Moule v Cambooya Shire Council
[2004] QSC 50
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- Unreported Judgment
- Moule v Cambooya Shire Council[2004] QSC 50
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Moule v Cambooya Shire Council[2004] QSC 50
Moule v Cambooya Shire Council[2004] QSC 50
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Moule v Cambooya Shire Council and Anor [2004] QSC 050 |
PARTIES: | BARRY ANTHONY BRUCE MOULE |
FILE NO: | BS 2484 of 2004 |
DIVISION: | Trial Division |
PROCEEDING: | Originating application |
DELIVERED ON: | 19 March 2004 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 18 March 2004 |
JUDGE: | Fryberg J |
ORDER: | Application dismissed |
CATCHWORDS: | HIGHWAYS – Structures – Whether removal of election signs was lawful LOCAL GOVERNMENT – Powers, functions and duties of councils generally – Powers over advertising signs and hoardings – Extent of power – Whether council had power to remove election signs exhibited on land under its control (Control of Signs) Local Law No 8 (Cambooya Shire Council) (Control of Signs) Subordinate Law No 8 (Cambooya Shire Council) Local Government Act 1993, ss 854AA, 901 |
COUNSEL: | P J Lyons QC for the applicant M D Hinson SC for the respondents |
SOLICITORS: | Bernays Lawyers for the applicant Connor O'Meara for the respondents |
- FRYBERG J: The Shire of Cambooya is situated at the eastern edge of the Darling Downs. It stretches from Toowoomba in the north almost to Warwick in the south. It has an area of approximately 630 square kilometres and a population of approximately 5300. In 1914 its inaugural Council chairman was a former clerk in the Registry of this Court and one-time Under-Sheriff of Queensland, Arthur Hoey Davis, better known as the author Steele Rudd. Like all (or almost all) local governments in Queensland, it is to hold quadrennial elections[1] on 27 March, eight days from now. Residents will be voting for the office of Mayor and for two councillors in two of the three divisions which compromise the Shire. Nominations for these offices closed on 27 February, so it has been a short campaign. Unlike many other local government areas, Cambooya Shire is conducting its election by postal ballot only.[2]
- The applicant, Mr Moule, is one of the three candidates for Mayor. The second respondent, Mr Slader, is by virtue of his position as Chief Executive Officer of the Council (the first respondent) the returning officer for the election.[3] On the weekend before last, 6-7 March, Mr Moule and his supporters erected electoral signs on a number of roads within the Shire in support of his candidacy. The roads were both main roads and local roads (or, to use the language of the Parliament, State-controlled roads under the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994[4] and local government roads[5]). This produced an immediate response from Mr Slader. He sent Mr Moule an e-mail which concluded, "You are required to remove those signs that have been installed in the road reserve otherwise Council will remove them." No time for removal was stated.
- Mr Moule did not comply with Mr Slader's requirement. He responded on the evening of Sunday 7 March with a somewhat argumentative e-mail. Next day, Council officers began removing some of the signs. That provoked a letter from Mr Moule's solicitors, Bernays Lawyers, to Mr Slader. So far as is presently relevant they wrote:
“Our client considers this a gross denial of procedural fairness. It is completely unreasonable for you as the Shire Returning Officer to require a candidate to remove numerous signs spread over the Shire immediately and without providing such Candidate with a reasonable period of time to remove his signs.
Having received our advice, our client accepts that the By-Law is clear in relation to the positioning of signs. The By-Law is silent as to what amount of time you as the Division Officer are required to give our client in to remove his signs. In the circumstances, a reasonable period of time is appropriate and certainly the 12 hours from the time when our client responded to your e-mail is appropriate.
We are further instructed to request the following:-
…
- That those signs which have been removed from State controlled roads (and which do not fall within the ambit of the By-Laws) be immediately returned to the positions from where they have been removed.
…
Finally, we are instructed to request that you place this letter before Council and to consider same to be a formal request under the relevant By-Law for consent by the Council for our client to place signs on relevant road reserves. Given the period of time between now and the election date, we trust a response to this application will be provided urgently.”
- Mr Slader immediately referred that letter to the Council's solicitors, Connor O'Meara. They responded to Bernays. They asserted that the erection of the signs within road reserves was a clear contravention of (Control of Signs) Local Law No 8 and (by implication) of the Main Roads Department's conditions for election signs, and enclosed copies of those documents.
