a substantial nature and the type of circumstance that would be likely to result in the Notice of Appeal not being lodged within the appeal period by a person acting reasonably. I am therefore satisfied that reasonable excuse is established and that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.”

  • The facts of this application are strikingly similar to the facts giving rise to the application in Loughnan. Importantly, the delay filing the Notice of Appeal was significantly longer in Loughnan.  Despite the lengthy delay, the Land Court was nonetheless satisfied it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.
  • The case of Trust Company of Australia Limited v Department of Natural Resources and Water[24] concerned the applicants late filing of a Notice of Appeal by one day. The solicitors for the applicant had miscalculated the expiry of the appeal period by one day on the basis of the date the decision on objection was received, as opposed to the date the decision was issued as required by section 45(2) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944.
  • In Trust Company the Court took the view that a flexible approach should be adopted, finding that there was a reasonable excuse for the “slip” by the applicant’s solicitor in miscalculating the expiry date of the appeal period.[25] However, the Court further held that even if that was not sufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse, the fault lay with the applicant’s solicitors and “the applicant had done everything that could be expected of a “reasonable man” in entrusting the institution of the appeal to its solicitors.”[26]
  • As in the Trust Company, the applicant did everything that could be expected of a reasonable landholder by instructing Savills to file the Notice of Appeal.
  • In those circumstances and having regard to the legislation and the position adopted by the Land Court in Loughnan, the Land Court should exercise its discretion under section 158(2)(b) of the act on the basis that it is satisfied that the applicant had a reasonable excuse for filing the Notice of Appeal outside the appeal period, such that the Land Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.
  • Further, even if the Land Court cannot be satisfied that the applicant has established that it had a “reasonable excuse”, the Land Court ought to follow the decision in the Trust Company and accept the late Notice of Appeal, to avoid penalising the applicant for any slip by its agent. 

The respondent’s initial submissions[27]

  1. [27]
    The respondent submits that the applicant cannot satisfy the Court of any cause which can be deemed a reasonable excuse. The following is a summary of those submissions:
  • The applicant had a right of appeal under section 155 of the LVA against the decision but by virtue of section 157(2), only if the appeal was instituted in 60 days after the date of issue stated in the decision on objection. The last day to lodge the appeal was 27 December 2020. As this day occurred on a public holiday and during the court closure period, the next business day when the court was open in 2021 was the last day to lodge the appeal. This was Monday 4 January 2021.
  • The Notice of Appeal (Form 3 at section 11) clearly states and sets out the procedures for filing which are either in person, by fax or by post.
  • Given the significant number of appeals lodged by Mr Murphy, a reasonable person would expect that Savills office would have detailed procedures and processes in place for handling, filing and service of appeals. For reasons unknown, the procedures and processes are not particularised, detailed nor made clear in Ms Vella -Neville’s affidavit.
  • Ms Vella-Neville’s affidavit fails to state what administrative steps were in place or what steps were to be taken in circumstances where one of the three methods of filing an appeal was not available; why the appeal was sent by email to the registry when the appeal form clearly states the procedure for filing must either be in person, by fax or post; and why the appeal was not sent by fax or by post when she returned to the office.
  • Ms Vella-Neville’s affidavit fails to clearly state or reveal the underlying facts and circumstances for the Court to conclude firstly, what is the actual cause of the delay and secondly, probative evidence to establish that the Court would be satisfied of reasonable excuse.
  • There is no evidence that either Ms Harmsworth or Mr Murphy checked the opening hours of the registry.
  • Ms Harmsworth faxed the Notice of Appeal to the registry after the close of business and following the closure of the registry. The fax transmission states that the times as 4.35 pm, 4.43 pm, 4.48 pm and 5.05 pm on 4 January 2021. Irrespective of the fax transmission error, the Notice of Appeal has not been registered on 4 January 2021 as it was outside the opening hours of the registry. The fax transmissions would have been filed the next day, being 5 January 2021.
  • Ms Harmsworth’s affidavit fails to state:
  1. What procedures and processes are in place in circumstances of affecting filing by fax that would necessarily consider the court rules and opening hours of the registry; and
  1. why the appeal was faxed after the close of the registry hours at 4.35 pm.
  • The affidavit of Ms Harmsworth fails to clearly state or reveal the underlying facts and circumstances for the Court to firstly conclude what is the actual cause of the delay and secondly, probative evidence to establish that the Court would be satisfied of reasonable excuse.

