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Murray Laws Pty Ltd v Josephine Lucille Reeves[2024] QMC 20

Murray Laws Pty Ltd v Josephine Lucille Reeves[2024] QMC 20

MAGISTRATES COURTS OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Murray Laws Pty Ltd v Josephine Lucille Reeves [2024] QMC 20

PARTIES:

Murray Laws Pty Ltd

(Plaintiff/Applicant)

v

Josephine Lucille Reeves

(Defendant/Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

M77138/24

PROCEEDING:

Application for Summary Judgment and/or Striking out the Defence

ORIGINATING COURT:

Kingaroy

DELIVERED ON:

22 November 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Kingaroy

HEARING DATE:

18 November 2024

MAGISTRATE:

Sinclair

ORDER:

The application is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

Legal Profession Act – Costs Disclosure – Cost Agreements – Consequences of non-compliance with the LPA – Application for summary judgment – Application to strike out Defence

LEGISLATION:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999

Rules 150, 157, 165, 166, 171, 292

Legal Profession Act 2007

Sections 3, 308, 315, 316, 322, 326, 329, 330, 331

Jackson & Anor v. Creswick Middleton Solicitors [2000] QDC 046

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] QCA 227

MNM Developments Pty Ltd v Gerrard [2005] QCA 230

SOLICITORS:

W. Davis of Stonegate Legal for the Plaintiff/Applicant

Ms Reeves (unrepresented)

  1. [1]
    This is an application for summary judgment in respect of a claim bought by the incorporated law practice against the defendant. The application seeks in the alternative that the defence be struck out.
  2. [2]
    At the commencement of the hearing of the application the defendant asked for an adjournment. That was opposed and refused given the ample opportunity she had had to obtain advice both before and after service of the application.
  1. Pleadings
  1. [3]
    The Statement of Claim asserts claims for $38,996.40 as
    1. A liquidated debt
    2. Damages for breach of contract
    3. Unjust enrichment.
  2. [4]
    The essence of the claim is that the Plaintiff company did legal work for the defendant and wants to be paid for it. It also claims interest and the repayment of personal loans made to the Defendant.
  3. [5]
    There were two items invoiced, one for a Family Law matter and the other a Property/Civil matter.
  4. [6]
    The Defendant is self-represented and filed handwritten defence documents. These are short and simple.
  5. [7]
    They assert that she was in a personal relationship with a director of the Plaintiff and that they shared a bed at her premises and the Plaintiff’s office (which is apparently also the Director’s home).
  6. [8]
    She pleads the claims arise in the context of that relationship and not any contract. She says the payments sought include items that were gifts.
  7. [9]
    The Plaintiff has not filed a Reply nor filed a list of documents.
  8. [10]
    It has sent the Defendant a r.444 letter in relation to the issues raised and had no response.
  1. Summary Judgment
  1. [11]
    The application seeks judgment under r.292 which sets out the two-part test. The court must be satisfied of both limbs.
  1. 292
    Summary judgment for the plaintiff
  1. (1)
    A plaintiff may, at any time after a defendant files a notice of intention to defend, apply to the court under this part for judgment against the defendant.
  1. (2)
    If the court is satisfied that –
  1. a.
    The defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending all or part of the plaintiff’s claim; and
  1. b.
    There is no need for a trail of the claim or the part of the claim;
  1. the court may give judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for all or the part of the plaintiff’s claim and may make any other order the court considers appropriate.
  1. [12]
    The leading case is Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] QCA 227 at [3]

“nothing … detracts from the well established general principle that issues raised in the proceedings will be determined summarily only in the clearest of cases.”

“Ordinarily, a party is not to be denied the opportunity to place his or her case before the court in the ordinary way, and after taking advantage of the usual interlocutory processes. The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but of all the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way”.

  1. [13]
    No real prospect of success does not mean merely that success is improbable. It means there is no real as opposed to merely fanciful prospect of success.
  2. [14]
    In support of its application the Plaintiff has filed two affidavits. One from the Director and another from the lawyer acting for it in these proceedings. The Defendant has not filed any material.
  1. Costs Disclosure
  1. [15]
    The Directors affidavit sets out what purport to be two costs disclosures made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and acknowledged by her.
  2. [16]
    The Director swears that he ‘sent’ them on 28 October 2023 and that she accepted them by signing ‘and returning the Agreements’.
  3. [17]
    The Statement of Claim and the affidavit firstly describe each document as a “Disclosure Notice” then switch to describing them as “Agreements”.
  4. [18]
    The documents are Exhibit CM-1. They are largely identical and are each headed:

DISCLOSURE NOTICE

Section 308 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld).

