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Moreton Bay Regional Council v Giffin[2022] QPEC 20

Moreton Bay Regional Council v Giffin[2022] QPEC 20

PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Moreton Bay Regional Council v Giffin & Anor [2022] QPEC 20

PARTIES:

MORETON BAY REGIONAL COUNCIL

(applicant)

v

LEE STEWART GIFFIN

(first respondent)

LINDA ANGELA BOYDELL

(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

4/2022

DIVISION:

Planning and Environment Court

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Maroochydore

DELIVERED ON:

16 June 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Marooochydore

HEARING DATE:

9 June 2022

JUDGES:

Long SC DCJ

ORDER:

As per draft.

CATCHWORDS:

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – ORIGINATING APPLICATION – ENFORCEMENT ORDERS – where the first and second respondents own land as joint tenants – where the second respondent owns an adjacent lot in his own right – where both lots are utilised for the purposes of operating an automotive spare parts business by the second respondent – where no development approval had been sought nor granted to permit such use – whether a development offence has been committed – whether discretionary relief is granted

LEGISLATION:

Planning Act 2016, ss 4, 5, 163, 165, 180, 181

CASES:

AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2011] QPELR 626
AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2013] 1 Qd R 1
Bassingthwaighte v Roma Town Council & Ors [2010] QPEC 91

Benfer v Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2019] QPEC 6
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Booth v Yardley [2007] QPELR 229

Caloundra City Council v Taper Pty Ltd and Anor [2003] QPELR 558
Chiefari v Brisbane City Council [2005] QPELR 500
Cuthbert v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2016] QPELR 179
Gold Coast City Council v Adrian’s Metal Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QPEC 45
Gympie Regional Council v Bennett (P&E Application No. 830 of 2017)
Gympie Regional Council v Pye [2016] QPEC 65
Gympie Regional Council v Tregoning (P&E Application No. 118 of 2017)
Livingstone Shire Council v Hooper [2004] QPELR 308
Mudie v Gainriver [2002] 2 Qd R 53
Lockyer Valley Regional Council v MacAndrews Industries Pty Ltd & Ors (P&E Application No. 1330 of 2019)
Project Blue Sky Inv v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
Sunshine Coast Regional Council v Werchon (P&E Application No. 177 of 2015)

Shire of Perth v O'Keefe (1964) 110 CLR 529

Warringah Shire Council v Sedevic [1987] 10 NSWLR 335
Yu v Brisbane City Council [2006] QPELR 102

COUNSEL:

Rix, B for the applicant

SOLICITORS:

Thynne & Macartney Lawyers for the applicant
Koolik & Associates Lawyers for the first respondent

Introduction

  1. [1]
    By originating application filed 4 January 2022, the applicant seeks enforcement orders pursuant to s 180 of the Planning Act 2016 (“PA”). 
  2. [2]
    The proceedings relate to land situated at 546 – 550 Morayfield Road, Burpengary, more particularly described as Lot 5 on RP85776 (“Lot 5”) and Lot 6 on RP85776 (“Lot 6”) (collectively “the land”).
  3. [3]
    Pursuant to s 180(2) of the PA:

“An enforcement order is an order that requires a person to do either or both of the following –

  1. (a)
    refrain from committing a development offence;
  1. (b)
    remedy to the effect of a development offence in a stated way.”
  1. [4]
    Pursuant to s 180(3) this Court may make such an enforcement order if it considers the development offence:
  1. (a)
    has been committed; or
  1. (b)
    will be committed unless the order is made.

Further, and having regard to powers pursuant to s 180(5) of the PA the applicant seeks orders which are directed at the goals of:

