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Hungtat Worldwide Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection[2017] QPEC 62

Hungtat Worldwide Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection[2017] QPEC 62

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hungtat Worldwide Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection [2017] QPEC 62

PARTIES:

HUNGTAT WORLDWIDE PTY LTD (ACN 072 776 759)

(Appellant)

and

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND HERITAGE PROTECTION

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

1366 of 2013

DIVISION:

Planning and Environment Court, Brisbane

PROCEEDING:

Hearing of an Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court of Queensland, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

27 October 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17 and 18 August 2017

JUDGE:

R S Jones DCJ

ORDER:

  1. The appeal is allowed.
  2. The clean-up notice dated 7 March 2013 is set aside.
  3. I will hear from the parties as to any consequential orders.
  4. The matter is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AGAINST ISSUING OF A CLEAN-UP NOTICE – where appellant owner occupier of large golf resort development in floodplain west of Surfer’s Paradise – where land in close proximity to canal development off Nerang River – where a water contamination issues including fish kill initiated investigation by respondent – where contamination determined to involve the release of acidic soil products and iron rich water from the land into canal – where respondent issued a clean-up notice on the appellant requiring it to carry out remedial work

WHERE NOT IN DISPUTE APPELLANT NOT DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAUSE OF CONTAMINATION – whether the appellant has caused or permitted a contamination incident to happen – whether a contamination incident had in fact happened – whether appellant was not the occupier of a place for the purposes of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 at the time of the alleged contamination incident – whether appellant was not the owner or person in control of any contaminant involved in alleged incident

LEGISLATION:

Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld)

Queensland Heritage Act 1992 (Qld)

CASES:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Cuthbert v Moreton Bay Shire Council [2016] QPELR 179

Darwen v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd [2010] QPELR 262

Gladstone Ports Corporation Ltd v Qld Heritage Council [2012] QPELR 422

Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449

Oakley v Chief Executive [2015] QPELR 157

COUNSEL:

Mr D Gore QC with Mr J Lyons for the appellant

Mr A Skoien with Mr J Dillon for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Hickey Lawyers for the appellant

Ms A-M Ireland, solicitor of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection for the respondent

  1. [1]
    This proceeding is concerned with an appeal against the decision made by the respondent to issue a Clean-Up Notice (the Notice) said to be pursuant to the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (EPA).   For the reasons set out below, the orders of the court are:
  1. The appeal is allowed.
  2. The clean-up notice dated 7 March 2013 is set aside.
  3. I will hear from the parties as to any consequential orders.
  4. The matter is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Introduction

  1. [2]
    This is an unusual case in many respects. There was no dispute between the parties that the subject land is a major part of a wide spread acidic soil problem which, in certain circumstances, leads to the contamination of canal waters immediately to the east. Nor is it in dispute that remedial action needs to be taken to address the significant environmental problem and that remedial works would have to occur on the subject land that is referred to in the Notice as the “Place”. It was also not in dispute that remedial works identified by the numerous experts involved (but not the remedial work specified in the clean-up notice) would be likely to be, if not wholly, then substantially successful. Finally, in this context, it was also not in dispute that the appellant has not carried out any works or indeed done anything by way of any positive act to have caused the alleged contamination incident.
  1. [3]
    In his opening, Mr Skoien, senior counsel for the respondent said “…there is an ongoing contamination incident by way of continual release of these contaminants that is caught by the Environmental Protection Act 1994 and which the current owner of the land needs to deal with in order to avoid material or serious environmental harm from occurring… in fairness, Hungtat says ‘look, it’s not our problem.  If there was something that caused a contamination incident, it was something that happened historically by someone else and we’re not responsible for what’s occurring.’  And that is a live issue in the proceeding.”[1]
  1. [4]
    The responsibility and/or liability of the appellant to carry out clean-up works was variously described in a number of the respondent’s documents. By way of examples: in a letter dated 1 February 2011, it was described in the following terms:[2]

“(d)Hungtat, as the land owner, controls the land, drains and water features where the AASS continues to runoff.  In these respects, the actions of Hungtat contribute to the environmental harm being caused by the AASS runoff.

The department expects Hungtat to take all reasonable actions to achieve full compliance with the enclosed Notice to Conduct or Commission an Environmental Evaluation that is issued.”

  1. [5]
    In the respondent’s Statement of Reasons it was, in this context, said:[3]

“17. Hungtat operates a golf course at and owns the premises.

  1. The previous landowner constructed drains on the premises.
  2. The Radisson Resort and the golf course were constructed on the premises.  The application points out that the resort and golf course was not constructed by Hungtat.  This is not considered relevant to the need for Hungtat as landowner to take an action to prevent further release of contaminants upon becoming aware of the release.

…

  1. On reasonable grounds the activity undertaken by Hungtat at the premises set out in the notice is causing or is likely to cause environmental harm.  Accordingly, the requirement of the Act at s 323(1)(b) is fulfilled.

…

  1. An activity may be defined according to the third edition of the Macquarie Dictionary as ‘a specific deed or action; sphere of action; social activities.’   The meaning of sphere in the same source is defined as ‘the place or environment within which a person or thing exists; a field of activity or operation.’
  1. Hungtat’s alleged operation of the golf course is therefore actually an activity which by definition, and inextricably, includes the premises as an activity which includes the location of the operation of the golf course.

…

  1. Hungtat operates a golf course at the premises including acquisition of the premises.
  1. In purchasing the premises, Hungtat must take responsibility for the consequences of nuisance resulting from the premises since the purchase of the land, including the financial consequences of complying with the notice and the consequences of the environmental harm including prevention and making good.” (Emphasis added).
  1. [6]
    Notwithstanding that which is asserted in paragraph 28 of the Statement of Reasons, no “activity undertaken by Hungtat” is specifically referred to in the Notice. It is simply asserted:

“The clean-up Notice is issued on the following grounds:

  1. On 30 January 2012 at 11.15am the Department and Gold Coast City Council inspected a contamination incident in the Witt Avenue Canal, Carrara, Gold Coast and in the watercourse within the Place.

2 The contamination incident involved the release of acidic soil products and iron rich water from the Place causing offensive odours, iron staining on aquatic crafts... death of marine organisms… in the waters of Witt Avenue canal and within the watercourse within the Place. 

