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  4. Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service - [2007] QSC 90

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Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service[2007] QSC 90

Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service[2007] QSC 90

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

CITATION:

Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] QSC 90

PARTIES:

ROBERT WILLIAM HEGARTY
(plaintiff)
v
QUEENSLAND AMBULANCE SERVICE
(defendant)

FILE NO:

S3353 of 2000

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

DELIVERED ON:

Reasons given on 20 April 2007
Orders made on 1 May 2007

DELIVERED AT:

Supreme Court, Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

13-17, 20-24, 27, 29 November 2006

JUDGE:

Wilson J

ORDER:

  1. That the limitation period prescribed by section 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 for the commencement of the proceeding be extended to 13 April 2000;
  2. That there be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for $569,635.31;
  3. That the question of costs of and incidental to the proceeding be adjourned to a date to be fixed.

CATCHWORDS:

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ESSENTIALS FOR ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE – WHERE NERVOUS SHOCK OR MENTAL DISORDER – COMMON LAW – the plaintiff worked as an operational ambulance officer for fifteen years – in the course of that employment the plaintiff was exposed to numerous traumatic events – the plaintiff developed post traumatic stress disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder – the plaintiff presented with signs of dysfunction – the employer provided some training to the plaintiff directed at self-recognition of symptoms of stress disorders, and self-referral – the plaintiff did not recognise his signs of dysfunction – this lack of self-recognition was not unreasonable – the employer provided some training in recognising signs of dysfunction in others to some supervisors – the plaintiff’s supervisors did not recognise signs of dysfunction in the plaintiff – the employer had a system of counsellors and peer supporters available to its employees – whether the employer provided adequate training to supervisors – whether the employer was negligent – whether the employer’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s mental disorder

TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – ESSENTIALS FOR ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE – WHERE NERVOUS SHOCK OR MENTAL DISORDER – COMMON LAW – the plaintiff gradually developed post traumatic stress disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder – when the plaintiff suffered from a recognisable psychiatric disorder

DAMAGES – MEASURE AND REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT – MEASURE OF DAMAGES – where loss suffered was the loss of the chance of a better outcome – calculation of damages on that basis – whether the plaintiff is entitled to Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages

WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) s 551

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 603

Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) s 28

Calvert v Mayne Nickless Ltd (No 1) [2006] 1 Qd R 106; [2005] QCA 263, cited

Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 410, followed

Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127, cited

Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161, followed

Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321, cited

Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373, cited

Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 201 ALR 470, cited

Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549, cited

Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638, cited

Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Byrne J, 5 June 1992), cited

Mott v Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 34; [1999] QCA 220, cited

New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583; [2000] NSWCA 119, cited

Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, cited

Schiliro v Peppercorn Child Care Centres Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 518; [2000] QCA 18, cited

Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1992-1994) 179 CLR 332, cited

State of New South Wales v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12, cited

Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, considered

Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, cited

COUNSEL:

G W Diehm and A Luchich for the plaintiff

D O J North SC and M O'Sullivan for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Butler McDermott & Egan for the plaintiff

Crown Solicitor for the defendant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

  • PRELIMINARY POINTS 4
  • Identity of defendant 4
  • Limitation defence 4
  • Overview 4
  • The pleadings 6
  • Dramatis personae 20
  • Those who have treated the plaintiff 23
  • Independent experts 23
  • LIABILITY 24
  • The traumatic incidents 24
  • Developing conditions – Gayndah 25
  • Conversations with Mr Borger 27
  • The medal ceremony 28
  • After the transfer to Bundaberg 31
  • Training while the plaintiff was in Gayndah 32
  • Training while the plaintiff was in Bundaberg 36
  • The plaintiff’s appreciation of signs of dysfunction 39
  • Incident in Bundaberg shortly before sick leave 40
  • Diagnosis and the beginning of treatment 40
  • Since April 1999 40
  • Treating doctors and psychologist 41
  • Medico-legal evidence 47
  • Conclusion about PTSD & OCD 49
  • Recognition and treatment of stress 50
  • Training of supervisors 54
  • Likely course of events in absence of employer’s default 56
  • Breach of duty of care 58
  • Causation 59
  • Conclusion on liability 61
  • No contributory negligence; no failure to mitigate loss 61
  • Breach of contract and breach of statutory duty 61
  • QUANTUM 61
  • Summary 66
  • JUDGMENT 67
  • ORDERS 67
  • Annexure 1 68
  • Annexure 2 87
  • Annexure 3 90
  • Annexure 4 92
  1. WILSON J: The plaintiff was an ambulance officer for 15 years from 1984 to 1999. In the performance of his duties he was exposed to multiple horrific events. He left his employment afflicted by post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and obsessive compulsive disorder (“OCD”) for which he alleges his employer is responsible. He claims damages for negligence, breach of contract and/or breach of statutory duty.

PRELIMINARY POINTS

Identity of defendant

  1. The named defendant to the proceeding is “Queensland Ambulance Service”. At the start of the trial, counsel informed the Court that shortly after the commencement of the proceeding there had been correspondence between the solicitors about the correct identity of the defendant, but that the State of Queensland was conducting the defence as if it were the employer at all material times, and was not taking any point in this regard.[1]

Limitation defence

  1. The defendant pleaded a defence under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld),[2] but its counsel informed the Court that if it was otherwise found liable to the plaintiff, it would not oppose an extension of time under s 31 of that Act.[3]

Overview

  1. Over the 15 years he was an ambulance officer the plaintiff worked at Emerald from 1984 to 1987, at Ayr from 1987 to 1989, at Gayndah from 1989 to the end of 1996, and at Bundaberg from 1 February 1997 to 13 April 1999.[4] On his case he was required to attend many traumatic and distressing scenes.[5] He gave evidence about more than 20 of such events, describing his perceptions and recollections of them and their effects upon him.
  1. At trial the defendant did not dispute that by the time the plaintiff left the Queensland Ambulance Service (“QAS”) he was very unwell. His psychiatric condition, PTSD and co-morbid OCD, was genuine and complex.
  1. The Queensland Ambulance Service (like its predecessor the Queensland Ambulance Transport Brigade (“QATB”)) is responsible for the provision of ambulance services throughout Queensland. By about 1993 it had approximately 1800-2000 employees, more than 85% of whom were ambulance officers. They worked from about 190 stations spread throughout the State from Thursday Island to Coolangatta.[6]
  1. The plaintiff worked in Gayndah for about eight years. It was a small country town about 140 kms from Bundaberg[7] with a population of about 2,500 in the town, and a total of 3,000 to 3,500 in the shire.[8] There was one doctor in the town, who was the medical superintendent of the town’s hospital with a right of private practice.[9] The hospital had about 16 beds plus a maternity section. It had an operating theatre, and whenever an anaesthetic was to be administered, the doctor from Mundubbera, a town of similar size less than 60 kms away, would come and assist.[10] There were two ambulance officers at the Gayndah station (the plaintiff the more junior of them), who were assisted from time to time by honorary officers.[11] Until about 1993 there was a clerical officer, but with the establishment of the Queensland Ambulance Service there ceased to be administrative staff in small centres.[12] There were two ambulance officers stationed at Mundubbera.[13]
  1. The two ambulance officers at Gayndah had a “rotating roster”[14] each working ten days on duty and then having four days off, rotating so that one would be off one weekend, and the other the next weekend.[15] There were days when both were rostered on;[16] on those days one of them (usually the plaintiff) would be on call in after hours as the first responding officer with the other designated as the second responding officer.[17]  When one of them had his days off, the other worked alone;[18] and as well as doing his eight hour day shift he had to be on call in after hours – thus making himself available 24 hours a day for four days.[19] If one of the officers went on holidays, the other was there by himself. If the more senior officer went on holidays, the other (the plaintiff) would step up to his position, leaving his own position vacant; he had to be available 24 hours a day but for his rostered days off he would try to obtain a relieving officer from a neighbouring station.[20]
  1. Bundaberg was a much larger town with a much larger ambulance centre, which employed an eight week rotating roster, with officers rostered for day and evening shifts. Those rostered to work in the day were generally placed on call to assist those working the evening shift where necessary.[21]
  1. Recognition of occupational stress in emergency services personnel, including ambulance officers, gathered momentum in the 1980s and early 1990s.[22] In Queensland, it was discussed (inter alia) in the First Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee of Inquiry into Ambulance Services which was tabled in the Legislative Assembly in December 1990.[23] This led to the Queensland Ambulance Service developing and implementing a program known as “Priority One”, aimed at reducing the impact of stress-related problems on ambulance personnel and their families.[24] The program was developed by May 1992, and progressively rolled out over the following years.[25] It had four elements – “Critical Incident Stress Debriefing”, peer support, a telephone counselling service and face-to-face counselling with a psychologist.[26]
  1. “Critical Incident Stress Debriefing”, a particular model of debriefing involving a probing intervention into a person’s response to a traumatic experience, was, to some degree at least, discredited by studies in the late 1990s.[27] Suffice it to say, the plaintiff was not subjected to it, and it was not part of his case at trial that he ought to have been.[28]
  1. The efficacy of the other aspects of “Priority One” and the extent and way in which they were actually implemented vis a vis the plaintiff were at the core of the litigation.

The pleadings

  1. The plaintiff alleged –

“7.During the course of the Plaintiff’s employment he was required to attend at many traumatic and distressing scenes, including

(a)in 1984 at Emerald an attendance at a scene at a domestic residence where a young male had been killed by being trapped under a motor vehicle upon which he had been working, when the jacks supporting it had collapsed;

(b)in 1985 at Emerald an attendance at a suicide in a caravan;

(c)in 1985 at Emerald an attendance at an attempted suicide in a house nearby the station;

(d)in 1985 an attendance at a motor vehicle accident involving nine patients, including one young child, who had died, but had lost, in the course of the accident, some half of its head;

(e)in 1986, at Emerald, an attendance at a motor vehicle accident involving four injured patients;

(f)in 1986, at Emerald, an incident where the Plaintiff’s ambulance vehicle was shot at while at attendance at the Willows Gem Fields;

(g) in 1986, at Emerald, an attendance at a motor vehicle accident involving a collision between a vehicle and a train, in which a female patient was killed;

(h)in 1988, at Ayr, when the Plaintiff’s personal belongings were lost due to flooding which occurred whilst the Plaintiff was working, and was therefore unable to attend to saving his belongings;

(i)in 1989 at Gayndah when the Plaintiff attended at a motor vehicle accident involving a logging truck which had rolled over and in which the driver was trapped inside his vehicle, and was having difficulty breathing. Conflict emerged between the Plaintiff and another officer in attendance as to the best course for treatment and/or extrication from the vehicle for the driver, with the course proposed by the other officer being followed. The patient died of affixiation [sic];

(j)attendance at a suicide at Gayndah in 1989;

(k)attendance at a murder / attempted suicide at Christmas 1990 at Gayndah;

(l)attendance with a male patient from a motor vehicle accident at a doctor’s surgery at Gayndah in 1990 during which time the patient died;

(m)attendance at a suicide by hanging at Gayndah in 1991;

(n)attendance at a child drowning at Gayndah in 1993, in circumstances where the child was a child of neighbours and family friends;

(o)attendance at a motor vehicle accident at Bundaberg in 1997 in which two male passengers were incinerated;

(p)involvement in a controversial attendance upon a cardiac arrest / stroke victim, (who subsequently died) in which there was conflict between the Plaintiff and other staff members regarding what went wrong in treatment, and who was responsible;

(q)involvement in 1998 in two incidents involving aircraft engine failure when on board the air ambulance;

(r) attendance in Bundaberg in 1998 upon a young teenage mother who had hung herself;

(s)attendance in Bundaberg in 1998 upon a female with a young family who had hung herself;

(t)attendance in Bundaberg in early 1999 involving a motor vehicle accident in which a baby had been trapped under an overturned vehicle, but which was not found until the vehicle was lifted;

(u)an incident in which the Plaintiff was involved in the transfer of a young child from the Gayndah hospital to the airport for transfer by air ambulance, in which the child subsequently died during the flight. 

  1. The attendance of the Plaintiff at the aforementioned events, as well as other events typically experienced in the course of his employment, was the source of much distress and angst for the Plaintiff.

8A.As a result of the Plaintiff’s repeated exposure to traumatic events such as those described in paragraph 7 above, he was exposed to a risk of developing psychiatric injuries, a risk the Defendant knew or ought to have known about.

8B.That risk of developing psychiatric injuries was a more than trivial risk of injury created by the Plaintiff’s workplace and/or work activities.

8C.Between in or about 1992 and 1996 the Plaintiff discussed with the Defendant’s Officer-in-Charge at Gayndah, Sam Borger, that he needed to get out of Gayndah because he was not coping or managing well with his duties as an ambulance officer in that his skill levels were deteriorating, he was having problems disassociating personal matters from professional issues and he felt he needed the security of working with someone who was at least as experienced as the Plaintiff.

8D.Between in or about 1994 and 1996, the Plaintiff had discussions to similar effect to those set out in paragraph 8C above, with the Defendant’s Sector Coordinator Gary Pratt. 

8E.In or about 1996 at a ceremony at which the Plaintiff was presented with a National Service Medal:-

(a)the Plaintiff informed Assistance [sic] Commissioner John Jacobsen [sic] and Deputy Commissioner Gerard Lawler of the same matters of which he had informed Sam Borger as set out in paragraph 8C above;

(b)further the Plaintiff requested of the said persons a transfer and indicated that he would resign if he was not transferred. 

8F.At the same medal presentation ceremony, the Plaintiff’s wife, Paula Hegarty informed Jacobsen [sic] Lawler and Pratt that the Plaintiff needed to leave Gayndah, that he was working too many hours and the family unit was not coping. 

8G.In addition, on two occasions in or about 1996 the Plaintiff’s wife told Borger words to the affect [sic] that the Plaintiff was not well and needed time out. 

8H.Following the Plaintiff’s transfer to Bundaberg in 1997, on two occasions, and to the knowledge of the Defendant, the Plaintiff failed to respond to code 1 emergency calls whilst on call at his residence.

  1. As a consequence of the Plaintiff’s experiences at the aforementioned events, the Plaintiff has developed:-

(a)post traumatic stress disorder;

(b)an obsessive compulsive disorder.

Particulars

(i)from in or about 1984 the Plaintiff had features of post traumatic stress disorder which developed into clinically significant distress from in or about 1988/1989;

(ii)thereafter as a result of the Plaintiff’s developing post traumatic stress disorder, the Plaintiff developed an obsessive compulsive disorder;

(iii)the Plaintiff subsequently developed a full blown post traumatic stress disorder from in or about the mid 1990’s. 

  1. The Plaintiff did not receive any counselling or psychological support, treatment or intervention with respect to the distress and angst experienced as a consequence of the aforementioned events.
  1. The Defendant did not at any time material to this action have in place any system of counselling and/or psychological support or treatment which would have resulted in the Plaintiff receiving the benefit of such support following involvement in such incidents.

11A.In the alternative, the system which the Defendant had in place was inadequate and/or not a sufficient response to the more than trivial risk to which the Plaintiff was exposed, because:-

(a)the Defendant did not have in place a system by which the Plaintiff received cognitive behaviour therapy following incidents which caused him distress or angst;

(b)the Defendant did not have in place a system whereby the Plaintiff’s supervisors were trained to identify signs of dysfunction in personnel regularly exposed to distressing and traumatic experiences, so that referral could be made for clinical psychological assessment and treatment such as cognitive behaviour therapy;[29]

(c)the Defendant did not have in place a system whereby the Plaintiff received training/education through which the Plaintiff would have come to know and recognise the signs of the possible effects of distress and angst following traumatic experiences;

(d)the system did not take into account the fact that ambulance personnel such as the Plaintiff, at times worked primarily by themselves in small isolated rural ambulance stations.

11B.In the further alternative, despite the matters pleaded in paragraphs 8A to 8H inclusive above, at no stage prior to 1999 did the Defendant:-

(a)recommend to the Plaintiff that he seek counselling or psychological assessment through Priority One or otherwise;

(b)refer the Plaintiff for counselling or psychological assessment through Priority One or otherwise;

(c)arrange for the Plaintiff to have access to counselling or psychological assessment through Priority One or otherwise. 

  1. If such a system of support, or alternatively a sufficiently adequate system of support as set out in paragraph 11A above, had been in place, the Plaintiff would not have developed the aforementioned psychiatric injuries or alternatively, he would have completely recovered from them, or the extent of the Plaintiff’s psychiatric injuries would have been significantly limited compared with his current psychiatric condition.

12A.Alternatively, had the Defendant counselled, recommended, referred or arranged for the Plaintiff to have counselling or psychological assessment prior to 1999, due to the matters pleaded in paragraphs 8A to 8H inclusive above, the Plaintiff would not have developed the aforementioned psychiatric injuries or alternatively, he would have completely recovered from them, or the extent of the Plaintiff’s psychiatric injuries would have been significantly limited compared with his current psychiatric condition. 

  1. In the premises, by virtue of the matters set out in paragraphs 10, 11, 11A, 12 and 12A above, the Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the employer’s negligence, and/or breach of the aforesaid implied term of contract of employment, and/or breach of the aforesaid statutory duties.”[30] 
  1. In response to these allegations the defendant pleaded –

“7.As to the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, the Defendant:

(f)admits the Plaintiff worked for the Defendant between 1984 and 1998;

(g)admits the allegations in subparagraph (a) but does not admit the Plaintiff attended the scenes listed in paragraph 7 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, and says the reason for such non-admission is that by reason of the lack of particularisation of the allegations, the Defendant is unsure of the truth or otherwise of the allegations and the Defendant is unable to admit or deny the allegations;

(h)does not admit the scenes listed in paragraph 7 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim were traumatic or distressing and the defendant repeats and relies upon the matters pleaded in subparagraph (b) hereof. Further the defendant states that whether such scenes were traumatic or distressing is a matter solely within the means of knowledge of the Plaintiff and the Defendant is unable to admit or deny the allegations.[31]

  1. As to the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, the Defendant:-

(a)  repeats and relies upon paragraph 7 herein;

(b)does not admit the Plaintiff attended the ‘other events typically experienced in the course of his employment’, and says the reason for such non-admission is that by reason of the lack of particularisation of the allegations, the Defendant is unsure of the truth or otherwise of the allegations and the Defendant is unable to admit or deny the allegations;

(c)  As to the allegation of ‘distress and angst’, the Defendant repeats the matters pleaded in paragraph 7 above and further says that the Plaintiff did not give the employer any indication he was suffering from any unhealthy distress or anxiety and consequently denies that the Plaintiff suffered from any unhealthy excessive ‘distress’ or ‘angst’ and otherwise does not admit this allegation.

  1. As to the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, the Defendant:-

(a)(i)admits the Plaintiff displayed some symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder;

(ii)denies the Plaintiff developed post traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of exposure to the events contained in paragraph 7 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim and says the reason for such denial is the medical reports do not support the allegation;

(b)(i)admits the Plaintiff had developed an obsessive compulsive disorder;

(ii)denies the obsessive compulsive disorder developed as a consequence of exposure to the events contained in paragraph 7 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim and says the reason for such denial is that the medical reports and other documents do not support the allegations.

9A.Further to the matters alleged in paragraph 9 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim and paragraph 9 above, the Defendant says:

(a)unknown to the Defendant, the Plaintiff had vulnerable personality that was unusually susceptible to suffering from psychiatric illness;

(b)  this vulnerability existed because the Plaintiff had an obsessive personality;

(c)on or about Friday 26 March 1999 the Plaintiff was involved in the medical transfer by air of a woman from Mundubbera to Bundaberg;

(d)as a result of the transfer, issues arose as to the Plaintiff’s conduct or competency and the Plaintiff was told by his superior, Patrick John Denham, that a ‘mandatory audit’ was to be conducted into the matter and that the Plaintiff was to be suspended from duties as a ‘mentor’ of other ambulance officers and as an ‘air attendant’ until the audit was completed;

(e)the Plaintiff’s subsequent decompensation and illness, which occurred within days of these events in early April 1999 and the Plaintiff’s subsequent loss and damage as claimed in this action, was a consequence of his idiosyncratic and unforeseeable reaction to the events referred to herein rather than the matters alleged in the Further Amended Statement of Claim;

(f)in the premises of (c) and (d) above, the conduct of the Plaintiff’s supervisor, Patrick John Denham, was a reasonable management action taken in a reasonable way in connection with the Plaintiff’s employment within the meaning of s.34(5) of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 and that in the premises whereby the ‘injuries’ for which the Plaintiffs claims arose out of this action, the Plaintiff is not entitled to sue or recover damages therefor.

(g)the defendant joins issue with the particulars alleged in paragraph 9 of the Further Further Amended Statement of Claim and relies upon the matters pleaded in paragraphs 8, 9, 9A herein, 13A and 13B hereof.

9B.As to the matters alleged in paragraphs 8A to 8H of the Further Amended Statement of Claim:-

(a)the Defendant admits knowledge of the risk pleaded  in paragraph 8A but otherwise does not admit the further allegations made and repeats and relies upon the matters pleaded in paragraphs 7 and 8 hereof;

(b)the Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 8B and it is for this reason that the Defendant established the ‘Priority One’ program referred to herein;

(c)the Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs 8C to 8H on the grounds that it believes them to be untrue save that the Defendant admits that the Plaintiff was keen to transfer from Gayndah to a larger centre as he was ambitious and wished to gain experience in a larger centre.

  1. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, that the Plaintiff did not receive any counselling or psychological support, treatment or intervention regarding the distress and angst experienced as a consequence of the events listed in paragraph 7 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, and says the reasons for such denial are:-

(a) the Plaintiff was an active participant in the informal system of debriefing;

(b)the Plaintiff was an active participant in the ‘Priority One’ program;

(c)the Plaintiff received counselling and psychological support from the Priority One program;

(d)further, the plaintiff attended stress management workshops and a suicide intervention workshop at Gayndah Hospital and had been trained in debriefing techniques and affective [sic] listening skills and a mentor course through the QAS.

  1. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 11 and 11A of the Further Amended Statement of Claim that it did not have in place any system of counselling and/or psychological support or treatment and says the reasons for the denial are:-

(a)(i)from 1990 onwards, the Defendant had in place an adequate system of counselling and peer support, called ‘Priority One’ by which employees who encountered, in the course of their employment, trauma or other stressful events would receive counselling, debriefing or other psychological intervention to assist them with their ability to cope with the traumatic experiences, or by which it might be identified that they had suffered or were at risk of suffering from some illnesses as a consequence of the experiences, and for which medical intervention was necessary;

(ii)under the ‘Priority One’ program, the Defendant had in place Peer Support Officers whose role it was to provide counselling and referrals for any Queensland Ambulance Service staff member;

(iii)the Defendant advised all of its employees of the existence of the Peer Support Officers and ‘Priority One’ program;

(iv)the Plaintiff was an active participant in the ‘Priority One’ program;

(b)(i)prior to 1990, the Defendant had in place an informal system which provided employees with informal debriefing and counselling following traumatic or other stressful events;

(ii)the Plaintiff was an active participant in the informal system of debriefing;

(c)ambulance officers receive advice and guidance on how to cope with the stress associated with ambulance work during their training.

  1. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 12 and 12A of the Further Amended Statement of Claim and says the reasons for such denial are -

(a) the Defendant had in place a system of support for its employees;

(b)the Plaintiff did not develop the psychiatric injuries in the course of his employment;

(c)the Plaintiff developed the psychiatric injuries despite the existence of the support system which was in place;

(d)the Defendant denies the allegations that had an alternative system been adopted the Plaintiff would have recovered from any illness or that such illness would not have been as severe as alleged on the grounds that the allegations are untrue and are speculative.

  1. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim that the Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the employer’s negligence and/or breach of implied term of contract, and/or breach of statutory duties and says the reasons for such denial are those set out in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 herein.

13A. Further as to paragraphs 10 to 13 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim the Defendant says that by reason of the matters in paragraphs 10 and 11 above:

(a)the Defendant chose an appropriate way to discharge its workplace health and safety obligation by taking the measures specified in paragraphs 10 and 11 above, which were reasonable precautions within s.27 and s.37 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995;

(b)further in the circumstances that the Plaintiff told no one at his work he was suffering from workplace stress and at all times presented as a healthy, normal functioning officer and only sought treatment for his illness in or about April 1999, and further in the circumstances that the Plaintiff knew of the services offered through Priority One, but did not use these services until he was ill in or about April 1999, the Defendant says that it exercised proper diligence within s.27 and s.37 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995;

(c)further the Defendant says that it took all practicable measures to ensure the health and safety of the Plaintiff within s.9 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1989.

13B.The Defendant says that in the circumstances where the Plaintiff told no one at his work that he was suffering from workplace stress and that at all times knew of the services that were available through Priority One, but failed to use those services until in or about April 1999 when he was already ill, the worker did not do everything reasonably possible to avoid sustaining the illness from which he has suffered and for which he claims pursuant to s.312(1)(e) of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 and that by reason thereof, the Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed or alternatively his damages reduced on the grounds that he substantially contributed to his claimed injury.