  1. (a)
    Stopping or bringing to an end unlawful activity (such as constitutes a development offence); and
  2. (b)
    Having the land returned to the condition it was in prior to the commission of the development offence.
  1. [5]
    The respondents are before the court as the registered proprietors, as joint tenants, of Lot 5, since approximately 11 October 2004,[1] and also in the case of the first respondent, as the sole registered proprietor of Lot 6, since approximately 30 October 2008.[2]
  2. [6]
    The second respondent has filed an affidavit and consistently with the position stated in that affidavit and through her legal representative on the hearing of this application, has indicated an absence of opposition to the draft order sought by the applicant.  It will only be necessary to return to her position in respect of the terms of that order, in one respect. More particularly, her position is explained in terms that:
    1. (a)
      she was formerly in a de facto relationship with the First respondent, commencing such relationship in or around 1994 and separating in February 2011. She provides some confirmation of the use of the land, which is the subject of these proceedings, particularly during the period of the relationship between the Respondents. The second respondent has not been responsible for the day-to-day operations on the land since the time of the separation in February 2011;
    2. (b)
      following the separation, the first respondent has continued to reside at the land and he has had, at all times, full use of the property;[3]
    3. (c)
      she has secured Orders from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia that require that arrangements be made to remove her as an owner of Lot 5. However, that has not, to date, occurred and the second respondent therefore remains an owner, as joint tenant for Lot 5,[4] and someone with control over that part of the land on that basis. Further, this Court has been provided with a sealed copy of the order made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, on 29 March 2022, appointing her as trustee for the sale of the property at 546 Morayfield Road Burpengary and requiring, in part, that the first respondent:

“ … do all things necessary to provide vacant possession  to the Trustee …. within 30 days after the request to do so by the wife”.

  1. [7]
    However, not only has the first respondent (who acted for himself in these proceedings) not filed any written material to be relied upon,[5] but on the hearing of the matter he, it must be said, largely failed to take the opportunities offered to him to address the Court as to any relevant considerations in respect of any opposition to the orders that are sought.  Notwithstanding this and having regard to the litany of complaints aired with the Court, as to his personal circumstances, his engagement with various authorities in respect of issues relating to his land and business interests and in respect of legal proceedings involving he and his former partner, it is apparent that he remains personally opposed to the orders sought. But it may also be noted that no particular challenge appeared to be raised as to the factual premise upon which the application is based and, in many respects, the first respondent incidentally acknowledged many of those facts.
  2. [8]
    At the outset it may be noted that despite the originating application seeking orders upon the alternative bases of identification of development offences pursuant to both ss 163 and 165 of the PA, the application is only pressed in relation to the application of s 165 and therefore upon the basis that the Court would ultimately be satisfied that:
    1. (a)
      the present use of the land is one that requires approval and that there being no such extant approval, the use of the land is unlawful;
    2. (b)
      that the uncontested evidence before the court is that the matters the subject of the application have been extant since about 2005, with the respondents being on notice about the contended unlawfulness of the activities and the need to either obtain approval or cease the activities, since at least December 2010;[6]
    3. (c)
      that the activities are ongoing and the unlawful use of the land is ongoing; and
    4. (d)
      the respondents have been given sufficient time to remedy matters without intervention of the Court, with the need now for an order to require the use to cease and the land to be remediated.