Respondent’s case authorities

  1. [28]
    The respondent makes the following submissions regarding the applicable legal principles and case law:
  • The principles for filing an appeal late are well settled in that the time limit is a substantive provision laid down in the Act itself and not a mere procedural time limit imposed by the rules of court which will be treated with indulgence appropriate to procedural rules.[28] The Act does not grant an unfettered discretion.
  • It is settled principle that the excuse offered must be “substantial”, that is, there must be some relevant circumstance or fact other than oversight or ignorance such that it would not be reasonable to hold the applicant to the statutory time period.[29]
  • The accepted authorities on the objective test of “reasonable excuse” endorsed by the Land Appeal Court in Director-General, Department of Transport v Congress Community Development and Education Unit Ltd are:

“what is to be determined is whether the applicant has shown any cause which can be deemed by the Court to be a reasonable excuse. I think this means cause which a reasonable man would regard as an excuse, a cause consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct, the kind of thing which one might expect to delay the taking of action by a reasonable man.”[30]

In the joint judgment of Member Wenck and Member Divett, their Honours were of the opinion that:

“The reasonable cause and explanation of the lateness of the service and lodgement of the notice and payment of the prescribed fee, is, in our opinion, the fact that the solicitor failed in the duty entrusted to her. The applicant had done everything that should have been expected of him.”

  • The Land Court in Body Corporate for Parklands CTS and Anor v Department of Natural Resources and Water (2009) 30 QLCR 50 made the following observations in respect of the nature of the application and the evidence in support.[31]
  • It is important to note both the Land Appeal Court decisions consistently emphasised that each case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances. It is critical that the application identifies a cause for the delay, supported by satisfactory explanation and evidence that can be deemed a cause consistent with the reasonable standard of conduct the kind of thing which one might expect to delay the taking of action by reasonable man.
  • Applying the above legal principles to the facts and circumstances of this matter it is submitted that:
  1. (a)
    the applicant has failed to identify the actual cause of the delay in filing the appeal late; and
  1. (b)
    the evidence relied upon by the applicants, (affidavits of Ms Vella-Neville and Ms Harmsworth) are unsatisfactory and insufficient to justify any conclusion that there was reasonable excuse for not filing the appeal within the mandatory prescribed period required by the act.
  • The applicant seeks to rely on the decisions of Loughnan v Valuer-General and Trust Company of Australia Ltd v Department of Natural Resources and Water. The applicant contends that the facts of Loughnan are strikingly similar to this matter due to the difficulty in the transmission of the appeal by fax to the registry.
  • The facts and circumstances in the present matter are dissimilar to the Loughnan decision. The critical fact which differentiates the matters is that the fax transmission in Loughnan occurred during the opening or business hours of the registry (i.e. during the appeal period) and Mr Loughnan was advised by the staff at the Roma Magistrates Court that his fax was on standby and would be sent shortly.
  • In the present matter, it is clear from the evidence that the facsimile transmissions occurred at the following times 4.35 pm, 4.43 pm, 4.48 pm and 5.05 pm on 4 January 2021 which is outside the opening hours for the Registry (i.e. after the appeal period). The Loughnan decision is of limited assistance to the applicant.
  • The applicant’s reliance on the Trust Company of Australia Limited decision and a submission that the applicant did everything that could be expected of a reasonable landowner by instructing Savills to file the appeal, (therefore satisfying reasonable excuse) is misconstrued and should not be accepted by the Court. It is submitted that there is insufficient probative evidence to support the conclusion that the applicant had done everything that should have been expected by a reasonable landholder. In fact, there is no evidence from the applicant which deposes to the instructions provided to Savills Valuations, nor that they had done everything that should have been expected of them.
  • In Hughes v Department of Natural Resources and Water,[32] the applicant’s lodged the Notice of Appeal one day late and sought to rely on the fact that the relevant file was boxed for removal. Member Scott considered the authorities in Congress Community Development case and AG Russell v The Crown and concluded that:

“I cannot conclude that a case has been made out that the fact that the file was boxed for removal was the cause of the lateness of filing of the notice of appeal. There is an absence of particularity as to the true nature of the cause. The affidavit does not depose that a notice of appeal could have been filed within time on 25 September 2007 when boxed material was unpacked, nor why it was not filed that day.”[33]

………………….