3 The contamination incident has caused and is likely to cause serious or material environmental harm. 

4  The recipient is a prescribed person for the contamination incident pursuant to s 363G of the EPA.”  (Emphasis added)

  1. [7]
    Put in its most basic terms, this proceeding is concerned about whether the appellant is required to bear the vast majority (if not all) of the costs associated with remedying the historic acid sulfate issue.

Background

  1. [8]
    The appellant is the owner of significant land holdings (the Place) southwest of Surfer’s Paradise and immediately to the west of the Nerang Broadbeach Road which separates it from a small canal development adjacent to the Nerang River.[4]  In particular, the Place lies to the west of a section of canal described during the course of the proceedings as the Witt Avenue Canal. 
  1. [9]
    While more will be said about the physical characteristics of the Place below, broadly speaking it occupies between 50% and 70% (more likely in the order of 60% plus) of a catchment area within the Merrimac floodplains. Historically, the Place had been used for various agricultural ventures but is now occupied in part by the well-known golf course “Palm Meadows” (the golf course), the balance remaining vacant land which has been historically cleared and is currently being used for limited grazing purposes.
  1. [10]
    Acting upon complaints made by a number of the residents in the Witt Avenue Canal, officers of the respondent carried out an investigation and discovered, amongst other things, a fish kill. Complaints also included that the canal water was discoloured, was emitting a foul smell and causing staining to boat hulls. The respondent determined that a “contamination incident” had occurred and was one that had caused or was likely to cause serious or material environmental harm. That contamination incident was described in Notice dated 25 June 2012 in the following terms:[5]

“The contamination incident involved the release of acidic soil products and iron rich water from the place causing offensive odours, iron staining on aquatic craft, iron scum on the water surface, death of marine organisms, low dissolved oxygen and low pH in the waters of Witt Avenue canal and in the watercourse within the place.”

  1. [11]
    For reasons it is not necessary to go into at this stage, a second clean-up notice dated 7 March 2013 was served on the appellant. The second notice described the contamination incident in the same terms. That this “contamination incident” occurred and that the appellant owns the Place essentially ground the basis for the issuing of the Notice.
  1. [12]
    Under the heading “Actions” the Notice required the appellant to take a number of steps to “prevent or minimise contamination”.  The actions the appellant was required to carry out included, among other things, the instillation of three aeration devices within specified locations.  Such devices had to be designed by an appropriately experienced person and approved by the respondent.  Daily water quality monitoring including surface water monitoring was required, as was the introduction of “neutralising agents” approved by the respondent together with regular reporting. 
  1. [13]
    On 22 April 2013, the appellant filed its Notice of Appeal. The grounds of appeal are:

“1. The Appellant is not a prescribed person for any contamination incident pursuant to s 363G of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 as:

  1. (a)
    the Appellant has not caused or permitted a contamination incident to happen;
  2. (b)
    the Appellant was not the occupier of a place at the time at or from which a contamination incident happened; and
  3. (c)
    the Appellant was not the owner or person in control of any contaminant involved in an incident.
  1. If there has been a contamination incident (which is not admitted) then it happened prior to the appellant becoming an occupier of the place (or having any interest in the place) the subject of the notice.”
  1. [14]
    In the appellant’s Amended Statement of Facts, Matters and Contentions the following matters were also pleaded in defence:[6]

“If there had been a contamination incident (which is not admitted) then it happened prior to the appellant becoming an occupier of the subject land (or having any interest in the subject land), at the time the subject land was drained for agricultural purposes.

The appellant did not on 30 January 2012 (nor at any other time) undertake an activity which caused (directly, indirectly or in any other way) environmental harm (within the meaning of s 14 of the Act) or serious or material environmental harm (within the meaning of s 16 and 17 of the Act).

In the premises, in making the decision to require the Appellant to take the actions stated in the clean-up notice, the respondent erred as there was no basis for a reasonable belief that the appellant was a prescribed person for a contamination incident.

Further, and in the alternative, it is not reasonable that the Appellant take the actions stated in the clean-up notice and/or the Appellant has a reasonable excuse for not complying with the notice…”

  1. [15]
    It can be seen that by reference to the dates of the Notice and the Notice of Appeal that a considerable amount of time had elapsed before the matter finally came before the court. That delay is attributable to the complexity of the environmental problem, the complexity of any solution and the longstanding without prejudice discussions and negotiations between the appellant, the respondent and, on occasions, other parties including the Gold Coast City Council (the Council).

The catchment and sources of contamination

  1. [16]
    While a somewhat unusual course of action, in the particular circumstances of this case it is useful to refer to a number of physical characteristics associated with the relevant catchment, the Place and the sources of contamination as identified in the Joint Expert Report (JER). Involved in the JER process were:
  • Mr M Stuckey retained by the respondent and Mr N Sutherland retained by the appellant to deal with agricultural issues and, in particular, soil science.
  • Dr T Johnson retained by the respondent and Mr C Anderson retained by the appellant to deal with hydrology and engineering issues.
  • Mr R Smith retained by the respondent and Dr J Thorogood retained by the appellant to deal with aquatic ecology and ecotoxicology.
  1. [17]
    In their JER, the experts described the catchment, catchment history, sources of contamination and acidic by-products in the following terms:[7]

“Landform

  1. The Place comprises separate Lots within the Merrimac floodplain, as depicted on the attached drawing 001.
  2. The near-surface soils within this floodplain were formed under marine conditions, followed by a sea level recession to “Still-stand” (RL 0 m) and subsequent alluvial erosion and deposition.  Since then anthropogenic impacts have modified the landform.
  3. Iron-rich sediment, eroded from the upper catchment, was deposited in shallow (often mangrove) swamps and inundated with sulfate-rich seawaters.  Using energy from decaying organic matter in the swamp, specialist bacteria formed iron disulfide (Pyrite) under anoxic (or reducing) conditions.  The formation of pyrite resulted in the production of what are termed potential acid-sulfate soils (PASS) across the floodplain, within and both upstream and downstream of the Place.