The Evidence

  1. [9]
    Particularly having regard to the history of the use of the land predating the introduction of the PA, on 3 July 2022, the evidence as to the history of the use of the land is largely relied upon as being contextual to an understanding of the evidence as to the present and ongoing use of the land. An appropriate summary of that evidence is provided in the applicant’s written submission,[7] as follows:
    1. (a)
      In about 1999, the first respondent began to conduct an automotive spare parts business on premises located at Lot 1 Dickson Road, Caboolture (i.e. not the land presently in question) under the business name 'Japanese 4x4 Spares and Repairs';[8]
    2. (b)
      In about 2002, the first respondent moved his automotive spare parts business to operate from premises located at 20 Reynolds Court, Burpengary and then, sometime thereafter, to 38 Kayleigh Road, Maroochydore;[9]
    3. (c)
      Sometime after the first respondent and second respondent purchased Lot 5 (that purchase occurring in late 2004), the first respondent moved his automotive spare parts business and commenced operating the business from Lot 5.[10] The historical aerial imagery, to hand, suggests that the use may have been operating (or at least preparations were underway to commence operations) from the land in January 2005,[11] and that the use certainly was operating by September 2009;[12]
    4. (d)
      Consistent with the above suggestion of the use of the land commencing in about 2005, from July 2005 through to 2021 the Council has received complaints from local residents with respect to the use of the land, including complaints that are clearly related to the use in question in this proceeding;[13]
    5. (e)
      The first respondent purchased Lot 6 in about October 2008 and eventually expanded the operation of his automotive spare parts business over both Lots 5 and 6;[14]
    6. (f)
      On or about 2 December 2010 the Council issued a Show Cause Notice to the First and second respondents asserting that Council reasonably believed that a development offence was being carried out on Lot 5, as it was being used for the storage of over 40 vehicles, a use which Council considered was assessable development (the use of Storage Facility) under its planning scheme as in force at the time (being the immediate predecessor to the current planning scheme).[15]
    7. (g)
      On or about 14 April 2011, the Council issued an Enforcement Notice to the First and second respondents in relation to the matters outlined in paragraph (f) above;[16]
    8. (h)
      On or about 22 January 2013 the Council issued a Show Cause Notice to the First and second respondents asserting that Council reasonably believed that a development offence was being carried out on Lot 5 as it was being used for the sale, repair, fitting of accessories, storage and wrecking of between 40 and 60 vehicles, uses which Council considered were assessable development under its planning scheme as in force at the time and that use being carried out in the absence of a requisite development approval thereby constituted a development offence within the meaning of the then current SPA;[17]
    9. (i)
      On or about 23 April 2013 the Council issued an Enforcement Notice to the first and second respondents in relation to the matters outlined in (h) above;[18]
    10. (j)
      On or about 19 September 2013 the Council issued an Enforcement Notice to the first and second respondents asserting that Council reasonably believed that a development offence was being carried out on Lot 5 as it was being used for the sale, repair, fitting of accessories, storage and wrecking of between 40 and 60 vehicles, uses which Council considered were assessable development under its planning scheme as in force at the time and that use being carried out in the absence of a requisite development approval thereby constituted a development offence within the meaning of the then current SPA;[19]
    11. (k)
      On or about 29 January 2015 the Council issued a Show Cause Notice to the first respondent asserting that Council reasonably believed that a development offence was being carried out on Lot 6 as it was being used for the storage of vehicles associated with the business being carried out on Lot 5, a use which Council considered was assessable development (the use of Storage Facility) under its planning scheme as in force at the time and that use being carried out in the absence of a requisite development approval thereby constituted a development offence within the meaning of the then current SPA;[20]
    12. (l)
      The historical aerial imagery that is available to the Court reveals that the number of vehicles present on the land has increased over time;[21]
    13. (m)
      Inspections of the land on 10 March 2022 and 11 March 2022 revealed that, inter alia:[22]
      1. signage at the front of the land advertised ‘Japanese 4x4 Spares & Repairs’;
      2. multiple vehicles (in the order of 50 or more) and vehicle parts in various states of repair and disrepair were present on the land;
      3. equipment (including a truck and forklift) and a shipping container with a vehicle on it were also present on the land (such equipment and shipping container clearly forming part of the ongoing use).
  2. [10]
    The land has an area of 2.1709Ha and is located and contained within the Council’s local government area and within the bounds of the area governed by the Council’s current Moreton Bay Regional Council Planning Scheme 2016 (the Planning Scheme), which identifies that the land is included in the Emerging Community Zone. Moreover, the land has fallen within that zone since the commencement of the current Planning Scheme on 1 February 2016.[23]
  3. [11]
    The land is not benefited by any development approval for building works, operational works or for a material change of use.[24]
  4. [12]
    The first respondent and second respondent have been the registered owners of Lot 5, as joint tenants, since 11 October 2004.[25] The first respondent has been the registered owner of Lot 6 since 30 October 2008.[26] Since February 2011 the first respondent has been solely responsible for the day-to-day operations on all of the Land.[27]

