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Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council[2024] QLC 8

Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council[2024] QLC 8

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2024] QLC 8 

PARTIES:

Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd ACN 054 174 271

(applicant)

v

Moreton Bay Regional Council

(respondent)

FILE NO:

AQL037-23

PROCEEDING:

Application for determination of separate questions

DELIVERED ON:

9 May 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARD ON:

26 March 2024

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

MEMBER:

JR McNamara

ORDER:

The application for determination of separate questions filed 21 February 2024 is allowed in respect of Question 1 (only).

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SEPARATE AND PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS – where the respondent issued two notices of intention to resume in respect of land owned by the applicant – where the applicant claims compensation under the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 for costs and expenses – where the applicant has applied for the separate and preliminary determination of two questions regarding the proper construction of section 16(1A) the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 – whether the questions are questions of law or fact or mixed fact and law – whether there is utility in making a determination of separate questions – whether it is just and convenient to make a determination of separate questions – whether a separate questions determination would save time and costs – whether the separate questions are hypothetical or seek an advisory opinion 

Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) s 16(1A)

Land Court Act 2000 (Qld) s 7

Land Court Rules 2022 (Qld) r 3

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 483(1)

Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 332

Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor (1999) 217 ALR 496

The Owners-Strata Plan No 75903 v Dix & Anor (2011) 80 NSWLR 186

Trondage Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General [2015] QLC 11

APPEARANCES:

D O'Brien KC, with W Macintosh (instructed by HWL Ebsworth) for the applicant

DR Gore, with D Quayle (instructed by In-house legal, Moreton Bay Regional Council) for the respondent

Background

  1. [1]
    The Applicant claims compensation from the Respondent, pursuant to section 16(1A) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (ALA), for costs and expenses that it claims it has incurred as a direct and ordinary consequence of the discontinuance by the Respondent of two notices of intention to resume that were issued in respect of land owned by the Applicant.
  1. [2]
    The Applicant has applied pursuant to rule 483(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) for the separate and preliminary determination of two questions regarding the proper construction of section 16(1A) of the ALA.[1]
  1. [3]
    In accordance with Orders made 8 December 2023, as amended 11 March 2024, a General Application together with a supporting Affidavit and Submissions of the Applicant (“Application for determination of a separate question on a critical matter of law”) were filed on 21 February 2024.[2]  The “Respondent’s Submissions re preliminary questions” and amended submissions were filed 15 March 2024, 22 March 2024 and 25 March 2024.[3] The Applicant’s Submissions in Reply were sent to the Court late on 25 March 2024 and filed 26 March 2024.[4]
  1. [4]
    The application for the preliminary determination of the questions was heard on 26 March 2024.

Jurisdiction

  1. [5]
    The Land Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters relating to compensation under the ALA.[5]
  1. [6]
    The Land Court Rules 2022 (Qld) (LCR) do not provide for the determination of separate questions, but the UCPR do. The Land Court Act 2000 (Qld) (Land Court Act) s 7A provides that the Land Court has, for exercising jurisdiction conferred by the Land Court Act or another Act, all the powers of the Supreme Court.  By rule 3 of the LCR, the provisions within the UCPR that govern the determination of separate questions apply in this proceeding with necessary changes.
  1. [7]
    Rules 482 and 483(1) of the UCPR relevantly provide:

482–Definition for pt 5

In this part –

question includes a question or issue in a proceeding, whether or fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by pleadings, agreement of parties or otherwise.

483–Order for decision and statement of case for opinion

  1. The court may make an order for the decision by the court of a question separately from another question, whether before, at, or after the trial or continuation of the trial of the proceeding.