- On 10 March the signs which had been removed were returned to Mr Moule. On the same day Bernays wrote to Mr Slader drawing his attention to s 854AA of the Local Government Act 1993. They asserted that to the extent that Local Law No 8 prohibited the placement of election signs or posters it was of no effect, and made other somewhat extravagant claims which are understandable only in the superheated atmosphere of an election. They threatened an application to the court unless the signs were reinstated by 5 pm that day.
- The signs were not reinstated and on the following day Connor O'Meara wrote to Bernays. They asserted that Local Law No 8 was regulatory and did not constitute a prohibition in relation to the placement of election signs. They advised that they had asked the Council to treat Bernays' letter of 8 March "as an application for an approval". The evidence discloses no further contact between the parties before the commencement of proceedings.
- On the day before yesterday, Wednesday 17 March, Mr Moule issued an originating application returnable instanter. Although the applications list was full, I consented to its listing on the ground of urgency. He appeared before me represented by senior counsel. The Council and Mr Slader had apparently been given informal notice of the application and Mr Connor appeared on their behalf. He applied successfully for a 24-hour adjournment to enable counsel to be briefed. Yesterday the matter was brought on urgently for hearing. The hearing occupied most of the day. The factors indicating urgency in bringing the matter on also indicate the need for judgment to be delivered quickly.
The application
- The application seeks the following substantive relief:
“1.A Declaration that Section 6 of Local Law no 8 (Control of signs) of the Cambooya Shire Council is invalid having regard to the provisions of Section 854AA of the Local Government Act 1993;
2.A further Declaration that the removal of electoral signs of the Applicant by employees of the First Respondent was unlawful;
3.An order requiring the Respondents to reinstate the signs removed illegally.”
The relevant law
- Relevant statutory provisions are annexed to these reasons for judgment.
The parties’ submissions
- The primary submission advanced on behalf of the applicant by Mr Lyons QC related to para 1 of the application. It was that in substance s 6 of Local Law No 8, read in context and with (Control of Signs) Subordinate Local Law No 8, prohibited the placing of electoral signs on all roads in the Shire. It was therefore a local law prohibiting in the Shire the placement of election signs for elections of the types described in s 854AA(1) of the Local Government Act 1993, with the consequence that, although valid when first enacted, since the coming into force of s 854AA(2) it was of no effect. It could not be saved by severing other parts of the legislation (eg ss 4(1)(g) and (h) of the subordinate local law) because once they were severed it would operate differently from how it was originally intended to operate.
- I should record at this point that the challenge to the local law was based solely on s 854AA. Mr Lyons conceded that apart from that section the law would be the product of a valid exercise of the Council's legislative power under the Local Government Act 1993. He also expressly disclaimed any challenge on the basis of a constitutional implication[6]. He was doubtless concerned at the delay which would result from any need to comply with s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
- As to para 2 of the application Mr Lyons submitted that the removal of the signs was unlawful unless some statutory power permitted it. The power in s 17(1)(a) of the local law clearly falls with the rest of the local law. Paragraphs (b) and (c) of that provision are either limited to signs capable of being licensed under the law; or have to be read down so as to avoid conflict with the purpose of s 854AA. That means that the power cannot be exercised to remove a sign the placement of which could not be prohibited by a local law. The same process of reading down must be applied to s 901 of the Local Government Act 1993. The power conferred by that section is cut down by the subsequent enactment of s 854AA.
- For the respondents, Mr Hinson SC submitted that s 854AA forbids only local laws containing a prohibition; it does not affect the Council's undoubted power to regulate election signs. The latter necessarily involves some restriction or prohibition of aspects of the regulated activity. "Prohibiting" in the section means "entirely and unconditionally suppressing". That construction is consistent with the purpose of the section as disclosed in the Explanatory Note. Section 6 of the local law regulates the placement of election signs; it does not entirely and unconditionally suppress them. Alternatively, if there is any contrariety between it and s 854AA, it is removed by reading down the local law to exclude the operation of ss 4(1)(g) and (h) of Subordinate Local Law No 8.
- Further, the removal of the signs is justified even if the local law be of no effect. By statute the Council has control of local government roads. This includes a power to take all necessary steps for regulation of the use of roads in its area. In taking those steps it has all the power of an individual and may do the things necessary or convenient to be done. The Council is empowered to remove a sign exhibited on land under its control without its approval by s 17(1)(c) of the local law. It is empowered to exercise for a State-controlled road in its area all powers that it may exercise for a local government road in its area.