Unlawful Use

  1. [13]
    Except as context for the evidence as to the current and ongoing use of the land, it is unnecessary, given the ultimate approach of the applicant to dwell on any this evidence to the extent it may suggest any change of use of the land, material or otherwise.  In respect of the development offence, which is alleged here, particular emphasis is therefore placed upon the evidence of:
    1. (a)
      Aerial Images of the Land that capture the land from 2002 and the evolving use between 2005 to 2021;[28]
    2. (b)
      Business and company extracts for 'Japanese 4x4 Spares and Repairs', as well as associated Facebook and Google searches, which indicate a business by that name has previously and still is operating from the land;[29] and
    3. (c)
      The Affidavits of Hattersley and Konarski,[30] which speaks to the status of the land and its ongoing use at the time of the last inspection, in March 2022.
  2. [14]
    As to the legal framework, it is to be noted that the Court’s powers to make enforcement orders are derived from sections 180 and 181 of the PA and that these are ultimately exercised as a matter of discretion. The discretion to do so, arises only upon satisfaction that a development offence has been committed or will be committed unless the order is made,[31] and particularly having regard to this necessity, it is recognised that such satisfaction requires application of the reasoning discussed in Briginshaw v Briginshaw.[32] Moreover and as some explanation for the approach of the applicant here, it has been recognised that these powers are referable only to development offences established as occurring after the commencement of the PA.[33]
  3. [15]
    The first issue is as to the characterisation of that present and ongoing use. The proper characterisation of a use is a matter which has been addressed by the Court on numerous occasions. Some key propositions may be summarised as follows:
    1. (a)
      The appropriate question to ask is what, according to ordinary terminology, is the appropriate designation of the purpose best served by the use of the premises;[34]
    2. (b)
      In relation to planning schemes, a use must be categorised in a practical and common sense way to determine the appropriate genus which describes the activities in question;[35]
    3. (c)
      Where there are two or more defined uses which are apt to cover a particular proposal, an approach which applies accepted principles of statutory construction is necessary, including as to any approach described as finding the “best fit”;[36] and
    4. (d)
      Where conflict appears to arise in a planning scheme, it must be alleviated as far as possible by adjustments which best give effect to the purpose and language of the provisions, while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions.[37]
  4. [16]
    Here the Court is assisted by the evidence of a Town Planner, Mr Mewing, who expresses views that:[38]
    1. (a)
      The activities occurring on the site are able to be identified as including one or more of the uses defined as “Warehouse”, “Outdoor Sales”, “Low Impact Industry”, and “Medium Impact Industry”, under the current Planning Scheme;
    2. (b)
      Under the current Planning Scheme each of these uses triggers assessable development and, more specifically, impact assessment. A publicly notifiable development application (and approval) is required for any such use being undertaken from the land at present; and
    3. (c)
      The superseded and historic planning schemes that were in force at various times prior to the commencement of the current Planning Scheme in February 2016 (when the land was similarly used) also identify that the activities occurring on the site could not have been lawfully established without a development approval being granted by Council.
  5. [17]
    Upon review of it and the material upon which it relies, that evidence should be accepted. As the applicant contends, put another way, the demonstrated use of the land has always and under all relevant planning schemes in force over its history, required a development approval. As noted in the CEO Certificate, no such approval has ever been obtained. In these circumstances, there is a proper basis established (factually and legally) for granting the relief sought by the applicant in respect of a current unlawful use of the premises, pursuant to s 165 PA, without any necessity to identify any more precise use of the land or point of material change of use of the land, including by any increase in scale or intensity of activity. Neither was there anything raised by the second respondent to deny that such use is ongoing. In fact what he did say, albeit from the bar table, as to his removal of some of the items, in issue, from the land, and his protestations as to where he would be able to take other items, was correctly noted for the applicant to amount to acknowledgement of the ongoing and therefore, unlawful, use of the land.
  6. [18]
    In these circumstances the Court is satisfied, to the necessary extent, having regard to the nature of the evidence relied upon and effect of the finding, that the development offence has been and is continuing to be committed.