Ambit of s 16(1A)

  1. [8]
    The “costs and expenses” for which compensation is claimed by the Applicant include a range of costs and expenses in addition to legal, valuation and other professional fees which the Applicant submits are over and above those that would have been incurred had the two notices of intention to resume not been issued.
  1. [9]
    In its 26 September 2023 Amended Respondent’s Statement of Facts and Issues (ARSFI),[6] the Respondent (by reference to the Applicant’s 4 August 2023 Amended Statement of Facts, Circumstances and Relevant Matters (ASFCM)),[7] describes the claimed costs and expenses as follows:
  1. A claim for increased development application costs (ASFCM [24]–[26]);
  1. A claim for increased tenancy costs and losses (ASFCM [27]–[29]);
  1. A claim for lost holding costs (ASFCM [30]-[32]);
  1. A claim for legal and other costs (ASFCM [33]–[37]).
  1. [10]
    The Respondent says that as a matter of law the ambit of a claim for compensation pursuant to s 16(1A) does not extend beyond out of pocket costs and expenses in the nature of legal, valuation and other professional fees that are reasonable and reasonably incurred in connection with the consideration of and/or in the preparation of a claim for compensation following the resumption of land foreshadowed by the notice of intention to resume; and any actual damage done to the land concerned by the constructing authority.[8]
  1. [11]
    The Respondent also contends that the Applicant’s claims do not come within the ambit of section 16(1A) of the ALA as a matter of fact, because the Respondent disputes that the Applicant incurred the costs and expenses, the quantum of those costs and expenses, and that those costs and expenses are causally connected to the Respondent’s discontinuance of the two notices of intention to resume.
  1. [12]
    The Applicant says that if the Respondent’s contended construction is correct, at least three out of the four bases of the Applicant’s claim will not be maintainable. Conversely, if the Applicant’s contended construction is correct, all four of the Applicant’s claims for compensation may proceed to hearing to determine whether those claims are made out as a matter of fact.

The questions posed by the Applicant

  1. [13]
    The questions as they appear in the General Application are:
  1. On the proper construction of s. 16(1A) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (ALA), is a claim for compensation pursuant to that provision limited to:
  1. out of pocket costs and expenses in the nature of legal, valuation and other professional fees:
  1. reasonably incurred;
  2. themselves reasonable; and
  3. which are incurred in connection with the consideration of and/or in the preparation of a claim for compensation following the resumption of land foreshadowed by the notice of intention to resume; and
  1. any actual damage done to the land by the constructing authority.
  1. If the answer to question 1 is “No”, does a “claim for compensation for costs and expenses incurred”, within the meaning of those words as used in s 16(1A) of ALA, extend to a claim for the financial loss claimed to have been suffered by the applicant as pleaded?
  1. [14]
    It is apparent that the Applicant’s wording of question 1 in the General Application has taken the Respondent’s pleaded construction of s 16(1A) in their Statement of Facts and Issues and converted it into the question.[9]  The Applicant says that question 2 is simply the converse.[10]
  1. [15]
    A point not missed is that the Applicant is advocating for, and the Respondent is resisting, the preliminary hearing of a question posed in submissions by the Respondent, which if answered in favour of the Respondent would, according to the Applicant’s submissions, bring an end to three of the four bases of the Applicant’s claim.
  1. [16]
    The Applicant characterises the questions as being pure questions of law. The Respondent disputes this characterisation.[11] They say the questions involve “ultimately questions of mixed fact and law” – which the Respondent says is relevant to the prospects of appeal and consequently to the expeditious resolution of the matter, cost and delay.  On further enquiry at the hearing, this submission appeared to be more directed at proposed question 2: … “one of the disadvantages of an affirmative answer to question 2 in favour of the applicant is that it is divorced from the facts”.[12] Although linked to the pleadings, proposed question 2 references “financial loss  claimed to have been suffered” by the Applicant which, it is submitted, could open the door to contested factual issues. 
  1. [17]
    The submissions of both parties were advanced on the basis that the questions would or would not proceed together; that is to say, the parties’ written submissions did not contemplate that either question might proceed alone.