13C.Further to paragraph 13A above and in respect of the matters alleged by the Plaintiff in paragraphs 11A and 11B of the Further Amended Statement of Claim and his further and better particulars dated 26 May 2005, the defendant says:

(a)the Defendant, through Priority One, did have a system whereby employees could be referred, or could self refer, to qualified psychologists or counsellors for help;

(b)it is not the duty or obligation of an employer to provide medical treatment to an employee;

(c)it is not the duty or obligation of an employer to require an employee to submit to medical treatment;

(d)it is not the duty of an employer nor is it reasonable for an employer to require employees to submit to psychiatric medical treatment;

(e)at the times material to this action, it was not the duty of an employer nor was it reasonable for an employer to be required to refer employees for cognitive behavioural therapy.”[32]

  1. The plaintiff pleaded (inter alia) by his reply –

“4.As to paragraph 9A of the Further Further Amended Defence, the Plaintiff:-

(a)denies that the Plaintiff had a vulnerable personality which was unusually susceptible to suffering from psychiatric illness as a result of an obsessive personality, because the allegation is untrue;

(b)admits the allegations in sub-paragraph (c);

(c)denies the allegations in sub-paragraph (d) because:-

(i)the Plaintiff was not told by his superior, Patrick John Denham that a ‘mandatory audit’ was to be conducted into the air transfer of the woman from Mundubbera to Bundaberg;

(ii)the Plaintiff was not suspended from duties as either a ‘mentor’ of other ambulance officers or as an ‘air attendant’ as a result of the conduct of the air transfer of the woman from Mundubbera to Bundaberg;

(d)denies that the Plaintiff’s decompensation and subsequent loss and damage was caused by any idiosyncratic or unforeseeable reaction to the events contained in paragraph 9A of the Further Further Amended Defence, because the allegations are untrue and because of the reasons set out in this paragraph of the Further Amended Reply;

(e)in the premises, denies the allegations in sub-paragraph (f) for the reasons set out in this paragraph of the Further Amended Reply;

(f)further, if the event did contribute to the Plaintiff suffering psychiatric injury, the Plaintiff says that it was only one contributing factor, and the matters relied on by the Plaintiff in the Further Amended Statement of Claim remain as a cause or causes of his injury. 

4A.As to paragraph 9B of the Further Further Amended Defence, the Plaintiff:-

(a)does not plead to the admissions contained in paragraphs 9B(a) and 9B(b);

(b)otherwise repeats and relies on paragraphs 8A and 8C to 8H inclusive of the Further Amended Statement of Claim.

  1. As to paragraph 10 of the Further Further Amended Defence, the Plaintiff:-

(a)denies the allegations in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) because they are untrue – the Plaintiff was neither an ‘active’ participant in any informal debriefing system, nor an ‘active’ participant in Priority One and did not receive any counselling or psychological support from Priority One;

(b)admits the Plaintiff attended a number of informal lectures and seminars during his posting to Gayndah in respect of domestic violence and suicide intervention (for patients), but says the courses were informal sessions for which no formal accreditation or recognition existed;

(c)admits the Plaintiff completed a subject entitled ‘developing communication skills’ in 1995 through the Department of Employment, Vocational Education, Training and Industrial Relations;

(d)admits that the Plaintiff completed a mentor course through the Defendant;

(e)denies that the Plaintiff was trained in debriefing techniques because the allegation is untrue. 

  1. As to paragraph 11 and 12 of the Further Further Amended Defence, the Plaintiff:-

(a)denies that from 1990 onwards the Defendant had in place a system called Priority One because the Priority One system was not operational until sometime in 1993/1994;

(b)admits that prior to 1990 the Defendant had no formal system in place and relied solely on an informal system of debriefing;

(c)otherwise denies the allegations contained in those paragraphs because:-

(i)the Priority One system was not adequate for the reasons set out in paragraph 11A of the Further Amended Statement of Claim on which the Plaintiff repeats and relies;

(ii)the Plaintiff did not receive any counselling nor was he an ‘active’ participant in the Priority One system or an ‘active’ participant in the informal system of debriefing;

(iii)the Plaintiff was not given any training/education through which he would have come to know and recognise the signs of the possible effects of distress and angst following traumatic experiences in his employment;

(iv)the Plaintiff did develop the psychiatric injuries referred to in paragraph 9 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim in the course of his employment and despite the existence of Priority One;

(v)of the matters set out in paragraph 4 of this Further Amended Reply which the Plaintiff repeats and relies upon. 

  1. As to paragraphs 13A, 13B and 13C of the Further Further Amended Defence, the Plaintiff:-

(a)denies the allegations that he told no one at his work he was suffering from workplace stress and at all times presented as a healthy, normal functioning officer and repeats and relies on the matters contained in paragraphs 8A to 8H inclusive of the Further Amended Statement of Claim;

(b)repeats and relies on paragraphs 11A and 11B of the Further Amended Statement of Claim;

(c)admits that the Plaintiff knew of the services offered through Priority One;

(d)says that the Plaintiff was not aware he required counselling or needed assistance until he was finally permitted to attend a Priority One program shortly before he ceased work for the Defendant because of his psychiatric injuries;

(e)otherwise denies the allegations because by reason of the matters set out in paragraphs 10 to 12A inclusive of the Further Amended Statement of Claim, the defences under ss. 27 and 37 of the Workplace Health & Safety Act 1995 (Qld) and s. 9 of the Workplace Health & Safety Act 1989 (Qld) are not available and the Defendant did not exercise proper diligence or take all practicable measures to ensure the health and safety of the Plaintiff;

(f)says that the Plaintiff did everything reasonably possible in the circumstances to avoid sustaining the illness and as such, the relief sought pursuant to s. 312(1)(e) of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) is not available.”[33] 

Dramatis personae

  1. (i) The plaintiff

The plaintiff was born in Hughenden in 1961 and raised in Charters Towers.[34] He left school after year 10,[35] and worked as a fitter’s assistant in an engineering works and subsequently as a wardsman, a male dresser and finally an enrolled nurse at the Charters Towers Hospital before becoming an ambulance officer at Emerald in 1984. By then he had completed various first aid courses and 1,000 hours of voluntary work as an honorary ambulance officer.[36]

He and his wife met when they were at school and married when they were 18 years old. They had two children, a daughter born in 1983 and a son born in 1986.[37] The plaintiff enjoyed good physical and mental health through the 1980s as he assumed the responsibilities associated with his growing family and his developing career.[38] His relationship with the children was very good.[39] Trevor Tighe, a work colleague who knew him in Emerald (and later in Gayndah), described him as a friendly, jovial person with a light hearted approach to work.[40]

(ii)Paula Hegarty

Pauline June Hegarty (known as “Paula”) is the plaintiff’s wife. She worked as a clerk before the children were born, and later she worked from home as a child-carer. Since about 1992 she has worked as a teacher aid, first in Gayndah and then in Bundaberg. She now works 15 hours per week.[41]

Mrs Hegarty is a sincere, compassionate and intelligent woman, who has demonstrated admirable loyalty to her husband and commitment to family values throughout her marriage. She gave her evidence candidly and without guile, and I have no hesitation in accepting her as an honest witness.

(iii)  Trevor Tighe

Trevor George Tighe has been involved in ambulance work all his adult life – first as a 17 year old volunteer in about 1969-1970, and since about 1975 on the paid staff. He was the Deputy Superintendent in Emerald for about 22 months from 1984 to 1986, where he first met the plaintiff, and in Gayndah for four years from 1986 until 1990 where he again worked with the plaintiff.[42] From early 1990 he has held a range of administrative positions in Brisbane; at the time of the trial he was the executive officer to the Queensland Emergency Medical System Advisory Committee within the Queensland Ambulance Service.[43]

(iv)Samuel Borger

Samuel Henry Borger was a full-time ambulance officer for 31 years and an honorary officer for three years.[44] He retired when he was 65 years old, and by the time of the trial was aged 72. He first met the plaintiff when he was posted to Gayndah in a relieving position in 1991.[45] He returned there in a permanent position later that year, and remained there until his retirement in July 1999.[46] He and the plaintiff were the only full-time officers in Gayndah until the plaintiff transferred to Bundaberg on 1 February 1997.

(v) John Robert Jacobson

John Robert Jacobson was an ambulance officer for almost 28 years, living and working in small centres and country towns[47] and rising to the position of Assistant Commissioner for the North Coast Region (from Caloundra north to Bundaberg and west to Kingaroy, Gayndah and Monto). As Assistant Commissioner he participated in a medal presentation ceremony in Gayndah in July 1996. By the time of the trial, he had left the Queensland Ambulance Service and was working as a stock and station agent in Wollongong.[48]

(vi)Gerard Anthony Lawler

Gerard Anthony Lawler was a very senior ambulance officer. In 1996 he was the Deputy Commissioner for the State of Queensland (Operations) – ie Mr Jacobson’s superior. In that role he visited towns such as Gayndah. By the time of the trial he was the Assistant Commissioner, Brisbane Region of the Queensland Ambulance Service.[49]

(vii)Patrick John Denham

Patrick John Denham was the officer in charge of the Bundaberg ambulance station for nine years until early 2001. In that capacity he met the plaintiff in Gayndah and was his commanding officer after he transferred to Bundaberg. Because of ill health Mr Denham did not give evidence at the trial,[50] but a statement made by him in August 2001 was admitted pursuant to s 92 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld).[51]

(viii)Margaret Anne Charteris

Margaret Anne Charteris was a fellow ambulance officer at Bundaberg when the plaintiff worked there.[52]

(ix) Graham Peatey

Graham Peatey was one of five communication centre supervisors in the Bundaberg ambulance station in 1999.[53]

(x) Paul Joseph Scully

Paul Joseph Scully joined the QATB in 1971, and worked as an ambulance officer until 1978, and then for a short period as a communications centre operator. He became a training officer in 1980, rising to the positions of senior training officer and acting chief training officer between 1986 and 1992. Since 1992 he has been the Coordinator of Staff Support Services within the Queensland Ambulance Service.[54] His qualifications include Bachelor of Social Science (Psychology) (1992), and a Graduate Diploma in Social Science (Counselling) (1997). He is undertaking a Master’s degree in Social Science (Counselling). As Coordinator of Staff Services he developed the program known as “Priority One”[55] and he has had a continuing role in its implementation and review. He has been seconded as a consultant to various organisations in the development and installation of peer support and trauma counselling programs, including ambulance services in Edinburgh, Northumbria and London in the United Kingdom.[56]

(xi)Willy Clarke

Willy Clarke was a counsellor engaged by Priority One to provide counselling services to ambulance personnel in the Bundaberg region.[57] He was based in Coolum and worked on a contractual basis.[58] He also ran information and training sessions,[59] and was involved in the vetting process for potential Peer Support Officers.[60] The solicitors for the defendant made quite considerable efforts to locate him,[61] but he proved elusive and so did not give evidence at trial.

Those who have treated the plaintiff

  1. [17]
    (i) Dr Richard Board, general practitioner;
  1. (ii) Dr Tom Bell, psychiatrist;
  2. (iii) Dr Frank Walsh, clinical psychologist.

Independent experts

  1. (i) Richard Allan Bryant

Professor Richard Bryant is a professorial fellow in the School of Psychology at the University of New South Wales. He is a clinical psychologist with an extensive and distinguished record of research and consultancy work, especially in relation to stress reactions to trauma. He examined the plaintiff in March 2003.[62]

(ii)  Peter John Mulholland

Dr Peter Mulholland has been registered as a specialist psychiatrist since 1972. He practises in Brisbane, and he examined the plaintiff in July 2006.[63]

(iii)Beverley Raphael

Professor Beverley Raphael is Professor of Population Mental Health and Disasters in the Medical School at the University of Western Sydney and Professor of Psychological Medicine at the Australian National University. She has had a long and distinguished career in public health, academia and consultancy. She has been a consultant to the Queensland Ambulance Service in relation to the Priority One program, and wrote two critical appraisals of it, dated 8 January 2003 and 10 December 2003.[64]

(iv)Joan Margaret Lawrence

Dr Joan Lawrence has been a specialist psychiatrist since 1963. She did not examine the plaintiff.[65] She addressed a number of issues of principle in relation to Priority One and the treatment of trauma affected persons.[66]

(v)Martin Melville Nothling

Dr Martin Nothling has been a specialist psychiatrist since 1973. He examined the plaintiff on 30 October 2002 and 13 September 2005.[67]

(vi)Gary Embelton

Professor Gary Embelton is a consultant psychologist and psychotherapist presently in private practice. He was previously a professor in Psychology at the Queensland University of Technology.[68] He chaired a committee which reported to the Queensland Ambulance Service on the application of psychological debriefing (November 2002) and another which performed a multi-method evaluation and review of Priority One (2003).[69]

(vii)Jane Elizabeth Shakespeare-Finch

Dr Jane Shakespeare-Finch is a lecturer in the School of Psychology at the University of Tasmania. She conducted research for the multi-method evaluation and review of Priority One. She did not give oral evidence, but a written report was admitted.[70]

LIABILITY

The traumatic incidents

  1. The plaintiff alleged that “he was required to attend at many traumatic and distressing scenes”, and set out a non-exhaustive list of 21 incidents between 1984 and 1999.[71] He alleged that attendance at such incidents was the source of much distress and angst for him.[72]
  1. In his oral evidence the plaintiff described each of these incidents and the effect it had on him. A summary of his evidence in relation to each incident is contained in Annexure 1 to these reasons for judgment. In some cases he was critical of the performance of other persons involved. Those other persons did not give evidence. His counsel made it plain that the Court was not being asked to make any findings about the conduct of other ambulance officers, because the case was about the plaintiff’s perception of what occurred.[73] Counsel for the defendant did not demur from that approach. Accordingly I have accepted the plaintiff’s evidence of the incidents on that basis, not intending to be judgmental about the conduct of others.
  1. The plaintiff identified four incidents as particularly significant in terms of their effects on him.[74] They were –

(i) Statement of claim [7(d)] – the motor vehicle accident at Emerald in about 1985 in which the top half of the head of a child aged about two was ground away;

(ii) Statement of claim [7(i)] – the logging truck incident at Gayndah in about 1989 in which the vehicle overturned and the driver was trapped upside down;

(iii) Statement of claim [7(j)] – the suicide at Gayndah in about 1989 in which the female victim’s head above the lower jaw was blown away by a rifle shot;

(iv) Statement of claim [7(n)] – the drowning of a neighbour’s ten year old son at Gayndah in about 1993.

He said –

“They’re the ones that I continually have the nightmares about, the more intrusive thoughts. They’re the ones that I have been unable to deal with emotionally.”[75]

Developing conditions – Gayndah

  1. Both the plaintiff and his wife gave evidence of the emergence and progression of behaviours and physical and emotional difficulties which experts have since recognised as signs that the plaintiff was at risk of developing and was later developing PTSD and OCD. The evaluation of that evidence is relevant to whether the defendant knew or ought to have known of his dysfunction, and if so, when.
  1. The plaintiff experienced intrusive thoughts and recollections of almost all of the 21 traumatic incidents on which he relied.[76] Those sequelae continued for years; in some cases they were relieved by the treatment he ultimately received from Dr Bell and Dr Walsh but those incidents he described as particularly significant[77]  still troubled him most at trial.[78]
  1. From early in his service at Gayndah[79] the plaintiff began to experience deterioration in his ability to cope and in his ability to retain information; insomnia, nightmares and persistent dreams; changing appetite and fluctuating body weight; mood swings with bouts of withdrawal, depression and anxiety; hyperactivity, hyperalertness and hypervigilance; intolerance of others; increasing verbal aggression; fatigue and lethargy; profuse sweating; tension in his stomach and lower back leading to his spending long periods in the bathroom trying to relieve his bowels; and unspecific back and neck pains. Later he also started grinding his teeth. Over the years his suffering increased in degree. He told the Court that he did not appreciate that what he was experiencing were symptoms of stress.[80]
  1. The plaintiff underwent surgery to remove his appendix on 1 November 1996,[81] but his abdominal symptoms did not abate.[82] On 21 January 1999 he had a colonoscopy when the “likely possibility” of early diverticulitis was identified.[83] It remains unclear whether his abdominal symptoms related to a physical problem or whether they were psychosomatic.[84]
  1. The plaintiff progressively exhibited behaviours consistent with OCD – washing his hands excessively, checking doors, light switches and ambulance vehicles compulsively and repeatedly.[85] According to his wife, towards the end of his time in Gayndah, he started spending between 30 and 45 minutes in the shower, after a traumatic incident involving the air transport of a boy he suspected of having meningitis.[86]
  1. Counsel sought to construct a chronology of when the various symptoms were experienced or outwardly manifest from the evidence of the plaintiff and his wife. There was some understandable imprecision in their responses to questions, and some variances from what they had told the doctors who examined the plaintiff. I accept that they did their best to respond truthfully, but given the length of the plaintiff’s tenure at Gayndah (eight years), the progressive emergence and intensification of his symptoms, and that he was still unwell at trial, absolute precision could not have been expected. As Dr Mulholland said of the information the plaintiff gave him –

“He had what I thought was the normal difficulty of recounting a chronology of symptoms because we were going back a long time. I wouldn’t really say he was vague. He had what I’d regard as ... a fairly normal difficulty, given the whole situation.

… In a general sense I was confident that I had the general picture. Some details, as always, might have been not … correct.”[87]

And of course Mrs Hegarty’s evidence was necessarily restricted to what the plaintiff told her he was thinking and feeling at different times and her observations of his behaviour.[88]

  1. Subject to these qualifications, I accept the following chronology which emerged from the plaintiff’s cross-examination –

1993   The plaintiff was aware of suffering lack of sleep, abdominal pains, back and neck pains, and intrusive dreams or recollections. He was not aware of hypervigilance, hyperactivity, hyperalertness, teeth-grinding, toileting problems, intolerance or social withdrawal.[89]

1994  The plaintiff was aware of suffering lack of sleep, unspecific abdominal pains, unspecific back and neck pains, intrusive dreams or recollections and toileting problems. He was not aware of hypervigilance, hyperactivity, hyperalertness, teeth-grinding, intolerance or social withdrawal.[90]

1995   The plaintiff was aware of suffering lack of sleep, toileting problems, and intolerance. He could not recall hypervigilance, hyperactivity, hyperalertness or teeth-grinding. He was not aware of social withdrawal, and he could not answer whether he suffered unspecific abdominal pains, or unspecific back and neck pains.[91]

1996   The plaintiff was aware of suffering lack of sleep, intrusive dreams or recollections, hyperactivity, toileting problems, abdominal pains, intolerance and social withdrawal. He could not recall hypervigilance, hyperalertness or teeth-grinding, and he could not answer whether he suffered back and neck pains.[92]

1997   The plaintiff was aware of suffering lack of sleep (but not to the same extent), intrusive dreams or recollections, toileting problems, abdominal pains, unspecific back and neck pains, intolerance and social withdrawal. He was not aware of hyperactivity, hyperalertness or teeth-grinding, and he could not answer with respect to hypervigilance.[93]

  1. The plaintiff said that he did not appreciate the true significance of what he was experiencing.
  1. Mrs Hegarty said that the plaintiff became “increasingly stressed” at Gayndah –

“Because he was always on call it was a huge burden on our life and I could tell that was wearing away at him in the end.”[94]

She said his health suffered: he had severe stomach pains and migraines, and his weight fluctuated.[95] He was a light sleeper, and because he was concerned about missing a phone call when he was on call, he was hypervigilant.[96] She did not recall his having toileting problems in Gayndah, although she recalled that in Bundaberg, “just before he was diagnosed”, he was spending three to four hours a day in the toilet.[97]  As I have already noted, she remembered him spending 30 to 45 minutes in the shower towards the end of their time in Gayndah.

  1. The plaintiff’s relationship with his wife and children gradually deteriorated.[98]

Conversations with Mr Borger

  1. The plaintiff and his wife gave evidence of several conversations with Mr Borger in Gayndah in which they voiced their concerns.[99]  Mr Borger did not deny that these conversations occurred, but he could not remember them.[100] I am satisfied that the conversations did occur, and the fact that they did so is consistent with the plaintiff and Mrs Hegarty’s accounts of the emergence and progression of his behavioural, physical and emotional problems. I am satisfied, too, that Mr Borger was an honest witness, who simply could not remember these conversations.

(a) The plaintiff said that on more than one occasion he talked to Mr Borger “regarding how [he] felt [he was] going in [his] employment at Gayndah”.[101] The first of these was “a couple of years” into Mr Borger’s permanent service there. He told Mr Borger that he was concerned his skill levels were dropping; that he was becoming impatient with other officers, particularly honorary officers; that he was becoming too close to the people in Gayndah which was preventing him being objective and performing his duties as well as he would have liked; and that he needed to “get out of Gayndah”. He said Mr Borger made no reply.[102]

(b) Mrs Hegarty recounted a conversation she had with Mr Borger at the ambulance station on the day of an ambulance competition in June 1996. She said she told him that she was “fed up” with the long hours the plaintiff was working, and with the fact that he could not get a transfer.[103]

(c) She gave evidence of another conversation she had with Mr Borger at a fete on the Gayndah Hospital grounds in October 1996. In the time leading up to this conversation, the plaintiff had been working largely by himself, doing relieving work in smaller, nearby centres and Mr Borger had also been away. She told Mr Borger –

“that [the plaintiff] had been very ill while Sam [Borger] had been wherever he had been. That he had been having terrible stomach aches and headaches and nausea, and that the local doctor had thought it was appendicitis”.[104]

She also said that the plaintiff “was very tired and … hadn’t had a day off in a long time.”[105] She could not recall Mr Borger’s response.

  1. As I have said, Mr Borger had no recollection of specific conversations along these lines; he could recall only that the plaintiff wanted a transfer from Gayndah to Bundaberg to improve his skills and to provide better educational opportunities for his children.[106] It was a recurring theme in the trial that those were the real reasons why the plaintiff wanted a transfer to Bundaberg. By all accounts he was an able and ambitious ambulance officer whose career was not going to advance if he stayed in Gayndah. Further, there would be much better educational opportunities available to his children in a larger centre[107] and one of his children who suffered from asthma would benefit from the milder climate of Bundaberg.[108] I accept that they were among the reasons why he wanted a transfer, and I observe that they were the reasons he gave when he applied for a transfer in about May 1996.[109]  But I am satisfied, too, that the plaintiff was experiencing the difficulties he described to the Court and to Mr Borger, and that they were another reason why he wanted to transfer to Bundaberg.

The medal ceremony

  1. The plaintiff was awarded a Queensland Ambulance Service national service medal while he was at Gayndah. It was presented to him at a ceremony there on 17 July 1996, attended by Deputy Commissioner Gerard Lawler, Assistant Commissioner John Jacobson, Sector Co-ordinator Gary Pratt, Mrs Hegarty and others.[110] The plaintiff alleged that there were conversations between him and Mrs Hegarty and these officers.[111] Understandably, he and his wife had more distinct recollections of the particular ceremony than did the visiting officers, who would have attended various similar ceremonies in other centres in the course of their duties. Mr Lawler had no specific recollection of the ceremony or of any conversations he had that day.[112] As I shall describe, Mr Jacobson’s evidence differed somewhat from that of the plaintiff and his wife, and Mr Pratt did not give evidence.

  1. (a) The plaintiff gave evidence of a conversation between him and Mr Lawler, a conversation between him and Mr Jacobson, and a third conversation with Mr Lawler and Mr Jacobson in which Mrs Hegarty joined.

(b) Mrs Hegarty gave evidence of a conversation she had with Mr Jacobson before the ceremony, another conversation with him after the ceremony, and a third conversation she had with Mr Lawler, Mr Jacobson and Mr Pratt.

(c)Mr Jacobson gave evidence of a conversation with the plaintiff and Mrs Hegarty and Mr Lawler; he could not recall any conversation with the plaintiff alone or with Mrs Hegarty alone.

  1. According to the plaintiff he told Mr Lawler that he “wasn’t coping” in Gayndah, that he was too attached to the people there and unable to “detach” when treating them, that his skill levels were dropping, and that he was having trouble communicating with other officers, including honorary officers.[113] He said –

“I indicated [to Mr Lawler] quite strongly that I needed to get out of Gayndah. I’d been there too long.”[114]

He said Mr Lawler said he would discuss the matter with Mr Jacobson and see what could be done.