“Even if the discretion granted to the court was unfettered there would be a need for a satisfactory explanation.”[34]

  • As stated in the submissions above, the applicants failed to identify with any particularity or precision the actual cause of the delay in filing the appeal and failed to provide any proof of evidence for the Court to be satisfied that reasonable excuse has been established.
  • The actions of the applicant or the conduct of its agents cannot be regarded as reasonable excuse in circumstances where:
  1. Ms Vella Neville incorrectly filed the appeal by email to the registry instead of fax or registered post. The correct filing instructions are clearly stated on the Notice of Appeal form.
  1. The (sic) Registrar[35] of the court notified Ms Vella Neville, Ms Harmsworth and Mr Murphy of the error on the last day to file the appeal and there was time to rectify the error and file the Notice of Appeal on the last day being 4 January 2021.
  1. The Registrar[36] also cautioned Mr Murphy, that the late filing is subject to a jurisdictional hearing which would seem on the evidence that the caution was not taken seriously by Mr Murphy.
  1. Ms Harmsworth faxed the Notice of Appeal to the registry at 4.35 pm, 4.43 pm, 4.48 pm and 5.05 pm on 4 January 2021 all of which occurred after the close of the registry.  Irrespective of the fax transmission error, the Notice of Appeal would not have been registered on 4 January 2021 as it was outside of the opening hours of the Land Court Registry. The appeal would have been filed the next business day on 5 January 2021.
  1. There is no explanation offered whether the applicant had acted reasonably by entrusting the institution of a legal proceeding to a valuation professional, not a solicitor.
  • The respondent submits that the Land Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which was filed outside the mandatory time period prescribed by the LVA.

The applicant’s reply submissions[37]

  1. [29]
    A summary of the applicant’s submissions in reply is detailed below:
  • Had the Land Court Registry not been closed, the Registrar would have been likely to advise Ms Vella-Neville that the Registry could not accept the Notice of Appeal by email, however as the Registry was closed, the Acting Senior Registrar did not advise that the Notice of Appeal had not been filed until 2.24 pm on 4 January 2021.  Savills were given approximately an hour and a half to arrange for the Notice of Appeal to be filed.
  • Given that the Savills office was closed until 18 January 2021, all relevant Savills employees were on annual leave on 4 January 2021. Upon being notified that the Notice of Appeal had not been filed, Ms Harmsworth made arrangements to travel into the Savills' office to provide a copy of the Notice of Appeal by facsimile.
  • With respect, the procedures in place regarding filing appeals is not relevant to the question of whether or not the applicant had a reasonable excuse for the late filing.
  • Ms Harmsworth's affidavit clearly sets out that the reason the Notice of Appeal was not sent by facsimile until 4.35 pm on 4 January 2021 was because the Savills office was closed, and Ms Harmsworth was required to travel from her home to the office in order to send the appeal by facsimile.
  • Ms Harmsworth's affidavits clearly demonstrate that the reason for the late filing of the Notice of Appeal was a combination of factors, namely:
  1. (a)
    the instructions to file the Notice of Appeal were only received from the applicant during the court closure period, on 22 December 2020;
  1. (b)
    Savills' mistaken belief that the Land Court Registry was open for filing on 22 December 2020;
  1. (c)
    Ms Vella-Neville's reasonable belief that the Notice of Appeal could be filed by sending the Notice of Appeal by email to the Land Court. Ms Vella-Neville's belief was reasonable in circumstances where she was aware that the Land Court had previously allowed Savills to file Notices of Appeal via email; and
  1. (d)
    the lateness of the time on 4 January 2021 at which Savills was advised that the Notice of Appeal had not been accepted by the Land Court for filing.
  • The respondent's contention that the facts in Loughnan[38] are not similar to the facts of this application is plainly incorrect. The respondent says that the distinguishing feature of Loughnan is the fact that the facsimile transmission in Loughnan occurred during registry business hours.
  • The decision in Loughnan cannot be disregarded purely because the time at which the facsimile was sent differs between the two matters (particularly considering that the relevant facsimile here was sent less than 10 minutes after the closure of the Land Court Registry). The similarities in the circumstances in which the attempt at filing the Notice of Appeal occurred (i.e. by facsimile) and therefore the Land Court's treatment of that issue in Loughnan is instructive here.
  • In any event, the key factor distinguishing Loughnan is that the delay in filing the Notice of Appeal was significantly longer, being 198 days, as opposed to the delay of one day in the present matter.
  • The Court in Loughnan held that it must be satisfied that: "…on the balance of probabilities that there is a reasonable excuse for the appeal not having been lodged within the appeal period in order to establish jurisdiction".
  • The Court considered the words "reasonable excuse" further and cited the decision of the Land Appeal Court in AG Russell v The Crown (1992-93) 14 QLCR 202, in which it was said that "the Land Appeal Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable cause or explanation".
  • The respondent submits that the applicant's reliance on the decision of the Land Court in The Trust Company of Australia Limited v Department of Natural Resources and Water[39] and its submission that the applicant did everything that could be expected of a reasonable landholder by instructing Savills, is misconstrued and should not be accepted by the Court.
  • The respondent's submission in relation to The Trust Company is of little utility. The respondent does not provide any substantive reason as to why the applicant's submission about The Trust Company is misconstrued, aside from vague assertions about there being "insufficient probative evidence" and "no evidence from the applicant which deposes to the instructions provided by the applicant to Savills".
  • It appears that the respondent seeks to, on the one hand, rely on the fact that Savills has significant experience in handling appeals of this nature but on the other, penalise the applicant for entrusting the institution of the appeal to Savills.
  • With respect, the respondent cannot reasonably suggest that the Court ought to punish the applicant for relying on Mr Murphy and Savills to progress the appeal in the appropriate manner. Any fault (if indeed there is any fault to be attributed), in this case, lies with Savills and that the applicant has "done everything that could be expected of a "reasonable man" in entrusting the institution of the appeal to its [agents]".
  • The test to be applied by the Court is whether the Court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the applicant has demonstrated that a reasonable excuse exists.

