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Queensland Police Service v Uprichard[2025] QMC 17

Queensland Police Service v Uprichard[2025] QMC 17

MAGISTRATES COURTS OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Queensland Police Service v Uprichard [2025] QMC 17

PARTIES:

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

(Prosecution)

v

RONALD WILLIAM UPRICHARD

(Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

MAG-00174706/24(7)

MAG-00178264/24(9)

MAG-00022483/25(1)

DIVISION:

Magistrates Courts

PROCEEDING:

Sentence

DELIVERED ON:

29 May 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

21 May 2025

MAGISTRATE:

Magistrate Lodziak

ORDER:

See annexure to this decision

CATCHWORDS:

JURISDICTION OF THE MAGISTRATES COURT – WHETHER A MAGISTRATES COURT CAN MAKE SENTENCING ORDERS THAT RESULT IN A PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT GREATER THAN THREE YEARS

SOLICITORS:

Ms Verwey for the prosecution

Mr Cuthbertson of Cuthbertson & Co Lawyers, for the defendant

  1. [1]
    This is a sentence hearing.  The hearing was adjourned because it was initially submitted that I could not make orders that would result in the defendant being sentenced to a period of imprisonment greater than three years.  I advised the parties I was not convinced of that and allowed time for further submissions to be made.  Ultimately, I am satisfied the offending in this case warrants sentencing orders that result in a period of imprisonment beyond three years.  I see no reason why I could not or should not make those orders in this case and sentence the defendant accordingly.  My reasons for so finding follow.[1]
  1. [2]
    Mr Uprichard is a 31-year-old man who, on 21 May 2025, pleaded guilty before me to 27 offences.  The following timeline sets out the charges (in bold) in the context of other events relevant to the sentencing process:

15 February 2023

Sentenced to 18 months imprisonment[2]

15 August 2023

Released to court ordered parole

28 August 2023

Unlawful use of a motor vehicle in company

1 November 2023

Parole suspended

3 November 2023 

Returned to jail

11 April 2024 

Released from jail (then end date of that period of imprisonment)

4 May 2024

Stealing after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

28 May 2024

Enter dwelling and commit indictable offence

31 May 2024

Enter dwelling and commit indictable offence

9 July 2024

Stealing after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

15 July 2024

Stealing after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

10 August 2024

Stealing after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

11 August 2024

Stealing after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

13-17 August 2024

Stealing after previous conviction 

16 August 2024

Stealing after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

23 October 2024

Disqualified driving

Participated in a recorded interview with police

10 November 2024

Stealing

Disqualified driving

13 November 2024

Allowed bail

18 December 2024

Fail to appear in court

7 January 2025

Common assault (domestic violence offence)

Wilful damage (domestic violence offence)

6 February 2025

Evasion offence, after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

Evasion offence, in the night, after previous conviction

Disqualified driving

7 February 2025

Disqualified driving

Returned to custody, on remand

  1. [3]
    Mr Uprichard has remained in custody since being arrested on 7 February 2025.  There are 111 declarable days of presentence custody.[3]

The facts of the offending

Unlawful use of a motor vehicle in company

  1. [4]
    This offence was committed less than a fortnight after Mr Uprichard was released on parole.  He, wearing gloves and a mask, was a passenger in a stolen car.  He was on parole for earlier offences of unlawfully using motor vehicles (although those two instances did not involve any circumstance of aggravation). 
  1. [5]
    Mr Uprichard was returned to custody on 3 November 2023 to serve the then remaining five months and eight days of his sentence.
  2. [6]
    The maximum penalty for this offence, given the circumstance of aggravation, is 14 years imprisonment.
  3. [7]
    No co-offenders have been charged.

Fuel stealing and associated charges

  1. [8]
    Mr Uprichard drove a 1999 white Toyota Hilux with Queensland registration 520STT to various petrol stations on different days and refuelled it, but left without paying for the fuel, as follows:

4 May 2024 $40.07 of fuel

9 July 2024 $40.00 of fuel

15 July 2024 $50.00 of fuel

10 August 2024 $90.00 of fuel

11 August 2024 $51.19 of fuel

  1. [9]
    On either 14, 15 or 16 August 2024, Mr Uprichard stole a Queensland registration plate (430CL2).
  2. [10]
    On 16 August 2024, Mr Uprichard again refuelled the 1999 white Toyota Hilux (this time displaying the 430CL2 plate) without paying the $56.83 owed for it.
  3. [11]
    The police next saw Mr Uprichard driving (while disqualified) on 23 October 2024.
  4. [12]
    On 10 November 2024, Mr Uprichard again stole fuel, this time after putting in $40.00 of fuel into a blue Mazda 3 (288MSK).
  5. [13]
    On each of the six instances he stole fuel using the Toyota Hilux, Mr Uprichard spoke to the attendant at the petrol station, advising that he could not pay for the fuel.  He then left without returning to pay.
  6. [14]
    The maximum penalty for the stealing offences, given the circumstance of aggravation, is 10 years imprisonment.
  7. [15]
    Restitution is sought with respect of each of the seven instances of stealing fuel.
  8. [16]
    Additionally, Mr Uprichard drove while disqualified by court order from holding or obtaining a driver licence at the time of each of the instances of stealing fuel.
  9. [17]
    The maximum penalty for that offence is 18 months imprisonment.  A disqualification period of at least two years must also attach to each instance of that offending.