Relevant principles

  1. [18]
    In Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society & Anor (Reading Australia),[13] Branson J summarised the relevant principles that govern the circumstances in which an order for a separate question may be determined.  Reading Australia was cited with approval by President MacDonald in Trondage Enterprises Pty Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General.[14]
  1. [19]
    Pertinent to this matter are the following principles:
  1. the judicial determination of a question … must involve a conclusive or final decision based on concrete and established or agreed facts for the purpose of quelling a controversy between the parties;
  1. care must be taken in utilising the procedure … to avoid the determination of issues not “ripe” for separate and preliminary determination;
  1. factors which tend to support the making of an order … include that the separate determination of the question may contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the issues for trial, or even lead to disposal of the action or contribute to the settlement of the litigation; 
  1. factors which tell against the making of an order include that the separate determination of the question may give rise to significant contested factual issues both at the time of the hearing of the preliminary question and at the time of trial, may result in significant overlap between the evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial, or prolong rather than shorten the litigation.
  1. [20]
    It was submitted by the Applicant that the proper construction of the phrase “costs and expenses” within section 16(1A) of the ALA is “ripe” for separate determination.[15]  They say that neither question is framed generally nor in the abstract; neither question is hypothetical; and neither question requires the assumption of any facts for its resolution.[16] They say the proper construction of section 16(1A) of the ALA is not a question that requires a determination of the factual matters underpinning each of the Applicant’s claims – but it is a question that is going to have to be decided in this case.[17]
  1. [21]
    The Respondent says[18] that: central to the purpose of a determination of a preliminary question is “the notion that such a determination includes a conclusive or final decision based on a concrete and established or agreed situation which aims to quell a controversy”;[19] the determination of a preliminary question is an “exceptional course”;[20] and “in the ordinary course of events all issues should be determined at one trial”.[21]
  1. [22]
    The Respondent says that the questions seek an advisory opinion on how s 16(1A) is to be construed, in the abstract and in the absence of facts found or agreed.

Utility (conclusiveness and readiness)

  1. [23]
    The Applicant says proposed Question 1 seeks to obtain an adjudication as to whether the “narrow construction” pleaded by the Respondent is correct; and proposed Question 2 seeks to obtain an adjudication as to whether the “wider construction” that has been pleaded by the Applicant is correct.
  1. [24]
    The Applicant submits that answers to the questions that have been posed will reduce the issues in dispute between the parties and are ripe for preliminary determination.[22]
  1. [25]
    The Applicant says a hearing of the preliminary questions would be a “limited exercise” and is estimated by Senior Counsel for the Applicant to occupy “half a day to one day at the most”.[23]  In response to a question posed about a hearing if the application for the determination of the preliminary questions is denied, Senior Counsel for the Applicant said: … “the proper construction of s 16(1A) is always going to have to be decided in this case… either one spends a day at the separate question phase, or one spends a day as part of the trial dealing with the separate question.”[24]  In response to the same question, Senior Counsel for the Respondent said that if the decision is made that there should not be preliminary questions it would run counter to that decision to invite the Court at the start of the hearing to nevertheless determine those questions.[25]  However, the parties agree that the proper construction of s 16(1A) is going to have to be decided in this case at some point.
  1. [26]
    Senior Counsel for the Applicant said, “if these questions are answered against us, those first three categories, the DA costs, the increased tenancy costs, the sterilisation costs and all of the dense factual history behind those disappear because there will not be an ability under this provision to make the claim”.[26]
  1. [27]
    This statement was qualified by the potential for “a very short appeal”, of “a discrete point”, occupying “not more than one day”, should the questions be answered “against” the Applicant.[27] The likelihood of appeal was said to be a “real possibility”.
  1. [28]
    I pause to note that if question 1 is answered against the Applicant, the Court would not proceed to answer question 2.
  1. [29]
    The Applicant filed the Affidavit of Peter John Bittner, solicitor, with the General Application.[28] Mr Bittner says that if the construction of s 16(1A) advocated by the Respondent is correct, the claim would be limited to only the Applicant’s Legal, Valuation and Other Professional Costs and would likely only take 1 – 2 days with little or no expert or lay witnesses. 
  1. [30]
    The Respondent noted that the appeal hierarchy from a decision of the Land Court begins with the Land Appeal Court, and then potentially the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The Respondent also raised the prospect of a higher court determining “that the question should not have been framed as a preliminary question in the first place”.[29] The Respondent said that an appeal is not a “given factor” if the matter proceeds to hearing without preliminary questions being determined.
  1. [31]
    Mr Bittner opines that should the preliminary questions not be determined, he does not “consider [the matter] will be ready for hearing this year and therefore [it is] unlikely to be heard before 2025”. He says that resolution of the question of the proper construction of s 16(1A) would remove a “significant impediment to the resolution of this matter”.
  1. [32]
    If the construction of s 16(1A) advanced by the Applicant is heard and determined to be correct, once any and all appeals have been exhausted, there will nevertheless be a challenge to the facts in relation to all 4 bases of claim. As noted later in these reasons at paragraph [36], Mr Bittner anticipates a 7 – 10 day hearing involving expert witnesses and up to 18 lay witnesses.
  1. [33]
    If the construction of s 16(1A) advanced by the Respondent is heard and determined to be correct, once any and all appeals have been exhausted, the Applicant has said they will not pursue bases of claim 1, 2 and 3. However aspects of the claim in the 4th category will be challenged.  The evidence of Mr Bittner is that a hearing of that nature would occupy 1 to 2 days.