Decided cases

  1. [30]
    In Director-General, Department of Transport v Congress Community Development and Education Unit Ltd[40] (Congress Community) the Land Appeal Court had to determine the existence of a reasonable cause pursuant to s 44(11)(d) of the Land Act 1962 for the late lodgement of a Notice of Appeal (the lodgement was one day late). After considering several decided cases Muir J held:

"In my view, the above authorities support the conclusion that for a reasonable excuse to exist it is not necessary that the conduct of the applicant (by itself or its agents) be blameless. The expressions under consideration are broad in meaning and quite apt to cover a "slip" of the nature of that made by the employee of the Crown Solicitor. One should not lose sight of the fact that the provision under consideration is remedial in nature, having been introduced in order to ameliorate the harsh consequences of a failure to comply with the requirements of s 44(11)(a) and (b); …"[41]

  1. [31]
    In relation to the meaning of “reasonable cause or explanation” his Honour noted that:

“Those authorities though, offer assistance in an assessment of whether any given conduct satisfies the statutory test, but each application must be considered on its own merits and by reference to its own facts. In my view, the conduct discussed above is consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct. It is the kind of thing which might be expected to delay the "taking of action by a reasonable man." An excuse is not necessarily unreasonable because the maker of the excuse has made a mistake or omitted to do something through an oversight or misapprehension as to a question of fact or law.”[42]

  1. [32]
    The Members on the Court, Mr Wenck and Dr Divert in allowing the application stated:

"That does not imply however that, in our opinion, there was a reasonable excuse for the conduct of the solicitor to whom the applicant had entrusted the institution of the appeal. The reasonable cause and explanation of the lateness of the service and lodgement of the notice and payment of the prescribed fee, is, in our opinion, the fact that the solicitor failed in the duty entrusted to her. The applicant had done everything that should have been expected of him.

The facts indicate that the solicitor acted reasonably at least until the last week of the prescribed period, in taking the instructions of her employer's client to the stage of having a notice of appeal prepared in its settled form, ready for checking, signing, service and lodgment. There was a personal work system in place to ensure things were not forgotten but that system was not properly implemented and failed.”[43]

  1. [33]
    In Anthony v Department of Natural Resources,[44] the meaning of “reasonable excuse” as set out in s 57(2) of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (VOLA) was considered in circumstances where an incorrectly addressed letter had caused the late filing which was compounded by a failure to comply with a requisition by the Registrar under s 58 (3) of the VOLA. Member Divett stated:

“In seeking understanding of the term "a reasonable excuse," I am directed by Mr Paterson to the findings of the Land Appeal Court in AG Russell v. The Crown (1992-93) 14 QLCR 202. That matter dealt with failure by the appellant to meet the strict time limitations imposed under s.44(11)(a) and (b) of the Land Act 1962. In the circumstances then prevailing under the Land Act 1962, the Land Appeal Court found at page 204:

"Whilst it has been laid down that each case depends on its own particular facts, it is clear from the above authorities that the reasonable cause or explanation must be substantial. The test is an objective one. It is of little use for an appellant for example, merely to say without more that he did not know of the time limitation, or that he had overlooked duly complying with the prescribed requirements of s.44(11)(a) and (b), or that he believed that what he did amounted to due compliance. The Land Appeal Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable cause or explanation."

The Land Appeal Court rejected the claim by the appellant that ill health had been the reason for the late lodgement of the appeal, noting any lack of particularity to support such a claim.”