- It is easiest to deal first with the submissions relating to para 2 of the application.
The power to remove signs
- At common law the soil of a highway to the mid-way line is vested in the owner of the land abutting the highway[7]. However the public has a right of way to pass and repass over the highway; that right entitles members of the public to make reasonable and ordinary use of the highway.[8] Use of the highway in a manner which exceeds the bounds of that right can constitute a trespass against the owner or person in possession of the abutting land.[9] Activities incidental to the right of way are within the ambit of the right. “[T]hese include the distribution of leaflets, market research, carol singing, Morris dancing, carnival parades and flag selling.”[10] Another permitted activity is participating in a procession.[11] In the time available I have found no case in which it has been held that the right of way permits the erection of a sign on the road. No such case was cited to me. It is unlikely that such a case exists. A sign would not ordinarily be associated with passing or repassing on a road. If anything it may constitute an obstruction; if it does it may amount to a public nuisance.[12] In my judgment the right to use a road does not authorise the erection of a sign on the road. Doing that requires permission. It follows that erection of a sign without permission will prima facie constitute a trespass.
- In Queensland the common law has been modified. Here, ownership of roads is vested in the Crown.[13] Consequently, but for statutory modification of the position, a person who wished lawfully to erect a sign on a road would have to get permission from the Crown. (Although trespass is designed to protect rights of possession, the Crown has not in terms parted with that right.) The incidents of ownership have however been modified by statute. Control of roads as defined in the Schedule to the Local Government Act 1993 is given to the local government of the area in which the roads lie.[14] Roads as so defined include everything which could conceivably be a road except a State-controlled road. That exception may be put to one side for the moment.
- The ambit of the power of control is not defined by the act. It expressly includes regulation of the use of roads[15], but presumably this refers to the lawful use of roads. Practical considerations suggest that the concept of control includes the power to grant permission for the erection of a sign on a road. The power is comprehended by "control". The Council is not required to promulgate a decree or make an announcement on the subject; a fortiori it need not enact a local law. Apart from s 901 of the act its position is relevantly no less empowered than that of any other person.[16] It also has jurisdiction to ensure the good rule and government of its area.[17] It may approve the erection of a sign because the Local Government Act 1993 confers on it one of the powers of the person in lawful possession of the land comprising the road.
- If a stranger places a sign on a road without approval, the legal position depends upon the manner of placement. If the sign becomes a fixture ownership of it vests in the Crown as owner of the land. As between the Crown and the local government, the right to deal with the fixture would depend upon the interpretation of "control" in the act; but the stranger who placed it would ordinarily have no rights in respect of it. In particular, he would have no right to insist that it remain where he left it. If the sign does not become a fixture the position is more complicated. Interfering with it may at common law constitute a trespass.[18] But whatever doubt may exist at common law as to the right of the local government to deal with the sign vanishes to the extent that there is a power conferred by statute to remove it.
- That is the position in the present case. The Council has an express power to remove a sign exhibited on land under its control without its approval.[19] That power does not depend on whether or not the sign is a fixture. It is not directed specifically at unlicensed signs. They are covered by another provision.[20] I reject the submission to the contrary: the use of the word “Enforcement” in the heading to Part 4 (which contains s 17) does not persuade me. Sections 17(1)(b) and (c) of the local law are independent powers designed to deal respectively with risky signs and signs on land under the Council's control. That becomes clear once it is appreciated that the local law does more than establish a licensing regime.[21] Mr Lyons submitted that s 2 of the law, which sets out its objects, is limited to such a regime. I do not so read it, either in terms or in substance.
- Mr Lyons further submitted that the power of control conferred by s 901 of the Act and the power of removal conferred by s 17 of the local law must be read subject to s 854AA. That section was inserted into the Act by s 19 of the Local Government and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003. Because it was later in time it must, he submitted, prevail over earlier legislation, particularly subordinate legislation. The purpose of the section was to prevent local governments from prohibiting the erection of election signs.[22] Any power of removal which permitted that was, he submitted, impliedly modified.