  1. [19]
    The method of ‘accepting’ them as the ‘Agreements’ is said to be pursuant to Clause 8. The Statement of Claim somewhat ambitiously pleads:
  1. Clause 8 of [both ‘Agreements’] defines the acknowledgement and acceptance of the agreement and says:
  1. a.
    I acknowledge that I have read and understood the contents of this disclosure notice
  1. i.
    You may accept by signing and returning a copy of this document.
  1. [20]
    Clause 8 actually reads as follows:
  1. 8.
    Acknowledgement
  1. I acknowledge that I have read and understood the contents of this disclosure notice.
  1. [21]
    The document is not headed agreement and is not a costs agreement as described in the Legal Profession Act 2007 (LPA).
  2. [22]
    There appears on the material before me to have been no costs agreement made or evidenced in writing as required by s. 322 LPA.
  3. [23]
    The disclosure notice does not amount to a costs agreement as it does not meet the requirements of s. 322(4) in that it does not state that it is an offer to enter into a costs agreement or state how the offer can be accepted.
  4. [24]
    A disclosure notice and a costs agreement are two separate things. The first is to inform the client of certain things. The second is an offer to enter into a contract.
  5. [25]
    The disclosure notices in this matter contain no offer and no acceptance.
  6. [26]
    It follows that on the material read in this matter there is no written agreement giving a contractual right to a debt or damages for breach of a contract.
  7. [27]
    It has also not been pleaded that there was any oral contract or partly oral contract.
  8. [28]
    On that material read on the application, all aspects of the Plaintiff’s claim relating to the legal work done on the basis of any ‘Agreement’ must fail. There does not appear in the Statement of Claim to be a discreet addressing of the elements required for a restitution/unjust enrichment case.
  9. [29]
    The Director swears that in August 2023 he was informed by the Defendant of her personal circumstances and that:
  1. 6.
    The Defendant appeared to be in great need and from 29 August 2023 until 26 June 2024 I provided legal services and personal and financial assistance to the Defendant in an attempt to help her put her life back together.
  1. [30]
    The Queensland Law Society offers advice to its members in Guidance Statement No 23 Acting for Family and Friends. This has no statutory effect but contains what seems to be sound advice including:
  1. 6.3.
    Practitioners should ensure that all required costs disclosures are made
  1. There is no exemption for family or friends in terms of costs disclosure or the requirements in relation to costs agreements. In addition, engagements with family or friends are more susceptible to misunderstandings given that either party might make incorrect assumptions based on the underlying relationship.
  1. If a solicitor does take on a family member or friend as a client, a specific and comprehensive retainer and meticulous costs disclosure will reduce the chances of misunderstandings and conflict during the engagement.
  1. Has there been disclosure as required under the LPA?
  1. [31]
    Disclosure is not required under the threshold amount[1] but over that amount it is by s. 308(4).[2] These include:
  1. (c)
    an estimate of the total legal costs if reasonably practicable or, if that is not reasonably practicable, a range of estimates of the total legal costs and an explanation of the major variables that will affect the calculation of those costs; …
  1. [32]
    The relevant part of the ‘Costs Disclosure’ with the heading “RE: District Court Property Matter” is:

2. How this firm charges

  1. (a)
    There are several bases by which legal practices charge for professional services rendered including itemised scale fees, statutory scales, task-based fees, fixed fee and conditional fee arrangements which may include an uplift fee. These different methods of charge may result in different fees payable.
  1. (b)
    Our firm’s professional fees charge will be as:
  1. (c)
    Principal – Fixed Fee of $765.00 per hour
  1. (d)
    Associate – Fixed fee of $330.00 per hour

Our estimated costs in undertaking your District Court Property matter to final hearing and settlement ranges between $3,300.00 and $3,960.00 to be paid the conclusion of our engagement.