  1. Mr Lawler impressed me as an honest witness, and responsible and professional in his approach to his work. That he had no recollection of the ceremony or of such a conversation is consistent with his usual practice of distancing himself from local issues and leaving them to be dealt with at local level.[115]
  1. The plaintiff gave evidence of repeating the same concerns in his conversation with Mr Jacobson and making the same request for a transfer, and Mr Jacobson saying he would see what could be done.[116] He said that he raised the same issues in the third conversation (with Mr Lawler and Mr Jacobson) and nominated two stations to which he would like to be transferred, Bundaberg being his first choice. He said they promised to discuss it and see what could be done; he said his wife joined the conversation and similar topics were traversed.[117] Although the precise sequence is not clear, their wish to send their children to a high school in Bundaberg was also raised. He said that in one of the conversations he said he would resign if not transferred out of Gayndah by Christmas.[118]
  1. Mr Jacobson made a speech at the ceremony.[119] Mrs Hegarty said he spoke with her before the ceremony, to check details such as the plaintiff’s work history,[120] but Mr Jacobson could not remember doing so.[121] She was upset and cried during the ceremony – something both she and Mr Jacobson remembered.[122] She said that after the ceremony she went into the superintendent’s office in the ambulance station to fix her makeup and Mr Jacobson followed her. She said she told him that the family was “at breaking point”: that the plaintiff was working very long hours, and that they had been trying to transfer out of Gayndah for quite a while. She said that Mr Jacobson said he understood because he had lost a marriage through overworking. She said she told him that their asthmatic son suffered every winter in the dry climate, and that she wanted her children to attend a Catholic high school, but there was none in Gayndah.[123] She said she thought she had said something like –

“Everybody in Gayndah thinks Robert is so wonderful in the job that he does and is so caring and giving … I don’t see any of that when he gets home. There’s nothing left for us.”[124]

  1. I am satisfied that Mr Jacobson did check the plaintiff’s career details with Mrs Hegarty before the ceremony, despite his having no recollection of having done so. It was the sort of step someone in his position could be expected to take, and from his perspective there would have been nothing noteworthy in his doing so.
  1. The resolution of the conflicting accounts of a subsequent conversation with Mrs Hegarty is more difficult. By the time of trial Mr Jacobson had put his ambulance service behind him and moved interstate where he was working in another field altogether. He recalled the plaintiff saying only that he wanted to be transferred to Bundaberg to improve his skills and gain wider experience, to allow his children to attend a Catholic secondary school and to allow his asthmatic son access to proper medical treatment.[125] It is significant that those were the reasons given by the plaintiff in his written request for a transfer made about two months before the medal ceremony, which Mr Jacobson had seen and directed another officer to discuss with him.[126] He remembered that Mrs Hegarty was visibly upset during the ceremony. He agreed that his former marriage had broken down, but denied that he had told Mrs Hegarty that this was caused by overwork or that that had been the case, and declined to elaborate.[127] He said that after the ceremony he “took extra steps” to ensure that the plaintiff was transferred to Bundaberg, but only because he thought the reasons outlined in the plaintiff’s earlier written request were fair and reasonable.[128] In all the circumstances, I have concluded that Mr Jacobson had only scant recollection of what happened that day, and that he had little independent recollection of why the plaintiff and his wife wanted to be transferred to Bundaberg.
  1. I am satisfied that Mrs Hegarty did tell Mr Lawler and Mr Jacobson that the plaintiff needed to leave Gayndah, that he was working too many hours and that the family unit was not coping.[129]
  1. I accept, too, the plaintiff’s evidence of what he told Mr Lawler and Mr Jacobson.[130]

After the transfer to Bundaberg

  1. According to Mrs Hegarty by late 1998 and early 1999 the plaintiff had become very aggressive, verbally abusive and short-tempered, and seemed to want nothing to do with her or their children. He was spending longer in the toilet (three to four hours a day) and up to 45 minutes in the shower. A shift worker, he had trouble sleeping.[131]
  1. Both Mr Denham – the plaintiff’s direct supervisor – and Ms Charteris – an officer who worked with the plaintiff from time to time – regarded the plaintiff as a dedicated and competent officer who largely kept to himself and did not join in staff social activities; neither noticed anything ‘unusual’ about him.[132]
  1. It was part of the plaintiff’s duty to respond promptly to “code 1 emergency calls”. His wife recalled that when they were in Gayndah –

“If Robert was at home and we received a code one, he was usually out the door within two minutes. He had his shoes laid out and his socks, and usually a pair of overalls for night-time that he would just pull on and go. And he responded within usually one to two minutes. He would be out the door and in the car, and then I would take the phones and the radio if needed.”[133]

In Bundaberg there was a Communications Centre which took such calls and then telephoned officers to attend.[134] Mrs Hegarty recalled receiving one of these calls in Bundaberg at a time when the plaintiff was at home on call. It was not long before he ceased work.[135] She took the call; the plaintiff was on the toilet on one of his prolonged visits there;[136] she went and told him “You’ve got a code one”; he did not respond; she repeated the message to him and he responded to the effect that he would not and could not come; she called the Communications Centre back and told them that she did not think her husband could attend.[137]

  1. Given the speed and efficiency with which Communications Centre staff handled such emergencies, the call would have been redirected to another officer without the Communications Centre staff learning the circumstances of the plaintiff’s non-response.[138] This event is therefore not relevant to the defendant’s liability.[139]

Training while the plaintiff was in Gayndah

The bridging course – 1993

  1. When the Queensland Ambulance Service was established in 1991[140] ambulance officers like the plaintiff, until then employed by local ambulance committees, became employees of the Queensland Ambulance Service.[141] In order to bring every officer’s qualifications up to the same basic level, the Queensland Ambulance Service, in conjunction with the Kangaroo Point College of TAFE, ran a “bridging course”. Some officers were exempt from certain parts of the course, according to their expertise and experience.[142] Upon successful completion of the course, officers received an Associate Diploma in Applied Science (Ambulance).
  1. Both the plaintiff[143] and Mr Borger[144] completed the course. The plaintiff attended classes at the Oxley Police Academy between 12 April 1993 and 7 May 1993[145] and also undertook external learning packages.[146] He completed the course by August 1993.[147] Mr Borger completed the course in early 1994.[148]
  1. The bridging course was taught in several modules. As part of the Human Relations module, there was a Self Needs and Self Help component taught by Mr Scully. The rest of the module was taught by a psychologist, Mr Brian O'Hanlan.[149] Course materials relevant to the module, consisting of learning specifications, resource/reading material, lecture presentation material (such as hard copies of overhead projector slides), teaching handouts and a competency record book, were made available to both students and teachers:[150] they were distributed as part of a large bundle of materials covering all aspects of the course.[151] The course was taught on a number of occasions between 1991 and 1996.[152] The course materials were apparently reviewed from time to time, and while I cannot be satisfied that the bundles put into evidence[153] are a precise replication of those distributed at the course the plaintiff attended,[154] I accept they give a reasonably accurate picture of what was taught.
  1. On 27 April 1993 Mr Scully gave a presentation on Self Needs and Self Help[155] which covered the causes and effects of stress, and how to cope with it.[156] With the aid of overhead projector slides he spoke with the students about the significance of these issues for an organisation such as the Queensland Ambulance Service and for them as employees.[157] He spoke about the effects of trauma under a number of subheadings – physical, cognitive, emotional and behavioural – and went on to list various examples of mental, behavioural, social, occupational, physical and emotional experiences which might be indicators of a stress reaction.[158] He spoke about Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and PTSD, and then Priority One, discussing the four components – the self referral counselling service, the telephone counselling service, Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and the peer support program.[159]
  1. At trial (more than 12 years later), the plaintiff could not recall the presentation, the specific module or the course materials.[160] He could not recall receiving any “training or instruction with respect to stress management” as part of the associate diploma course.[161] Mr Borger conceded that the course materials were probably handed out in lectures, but he did not recall ever seeing them or being specifically assessed on any of their contents.[162] Given the lapse of time, their failure to remember the presentation was understandable. I am unable to form any view as to whether it was also indicative of deficiencies in the course content or manner in which it was presented. As Mr Scully said in his evidence, at that time the defendant was trying to bring about a culture change in the appreciation of work-related trauma as a significant part of the occupational setting.[163] There was clearly a need for ongoing education in the area, and to its credit the Queensland Ambulance Service undertook considerably more work in this area over the ensuing years.

Priority One video – November 1992

  1. In the early 1990s the Queensland Ambulance Service used video broadcasting via satellite television as a medium to provide information to employees. The broadcasts were received at TAFE Colleges across the State, including Gayndah.[164] Receipt of the broadcasts required the co-operation of TAFE staff to open their facilities and operate equipment. The plaintiff said these broadcasts were usually received in the early evening; he endeavoured to attend, but work commitments and the unavailability of TAFE staff sometimes precluded him from doing so.[165]
  1. In November 1992 Mr Scully presented a one hour video broadcast on Priority One. It included information about the services available to staff, a discussion and commentary about self care in relation to shiftwork, and an interview with Professor Raphael about occupational stress in the ambulance service environment.[166]
  1. Neither the plaintiff nor Mr Borger attended the broadcast.[167]
  1. A VHS copy of the broadcast was subsequently distributed to ambulance stations across the State.[168] Mr Borger recalled receiving a video on Priority One, which was kept in the station cabinet. He did not remember watching it. When it was received, the station did not have a video player, although it obtained one later in his service there.[169] The plaintiff did not remember ever seeing a video of any broadcast while he was at Gayndah.[170]

Priority One – Roll-out to the regions

  1. Over a period of about three months between July and September 1992 Mr Scully visited all Queensland Ambulance Service regions conducting information sessions and meetings with senior staff, operational staff and their families in relation to Priority One. Relevantly, he visited Bundaberg (a regional centre), but not Gayndah.[171]
  1. In February 1993 the first training course for Peer Support Officers was conducted.[172]

Brochures – from 1993

  1. Brochures about Priority One were produced from about 1993. Essentially these took two forms – one setting out “4 Practical Ways Priority One can help you and your family” (“the red brochure”)[173] and the other dealing with “Your Reaction to Stressful Events” (a brochure with pictures of sunflowers in various poses).[174] The brochure dealing with “Your Reaction to Stressful Events” went through various versions: the original version,[175] the version with a purple background (exhibit 47),[176] and exhibit 48.[177] The red brochure was updated sometime after August 2000 and used the sunflower motif.[178]
  1. According to Mr Scully every October between 1994 and 2000 brochures were attached to payslips, as well as being distributed at training courses and being given to Peer Support Officers for distribution to stations along with other materials.[179]
  1. I accept Mr Borger’s evidence that the two payslips for the Gayndah station (his and the plaintiff’s) came together addressed in one envelope; it was his practice always to hand the plaintiff’s payslip to him unless he was out, in which case he would leave it on the desk.[180] There was a noticeboard in the station on which staff pinned important information, and a cabinet in which material was kept.[181]
  1. The plaintiff recalled receiving a leaflet explaining the Priority One services attached to his payslip, but he could not remember when he received it.[182] From the leaflet he understood that the –

“concept of Peer Support was that there was going to be some training for ambulance officers who would be trained in order to assist other ambulance officers who were having difficulties with their work.”[183]

He recalled seeing a brochure containing information similar to that in the red brochure, but could not recall seeing the exact brochure.[184] He denied seeing the other brochure (either in its original form or in its updated forms) while at Gayndah or indeed at any time before he left his employment,[185] and denied that the latter brochure was distributed with his payslips.[186] He said it was his practice to read any material that came into his possession.[187] Mrs Hegarty recalled seeing a brochure with a sunflower design sometime after the plaintiff’s disorders were diagnosed (ie after he ceased work); she did not recall seeing any of the brochures before 1999.[188]

  1. Mr Borger on the other hand recalled both exhibited versions of the second brochure, although not the circumstances in which he received them. It is perhaps significant that he remained at Gayndah for about two and half years after the plaintiff moved to Bundaberg, and he may have received at least one of them after the plaintiff had moved.
  1. Mr Tighe was working in Brisbane from 1990. He recalled the red brochure, although he could not say in what context, and suggested it had been displayed in stands on counters around his workplace in Brisbane.[189] He recalled the graphic designer responsible for the sunflower images. He said he was very familiar with the information contained in the second brochure, which was widely available.[190] He suggested that the brochures with the sunflower motifs were attached to payslips at some stage, but could not say with certainty which ones or when.[191]
  1. Mr Jacobson clearly remembered that the purple version of the second brochure came with his payslip.[192]
  1. In all the circumstances I am not satisfied that the system for distributing the brochures attached to payslips was implemented as consistently as Mr Scully’s account would suggest. I think it is more probable than not that the red brochure came to the plaintiff’s attention when it was attached to one of his payslips, but I am not satisfied that he saw the brochure entitled “Your Reaction to Stressful Events” before he ceased employment. Mr Borger probably received the red brochure in that way, too, despite his denial, but I am not satisfied he received any of the sunflower motif brochures before the plaintiff left Gayndah. I will return to Mr Borger’s appreciation of occupational stress as a workplace health and safety issue and related matters shortly.

Station resource manual –  late 1996

  1. A station resource manual was produced and distributed from September 1996.[193] It was a loose-leafed ring binder containing readings divided into nine sections – (1) Priority One - Staff Support Service, (2) Peer Support Program, (3) Stress, (4) Critical Incident Stress, (5) Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD), (6) Shiftwork, (7) Conflict, (8) Suicide, and (9) Grief and Loss.[194] Mr Scully wrote to officers in charge of stations across the State informing them they would be contacted by local Peer Support Officers who would distribute the manuals.
  1. Because there was no Peer Support Officer at Gayndah at the time, the Peer Support Officer from Mundubbera was to deliver a copy of the manual to Mr Borger.[195] This could have taken up to a month.[196] Mr Borger recalled receiving a copy of the manual and placing it on a shelf or in the cabinet in his office.[197] He did not recall ever consulting it: he “didn’t worry about this type of thing too much.”[198]
  1. It is unlikely that the existence of the manual came to the plaintiff’s attention while he was in Gayndah. He told the Court that he had never seen the manual; he could remember that there was a station resource manual without saying when he became aware of it; he did not receive any instruction to read it at Gayndah or Bundaberg.[199] I accept his evidence in this regard.  In late 1996 he was absent from the Gayndah station on annual leave and sick leave associated with his appendectomy for many weeks, and on 1 February 1997 he took up his new position in Bundaberg.[200]

Training while the plaintiff was in Bundaberg

Application to become Peer Supporter – 18 June 1997

  1. On 18 June 1997, about four and a half months after transferring to Bundaberg, the plaintiff completed an application to become a Peer Support Officer.[201] By that time he knew that stress management was an issue for workers in emergency services, and that it could lead to illness. He knew that various phenomena such as nightmares and intrusive thoughts leading to distress, tension and stress associated with those nightmares or intrusive thoughts or with having to go to work, and avoidance could be signs of a disorder or that one was developing. He had some conceptual familiarity with PTSD. He knew of the services offered by Priority One.[202]
  1. In his application the plaintiff listed a number of workshops he had attended and stress management techniques he utilised. In his oral evidence he clarified that the list had been taken from a textbook[203] and that they were techniques used in the management of other persons rather than in self management.[204] This is what he said as to why he was interested in becoming a Peer Support Officer –

“After a lot of both personal and professional consideration to the commitment and dedication required to become a Peer Support Officer, I feel I have the qualities and ability to contribute productively to this very worthwhile service.

I tend to be a quiet but open person and am willing to share my experiences with others and just as equally listen to theirs.

I see myself as a realistic person and dedicated to my chosen profession.

Peer Support I feel is a means where a person who for some reason requires to talk to someone who is empathetic to their needs in confidentially [sic]. To be simply a good listener and a good friend.

This might be to only share the experience and to re-affirm that the officers feelings and anxieties are normal.

I have been associated with nursing and ambulance for 3 1/2 and 17 years respectively and am certain that I can maintain trust and confidentiality and be non discriminatory with peoples emotions and feelings.

I believe that I have experienced many lifes trials and joys, lows and highs that will enable me to participate as a useful team member as a ‘Peer Support Officer’ to assist my fellow colleagues and families.”[205]

  1. Although the plaintiff’s application was accepted into the relevant training program, because of his work commitments and because some courses were cancelled,[206] 18 months passed before he participated in a Peer Support Officers training course in February 1999. I shall return to this.

Mentor Course – 8-12 September 1997  

  1. The plaintiff became qualified to mentor junior officers and trainees by late 1998.[207] This required his attendance at lectures and completion of workbooks and assignments in various modules.[208] The lectures, conducted at the Mt Binga Complex near Blackbutt between 8 and 12 September 1997,[209] were attended by 12 participants. Mr Scully gave a two hour presentation on occupational stress and Priority One on 9 September 1997.[210] The plaintiff had a vague recollection of him talking about Priority One but not of occupational stress.[211] The course materials used by Mr Scully were not available at trial, but he said that the content would have been similar to those for the associate diploma (bridging) course.[212]  Mr Scully marked the plaintiff’s project assessment sheet for the occupational stress module on 12 June 1998, noting on it “Well don[e] Robert”.[213]
  1. The plaintiff was cross-examined about his appreciation at that time that what he had complained of experiencing at Gayndah could be symptoms of stress.[214] While he conceded this to be the case, he maintained that he had not recognised it as such in himself.[215]

“Caring for Self” Workshop – 16 September 1997 

  1. According to Mr Scully, counsellors retained by the Queensland Ambulance Service were encouraged to cultivate relationships with local stations and to conduct local training sessions, including sessions on self-help.[216]
  1. One of those counsellors, Mr Willy Clarke, gave a presentation on Caring for Self at Gayndah on 16 September 1997. According to the plaintiff’s diary, he attended the workshop, travelling from Bundaberg to do so,[217] although at trial he had no memory of it.[218]
  1. Mr Borger remembered Mr Clarke visiting the Gayndah station once, some time in the middle of his service there (which was from 1991 to 1999).[219] He was there for about two hours, and –

“he gave us an insight what we needed to do if we had to call on Priority One for any reason and where to get – where to get help from and his contact.”[220]

He could not recall any details of what Mr Clarke told them.

Peer support course – 7-12 February 1999

  1. The plaintiff participated in a peer support training course at the Forestry Training Centre at Gympie between 7 and 12 February 1999. The course ranged over the duties of a Peer Support Officer, stress in emergency services, communication and counselling skills, Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and confidentiality and ethics.[221] External counsellors and facilitators ran small group sessions which allowed them to review and evaluate the capacity of individuals to be effective peer supporters.[222]
  1. Participation in the course was a watershed for the plaintiff.  At its conclusion, he declined to act as a Peer Support Officer.

“I indicated to Paul Scully that I had some private issues, personal issues, work issues that I needed to deal with first, indicating that I needed to sort myself out before I could help any other person.

…

At the time I still couldn’t identify them. I knew that something was wrong. I knew that there was a problem. I still could not identify it. I just knew that there was something wrong.”[223]

Mr Scully suggested that he see Mr Clarke for “personal development work”.[224] Mr Scully wrote to him a few days later –

“I write to express my thanks to you for your commitment and focussed participation in the recent peer support course and for your courageous personal insight.

In particular Robert, I write to confirm our discussion at the end of course interview in which you so appropriately chose to ‘mark time’ whilst undertaking ongoing personal development work with Willy Clarke. I am aware that this has been a significant personal milestone for you and I congratulate you on your willingness to confront these difficult personal issues. 

In view of your decision I have made contact with Willy Clarke and informed him of your choice, and confirmed with him that you have unrestricted access to him in order to complete this important personal development task. 

My thanks again for your participation. I look forward to talking with you and Willy in due course, and to your full participation in the Priority One Program in the future.”[225]

The plaintiff’s appreciation of signs of dysfunction

  1. I accept that the plaintiff received some training in the identification of possible signs of stress as part of the bridging course and his participation in various courses. Even before he applied to become a Peer Support Officer in June 1997, he knew that a combination of symptoms such as he was experiencing might indicate a stress-related condition, and if someone else had been experiencing them he would have suggested that he or she contact a Peer Support Officer or Priority One, or seek medical or other professional help.[226] He maintained that he did not recognise his own symptoms as possible signs of stress: it was only when he did the peer support training course in February 1999 that he realised something was wrong, although even then he did not understand what his problem was.[227]
  1. Despite counsel for the defendant’s spirited attack on the plaintiff’s credibility on this issue, I accept the plaintiff’s evidence. It accords with my overall impression of him as an honest witness, with the professional observations of witnesses such as Dr Bell, Professor Bryant and Professor Raphael that it is not uncommon for patients to fail to recognise the significance of what is happening to themselves (even though they may recognise the significance of similar signs in others),[228] and with the common human failing of being unable to see ourselves as others see us.[229]
  1. Thus the plaintiff’s allegation that his injuries were caused by the defendant’s failure to have in place a system which provided him with training/education through which he would have come to know and recognise signs of possible dysfunction[230] was not made out, as his counsel conceded.[231]

Incident in Bundaberg shortly before sick leave

  1. On 26 March 1999 the plaintiff was involved in the transfer by air of a female patient from Mundubbera to Bundaberg. This gave rise to issues about his competency and conduct,[232] and according to Mr Denham he informed the plaintiff that he would be suspended from duties as a “mentor” for other ambulance officers and as an “air attendant” pending an audit into the matter.[233] A summary of the evidence in relation to this incident is contained in Annexure 3 to these reasons for judgment. In fact he was not so suspended and no audit was conducted. He continued to work in accordance with his roster (which included a subsequent air transfer) until 11 April 1999 when he went off on sick leave.[234]

Diagnosis and the beginning of treatment

  1. The plaintiff has not worked since April 1999. On 13 April 1999 he had his first consultation with Mr Clarke at Buxton, a fishing hamlet about 50 minutes drive from Bundaberg.[235] At Mr Clarke’s suggestion, he consulted a general practitioner, Dr Richard Board, on 15 April 1999.[236] He was referred to Dr Tom Bell, psychiatrist, whom he first consulted on 6 July 1999,[237] and later to Dr Frank Walsh, clinical psychologist, whom he first consulted on 4 July 2000.[238] I shall turn to the evidence of Dr Bell and Dr Walsh shortly.

Since April 1999

  1. The plaintiff and his wife gave vivid evidence of his condition and routines since he left work in April 1999. I have no hesitation in accepting that, despite some improvement while he was being treated by Dr Walsh and the partial resolution of his OCD, he has remained a psychological cripple, incapable of working.
  1. Mrs Hegarty said that the plaintiff still has the same behavioural and personality issues, and that, over time, the family has become better at dealing with them, identifying triggers, adapting their mode of interaction and lowering their expectations.[239] The children have left home – the daughter has married and the son is a university student who lives on campus in Rockhampton.[240] The plaintiff is no longer verbally abusive, but he remains short-tempered and can ignore his wife for days at a time.[241] He has night sweats, sleeps restlessly and grinds his teeth at night.[242] After he began treatment with Dr Walsh, there was some improvement in his toileting habits, but when he ceased that treatment, he regressed. By trial the excessive showering was no longer a problem.[243]
  1. The plaintiff has needed his wife to insist that he get out of bed in the morning, make sure he takes his medication[244] and generally motivate him and organise his activities.[245] She cooks all his meals – otherwise he would not eat.[246] She makes suggestions about things for him to do during the day, but he is forgetful and has trouble concentrating.[247] When he has to attend medical appointments in Brisbane, she has to undertake quite elaborate steps for the purchase of his train ticket the day before, getting him to the station early in the morning to catch the train to Brisbane, ensuring he takes a toilet bag and a book with him, collecting him when he returns tired in the evening (always parking in the same spot near the station) and taking him home for a warm drink and a chat before going to bed.[248] In contrast to his sociable nature early in his time as an ambulance officer, the plaintiff avoids social situations because he does not feel comfortable.[249] He has only one friend he sees regularly, Mr Ian Beattie (another ambulance officer),[250] but social activities are often cancelled or curtailed.[251] Mrs Hegarty has to attend to all the shopping and financial affairs of the household. He will mow the back yard and put the rubbish bins out, if reminded.[252] He has attempted to take up some hobbies, but not persisted with any.[253] Cross-examination of Mrs Hegarty about her husband’s activities by reference to entries in his diary[254] did not dint the overall picture of disability and despair. Mrs Hegarty estimated that she spent six hours a day caring for her husband and generally assisting him in the first 12 months after he left work, and that since then she has spent at least three hours per day doing so.[255]

Treating doctors and psychologist

Dr Board

  1. Dr Board, the general practitioner, commenced the plaintiff on anti-depressant medication, and approved further counselling with Mr Clarke.[256] In fact the plaintiff seems to have continued to receive basic trauma counselling[257] from Mr Clarke until some time in early 2001.[258]
  1. On 26 May 1999 Dr Board referred the plaintiff to Dr Bell.[259]

Dr Bell

  1. Dr Bell first saw the plaintiff on 6 July 1999,[260] and he continued to be his treating psychiatrist to the trial.[261] His diagnosis of PTSD and OCD was unchallenged.
  1. There had always been obsessional traits in the plaintiff’s personality, but obsessional personality traits and OCD are two separate clinical entities and not the extremes of a continuum.[262]
  1. PTSD and OCD may emerge concurrently, or one may precede the other. If both are present, they can make each other worse.[263]
  1. Dr Bell’s notes of the plaintiff’s first consultation with him record –

“All these suppressed emotions over the years – I just put it on the back-burner. Never do anything about it except keep it at the back. Never talked to anyone about it, either friends, work colleagues, family.”[264]

After seeing the plaintiff again a fortnight later, Dr Bell reported to WorkCover that he considered both disorders to be of many months and probably several years duration, and expressed surprise that the plaintiff had managed to struggle on at work as long as he had, considering his conditions had been relatively severe for quite some time before he had consulted Dr Board.[265] He said –

“The prognosis, both in the short and long term, is very guarded indeed. These psychiatric disorders are severe, chronic, and so far have been unresponsive to usually effective treatment. I believe it will take many months and possibly several years before Mr Hegarty’s psychiatric disorders are resolved, and in fact they may never be totally resolved.