Catchment

  1. The catchment upstream of the Place totals approximately 16,500 hectares (ha).  This catchment and the watercourses draining to the Witt Avenue Canal are shown on drawing 002.
  2. To the south-west of the Place, there are some complexities in the exact watersheds and flow regimes due to back-flows during floods.  However, under most flow conditions, the point of discharge is at the Witt Avenue Drain.
  3. Widespread areas within the upstream catchment, under State and local government ownership, deliver runoff to the floodplain upstream of the Place.
  4. Under recharge and flood conditions, these waters provide a mechanism for ASS products to be delivered further downstream.
  5. The waters downstream of the Witt Avenue Drain are buffered, in part, by sea water.  That is, acidic products from the development of ASS are mixed with the alkaline sea waters, which exchange tidally in the Nerang River.  This sea water neutralisation, in which waters are exchanged twice a day with the tides, has reduced the acid sulfate impacts of the downstream developments.  Effectively, the downstream developments are employing the receiving environment as their treatment method.

Catchment history

  1. The catchment has been extensively developed. Upstream of the point of discharge, there are some 4,870 lots serviced by infrastructure including the M1 Motorway which bisects the catchment.
  2. Whilst anecdotally the extensive agricultural drainage within the catchment was started before 1860 it is evident upstream of the Place and on the Place before 1955, based on aerial photography.
  3. Drawings 008 to 031 reproduce aerial photographs from 1955 to 2016. These variously depict the Place, the agricultural drains and the state of development within the Place and the catchment.
  4. ASS impacts are evident throughout this photography, both in the Place and on the surrounding lands.
  5. Both drainage for infrastructure and agriculture have historically lowered the natural groundwater levels.
  6. In the lowering of the groundwater levels, Potential ASS (PASS) were turned into Actual ASS (AASS), with the resultant sulfuric acid lowering the pH, together with the release of iron and aluminium, the acid making those elements more bioavailable as dissolved cations and hence more toxic to the receiving environment. It is these impacts that the Notice ought to address, in our view.

…

Sources of contamination

  1. Coastal acid sulfate soils are naturally occurring sediments that have been deposited under specific estuarine conditions.  The combination of iron-rich sediments, sulfate-rich seawaters, decaying organic matter and anoxic conditions allowed specialist bacteria to emit hydrogen sulfide (H2S) which then combined with the dissolved ferrous ion (FE²⁺) to produce iron disulfide (FeS2), otherwise known as iron pyrite.  Pyrite remains stable in the anoxic environment, while remaining below the water table in a saturated form.  However, when exposed to air or to oxygen, pyrite oxidises to form sulfuric acid (H2SO4) and a range of iron and other by-products of the acid formation.
  1. The acid solubilises metals, particularly aluminium, from surrounding clay-based soils. All of these chemical compounds may then be mobilised by natural or anthropogenic mechanisms such as flooding or agricultural drainage and dispersed to other areas where they may cause environmental harm.

Acidic by-products

  1. When fresh waters, containing these acidic by-products discharge to alkaline seawaters, oxidation reactions take place which can lead to a decrease in pH, a reduction in dissolved oxygen concentration and bicarbonate content, and the precipitation of ferric oxy-hydroxide (FeO(OH)) and related compounds which form an insoluble orange gel or floc.
  2. The impacts described in Witt Avenue canal are typical of those caused by the discharge of acid sulfate by-products following oxidation and mobilisation.
  3. Potential acid sulfate soils (PASS) are those soils which remain in a stable anoxic environment below the water table, and have not been subject to oxidation (sulfidic material). Actual acid sulfate soils (AASS) are those soils which have been either partially or completely oxidised (sulfuric material). AASS may either remain in-situ, where oxidation has commenced as a result of the lowering of the water table level by either natural or anthropogenic causes, or have been disturbed and commenced oxidation by being exposed to the atmosphere, again by either natural or anthropogenic means. Both PASS and AASS are present in the catchment of Witt Avenue canal and are not restricted to the subject Place.
  4. Acidic runoff is likely to have been a natural response of this catchment even without anthropogenic influences.
  5. The oxidation of acid sulfate soils at the Place and mobilisation of acidic by-products, has been significantly exasperated by the construction of an agricultural drainage system in the late years of the nineteenth century.
  6. Anthropogenic actions elsewhere in the catchment are also likely to contribute acidic runoff, although, as with the impact from the Place, the extent of this impact has not been quantified.” (Emphasis added).
  1. [18]
    The reference to there being 16,500 ha of catchment upstream of the Place is an error. It should be 1,560 ha. The catchment boundary and the boundary of the Place are found in various documents.[8]  There was debate about what percentage of the relevant catchment area was occupied by the Place.  The evidence was that it was somewhere between 50% and 70%.  On balance, I consider that it would be no less than 60% and more likely 60% plus. The actual proportion is not a determinative consideration.  That is, as was recognised by all of the experts and indeed by the appellant the Place, being at the most eastern boundary of the catchment before the Nerang River, was a necessary and critical part of any environmental solution. 

The remedial works required

  1. [19]
    The type of works required under the Notice have already been referred to but are more fully set out in that document at page 2.[9] 
  1. [20]
    During the JER process, what was described as a “proposed relocation of treatment area” was produced.  This document was the product of the input of Dr Johnson and in particular, in my view, Mr Sutherland, who had been employed by the appellant to investigate the acid sulfate issues associated with its land.  These remedial works included a strategy described as a “Proposed Scope of Works” designed to provide for the “Management of Acid Sulfate Soils and Drainage Waters, Palm Meadows Estate, Queensland”:[10]

“This strategy involves relocating the treatment area for oxidation products discharging from the agricultural drainage network from the Witt Avenue canal system (downstream of the tidal floodgates) to upstream of the existing floodgates allowing treatment on the Palm Meadows site prior to discharge into the Witt Avenue canal system.  Two options for this treatment measure were previously researched and also discussed:

  1. (a)
    lime dosing of the drain waters upstream of the existing floodgates; and
  2. (b)
    modification of the Witt Avenue floodgates to allow tidal waters to enter the Witt Avenue drain and thence into the site.”
  1. [21]
    It was Dr Johnson’s opinion that the works proposed under the JER process fitted within, or were the type of works contemplated by the Notice issued to the appellant. I cannot accept that. The works now proposed are vastly different to that required under the Notice. The works under the Notice were essentially contained within the land owned by the appellant. A matter acknowledged by Dr Johnson.[11]  The works proposed, as a consequence of the JER process, involves an entirely different philosophical approach.  A principle feature of the newly proposed works was the introduction of saline water from the canal system via the tidal gates at Witt Avenue onto the subject land.  Dr Johnson described the philosophy in these terms:[12]