Enter dwelling and commit indictable offence (stealing)

  1. [18]
    At some time between midnight and 7:30am on 28 May 2024, Mr Uprichard stole a $1,500 electric scooter from within a dwelling.  The victim of that offending did not immediately report that offence, only going to the police after discovering her home had been burgled a second time.  Restitution is sought.
  2. [19]
    Mr Uprichard returned to the same address three days later and stole an $1,800 electric scooter he had observed on his first visit to the house.  He also stole a battery charger for the scooter and keys to the victim’s car.[4]  Again, restitution is sought.
  3. [20]
    The maximum penalty for each of these offences is life imprisonment.

Fail to appear in court in accordance with an undertaking

  1. [21]
    Mr Uprichard was granted bail on 13 November 2024 and was required to appear in court on 18 December 2024.  He did not appear.  He continued to commit offences (outlined below) and was not located by police until 7 February 2025.  He would not give police his name but was not charged with an offence in that regard.
  2. [22]
    The maximum penalty for this offence is 2 years imprisonment.[5]
  3. [23]
    The following offences were committed after Mr Uprichard was granted bail and failed to appear at court.

The domestic violence offences

  1. [24]
    On 7 January 2025, Mr Uprichard and his then partner were at an address in Innisfail when the victim told him to leave after he told her crying child “to shut the fuck up”.  Mr Uprichard then started to throw items at the victim, grabbed her by the hair and punched her in the head multiple times.
  2. [25]
    She then used her mobile phone to call police, but Mr Uprichard grabbed the phone from her and threw it on the ground, causing the screen to smash.
  3. [26]
    The victim was pregnant at the time of these offences.
  4. [27]
    The maximum penalties for the common assault and wilful damage offences are three and five years imprisonment respectively.

The evasion offences

  1. [28]
    At 10:27pm on 6 February 2025, police activated their car’s lights and siren to intercept the blue Mazda 3 (288MSK) being driven by Mr Uprichard.  Evading police, he sped up and travelled on the wrong side of the road.
  2. [29]
    At 11:48pm, police observed the same car and again activated lights and siren to intercept it.  Although the car initially slowed, it ultimately sped up and evaded police.
  3. [30]
    The minimum penalty for this offending is 50 penalty units or 50 days imprisonment served wholly in a corrective services facility.  The maximum penalty, because of the aggravating features, is 300 penalty units or 5 years imprisonment.  A disqualification period of at least two years must also attach to each instance of this offending.
  4. [31]
    On each occasion, Mr Uprichard was again driving while disqualified by court order from holding or obtaining a driver licence.

The arrest of Mr Uprichard

  1. [32]
    Police found the Mazda at Smithfield Shopping Centre on the afternoon of 7 February 2025.  They entered the shopping centre and found Mr Uprichard inside with the car’s keys in his possession.  He initially denied driving there but later admitted to it.
  2. [33]
    Mr Uprichard was arrested and remanded in custody.

Mr Uprichard’s antecedents

  1. [34]
    Mr Uprichard is currently 31 years of age.  He was 29 and 30 at the time of the subject offending.
  2. [35]
    His family relocated from Papua New Guinea when he was 7 years old.  He completed Year 11 and is the father of two children, a five year old and a four year old.  Both children are in the care of his parents due to the intervention of the Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety (the Department).  His third child is expected to be born at the start of July.
  3. [36]
    He has a limited employment history, having worked as a wood machinist with his father and later intermittently as a removalist over the course of six years.
  4. [37]
    Mr Uprichard’s relationship with the mother of his two children commenced in 2018.  The Department became involved two years after their separation.[6]  At that time, Mr Uprichard was consuming methylamphetamine and was unable to assist with the care of the children.  The Department was reportedly also concerned about the mother’s capacity.  Tragically, she took her own life in August 2024.  Mr Cuthbertson tendered a Cairns Post article which conveyed the grief in the community at her sudden passing. 
  5. [38]
    Mr Uprichard had moved to Innisfail about a month before she passed and began a relationship with the victim of the common assault and wilful damage offences (currently pregnant with his third child).
  6. [39]
    He is reportedly plagued by guilt for not being able to care for his children and prevent them from being taken into care.  He was heavily impacted by the death of his former partner and his drug use spiralled.  It was submitted that he was “not in the right state of mind” after August 2024.
  7. [40]
    It was said that some of the driving offending occurred because Mr Uprichard was driving up from Innisfail for work.
  8. [41]
    Since being remanded in custody, Mr Uprichard has remained free of illicit substances, has found work in the kitchen, arranged for his car to be sold and enrolled in substance intervention courses.