...

In my opinion, there does seem to be a very clear association between the many years of exposure to stress and trauma in his employment as an ambulance officer and the subsequent development of post traumatic stress disorder and also obsessive compulsive disorder.

...

It will be many months, and possibly years, before Mr Hegarty’s psychiatric condition is resolved. There is a possibility that it may never be totally resolved.

In regard to his prospective work functioning, I do not believe that he will be able to return to work as an ambulance officer at any stage in the future. It will probably be many months, and possibly years, before he could even consider work in any other capacity.

...

Mr Hegarty is going to require prolonged psychiatric treatment, with a combination of psychotropic medications, psychotherapeutic support, cognitive techniques, and advice on relaxation and better stress management.

Rehabilitation intervention is totally contraindicated at this time and that is likely to remain the case for a prolonged period.”[266]

  1. Reporting to WorkCover on 25 October 1999, Dr Bell said –

“I should also emphasize that Mr Hegarty has not only one severe psychiatric condition, but two. Progress will not be easy, nor will it be rapid. Nevertheless, Mr Hegarty has shown a commitment to treatment, and a determination to overcome his problems. I feel sure that, in the long run, we can improve his psychological and emotional functioning very substantially, but there is not likely to be a great deal of progress in the immediate future.”[267]

  1. Because the significance of legislative changes which took effect on 1 February 1997[268] was anticipated to loom large in counsel’s submissions, considerable time was spent in cross-examining and re-examining Dr Bell and other expert witnesses about when the plaintiff’s disorders would have been clinically diagnosable as such. None of the medical witnesses found this capable of a ready answer, both because of imprecision in the chronological catalogues of symptoms that were put to them by the plaintiff and at trial and because of their concentration on the clinical presentation of a patient and prospective treatment, in contrast to the legal process’s concentration on analysis of past events.[269]
  1. Dr Bell was cross-examined by reference to a chronology recorded by Dr Mulholland in a telephone interview with Mrs Hegarty on 1 November 2006,[270] which placed the emergence of various symptoms later in time than I have found them to have been.[271] In that context the following exchange occurred between senior counsel for the defendant and Dr Bell in relation to PTSD –

“Now, if we were to assume that as a reliable guide of this man’s presentation to his wife over the years, Doctor, does that, I would suggest, indicate that this man didn’t become functionally disabled until 1988 – 1998 or 1999?--  I think by that time he was, without doubt, functionally disabled, but he had been going downhill, as it were, for quite some time before that, several years before that, but disguising it, trying to minimise it, even deny it to some extent.

You said deny it, is it possible that this man was aware of his problems and had insight into his problems, but chose to deny it for some personal reason?--  I think he – he didn’t really – he wasn’t really fully aware of the full significance of what was happening with him.  He put a lot of store by physical symptoms rather than psychological or emotionally ones.  I’m not sure that he really saw himself as being all that obsessional in his earlier years.  That’s not uncommon, of course.

No.  What I’m suggesting, Doctor, though is that in terms of satisfying the diagnostic criteria required for PTSD or for obsessive compulsive disorder, this man may not have – well, I’ll go back.  There is no doubt that this man showed traits or features of both traumatic stress illness for a number of years if one accepts his account of the intrusive recollections?--  Yes.

So one has to accept the reliability of his account of these things before one can be – as a basis for making a diagnosis?--  Yes.

If there is reason to have concern about this man’s – the accuracy of this man’s ability – or I withdraw that.  If there is reason to have reservation or doubt about this man’s capacity to accurately recall events in the past, is that a ground for having reservations about – being able to make a diagnosis based upon a history?--  Well, yes, it would be.

All right.  What I would suggest, Doctor, is that the diagnostic criteria for PTSD may not have been fully satisfied until some time in ‘97 or ‘98 when accepting his account or the account of others it began to affect him obviously in the way in which he lived?--  Yes, I think that’s true.

So that in terms of a diagnosable psychiatric illness, in terms of PTSD, it may not have existed until ‘98; is that right?--  Yes, that’s right, yes.

Is that likely?--  That’s quite possible, yes.

Likely?--  Yes.”[272] 

  1. In re-examination Dr Bell agreed that it was not easy to determine in retrospect when the plaintiff’s disorders would have been clinically diagnosable as such. Various symptoms of PTSD were put to him, and then the following –

“Now, on their own, these things may not necessarily lead you to a conclusion that there was a diagnosable psychiatric illness at that particular point in time?-- That’s right.

But if there was a combination of those factors – let’s start with this proposition.  If all of those factors were present would you be inclined to think that there was a diagnosable psychiatric illness at that time?-- Yes, you would, if those things were significantly discernible.

What if he was still managing to hold down work at that time?--  He could still qualify for the diagnosis and work possibly.

All right?-- Many people wouldn’t but some could.

So if you were to assume that those symptoms were present in 1996, would a diagnosis of a psychiatric illness be made then?-- Well, it’s possible.

Is the degree of possibility the same or different from the prospect that the psychiatric illness was present in 1997 or 1998?-- Well, I – my understanding of it is that it would be less likely.”[273]

  1. Dr Bell thought that the plaintiff’s OCD probably emerged earlier than his PTSD. He could not say when it was probably first diagnosable; it was certainly fully blown by the late 1990s, but it was probably emerging as early as the late 1980s.[274]
  1. On the recommendation of Dr Bell, the plaintiff consulted Dr Frank Walsh, a clinical psychologist with special skill in cognitive behaviour therapy,[275] between July 2000 and early 2002. He could not afford to go on seeing Dr Walsh,[276] but resumed sessions with him in about August 2006.[277]
  1. Dr Bell has continued to see the plaintiff. Between August 2001 and May 2006 he saw him on 32 occasions, at intervals of approximately six to eight weeks.[278] He described the plaintiff’s condition by the time of trial as “treading water”, as having reached a plateau and not getting any better or any worse,[279] largely because he had ceased treatment with Dr Walsh until shortly before trial.[280] He is hoping to implement a different treatment regime involving structured cognitive behaviour therapy administered by Dr Walsh and different anti-depressant medication.[281] He expects that finalisation of the litigation will result in an improvement in the plaintiff’s condition, perhaps of the order of 20%.[282] There is a prospect that with the finalisation of the litigation and the new treatment regime, the need for ongoing treatment will decrease over three or four years, although he will definitely still need some treatment.[283] But there is always the possibility of relapse at any stage, particularly if he were re-exposed to the stress he has experienced over the last 20 years.[284] It is more likely than not that after four years he will be in a position to look for part-time work in a range of clerical jobs such as bookkeeping or a range of physical jobs.[285] Full-time work would be feasible after the first four or five years.[286]

Dr Walsh

  1. Dr Walsh had seen the plaintiff on about 70 occasions by the time of trial.[287] He agreed with the dual diagnoses of PTSD and OCD,[288] and administered treatment focussed on both. The plaintiff’s OCD responded more positively to treatment than the PTSD, although it fluctuated somewhat according to external stressors in his life, but there was some early progress in relation to the PTSD also.[289]
  1. In an early report he described the plaintiff as “a dedicated, conscien[ti]ous, and reliable patient”[290] and on another occasion he wrote – 

“It is my opinion that Mr Hegarty is genuine in his desire to recover his good health, return to work, and become financially self-sufficient again. It is my opinion that he has the desire, capability, determination, and persistence to achieve this outcome. Mr Hegarty has been an ambulance officer serving in an operational capacity for a long period of time. He has attended many extremely traumatic and distressing events, which has ultimately resulted in him developing PTSD. PTSD of this nature is not an easy or quick disorder to resolve. Mr Hegarty’s progress in resolving it is comparable to that of other patients I have treated with a similar level of severity of disorder.”[291]

  1. Dr Walsh resumed his treatment of the plaintiff in August 2006. He considered it desirable to see him for one two hour session every week, probably for the next year. It is likely he will require treatment on an “as needs” basis for the indefinite future.[292]

Medico-legal evidence

Dr Mulholland

  1. Dr Mulholland examined the plaintiff for medico-legal purposes on 17 July 2006, and he had a telephone interview with Mrs Hegarty on 1 November 2006. His assessment of the plaintiff’s present condition differed little from that of Dr Bell: while it has improved in comparison to how it was a few years ago, it has plateaued out at an unsatisfactory level. His OCD is in remission, but at risk of recurrence, and, of course, the lifelong obsessive features in his personality continue. The PTSD is chronic.[293]
  1. Both in his reports and written statement[294] and in his oral evidence,[295] Dr Mulholland dealt at some length with the timeframes in which the two disorders probably developed, and in particular at what point they would have been clinically diagnosable. He clearly found these not easy issues – because of his focus on present and recent issues in his reporting,[296] and because from his perspective a face-to-face assessment would have been far preferable to trying to assess these issues by reading various documents.[297] He had reservations about relying on Mrs Hegarty’s account of when symptoms occurred, because she might not have known exactly what he was thinking or feeling, and she would have concentrated more on behaviours, irritability, insomnia, avoidance, etc.[298] He said in his report that it sounded as though the plaintiff had developed frank OCD by about 1996-1997. He went on –

“This man had features of post traumatic stress from 1984 and there probably was clinically significant distress from 1988/9 and he was developing a full blown post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) however for several years he compensated by being more obsessive such that he developed an obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). It sounds as though he developed a full blown PTSD including nightmares, bad dreams with marked insomnia from the mid to late 1990s however he ‘soldiered on’ with difficulty for several years.”[299]

And he said on 10 November 2006 –

“In my view, Mr Hegarty was probably sub-clinical in the early 1990s. A clinical diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder could probably have been made in the mid to late 1990s. I understand that prior to Mr Hegarty being transferred from Gayndah to Bundaberg, he was complaining that he had been in one place for too long; that he was becoming too close to the people in the town and was having problems disassociating personal matters from professional issues. In my opinion, a diagnosis of Mr Hegarty’s post traumatic stress disorder could have been made at that time and perhaps even a year or two earlier.”[300]

In oral evidence a chronology constructed from the plaintiff’s evidence, showing the emergence of symptoms between 1992 and 1996, was put to him:[301] he said that “move[d the diagnosis of PTSD] forward a few years.”[302]

  1. Dr Mulholland said that it is not necessary for PTSD to be clinically diagnosable for a competent professional psychologist or psychiatrist to recognise a developing condition and implement measures to treat it.[303] Professional intervention at the sub-clinical stage could have been expected to produce a better outcome –

“The problem in this case is that Mr Hegarty’s symptoms were recognised at such a late stage that he is effectively a psychiatric invalid.”[304]

Had treatment been commenced while he was at the sub-clinical stage, it would have been obvious after six to 12 months whether he was going to improve.[305]  I accept what Dr Mulholland said about the likely outcome of treatment –

“Assuming that Mr. Hegarty had the fully established condition of PTSD by 1997 or 1998 then the most likely prognosis at that point assuming that he had optimum treatment which included CBT +/- SSRI antidepressant medication would have been along the lines of approximately 1/3 do well with none or minor symptoms and able to continue working in the ambulance although probably in different context, e.g. not dealing directly with patients. Approximately another 1/3 would not do so well and would have moderate symptoms however would probably be able to retrain and do some work outside of the ambulance. Approximately another 1/3 would have a bad outcome and continue to have significant symptomatology and be not capable of working at all or only limited work and that away from the ambulance. If treatment intervention had been earlier, e.g. in the early 1990s then the overall outcome would have been better. It is not possible to give hard and fast figures in respect of the extent of that improvement and the following suggestion in respect of Mr. Hegarty is that there would be an approximately 50% chance that he would have had a good outcome, i.e. having nil or minor symptoms and to be able to continue working with the ambulance. Approximately 25% would have had an in between outcome, i.e. with moderate symptoms and probably be capable of some work but probably away from the ambulance. Another 25% would probably have done badly even with intensive therapeutic intervention.”[306]

Dr Nothling

  1. Dr Nothling examined the plaintiff twice for medico-legal purposes – on 30 October 2002 and on 13 September 2005, and he reviewed the various reports relating to the plaintiff and to Priority One. He agreed with the diagnoses made by Dr Bell.[307] At trial he was questioned particularly about when the plaintiff’s disorders would have become diagnosable as such.
  1. Dr Nothling’s opinion was that the plaintiff’s psychiatric disorders were clinically diagnosable from about the time he started in Bundaberg or a little later.[308] That opinion was expressed on his assessment of Mrs Hegarty’s account of the emergence of symptoms.[309] Even then there are some aspects of her evidence to which he did not attach the same weight as other witnesses did – the possibility that the plaintiff’s bowel problems were psychosomatic,[310] fluctuations in the plaintiff’s weight,[311] and that the plaintiff showered for excessive times in Gayndah before moving to Bundaberg.[312]
  1. But he conceded in cross-examination that it would not be reasonable to reach a diagnosis based just on what a spouse said, although if a lot of other information fitted into a pattern with which the spouse’s evidence was consistent, he would weigh it all up and come to a diagnosis.[313] Moreover, he would need to be fairly certain about a constellation of symptoms before expressing an opinion about whether a condition was diagnosable.[314]

Professor Bryant

  1. Professor Bryant assessed the plaintiff on 25 March 2003.[315] At that time he considered him to be impaired by PTSD, but not by OCD.[316] He observed that the plaintiff’s obsessive personality made him vulnerable to PTSD and OCD.[317]

Conclusion about PTSD & OCD

  1. I am satisfied the plaintiff’s PTSD was sub-clinical through the early to mid 1990s but that by mid 1996 it was causing clinically significant distress and impairment in his social and occupational functioning.[318] I am also satisfied that had he come to the attention of competent mental health professionals such as psychiatrists and clinical psychologists at that time, a treatment regime directed at what were then psychiatric disorders (as opposed to one directed at the prevention of disorder) would have been implemented at that stage; had that occurred, he would probably not have suffered to the extent he subsequently did, and his long-term prognosis would probably have been better.
  1. I am satisfied too, that his OCD was fully blown at least by then. 

Recognition and treatment of stress

  1. The plaintiff was exposed to multiple traumatic events over his 15 years service as an ambulance officer, and he experienced a cumulative stress reaction over time, as opposed to an acute reaction to a single traumatic event. His PTSD was chronic.[319]
  1. No one suggested that the plaintiff ought to have been subjected to any compulsory assessment procedure. To do so would have been wrong and potentially harmful to him as an individual and to employer-employee relations within the Queensland Ambulance Service.[320]
  1. Professor Bryant’s extensive research and consultancy work with emergency services personnel well qualified him to express opinions about the nature of stress reactions in such personnel, and their identification and treatment, including systems and responses appropriate for adoption by employers of such personnel.[321] In his opinion the best approach an employer organisation can adopt is one which involves identifying an individual at high risk of having a problem, and inviting that person to have an assessment or interview, in a confidential way that does not impact on his or her position within the organisation, to see if there is a problem.[322] He knew of organisations that had adopted this approach as early as the 1980s.[323] The identification of a person as being at risk may be achieved in a variety of ways – by self-report, by observation of operational signs that the person is not functioning as well as he or she should (eg absenteeism, disciplinary problems, a deficit in functioning), by supervisors being trained to identify behavioural signs which are flags or markers that the person needs assessment (eg irritability, conflict with peers, being late for work).[324] There are various assessment tools available – a telephone call or visit from a counsellor or screening (by survey or questionnaire) of high risk individuals or those in high risk situations.[325]
  1. Professor Bryant acknowledged that a patient who lacks insight into his or her own problem is unlikely to self-report. But he or she may still exhibit behaviours indicative that something may be wrong.  Things said or behaviours engaged in, if taken in isolation, may not be indicative of a potential problem, but if taken together, in the context of a person repeatedly exposed to traumatic events, they may be[326] – for example, an employee’s complaining that his skills are deteriorating, an expressed desire to obtain a higher skill level in a different work environment, requesting a transfer for various reasons and threatening to resign if not transferred, complaining of working too many hours, failing to respond to a code 1 emergency. A statement by someone in a small country town that he was having trouble disassociating professional and personal relationships would unequivocally be such a flag.[327] Of course, these examples were all taken from the plaintiff’s case, and as I have already said,[328] I accept that the plaintiff did say these things to his superiors. That they did not recognise them as signs that the plaintiff should be offered professional assessment may have reflected deficiencies in their training.[329] I shall consider the adequacy of the training the Queensland Ambulance Service provided supervisors shortly.
  1. The general thrust of Professor Bryant’s best practice model was not seriously challenged, although the wisdom and efficacy of screening through the use of questionnaires or otherwise was contentious. There was no evidence that any questionnaire or other assessment tool was ever administered to the plaintiff while he was a serving ambulance officer.
  1. There is a range of psychiatric disorders which an ambulance officer may develop in consequence of the work he or she does, such as chronic anxiety disorder, PTSD, OCD, depressive disorders, substance abuse disorders, psychotic disorders and psychosomatic symptomatologies.[330] Professor Bryant’s evidence was restricted to questionnaires, etc which might help identify PTSD in its acute or chronic form. Dr Lawrence spoke of the General Health Questionnaire, which is used particularly in research projects to help identify people in a given population who may have evidence of a psychiatric or psychological disorder, but which needs to be followed by detailed individual assessment.[331] No other questionnaire which ranged across the spectrum of possible disorders was identified.
  1. Some assessment tools that screen for chronic PTSD are self-report measures, and some are interviews; they are not specifically designed to screen for the risk of developing PTSD.[332] A number of these were available while the plaintiff worked for the Queensland Ambulance Service.[333] The use of self reporting questionnaires as an early predictor of someone being at risk of developing PTSD came later. Professor Bryant said that it was not until about 2000 (after the plaintiff ceased work) that the state of professional knowledge was such that a reasonable clinician or employer might have considered using these, and he conceded that a responsible employer organisation would still be cautious about using them.[334]
  1. Professor Bryant did not advocate organisation-wide screening or suggest it as the optimal means of identifying targeted groups, but regarded it simply as providing another opportunity for targeted groups to let their employer know they might have a problem.[335] At most the responses to such a questionnaire could indicate that an individual might have a problem warranting further investigation,[336] and there are clearly risks associated with their use – such as employee resistance, inaccurate responses, distress, fear of stigmatism, employee concerns about confidentiality, and the suggestibility of some people in relation to their own ill health.[337] Moreover, he was not aware of any studies demonstrating the reliability of targeted screening.[338] Professor Bryant suggested that the consensus view nevertheless was that the potential benefits outweigh potential costs.[339] However, Professor Raphael and Dr Lawrence were less enthusiastic: Professor Raphael could see a use for questionnaires in a clinical setting, but not as a stand alone screening process,[340] and Dr Lawrence thought they should be used only if preliminary to a fairly prompt assessment by a properly trained clinician.[341]
  1. Dr Lawrence conceded in cross-examination that she would have less concern about an ambulance service, aware that its officers had been subjected to traumatic experiences in the workplace over a number of years, using a questionnaire for officers working in regional areas and smaller stations which it knew to be more at risk of stress-related illness than their metropolitan colleagues. The concession was made subject to these qualifications: that the ambulance service engage external psychologists to administer the questionnaire; that it invite officers to complete the questionnaire voluntarily, explaining the purpose in doing so and that if something of concern were discerned from the results they would be contacted by a psychologist about the possibility of having further consultations; that it give assurances of confidentiality and that the results, whatever they might be, would not be used against them in their employment.[342] Nevertheless in all the circumstances I am not persuaded that an employer in the position of the Queensland Ambulance Service exercising reasonable care for its employees such as the plaintiff should have used tools such as questionnaires to screen its employees generally or even to screen targeted groups for PTSD or stress-related problems generally at any time while the plaintiff was a serving ambulance officer.
  1. There can be various forms of “debriefing” from the structured and probing but largely discredited Mitchell model of Critical Incident Stress Debriefing on the one hand to informal chats among workers about operational and personal issues soon after a traumatic event on the other.[343] There was general agreement among Professor Raphael, Dr Lawrence and Professor Bryant that informal debriefing can be valuable in assisting with coping and building social cohesion, but that it does not prevent or ameliorate psychopathology.[344]
  1. Clinicians administer treatment when satisfied that a patient is suffering sufficient symptoms to warrant consideration that he or she is clinically disordered. Dr Lawrence made the point well when she said that they treat people, not diagnoses, and that they are not too concerned if all of the symptoms cannot be fitted into a particular diagnostic box.[345] Further, they design a treatment program suited to the individual patient.[346] As the results of various research projects have been published and as clinicians’ understanding and experience in treatment have expanded, there have been modifications to what has been regarded as best or usual practice for the treatment of chronic PTSD.[347]
  1. One of the treatment modalities recommended for the plaintiff by Dr Bell was cognitive behaviour therapy (“CBT”), and while it was being administered by Dr Walsh it was effective in improving the plaintiff’s psychopathology. It was part of the plaintiff’s case that the Queensland Ambulance Service ought to have had in place a system by which he received CBT following incidents which caused him distress or angst.[348]
  1. CBT has three goals – to reduce anxiety, to teach the patient that what he or she is afraid of is actually no longer a threat, and to correct maladaptive interpretations he or she may have about the event and the future. Three different techniques are used –
  1. teaching the patient to breathe more slowly to reduce anxiety – by reducing panic and arousal;
  1. exposure: requiring the patient to think for prolonged periods about traumatic memories or to stay in close proximity to reminders that are distressing; and
  1. teaching the patient to identify extreme thoughts and to think more realistically.[349]
  1. The efficacy of CBT as a treatment modality for those who suffer as a result of cumulative exposure to trauma (even if sub-clinical in terms of the emergence of PTSD) has been known and accepted longer than has its efficacy in preventing the development of PTSD immediately after a single traumatic incident. Professor Bryant said that it had been known since the early 1990s that CBT could be effective in treating chronic PTSD;[350] Professor Raphael referred to papers published in 1995 and 1997[351] and said its effectiveness for that purpose was being progressively established;[352] while Dr Lawrence said that it was available and used (not universally) for that purpose in the 1990s, becoming widely accepted and more used by 2000.[353] The publication of research papers supporting early intervention with CBT did not begin until 1995;[354] Dr Lawrence said that as at 2000 early intervention with CBT to treat acute stress disorder or to prevent or reduce the potential effects of suffering chronic PTSD was not widely known or supported among clinicians;[355] and Professor Raphael described it as an emerging concept that was being increasingly but not universally accepted in 1999.[356]
  1. Given the state of expert knowledge during the time the plaintiff worked for the Queensland Ambulance Service, I am not satisfied that the Service ought to have had in place a system by which he received CBT following incidents which caused him distress or angst.

Training of supervisors

  1. It was a major part of the plaintiff’s case at trial that Priority One was deficient as a response to the risk to which he was exposed, because it did not include training supervisors to identify signs of dysfunction in personnel regularly exposed to distressing and traumatic experiences, so that they could be referred for clinical psychological assessment and treatment such as CBT.[357] 
  1. I am satisfied that none of the plaintiff’s supervisors received such training. Mr Scully said that neither Mr Lawler nor Mr Jacobson received supervisor training because of their high rank within the Queensland Ambulance Service.[358] Mr Tighe apparently gleaned some training of this type as part of his training to be a Peer Support Officer, but that was after he had left Gayndah.[359]
  1. In the course of his long career as an ambulance officer Mr Borger was himself exposed to many horrific accident scenes. Even now in his retirement he has disturbing memories of some of them, but he has always been “able to cope with it”.[360] He clearly regarded it as quite normal for someone who had attended those sorts of scenes to still think about them many years later.[361] Mr Borger impressed me as a compassionate man, and I am sure he would have assisted the plaintiff to obtain help through Priority One had the plaintiff requested it.[362] But in the absence of such a request, he treated distress consequent on exposure to traumatic incidents as simply part of the job they had to do.[363] His failures to recognise the concerns expressed to him by the plaintiff and his wife as flags of possible dysfunction and to suggest to the plaintiff that he speak with a Peer Support Officer or a counsellor are consistent with his not having received relevant training as a supervising officer. The bridging course and the brochures had focussed on self recognition and self referral, and there is no evidence that he received any other training focussing on his role as a supervisor in this respect.
  1. The need to train supervisors to recognise signs of stress in staff members was appreciated even before the inception of Priority One. One of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Select Committee of Inquiry into Ambulance Services which reported to State Parliament in December 1990 was –

“64.2 An education programme aimed at promoting a better understanding of the causes and consequences of stress in ambulance work should, be directed to existing operational staff, senior management staff and spouses/partners of ambulance officers.”[364]

A Discussion Document was generated by a working party in February 1991.[365] It recognised education as “the singularly most important component”[366] of the proposed program, and said it should be directed at –

“(a) Operational Staff at:

-  Recruit Level and during ongoing training at the Board Courses.