  1. [34]
    In Body Corporate for Parklands CTS and Anor v Department of Natural Resources and Water,[45] Member Jones (as he was then) considered an application to determine jurisdiction in the context of s 57 of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 (VLA). The solicitor later engaged by the applicant deposed an affidavit to try and establish reasonable excuse as set out in s 57 of the VLA.
  1. [35]
    A critical question in Parklands concerned hearsay elements of the affidavit relied on behalf of the applicant to demonstrate “reasonable excuse”. Member Jones observed as follows in relation to the nature of the application and the evidence in support:

“[15] Before proceeding further with this matter I should deal with some specific submissions made by Mr Fynes-Clinton, counsel for the respondent. Mr Fynes-Clinton properly described this application as being substantive rather than procedural in character. And, that pursuant to s (57)(1) a two step process is involved. First, the applicants must clearly put before the Court an excuse established by probative evidence upon which it relies for relief. It is only then that the next step arises, namely whether or not, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the excuse relied on is “reasonable”. I agree with this analysis.

[16] Mr Fynes-Clinton submits further that in this application the applicants fail at the first hurdle because the evidence relied on is, in nearly all material respects, merely hearsay and applications such as this require direct evidence to establish the excuse relied on.

[17] I have considerable sympathy for the approach advocated by Mr Fynes-Clinton. Save for those cases where the Court is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for accepting hearsay evidence, applications such as this should be supported wherever practicable by direct evidence.

[18] Section (7) of the Land Court Act 2000 (LCA) of course provides that the Land Court is not bound by the rules of evidence and must act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to legal technicalities and forms or the practice of other Courts. Section (7) however does not provide a blanket excuse or basis for not putting before the Court probative evidence capable of being tested by the other side. It is well established that statutory provisions such as s (7) of the LCA permits the Court to resort to common sense judgement in the circumstances of the case before it. However, that does not mean that the Court can act in an arbitrary way. It must still apply appropriate legal principles including the standard of being satisfied on the balance of probabilities. The equity and good conscience provisions do not empower the Land Court or the Land Appeal Court to ignore established principles of law or to dispense justice other than in accordance with basic principles of natural justice to all parties.

[19] In re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs at 41 Brennan J stated:

“Some stress has been laid by the present respondents upon the provision that the Tribunal is not, in the hearing of appeals, “bound by any rules of evidence”. Neither it is. But this does not mean that all rules of evidence may be ignored as of no account. After all, they represent the attempt made, through many generations, to evolve a method of inquiry best calculated to prevent error and elicit truth. No tribunal can, without grave danger of injustice, set them on one side and resort to methods of inquiry which necessarily advantage one party and necessarily disadvantage the opposing party. In other words, although rules of evidence as such, do not bind, every attempt must be made to administer “substantial justice”. That does not mean, of course, that the rules of evidence that have been excluded expressly by the statute creep back through a domestic procedural rule. Facts can be fairly found without demanding adherence to the rules of evidence…."

[20] In the course of his reasoning Brennan J cited with approval observations made by Diplock LJ in R v Deputy Industrial Inquiries Commission, Ex parte Moore at 488 where his Lordship observed that the technical rules of evidence form no part of the rules of natural justice but a decision of the tribunal of fact must be based on evidence which is logically probative.

[21] I respectfully agree with the observations of Brennan J but it must be stressed that I am not attempting to formulate a test or rigid formula applicable to all applications brought in the Land Court. Each must be dealt with on its own facts, circumstances and merits.

[22] The force and effect of s (7) of the LCA must not be construed in such a way as to limit the flexibility Parliament intended the Land Court to have in the exercise of its jurisdiction. However, in applications such as this and in many other cases no doubt, hearsay evidence, if admitted, runs the real risk of unfairly advantaging one party and disadvantaging the other. That is so because the evidence cannot be adequately challenged or otherwise tested.”[46]

  1. [36]
    In Hughes v Department of Natural Resources and Water[47] Member Scott made the following observations:

[13] The phrase "reasonable excuse" and other similar phrases have been considered in a number of authorities many of which are collected in the judgment of Muir J in Director General, Department of Transport v Congress Community Development and Education Unit Limited (1998) 19 QLCR 168 at 171. The phrases considered in the authorities referred to by His Honour include "reasonable cause for explanation"; "reasonable cause" and "reasonable excuse". I might usefully refer to one of the authorities relied upon by His Honour that being Pascoe v The Nominal Defendant (Qld) No. 2 [1964] Qd R 373 at 378 in which Mansfield CJ said –

"What is to be determined is whether the applicant has shown any cause which can be deemed by the court to be a reasonable excuse. I think this means cause which a reasonable man would regard as an excuse, a cause consistent with a reasonable standard of conduct, the kind of thing which might be expected to delay the giving of notice by a reasonable man."