Criminal and traffic histories

  1. [42]
    A seven page Queensland criminal history and an eight page Queensland traffic record were tendered.
  1. [43]
    Mr Uprichard has previously been convicted of unlicenced driving 19 times.  He was additionally disqualified by court order at the time of 12 of those instances of driving.
  2. [44]
    Nine of the previous instances of driving while disqualified by court order occurred between 5 January 2019 and 7 October 2022.[7]  Each of those nine instances attracted a term of imprisonment ranging from three months to 15 months imprisonment.
  3. [45]
    He has six previous convictions for unlawfully using motor vehicles and four previous convictions for evading police and two for failing to stop under section 754 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld). 
  4. [46]
    He has four previous convictions for failing to appear and several previous convictions for dishonesty offending including stealing, unlawfully entering and using vehicles, receiving tainted property and burglary.
  5. [47]
    Mr Uprichard’s criminal offending commenced in 2011.[8]  He has received several terms of imprisonment in the past.  On 17 May 2019, he received 2 months imprisonment served wholly in a correctional centre for evasion offences.  On 9 September 2020, he received a 12 month period of imprisonment for evading police, burglary, stealing and receiving tainted property.[9]  On 9 March 2022, he was sentenced to a 15 month period of imprisonment for unlawful use of vehicles, evading police, and multiple instances of stealing and receiving tainted property.[10]  
  6. [48]
    Finally, on 15 February 2023, he was sentenced to an 18 month period of imprisonment for two instances of unlawfully using motor vehicles and one of receiving tainted property.  128 days of presentence custody were declared as time already served under the sentence,[11] and a parole release date of 15 August 2023 was set.  The sentencing court further convicted but did not further punish Mr Uprichard of an offence of possessing utensils or pipes and of stealing.
  7. [49]
    As already mentioned, Mr Uprichard was on parole for two instances of unlawfully using motor vehicles at the time of the unlawful use offence I am to sentence him for, having been sentenced for that earlier offending only 6 months prior and being released on parole 13 days prior.  The rest of the present offending commenced less than a month after he was later released from prison.

Submissions

For the prosecution

  1. [50]
    At one point Ms Verwey submitted that I would abstain from determining the matter, but ultimately submitted that I would sentence Mr Uprichard to a period of imprisonment between two and a half and three years.  It was initially submitted that the burglary offending on its own, in circumstances where there was the aggravating feature of a return to the same address, warranted a term of between two and a half and three years imprisonment.
  1. [51]
    It was otherwise submitted that the common assault and wilful damage offences warranted a sentence of 12 to 15 months imprisonment.  The disqualified driving offences were said to warrant 15 months in prison and the evasion offences warranted six to nine months of imprisonment to be served cumulatively.
  2. [52]
    Ms Verwey later provided written submissions arguing that I can impose terms of imprisonment that would result in a period of imprisonment greater than three years.

For the defendant

  1. [53]
    Mr Cuthbertson, appearing for Mr Uprichard, submitted that I would not sentence Mr Uprichard to a period of imprisonment any longer than three years.  He submitted that a 33 month (two year and nine month) period of imprisonment be imposed, made up of a three month term for the fail to appear offence being added to a 30 month period attaching to the remaining offences.  It was anticipated, however, that this sentence would be ordered to be served cumulatively on the contingent liability Mr Uprichard owes under his previous period of imprisonment.
  2. [54]
    He submitted that a parole eligibility date be set at a third of that period (7 January 2026).[12]  
  3. [55]
    Mr Cuthbertson noted the combined effect of mandatory minimum disqualification periods for the driving offences would already produce a 26 year period of disqualification and sought I impose only the minimum periods of disqualification.
  4. [56]
    It was further submitted that Mr Uprichard was not able to pay restitution.
  5. [57]
    On the question of jurisdiction, Mr Cuthbertson argued that I was not able to make orders resulting in a period of imprisonment greater than three years and ultimately relied on the case of Commissioner of Police v Aplin [2012] QDC 391.

Can I make orders that would result in an overall sentence in excess of three years?