  1. [33]
    Nowhere is there any attempt to provide an explanation of the major variables that will affect the calculation of those costs.
  2. [34]
    In fact, the Costs Disclosure does not describe in any manner the legal services to be provided. There is no description of the legal services at all except “District Court Property Matter”. It does not set out whether the Defendant is a party to any existing action or if any proceedings have started or what the nature of those proceedings might be.
  3. [35]
    It could be as much about a proposed District Court matter in which the Defendant in these proceedings was to be the applicant or an existing one in which she was the defendant. The only clue comes from the description that the matter might proceed to a final hearing.
  4. [36]
    Under s. 326 a costs agreement can be enforced in the same way as any other contract. One aspect of contract law is certainty as to terms.
  5. [37]
    The Costs Disclosure headed RE: Family Law Parenting, Property & Spousal Maintenance Matter is identical except for the last paragraph which reads:

Our estimated costs in undertaking your Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) matter to final hearing and settlement ranges between $66,000 and $132,000 to be paid at the conclusion of our engagement.

  1. [38]
    Again, there is no explanation of the variables or the range of services to be provided beyond the heading and the estimate.
  2. [39]
    This disclosure is also only made for a final hearing. No estimate was provided of costs that would or might apply if the matter ended before final hearing as it apparently did.
  3. [40]
    Section 308(4) also requires.
  1. (f)
    if the matter is a litigious matter, an estimate of—
  1. (i)

    the range of costs that may be recovered if the client is successful in the litigation; and

  1. (ii)

    the range of costs the client may be ordered to pay if the client is unsuccessful; …

  1. [41]
    These disclosures simply state:

7. Costs in court proceedings

  1. (a)
    if court proceedings are taken on your behalf:
  1. (i)
    The court may order that you pay another party’s costs. E.g. if you lose the case;
  1. (ii)
    The court may order the other party to pay your costs of the proceedings and , as a general rule, this will not be the whole of the legal costs you are liable to pay us; and
  1. (iii)
    If the court orders you to pay costs, the court ordered costs are payable by you to the other party in addition to the costs liable to be paid pursuant to the proposed CSA.
  1. (b)
    (b) If settlement of your claim is being resolved by alternative dispute resolution, prior to any agreement resolving the matter this firm will provide you with a reasonable estimate of its costs payable by you on settlement, a reasonable estimate of the costs you would obtain from the other party on settlement if the settlement is favourable to you, or a reasonable estimate of the costs you may have to pay the other party.
  1. [42]
    These disclosures do not comply with that obligation. The reader is left totally ignorant of the possible quantum of costs for or against them either by describing the types, categories, percentages or estimated amounts.
  2. [43]
    A costs disclosure for litigation ought to provide at the very least, the amount of legal costs both parties are likely to incur up to the first day of litigation and for each subsequent day.
  3. [44]
    These failures to adequately comply with the LPA and make proper disclosure were not a ‘one off’. They continued for many months because the LPA requires ongoing disclosure and there is no evidence provided that the Defendant was ever give anything in relation to the changes especially as the Family matter approached settlement:

315 Ongoing obligation to disclose

A law practice must, in writing, disclose to a client any substantial change to anything included in a disclosure already made under this division as soon as is reasonably practicable after the law practice becomes aware of that change.

  1. [45]
    There is also no evidence of compliance with item 7(b) as both matters were (apparently) settled out of court.
  1. [46]
    It follows from the findings made into the sufficiency to meet s. 308(4)(c) & (f) that the Plaintiff, on its own material, has failed to make disclosure in accordance with the LPA.
  1. Effect of failure to disclose
  1. [47]
    The LPA is very specific as to what such a failure means (my underlining):