“…there are two components to the method put forward by Mr Sutherland.   The first is to introduce saline water into the area downstream of what I’ll call the golf course weir.  I’m sure you would have visited that during the site inspection, and it’s the site upstream of which it’s fresh water and downstream of which at the moment it’s a brackish environment.  Mr Sutherland intends to open the tidal gates during a tidal event and allow seawater, estuarine water, to come in and reside within the system.  Now, that achieves the first element, potentially, of the treatment notice, which is a requirement to neutralise the effects of acidity.  But the second element that Mr Sutherland is proposing is to effectively flood the areas upstream of the golf course weir.  And by that, I mean he proposes to build weirs and stop board systems which will allow the water level upstream of that weir to be substantially higher, perhaps 600 millimetres to a metre higher, than it currently is.  That will have the effect, in my opinion, of mobilising the acidity which is present within much of the soil layers up in those areas.  And that mobilisation will take place, in my opinion, over a period probably extending to years.  Now, at a guess, I would say between two and five years, and the reason I would say that is because, upon a review of the Trinity East – East Trinity system which has been discussed in this court previously, it took approximately two to two and a-half years for the residual acidity within the East Trinity site to be flushed out once it had been reflooded with saltwater.  Now, that was a different situation, in that the saltwater in that case could occupy all of those channels which were affected.  In this case, saltwater can’t penetrate upstream of the golf course weir.  Therefore, there’s a need to mobilise the upstream acidity, but also to re-establish what I call are anoxic conditions, under which the existing acidity upstream won’t continue to oxidise…”

  1. [22]
    According to Mr Sutherland, what is now proposed would probably obviate the need to introduce any aeration devices of the type envisaged under the Notice. His evidence about this was not challenged.
  1. [23]
    Under the heading “effects of the actions in Notice” it was reported in the JER:[13]

“TJ, MS & RS:

Sources of existing and actual acidity exist in the catchment beyond the extent of the place.  However, it is our opinion that the Place is a significant contributor to the impacts observed in Witt Avenue Canal, and that the works proposed for the site will result in substantial improvement in downstream water quality.

CA & NS:

The works as described in the Notice are neither practicable nor equitable in our view.  However, the works detailed in Appendix 3 should result in a substantial benefit.  In respect of sustainability, we note that the Respondent advocated, in part, the tidal regime restoration solution (detailed in Appendix 3) in November 2009. 

TJ, MS & RS:

The requirements of the notice are reasonably generic, in that they require the Appellant to undertake works to mitigate the impact of the runoff of acidic by-products from the Place.  We agree that standard aeration and lime dosing systems are unlikely to be successful in neutralising the acid waters because of the scale of the problem.  However, we consider that it would be technically feasible to develop and implement a suitable dosing system (in combination with other long term remedial measures such as floodgate control/removal), while acknowledging that the costs are likely to be significant. 

A further option to mitigate the long term impacts of acidic runoff on Witt Avenue canal would be to remove the tidal gates downstream of the golf course and the weirs within the golf course, so as to allow full tidal conditions to be re-established in the floodplain.  However, this would permanently increase the tidal component of the Nerang River in relation to existing conditions and increase tidal velocities in the river…”[14] (Emphasis added).

  1. [24]
    On the evidence before me, while I am satisfied that if the works prescribed in the Notice were carried out, they might result in substantial water quality improvement downstream of the Place, they would not achieve an adequate remedy or solution to the problem. Indeed, the respondent has proceeded on the basis that works of the type envisaged in the JER was the best potential solution. The ramifications of this issue are dealt with below.

The Environmental Protection Act

  1. [25]
    Sections 8 and 9 of the EPA define ‘environment’ and ‘environmental value’ as follows:

“Environment includes—

  1. (a)
    ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and communities; and
  2. (b)
    all natural and physical resources; and
  3. (c)
    the qualities and characteristics of locations, places and areas, however large or small, that contribute to their biological diversity and integrity, intrinsic or attributed scientific value or interest, amenity, harmony and sense of community; and
  4. (d)
    the social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions that affect, or are affected by, things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c).

Environmental value is—

  1. (a)
    a quality or physical characteristic of the environment that is conducive to ecological health or public amenity or safety; or
  2. (b)
    another quality of the environment identified and declared to be an environmental value under an environmental protection policy or regulation.”
  1. [26]
    The power to issue a clean-up notice is contained in section 363H of the EPA, which relevantly provides:

“363H  Administering authority may issue clean-up notice

  1. (1)
    The administering authority may issue a written notice (a clean-up notice) to a person whom the administering authority reasonably believes to be a prescribed person for a contamination incident, requiring the person to take stated action to do all or any of the following—
  1. (a)
    prevent or minimise contamination;

Example—

action to contain, remove, disperse or destroy the contaminants

  1. (b)
    rehabilitate or restore the environment because of the incident, including by taking steps to mitigate or remedy the effects of the incident;
  2. (c)
    assess the nature and extent of the environmental harm, or the risk of further environmental harm, from the incident, including by inspecting, sampling, recording, measuring, calculating, testing or analysing;
  3. (d)
    keep the administering authority informed about the incident or the actions taken under the notice, including by giving to the administering authority stated reports, plans, drawings or other documents.” (Emphasis added).
  1. [27]
    It is significant that the EPA does not require the administering authority to be satisfied that there has been any offence committed by the intended recipient of a clean-up notice. The focus is upon the occurrence of a “contamination incident,” not on any deliberate or negligent misconduct by a person.
  1. [28]
    Section 363F defines a “contamination incident” as follows:

“Contamination incident means—

  1. an incident involving contamination of the environment that the administering authority is satisfied has caused or is likely to cause serious or material environmental harm; or
  2. the carrying out of an activity on contaminated land, the happening of an event on contaminated land, or a change in the condition of contaminated land that the administering authority is satisfied has caused or is likely to cause the land or any other land to become contaminated land; or
  3. a combination of matters mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b).”  (Emphasis added).
  1. [29]
    “Contamination” is defined in section 10 as follows:

“Contamination of the environment is the release (whether by act or omission) of a contaminant into the environment.” (Emphasis added).