(b) Controllers/Despatch Room Personnel

(c) Superintendents

(d) Senior Uniformed Officers

(e) Supporting and Ancillary Staff.”[367]

It recognised the need for a mechanism for referrals, for example, to a psychiatrist.[368]

  1. Priority One was intended to provide a framework within which individuals might seek assistance through self referral or alternatively Peer Support Officers or supervisors might recommend assistance based on perceived problems. While performance-related matters and stress-related matters were to be treated as separate issues, where they were identified as related, they were to be addressed individually while acknowledging their connection. Training programs educating the staff about management and prevention of stress were to be formulated, and incorporated in key training areas, particularly induction training, management development, supervisor training and volunteer training.[369]
  1. That Priority One did not meet this educational objective is apparent from the lack of training afforded to the senior officers with whom the plaintiff had contact. It was recognised, too, in the Multi-Method Evaluation and Review of the QAS Staff Support Service “Priority One Program” published in 2003.[370] The report was produced by a committee chaired by Professor Embelton with the assistance of Dr Shakespeare-Finch. Professor Embelton has been a consultant to the Queensland Ambulance Service since 1994,[371] and he has contributed to workshops and seminars associated with the program and given lectures on “psychological trauma, implications for trauma [sic], the area of post traumatic stress disorder”[372] as well as communication. I was unimpressed with his attempt to put a gloss on the report when he said –

“… we saw this as issues of reinforcement, to reinforce this [training of supervisors], to bring it into much more stronger consciousness and so that - and enhancement of what was already happening. So we were quite aware that it was happening, that there was adequate work being done, however, we wanted to stress this and underline it even more. In any system you can always develop, enhance.”[373]

I am satisfied that at least during the time the plaintiff worked for the Queensland Ambulance Service his supervisors and senior officers did not receive the requisite training.

  1. I have accepted the evidence of the plaintiff and his wife as to their conversations with Mr Borger.[374] I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that even though Mr Borger may not have been concerned about the way the plaintiff performed his work, the cluster of complaints made by the plaintiff was such that a properly trained supervisor in his position would have recognised them as possible signs of stress, and suggested to the plaintiff that he approach Priority One or otherwise be assessed professionally. The matters raised by Mrs Hegarty, if considered in isolation from those raised by the plaintiff, did not bear that quality, but in the context of the plaintiff’s complaints, they added to the overall picture presented to Mr Borger, making it an even clearer example of circumstances in which a properly trained supervisor would have been alerted to the possibility of the plaintiff’s suffering stress.
  1. Similarly, I have accepted the evidence of the plaintiff and his wife as to their conversations with Mr Jacobson and Mr Lawler at the medal ceremony.[375] And again I am satisfied that the cluster of complaints was such that properly trained officers in their positions would have appreciated that these were flags of possible dysfunction, and suggested to the plaintiff that he approach Priority One or otherwise be assessed professionally.
  1. I find that the system which the Queensland Ambulance Service had in place did not provide adequately for the training of supervisors to identify signs of dysfunction in personnel regularly exposed to distressing and traumatic experiences, so that they could be referred for psychological assessment and treatment (if necessary).[376]

Likely course of events in absence of employer’s default

  1. Had one of the plaintiff’s supervisors tapped him on the shoulder and suggested he approach Priority One or otherwise be professionally assessed –

(a) would he have done so; and

(b) what would have been the outcome?

  1. The plaintiff’s own evidence was that had a supervisor approached him along these lines while he was in Gayndah or after he transferred to Bundaberg, he would certainly have taken up the suggestion.[377] This evidence was self-serving[378] and further, as his counsel fairly conceded, it was of limited persuasive force, because it was evidence on a hypothetical proposition with the benefit of hindsight.[379]
  1. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that there was objective evidence corroborating that of the plaintiff. He relied on –

(a) the evidence of Professor Bryant that, intuitively, experts like him believe that such guidance can be effective;[380]

(b) the plaintiff’s vigorous pursuit of treatment for what he believed to be physical ailments;[381]

(c) the plaintiff’s obsessive personality, which made it less likely he would have consciously neglected a health issue;

(d) the plaintiff’s respect for the Priority One program generally, as illustrated by his enthusiastic pursuit of enrolment in the peer support training course;[382]

(e) that the plaintiff acted promptly (within six or seven weeks) in consulting Mr Clarke after Mr Scully suggested that he do so;[383]

(f) that the plaintiff enjoyed good relations with his supervisors, in particular Mr Tighe and Mr Borger;

(g) that since his diagnosis the plaintiff has pursued treatment to the fullest extent possible, despite logistical difficulties.[384]

  1. Counsel for the defendant submitted that there was evidence from which the Court should conclude on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff would not have taken up such a suggestion. He relied particularly on the concern about confidentiality which the plaintiff mentioned to Professor Bryant[385] and what he described as the plaintiff’s unexplained failure to take up an offer of treatment between February and April 1999 when he clearly recognised there was something amiss.[386] However, I accept the plaintiff’s evidence in cross-examination that his concern about confidentiality related to Peer Support Officers rather than counsellors, and that it did not influence him in not making contact with Priority One.[387] And I do not think that it would be fair to describe his conduct between February and April 1999 as an unexplained failure to take up an offer of treatment. At the conclusion of the peer support training course in February, he appreciated for the first time that something was wrong, but he could not identify it.[388] I accept his evidence that he told Mr Scully, in the presence of a course facilitator Maureen Pauli, that he did not feel ready to act as a Peer Support Officer because he had some personal work-related issues which he needed to address, and that Mr Scully subsequently wrote to him offering him unrestricted access to the services of Mr Clarke.[389] The plaintiff said of the incident involving the air transfer of a patient from Mundubbera to Gayndah[390] –

“The case eventually didn’t – it didn’t work out too good in the patient’s best interest. Subsequently, realising a few things were said by staff at the Bundaberg station, at this point I still couldn’t identify what the problem was within myself, but I’d certainly got a realisation that I needed to talk to someone. At that point, I made a phone call to Willy Clarke and made arrangements for an interview.”[391]

He saw Mr Clarke within a day or two of that phone call. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence on this point as a truthful and, in all the circumstances, adequate explanation of the delay between his completion of the peer support training course and his contacting Mr Clarke.

  1. The conversations which should have alerted senior officers to the possibility of dysfunction took place in 1996, and the plaintiff’s chronology of his emerging symptoms (which I have accepted at [28] above) indicates significant functional impairment by that time.  In all the circumstances, I infer that had one of the plaintiff’s supervisors tapped him on the shoulder and suggested he approach Priority One or otherwise be professionally assessed at about that time, he would have done so. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he would have done so at an earlier time.
  1. The counsellors retained by Priority One were hand picked, based on expert advice, for their suitability and knowledge in managing the needs of ambulance personnel.[392] I infer that had the plaintiff been referred to or approached one of them, he would have been professionally and competently assessed and referred to treating clinicians, as in fact occurred when he consulted Mr Clarke. The earlier an appropriate treatment regime had been implemented, the greater would have been his chance of not suffering to the extent he did, and the greater would have been his chance of a better long-term prognosis: this was the thrust of all the expert evidence, and particularly that of Dr Mulholland, which I have set out at [106] above.

Breach of duty of care

  1. It is now well established that an employer’s duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury to an employee –

“is a duty to take reasonable care to eliminate all risks of injury that can be reasonably foreseen and avoided – whether they are risks to the employee’s psyche, person or property.”[393]

The law no longer draws a distinction in principle between physical injury and psychiatric injury[394] but it does maintain the distinction between psychiatric injury and emotional distress, allowing recovery of damages only in the case of a “recognisable psychiatric illness”.[395]

  1. Once it is established that the risk of the employee sustaining a recognisable psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable, in the sense of its not being far fetched or fanciful,[396] the question becomes that of a reasonable response to that risk. This involves consideration of the magnitude of the risk, the degree of probability of its occurrence, the expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any conflicting responsibilities of the employer.[397]
  1. The risk that ambulance officers could develop psychiatric injury in the course of their work was expressly recognised in the Discussion Document produced in early 1991.[398] It is true that the plaintiff had obsessive traits in his personality which made him more vulnerable to psychiatric disorders than those without such traits. However, he could have developed such disorders without those traits,[399] and they did not render him so susceptible to psychiatric injury that it would have been unreasonable to require his employer to contemplate the possibility of harm to him or to take care to avoid such harm.[400] Anyway, “normal fortitude” is no longer a “pre-condition” for liability for negligently inflicted psychiatric illness.[401]
  1. Informal debriefing does not prevent or ameliorate psychopathology.[402] Therefore any system of such informal debriefing which may have been in place[403] was not an adequate response to the risk.
  1. The need for training of supervisors was also recognised at that early stage. It was not suggested that the geographic spread of the Queensland Ambulance Service’s operations or any other factor would have made training of supervisors focussing on their role in picking up on signs of possible dysfunction impracticable or unduly expensive or inconvenient. It would have afforded a reasonable response to the risk – but, as I have found,[404] it was not provided. Thereby the employer breached its duty of care to the plaintiff.

Causation

  1. The plaintiff bears the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that his employer’s breach of duty materially caused or materially contributed to compensable loss. In Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd[405] Mason J said –

“On the issue of causation it was for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his injuries were caused by the defendant’s omission to provide a safe place or system of work or to perform his statutory duty. To do so he must show that the safety measures would have been effective and that he would have made use of them if they had been available.”[406]

  1. In the same case Gibbs J said –

“The general principle is clear, that the plaintiff must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the breach of duty caused or materially contributed to his injury … This means that ‘it is for the plaintiff to prove on the balance of probabilities both that the safety measures would have been effective and that the injured person would have made use of them had they been available’”.[407]

  1. I am satisfied that if they had been given appropriate training, Mr Borger, Mr Lawler and Mr Jacobson would have been able to recognise signs of possible dysfunction in the plaintiff in 1996, that they would have done so, and that they would have suggested to him that he approach Priority One or otherwise be professionally assessed. I am further satisfied that the plaintiff would have taken up such a suggestion, and that he would have been referred to clinicians for treatment, with the chance of a better outcome than has in fact been achieved.
  1. For that loss of a chance to be compensable, it must be one associated with a recognisable psychiatric injury as opposed to emotional distress.
  1. The existence of a recognisable psychiatric injury is not a question of whether a plaintiff’s disability fits neatly within a particular diagnostic box. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR published by the American Psychiatric Association (“DSM-IV”) is merely a tool for classifying mental disorders. In New South Wales v Seedsman[408] Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P and Meagher JA agreed) discussed its limitations, many of which are expressly acknowledged by its authors, and went on –

“DSM-IV also contains reservations about its use in litigation which it is unnecessary to set out. The limitations of such use was [sic] also referred to in Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577 especially at 610-611 per Thorpe LJ. At 611 his Lordship rejected the proposition that the existence of a recognised psychiatric illness can be reduced to PTSD as defined in the DSM-IV or nothing.

Aspects of the application of post traumatic stress disorder in litigation remain controversial: see, for example, Mendelsohn ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Litigation’ (1999) 15 Australian Forensic Psychiatry Bulletin 3; Freckelton, ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Challenge for Public and Private Health Law’ (1985) 5 Journal of Law & Medicine 252.

The issue is not one of labelling, but of establishing a psychiatric injury of some character. As Brennan J put it in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 at 560; 54 ALR 417 at 425:

‘Compensation is awarded for the disability from which the plaintiff suffers, not for its conformity with a label of dubious medical acceptability.’

In each case, the court must deal with the particular submissions made to it.”[409]

Conclusion on liability

  1. By mid 1996 the plaintiff’s OCD and his PTSD had both developed beyond the sub-clinical to the point of causing clinically significant impairment in his social and occupational functioning warranting professional intervention in the nature of treatment rather than prevention. By that time he had sustained recognisable psychiatric injury.[410]
  1. I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s loss, namely the loss of the chance of a better outcome, was caused by his employer’s negligence. I am satisfied, too, that his loss was sustained by mid 1996.

No contributory negligence; no failure to mitigate loss

  1. The plaintiff did not recognise his own symptoms as possible signs of stress; such lack of recognition was not unreasonable[411] and so there is no basis for a finding of contributory negligence or of failure to mitigate his loss.

Breach of contract and breach of statutory duty

  1. The plaintiff is entitled to succeed also on his claims for breach of contract and breach of statutory duty. These claims were pleaded in the alternative.
  1. The employer’s duty to take reasonable care to avoid injury to its employee was an implied term of the plaintiff’s contract of employment. The defendant breached that term in the manner described above.
  1. Pursuant to s 28 of the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) the plaintiff’s employer was obliged to ensure his workplace health and safety – that is, to ensure that he was not exposed to risks that were more than trivial.[412] Breach of that statutory duty constituted a civil cause of action.[413] In the circumstances of this case, where the defendant admitted that there was a risk to the plaintiff which was more than trivial[414] the defendant then had the onus of showing that the obligation was discharged in an appropriate way by the taking of reasonable precautions and the exercise of proper diligence.[415] It failed to discharge that onus.

QUANTUM

  1. The plaintiff took up duties in Bundaberg on 1 February 1997. Coincidentally, that was the date upon which provisions of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) limiting an injured worker’s right to damages came into effect. Neither that legislation nor the later Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) affects his claim, because his cause of action was complete before that date.[416]
  1. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff lost the chance of a better outcome. The quantum of the judgment to be entered on his behalf must reflect the value of that lost chance, and the evaluation of it is to be approached as a matter of informed estimation.[417]
  1. The employer’s liability stems from the failure of senior officers to identify signs of possible dysfunction in mid 1996, by which time the plaintiff had, in my judgment, sustained what the law classifies as psychiatric injury. Had appropriate treatment been commenced at about the time his PTSD became a psychiatric injury and continued for two years or more, there was approximately a 1/3 chance of a good outcome, a 1/3 chance of a bad outcome in the sense of continuing significant symptomatology and incapacity for work, and a 1/3 outcome of an intermediate outcome.[418]
  1. I intend evaluating the loss of the chance of a better outcome by assessing the damages to which the plaintiff would be entitled if the loss to be visited upon the employer were the whole of the plaintiff’s suffering at and from that point in time and its sequelae, and then discounting that quantum by 35%.
  1. The plaintiff was born on 23 March 1961. He was 45 at trial and is now 46. He has not worked for the last eight years. I have previously described his suffering in Gayndah in 1996 and 1997,[419] after his transfer to Bundaberg[420] and since he ceased work and commenced treatment.[421] He has an ongoing need for regular and frequent psychiatric and psychological treatment. The finalisation of the litigation may bring about an improvement in his condition of up to 20%, and a greater prospect of treatment yielding positive results.[422] However, he will still need treatment, and although his treatment needs may decline over the next three or four years, Dr Bell did not foresee a time when he will not require any treatment at all.[423] 
  1. I assess the plaintiff’s pain and suffering and loss of the amenities of life at $70,000, half of which I apportion to past loss.
  1. I assess interest on past pain and suffering and loss of amenities at 2% per annum over ten years ($7,000).
  1. The plaintiff has not worked since April 1999. He received worker’s compensation payments until 12 October 2001.[424] More recently he has been receiving payments under an income protection insurance policy. The worker’s compensation will have to be deducted from the award of damages and it is relevant to the amount of past economic loss on which interest should be allowed. The payments under the insurance policy do not affect the assessment of past economic loss.[425]
  1. The parties agreed upon the rates of pay applicable to a QAS operational ambulance officer, a QAS administration officer and a QAS communications officer in the years ended 30 June 1999 to 30 June 2006, as well as the award wages payable to a bookkeeper/accounts clerk, an aged care nurse and a wardsman in the year ended 30 June 2006.[426] Of the three categories of ambulance officer, the operational officer has been the most highly paid, followed by the administration officer and then the communications officer. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the assessment of past loss of earning capacity should take account of Dr Mulholland’s evidence as to the likely outcome had there been intervention in the early 1990s (at the sub-clinical stage), and that this should be done by applying a weighted average calculation of the three ambulance officer positions (allowing 2/3 for the operational ambulance officer and 1/3 for the combination of the other two). Applying that methodology they calculated net economic loss to trial at $267,482.[427] Counsel for the defendant simply applied the wages of an operational ambulance officer over the whole period and arrived at net economic loss to trial of $284,600.[428]
  1. Mathematical precision is not possible or desirable in this area. I do not think the weighted average method is appropriate in this case, given my findings that the breach occurred in mid 1996 and as to the chance that was lost. Allowance must be made for the time between trial and judgment, and there needs to be some discounting for the vicissitudes of life. In all the circumstances, I assess past loss of earning capacity at $250,000.
  1. The gross worker’s compensation payments received amounted to $77,269.12,[429] and the income tax deducted from them (the Fox v Wood[430] component)[431] amounted to $25,262.62. I would allow interest on the amount of the past economic loss minus the net worker’s compensation payments received ($250,000 minus $52,006.50 = $197,993.50) at 5% per annum over eight years. I round the result up to $79,200.
  1. The plaintiff was an able and ambitious ambulance officer, and I am satisfied he would otherwise have worked until 60 or 65 before retiring. I am satisfied, too, that he will never be able to return to work as an operational ambulance officer. He will be incapable of working at all for the next three years. Thereafter there is about a 50% chance he will be able to work full-time and about an 80% chance he will be able to work part-time.[432] Such work would have to be in some other field, for example clerical work. He has expressed an interest in bookkeeping, but of course would require retraining. Further, it is reasonable to take account of the difficulties in finding work, particularly work in a new field, that are often faced by persons in their late 40s.
  1. The plaintiff’s counsel submitted that future economic loss should be calculated on the following basis[433] –

●For the next 3 years based on $773 per week (being the weighted average figure arrived at in the manner I have already described)

●For the subsequent 17 years on $623 per week (being $773 less $150 on account of earnings as a part-time bookkeeper)

●The total so arrived at should be discounted for contingencies by no more than 10%.

Counsel for the defendant submitted that the starting point should be the wages of an operational ambulance officer ($834.57 per week) to age 65, and that there should be discounting for contingencies of 40%.[434] The calculation of future economic loss by the plaintiff’s counsel was $393,315, and that by the defendant’s counsel $333,500.

  1. My assessment of future economic loss is $350,000, which I calculated as follows (using the 5% table) –
For the next three years $835 per week$121,576
For the subsequent 16 years $685 per week[435]$342,911
Discounted for contingencies by approximately 25% 
Result$350,000
  1. It was agreed that lost superannuation benefits on past economic loss should be calculated at 8% and on future economic loss at 9%.[436]  On that basis, the past loss is assessed at $20,000, and the future loss is assessed at $31,500.
  1. Special damages were agreed as follows[437] –
Expenses paid by WorkCover:
Medical$ 27,020.98 
Other$ 25,336.72$52,357.70
 
Other expenses:
Medical$ 7,047.00 
Pharmaceutical$ 809.95 
Travel$ 11,542.20 
Miscellaneous$ 972.00$20,371.15
   
TOTAL $72,728.85
  1. I allow interest on $16,004.85 (being $20,371.15 minus Medicare benefits $4,366.30[438]) of the special damages from 13 April 1999, calculated at 5% per annum over eight years. I round down the result to $6,400.
  1. Under the principle in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer[439] an injured plaintiff is to be compensated for his or her need for care and assistance, even though that care and assistance is provided gratuitously. The loss is to be assessed by reference to the commercial cost of obtaining similar care and assistance.[440] In this case the plaintiff claimed the value of care and assistance gratuitously provided by his wife as follows[441] –

For the past –

Six hours per day for one year from 13 April 1999

Thereafter three hours per day

For the future –

Three hours per day for the next three years

Thereafter one hour per day for 30 years.

Counsel for the defendant submitted that no need had been demonstrated, relying particularly on the activities disclosed in the plaintiff’s diary[442] and the evidence of Dr Nothling.[443] It was agreed that the value of any past need should be calculated at the rate of $18 per hour and the value of any future need at the rate of $20 per hour.[444]

  1. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has needed care and assistance of the type his wife described having provided.[445] Her fulfilment of his need has necessarily involved much more than what might have been regarded as a reasonable readjustment of their activities of daily living as a married couple.[446] I am not persuaded by the catalogue of activities in his diary that that has not been the case.
  1. It is not easy to arrive at a fair assessment of the plaintiff’s needs in this regard. In all the circumstances I would allow the following –
For the past –
Three hours per day for one year$ 19,710
One hour per day for seven years $ 45,990
Total$ 65,700
  
For the future –
one hour per day for three years[447]$20,500
  1. Interest on the past Griffiths v Kerkemeyer component at 5% per annum over eight years would be $26,280.
  1. The plaintiff will require ongoing treatment from a psychiatrist such as Dr Bell and a highly skilled clinical psychologist such as Dr Walsh. Dr Bell initially thought he would require five to ten years treatment,[448] but in his oral evidence he said that although the extent of the treatment required might reduce after three to four years, there would never be a time when he did not require any treatment.[449] At the time of trial the plaintiff was seeing Dr Bell at six to eight week intervals at a cost of $265 per visit, and there was the prospect of a short term increase in that frequency while a new medication regime was established. He was seeing Dr Walsh once a week at a cost of $372 per session. Dr Walsh estimated that he should continue treatment at that frequency for about a year and thereafter on an as needs basis. Both Dr Bell and Dr Walsh practise in Brisbane, and the plaintiff travels by train from Bundaberg for his appointments with them at a total cost of $67.40 per trip.[450]
  1. The cost of future medical treatment and associated expenses is assessed as follows –
Dr Bell$37.70 per week for 7.5 years[451]$ 12,354.30
 Thereafter, a global sum$ 3,000.00
Dr Walsh$372 per week for one year[452]$ 18,934.80
 Thereafter, a global sum$ 1,000.00
Medication- say,$ 1,000.00
Travel expenses- say,$ 7,500.00
Total $ 43,789.10

I round up the result to $43,800.

  1. The Fox v Wood component was agreed at $25,262.62.[453]
  1. The amount of the WorkCover refund was agreed at $124,806.15.[454]

Summary

  1. I assess damages (on the basis of the employer’s being responsible for the whole of the plaintiff’s suffering[455]) as follows –
Pain, suffering, loss of amenities of life$70,000.00
Interest$7,000.00
Past loss of earning capacity$250,000.00
Interest$79,200.00
Loss of past superannuation benefits$20,000.00
Future loss of earning capacity$350,000.00
Loss of future superannuation benefits$31,500.00
Special damages$72,728.85
Interest$6,400.00
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (past)$65,700.00
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (future)$20,500.00
Interest$26,280.00
Future medical treatment$43,800.00
Fox v Wood$25,262.62
Total$ 1,068,371.47
  1. My evaluation of the plaintiff’s loss of the chance of a better outcome is –

($1,068,371.47 x 65%) minus $124,806.15 = $569,635.31.

JUDGMENT

  1. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the sum of $569,635.31. I will hear the parties on the form of orders (including any order in relation to the extension of the limitation period) and on costs.

ORDERS

  1. The following orders were made on 1 May 2007:
  1. That the limitation period prescribed by section 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 for the commencement of the proceeding be extended to 13 April 2000;
  1. That there be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for $569,635.31;
  1. That the question of costs of and incidental to the proceeding be adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Annexure 1

The First Incident[456]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Early in the plaintiff’s time at Emerald,[457] he attended the scene of a motor vehicle accident. Two vehicles with a total of eleven occupants had collided on the highway west of Emerald. The plaintiff was called in to assist the on-duty officer and an honorary officer who had already been dispatched to the scene. The first ambulance arrived only moments before the plaintiff’s, despite having a “big head start”.[458] The plaintiff observed that the other officer had “frozen”, and the honorary officer was not moving, either through lack of experience or direction.[459]
  1. Eight people had been injured in this accident. One casualty was a young child, approximately two years old. The top half of the child’s head had been ground away as a result, according to the plaintiff’s deduction, of being dragged along the bitumen by the skidding vehicle. When he arrived the child still had a pulse and was breathing.[460] He administered first aid and placed the patient in the back of one of the ambulances. He recalls loading two other patients into the ambulance, before the honorary officer drove it back to Emerald.[461] The child died of his injuries.[462] The plaintiff had called the ambulance station for backup, which never arrived.[463]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff developed a “persistent recalling”[464] of the event – nightmares which came when he was asleep and awake. He had no control over these memories, which could be triggered by various stimuli. The events would run their course in his mind, in some graphic detail.[465] The thoughts were upsetting.[466] He was particularly troubled by the “grossness of the injuries”[467] sustained by the child, and the fact that his requested backup never came. He “had to treat all the remaining patients by [himself]”.[468] In the early stages after the event the recollections would come every day and every night. He continued to have the thoughts and dreams throughout his service with the QATB and QAS,[469] and at the time of the trial they still troubled him regularly: “every night, every second night”.[470] The intrusive thoughts came at least weekly.[471]

Any informal debrief/discussions?