  1. [58]
    As indicated, I invited submissions during the hearing on whether I could impose cumulative terms of imprisonment where the result for the offences before the Court would be a period of imprisonment exceeding three years.  I first stood the matter down and later adjourned to allow both parties to advance further submissions and material if they wished.  
  2. [59]
    Section 22A of the Justices Act states:

Magistrates Courts are to have the civil, criminal and other jurisdiction—

  1. that Courts of Petty Sessions or justices sitting in Petty Sessions had before the commencement of the Justices Acts Amendment Act 1964 ; and (b) that is conferred on them by this Act and other Acts.
  1. [60]
    One of those other Acts is the Criminal Code Act 1899 which contains The Criminal Code (Qld) (the Criminal Code).
  1. [61]
    Section 3(4) of the Criminal Code states that “A person guilty of a regulatory offence or simple offence may be summarily convicted by a Magistrates Court”.  An offence not otherwise designated is a simple offence.[13]
  2. [62]
    Additionally, Chapter 58A of the Criminal Code deals with indictable offences that must and may be dealt with summarily.
  3. [63]
    Section 552D(1) states that a Magistrates Court must abstain from dealing summarily with a charge that would otherwise, because of Chapter 58A, be dealt with by a Magistrates Court if satisfied the defendant may not be adequately punished on summary conviction.  In the ordinary course, a Magistrate sentencing a defendant for such an offence is limited to imposing a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units or three years imprisonment.[14]
  4. [64]
    My view of the relevant provisions is that the three year limitation applies to the term of imprisonment imposed for a single charge and not the period of imprisonment that results from the imposition of multiple terms of imprisonment on multiple charges.
  5. [65]
    I have not found anything in the Magistrates Court Act 1921 (Qld) or the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) to indicate a Magistrates Court is precluded from making sentencing orders that would result in a period of imprisonment greater than three years.  
  6. [66]
    There is nothing in the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) to suggest the ability to impose cumulative terms of imprisonment under section 156 of that Act is somehow limited in sentencing proceedings before the Magistrates Court.  
  7. [67]
    Consider this scenario under section 156A of the Penalties and Sentences Act.  A prisoner is serving a three year period of imprisonment in jail.  While serving that sentence, he commits, is convicted of, and is sentenced for an offence of preparing to escape from lawful custody under section 124(1)(a) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld).  That is an offence found in Schedule 1 of the Penalties and Sentences Act.  Because of that and section 156A, any “sentence of imprisonment imposed for the offence must be ordered to be served cumulatively with any other term of imprisonment the offender is liable to serve”.[15]
  8. [68]
    The maximum penalty for a section 124(1)(a) offence is two years imprisonment.  As it is an offence not otherwise designated (it is not, for example, a misdemeanour or crime), it is a simple offence and so may be dealt with by a Magistrates Court.[16]
  9. [69]
    If the submission advanced on behalf of Mr Uprichard is correct, a Magistrates Court in that circumstance would not be able to sentence the prisoner to any term of imprisonment.  That cannot be correct.
  10. [70]
    It was suggested there might be a distinction between a scenario where one magistrate sentences a defendant to multiple offences on the one day in one sentence hearing and a scenario where that defendant instead had two separate sentence hearings, held on separate days.  That is, it was agreed that Magistrate X could sentence a defendant to
  1. three year period of imprisonment on one day and, while serving that sentence, Magistrate Y could some days, weeks or months later impose a cumulative term of imprisonment, provided that term was also no longer than three years in length.  I agree that a Magistrate can make such orders, but I do not see how, if those hearings were combined, the same result could not lawfully be ordered by the one magistrate.
  1. [71]
    Such an anomaly would mean that the Magistrates Court jurisdiction would vary depending on how long it might take for a defendant’s matters to be finalised and how many charges they might accumulate while awaiting sentencing.  It would also mean that a piecemeal finalisation of matters could see the charges remain in the Magistrates jurisdiction, but the finalisation of all outstanding matters at once, which would be a neater way to deal with totality considerations, could lead to charges being committed to a higher court.  
  2. [72]
    While that is plainly a desirable result where the seriousness of the offending truly requires it, I respectfully suggest it would not be desirable in the circumstances I am contemplating, especially where the charges would potentially be split.  In Mr Uprichard’s case, if I was to find I could not adequately punish him for the charges before the Court, I would commit him only on the offences that fall under Chapter 58A.  The remaining charges would remain in the summary jurisdiction unless the higher court dealt with them under section 651 of the Criminal Code.  That would require section 652 to be complied with.
  3. [73]
    That then begs the question of what a magistrate should do with a defendant who pleads guilty to a very large number of simple offences that warrant a period of imprisonment greater than three years.  Suppose those offences each carry maximum penalties of at least two years imprisonment and the defendant has a lengthy criminal history showing multiple previous periods of incarceration for such offending.  Is that offender spared the risk of a Magistrates Court sentencing them to a period greater than three years? If so, provided that offender was successful in obtaining repeated adjournments of their sentencing, they would be free to continue to commit further offences without fear of their penalty exceeding a three year period of imprisonment.
  4. [74]
    I see no distinction between an example in which Magistrate X sentences a defendant to charge A on one day to two and a half years imprisonment and Magistrate B sentences them the next day on charge B to a cumulative 12 month term of imprisonment and an example in which the one magistrate sentences that defendant to a term of two and a half years imprisonment on charge A and a cumulative term of 12 months imprisonment on charge B at the same sentencing hearing.  There was agreement at the Bar table that there was no difficulty with the former example.
  5. [75]
    In R v Hall and Ors [1980] Qd R 304, it was stated:

While there would not seem to be any reason why a magistrate cannot make sentences cumulative, it is undesirable that they should do so to achieve a sentence far outside the range of sentence entrusted to them.