316 Effect of failure to disclose

  1. (1)
    If a law practice does not disclose to a client or an associated third-party payer anything required by this division to be disclosed, the client or associated third party payer, as the case may be, need not pay the legal costs unless they have been assessed under division 7.
  1. (2)
    A law practice that does not disclose to a client or an associated third-party payer anything required by this division to be disclosed may not maintain proceedings against the client or associated third party payer, as the case may be, for the recovery of legal costs unless the costs have been assessed under division 7.
  1. [48]
    Regardless of anything in the defence or any ultimate findings of fact, the Defendant has a statutory right not to pay these costs until they have been assessed. They have not been assessed.
  2. [49]
    The Plaintiff submits the Defendant has not requested an itemised bill. She indicated during submissions  that she will be doing so. The Plaintiff submits she might still then not request a costs assessment. That is so but the LPA is clear. Unless the costs are assessed even at the expense of the Plaintiff, it cannot recover them.
  3. [50]
    There is a statutory bar to the Plaintiff continuing this action which in my view does not require the Defendant to plead in order to have the protection of. That is because it prohibits the Plaintiff from maintaining the proceedings. It does not prohibit them being commenced. The LPA is consumer protection law and should be interpreted liberally with that purpose in mind.[3]
  4. [51]
    The Plaintiff has shown that there is no need for trial at this stage in relation to the legal costs: not because it must certainly win but because it cannot win.
  1. The Loans
  1. [52]
    The Plaintiff is a company. It is suing on the basis that it loaned money to the Defendant.
  2. [53]
    Her filed defence says they were gifts from the Director.
  3. [54]
    That would be sufficient to show an issue which must be resolved at trial.
  4. [55]
    But there is evidence on the matter in this application. It comes from the affidavit of the Director who is an admitted legal practitioner.
  5. [56]
    His affidavit does not swear that the Plaintiff loaned money to the Defendant.
  6. [57]
    It says:
  1. 15.
    As outlined in paragraphs (4)-(5) of ‘the SOC’ I loaned the Defendant the total sum of $4016.40 made up of invoice payments for various suppliers.
  1. 16.
    16. On each occasion the Defendant sought financial assistance during the period 12 November 2024 and 24 April 2024, the Defendant verbally agreed to repay the amount of each expense upon the settlement of her Family Law Property matter, being April 3 2024.
  1. [58]
    As if to emphasize the use of the words ‘I loaned’, they are repeated:
  1. 18.
    Since issuing the Tax Invoice to the Defendant on 10 May 2024, I loaned additional monies to the defendant totalling sums of $1,516.40.
  1. [59]
    Thus, the only sworn evidence would establish that the Director is the source of the fund and not the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff cannot on the material read in this application succeed in respect of summary judgment for the loans.
  1. The ‘Bill’
  1. [60]
    The Director  also swears that he sent a letter on 9 May 2024[4]. That letter puts the loans as $2500. According to the Statement of Claim, the loans would have totalled $3060.90.
  2. [61]
    The letter also refers to an attached “Client Engagement Agreement” for the Family and Civil matters, but nothing is attached to the Exhibit.
  3. [62]
    That affidavit also refers to the document that is CM-4 variously as “the Bill” and “an invoice”:
  1. 17.
    On 10 May 2024, I handed an invoice totalling the sums of $37,480.00, along with a Form 2 Notification of Client’s Rights, to the Defendant in person for payment of the provision of legal work provided which was due within 14 days. Annexed hereto an marked "CM-4” is a true and correct copy of the Bill.
  1. [63]
    The Form 2 is not part of CM-4. Nor does the letter/bill mention that one is attached.
  2. [64]
    It is apparently a document that ensures compliance with s. 331 of LPA approved under subsection (3). The Defendant during submissions denied that any was given to her.
  3. [65]
    CM-4 appears on letterhead and sets out details of the conclusion of the litigation. It contains towards  the end:

INVOICE

Family Law Matter @ Fixed Cost of $33,000.00               $33,000.00

Civil Law Matter @ Fixed Cost of    $1,980.00                    $1,980.00

Personal Loan @ $2,500                                                      $2,500.00

TOTAL                                                                                $37,480.00.

  1. [66]
    The Director asserts that CM-4 is a Tax Invoice in his paragraph 18. 
  2. [67]
    CM-4 does not meet the requirements of a Tax Invoice. There is no reference to the amount of GST payable and it does not call itself a “Tax Invoice”. This is not fatal to the application.
  3. [68]
    Curiously, the Statement of Claim asserts that this ‘invoice’ provided … b. The invoice payment terms were strictly fourteen (14) days;
  4. [69]
    It is curious because CM-4 (the letter/bill) makes no such reference to terms and nor does the Costs Disclosure.
  5. [70]
    The demand for payment is said to be “Fixed Cost” yet there is no fixed cost costs disclosure or cost agreement spoken of at all in the Plaintiff’s material except a reference to the hourly rates of various practitioners as being ‘Fixed fee of $[x] per hour’ in the Costs Disclosure.
  6. [71]
    The Statement of Claim refers to the Bill and sections 329 and 330 of the LPA. It says it is a ‘lump sum bill’.
  7. [72]
    It is certainly not an itemised bill which is defined as:

itemised bill means a bill stating, in detail, how the legal costs are made up in a way that would allow the legal costs to be assessed under division 7.