Just and convenient

  1. [34]
    The Applicant says it is just and convenient for the questions to be separately determined because:
  1. resolution of the questions will resolve a critical issue between the parties and therefore likely result in a cost and time saving;
  1. resolution of that critical issue will likely increase the prospects of settlement of the proceeding;
  1. the proposed questions require no factual determination to be made, with the result that there is no risk of inconsistent findings or overlapping of evidence at the ultimate trial; and
  1. the separate question hearing can be brought on promptly and can be heard in a day.[30]
  1. [35]
    In written submissions, the Respondent says the determination of the preliminary questions will not achieve the Court’s purpose of the just and quick resolution of the issues (in the proceeding) and the avoidance of undue delay and expense – and will prolong rather than shorten this litigation.[31] They say the likelihood that the disappointed party would appeal is high and that even if both questions are answered in favour of the Applicant, a “long and expensive” factual trial to determine whether the Applicant’s claims can be maintained is nevertheless likely.

Time and Cost-saving

  1. [36]
    Mr Bittner expressed his opinion on the process and expected costs of proceeding to a full hearing on the Originating Application. He anticipates a 7 – 10 day hearing; 6 months preparation time; expert town planning and valuation witnesses and up to 18 lay witnesses to be called; and he estimates the cost of Senior and Junior Counsel, solicitor, and expert witness fees. The estimated cost is between $325,000 and $480,000 “plus a reasonable further contingency of approximately 10%”.
  1. [37]
    This amount ($325,000 - $480,000), is said by Senior Counsel for the Applicant to be the costs that would be saved (by the Applicant, and a similar amount to be saved by the Respondent) if the questions are answered against the Applicant “either here or in an appellate court”. It is, the Applicant says, a saving because three of the four bases of claim “disappear”; “The cost that would be saved of a full-blown trial is in the million dollar mark.”[32]
  1. [38]
    If the questions were answered in favour of the Applicant, either in the Land Court or in an appellate court, the Applicant nevertheless anticipates a lengthy hearing to determine the factual matters in contest. However, they submit that a significant threshold issue between the parties will have been determined, necessarily shortening the length of the hearing.
  1. [39]
    The opinion of Mr Bittner regarding the process and cost estimates was not challenged. The Respondent in written submissions refers to the numerous complex counterfactuals to the three (most) contentious areas of claim and the complexity of the case in a causal sense and “how fact and law heavy it will be to try”.[33]