- The first difficulty with this argument is that s 17(1)(c) is not a law prohibiting the placement of election signs or posters. It is a law permitting their removal. That is more than just a semantic difference. The conduct authorised by the local law is completely different from that prohibited by the act and it is performed by a different actor. The difference between the sections is one of substance. The second difficulty is that what is forbidden by s 854AA is a law prohibiting the placement of election signs. Section 17(1)(c) should not be characterised as one whose object is election signs, any more than s 17(1)(b) should be so characterised. Those paragraphs provide for the removal of unauthorised signs and risky signs respectively. It is improbable that Parliament intended to forbid enactment of such laws. Its purpose was to make clear a prohibition "based on the High Court's decisions in a number of cases about the implied constitutional freedom of communication in relation to political matters."[23] Although the point was not addressed by counsel, it is unlikely that the constitutional freedom would be impaired by such local laws.[24] They do not conflict with the purpose of the amendment.
- These difficulties are I think insuperable. In my judgment, insofar as it applies to roads, s 17(1)(c) of Local Law No 8 is not rendered ineffective by s 854AA of the Local Government Act 1993. (I have not considered the position in relation to so much of s 17(1)(c) as applies to “public places”. That term is very widely defined and includes some privately-owned land.)
- What is the position with respect to State-controlled roads? The Council may by statute exercise all powers for such a road that it may exercise for a local government road in its area.[25] There is no reason why that power should not include the power of removal conferred by s 17(1)(c).
- Before me both sides assumed that none of Mr Moule’s signs had Council approval. That has not been clearly demonstrated on the evidence. It may be so; but if, for example, any of the signs erected on State-controlled roads complied with the Main Roads Department document "Conditions for Election Signs in the Road Reserve" it is arguable that it was approved. It must be remembered that approval in this context refers to permission at common law, not a licence under the local law. Because the parties did not raise that point or lead evidence on it I take it no further. The Council has been asked by its solicitors to treat Bernays’ letter of 8 March as an application for approval and intends to deal with it at the earliest possible opportunity. There is no suggestion that it has been guilty of any undue delay.
- Mr Moule has not shown that the removal of his electoral signs was unlawful. The relief sought in para 2 of the application must be refused. Consequentially, so must that sought in para 3.
Effectiveness of s 6 of the local law
- Mr Moule seeks a declaration that s 6 of the local law is invalid. I take that to mean a declaration that it is of no effect. He presses for that relief even if he fails in respect of paras 2 and 3 of the application. It is difficult to see what utility there would be in making such a declaration. It cannot pre-empt a prosecution for breach of s 6, because the Council offered an undertaking at the hearing not to prosecute; and in any event, I doubt if it would be proper to make a declaration for this purpose. Mr Lyons argued that the question of the effectiveness on the law was important in the affairs of the Shire, particularly having regard to Mr Moule's candidacy. He submitted that it would be a shame to waste the substantial argument so carefully prepared and addressed to me. There is force in that submission. I have been greatly assisted by the arguments of counsel on both sides (although I suspect that each would concede that his submissions could be improved with more time to work on them), and one does not like to waste costs. Moreover, the question is an interesting one.
- Despite these considerations I have come to the conclusion that I should not embark on a consideration of it. It is a complicated and difficult question. It involves analysis of the scheme presented by the local law and subordinate local law; consideration of the numerous, not easily reconciled cases in which the distinction between regulation and prohibition is drawn; consideration of the relevance of those cases to a statutory provision which, unusually, forbids a prohibition rather than empowers regulation or prohibition; and a determination of whether the local law does amount to a prohibition and if so of what. It would be necessary to examine s 21 of the Statutory Instruments Act 1992 and a number of cases on reading down statutes. It would also be necessary to analyse s 854AA, to identify the significance of the phrase "in its area" (contrast s 854A) and to determine how extensive is the power removed from the jurisdiction of the local government. All of this would have to be done in a rush, for a declaration after the election would be unlikely to be useful to Mr Moule or anyone else. I am sitting in the applications list for another week. I do not have the time. Any benefits which Mr Moule might gain from a successful application are too remote and transient to warrant dislocating other litigants by coming out of the list.
- A declaration is a discretionary remedy. It may be refused if it would lack utility. In the present case, a declaration would have little utility; and proper consideration of the issues would not be possible in the time available without serious disruption to other litigants. In these circumstances it should be refused.
- The application is dismissed. I shall hear the parties on costs.
ANNEXURE
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Local Government Act 1993
25 Jurisdiction of local government
Each local government has jurisdiction (the “jurisdiction of local government”) to make local laws for, and otherwise ensure, the good rule and government of, its territorial unit.
36 General powers
(1) A local government has, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, all the powers of an individual.
(2) A local government may, for example—
…
(d)do other things necessary or convenient to be done in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
…
(4) A local government may exercise its powers inside and outside its territorial unit.