[14] It can be understood from this quotation that for a Court to conclude that a "reasonable excuse" exists for the delay there must first be identified an actual cause or causes of the delay. I cannot conclude that a case has been made out that the fact that the file was boxed for removal was the cause of the lateness of filing of the Notice of Appeal. There is an absence of particularity as to the true nature of the cause. The affidavit does not depose that a Notice of Appeal could not have been filed within time on 25 September 2007 when boxed material was unpacked, nor why it was not filed that day. The Notice of Appeal was filed on 26 September 2007 by facsimile with the receiving machine in the Land Court registry recording a filing time of 12:24 pm that day.

[15] In AG Russell v The Crown [1992] 14 QLCR 202 the Land Appeal Court was dealing with an application for extension of time to lodge an appeal. That involved a consideration of s.44(11)(a)(b) for the Land Act 1962 which permitted an extension of time if the applicant demonstrated a "reasonable cause or explanation". At 204 the Court said:

"Mr Conroy submitted that the reason for the late compliance with s.44(11)(a) and (b) was his client's ill health. Unfortunately, in spite of questioning from the bench, no particulars were given as to the nature of this illness, its duration, and what medical treatment if any had been received. There is no medical evidence and no certificate is produced, and the appellant himself has not sought to explain to this Court his circumstances, notwithstanding that two letters have already been sent to the appellant and Mr Conroy, informing them that the appellant must establish this matter before the appeal can proceed."

Even if the discretion granted to the Court was unfettered there would be a need for a satisfactory explanation.

  1. [37]
    In Loughnan v Valuer-General[48] the Notice of Appeal, although forwarded by facsimile transmission was not received in the Land Court registry.  The Court noted the following:

[6] On 9 October 2019 a statement by Mr. Loughnan was provided to the Court detailing the circumstances surrounding his attempt to lodge the Notice of Appeal via facsimile from the Roma Courthouse.  Although it is unnecessary to recite the statement in full, it is not in dispute that Mr. Loughnan attended the Roma Courthouse on 12 March 2019 and provided the Notice of Appeal to a member of staff who then helpfully proceeded to commence transmission of the Notice of Appeal by facsimile to the Land Court registry in Brisbane.

……

[13] The nature of a reasonable excuse has been considered by this Court and the Land Appeal Court on a number of occasions. In AG Russell v The Crown the Land Appeal Court stated:

“Whilst it has been laid down that each case depends on its own particular facts, it is clear from the above authorities that the reasonable cause or explanation must be substantial. The test is an objective one. It is of little use for an appellant for example, merely to say without more that he did not know of the time limitation, or that he had overlooked duly complying with the prescribed requirements of s.44(11)(a) and (b), or that he believed that what he did amounted to due compliance. The Land Appeal Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable cause or explanation.”

[14] On the evidence before the Court I am satisfied that the appellant’s attempt to lodge the Notice of Appeal has been frustrated by some failure in transmission by the facsimile on 12 March 2019. On an objective view this failure is of a substantial nature, and the type of circumstance that would be likely to result in the Notice of Appeal not being lodged within the appeal period by a person acting reasonably. I am therefore satisfied that reasonable excuse is established and that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.

  1. [38]
    In Trust Company of Australia Limited v Department of Natural Resources and Water[49] the Court observed:

[9] Mr Lonergan explained the procedure which had been adopted by the solicitors for the processing of decisions on objection and the preparation and lodging of any notices of appeal. During that process written instructions were received from the applicant on 5 October 2006 to lodge an appeal against the valuation. A diarised reminder was brought to Mr Lonergan's attention on 14 November 2006 and the appeal was filed on 15 November 2006. However, an administrative error had occurred. The final date for lodging an appeal had been calculated from the date the decision on objection was received, not from the date of issue of the decision as required by s.45(2) of the Act. That error was the reason for the filing of the notice of appeal one day late.

[10] There is no dispute that an error has occurred in calculating the final date to institute an appeal. The solicitors have conceded that the fault was theirs. The applicant had promptly given instructions to lodge an appeal.  The issue is whether in these circumstances the applicant should suffer for the error of its solicitors.

……………………

[45] Having regard to the circumstances of the present case and the authorities referred to above, I am of the view that the more flexible approach taken by the Land Appeal Court in the Congress Community Development case should be followed in the present case. Muir J found that there was reasonable excuse for the "slip" of the solicitor in that case. In my view, the same could be said for the "slip" of the solicitor in this case.