  1. [30]
    “Release” is defined in Schedule 4 of the Act as follows:

“Release, of a contaminant into the environment, includes—

  1. to deposit, discharge, emit or disturb the contaminant; and
  2. to cause or allow the contaminant to be deposited, discharged, emitted or disturbed; and
  3. to fail to prevent the contaminant from being deposited, discharged, emitted or disturbed; and
  4. to allow the contaminant to escape; and
  5. to fail to prevent the contaminant from escaping.”
  1. [31]
    Section 14 defines “environmental harm”:

“Environmental harm

  1. (1)
    Environmental harm is any adverse effect, or potential adverse effect (whether temporary or permanent and of whatever magnitude, duration or frequency) on an environmental value, and includes environmental nuisance.
  2. (2)
    Environmental harm may be caused by an activity—
  1. (a)
    whether the harm is a direct or indirect result of the activity; or
  2. (b)
    whether the harm results from the activity alone or from the combined effects of the activity and other activities or factors.”
  1. [32]
    “Material environmental harm” and “serious environmental harm” are defined in sections 16 and 17 of the EPA. It cannot be doubted that the risk of serious or material environmental harm has been actualised and remains present.
  1. [33]
    Section 363G identifies prescribed persons for the purposes of chapter 7, part 5B:

“363G  Who are the prescribed persons for a contamination

incident

For this part, each of the following persons is a prescribed person for a contamination incident—

  1. (a)
    a person causing or permitting, or who caused or permitted, the incident to happen;
  2. (b)
    a person who, at the time of the incident, is or was—
  1. (i)
    the occupier of a place at or from which the incident is happening or happened; or
  2. (ii)
    the owner, or person in control, of a contaminant involved in the incident;

(ba)  for a contamination incident mentioned in section 363F, definition contamination incident, paragraph (b)—a prescribed responsible person for the land to which the incident relates;

  1. (c)
    if a clean-up notice is issued to a corporation (the first corporation) in relation to the incident and it fails to comply with the notice—
  1. (i)
    a parent corporation of the first corporation; and
  2. (ii)
    an executive officer of the first corporation.”
  1. [34]
    Schedule 4 further defines the terms ‘occupier’ and ‘owner’:

“Occupier, of a place, includes the person apparently in charge of the place.

Owner—

1  The owner of land is—

  1. (a)
    for freehold land—the person recorded in the freehold land register as the person entitled to the fee simple interest in the land; or
  2. (b)
    for land held under a lease, licence or permit under an Act—the person who holds the lease, licence or permit; or
  3. (c)
    for trust land under the Land Act 1994—the trustees of the land; or…"

Onus and standard of proof

  1. [35]
    Each party contended that the other bore the onus. On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that in “a proceeding such as this” it is incumbent upon the respondent to establish its case at “the higher end of the civil standard.”[15]  That is, to a standard higher than the balance of probabilities of the type described in accordance with the “sliding scale” discussed in Briginshaw v Briginshaw.[16]  Reliance was placed on two decisions of this court, Darwen v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd[17] and, in particular, Cuthbert v Moreton Bay Shire Council.[18]  On behalf of the respondent it was submitted that regardless of who bore the onus of proof, the appropriate standard was the usual civil standard, namely on the balance of probabilities.
  1. [36]
    Turning to the question of which party bears the onus, I was referred to two cases in particular. The first was the reasoning of Rackemann DCJ in Oakley v Chief Executive[19] and to the second, my reasoning in Gladstone Ports Corporation Ltd v Queensland Heritage Council.[20]
  1. [37]
    The former case was concerned with an appeal against a decision by the relevant delegate to issue a notice in circumstances where noncompliance could result in a penalty of up to a maximum of 3000 penalty units. The latter case was concerned with the listing of a place under the Queensland Heritage Act 1992.  There is a marked distinction between the potential consequences which might have befallen each of the appellants in those respective cases.  In the circumstances of this case, I consider the reasoning of Rackemann DCJ in Oakley to be, in my respectful view, correct.  His Honour relevantly said:[21]

“The Coastal Protection and Management Act (1995) does not state which party is to bear the onus. While it is the person who is dissatisfied with the decision to give the notice who brings the appeal, it does not necessarily follow that that person bears the onus. In conducting a de novo hearing, the court will be concerned with whether a notice ought issue. That notice disturbs the pre-existing status quo, by requiring the recipient to comply with a notice. Failure to do so is punishable by a maximum penalty of 3000 penalty units.

Prior to the issue of the notice it was for the chief executive to determine whether such a notice should issue. Such a notice ought not have issued unless the chief executive was satisfied that it was appropriate in the circumstances. Similarly, the court, on a de novo hearing, ought not dismiss the appeal unless it is so satisfied. In such circumstances the onus properly falls upon the respondent, as the authority contending that it is appropriate that the notice be given. The respondent properly accepts that it bears the onus in such appeals.” (Citations omitted)

  1. [38]
    Accordingly, in my view the respondent bears the onus in this proceeding. As to the standard of proof, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the application of principles of the type enunciated in Briginshaw “only (have) any real application in cases where the matters that are to be proven involve some finding of moral or legal impropriety (most notably where the allegations depend on a finding that an offence has been committed).”[22]  
  1. [39]
    No authority was stated for that proposition however reference was made to the reasoning of the High Court in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449.  In my view, the submissions made on behalf of the respondent fail to take into account: first, the serious allegation that the appellant was responsible for an incident involving the release of contaminants which would cause or be likely to cause serious or material environmental harm.  Second, that the financial and managerial costs to the appellant in complying with the Notice would be significant and ongoing for an unknown period of time.  Third, failure to comply with the Notice can result in penal sanctions.  In this regard I consider the observations made by Morzone QC DCJ in Cuthbert v Moreton Bay Shire Council[23] to be apposite:

“The appeal is by way of rehearing, unaffected by the council’s decision. The court rules and directions govern the proceeding. In deciding the appeal, the court is empowered to:

  1. (a)
    confirm the decision appealed against; or
  2. (b)
    vary the decision appealed against, and such varied  decision will be taken to be that of the council; or
  3. (c)
    set aside the decision appealed against and make a decision in substitution for the decision set aside, and such substituted decision will be taken to be that of the council.