854A No jurisdiction to make local laws and subordinate local laws about distributing how-to-vote cards
(1)A local government has no jurisdiction to make a local law or subordinate local law prohibiting or regulating the distribution of how-to-vote cards for an election under this Act or the Electoral Act 1992.
(2)A local law or subordinate local law, to the extent that it is contrary to subsection (1), is of no effect.
(3) In this section—
“how-to-vote card” includes a how-to-vote card under the Electoral Act 1992.
854AA No jurisdiction to make local laws and subordinate local laws prohibiting placement of election signs or posters
(1)A local government has no jurisdiction to make a local law or subordinate local law prohibiting, in its area, the placement of election signs or posters for an election under this Act, the City of Brisbane Act 1924, the Electoral Act 1992 or the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cwlth).
(2)A local law or subordinate local law, to the extent it is contrary to subsection (1), is of no effect.
(3) In this section—
“election signs or posters” means signs or posters that are able, or are intended—
(a) to influence a person about voting at an election; or
(b) to affect the result of an election.
896 Effect of local laws
On commencement, a local law made by a local government has the force of law.
897 Extent to which subordinate local law is binding
(1) A local government’s subordinate local law is binding on the local government.
(2) A local government’s subordinate local law on a matter is, and it is declared always was, binding on anyone else to the extent stated in the local law stating the matter about which the subordinate local law may be made.
899 Local law and subordinate local law presumed to be within jurisdiction
In a proceeding, the competence of a local government to make a particular local law or subordinate local law is presumed unless the issue is raised.
901 Local governments’ control of roads
(1) A local government has control of all roads in its area.
(2) Control of roads includes capacity to take all necessary steps for—
(a)survey and resurvey of roads; and
(b)construction, maintenance and improvement of roads; and
(c)regulation of use of roads; and
(d)regulation of movement of traffic and parking vehicles on roads
….
(4) Regulation of use of roads includes—
(a)requiring, by local law, an owner of land adjoining a road to fence the land to prevent animals escaping from the land onto the road; and
(b)specifying, by local law, the obligations of the owner of the land.
SCHEDULE
“road” means—
(a)an area of land dedicated to public use as a road; or
(b)an area that is open to or used by the public and is developed for, or has as 1 of its main uses, the driving or riding of motor vehicles; or
(c)a bridge, culvert, ferry, ford, tunnel or viaduct; or
(d)a pedestrian or bicycle path; or
(e)a part of an area, bridge, culvert, ferry, ford, tunnel, viaduct or path mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d);
but does not include a State-controlled road under the Transport Infrastructure Act 1994.
Transport Infrastructure Act 1994
45 Management of particular functions on State-controlled roads by local governments
(1) A local government may exercise, for a State-controlled road in its area, all the powers that it may exercise for a local government road in its area.
SCHEDULE 6
“local government road” means a road that is under the control of a local government.
“road”
…
(d) subject to paragraphs (a) to (c), means—
(i)an area of land dedicated to public use as a road; or
(ii)an area that is open to or used by the public and is developed for, or has as 1 of its main uses, the driving or riding of motor vehicles; or
(iii)a bridge, culvert, ferry, ford, tunnel or viaduct; or
(iv)a pedestrian or bicycle path; or
(v)a part of an area, bridge, culvert, ferry, ford, tunnel, viaduct or path mentioned in subparagraphs (i) to (iv).
Land Act 1994
95 Roads vest in the State
The land in all roads dedicated and opened for public use under the following Acts vests in, or remains vested in, the State—
(a) this Act, or an Act repealed by this Act or repealed by the repealed Act;
(b) the Land Title Act 1994.
(Control of Signs) Local Law No. 8 (Cambooya Shire Council)
Objects
2 The objects of this local law are to ensure that signs, advertisements and associated structures within the Area -
(a) compliment [sic] or, at least, do not unreasonably detract from, desirable characteristics of the built and natural environment in which the signs are exhibited; and
(b) are of high quality.
Definitions
3 In this local law:-
“exempt sign” means, subject to section 5.(3) of this local law, a sign classified as an exempt sign under Part 2 of this local law;
“exhibit” includes the doing of any act with respect to the erection, painting, operation, or alteration of a sign;
“sign” means a structure or device which is visible from a road or other public place and which conveys information or directions of any kind (other than a sign or device exhibited pursuant to the authority or requirements of an Act) and the term includes any structure forming part of the sign or to which the sign is attached or on which it is exhibited, which in turn includes a vehicle that is advertised or displayed for sale.