Hypothetical questions and advisory opinions

  1. [40]
    The majority of the High Court in Bass said: “Because the object of the judicial process is the final determination of the rights of the parties to an action, courts have traditionally refused to provide answers to hypothetical questions or to give advisory opinions”,[34] noting that an advisory opinion (as opposed to a declaratory judgment) is not based on a concrete situation and does not amount to a binding decision raising a res judicata between parties.[35]
  1. [41]
    In this application the parties’ submissions were made in respect of both questions, collectively. However, the questions are distinguishable.
  1. [42]
    The Applicant says that neither question is framed generally nor in the abstract. Question 1 seeks to obtain an adjudication as to whether the narrow construction that has been specifically pleaded by the Respondent is correct.[36]  Question 2 seeks to encapsulate the Applicant’s contended construction of s 16(1A) – that the loss claimed by the Applicant falls within “costs and expenses” as that term is deployed in s 16(1A). 
  1. [43]
    The Applicant’s proposed question 1 is framed as a question of law to be decided without reference to the facts. The Court in Bass recognised that some questions of law can be decided that way.[37]  Question 2 references a claim for financial loss as pleaded, indicative of a mixed question of fact and law.
  1. [44]
    Question 1 in this application invites a yes or a no answer. It is framed in a way that enables a definitive answer. It does not require the agreement or assumption of facts. It is submitted (by the Applicant) that if answered in favour of the Respondent, it would result in the discontinuance of three of the four bases of claim and the attendant cost. Its hearing as a preliminary question would require no consideration of the credit of witnesses.
  1. [45]
    The reframing of question 1 by the Court in Bass enabled it to become a question which was capable of being determined in the abstract.[38]  In that case the question was not whether the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) bound the State, but whether the State was a person. The answer was that the claim against the State was not maintainable because the State was not a person for the purposes of the Trade Practices Act. There was no need for that question to look at the facts; the question simply considered whether there was a claim against the State. 
  1. [46]
    In this matter, it is question 2 which poses the question whether the claim as pleaded could come within s 16(1A).
  1. [47]
    Question 2 would only require answering if a negative answer (that is, an answer favouring the Applicant) is given to question 1. In that event question 2 invites a yes or no answer, following the consideration of the claimed financial losses as pleaded. The claimed financial losses are not agreed and the Respondent has submitted they would be forcefully contested.
  1. [48]
    Referring to proposed question 2, the Respondent submits that it would be unhelpful if not misleading for the Court to decide that the claim could come within the relevant section in circumstances where the Applicant could fail on the facts.[39]  That, they submit would be simply an advisory opinion – and it would be unhelpful to give an advisory opinion.  It gives false encouragement to the Applicant. 
  1. [49]
    The Respondent refers to a number of passages from Bass which support this conclusion including at [49] where the plurality said:

“As the answers given … were not based on facts, found or agreed, they were purely hypothetical, at best, the answers do no more than declare that the law dictates a particular result when certain facts in the material or pleadings are established. What those facts are is not stated, nor can they be identified with any precision. They may be all or some only of the facts. What facts are determinative of the legal issue involved in the question asked is left open. Such a result cannot assist the efficient administration of justice.”