The onus of proof rests with the respondent council. Whilst there is no doubt that that the proceedings are governed by the civil standard of proof, being the balance of probabilities, there is some debate whether the standard is modified by the “sliding scale” described in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 ; [1938] ALR 334 .

In this case, s 538 is not a penal section. No sanctions are sought for the commission of any offences. However, the decision necessitates findings of whether the appellant has breached the EA or its general environmental duty by carrying out any activity that causes, or is likely to cause, environmental harm or nuisance. Such findings may bespeak potential offences against ss 430, 437, 438, 400 and 440ZG of the Act involving material environmental harm or serious environmental harm, which are punishable with fines ranging from about $70,000.00 to $525,000.00, in the absence of a wilful element.

In an application seeking enforcement orders, injunctive and declaratory relief predicated on allegations that the respondent had committed various breaches of ss 437 and 438 of the Act, Robinson DCJ described the appropriate standard of proof as being “at the higher end of the civil standard”.

Having regard to the consequences of the outcome of this proceeding, in my view, the appropriate standard of proof to be applied is that at the higher end of the civil standard in accordance with the Briginshaw principles.”

  1. [40]
    I respectfully agree with and adopt the reasoning of his Honour. In the circumstances of this proceeding I have concluded that the onus rests on the respondent to establish that it was appropriate that the notice be issued. And, that while the standard of proof is governed by the civil standard, the evidence needs to be scrutinized carefully to ensure that it is clear and compelling. As to the second of these matters, at the end of the day, I consider that little turned on the standard of proof to be applied. The result would have been the same had the usual civil standard been applicable.

Consideration and conclusions

  1. [41]
    In paragraph 5 above I set out a number of the Statement of Reasons issued by the respondent to the appellant. With all due respect to the author of that document, a number of the assertions made are not, relevant to this case, “reasons”. Further, in the circumstances of this case, the assertions made in paragraphs 43 to 48 are, to a significant extent, not only irrelevant but nonsensical.
  1. [42]
    At the risk of putting the respondent’s case a little crudely, it considered the appellant’s responsibility to arise out of it being the owner or the occupier of the Place and not having done something to address an environmental problem caused by others. In this context it needs to be borne in mind that not only did the appellant not carry out any works that lowered the water table, but also there is no suggestion that when those works were carried out by others, they were carried out unlawfully. To use Mr Skoien’s words in this regard, “…as we know, nobody’s suggesting that any new development by Hungtat did anything.”[24]  In this context he went on to say that “…the issue of a clean-up notice is not intended to imply that a prescribed person caused or was responsible for the contamination incident.”[25]
  1. [43]
    The evidence establishes sufficiently clearly that at the relevant times:
  1. (i)
    a contamination incident had occurred;
  2. (ii)
    the appellant was the occupier of the Place;
  3. (iii)
    a contamination incident emanated from the Place;
  4. (iv)
    up until the retention of Mr Sutherland, the appellant had done little to address the known environmental problems associated with the Place;
  5. (v)
    if appropriate steps are not taken it is very likely further contamination will occur;
  6. (vi)
    while the works identified in the Notice would probably lead to a material improvement in water quality, they would be unlikely to remedy the situation; and
  7. (vii)
    the works proposed by the experts are materially different to those required under the Notice and would be much more likely to meaningfully address the major environmental problems involved.
  1. [44]
    In circumstances where the appellant had done nothing that might be said to have caused the oxidisation, mobilisation and eventual discharge of AAS products into the canal system, it is understandable that its position was that it has had no involvement in the occurrence of a “contamination incident” for the purposes of the EPA.
  1. [45]
    However, in my opinion, given the meaning given to what constitutes “contamination”, “release” and a “contamination incident” for the purposes of that Act, the event that occurred at the Witt Avenue canal was such an incident. It does not however necessarily follow that the appellant must comply with the clean-up Notice.
  1. [46]
    In its pleadings the appellant expressly denied that it was a prescribed person for the purposes of the EPA. In response to that denial the respondent pleaded:

“[The respondent] denies:

  1. (a)
    [the respondent] denies the allegation that the Appellant is not a prescribed person and says that Appellant is a prescribed person pursuant to s 363G…
  2. (b)
    denies the allegations in sub-paragraphs 11(a) and (b) and says that the Appellant has caused or permitted a contamination incident to happen for the purposes of s 363G…
  3. (c)
    denies the allegation in sub-paragraph 11(c) and says that the Appellant is the occupier of each of the lots comprising the subject land for the purposes of s 363G.”
  1. [47]
    Thereafter it is asserted that the appellant is a prescribed person because it was the occupier of the land and/or, alternatively, was the person in control of the acid sulfate soils and acid sulfate soil products on the subject land. As has already been identified, I am satisfied that the appellant was the occupier of the Place at all relevant times. Further, notwithstanding its written pleadings by reference to the submissions made by Mr Skoien, the respondent quite properly does not contend that the appellant had caused the subject contamination incident. In this context I also reject the argument that the appellant had “permitted” the incident to happen. The respondent relied on the Macquarie Dictionary definition of “permit”:[26] 

“Verb (t)…

  1. To allow (a person, etc) to do something: permit me to explain. 
  2. To let (something) be done or occur: …
  3. To tolerate; agree to. 
  4. To afford the opportunity for; allow: …
  5. To grant permission; allow liberty to do something.
  6. To afford opportunity or possibility: …” 
  1. [48]
    After citing a number of authorities, the respondent’s written submissions concluded:[27] 

“Having regard to the context of s 363G and, in particular, the juxtaposition of “cause” with “permit” in s 363G(1)(a), and in considering the authorities above as well as other relevant case law; it is clear that Hungtat permitted and is permitting, the ongoing contamination because: 

  1. (a)
    Hungtat is, and was, aware of the continuing contamination incident and that the periodic release of acid soil products and iron rich water from the Hungtat land would continue to occur;
  2. (b)
    Hungtat had, and has, the capacity to prevent the periodic emissions; and
  3. (c)
    Either Hungtat was under a duty to stop the contamination incident, or its continued inaction amounts to acquiescence of a sanctioning of the emissions. 

With regard to the proper meaning of the word “permit”, in the context of the release of contaminants it is significant that the definition of “contamination” (s 10) includes both acts and omissions and the definition of “release” include allowing, and failing to prevent, the escape of contaminants. 