  1. The plaintiff gave evidence that there was no formal or informal meeting of staff to discuss the incident. He did discuss the events with Trevor Tighe, the superintendent of the Emerald station; he spoke about the reactions of the other officers at the scene, and about the failure of backup to attend at his request. He could not recall Mr Tighe’s response.[472]

The Second Incident[473]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Between six and 15 months[474] into his time in Emerald,[475] and some time after the First Incident, the plaintiff attended a scene where a young male was trapped under a motor vehicle. He was the sole officer dispatched to this incident.[476] The accident occurred at a farm west of Emerald; the patient had been pinned face down when a utility vehicle collapsed off some jacks.[477] When the plaintiff arrived he inspected the body and deduced that the patient had been dead for some time. The deceased’s fingernails had been torn away, clawing at the ground in an attempt to extricate himself.[478] The plaintiff did not have enough equipment to free the body and had to wait for the police to arrive.[479]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed by this incident. He deduced that it had been a slow death, and later found out that the deceased’s personal circumstances were very similar to his own.[480] He began having daily nightmares about the incident, when he was asleep and awake. By the time of the trial he still had frequent recollections of the event.[481]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. There was no meeting with staff to discuss the incident.[482] The plaintiff could not recall any conversation about the incident with Mr Tighe.[483] Mr Tighe gave evidence of a conversation he had with the plaintiff on the day of the incident or the day after, in which the plaintiff described what had happened and shared his frustration at not being able to do anything for the patient.[484]

The Third Incident[485]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Some time after these events, between 18 months and two years into his service at Emerald,[486] the plaintiff attended the scene of a suicide, in a caravan.[487] The patient was a young man in his late teens.[488] The plaintiff was on call that evening; when he arrived at the scene the on-duty ambulance officer was already in attendance together with a number of police officers.[489] Upon entering the caravan, the plaintiff observed that no one was assisting the patient who was still breathing and had a pulse.[490] There was an entry wound in the patient’s mouth and an extensive amount of blood coming from the top of his head.[491]
  1. The plaintiff attempted to remove the firearm, to gain access to the patient. The police officer at the scene commented –

“Why are you bothering to do anything? Why don’t you just let him die?”[492]

The plaintiff ignored the officer and continued to treat the patient. He positioned the patient, and dressed the wound. He applied an Oxy-Viva machine in an attempt to ventilate the patient[493] but, because of the damage caused by the firearm, the applied oxygen caused brain matter to be pushed out through the hole in the patient’s skull.[494] The patient was loaded into an ambulance and transported to Emerald hospital. There the plaintiff was instructed by the attending doctor to cease resuscitation, and the patient died shortly after.[495]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed by the age of the patient, the nature of the suicide attempt, and the physical effects of the resuscitation attempts. He was particularly affected by the callousness of the police officer’s comment. Almost immediately, he began being troubled by daily nightmares and disturbing thoughts of the incident over which he had no control. At trial he still had frequent nightmares about this incident; they were less frequent than those about the first two incidents, and had diminished since he had began receiving treatment.[496]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. The plaintiff remembered asking the other officer why he had not initiated treatment, but could not recall an answer. There was no other staff discussion about the incident.[497]

The Fourth Incident[498]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. The plaintiff attended an attempted suicide in Emerald, at a house adjoining the ambulance station.[499] He was rostered on the evening shift; the superintendent, deputy superintendent, the station officer mechanic and a student officer were also present at the station. A senior officer took the call, and directed the plaintiff and the student officer to attend the scene. There they found a man on the roof of a two storey house, threatening to jump. The plaintiff eventually climbed on the roof himself and talked the man into coming down safely.[500]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed by the fact that he put himself in a dangerous position, being close enough to the man to be pulled off the roof. It also disturbed him that there were three more senior officers less than 30 metres walk away at the ambulance station who did not attend the scene.[501] By trial recollections of this incident were less intrusive than those of the previous incidents: treatment had enabled him to put it in perspective.[502]

The Fifth Incident[503]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Some time after these incidents, but while he was still stationed at Emerald,[504] the plaintiff attended a motor vehicle accident involving four patients.[505] He was on a rostered day off, having dinner at his uncle’s residence. The superintendent called him there, requesting that he come to the station. He indicated to the superintendent that he had consumed a large amount of alcohol; the request to attend the station became a directive. The superintendent had already dispatched the on-duty officer and an honorary officer, but was unsure how they would manage the situation.[506]
  1. Upon arriving at the scene the plaintiff observed that the two officers were not doing anything.[507] Four people sustained injuries in the two-vehicle accident, but only one was seriously hurt. One patient, a woman, had the front part of her skull ground away when the vehicle she was in flipped and dragged her along the bitumen. Brain matter was exposed. She suffered fractures and soft tissue injuries to her limbs.[508] The plaintiff asked the officer for information on the situation, which he could not provide. He then assessed the scene for himself, determining that only one person was seriously hurt,[509] and began treating this patient. Further officers arrived on the scene, one of whom sustained an injury himself.[510] The plaintiff became frustrated with the honorary officer, who was not able to retrieve the correct equipment on instruction. He also had an argument with the officer who arrived first as to who should transport the patient to the hospital.[511] After taking that patient to the hospital, he was later required to transport the same patient to the airport for transfer to Rockhampton.[512]
  1. The plaintiff returned to the ambulance station from the hospital. Angry, he demanded to know where the officer was who had arrived at the scene first.[513] The superintendent told him that the other officer was not there: “We knew you would have been looking for him when you came back to the station, so we sent him home.”[514] In the plaintiff’s view this officer had failed to manage an accident scene appropriately and “frozen on a patient”[515] on prior occasions. He was angry that he had been placed in a compromising position by a senior officer who knew that he had been drinking and may have poor clinical judgment. The on call officer had also been drinking that night.[516]

The effect it had on him

  1. At trial the plaintiff still recalled the patient’s face and injuries. He still felt the frustration he experienced that night, and his distress at being placed in a compromising position. Since receiving treatment, the intensity of these feelings had subsided.[517]
  1. Following another incident where he was required to attend an accident scene on a day off during which he had been drinking, he gave up alcohol.[518]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. Other than the confrontation when the plaintiff returned to the station, there was no discussion of this incident among the staff.[519]

The Sixth Incident[520]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. During one night shift[521] the plaintiff was required to attend a case in the Willows gem fields. The area was remote and traffic was light, so he proceeded without siren or flashing lights. He heard what he believed to be a gunshot.[522] The following day he discussed the incident with the station officer, who said –

“Hasn’t anyone ever told you, you never go out at night to the gem fields unless you’ve got your flashing lights on … The reason why is when you go out, they think you’re someone trying to jump their claim so they will shoot at you.”[523]

This distressed the plaintiff, who thought that this information should have been given to him earlier, as he was an operational officer required to go out to the gem fields frequently.[524]

The effect it had on him

  1. At trial the plaintiff still had memories of this event. External triggers, such as seeing or hearing a firearm, brought these thoughts to his mind.[525]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. There was no further discussion of the incident with other officers.[526]

The Seventh Incident[527]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Towards the end of his time in Emerald the plaintiff attended the scene of a collision between a car and a train.[528] The superintendent had already arrived at the scene, and was talking to other personnel.[529] The plaintiff attended to the female driver of the vehicle, initially by tilting her head to assist breathing. The patient had severe bone fractures to her limbs, including wounds where bone protruded from her skin, facial wounds and soft tissue injuries; she died at Emerald hospital.[530]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was troubled by the “sheer grossness”[531] of the patient’s injuries. He suffered frequent nightmares about the incident, which came when he was asleep and awake. They initially came frequently but, following treatment, they were less intrusive.[532]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. There was no discussion between the plaintiff and other officers about this incident.[533]

The Eighth Incident[534]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. The plaintiff was transferred to Ayr in the late 1980s. During that time a cyclone threatened the area.[535] He was rostered on days off. The superintendent phoned him requesting his attendance at the station, in anticipation of injuries that may take place in the course of the cyclone. He agreed, and upon arrival at the station he found that some officers who were rostered on duty had refused to come in.  He took his family into the station, to ensure their safety.[536] The cyclone struck just north of Ayr, and the resultant flooding caused him and his family to lose most of their belongings. In the course of the event his was the only emergency services vehicle in operation.[537]
  1. The plaintiff described an incident where he was driving an ambulance while an honorary officer was treating a patient. He almost drove the vehicle into a storm water drain: floodwater came over the ambulance’s windscreen.[538]

The effect it had on him

  1. The events on the day of the cyclone caused Mr Hegarty “a lot of anxiety and distress”.[539] The effect was not as severe as other events,[540] and by trial he had not been troubled by this incident for some time.[541]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. No.[542]

The Ninth Incident[543]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Early in his time at Gayndah the plaintiff attended the scene of an accident involving a logging truck which had rolled at the base of the Binjour Range.[544] The superintendent, Mr Tighe, drove with him to the site. The plaintiff gave evidence that the two men discussed the allocation of tasks and decided that Mr Tighe would be responsible for patient care, and the plaintiff for extrication.[545] (Mr Tighe could not recall this discussion,[546] but thought it more likely that he would have been in charge of liaising with the fire service regarding extrication.[547]) Upon arriving at the scene, the plaintiff observed the overturned truck, and logs strewn over the road.[548] The cab of the truck was upside down and partially imbedded in the roadside bank.[549] The driver of the truck – a man with a “very large belly and large chest”[550] – was suspended upside down in the driver’s seat, pinned between the seat and the steering wheel.[551] His head rested on the hood of the cabin, which had been partially crushed. The patient was conscious; he was breathing, talking and had a pulse.[552]
  1. Other emergency services officers were present. The plaintiff instructed one of the fire officers to take off the door of the vehicle and to cut the steering wheel. He was informed that the equipment was incapable of cutting through the steering wheel. He then indicated another position within the vehicle to be cut. He said that at that point Mr Tighe approached him and directed that he be responsible for patient care, and Mr Tighe would manage the extrication. (Mr Tighe does not recall this direction.[553]) Mr Hegarty complied.[554]
  1. The plaintiff described his attempts to treat the patient, including the application of oxygen, and an attempt to prevent the patient’s stomach crushing his diaphragm.[555] The patient deteriorated and eventually died.[556] During this time Mr Tighe was attempting to lift the prime mover with hydraulic rams. The plaintiff gave evidence that he knew these attempts would prove futile and told Mr Tighe as much.[557] There were protracted attempts to lift the prime mover, all of which failed, in part because of the weather conditions and softness of the ground.[558] The plaintiff had tried and failed to obtain the use of a hydraulic pump.[559] After the patient died activity at the scene slowed down. The plaintiff and another officer were then successful in extricating the patient, through the use of the ‘jaws of life’ (enhanced by a hydraulic pump) to cut through the backrest of the driver’s seat.[560] This process took “under three minutes”.[561] Mr Tighe suggested that the back seat was only able to be removed after a small polystyrene esky had been extracted.[562]
  1. The plaintiff denied suggestions that it had not been safe to extract the patient until the fire brigade arrived, and that he had been instructed by Mr Tighe to come away from the truck because it was too dangerous.[563] He also denied the suggestion that there had been no conflict between him and Mr Tighe.[564]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff described this as one of the most disturbing incidents of his career.[565] He believed that the patient “did not have to die”,[566] yet died slowly and painfully. He described the frustration of watching the patient die without being able to help.[567] At trial the incident continued to disturb him –

“I have extensive nightmares, very extensive nightmares. It affects me all the time. I think about it all the time. It’s just a thought that I just cannot get out of my head.”[568]

These thoughts were immediate and ongoing.[569] The dreams still came as frequently as weekly.[570] He described “reliving” the incident, thinking about every aspect of the event; the incident was “in front” of him, unfolding over hours.[571] The recollections could be triggered by seeing a truck, particularly a logging truck, or thinking about his father’s career as a truck driver.[572] He had no control over these thoughts.[573]

  1. Mr Tighe did not notice any change in the plaintiff’s behaviour following the incident.[574]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. The plaintiff gave evidence of repeatedly trying to discuss the incident with Mr Tighe, who refused to talk about it.[575] He denied the suggestion that, on the night of the incident, he and Mr Tighe discussed the incident upon their return to the ambulance station. He also denied that, in the days and weeks following the accident, there was “a fair bit of talk” about the incident among personnel of all the emergency services.[576]
  1. Mr Tighe gave evidence that he, the plaintiff, and local fire officers discussed the incident that night and over the following days.[577] He specifically recalled a conversation with the plaintiff on the night of the accident, after they had returned to the ambulance station and tended to the ambulance vehicles.[578] They went into the small kitchenette room at the back of the station, made tea and coffee, and discussed the incident, particularly the difficulties involved in the extraction of the patient.[579] He also recalled telling the plaintiff about seeing the truck in the Biggenden wrecking yard to which it was towed.[580] He said that everyone involved in the incident was upset by its outcome,[581] but also stated that he could not recall the plaintiff being upset, distressed or withdrawn.[582] Mr Tighe was “not aware” that the plaintiff had problems with the management of the extrication process, or tried to talk to him about the incident, or that he did not engage in conversation with the plaintiff.[583] Mr Tighe denied ever refusing to discuss the incident with the plaintiff.[584] There was no “calling together of a group” to discuss the incident.[585]

The Tenth Incident[586]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Approximately 18 months into his time in Gayndah, the plaintiff was required to attend the scene of a suicide in a flat above an electrical store.[587] He was on call that evening, and was directed to attend as backup.[588] He and Mr Tighe arrived almost simultaneously, and entered the flat together.[589] Upon entering the main bedroom they discovered a young female lying on the bed, with a high powered rifle propped up against the bed and held between her legs. The whole of the patient’s head above the lower jaw was gone. Blood and fragments of bone and brain were scattered around the room, on the roof, walls and floor. Mr Tighe went outside and vomited.[590]
  1. The plaintiff knew the patient – she was the daughter of an officer at the Gayndah fire station, and a friend of an ambulance officer.[591]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed by the “sheer grossness”[592] of the incident, the type of rifle used and the extent of the injury. He was distressed by the age of the patient.[593] He was troubled by dreams and nightmares about the incident, which came when he was asleep and awake.[594] He had no control over these thoughts,[595] and they continued throughout his career.[596] At trial they still troubled him daily,[597] or at least as frequently as weekly.[598] Anything to do with guns, especially if a young person was involved in a shooting, triggered the recollections.[599]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. No.[600]

The Eleventh Incident[601]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Some time after these incidents, during the course of his service at Gayndah, the plaintiff had some involvement in a case of murder and attempted suicide.[602] He was on call, and was dispatched to a scene within walking distance of the ambulance station. He and a police officer entered the residence together.[603] The plaintiff smelt blood and urine, and, some distance into the dwelling, discovered a deceased female propped up against the wall and a display cabinet. He checked the patient for vital signs, and determined she was dead. He was concerned that he and the police officer had proceeded so far into the building when the perpetrator of the attack on the woman could still have been present. The patient was left in the care of the police officer, as it was a crime scene.[604]
  1. Later that evening, the plaintiff – who was still on call – received a call at his home, directing him to come to the station: he was required to attend the site of a shooting on a property a short way out of Gayndah. On the way to the property, he and Mr Tighe came across an empty motor vehicle at the side of the road. There was an indent in the roof above the driver’s seat the size of a .22 calibre bullet.[605] They located a man further along the road who had placed a .22 calibre rifle against the front part of his skull and fired.[606] The plaintiff surmised that the bullet had gone through the skin without penetrating the skull, before exiting and making the hole in the roof of the vehicle. The patient was bleeding profusely and the plaintiff could not find an exit wound. He treated the patient in the ambulance while Mr Tighe drove to Gayndah hospital. The plaintiff and Mr Tighe knew, on their way out to the property, that the patient was the man who had stabbed the woman (his de facto partner) at the residence near the ambulance station.[607]
  1. The plaintiff denied the suggestion that the woman had been alive, on the veranda, when he arrived at the first scene, and that she had died in his presence.[608] He also denied that Mr Tighe took the second patient to Maryborough while he remained on call in Gayndah.[609]

The effect it had on him

  1. The two patients the plaintiff treated on this occasion lived two doors down from his own home (the stabbing had occurred at the victim’s parents’ home). He was concerned that someone who had committed such an attack lived so close to his own family.[610] He was disturbed by the “blatant disregard for life”[611] that lay behind the attack. The incident “played on [his] mind”[612] for some time, but he did not have “extensive intrusive dreams or nightmares”.[613] The thoughts ceased after he began treatment.[614]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. The plaintiff strongly denied the suggestion that the incident was “a topic of conversation in the station for some days.”[615] He said –

“I tried to talk to Mr Tighe but he wouldn’t talk, he wouldn’t listen.”[616]

The Twelfth Incident[617]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Between eight and 18 months into his service in Gayndah[618] the plaintiff attended the scene of a motorbike accident.[619] He was on call that evening, and asked his wife to contact an honorary officer to assist at the scene. The accident occurred in the main street of Gayndah. The motorbike had hit a metal barrier, which sent the rider and the bike into a power pole. The rider’s helmet was cracked, indicating that the force of the impact was severe.[620] The patient was a young man in his late teens or early 20s.[621] The plaintiff and the honorary officer removed the patient’s helmet and observed that the top part of his skull was spongy, indicating a serious head injury. They began treatment, and transported the patient to the doctor’s surgery.[622]
  1. At the time there was only one doctor in Gayndah – a public doctor with a right of private practice. During the early stages of the plaintiff’s time in Gayndah, the usual procedure was to take emergency patients to the doctor’s surgery then, if directed, to the hospital. Under the QATB system, “the doctor’s word was law”[623] – his instructions had to be obeyed.
  1. When the plaintiff transported the patient to the surgery on this occasion, the doctor examined the patient in the back of the ambulance. The doctor instructed that the ambulance officers cease treatment. Some minutes later the patient went into respiratory arrest and cardiac arrest, and then died.[624]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff found “the actions of the doctor questionable and very distressing”.[625] He found it disturbing that someone in a position of authority gave him a direction contrary to his teaching, and his instinct to try to save a life. At trial he still had dreams and nightmares about the incident, which came when he was asleep and awake. The regularity and intensity of these thoughts had been decreasing since he had began receiving treatment.[626]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. Following this incident, Mr Tighe asked the plaintiff why he had not requested backup. He responded that he had made such a request. There was no other discussion regarding this incident.[627]

The Thirteenth Incident[628]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. The plaintiff attended a suicide by hanging about 18 or 20 months into his service at Gayndah.[629] He was on call that evening, and was directed to attend the scene. Upon arriving at the residence, he found an elderly female patient lying on the concrete floor under the house. She was deceased. He observed a deep red/purple depression on her neck. He learned that she had hung herself with baling twine from the rafter under the house. Prior to his arrival, the patient’s husband and son had cut her down and placed her on the floor.[630]
  1. The plaintiff learned the circumstances of the suicide. The deceased had stood on a stool in the downstairs shower area under the high blocked house. She had tied the baling twine around her neck and the rafter, then stepped off the stool. The plaintiff considered that the deceased could have saved herself at any time.[631]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed that someone could be distraught to the degree that they would be so committed to taking their own life, and “the selfishness of it or the sheer determination of it”.[632] His thoughts about the case came frequently, though not as frequently as those concerning other incidents. They came when he was asleep and awake, but ceased when he began receiving treatment.[633]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. No evidence was led as to any informal discussion of this incident.

The Fourteenth Incident[634]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. A few years into his service in Gayndah[635] the plaintiff attended an incident where a ten year old boy had drowned. He was on duty, and received a call from the Bundaberg communications room concerning the incident.[636] He contacted an honorary officer and together they proceeded to the scene. There was some difficulty in locating the site, due to incomplete information. When they arrived the deceased boy had been completely covered with a blanket.[637] The plaintiff treated the patient: he was confident that the boy was dead, but could not accept it. He transported the patient to the hospital, and then to the morgue.[638]
  1. The deceased boy lived next door to the plaintiff. The two families were good friends: they had barbecues and other meals together, their children played together, and they would look after each other’s children when required.[639]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was “grossly affected”[640] by this incident, particularly because of the closeness of the child: “It was almost like losing one of your own children.”[641] He experienced very intrusive nightmares, day and night. Many things could trigger these thoughts, which started immediately after the incident.[642] They were a “constant feature” of his life through to 1996 or 1997, and happened about once a week.[643]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. The plaintiff received a phone call soon after the incident from someone calling all local ambulance stations to inform them of the death of an officer who worked at the Bundaberg communications centre. He told the caller about the drowning case, but there was no further discussion of the matter.[644] There was no other discussion of the incident.[645]

The Fifteenth Incident[646]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. In about 1994 or 1995 the plaintiff was involved in the air transport of a young male patient from the Gayndah hospital to Bundaberg. He was on call that night, and, after collecting the necessary equipment from the ambulance station, proceeded to the hospital.[647] The patient was about 10-12 years old, and attended the same school as the plaintiff’s children. On enquiry, the plaintiff was told that the patient was being treated for leukaemia. He examined the patient, and told the attending nurses that he believed the boy was suffering from meningitis, not leukaemia. His concerns were dismissed.[648]
  1. The plaintiff lifted the patient to place him on a stretcher. He observed that the boy stopped breathing for a time, but the nurses dismissed his concerns. He asked who was escorting the patient to the airport, but no answer was forthcoming.[649] At the airport, he shared his concerns with the air attendant, and indicated that he was “not happy”[650] with the patient being transferred by air. He thought that the Royal Flying Doctor Service should transport the patient, not the QAS, or that a doctor should be present on the plane.[651] The boy stopped breathing for a second time when he was lifted and loaded into the plane. Later that morning the plaintiff was told that the boy had gone into cardiac arrest on the flight and died; the patient’s father was required to assist with the resuscitation attempt.[652]
  1. The plaintiff was required to return to the hospital from the airport to retrieve equipment. There he found an aircraft call sheet relating to this patient, in a wastepaper basket. The words “meningitis, query, leukaemia” were written on it.[653] This was not the information he had received, and he formed the view that it had been deliberately withheld to ensure a hasty transfer.[654]

The effect it had on him

  1. This incident disturbed the plaintiff because he knew the patient through his children’s school. He was disturbed by the fact that his concerns and opinions were “so easily dismissed”.[655]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. A coroner’s inquiry was held after the incident at which the plaintiff gave evidence. He recalled being “clearly instructed to keep [his] mouth shut”.[656]
  1. The inquest took place in Bundaberg, Gayndah and Brisbane. The plaintiff gave evidence at the inquest on 17 June 1996 in Gayndah.[657] Mr Tighe was in attendance that day; according to the plaintiff, Mr Tighe did not make it known that he was there as a Peer Support Officer, nor did he offer him assistance.[658] He could not recall having a conversation with Mr Tighe after he gave evidence at the inquest.[659]
  1. Mr Tighe gave evidence that Mr Scully requested that he attend in his capacity as a Peer Support Officer to support the plaintiff.[660] Mr Tighe said that he spoke with the plaintiff before and after he gave evidence, and that he had been “a little bit stressed” but “light-hearted”.[661] Mr Tighe noticed no changes in the plaintiff from when they last worked together in 1990.[662]
  1. Mr Borger recalls a discussion about the incident with the plaintiff, but it was limited to a description of events and the patient’s family.[663]

The Sixteenth Incident[664]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. Early in his time at Bundaberg the plaintiff was required to attend a motor vehicle accident.[665] He and another officer proceeded to scene and found the vehicle and surrounding vegetation on fire. At that time they were the only emergency service personnel at the scene, though the police arrived soon after.[666] The plaintiff was able to get close to the vehicle, and observed that its occupants had been incinerated. By counting leg bones, he surmised that three people had been in the car. A search was conducted of the nearby area because of the possibility that a passenger had been thrown from the vehicle; it was later determined that only two people had been in the car. When the fire service eventually arrived the plaintiff and his partner returned to the station as they were no longer required.[667]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff found the sight and smell of the incident very disturbing.[668] He vividly described the sight of the partially incinerated bodies, and the smell of burning flesh and hair. He began having intrusive thoughts and nightmares about the incident, both when he was asleep and awake. The frequency and intrusiveness of these recollections  diminished after he began receiving treatment.[669]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. No.[670]

The Seventeenth Incident[671]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. While stationed at Bundaberg, the plaintiff attended to a stroke victim[672] with a student ambulance officer, a Mr Geddes. He was Mr Geddes’ mentor, a position for which he had successfully completed a course. The adult male patient was located on a waterbed in his residence. After a brief examination, the plaintiff instructed the student officer to apply the Oxy-Viva machine. The machine produced an unusual hissing sound that indicated to the plaintiff that a seal was loose. The student officer was unable to repair the machine, so the plaintiff did it himself.[673]
  1. The plaintiff attached a monitor to the patient. It revealed that the patient required defibrillation to correct a fluttering heart rhythm. He had difficulty moving the patient from the waterbed, where it would have been unsafe to administer the electric shock. Twice he had to abort the shock procedure because the student officer was too close.[674] It had to be aborted a third time because of the proximity of the patient’s wife – the plaintiff threw her across the room. When the shock was administered the patient’s heart stopped beating; the plaintiff began cardiopulmonary resuscitation. A back-up unit arrived and the patient was transported to Bundaberg hospital, where he died.[675]
  1. When the plaintiff began his shift the next evening, he was met by the officer in charge and other officers. He was taken to the staff room where, in his words, “an inquisition took place”.[676] He was asked various questions about his handling of the incident without being afforded proper opportunity to answer.[677] The outcome of the meeting was that he was not to act as a mentor for one month, and all of his case sheets for that period were subject to mandatory review.[678] The effect of this was that he was not able to work with any student or honorary officers: he worked “unsupervised, unaided”.[679]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed by the fact that the patient was a young man with a new baby: the patient’s circumstances “sit[] quite heavily with [him]”.[680] He was affected by the fact that so much went wrong in the course of treating the patient, and by the fact that he was not afforded the chance to fully explain his actions.[681] The plaintiff had dreams and nightmares about the incident while he was asleep and awake. The frequency and intensity of these thoughts diminished when he began treatment.[682]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. Aside from the discussion in the staff room, the plaintiff discussed the incident with another officer, a Mr Babb. They discussed the incident and the meeting in the staff room. Mr Babb asked why he had not simply walked out of the meeting. There were no further discussions.[683]