  1. [76]
    There, when the maximum sentence which could be imposed on summary conviction was two years imprisonment, the sentencing Magistrate imposed cumulative terms of two, two and one year imprisonment (a resultant five year period of imprisonment).  The period of imprisonment imposed in that case was two and a half times the maximum penalty that could be imposed for a single offence.
  2. [77]
    I do not think the decision of Hall precludes me from imposing a period of imprisonment greater than three years on Mr Uprichard.  I am not contemplating “a sentence far outside the range of sentence entrusted to [me]”.  Instead, given I am not contemplating such a sentence, I consider Hall to be authority for the proposition that a Magistrates Court can, in appropriate cases, sentence defendants to periods (as opposed to terms) of imprisonment greater than three years.[17]
  3. [78]
    While I accept it is not strictly an authority for the proposition that a magistrate can impose periods of imprisonment greater than three years, Hobson v Queensland Police Service [2009] QDC 246 was an appeal of a 37 month period of imprisonment imposed by a magistrate.  The appeal succeeded because the resultant period was deemed to be an excessive one, not because a magistrate is not permitted to impose sentencing orders that would result in a 37 month period of imprisonment.  That point was not argued in that appeal.
  4. [79]
    In Commissioner of Police v Aplin [2012] QDC 391, his Honour Judge Dearden referred to the following statement made by the sentencing Magistrate during submissions:

And so the sentence that I have to impose, to keep her [the appellant] within the jurisdiction of the court, may have to involve a parole release date which is more than one-third.  Now, in accordance with that [indistinct] case, I'm thinking I warn you, Mrs Blundstone, that what I propose to do is have a parole release date which is more than the usual one-third and ask you to tell me why you think that's inappropriate.[18]

  1. [80]
    The sentencing Magistrate in that case imposed a sentence of two years and nine months imprisonment with a parole release date at the 18 month mark.  It is clear from the above passage that the sentencing Magistrate imposed such orders “to keep [that defendant] within the jurisdiction of the court”.
  2. [81]
    Dearden J went on to say:

Simply put, if the learned magistrate was concerned that he could not adequately punish the appellant within the limits of his jurisdiction (see Criminal Code s. 552C(2)(b), s. 552D(1), s. 552H(1)(a)), then the proceedings should have been committed to the District Court pursuant to Criminal Code s. 552B(3).

  1. [82]
    Again, the case of Aplin was not one in which the District Court was asked to consider whether a magistrate can make sentencing orders that would result in a period of imprisonment greater than three years.
  2. [83]
    I do not intend to manipulate the sentencing orders I consider appropriate to keep Mr Uprichard within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court.  Further, I am not concerned that I cannot adequately punish Mr Uprichard within the limits of my jurisdiction.  I do not therefore find that the decision of Aplin precludes me from sentencing Mr Uprichard to a period of imprisonment greater than three years.
  1. [84]
    I was also referred to the decision of GAF v QPS [2008] QCA 190.  Although it considered a different aspect of section 552H, the judgment of Justice Lyons stated:

[t]he purpose of [section 552H] is to limit the penalty that a Magistrate can impose for that offence.[19] (my underlining)

  1. [85]
    It is plain that a magistrate, unless specifically authorised,[20] cannot impose a term of imprisonment greater than three years on a single charge.  However, in appropriate cases, I see no prohibition on a magistrate making sentencing orders that would result in a period of imprisonment greater than three years, provided no individual term of imprisonment exceeds three years.