Hungtat has known about the contamination and the source of the contaminating for some time, at least 17 years, since the provision of the GGO Coastal Australia Report. 

Apart from anything else, Hungtat has a duty to stop the contamination incident because it amounts to a public or private nuisance or both.  Hungtat did not create or cause source [sic] of the contamination, but it adopted or continued the nuisance by having knowledge of the emissions Hungtat land, causing impacts upon others, and failing to take all reasonable measures to remedy or abate the nuisance within a reasonable time.” (deleted)

  1. [49]
    According to Mr Skoien, “there’s the contamination incident and then what makes Hungtat a prescribed person is the failure to take steps and the awareness of the matter…”[28]
  1. [50]
    I cannot accept those submissions. Whether a person has permitted something to occur must always be assessed having regard to the relevant and surrounding facts, matters and circumstances. Neither the knowledge that the problem existed nor the capacity to prevent it from manifesting itself but failing to do so, is sufficient. There is no probative evidence to establish that the appellant had acted in any way which could sensibly be described as permitting the contamination incident to occur. The ability to potentially remedy a problem not of one’s making by carrying out extensive and expensive works does not constitute a “permitting” of future occurrences of that problem. The respondent was, in my view, unable to point to any act and/or omission on the part of the appellant that would meet any sensible construction of the word “permit”.
  1. [51]
    For the sake of completeness I should also record that I reject the argument that the appellant was an “owner” or “person in control” for the purposes of s 363(G)(b)(ii) of the EPA. The underlying problem, the acid sulfate soils, are a naturally occurring sediment which have become exposed over time as a consequence of the historical activities of others. Further, the release or discharge of the contaminant is not the result of action or inaction on the part of the appellant. The mobilisation of the contaminants within and eventually from the Place are the result of natural or anthropogenic mechanisms such as flooding.
  1. [52]
    For the reasons given, the only basis that could cause the respondent to have a reasonable belief that the appellant was a prescribed person for the purposes of the Act was because it was an “occupier” for the purposes of s 363G(b)(i).

Should the Notice have been issued on discretionary grounds?

  1. [53]
    In Oakley v Chief Executive[29] it was relevantly said:

“Prior to the issue of the notice, it was for the Chief Executive to determine whether such a notice should issue.  Such a notice ought not have been issued unless the chief executive was satisfied that it was appropriate in the circumstances.  Similarly, the court on a de novo hearing ought not dismiss the appeal unless it is so satisfied.”

  1. [54]
    The use of the word “may” in s 363H of the Act clearly contemplates that the relevant officer has a discretion as to whether or not in the circumstances of each particular case such a notice should issue. Notwithstanding the facts that a contamination incident causing significant or material environmental harm had occurred and indeed that further incidents could occur in the future and that the appellant is a prescribed person for the purposes of the EPA this notice should not have been issued. That is so for a number of reasons.
  1. [55]
    First, the expert evidence is clearly to the effect that while the works specified in the notice might have some positive environmental impact, they would not address the real problems which are not only widespread but extremely complex. To put it bluntly, for the appellant to carry out the works prescribed in the notice, would be likely to result in a material waste of time and money. Also, in this context for the reasons already given, it could not be sensibly said that the works of the type now advocated for by Mr Sutherland and Dr Johnson could fall within the description of the works specified in the notice no matter how broadly construed.
  1. [56]
    Second, the best solution would require the co-operation of the Gold Coast City Council in no small part. It is that authority that would be required to permit the operation of the floodgates at the Witt Canal in a manner required under the works identified by Mr Sutherland and Dr Johnson.  The gaining of such permission is not a mere technicality but a matter of substance and there is no evidence that the Council has or would agree.
  1. [57]
    Third, to require the appellant to bear the financial burden and the managerial burden associated with the now proposed works would amount to the imposition of unjustifiably disproportionate consequences. As has already been discussed, while the appellant owns and occupies a significant proportion of the relevant catchment, it is not the sole owner and/or occupier. In the JER the experts agreed that “both PASS and AASS are present in the catchment of Witt Avenue Canal and are not restricted to the subject Place.”  Indeed during the cross-examination of Dr Johnson the following exchange took place:[30]

“Q Can I suggest that there are really two factors that need to be considered in addressing or identifying the water quality problems.  The first is the contribution of acid?

A Yes.

Q And the second is the delivery of water to mobilise the acid sulfate and the oxygen?

A Yes, you – you’re absolutely right.  I mean, obviously the catchment west of the motorway contributes runoff, which then enters the subject lands and mobilises the thing.  So I happily accept that as a valid point.”

  1. [58]
    Finally, it is not an irrelevant consideration that the appellant has in no material way been the cause of the subject environmental problems. When it purchased the land it inherited a pre-existing problem that was one not fully appreciated in Queensland until the 1990s.[31] 
  1. [59]
    That the works of the type prescribed in the notice might well be futile were identified by a Dr Tripodi in a memo dated 7 July 2015.[32]  He is a scientist within the State Department of Science, Information Technology and Innovation and his works were checked by and provided through Dr Mann, the Principal Scientist within that department.  Under the heading clean-up notice a number of observations are made:[33]

“Although WAS does not possess the relevant expertise to address this matter in any detail, we nonetheless advise caution, in that:

  • the requirements under Notice represent a massive undertaking that may not be fully appreciated by DEHP at the present time;
  • according to the information provided in the 2000 GeoCoastal Report, the presence of the ASS-related impacts upon receiving waters around Palm Meadows is the result of historical ignorance and government encouragement, and this Notice may lead to court action against it;
  • requiring the client to install aeration devices, without any supporting evidence indicating whether or not they will actually be effective in mitigating the impacts to a sufficient level to avert (at least some) further incidents, represents a high risk to the delegate;
  • …

Recommendation: it is strongly recommended that DEHP delay issuing the Clean-up Notice until further expert evidence and investigation has been carried out.  It is not clear whether such a mitigation approach is even feasible, given the volumes of water that will be passing the dosing points and the contact time between the affected waters and the reagents (air, neutralising agent(s)).  Stronger forms of re-oxygenation might be necessary (e.g. peroxide dosing).  In any event the 2000 GeoCoastal Report recognised that a community effort would be required to support the financial cost of any significant remedial actions.