The Eighteenth Incident[684]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. While at Bundaberg, the plaintiff attained qualifications to act as an air attendant for the QAS.[685] On two occasions the plane on which he was serving had engine trouble.[686] The first incident occurred on a flight from Hervey Bay to Bundaberg.[687] An engine failed soon after take-off, and the pilot managed to return to Hervey Bay and land safely.[688] The second incident occurred about three weeks later when he was transferring patients from Cunnamulla to Toowoomba, then to Brisbane before returning to Bundaberg.[689] The plane’s crew was the same as during the first incident.[690] At Cunnamulla the plaintiff observed oil sprayed on the outer skin of the aircraft, which he brought to the attention of the pilot. He observed more oil on the aircraft at Toowoomba; when the pilot removed the lower cover of the engine, some two litres of oil escaped. The patient they were to transport to Brisbane was taken back to the Toowoomba hospital.[691] The plaintiff and the pilot were directed to return to Bundaberg, but they refused to comply: they stayed in a motel at Toowoomba that night. Early the next morning, the plaintiff met the QAS’s chief pilot and an engineer at the airport. He understood that, following an inspection, the aircraft was declared not to be airworthy.[692]

The effect it had on him

  1. After the first incident the plaintiff began having daily distressing thoughts about the event. These diminished when he began receiving treatment.[693] He found having the two incidents so close together to be “greatly disturbing”.[694] Although he subsequently was very reluctant to fly, he still performed his duties as an air attendant. He was distressed by thoughts that another incident might occur.[695]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. The plaintiff discussed the first incident with Mr Pat Denham, the officer in charge at Bundaberg. The plaintiff did not initiate the discussion; he recalled being told to say nothing about the incident, because “the public don’t need to hear about this”.[696] Following the second incident he had another discussion with Mr Denham, who told him –

“Don’t speak to anyone about this. You’re to keep your mouth shut. … I don’t think I’m going to let you work with Davey Harlow [the pilot on both occasions] anymore because you keep breaking aircraft.”[697]

The Nineteenth Incident[698]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. The plaintiff attended on two suicides by hanging while at Bundaberg.[699] He was called to the first incident to be the backup unit. He arrived at the scene at the same time as the primary unit. An elderly man directed them to the backyard of the house, where the young female patient’s father had found her hanging by a rope. The patient’s father had cut her down before the ambulances arrived.[700] The plaintiff examined the patient, but found no signs of life. He observed rope marks around the patient’s neck, and marks on two of her fingers. He concluded that the patient had changed her mind about committing suicide and had attempted to free herself by slipping her fingers between the rope and her neck. The patient had an eight month old child.[701]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed by the fact that the patient, a young mother, had committed suicide. He found the way the she died distressing – it would have been a slow process, in which she had been unsuccessful in her attempts to free herself. The plaintiff started having dreams and nightmares about the incident, which came when he was asleep and awake.[702] At trial he still had disturbing thoughts about the incident, but they were not as intrusive compared to his thoughts about other incidents. They had become more manageable after he had begun treatment.[703]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. No evidence was led as to any informal discussion of this incident.

The Twentieth Incident[704]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. The plaintiff was just coming off a night shift when he was directed to attend the scene of another suicide by hanging. He and another officer proceeded to a residence on the outskirts of Bundaberg. They found an adult female patient lying in the backyard; her husband had found her hanging by rope and had cut her down.[705] The patient had tied a rope around a beam protruding from a chook pen. The beam was low to the ground and the patient could have aborted the suicide attempt at any time by kneeling or standing up. The plaintiff and the other officer began resuscitation procedures. Another ambulance arrived with a paramedic, who employed advanced patient care techniques.[706] After “extensive and exhaustive resuscitation attempts”[707] the patient was declared deceased.

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was disturbed by the method the patient had used to commit suicide, and by the fact that she left behind a young family. He began having dreams and nightmares about it. He thought about the incident, “trying to put it in perspective as to what had happened and why”.[708] He was no longer affected by the incident, since beginning treatment.

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. No evidence was led as to any informal discussion of this incident.

The Twenty-First Incident[709]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. In early 1999, while he was in service at Bundaberg, the plaintiff attended the scene of a motor vehicle accident. He was on duty that evening, and proceeded to the scene with a paramedic, Mr Charteris. They found a car upside down among the trees, and an adult female walking around outside the vehicle. The woman said that she was not injured, and that she had been the only person in the car. The plaintiff could smell alcohol, and the woman was slurred and unsteady on her feet. She did not seem confident that she had been alone in the vehicle.[710] The plaintiff crawled into the car and found children’s toys and clothing. He thoroughly checked the interior but could not locate a child. However the roof did not respond naturally to his weight, and he suspected that there was someone trapped underneath the vehicle. He shared his concern with Mr Charteris.[711]
  1. The plaintiff explored the surrounding bush, but maintained his theory that someone was trapped beneath the car.[712] The female driver claimed that she had left the child with her partner, which he denied when contacted by the police. She eventually conceded that the child may have been in the car. The fire service arrived and lifted the car with air jacks (inflatable mattresses) – Mr Charteris and some fire officers determined that there was no one underneath. However, some time later when the vehicle was rolled on its side, they found that the child had indeed been trapped. The plaintiff and Mr Charteris attempted unsuccessfully to resuscitate the child.[713]

The effect it had on him

  1. The plaintiff was very frustrated that he had pointed out where he thought the child was but that his suggestion was dismissed. He wondered whether, if they had found the child sooner, the result would have been different. He had dreams and nightmares about it, in which he saw the child. His thoughts about the case came when he was asleep and awake, but they “subsided slightly”[714] in frequency and intensity after he began receiving treatment.

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. The plaintiff tried to discuss the incident with Mr Charteris on a number of occasions. He asked why Mr Charteris had not listened to his theory about the location of the child; Mr Charteris “didn’t want to talk about it”.[715] He did not discuss the incident with any other officer. [716]

Annexure 2

Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] QSC 90

Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] QSC 90

Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] QSC 90

Annexure 3

The Twenty-Second Incident[717]

The plaintiff’s description of events

  1. In early 1999 the plaintiff was involved in the air transport of a patient with a retained placenta. The patient was being transferred from Mundubbera to Bundaberg. The plaintiff was the air attendant on duty, and flew to Mundubbera to collect the patient.[718] The enrolled nurse who escorted the patient to the airport was unable to answer his detailed questions.[719] After some discussion the patient, her husband, the infant and some belongings were flown to Bundaberg. On the plaintiff’s instructions, the pilot flew at the lowest safe altitude.[720] He denied that he became concerned with the patient’s condition during the flight and requested an ambulance be at the airport.[721] A single transport officer met the plane at Bundaberg. A transport officer generally deals with non-critical patients; the plaintiff thought that this officer ought to request backup to deal with this patient.[722] The plaintiff was required to accompany a different patient to Brisbane.[723]
  1. When the plaintiff returned to Bundaberg he was confronted by Ms Margaret Charteris, who told him that the patient with a retained placenta had almost died on the way to the hospital. She quizzed him about his treatment of the patient and the information he had received in Mundubbera;[724] she was concerned that the patient had not been sufficiently stabilised in Mundubbera to render the air transport procedure safe.[725] According to the plaintiff, Ms Charteris showed him a draft “letter of concern” she had written to the officer in charge of Bundaberg station on 26 March 1999, some five days before she submitted the final version.[726]

Ms Charteris’s description of events

  1. Ms Charteris met the patient and transport officer en route to the hospital, and began treating the patient in the transport officer’s vehicle.[727]
  1. Ms Charteris spoke to the plaintiff and Mr Denham about the incident, as she was concerned about the treatment the patient received prior to her involvement. The plaintiff did not know there had been a problem with the patient,[728] but expressed concern about the way treatment was administered in Mundubbera, and about the lack of information he had received at the Mundubbera airport.[729] Ms Charteris prepared a written report,[730] dated 1 April 1999. She said the date on the document was the date it was prepared,[731] but accepted that she might have prepared it earlier than 1 April and made minor changes before handing it in.[732] Ms Charteris recalled showing the report to the plaintiff, and accepted that it may have been on 26 March.[733]

Any informal debrief/discussion?

  1. Soon after his discussion with Ms Charteris, the plaintiff was approached by Mr Denham, the officer in charge. Mr Denham asked him to write a report detailing the information he received from the enrolled nurse at Mundubbera. Referring to the Fifteenth Incident, Mr Denham commented –

“We do not need another incident like the one that happened out of Gayndah.”[734]

The plaintiff’s evidence was that he was not told that his subsequent cases would be subject to a mandatory audit, nor was he suspended from air attendant duties.[735] He performed work for the QAS, including work as an air attendant, following this incident,[736] but stopped work shortly after.[737]

Annexure 4

Scholarly articles cited in these reasons

Davidson, J.R.T., Book, S.W., Colket, J.T., Tupler, L.A., Roth, S., David, D., Hertzberg, M., Mellman, T., Beckham, J.C., Smith, R D, Davison, R.M., Katz R., & Feldman, M.E. (1997). Assessment of a new self-rating scale for post-traumatic stress disorder. Psychological Medicine, 27, 153-160.

Foa, E.B., Cashman, L., Jaycos, L., & Perry, K.I. (1995). The validation of a self-report measure of posttraumatic stress disorder: the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale. Psychological Assessment,9, 445-451.

Horowitz, M.J., Wilner, N., & Alvarez, W. (1979). The impact of event scale: A measure of subjective stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 41, 209-218.

Keane, T.M., Caddell, J.M., & Taylor, K.L. (1988). Mississippi Scale for Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Three studies in reliability and validity. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 85-90.

Watson, C.G., Juba, M.P., Manifold, V., Kucala, T., & Anderson, P.E.D. (1991). The PTSD interview: Rationale, description, reliability, and concurrent validity of a DSM-III-based technique. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 47, 179-188.

Weathers, F.W., Blake, D.D., Krinsley, K.E., Haddad, W., Huska, JA. & Keane, T.M. (1992). The Clinician Administered PTSD scale: Reliability and construct validity. 26th Annual Meeting of Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy. Boston, MA.

Footnotes

[1] Transcript of the proceeding, p 3. On the structure of the ambulance service in Queensland see Ambulance Services Act 1967 (Qld); Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld); transcript of the proceeding, p 616.

[2] Further Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006, [16], [18].

[3] Transcript of the proceeding, p 6.

[4] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [6]; Further Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006, [6].

[5] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7], [8].

[6] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 616-617.

[7] Transcript of the proceeding, p 822.

[8] Transcript of the proceeding, p 724.

[9] Transcript of the proceeding, p 723.

[10] Transcript of the proceeding, p 724.

[11] Transcript of the proceeding, p 819.

[12] Transcript of the proceeding, p 820.

[13] Transcript of the proceeding, p 725.

[14] Transcript of the proceeding, p 82.

[15] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 82, 821.

[16] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 82, 821.

[17] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 82-83.

[18] Transcript of the proceeding, p 82.

[19] Transcript of the proceeding, p 82.

[20] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 83-84.

[21] Transcript of the proceeding, p 84.

[22] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 615-616; Exhibit 4, [3]-[4].

[23] Exhibit 1, Tab 1, pp 170-177.

[24] Exhibit 2, Tab 2 (“Discussion Document – For the Working Party Investigating Stress and the Need for Counselling Services in the Queensland Ambulance Transport Brigade – February 1991”), [4.1]; Exhibit 4, [7]; mission statement in Exhibit 4, Attachment 4 (“Memorandum to Regional Assistant Commissioners re establishment of the Priority One Program, date 27/05/1992”).

[25] Exhibit 4, [6]-[16]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 616-620.

[26] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 18-20.

[27] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 11-12, 364, 380 (Prof Bryant), 436 (Prof Raphael).

[28] Transcript of the proceeding, p 18.

[29] At the commencement of the trial senior counsel for the defendant sought particulars of the “reasonable grounds upon which it is said the particular supervisors ought to have been aware that [the plaintiff] was suffering any illness.” Counsel for the defendant responded that he relied on the matters pleaded in [8C]-[8G] of the Further Amended Statement of Claim: see transcript of the proceeding, pp 21-22. Note that the Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave on the second day of the trial, does not alter these paragraphs. I shall discuss these matters, and the evidence called in relation to them, in due course.

[30] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006.

[31] There were only three sub-paragraphs (labelled (f)-(h)) in paragraph 7.

[32] Further Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006.

[33] Further Amended Reply to the Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006.

[34] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 73-74.

[35] Transcript of the proceeding, p 75.

[36] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 76-78.

[37] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 79, 456, 519-520.

[38] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 85, 520-521.

[39] Transcript of the proceeding, p 525.

[40] Transcript of the proceeding, p 722.

[41] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 520-521.

[42] The plaintiff was in Gayndah from 1989 to 1996.

[43] Transcript of the proceeding, p 714.

[44] Transcript of the proceeding, p 840.

[45] Transcript of the proceeding, p 819.

[46] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 820-821, 825.

[47] Transcript of the proceeding, p 814.

[48] Transcript of the proceeding, p 806.

[49] Transcript of the proceeding, p 709.

[50] Exhibit 58.

[51] Exhibit 46.

[52] Transcript of the proceeding, p 856.

[53] Transcript of the proceeding, p 848.

[54] Exhibit 4, Attachment 1 (“Curriculum Vitae of Paul Joseph Scully”); Transcript of the proceeding, p 614.

[55] Exhibit 4, [5]-[6].

[56] Exhibit 4, Attachment 1.

[57] Transcript of the proceeding, p 644.

[58] Transcript of the proceeding, p 649.

[59] Transcript of the proceeding, p 649.

[60] Transcript of the proceeding, p 655.

[61] Exhibit 60.

[62] Exhibit 25; Exhibit 3, Tab 8 (“Reports of Professor Bryant”).

[63] Exhibit 23; Exhibit 3, Tab 7 (“Reports of Dr P Mulholland”).

[64] Exhibit 6.

[65] Transcript of the proceeding, p 581.

[66] Exhibit 5.

[67] Exhibit 45.

[68] Exhibit 54.

[69] Exhibit 4, Attachments 24 (“A Report Examining the Application of Psychological Debriefing within the Queensland Ambulance Service”) and 25 (“A Multi-Method Evaluation and Review of the QAS Staff Support Service ‘Priority One Program’”).

[70] Exhibit 44.

[71] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7].

[72] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8].

[73] Transcript of the proceeding, p 32.

[74] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 207-208, 458-460.

[75] Transcript of the proceeding, p 208.

[76] The plaintiff did not experience intrusive thoughts of the eighth or fifteenth incident: see Annexure 1.

[77] See [21] above.

[78] The plaintiff remains troubled most by the four incidents I have described at [21] above. However, at trial he explained that he was also still troubled by the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, twelfth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twenty-first incidents: see Annexure 1. His intrusive thoughts of these incidents have diminished but not ceased since he began receiving treatment.

[79] Transcript of the proceeding, p 191.

[80] Transcript of the proceeding, p 244, 246-248, 250-251, 275-276, 306, 316-318, 455, 457, 461, 463, 465-466.

[81] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 191, 312, 553.

[82] Transcript of the proceeding, p 191.

[83] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 124-242, 568.

[84] Exhibit 3, Tab 6 (“Letter from Dr R Broad to Dr T Bell”); Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Report to the Court 25 July 2006, pp 4-5 (pp 6-7 of tab); Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to Dr P Byrnes (p 1 of tab); Exhibit 3, Tab 10 Exhibit 3, Tab 10, Report to WorkCover 14 August 2000, p 2 (p 2 of tab); transcript of the proceeding, pp 506 (Dr Mulholland), 731-732 (Dr Nothling).

[85] Transcript of the proceeding, p 210.

[86] The fifteenth incident (see Annexure 1); transcript of the proceeding, pp 523-524.

[87] Transcript of the proceeding, p 509.

[88] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 505-506.

[89] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 307-308.

[90] Transcript of the proceeding, p 310.

[91] Transcript of the proceeding, p 311.

[92] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 312-313.

[93] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 314-315.

[94] Transcript of the proceeding, p 522.

[95] Transcript of the proceeding, p 522.

[96] Transcript of the proceeding, p 524.

[97] Transcript of the proceeding, p 523.

[98] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 221-222.

[99] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8C], [8G].

[100] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 832, 844-846.

[101] Transcript of the proceeding, p 201.

[102] Transcript of the proceeding, p 201.

[103] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 540, 551.

[104] Transcript of the proceeding, p 540.

[105] Transcript of the proceeding, p 541. See also pp 552-554 as to the actual time worked.

[106] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 822, 845.

[107] I note that the plaintiff’s daughter ultimately became a teacher, and that his son was a university student at the time of trial: transcript of the proceeding, p 79.

[108] Transcript of the proceeding, p 807.

[109] Ex 28

[110] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 202, 536-537; Exhibit 12.

[111] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8E], [8F].

[112] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 710-713.

[113] Transcript of the proceeding, p 204.

[114] Transcript of the proceeding, p 204.

[115] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 710-713.

[116] Transcript of the proceeding, p 204.

[117] Transcript of the proceeding, p 205.

[118] Transcript of the proceeding, p 206.

[119] Transcript of the proceeding, p 810.

[120] Transcript of the proceeding, p 537.

[121] Transcript of the proceeding, p 811.

[122] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 538, 811.

[123] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 510-511.

[124] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 538-539.

[125] Transcript of the proceeding, p 807.

[126] Exhibit 28 (initialled by Mr Jacobson on 8 May 1996); Transcript of the proceeding, p 807.

[127] Transcript of the proceeding, p 812.

[128] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 813-814.

[129] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8F].

[130] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8E].

[131] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 523-524.

[132] Exhibit 46; transcript of the proceeding, pp 856-857, 862-863.

[133] Transcript of the proceeding, p 541.

[134] Transcript of the proceeding, p 541.

[135] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 542, 566.

[136] Transcript of the proceeding, p 564.

[137] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 543, 565.

[138] Transcript of the proceeding, p 850.

[139] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8H].

[140] Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld) (No 36 of 1991) s 2.4, came into operation 1 July 1991.

[141] Ambulance Service Act 1991 (Qld) (No 36 of 1991) s 8.2.

[142] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 253-254.

[143] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 192, 255.

[144] Transcript of the proceeding, p 835.

[145] Transcript of the proceeding, p 255.

[146] Transcript of the proceeding, p 192.

[147] Transcript of the proceeding, p 192.

[148] Transcript of the proceeding, p 835.

[149] Transcript of the proceeding, p 628.

[150] Exhibit 49; transcript of the proceeding, p 628.

[151] Transcript of the proceeding, p 629.

[152] Transcript of the proceeding, p 627.

[153] Exhibit 49 (which was in two parts).

[154] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 677-681.

[155] Transcript of the proceeding, p 627.

[156] Exhibit 49 (Learning Specifications section), pp 555-557.

[157] Transcript of the proceeding, p 632.

[158] See Annexure 2. This contains three pages from Exhibit 49, which reflect material on the effects of trauma used as overhead projections and handouts at the bridging course.

[159] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 631-644.

[160] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 255-256, 265-269, 314.

[161] Transcript of the proceeding, p 193.

[162] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 836-837.

[163] Transcript of the proceeding, p 632.

[164] Exhibit 4, [11]; transcript of the proceeding, p 168. Surprisingly, Mr Scully was apparently unaware that there was a TAFE College in Gayndah: transcript of the proceeding, p 624.

[165] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 168-169.

[166] Exhibit 4, [11].

[167] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 170, 829.

[168] Exhibit 4, [11]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 618, 624.

[169] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 829-830.

[170] Transcript of the proceeding, p 170.

[171] Exhibit 4, [10]; transcript of the proceeding, p 699.

[172] Exhibit 4, [12].

[173] Exhibit 4, Attachment 10.

[174] Exhibits 47, 48.

[175] Created in about 1994 with the sunflower design on a white background: transcript of the proceeding, p 620.

[176] Created in about 1996 or 1997: transcript of the proceeding, pp 625-626.

[177] Created after the August 2000 introduction of the Gay and Lesbian Support Service: transcript of the proceeding, p 685.

[178] Exhibit 51. See Exhibit 4, Attachment 24, p 18; transcript of the proceeding, pp 685, 697-698, 786.

[179] Exhibit 4, [14]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 619, 624, 694-695.

[180] Transcript of the proceeding, p 827.

[181] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 289, 829.

[182] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 164-165, 284-285.

[183] Transcript of the proceeding, p 165.

[184] Transcript of the proceeding, p 284.

[185] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 285-288.

[186] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 286-288, 456-457.

[187] Transcript of the proceeding, p 457.

[188] Transcript of the proceeding, p 548.

[189] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 720, 721, 785.

[190] Transcript of the proceeding, p 720.

[191] Transcript of the proceeding, p 721, 786-787.

[192] Transcript of the proceeding, p 809.

[193] Exhibit 4, [16].

[194] Exhibit 11; Exhibit 4, Attachment 12 (“Letter dated 10/09/1996 to Officers-in-Charge referring to the manual”).

[195] Transcript of the proceeding, p 700-701.

[196] Transcript of the proceeding, p 701.

[197] Transcript of the proceeding, p 830.

[198] Transcript of the proceeding, p 831.

[199] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 193-194, 240.

[200] Exhibit 55.

[201] Exhibit 7.

[202] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 232-236.

[203] Transcript of the proceeding, p 240.

[204] Transcript of the proceeding, p 239.

[205] Exhibit 7.

[206] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 171-172, 244-245, 655.

[207] Exhibit 18 records that Mr Hegarty gained the qualification on 19 October 1998, but the module assessment forms required to complete the course were not submitted until 28 December 1998 (Exhibit 26). Probably nothing turns on this.

[208] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 270-272, 651.

[209] Transcript of the proceeding, p 264. The plaintiff travelled from Bundaberg to Blackbutt for this purpose. Blackbutt is in the South Burnett region, between Kilcoy and Nanango; it is is about 300 km from Bundaberg.

[210] Transcript of the proceeding, p 651.

[211] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 273-274.

[212] Transcript of the proceeding, p 652.

[213] Part of Exhibit 26.

[214] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 314-315.

[215] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 316-317.

[216] Transcript of the proceeding, p 648-649.

[217] Exhibit 19.

[218] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 256-257, 263-264.

[219] Transcript of the proceeding, p 825.

[220] Transcript of the proceeding, p 826.

[221] Exhibit 17; transcript of the proceeding, pp 250-251, 656.

[222] Transcript of the proceeding, p 656.

[223] Transcript of the proceeding, p 173.

[224] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 250, 657.

[225] Exhibit 8.

[226] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 307-313.

[227] Transcript of the proceeding, p 173; see [79] above.

[228] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 296 (Dr Bell), 347 (Prof Bryant), 438 (Prof Raphael) See also p 674 (Mr Scully).

[229] Robert Burns, To a Louse, On Seeing One On A Lady’s Bonnet At Church (1786).

[230] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [11A(c)], [13].

[231] Written submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, [85].

[232] Exhibit 59; transcript of the proceeding, p 860, 863.

[233] Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006, [9A(c)], [9A(d)]; Exhibit 46, [24]-[32].

[234] Exhibit 40; transcript of the proceeding, p 180.

[235] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 176, 186, 247, 250; Exhibit 61.

[236] Exhibit 3, Tab 6.

[237] Exhibit 3, Tab 9.

[238] Exhibit 3, Tab 10.

[239] Transcript of the proceeding, p 526.

[240] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 79, 526.

[241] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 526-527.

[242] Transcript of the proceeding, p 533.

[243] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 221, 525-526.

[244] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 531-532.

[245] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 209, 222, 532.

[246] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 531-532.

[247] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 216, 532, 555.

[248] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 534-535.

[249] Transcript of the proceeding, p 219.

[250] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 218-219, 527.

[251] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 527-528, 530-531.

[252] Transcript of the proceeding, p 529.

[253] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 529-530.

[254] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 558-564.

[255] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 535-536.

[256] Exhibit 3, Tab 6.

[257] Description given to it by Dr Bell:  Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to WorkCover 15 May 2000, p 4 (p 12 of tab).

[258] Exhibits  61 and 62.

[259] Exhibit 3, Tab 6.

[260] Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to Dr P Byrnes (p 1 of tab).

[261] Exhibit 21; transcript of the proceeding, p 292.