  1. [50]
    In response the Applicant in oral submissions say that Bass confirms “that a question is not hypothetical and the answering the question is part of the judicial function if it is tied to identified facts”.[40] As a result, the Applicant says in reference to proposed question 2: “in our case, the pleading – the legislation can be construed against. The identified facts are identified by reference to the statement of claim.”[41] This, the Applicant says will allow a conclusive adjudication as to whether these claims can be made under the ALA.
  1. [51]
    Senior Counsel for the Applicant said the difficulty in Bass was not that the facts were in dispute, the difficulty was that the facts had not been identified at all.[42] There was no agreed position as to what the facts were.  Senior Counsel pointed to the following passage in paragraph [50]: “… If the “facts” which are the basis of an answer to a legal question are identified, that answer will have utility for the parties provided that no other evidence could add to or qualify those “facts”. In such a case, the parties’ rights will be determined when the evidence finally determines the existence or non-existence of those “facts”.
  1. [52]
    The Applicant describes this as “the clearest endorsement by the High Court that it is appropriate” and part of the judicial function to answer questions by reference to various pleaded facts. The Applicant says the questions proposed are entirely conventional, and why it is appropriate for the Court to determine the questions as part of the proper judicial function.[43]
  1. [53]
    Senior Counsel for the Respondent said at the hearing of the application that:

“… one of the difficulties with question 2 is that it does only look at one side of the case. On the way the applicant wants to run question 2 … it wants the court to turn a blind eye to the council’s pleading and to say, “Just look at the applicant’s pleading and assume that everything in that is true”.[44] That is not the way to determine preliminary questions, because it does only involve giving an advisory opinion saying, “Well, [if] you can come up to proof. You’re within the section.” That’s only one side of the case. It doesn’t “quell a controversy”, to use the language of many of the cases.”

  1. [54]
    The Respondent acknowledges that question 1 “doesn’t have all the evils of question 2”.[45]  The Respondent accepts that if decided in favour of the Respondent then it puts an end to (a major part of) the claim.  The Respondent submits however that a determination of the preliminary questions would enhance the prospect of an appeal and delay the process unnecessarily.  They say: “Tempting as it may be, it does, in truth, amount to an advisory opinion rather than a determination of a preliminary question and would not be an appropriate course." 
  1. [55]
    Following this Senior Counsel for the Applicant said:

“But if your Honour was so inclined … question 1 would answer whether those three first categories of claim could be advanced by the client successfully, as a matter of law. And, obviously, the benefit of question 1, it cannot be said to be advisory. It is a classic question of law.”[46] They say that it would simply be a question of law devoid of any reference to the particular facts … in the sense that question 2 does.[47]  

  1. [56]
    Senior Counsel for the Applicant said the reason they proposed the two questions was to cover the field but that is question 2 was not answered, question 1 would be of almost, if not the same, utility.[48]

Conclusions

  1. [57]
    Having considered the submissions of the parties and my concerns regarding question 2 I am of the view that question 1, but not question 2, can proceed as a preliminary question.
  1. [58]
    Question 1 in my view is a question of law which is capable of being answered conclusively. It is a question which can be decided without reference to facts found or agreed. The proper construction of s 16(1A) of the ALA is an issue in dispute which necessarily needs to be determined. Despite the objection of the Respondent, it is the Respondent’s proposed construction which frames the question. It would be expected that it is that construction which the Respondent would urge at a hearing.
  1. [59]
    I accept that if the answer to the question favours the Applicant, the contentious elements of Applicant’s claim could nevertheless fail on the facts. The question of the proper construction of s 16(1A) must be determined – either as a preliminary question or at a full hearing.
  1. [60]
    I am satisfied that question 1 is ripe for separate and preliminary determination. A determination on the proper construction of s 16(1A) has real utility and will quell a controversy, even if the answer at first instance is the subject of appeal. Whenever the question is determined, an appeal in relation to the construction of s 16(1A) is likely. If determined as a preliminary question, and subject to the view of any appeal court, the Applicant anticipates a discrete and relatively efficient appeal progression.
  1. [61]
    I have not been directed to contested factual issues for consideration at the time of hearing preliminary question 1 which may result in overlap between evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial. Question 1 is a question that does not require the assumption or finding of any facts in respect of the matters contested.
  1. [62]
    I have formed the view that if the matter proceeds to a preliminary determination of question 1 (only), the overall impact on time and costs will be, if answered in favour of the Respondent, a much reduced expected hearing measured in both time and cost; and if answered in favour of the Applicant, possibly cost neutral. Regardless of the outcome, the preliminary determination will narrow the issues for trial. The time and cost savings will be of the order described by the Applicant if the answer favours the Respondent.
  1. [63]
    I have formed the view that question 2 should not proceed as a preliminary question. I do not think it is necessary at this time, and it has the potential to cloud the issues. Although the framing of question 2, which references the pleadings so as to attach the dispute to specific facts, makes its consideration somewhat consistent with Bass, I am sympathetic to the submission of the Respondent that question 2 “only looks at one side of the case”. The proposed question 2 refers to “financial loss claimed to have been suffered by the applicant as pleaded”.  The potential for the hearing of that preliminary question to descend into contested factual issues at the hearing of the preliminary question is real.  This may result in overlap between the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing of the question and at trial and may prolong the matter.