The appropriate sentence

  1. [86]
    Relevant to the exercise of my sentencing discretion, among other things, are:
    • The pleas of guilty;
    • Mr Uprichard’s cooperation and, where made, the admissions to police;
    • The unsophisticated nature of most of the offences;
    • The principle that, other than for the common assault offence, a sentence of imprisonment should be one of last resort and a sentence that would see Mr Uprichard stay in the community is to be preferred;
    • The commission of an offence of violence that was also a domestic violence offence;
    • Mr Uprichard’s antecedents and the circumstances in which the offending occurred;
    • The criminal and traffic histories;
    • The time he has spent on remand (103 days between 7 February and 20 May 2025);
    • The time he may be liable to serve under previously imposed orders (64 days);[21]
    • The fact that one of the offences occurred on parole and for like offending;
    • The fact that some of the offences occurred while Mr Uprichard was on bail and after he failed to appear in court in accordance with that bail undertaking; and
    • The fact that the offending spanned 16 separate days over a period of more than 17 months (although 26 of the 27 offences spanned a period of about nine months).
  1. [87]
    I was taken to several cases.  In the case of Jones v Queensland Police Service [2022] QDC 281, a 15 month period of imprisonment was imposed on a 42 year old offender for 15 offences, the most serious of which was an enter premises and commit indictable offence by break offence.  She was required to serve five of those months in jail before being released on parole.  While she had been on a six month probation order at the time of the latter, less serious offences (including a charge of receiving tainted property, three instances of public nuisance and three seemingly minor drug offences), she was not subject to any court orders at the time of the most serious offending.  Ms Jones had a “relevant and prolific criminal history” in the context of a deprived upbringing which included exposure to domestic violence and being a victim of domestic violence.  Her offending was described as “street and property offending”.  The most serious offence involved her breaking into an office after hours in desperation after being subjected to unwanted sexual advances and becoming stranded.  It was described as unsophisticated and unplanned.  The offending in that case was far less serious and less varied as compared to the offending by Mr Uprichard.
  1. [88]
    The three year period of imprisonment with a requirement that the appellant serve half of that period in prison was not disturbed on appeal in Pamtoonda v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 207.  There was more serious and repeated violence in that case, but no domestic violence and no offending on parole.  Apart from there being multiple offences committed on several days over several months, the offending in that case is not overly comparable to the offending engaged in by Mr Uprichard.
  2. [89]
    The appellant in Annas v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 251 was a 31 year old with 12 pages of criminal history including 36 previous convictions of a similar nature who was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment for related offences of burglary and stealing and unlawful use of a motor vehicle.  His sentence was not disturbed on appeal.  He and co-offenders entered the dwelling through an unlocked door and untidily searched the house.  Somewhere between $1,000 and $5,000 in cash, a video camera, navigation device and tools were taken.  Finally, the appellant removed a motorcycle from a shed and moved it to the driveway attempting to start it before falling asleep on it and later being found by the victim.  That offending occurred six days after release on parole and, significantly, the three year sentence was imposed cumulatively on the six months or so that remained to be served under the earlier sentence.
  3. [90]
    The appellant in Ratcliffe v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 144 pleaded guilty to 13 offences he committed over a five month period as a 26 year old.  He had a challenging childhood and presented to the Court with a seven page criminal history and two pages of traffic history.  He was not on any court orders at the time of his offending.  It is not said that he was on bail at the time of his offending.  His offending did not include any burglaries or domestic violence offences and included only one instance of an evasion offence and no instances of driving while disqualified by court order (although there were repeated instances of unlicenced driving).  He was resentenced on appeal to a 20 month period of imprisonment.  Mr Uprichard’s offending was plainly more serious than that of Mr Ratcliffe.
  4. [91]
    I was also taken to R v Hazelgrove [2013] QCA 243 where a three and half year period of imprisonment was imposed for a burglary, two aggravated break and enter premises charges and five other lesser offences.  There were totality considerations in that case, too.
  5. [92]
    A cumulative sentence of 15 months imprisonment was replaced by a cumulative sentence of eight months imprisonment for an unsophisticated burglary committed by a 19 year old offender on parole in Age v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 169.  That appellant had pleaded guilty also to an offence of trespass for which he received no further penalty.  He had a poor criminal history but had identified his cooffender.  He had a disadvantaged upbringing.  The sentence there was moderated because it had to be served cumulatively on the sentence the offender was already serving.
  6. [93]
    Mr Uprichard does not have the benefit of youth.  He is certainly not as young as the offender in Age was.  Further, his offending only ceased when he was apprehended by police.  Previous sentences of imprisonment, including actual imprisonment, and orders for him to be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence have not deterred him from committing further like offences.