  1. [73]
    ‘Lump sum bill’ is defined in the LPA as:

lump sum bill means a bill that describes the legal services to which it relates and specifies the total amount of the legal costs.

  1. [74]
    The ‘Bill’ does not meet the requirement to ‘describe the legal services to which it relates’. It merely says, ‘Family Law Matter’ or ‘Civil Law Matter’. Those terms might be understood as between these parties to refer to the disclosure notices but it does not describe in any way the ‘services provided’. This is especially critical given the complete failure to set out the terms of the retainer in the costs disclosure or to enter into a formal costs agreement.
  2. [75]
    The Letter itself does not describe any of the work done. It describes outcomes of each matter but not what part the firm played in obtaining them.
  3. [76]
    It does not seem to include any amount for disbursements.
  4. [77]
    I note the different hourly rates disclosed for the Principal and Associate and that the nominated contact person is ‘Leonardus Smits of Murray Laws Pty Ltd’. The disclosure is signed by the Director. The bill is completely opaque as to who provided any legal services or what they were.
  5. [78]
    It is obvious from the body of the letter that this is not a fixed costs bill where the cost was fixed by agreement between the parties. This is because it says the bill has been ‘greatly reduced’ from the estimate in the ‘Client Engagement Agreement’. It does not say that it was agreed to as a fixed fee.
  6. [79]
    There is also no ‘Client Engagement Agreement’ attached to CM-4 (as well as there being no evidence one was ever entered into). I presume that what was meant was the Costs Disclosure.
  7. [80]
    Is it sufficient to be a ‘lump sum bill’ if there is no description at all of the legal service provided? I think it cannot be.
  8. [81]
    The LPA seems to allow for a great deal of brevity in a lump sum bill because it must be itemised if requested. That seems to overcome the long-standing rulings of the Courts that all bills must at least contain enough detail for the recipient to know whether they should apply for assessment.[5]
  9. [82]
    There is need for trial on the issue whether CM-4 is a bill under s. 330. At this stage of proceedings, it would appear not to be.
  10. [83]
    That is important because legal action can’t start until a complying bill has been issued (my underlining):

329 Legal costs can not be recovered unless bill has been served

  1. (1)
    A law practice must not start legal proceedings to recover legal costs from a person until at least 30 days after the law practice has given a bill to the person under sections 330 and 331 or under provisions of a corresponding law that correspond to sections 330 and 331.
  1. [84]
    This applies whether there was a complying costs disclosure or not. The lack of a proper costs disclosure is expressed to result in the action not being maintainable. That lack of a proper bill is expressed to result in the inability to even file the action.
  2. [85]
    I have considered whether the Claim and Statement of Claim should be struck out now but that ought to await a full hearing given that a complying itemised bill may be issued and assessed before then or the Defendant may get advice and take the next step herself.
  1. Striking Out Application
  1. [86]
    As the Plaintiff cannot either commence this action or maintain it, there is strictly speaking no need to consider the application to strike out the Defence but I will address it for completeness.
  2. [87]
    The second half of the application seeks for the defence to be struck out on various grounds set out in the Plaintiffs r.444 letter.
  3. [88]
    As to the ‘loans’ the defence is perfectly adequate. The pleading is that the sums were gifts from the Director and not loans from the Plaintiff. That is a complete denial of the asserted express agreement to repay.
  4. [89]
    Rules 177 is referred to in the Plaintiff’s r.444 letter. That provides :

171 Striking out pleadings

(1) This rule applies if a pleading or part of a pleading—

(a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence; or

(b) has a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or

(c) is unnecessary or scandalous; or

  1. [90]
    I consider that certainly for the gifts it discloses a defence. Whether the sums were paid is not an issue. Who paid them and on what basis is. The trial on those issue should be simple enough.
  2. [91]
    There is nothing scandalous about asserting that personal loans were a gift.
  3. [92]
    The complaint is made that paragraph 3 of the defence does not plead a material fact. It reads:

3. ** Nature of Relationship ** Our relationship was intimate, and many items exchanged between us were gifts, not formal agreements. This includes personal items and a phone that [the Director] gifted me for my birthday.

  1. [93]
    I find that paragraph 3 does plead a material fact when read with paragraphs 2, 4 & 5.

2. ** Background ** I was in a personal relationship with [the Director] from August 2023 until our breakup in July 2024. During this time we shared a bed at both [my address] and [his address].