Order

The application for determination of separate questions filed 21 February 2024 is allowed in respect of Question 1 (only).

Footnotes

[1]Ex 1, tab 14. 

[2]Ibid.  

[3]Ex 1, tabs 17-19.

[4]Ex 1, tab 20.

[5]ALA s 26(1).

[6]Ex 1, tab 6.

[7]Ex 1, tab 5.

[8]ARSFI [3].

[9]Ex 1, tab 2, para 3. 

[10]T1-7, lines 40 to 43; Ex 1, tab 16, para 6.

[11]T1-28, lines 30 to 34.

[12]T1-29, lines 23 to 24.

[13](1999) 217 ALR 495, [8].

[14][2015] QLC 11.

[15]Ex 1, tab 16, para 45.

[16]Ex 1, tab 16, para 46-49.

[17]T1-10, line 26.

[18]Ex 1, tab 19, para 2-3.

[19]Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 355 [45] (Bass).

[20]The Owners-Strata Plan No 75903 v Dix & Anor (2011) 80 NSWLR 186, 190 [13]. 

[21]Ibid [13].

[22]Ex 1, tab 16.

[23]T1-10, lines 7 to 8.

[24]T1-10, lines 25 to 28.

[25]T1-38, lines 5 to 6.

[26]T1-9, lines 42 to 45.

[27]T1-8, lines 17 to 20.

[28]Ex 1, tab 15.

[29]T1-31, lines 46 to 47.

[30]Ex 1, tab 16.

[31]Ex 1, tab 19, para 33-39.

[32]T1-11, line 10.

[33]Ex 1, tab 19, para 19-21.

[34]Bass [47].

[35]Ibid [48].

[36]Ex 1, tab 16, para 46-47.

[37]Bass [52].

[38]Bass 353 [38].

[39]T1-34, lines 41 to 45.

[40]T1-12, line 47; T1-13, lines 1 to 2.

[41]T1-15, lines 25 to 27.

[42]T1-17, lines 17 to 18.

[43]T1-17, lines 45 to 47; T1-18, lines 1 to 5.

[44]T1-38, lines 29 to 36.

[45]T1-39, lines 2 to 13.

[46]T1-40, lines 39 to 43.

[47]T1-41, lines 5 to 7.

[48]T1-39, lines 25 to 27.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council

  • MNC:

    [2024] QLC 8

  • Court:

    QLC

  • Judge(s):

    JR McNamara

  • Date:

    09 May 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 332
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 198 CLR 332
Bass v Permanent Trustee Company Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 198 CLR 334
Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1999) 217 ALR 495
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1999) 217 ALR 495
The Owners-Strata Plan No 75903 v Dix & Anor (2011) 80 NSWLR 186
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 80 NSWLR 186
Cite 2 - (2011) 80 NSWLR 186
Trondage Enterprises Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2015] QLC 11
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QLC 11
Cite 2 - [2015] QLC 11

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council (No 2) [2024] QLC 241 citation
1

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