Discretionary Matters

  1. [19]
    The relief sought by the Council is discretionary in nature.[39] The guidelines for the exercise of this discretion, as identified in the decision of Warringah Shire Council v Sedevic,[40] have been expressly approved by the Queensland Court of Appeal,[41] and applied in this Court on numerous occasions.[42] In particular, there is  there is a useful summary of the broadly applicable principles Glastonbury & Anor v Townsville City Council & Ors:[43]
  2. [20]
    It should be accepted, as contended for the applicant, that the following considerations particularly favour an exercise of discretion to grant the relief sought:
    1. (a)
      this proceeding is brought by a Council, which is a publicly elected body rather than a private individual (or competitor) whose interests in the proceeding encompass the good order and good governance of the locality, including in respect of the governance of assessable development in that locality;
    2. (b)
      there has been some public concern raised as to the use, as reflected is in receipt, by the Council, of complaints with respect to the activities on the land;
    3. (c)
      the use in question is industrial in nature. Whilst there is no evidence of environmental impacts, the nature of the use, particularly where it is unregulated by development approval and controls, makes such impacts a real possibility (if not now, then in the future);[44]
    4. (d)
      the Respondents have been well aware of the issues for some time. It cannot fairly be said that the Council has rushed to Court as an early step or not sought to provide the Respondents with time to get their affairs in order. The Respondents have chosen not to lodge any development application(s) or bring the use in question to an end despite being given what can only be described as an ample opportunity to do so. To the contrary, the evidence suggests of an increase in the scale and intensity of the use, over time;
    5. (e)
      similarly, there ought be no adverse inference against the Council with respect to any suggestion of delay. To the contrary, the elapsed time since the issues first arose is, fairly, indicative only of the Council giving the Respondents time to remedy their conduct before taking the step of this Court proceeding;

Further, these considerations must also be considered in light of the general proposition that planning laws should be enforced and offending conduct redressed, with a particular importance on sending a strong message that the contravention of planning laws will not be tolerated.[45]

Consequential Relief 

  1. [21]
    The nature of the consequential relief sought by the Council may be accepted as relatively uncontroversial and reasonable, in the circumstances of this case.  That is in terms of requirements to:
    1. (a)
      cease the unlawful use of the land;
    2. (b)
      remove the vehicles and vehicle parts associated with that unlawful use (whilst not interfering with the ability to keep two personal vehicles on site);
    3. (c)
      remove the shipping containers that are being used as part of the unlawful use (their removal therefore properly falling within the ambit of a remediation of the unlawful use);
    4. (d)
      see the land otherwise returned, as close as is practicable, to the state it was in prior to the use commencing (such state being apparent from the aerial images that are in evidence before the Court in this proceeding and involving, in effect, nothing more than grass where the vehicles, shipping containers and other items associated with the use are presently located);
    5. (e)
      see the matters set out in (b), (c) and (d), above, occurring within a reasonable (but not unacceptably long) period of time, being eight weeks from the date of the Order. That is, in a permissive and not unnecessarily prescriptive sense, in allowing the Respondents to arrange these matters in whatever way is most appropriate for them, in the circumstances. In this respect the time period suggested may be seen as also supported by and appropriate to the efficacy of the extant order made most recently in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, on 29 March 2022; and
    6. (f)
      permit Council officers to come and inspect the land in two (and only two) defined periods, both being after the time in which the use should have ceased, the items associated with the use should have been removed and the land should have been remediated (those time periods being eight and ten weeks from the time of the Order).
  2. [22]
    Such relief is both:
    1. (a)
      Consistent with the nature of relief that can and is regularly granted in proceedings such as these;[46] and

Appropriate, in the particular circumstances of this case.

Footnotes

[1]CEO Certificate, CD No. 22, at para. [1] and Ex. GC-01.

[2]Ibid, at para. [3] and Ex. GC-02.

[3]Affidavit of Linda Angela Boydell, at para. [15].

[4]CEO Certificate, para. [1] and Ex. GC-01.

[5]As was the direction of the Court, on 25/2/22.

[6]See CEO Certificate at p. 3. Ex. GC-03.

[7]The second respondent himself made reference to much of this essential history in the course of his addresses to the Court upon the hearing of this application, on 9/6/22.

[8]Affidavit of Antony Calligeros (CD 16), Exhibit APC-10.

[9]Affidavit of Antony Calligeros (CD 16), Exhibit APC-10.

[10]Affidavit of Antony Calligeros (CD 16), Exhibit APC-10.

[11]Certificates pursuant to s 131(2) Survey and Mapping Infrastructure Act 2003, CDs 6 and 7.

[12]Certificate pursuant to s 131(2) Survey and Mapping Infrastructure Act 2003, CD 3.

[13]Affidavit of Richard Konarski (CD 18), para. [8] and Exhibit RJK-03.

[14]Certificates pursuant to s 131(2) Survey and Mapping Infrastructure Act 2003, CD 3 and CD 4.