4 ** Claims Against Me ** The claims against me regarding money allegedly owed arise from our personal relationship, not from any formal agreements.

5 ** Circumstances ** These claims were initiated only after our breakup when [the Director] sought to collect payment for things that were given as gifts during our time together.

  1. [94]
    The other complaint about it is that there are insufficient particulars. The remedy for a lack of particulars is set out in r.161. Striking out is appropriate only where this would not be an adequate remedy.
  2. [95]
    Paragraph 4 is challenged as lacking material facts and being inaccurate.
  3. [96]
    The accuracy of a pleading is the very thing that a trial is to resolve.
  4. [97]
    When read with paragraphs 3 and 5 it is clear that the material fact relates to the whole of the claim. It starts ‘The claims against me’ and so are naturally taken to be all the claims against the Defendant.
  5. [98]
    The material fact is clear enough in that it is that there was no contract. It was submitted that there were insufficient particulars of that relationship however the defence clearly articulates the Defendants case that the parties shared beds at two different locations and were intimate.
  6. [99]
    Complaint is made that the defence does not comply with the requirements of r.157 and so cannot be replied to. It was submitted it might lead to surprise at trial if new issues were pleaded. That is simply speculation at this stage. The issues are defined well enough to enable a reply to be pleaded.
  7. [100]
    I accept that the departure from the practice of professionals who carefully admit, deny or not admit each and every allegation and paragraph by express reference can make it harder for the reader to work out what any deemed admissions are. But that does not mean they are deemed admissions.
  8. [101]
    The UCPR makes pleading a denial or non-admission an option and not mandatory:
  1. 165 Answering pleadings

(1) A party may, in response to a pleading, plead a denial, a non-admission, an admission or another matter.

  1. [102]
    That is because it also has consequences if the defence does not plead them correctly:

r.166 (4) A party’s denial or non-admission of an allegation of fact must be accompanied by a direct explanation for the party’s belief that the allegation is untrue or can not be admitted.

  1. [103]
    In my view pleadings need not specifically use any specific word or phrase such as I deny the allegations in paragraph 3 of the SOC because …  in order to make an effective denial.
  2. [104]
    Doing so is a somewhat risky proposition however and the convention of doing so expressly in relation to each allegation and ensuring the explanation is present for that allegation is a sensible practice.
  3. [105]
    This defence is a denial of paragraphs 4, 10, 11, 12, 22, 30 and 31 of the SOC. They are the operative parts of any entitlement for the Plaintiff to be paid or repaid. Even if the other paragraphs are all the subject of implied admissions pursuant to r.166(1), the Plaintiff would not succeed on them alone. Indeed, most of them seem unlikely to be in contest.
  1. Consideration
  1. [106]
    Given that the claim is statute barred and that the costs will now have to be assessed after an itemised bill is issued, the statement of claim will have to be amended and the proceedings can thereafter follow the UCPR.
  2. [107]
    The application for summary judgment is dismissed.
  3. [108]
    The application to strike out the defence is dismissed.
  4. [109]
    The Defendant was not legally represented so there will be no order as to costs.

Footnotes

[1] $1500/$3000 under s. 300(b)

[2] As an incorporated legal practice the Plaintiff must also consider s. 123 LPA

[3] MNM Developments Pty Ltd v Gerrard [2005] QCA 230 at [30] and LPA s. 3(a)

[4] Exhibit CM-4

[5] Jackson & Anor v. Creswick Middleton Solicitors [2000] QDC 046 at [19] and [20] (see also Patel v Sica [1982] VicRp 25; [1982] VR 273)

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Murray Laws Pty Ltd v Josephine Lucille Reeves

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Murray Laws Pty Ltd v Josephine Lucille Reeves

  • MNC:

    [2024] QMC 20

  • Court:

    QMC

  • Judge(s):

    Sinclair

  • Date:

    22 Nov 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo[2005] 2 Qd R 232; [2005] QCA 227
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 227
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 227
Jackson v Creswick Middleton Solicitors [2000] QDC 46
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] QDC 46
Cite 2 - [2000] QDC 46
MNM Developments Pty Ltd v Gerrard[2005] 2 Qd R 515; [2005] QCA 230
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 230
Cite 2 - [2005] QCA 230
Patel v Sica [1982] VR 273
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1982] VR 273

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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