[46] However, if that was not sufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse, I would adopt the reasoning of Mr Wenck and Dr Divett. As in that case, in the present case the fault lies with the solicitors, but the applicant has done everything that could be expected of a "reasonable man" in entrusting the institution of the appeal to its solicitors.[50]

Consideration

  1. [39]
    The applicant contends that the case of Loughnan[51] is strikingly similar to the present circumstances. The Court is not able to accept this submission. In this case, unlike Loughnan, the failure of the facsimile to transmit occurred after the appeal period had expired and therefore, was not the cause of the Notice of Appeal being lodged outside the appeal period. This failure to transmit was immediately apparent to Ms Harmsworth. In Loughnan, the failure in transmission occurred during the appeal period and did not become apparent to the applicant until he became aware the matter had not been listed for a preliminary conference at Roma. The Court did not find that the delay was occasioned by Mr Loughnan. 
  1. [40]
    A critical area of disagreement between the parties concerns the identification of the cause or causes of the delayed lodgement. Relying on the decision of Hughes v Department of Natural Resources and Water[52] the respondent contends that as no actual cause has been identified by the applicant there is no basis for any discretion to be exercised.[53] Although the focus of this contention appears to be affidavits initially filed by the applicant, the Court must still attempt to identify an actual cause from the evidence in its entirety.[54]
  1. [41]
    The applicant’s submissions in reply[55] state that:

“For the avoidance of doubt, the cause of the delay is a consequence of:

  1. (a)
    the instructions to file the Notice of Appeal were only received from the Applicant during the Court closure period on 22 December 2020;
  1. (b)
    Savills’ mistaken belief that the Land Court registry was open for filing on 22 December 2020;
  1. (c)
    Ms Vella-Neville’s reasonable belief that the Notice of Appeal could be filed by sending the Notice of Appeal by email to the Land Court, on the basis that the Land Court had previously accepted notices of appeal filed via email; and
  1. (d)
    the late time at which Savills was advised on the last day to file an appeal that the Notice of Appeal had not been accepted by the Land Court for filing.”
  1. [42]
    Having considered the suggested causes, the Court is of the view that although items (a), (b) and (d) provide a degree of background, none are sufficiently connected with the attempt to file the Notice of Appeal on 4 January 2021.
  1. [43]
    In respect of (c), the Court has already noted that a finding regarding any belief held by Ms Vella-Neville is not possible in the absence of any further evidence from her.[56] Notwithstanding this, Ms Harmsworth’s second affidavit has been received as evidence of matters within her knowledge as executive assistant at Savills.
  1. [44]
    As understood, Ms Harmsworth’s evidence is that the reason for filing by email was because the Court had accepted filing by email on two earlier occasions and further, that the signature block of emails from the Court had contained the words “from 15 June 2020 until further notice …parties may attend at the registry in person to file documents or make enquiries.  However, the Court encourages parties to continue to use phone, mail or email wherever practicable”.
  1. [45]
    Finally, in relation to (d) the Court is unable to conclude that the email notification from the Acting Senior Registrar at 2.16 pm on 4 January 2021 was somehow a cause of the late lodgement by Ms Harmsworth at 4.35 pm that same day. No persuasive factual analysis or explanation has been provided as to how this result eventuated as a consequence of the email.  
  1. [46]
    At this point it should be noted that despite being unable to adopt every cause contended for by the applicant, the Court is of the view that Ms Harmsworth’s second affidavit provides sufficient evidence to enable the Court to discern an actual cause. Accordingly, it follows that the contended application of Hughes does not arise and the relevant submission[57] by the respondent is unable to be accepted.
  1. [47]
    The question of reasonable excuse in the context of annual leave or holiday periods requires that alternative arrangements be put in place to ensure the Notice of Appeal is filed on time[58]. In the present case the agent’s closure arrangements seem to have involved staff checking emails and then emailing one another as how to respond, the response ultimately involving Ms Harmsworth leaving her home at 3.55 pm to drive to the unstaffed Savills office to attempt to fax the Notice of Appeal.
  1. [48]
    Ms Harmsworth deposes (during what must have been the final minutes of the appeal period) that she “did not arrive in the office until after 4pm on 4 January 2021, due to the distance between my house and Savills’ offices. This was the reason the first attempt to send the Notice of Appeal to the Land Court Registry via fax was not made until 4.35pm”.[59]
  1. [49]
    The Court has reached the conclusion that the closure arrangements that necessitated Ms Harmsworth commuting to the Savills office, although in effect working remotely, were the actual cause of the Notice of Appeal not being filed during the appeal period.
  1. [50]
    The respondent submits that the appeal notice could have been filed earlier on 4 January 2021, whereas the applicant contends[60] that Savills believed that the Notice of Appeal emailed to the Court on 22 December 2021 would be accepted for filing given that: Ms Vella-Neville had attended in person to file the notice and not realised the registry was closed; the registry had accepted appeal notices by email on two earlier occasions in 2016 and 2021; and filing arrangements due to COVID-19 precautions had been noted earlier in emails forwarded by the Court.[61] 
  1. [51]
    Ms Harmsworth’s uncontradicted evidence seems to suggest that Savills had believed that the notice forwarded by email on 22 December 2021 would be accepted for filing given earlier flexibility associated with COVID-19 precautions. This evidence, which is neither fanciful nor inherently improbable, is accepted by the Court.
  1. [52]
    On the evidence, it would follow that if Savills had thought that the notice had not been properly filed, they would have acted to ensure that it was, rather than neglecting to do so. The evidence in this regard does not give the impression of any conscious neglect or abandonment.