[15]CEO Certificate, pp. 3-5 and Affidavit of Leo Mewing (CD 20).

[16]CEO Certificate, pp. 6-10.

[17]CEO Certificate, para. [13] and pp. 11-19. 

[18]CEO Certificate, pp. 20-28.

[19]CEO Certificate, para. [13] and pp. 29-37.

[20]CEO Certificate, para. [13] and pp. 38-40.

[21]Certificates pursuant to s 131(2) Survey and Mapping Infrastructure Act 2003, CDs 3-9.

[22]Affidavits of Shane Hattersley (CD 17) and Richard Konarski (CD 18).

[23]CEO’s Certificate, para. [6].

[24]CEO’s Certificate, para. [13].

[25]CEO’s Certificate, p. 1.

[26]CEO’s Certificate, p. 2.

[27]Affidavit of Linda Angela Boydell (CD 14), at [14] – [15].

[28]Certificates pursuant to s 131(2) Survey and Mapping Infrastructure Act 2003, CDs 3-9.

[29]Affidavit of Antony Calligeros (CD 16).

[30]CD 17 and CD 18.

[31]s 180(3)(a) and (b) of the PA.

[32](1938) 60 CLR 336. See: (for example) Gympie Regional Council v Pye [2016] QPEC 65 at [49], Cuthbert v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2016] QPELR 179 and Gold Coast City Council v Adrian’s Metal Management Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QPEC 45 at [31].

[33]Benfer v Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2019] QPEC 6, at [178].

[34]Shire of Perth v O'Keefe (1964) 110 CLR 529, at 535.

[35]Yu v Brisbane City Council [2006] QPELR 102, at [16], Bassingthwaighte v Roma Town Council & Ors [2010] QPEC 91, at [23] – [24].

[36]Livingstone Shire Council v Hooper [2004] QPELR 308, at [14]-[16], Chiefari v Brisbane City Council [2005] QPELR 500, at [23]-[24], Yu v Brisbane City Council [2006] QPELR 102, at [16], AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2011] QPELR 626, at [23] and [30] and cf: AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2013] 1 Qd R 1, at [45]-[49] and [72]-[73].

[37]Project Blue Sky Inv v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, at[70], as specifically noted in AAD Design Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2013] 1 Qd R 1, at [72].

[38]Affidavits of Leo Mewing (CD 19 and 20).

[39]Mudie v Gainriver [2002] 2 Qd R 53, at 58-59, Warringah Shire Council v Sedevic [1987] 10 NSWLR 335. 

[40][1987] 10 NSWLR 335.

[41]Mudie v Gainriver [2002] 2 Qd R 53, at 58-59.

[42]See, for example, Gympie Regional Council v Pye [2016] QPEC 65, Caloundra City Council v Taper Pty Ltd and Anor [2003] QPELR 558 at [581] - [582]. 

[43][2011] QPEC 128, at [131].

[44]In this respect, it may be noted that the purposes of the PA, which are relevant to the exercise of the Court’s powers in this proceeding include:

  1. (a)Achieving ecological sustainability through “a variety of offences and enforcement arrangements”; and
  1. (b)Following ethical decision-making processes that… apply the precautionary principle, namely that the lack of full scientific certainty is not a reason for delaying taking a measure to prevent degradation of the environment if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage.

See: PA, s 4(i) and s 5(2)(a)(ii). 

[45]Caloundra City Council v Taper Pty Ltd and Anor [2003] QPELR 558, Booth v Yardley [2007] QPELR 229.

[46]For example, see the substantive relief granted by this Court in Sunshine Coast Regional Council v Werchon (P&E Application No. 177 of 2015), Gympie Regional Council v Tregoning (P&E Application No. 118 of 2017), Gympie Regional Council v Bennett (P&E Application No. 830 of 2017) and Lockyer Valley Regional Council v MacAndrews Industries Pty Ltd & Ors (P&E Application No. 1330 of 2019).

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Moreton Bay Regional Council v Giffin & Anor

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Moreton Bay Regional Council v Giffin

  • MNC:

    [2022] QPEC 20

  • Court:

    QPEC

  • Judge(s):

    Long SC DCJ

  • Date:

    16 Jun 2022

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

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