In any event, it is recommended that if some kind of Notice needs to be issued that it is less prescriptive of the methods and more focussed towards achieving realistic outcomes.  This could involve, for example, a requirement for the client to engage in environmental engineers to assess:

  • volumes of water running off …
  • infrastructure required to mitigate (local?) impacts …
  • feasibility of successfully treating ASS-impacted WQ to acceptable standards …

and propose a strategy; however, as was the case for the 2000 GeoCoastal Report, this may need to be a steered [sic] by a committee of relevant government and commercial stakeholders.” (Original and additional emphasis added).

  1. [60]
    That memo itself makes clear that Dr Tripodi and Dr Mann, both of whom are scientists, had real concerns about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the works proposed in the Notice. Somewhat bizarrely this memo was requested on 10 June 2015 well after the date the Notice was issued. The evidence surrounding this memorandum, in particular the circumstances of it coming into existence, its timing and its consequences (which would appear to have been zero) were far from adequately explained.[34]  At the conclusion of the evidence on this topic I was left with the strong impression that at the very least the respondent chose simply to disregard Dr Tripodi’s advice.
  1. [61]
    In conclusion on this topic it would appear by reference to the evidence of Mr Inonda that the respondent’s primary motivation in issuing the Notice was to be seen to be taking steps to address what occurred at Witt Avenue without any proper regard as to the appropriateness of the Notice being issued. Mr Inonda was the Compliance Delivery Manager of the respondent. On more than one occasion his answer to questions strongly suggested that that was the respondent’s position. By way of examples, when being questioned about whether he had considered whether the appellant had a reasonable excuse not to comply with the Notice the following exchanges took place:

“Q So in the way that you’ve written that there, that suggests to the reader that you were aware that the landowner considered that it did have a defence; is that correct?

A I – it’s correct, yes, but when I was issuing the – the – the clean-up – when I was recommending the clean-up notice, regardless of whoever had done the works was not – to me it wasn’t a reasonable excuse not to comply with the notice.  I was – I was more worried about the contamination incident and what needed to be done to prevent it from happening again.

Q So you formed the view yourself that it wasn’t a reasonable excuse that the land owner hadn’t created the state of affairs that caused the contamination incident?  Is that your position?

A Yes.

…

A Looking at it now, that would have been better, but again, like – like I said before, … it didn’t matter to me who did the works or whether they were done by Hungtat or – or – or Jo Bloke.  My – my main concern was more or less trying to address the issues that were a concern to the community in the Witt Avenue Canal.

…

Q Was it a case that you thought the – solving the problem was the dominant consideration?

A That’s correct, your Honour.

Q Get in and solve it – to get in and fix it?

A Yeah.  That’s correct your Honour.”[35]

  1. [62]
    There can be no doubt that the environmental problems within the subject catchment are a major concern that need to be addressed. If not addressed future and potentially worse contaminant incidents could arise. That said, for the reasons given, the subject clean-up notice ought not to have been issued. It follows therefore that the appeal ought be allowed.
  1. [63]
    Orders
  1. The appeal is allowed.
  2. The clean-up notice dated 7 March 2013 is set aside.
  3. I will hear from the parties as to any consequential orders.
  4. The matter is otherwise adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Footnotes

[1]T1-11 ll 14-25.

[2]Exhibit 15 p 52.

[3]Exhibit 7, Tab 9, pp 181, 182 and 184.

[4]See for example Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 24.

[5]Exhibit 15, Tab 8, para 2.

[6]Exhibit 1 Tab A p 13.

[7]Exhibit 3 at pp 2-5.

[8]See in particular Exhibit 2 at p 8.

[9]Exhibit 1 Tab A at p 2.

[10]Exhibit 3, Appendix 3, p 67.

[11]T3-58 ll 25-28.

[12]T3-59 ll 24-47.

[13]Exhibit 3 pp 16-17, paras 60-61.

[14]The initial references are to Dr Johnson, Mr Stuckey, Mr Smith, Mr Anderson and Mr Sutherland.

[15]Appellant’s written submissions at para 73.

[16](1938) 60 CLR 336.

[17][2010] QPELR 262, 265.

[18][2016] QPELR 179 at 182.

[19][2015] QPELR 157.

[20][2012] QPELR 422.

[21]At p 160.

[22]Respondent’s written submissions at para 2.47.

[23][2016] QPELR 179.

[24]T6-49 ll 13-14.

[25]T6-53 ll 10-14.

[26]Respondent’s written submissions at para 4.74. 

[27]At paras 4.91-4.94. 

[28]See also at T6-53 ll 32-43 and T6-48 ll 21-24.

[29][2015] QPELR 157 at 160 per Rackemann DCJ.

[30]T3-73, l 45-T3-74, l 5.

[31]E.g. T2-56, l 35: T2-59, l 30.

[32]Exhibit 36.

[33]Ibid, pp 4 and 5.

[34]E.g. evidence of Mr Glosko at T4-87.

[35]T5-12, l 45 – T5-13, l 40.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Hungtat Worldwide Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Hungtat Worldwide Pty Ltd v Chief Executive of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection

  • MNC:

    [2017] QPEC 62

  • Court:

    QPEC

  • Judge(s):

    Jones DCJ

  • Date:

    27 Oct 2017

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] ALR 334
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1938] ALR 334
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Cite 2 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Cite 3 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Cuthbert v Moreton Bay Shire Council [2016] QPELR 179
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QPELR 179
Cite 2 - [2016] QPELR 179
Cite 3 - [2016] QPELR 179
Darwen v Pacific Reef Fisheries (Australia) Pty Ltd [2010] QPELR 262
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QPELR 262
Cite 2 - [2010] QPELR 262
Gladstone Ports Corporation Ltd v Qld Heritage Council [2012] QPELR 422
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QPELR 422
Cite 2 - [2012] QPELR 422
Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 110 ALR 449
Cite 2 - (1992) 110 ALR 449
Oakley v Chief Executive [2015] QPELR 157
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QPELR 157
Cite 2 - [2015] QPELR 157
Cite 3 - [2015] QPELR 157
Cite 4 - [2015] QPELR 157

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Gold Coast City Council v Adrian's Metal Management Pty Ltd [2018] QPEC 452 citations
1

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