Conclusion

  1. [53]
    The Court has considered the entirety of evidence presented by the applicant in relation to the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to file the Notice of Appeal. The views of Muir J in Congress Community[62] set out at [30] and [31] have been given close consideration in view of the peculiar chain of events that have emerged in this case.
  1. [54]
    The Court has reached the conclusion that the circumstances which preceded the attempted filing of the notice (a matter of minutes outside of the appeal period) may be viewed as a “slip” by the agent as envisaged by Muir J in Congress Community.[63] It therefore follows that reasonable excuse is established and the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.

Orders

  1. The application is allowed.
  1. The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal.
  1. Any submissions seeking a costs order in this matter must be filed and served within 14 days of the publication of these reasons.

Footnotes

[1] Acts Interpretation Act 1954 s 38.

[2]  Ex 1.

[3]  Ex 1, GLVN-02.

[4]  Ex 2.

[5]  Ex 2, NFH-01.

[6]  Ex 2, NFH-02.

[7]  Ex 2, NFH-03.

[8]  Ex 2, NFH-04.

[9]  Ex 2, NFH-05.

[10]  Ex 2, NFH-06.

[11]  Ex 2, NFH-07.

[12]  Ex 2, NFH-08.

[13]  Ex 3.

[14]   [2005] VSC 18 [41].

[15]   Ibid.

[16]   Ibid.

[17]   Ex 3.

[18]  Ex 3, para 9-12. 

[19]  Ex 3, para 12. 

[20]   Body Corporate for Parklands CTS and Anor v Department of Natural Resources and Water (2009) 30 QLCR 50 [17].

[21]  Ex 3, para 13-16.

[22]  Ex 3, para 18.

[23]  Filed 26 May 2021.

[24]  [2007] QLC 45.

[25]  [2007] QLC 45 [45].

[26]  [2007] QLC 45 [46].

[27]  Filed 2 June 2021.

[28] Jackamarra v Krakouer and Anor [1998] 195 CLR 516 [539]-[540].

[29] AG Russell v The Crown (1992-1993) 14 QLCR 202 [204].

[30]  [1998] QLAC 71.

[31]  For brevity the paragraphs of Parklands [15] to [22] are included in Decided Cases at [34] herein.

[32]  [2007] QLC 129.

[33]  [2007] QLC 129 [14].

[34]  [2007] QLC 129 [15].

[35]  Acting Senior Registrar.

[36]  Ibid.

[37]  Filed 7 June 2021.

[38] Loughnan v Valuer-General [2020] QLC 1.

[39]  [2007] QLC 45.

[40]   (1998) 19 QLCR 168.

[41]  (1998) 19 QLCR 168, 171.

[42]  (1998) 19 QLCR 168, 172.

[43]  (1998) 19 QLCR 168, 173.

[44]  [2000] QLC 72, 7.

[45]  (2009) 30 QLCR 50.

[46]  (2009) 30 QLCR 50.

[47]  [2007] QLC 129.

[48]  [2020] QLC 1.

[49]  [2007] QLC 45.

[50]  [2007] QLC 45.

[51]  [2020] QLC 1.

[52]  [2007] QLC 129.

[53]   Respondent’s submissions filed 2 June 2021 [46].

[54] Body Corporate for Parklands CTS and Anor v Department of Natural Resources and Water (2009) 30 QLCR 50 [15].

[55]  Applicant’s submissions in Reply filed 7 June 2021, 7.

[56]Body Corporate for Parklands CTS and Anor v Department of Natural Resources and Water (2009) 30 QLCR 50 [17].

[57]   Respondent’s submissions filed 2 June 2021 [46].

[58] Branch v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2002] QLC 86.

[59]  Ex 3, para 16.

[60]    Respondent’s submissions filed 2 June 2021 [48].

[61]  Applicant’s submissions filed 7 June 2021, 7.

[62]  (1998) 19 QLCR 168.

[63]  (1998) 19 QLCR 168, 171-172.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Lamington Markets Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Lamington Markets Pty Ltd as Tte v Valuer-General

  • MNC:

    [2021] QLC 41

  • Court:

    QLC

  • Judge(s):

    GJ Smith

  • Date:

    02 Dec 2021

Appeal Status

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