When exhibition permitted
6(1) A sign must not be exhibited in the Area unless -
(a)the sign is an exempt sign; or
(b)the exhibition of the sign is licenced by the Local Government in accordance with this local law.
(2)If a sign is exhibited in contravention of section 6.(1) of this local law, the advertiser is guilty of an offence.
Maximum penalty - 50 penalty units.
(3)If a person is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for the defendant to prove that the sign is exhibited without the defendant’s knowledge or consent.
Removal of unlawful signs
14. (1)If a sign is being exhibited in contravention of this local law, or a condition imposed under this local law, an authorised person may, by written notice to the advertiser, require the advertiser to remove the sign within the time specified in the notice.
(2)The Local Government must withdraw a notice under section 14.(1) of this local law if, within the time allowed for removal of the sign, the advertiser obtains the necessary approval for exhibition of the sign or takes other necessary action to ensure that the sign is lawfully exhibited.
(3) An advertiser must comply with a notice under section 14.(1) of this local law within the time specified in the notice.
Maximum penalty - 50 penalty units.
Local Government's powers on default
16(1)If a person fails to comply with a notice under this Part within the time allowed in the notice, an authorised person may remove and dispose of the sign or take such action that may be necessary to paint out any painted sign.
(2)An authorised person may carry out demolition or other work that may be necessary to remove the sign.
Removal without notice
17 (1) If -
(a)a sign is exhibited in contravention of this local law, or any condition imposed under this local law and there are, in the opinion of an authorised person, adequate reasons for removing the sign immediately; or
(b)a sign creates, in the opinion of an authorised person, a risk to life or property; or
(c)a sign is exhibited on a public place or on land under the control of Local Government, without the approval of Local Government, or in contravention of any conditions of an approval by Local Government;
the authorised person may remove7 and dispose of the sign.
(2)An authorised person may carry out demolition or other work that may be necessary to remove the sign.
(3)For the avoidance of doubt, the power to remove and dispose of a sign under this section includes the power to remove and dispose of a vehicle (with or without current registration), if that vehicle contains a sign or is advertised for sale itself, where the sign is in contravention of this local law.
22(1) A person must not remove, alter, deface, damage or otherwise interfere with a sign exhibited by the Local Government.
Maximum Penalty - 50 penalty units.
(2) Whether or not any person is prosecuted under section 22.(1) of this local law, the Local Government may recover the cost of repair or replacement of a sign dealt with in a manner contrary to section 22.(1) of this local law as a debt owing by the person who so dealt with the sign.
(Control of Signs) Subordinate Local Law No. 8 (Cambooya Shire Council)
4 For the purposes of section 8(2) of the local law:-
(1) The following classes of sign are prohibited1:-
…
(g)Election related signs displayed more than 28 days prior to or 7 days after an election, poll or referendum.
(h)Election signs displayed on local government premises or on land or roads under the control of the local government.
Footnotes
[1] Local Government Act 1993, s 266.
[2] Under Local Government Act 1993, s 318.
[3] Local Government Act 1993, s 272.
[4] Local Government Act 1993, Schedule "road".
[5] Transport Infrastructure Act 1994, Schedule 6 "local government road".
[6] See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
[7] “Highway” refers to any road: see City of Keilor v O'Donohue (1971) 126 CLR 353 at p 363.
[8] 14 Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, para 225-555.
[9] Harrison v Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 QB 142; Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 QB 752.
[10] The Laws of Australia (Thomson Lawbook Co), art 10.10, para 40.
[11] Melbourne Corporation v Barry (1922) 174 CLR 174 at p 196 per Isaacs J, p 206 per Higgins J.
[12] “No one can make a stable-yard of the King’s highway”: R v Cross (1812) 3 Camp. 224 at p 227; 170 ER 1362 at p 1363.
[13] Land Act 1994, s 95.
[14] s 901(1).
[15] s 901(2)(c).
[16] Local Government Act 1993, s 36.
[17] Ibid, s 25.
[18] Arthur v Anker [1997] QB 564.
[19] (Control of Signs) Local Law No 8, s 17(1)(c).
[20] s 17(1)(a).
[21] Compare for example s 22.
[22] Explanatory Notes, Local Government and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003, pp 2, 3, 13.
[23] Ibid, p 3.
[24] Compare Sellars v Coleman [2001] 2 Qd R 565.
[25] Transport Infrastructure Act 1994, s 45.