  7. [94]
    Mr Uprichard’s offending involved a variety of offences committed at different times and against different victims.  There were distinct episodes of offending that call for the consideration of cumulative sentences, at least in respect of the domestic violence offences and the offences committed on 6 February 2025.
  8. [95]
    I was taken to cases that considered the offence of entering a premises in circumstances where Mr Uprichard is to be sentenced for entering a dwelling.  I am conscious of the fact that the victim of the burglary offence would barely have had time to begin to try and deal with the 28 May 2024 offence when Mr Uprichard returned to commit another such offence only three days later.  He took more items on that occasion, including the victim’s car keys.  She would have been perfectly entitled to fear a third return of Mr Uprichard to facilitate the theft of her car.
  9. [96]
    Being cognisant of decisions that have at times found there to be little to distinguish the two, I consider the crime of entering a person’s home and stealing from them to be one of generally greater concern to the community than a like offence committed in an unoccupied business premises.
  10. [97]
    It is reasonable to infer that the invasion of a person’s home, all else being equal, would generally have greater impacts on the victim or victims and is offending I consider to be more deserving of a deterrent sentence.  Notably, the maximum penalty for entering a dwelling and stealing is life imprisonment, while the maximum penalty for entering a premises and stealing is 14 years imprisonment. 
  11. [98]
    I must avoid a sentence that is crushing.  It would be wrong for me to simply add up the sentences that I might attribute to each offence or even each incident of offending.  If I did, Mr Uprichard would likely be facing a sentence in excess of seven years imprisonment.  To illustrate this point, the imposition of even the most lenient sentence of imprisonment previously imposed on him for driving while disqualified by a court of three months on just each of those offences here, would accumulate to a period of almost three years imprisonment.
  12. [99]
    Given that, I have determined to impose a cumulative sentence of imprisonment on the evasion offences, but not on the offences of domestic violence.  I do not for a moment mean for that determination to suggest that the domestic violence offences are less serious than the evasion offences, but the offending from 6 February 2025 deserves to be singled out given Mr Uprichard’s woeful history of driving related offences.
  13. [100]
    The domestic violence offences are serious.  The common assault culminated with repeated strikes to the head of Mr Uprichard’s pregnant partner.  Despite that, no injuries are alleged.  Mr Uprichard then damaged her phone when she sought to contact police for assistance.  The offending occurred in the presence of her child.  
  14. [101]
    Mr Uprichard does not have any previous convictions for domestic violence or obviously violent offending.[22]
  15. [102]
    I consider the fail to appear in court offence in this case to be a serious example of the offence, especially given the earlier convictions for such offending.  A term of imprisonment is warranted for that offence and is required to be served cumulatively.
  16. [103]
    I sentence Mr Uprichard as follows:[23]
    1. For the 31 May 2024 burglary offence, taking the remaining offending into account (other than the offending for which cumulative terms are imposed): two and a half years imprisonment;[24]
    2. For the aggravated unlawful use of a motor vehicle offence: 19 months imprisonment;
    3. For failing to appear in accordance with his bail undertaking: two months imprisonment (cumulative);
    4. For evading police at night after a previous conviction: seven months imprisonment (cumulative);
    5. Shorter concurrent terms of imprisonment are imposed for the remaining offences.
  17. [104]
    I have arrived at this three year and three month period of imprisonment after moderating the terms of imprisonment imposed cumulatively and reviewing the aggregate sentence and determining that it is just and appropriate.[25]  I do not consider this sentence, especially in light of the parole eligibility date, to be crushing.
  18. [105]
    The presentence custody of 111 days (7 February to 28 May 2025) is declared as time already served under that period of imprisonment.
  19. [106]
    Given the orders I have made, Mr Uprichard is not entitled to a parole release date.  He has been in continual custody for three months and three weeks and the suspension of his parole order in November 2023 saw him spend about five months and one week in prison, serving out the rest of his earlier sentence.  That further period is relevant to the aggravated unlawful use of a motor vehicle offence from 28 August 2023 and therefore the sentencing process overall.[26]  The term of imprisonment imposed on that 28 August 2023 offence will cancel that earlier parole order.  I proceed on the basis that, short of a Schedule 1 offence being involved or a court order to the contrary being made, any time Mr Uprichard might additionally be required to serve because of that cancellation will be served concurrently with the sentences I am imposing.  No submissions were made to the contrary.  In all the circumstances, I consider the appropriate parole eligibility date in this case to be 6 January 2026.[27]
  1. [107]
    Although I do not consider it necessary to state, I make it clear that I do not intend the sentence I impose to be served cumulatively on Mr Uprichard’s contingent liability.[28]
  1. [108]
    Given Mr Uprichard’s incarceration and there not appearing to be any suggestion he has or will in the near future have the means to make payment of restitution or compensation, I decline to make such an order.
  2. [109]
    The full list of orders I make, including the periods of disqualification, are set out in the annexure to these reasons.
  3. [110]
    Naturally, convictions are recorded for each offence.

ANNEXURE

  1. The sentencing orders are:

Date

Charge

Order/s

28 August 2023

UUMV in company

19 months imprisonment

4 May 2024

Stealing after previous

2 months imprisonment

Driving while disqualified

9 months imprisonment

28 May 2024

Burglary and steal

20 months imprisonment

31 May 2024

Burglary and steal

30 months imprisonment

9 July 2024

Stealing after previous

3 months imprisonment

Driving while disqualified

9 months imprisonment

15 July 2024

Stealing after previous

3 months imprisonment

Driving while disqualified

9 months imprisonment

10 August 2024

Stealing after previous

3 months imprisonment

Driving while disqualified

9 months imprisonment

11 August 2024

Stealing after previous

3 months imprisonment

Driving while disqualified

9 months imprisonment

13-17 August 2024

Stealing after previous

6 months imprisonment

16 August 2024

Stealing after previous

6 months imprisonment

Driving while disqualified

12 months imprisonment

23 October 2024

Driving while disqualified

12 months imprisonment

10 November 2024

Stealing

3 months imprisonment

Driving while disqualified

12 months imprisonment

18 December 2024

Fail to appear

2 months imprisonment

7 January 2025

Common assault – domestic violence offence

12 months imprisonment

Wilful damage – domestic violence offence

6 months imprisonment

6 February 2025

Evasion offence after previous at night

7 months

Driving while disqualified

6 months

Evasion offence after previous

6 months

Driving while disqualified

6 months

7 February 2025

Driving while disqualified

12 months imprisonment

  1. The terms of imprisonment imposed for the offences committed on 6 February 2025 are to be served concurrently with each other, but cumulatively on the term of imprisonment imposed on the 31 May 2024 burglary offence.
  1. The term of imprisonment imposed for the fail to appear offence will necessarily commence at the conclusion of the 37-month period of imprisonment created by the sentencing orders on the remaining offences.  The defendant is therefore subject to a 39-month period of imprisonment.
  1. 111 days (7 February to 28 May 2025) of presentence custody are declared as time already served under the sentence.
  1. The parole eligibility date is set at 6 January 2026.
  1. Separate two-year disqualification orders (the defendant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence) are made with respect to each instance of disqualified driving and evasion offence.

Footnotes

[1] See paragraphs [57] – [84] for my reasons concerning the jurisdiction point.

[2] For 2 x unlawful use of a motor vehicle, 1 x receiving tainted property, 1 x stealing and 1 x possess utensil.  A declaration of presentence custody was made from 10 October 2022.

[3] 7 February to 28 May 2025.

[4] The agreed facts state entry was gained by breaking, but no such circumstance is charged. Although such a circumstance of aggravation could not further increase the maximum penalty here, I have disregarded it in determining the appropriate penalty - R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383.

[5]Sections 33 and 35 of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld).

[6] Neither date is known to me.

[7] For context, Mr Uprichard spent at least 11 months in prison during that period and the 7 October 2022 offence was committed while on parole for unlawfully using motor vehicles and evading police.

[8] With an offence of enter dwelling with intent.

[9] He was also convicted but not further punished for failing to appear in court.

[10] He was also convicted but not further punished for failing to appear in court, possessing utensils or pipes and obstructing a police officer.

[11] 10 October 2022 to 14 February 2023.

[12] It was submitted that a parole eligibility date would be set because it was conceded that a term of imprisonment would attach to the unlawful use of a motor vehicle offence committed on parole and that would trigger a cancellation of that parole order.  Given my conclusion as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed, I do not need to consider this point.

[13] Section 3(5).

[14] Section 552H(1)(b).  The maximum penalty is four years imprisonment for a magistrate imposing a drug and alcohol treatment order – section 552H(1)(a).

[15] Section 156A(2) of the Penalties and Sentence Act 1992.

[16]Section 3 of the Criminal Code.

[17] See the definitions of “period of imprisonment” and “term of imprisonment” in section 4 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992.

[18] Page 5 of that decision.

[19] Paragraph [22] of the judgment.

[20] As is the case under section 552H(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, for example.

[21] 28 August 2023 to 1 November 2023.

[22] There is an assault or obstruct police conviction from 2017 for which I was not provided the facts.

[23] The annexure to these reasons sets out these orders in tabular form.

[24] R v Nagy [2004] 1 Qd R 63.

[25] Mill v The Queen [1988] 166 CLR 59.

[26] Ibid and R v Gray [2016] QCA 322 at [3] and [33]-[42].  No evidence was put before me that the 3 November 2023 to 11 April 2024 period in custody was declarable.  However, if Mr Uprichard was remanded on the unlawful use of a motor vehicle in company offence at that time, I would have elected not to declare that time given he was also serving his previous sentence.  I have taken that time into account.

[27]11 months into the 39 month period of imprisonment, giving full credit for the presentence custody between 7 February to 28 May 2025 and some allowance for the 3 November 2023 and 11 April 2024.

[28]The period of unserved imprisonment from 28 August 2023 to 1 November 2023.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Queensland Police Service v Uprichard

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Queensland Police Service v Uprichard

  • MNC:

    [2025] QMC 17

  • Court:

    QMC

  • Judge(s):

    Magistrate Lodziak

  • Date:

    29 May 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Age v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 169
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QDC 169
Annas v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 251
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QDC 251
Commissioner of Police v Aplin [2012] QDC 391
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QDC 391
Cite 2 - [2012] QDC 391
GAF v QPS [2008] QCA 190
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] QCA 190
Hobson v Queensland Police Service [2009] QDC 246
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QDC 246
Jones v Queensland Police Service [2022] QDC 281
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QDC 281
Mill v R (1988) 166 CLR 59
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1988) 166 CLR 59
Pamtoonda v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 207
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QDC 207
R v De Simoni (1981) 147 C.L.R., 383
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1981) 147 C.L.R., 383
R v Gray [2016] QCA 322
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCA 322
R v Hall [1980] Qd R 304
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1980] Qd R 304
R v Hazelgrove [2013] QCA 243
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCA 243
R v Nagy[2004] 1 Qd R 63; [2003] QCA 175
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] 1 Qd R 63
Ratcliffe v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 144
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QDC 144

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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