[262] Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to WorkCover 30 November 2000, p 3 (p 16 of tab); transcript of the proceeding, p 297.

[263] Transcript of the proceeding, p 297.

[264] Transcript of the proceeding, p 293.

[265] Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to WorkCover 4 August 1999, p 2 (p 3 of tab).

[266] Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to WorkCover 4 August 1999, p 3 (p 4 of tab).

[267] Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to WorkCover 25 October 1999, p 2 (p 7 of tab).

[268] Commencement of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) (coincidentally the date the plaintiff took up duties in Bundaberg).

[269] See Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 416-417 (Hayne J).

[270] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Report of Dr Mulholland 1 November 2006, pp 1-2 (pp 16-17 of tab).

[271] See [28] above, where I set out a chronology of the plaintiff’s symptoms.

[272] Transcript of the proceeding, p 296.

[273] Transcript of the proceeding, p 303.

[274] Transcript of the proceeding, p 298.

[275] Exhibit 3, Tab 10; Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to WorkCover 15 May 2000, pp 3-4 (pp 11-12 of tab); Report to WorkCover 30 November 2000, pp 1-2 (pp 14-15 of tab); Report to WorkCover 26 March 2001, p 1 (p 18 of tab), Report to WorkCover 26 June 2001 p 2 (p 22 of tab); Transcript of the proceeding, pp 294 -295, 301.

[276] Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to plaintiff’s solicitors 5 May 2006, p 2 (p 24 of tab).

[277] Exhibit 20.

[278] Exhibit 3, Tab 9, Report to plaintiff’s solicitors 5 May 2006, p 1 (p 23 of tab).

[279] Exhibit 21; transcript of the proceeding, p 300.

[280] Transcript of the proceeding, p 300.

[281] Exhibit 21.

[282] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 299-300.

[283] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 300-301.

[284] Transcript of the proceeding, p 302.

[285] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 300, 301.

[286] Transcript of the proceeding, p 301.

[287] Transcript of the proceeding, p 322.

[288] Exhibit 3, Tab 10, Report to WorkCover 14 August 2000, p 3 (p 3 of tab).

[289] Exhibit 3, Tab 10, Report to WorkCover 2 April 2001, p 1 (p 7 of tab).

[290] Exhibit 3, Tab 10, Report to WorkCover 15 November 2000, p 1 (p 5 of tab).

[291] Exhibit 3, Tab 10, Report to WorkCover 4 September 2001, p 2 (p 11 of tab).

[292] Exhibit 20.

[293] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Report to the Court 25 July 2006.

[294] Exhibit 3, Tab 7.

[295] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 504-505, 510-511.

[296] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Report to the Court 25 July 2006, [4.4] (p 5 of tab).

[297] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 504-505.

[298] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 505-506.

[299] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Report to the Court 25 July 2006, [13.2] (p 10 of tab) (emphasis in original).

[300] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Statement of Dr P Mulholland 10 November 2006, [9].

[301] Exhibit 41.

[302] Transcript of the proceeding, p 504.

[303] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Statement of Dr P Mulholland 10 November 2006, [10].

[304] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Statement of Dr P Mulholland 10 November 2006, [10].

[305] Transcript of the proceeding, p 507.

[306] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Statement of Dr P Mulholland 10 November 2006, [13].

[307] Exhibit 45, Report to defendant’s solicitors 16 September 2005.

[308] Transcript of the proceeding, p 733.

[309] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 731-733.

[310] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 731 (Dr Nothling), 506 (Dr Mulholland), (see footnote 84 above).

[311] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 731 (Dr Nothling), 303 (Dr Bell)

[312] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 756 (Dr Nothling)

[313] Transcript of the proceeding, p 754.

[314] Transcript of the proceeding, p 755.

[315] Exhibit 3, Tab 8, Report to plaintiff’s solicitors 10 July 2003.

[316] Exhibit 3, Tab 8, Report to plaintiff’s solicitors 10 July 2003, p 10 (p 10 of tab).

[317] Transcript of the proceeding, p 376.

[318] See the diagnostic criteria for PTSD in DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed, text revision, 2000) 467-468); transcript of the proceeding, p 587 (Dr Lawrence).

[319] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 385 (Prof Bryant), 446 (Prof Raphael).

[320] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 410 (Prof Bryant), 434-435 (Prof Raphael), 589-590 (Dr Lawrence).

[321] Professor Bryant has recently consulted with the Royal Ulster Constabulary; the New York Police Department following the terrorist attacks in September 2001; the US Department of Defense; and the New South Wales Department of Health and Police Force. See transcript of the proceeding, pp 353, 354, 419-420, 423.

[322] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 350, 411-412.

[323] Transcript of the proceeding, p 350.

[324] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 350-355. Professor Bryant made it plain that he was not suggesting that supervisors be trained to identify clinical signs: transcript of the proceeding, pp 350, 412.

[325] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 356-357, 405.

[326] Transcript of the proceeding, p 415.

[327] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 413-416.

[328] See [32], [43] above.

[329] Transcript of the proceeding, p 412.

[330] Transcript of the proceeding, p 591 (Dr Lawrence).

[331] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 591-592.

[332] Transcript of the proceeding, p 388.

[333] Self-report measures: Impact of Events Scale (developed by Horowitz et al in 1979), the Mississippi Scale (Keane, Caddell & Taylor, 1988), the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson et al, 1997); interviews: PTSD Interview (Watson et al, 1991), Mississippi Scale (Keane, Caddell & Taylor, 1988), Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (Weathers et al, 1992) and Post Traumatic Diagnostic Scale (Foa et al, 1997). See Exhibit 3, Tab 8, Report to plaintiff’s solicitors 10 July 2003, p 21 (p 21 of tab); transcript of the proceeding, p 388 (Prof Bryant). See also transcript of the proceeding p 452 (Prof Raphael): the Impact of Events Scale was not initially validated as a measure of PTSD. See Annexure 4 for full citations to these studies.

[334] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 409-410.

[335] Transcript of the proceeding, p 410.

[336] Transcript of the proceeding, p 593 (Dr Lawrence).

[337] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 410 (Prof Bryant), 434 (Prof Raphael), 589-590 (Dr Lawrence).

[338] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 410 (Prof Bryant), 453 (Prof Raphael), 601 (Dr Lawrence).

[339] Transcript of the proceeding, p 410.

[340] Transcript of the proceeding, p 454.

[341] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 589-593.

[342] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 594-595.

[343] Further Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006, [10(a)], [11(b)(i)], [11(b)(ii)].

[344] Transcript of the proceeding, pp  365 (Prof Bryant), 435-436 (Prof Raphael), 582-583, 598-599 (Dr Lawrence).

[345] Transcript of the proceeding, p 597. See also transcript of the proceeding, pp 347, 423 (Prof Bryant); Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Statement of Dr P Mulholland 10 November 2006, [10].

[346] Transcript of the proceeding, p 586.

[347] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 586-587.

[348] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [11A(a)].

[349] Transcript of the proceeding, p 346.

[350] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 381-382, 400, 423.

[351] Exhibit 6, Part 2, Report to defendant’s solicitors 10 December 2003, p 3.

[352] Transcript of the proceeding, p 445.

[353] Transcript of the proceeding, p 586.

[354] Transcript of the proceeding, p 382, 392, citing a paper published by Foa et al in 1995. I note that Dr Lawrence cited this paper in the context of early intervention with CBT, whereas Professor Raphael referred to it in the context of using CBT to treat chronic PTSD (see footnote 351 above).

[355] Transcript of the proceeding, p 583.

[356] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 432-433.

[357] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [11A(b)].

[358] Transcript of the proceeding, p 691.

[359] Transcript of the proceeding, p 777.

[360] Transcript of the proceeding, p 840.

[361] Transcript of the proceeding, p 840.

[362] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 843-844.

[363] Transcript of the proceeding, p 844.

[364] Exhibit 1, Tab 1, p 175.

[365] Exhibit 4, Attachment 2. Note that this document is duplicated as Exhibit 2, Tab 2 (see footnote 24 above).

[366] Exhibit 4, Attachment 2, p 11.

[367] Exhibit 4, Attachment 2, p 12.

[368] Exhibit 4, Attachment 2, p 15; transcript of the proceeding, p 671 (Mr Scully).

[369] Bureau of Emergency Services Policy and Procedure Statement – Trauma and Stress Counselling Services, annexed to Exhibit 4, Attachment 2; transcript of the proceeding, p 672 (Mr Scully).

[370] Exhibit 4, Attachment 25, pp 66, 76.

[371] Exhibit 54, p 18.

[372] Transcript of the proceeding, p 803.

[373] Transcript of the proceeding, p 795.

[374] See [32]-[33] above; Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8C], [8G].

[375] See [34]-[43], above; Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8E], [8F].

[376] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [11A(b)].

[377] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 195-196, 223.

[378] Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 201 ALR 470, [23]; Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434, [155]-[156], [221].

[379] Written submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, [114].

[380] Transcript of the proceeding, p 418.

[381] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 191, 243.

[382] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 170-172; Exhibits 7, 14, 15, 16.

[383] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 175-176; Exhibit 8.

[384] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 186-188, 214-215, 534-535.

[385] See Exhibit 3, Tab 8, Report to plaintiff’s solicitors 10 July 2003, pp 4, 21 (pp 4, 21 of tab).

[386] Submissions on behalf of the defendant, [73], [75]-[76].

[387] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 488-490.

[388] Transcript of the proceeding, p 173.

[389] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 173-175, 249-251; Exhibit 8. See also transcript of the proceeding, pp 656-658, 660-664.

[390] Annexure 3.

[391] Transcript of the proceeding, p 176.

[392] Exhibit 4, [19]-[20].

[393] Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, [140] (McHugh J).

[394] See the discussion in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549, 559-560 (Brennan J).

[395] Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, [7], [44], [193]-[194].

[396] In the present case this was admitted on the pleadings. Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8A], [8B]; Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006, [9B(a)], [9B(b)].

[397] Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48 (Mason J). The correctness of that decision is apparently under review by the High Court. See the transcript of argument in the appeal State of New South Wales v Fahy [2006] HCA Trans 615 (9 November 2006) at p 1; the High Court’s decision is reserved.

[398] Exhibit 2, Tab 2.

[399] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 517-518 (Dr Mulholland).

[400] See Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, [16] (Gleeson CJ).

[401] Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, [16] (Gleeson CJ), [61]-[62] (Gaudron J), [188]-[189] (Gummow and Kirby JJ).

[402] See [122] above.

[403] Further Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006, [10(a)], [11(b)(i)], [11(b)(ii)].

[404] at [136] above.

[405] (1973) 47 ALJR 410.

[406] (1973) 47 ALJR 410, 419.

[407] (1973) 47 ALJR 410, 417.

[408] (2000) 217 ALR 583; [2000] NSWCA 119.

[409] New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583, [119]-[122]. See also Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 416 (Hayne J).

[410] See [111]-[112] above.

[411] See [81] above.

[412] Schiliro v Peppercorn Child Care Centres Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 518 at [46], [69]-[72]; Calvert v Mayne Nickless Ltd (No 1) [2006] 1 Qd R 106, [83].

[413] Schiliro v Peppercorn Child Care Centres Pty Ltd (No 2) [2001] 1 Qd R 518, [49].

[414] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [8A], [8B]; Further Amended Defence of the Defendant, filed by leave 13 November 2006, [9B(a)], [9B(b)].

[415] Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) s 27, s 37; Calvert v Mayne Nickless Ltd (No 1) [2006] 1 Qd R 106, [87].

[416] WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) s 551; Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) s 603.

[417] Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1992-1994) 179 CLR 332, 368 (Brennan J); Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127, 143 (Dixon and McTiernan JJ); Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638, 643; Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Byrne J, 5 June 1992) p 12; State of New South Wales v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12, [80].

[418] Exhibit 3, Tab 7, Statement of Dr P Mulholland 10 November 2006, [13]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 512-513.

[419] See [22]-[28], [30] above.

[420] See [28] above.

[421] See [85]-[87] above.

[422] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 299-300.

[423] Transcript of the proceeding, p 301.

[424] In the written submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, [175], he is said to have received payments until his medical retirement in September 2002. This does not accord with the schedule provided by WorkCover (Exhibit 10) or with the defendant’s written submissions, [214].

[425] Harold Luntz, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death (4th ed, 2002) [8.1.5].

[426] Exhibit 42.

[427] Written submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, [179]-[180].

[428] Written submissions on the behalf of the defendant, [211].

[429] Exhibit 10.

[430] (1981) 148 CLR 438.

[431] Exhibit 63.

[432] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 300-301 (Dr Bell).

[433] Written submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, [188]-[190].

[434] Written submissions on behalf of the defendant, [215].

[435] This figure was calculated by deducting the lump sum figure for three years from the figure for 19 years – thus arriving at the present value of $685 per week for 16 years deferred for three years.

[436] Exhibit 43.

[437] Exhibits 9, 10.

[438] Exhibit 9.

[439] (1977) 139 CLR 161.

[440] Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161, 187-188 (Mason J); Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321, 325.

[441] Written submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, [200], [202].

[442] Exhibit 38.

[443] Exhibit 45.

[444] Exhibit 43.

[445] See [87] above.

[446] Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373, 380-380 (Kirby J).

[447] This is an approximate figure. Using the 3% table yields an amount of $20,972; the 5% table yields $20,384. See Mott v Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [2000] 2 Qd R 34.

[448] Exhibit 21.

[449] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 300-301.

[450] Exhibit 9, pp 5-6.

[451] Using the 5% table.

[452] Using the 5% table.

[453] Exhibit 63.

[454] Exhibit 10; transcript of the proceeding, p 916.

[455] See [162] above.

[456] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(a)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 92-95, 721-722, 783.

[457] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1985.

[458] Transcript of the proceeding, p 86.

[459] Transcript of the proceeding, p 86.

[460] Transcript of the proceeding, p 86.

[461] Transcript of the proceeding, p 87.

[462] Transcript of the proceeding, p 90.

[463] Transcript of the proceeding, p 90.

[464] Transcript of the proceeding, p 90.

[465] Transcript of the proceeding, p 90

[466] Transcript of the proceeding, p 90.

[467] Transcript of the proceeding, p 90.

[468] Transcript of the proceeding, p 90.

[469] Transcript of the proceeding, p 463

[470] Transcript of the proceeding, p 91. See also p 463.

[471] Transcript of the proceeding, p 464.

[472] Transcript of the proceeding, p 91.

[473] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(a)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 92-95, 721-722, 783.

[474] Transcript of the proceeding, p 93.

[475] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1984.

[476] Transcript of the proceeding, p 93.

[477] Transcript of the proceeding, p 93.

[478] Transcript of the proceeding, p 93.

[479] Transcript of the proceeding, p 94.

[480] Transcript of the proceeding, p 94.

[481] Transcript of the proceeding, p 95.

[482] Transcript of the proceeding, p 95.

[483] Transcript of the proceeding, p 332.

[484] Transcript of the proceeding, p 721-722, 783.

[485] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(b)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 95-97, 99.

[486] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1985.

[487] Transcript of the proceeding, p 95.

[488] Transcript of the proceeding, p 96.

[489] Transcript of the proceeding, p 95.

[490] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 95-96.

[491] Transcript of the proceeding, p 96.

[492] Transcript of the proceeding, p 96.

[493] Transcript of the proceeding, p 96.

[494] Transcript of the proceeding, p 97.

[495] Transcript of the proceeding, p 97.

[496] Transcript of the proceeding, p 97.

[497] Transcript of the proceeding, p 99.

[498] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(c)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 97-99.

[499] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1985.

[500] Transcript of the proceeding, p 98.

[501] Transcript of the proceeding, p 98.

[502] Transcript of the proceeding, p 99.

[503] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(e)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 99-105.

[504] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1986.

[505] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 99-100.

[506] Transcript of the proceeding, p 100.

[507] Transcript of the proceeding, p 100.

[508] Transcript of the proceeding, p 101.

[509] Transcript of the proceeding, p 101.

[510] Transcript of the proceeding, p 101.

[511] Transcript of the proceeding, p 102.

[512] Transcript of the proceeding, p 102.

[513] Transcript of the proceeding, p 103.

[514] Transcript of the proceeding, p 103.

[515] Transcript of the proceeding, p 103.

[516] Transcript of the proceeding, p 103.

[517] Transcript of the proceeding, p 103.

[518] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 105-106.

[519] Transcript of the proceeding, p 103.

[520] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(f)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 106-108.

[521] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1986.

[522] Transcript of the proceeding, p 107.

[523] Transcript of the proceeding, p 107.

[524] Transcript of the proceeding, p 107.

[525] Transcript of the proceeding, p 108.

[526] Transcript of the proceeding, p 108.

[527] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(g)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 109-111.

[528] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1986.

[529] Transcript of the proceeding, p 109.

[530] Transcript of the proceeding, p 110.

[531] Transcript of the proceeding, p 110.

[532] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 110-111.

[533] Transcript of the proceeding, p 111.

[534] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(h)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 112-115.

[535] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1988.

[536] Transcript of the proceeding, p 113.

[537] Transcript of the proceeding, p 114.

[538] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 114-115.

[539] Transcript of the proceeding, p 114.

[540] Transcript of the proceeding, p 114.

[541] Transcript of the proceeding, p 115.

[542] Transcript of the proceeding, p 114.

[543] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(i)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 115-120, 332-333, 464, 485-486, 722-723, 779-783, 787-791.

[544] Transcript of the proceeding, p 115. The Statement of Claim places this event in 1989.

[545] Transcript of the proceeding, p 115.

[546] Transcript of the proceeding, p 780, 781

[547] Transcript of the proceeding, p 781.

[548] Transcript of the proceeding, p 115.

[549] Transcript of the proceeding, p 116.

[550] Transcript of the proceeding, p 116.

[551] Transcript of the proceeding, p 116.

[552] Transcript of the proceeding, p 116, 781.

[553] Transcript of the proceeding, p 781.

[554] Transcript of the proceeding, p 116.

[555] Transcript of the proceeding, p 117.

[556] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 117-119, 781.

[557] Transcript of the proceeding, p 117.

[558] Transcript of the proceeding, p 117, 781.

[559] Transcript of the proceeding, p 118.

[560] Transcript of the proceeding, p 118.

[561] Transcript of the proceeding, p 118.

[562] Transcript of the proceeding, p 782.

[563] Transcript of the proceeding, p 333.

[564] Transcript of the proceeding, p 333.

[565] Transcript of the proceeding, p 207.

[566] Transcript of the proceeding, p 119.

[567] Transcript of the proceeding, p 119.

[568] Transcript of the proceeding, p 119.

[569] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 120, 464.

[570] Transcript of the proceeding, p 464.

[571] Transcript of the proceeding, p 120.

[572] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 120, 485.

[573] Transcript of the proceeding, p 120.

[574] Transcript of the proceeding, p 790.

[575] Transcript of the proceeding, p 119.

[576] Transcript of the proceeding, p 333.

[577] Transcript of the proceeding, p 723, 779, 777.

[578] Transcript of the proceeding, p 788.

[579] Transcript of the proceeding, p 789.

[580] Transcript of the proceeding, p 790.

[581] Transcript of the proceeding, p 782.

[582] Transcript of the proceeding, p 781, 789.

[583] Transcript of the proceeding, p 783.

[584] Transcript of the proceeding, p 790.

[585] Transcript of the proceeding, p 790.

[586] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(j)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 120-122, 464-465.

[587] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1989.

[588] Transcript of the proceeding, p 120.

[589] Transcript of the proceeding, p 121.

[590] Transcript of the proceeding, p 121.

[591] Transcript of the proceeding, p 121.

[592] Transcript of the proceeding, p 121.

[593] Transcript of the proceeding, p 121.

[594] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 122, 465.

[595] Transcript of the proceeding, p 122.

[596] Transcript of the proceeding, p 464.

[597] Transcript of the proceeding, p 122.

[598] Transcript of the proceeding, p 464.

[599] Transcript of the proceeding, p 122.

[600] Transcript of the proceeding, p 122.

[601] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(k)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 122-125, 335.

[602] The Statement of Claim places this event at Christmas 1990.

[603] Transcript of the proceeding, p 122.

[604] Transcript of the proceeding, p 123.

[605] Transcript of the proceeding, p 123.

[606] Transcript of the proceeding, p 123.

[607] Transcript of the proceeding, p 124.

[608] Transcript of the proceeding, p 335.

[609] Transcript of the proceeding, p 335.

[610] Transcript of the proceeding, p 124.

[611] Transcript of the proceeding, p 125.

[612] Transcript of the proceeding, p 125.

[613] Transcript of the proceeding, p 125.

[614] Transcript of the proceeding, p 125.

[615] Transcript of the proceeding, p 335.

[616] Transcript of the proceeding, p 335.

[617] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(l)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 125-128.

[618] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1990.

[619] Transcript of the proceeding, p 125.

[620] Transcript of the proceeding, p 126.

[621] Transcript of the proceeding, p 127.

[622] Transcript of the proceeding, p 126.

[623] Transcript of the proceeding, p 125.

[624] Transcript of the proceeding, p 126.

[625]Transcript of the proceeding, p 127.

[626] Transcript of the proceeding, p 127.

[627] Transcript of the proceeding, p 128.

[628] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(m)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 128-129.

[629] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1991.

[630] Transcript of the proceeding, p 128.

[631] Transcript of the proceeding, p 129.

[632] Transcript of the proceeding, p 129.

[633] Transcript of the proceeding, p 129.

[634] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(n)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 129-135, 207, 465.

[635] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1993.

[636] Transcript of the proceeding, p 129.

[637] Transcript of the proceeding, p 130.

[638] Transcript of the proceeding, p 131.

[639] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 130-131.

[640] Transcript of the proceeding, p 131.

[641] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 131-132.

[642] Transcript of the proceeding, p 132.

[643] Transcript of the proceeding, p 465.

[644] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 132, 134-135.

[645] Transcript of the proceeding, p 135.

[646] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(u)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 135-139, 337-338.

[647] Transcript of the proceeding, p 135.

[648] Transcript of the proceeding, p 136.

[649] Transcript of the proceeding, p 136.

[650] Transcript of the proceeding, p 137.

[651] Transcript of the proceeding, p 138.

[652] Transcript of the proceeding, p 137.

[653] Transcript of the proceeding, p 138.

[654] Transcript of the proceeding, p 139.

[655] Transcript of the proceeding, p 138.

[656] Transcript of the proceeding, p 139.

[657] Transcript of the proceeding, p 338. cf p 725 where the date is given as 19 July 1996.

[658] Transcript of the proceeding, p 338.

[659] Transcript of the proceeding, p 339.

[660] Transcript of the proceeding, p 725. See also 783-784.

[661] Transcript of the proceeding, p 725.

[662] Transcript of the proceeding, p 725.

[663] Transcript of the proceeding, p 825.

[664] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(o)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 140-142.

[665] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1997.

[666] Transcript of the proceeding, p 140.

[667] Transcript of the proceeding, p 141.

[668] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 141-142.

[669] Transcript of the proceeding, p 142.

[670] Transcript of the proceeding, p 142.

[671] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(p)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 142-148.

[672] Transcript of the proceeding, p 142.

[673] Transcript of the proceeding, p 143.

[674] Transcript of the proceeding, p 144.

[675] Transcript of the proceeding, p 145.

[676] Transcript of the proceeding, p 146.

[677] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 146, 147.

[678] Transcript of the proceeding, p 146.

[679] Transcript of the proceeding, p 147.

[680] Transcript of the proceeding, p 148.

[681] Transcript of the proceeding, p 147.

[682] Transcript of the proceeding, p 148.

[683] Transcript of the proceeding, p 147.

[684] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(q)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 148-156.

[685] Transcript of the proceeding, p 148.

[686] The Statement of Claim places these events in 1998.

[687] Transcript of the proceeding, p 148.

[688] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 150-151.

[689] Transcript of the proceeding, p 153.

[690] Transcript of the proceeding, p 155.

[691] Transcript of the proceeding, p 154.

[692] Transcript of the proceeding, p 155.

[693] Transcript of the proceeding, p 152.

[694] Transcript of the proceeding, p 155.

[695] Transcript of the proceeding, p 155.

[696] Transcript of the proceeding, p 152.

[697] Transcript of the proceeding, p 156.

[698] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(r)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 156-158.

[699] The Statement of Claim places this event in 1998.

[700] Transcript of the proceeding, p 156.

[701] Transcript of the proceeding, p 157.

[702] Transcript of the proceeding, p 157.

[703] Transcript of the proceeding, p 158.

[704] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(s)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 158-159.

[705] Transcript of the proceeding, p 158.

[706] Transcript of the proceeding, p 159. Paramedics have greater qualifications and experience than ‘qualified ambulance officers’: see transcript of the proceedings, p 158.

[707] Transcript of the proceeding, p 159.

[708] Transcript of the proceeding, p 159.

[709] Further Further Amended Statement of Claim, filed by leave 14 November 2006, [7(t)]; transcript of the proceeding, pp 160-163.

[710] Transcript of the proceeding, p 160.

[711] Transcript of the proceeding, p 161.

[712] Transcript of the proceeding, p 161.

[713] Transcript of the proceeding, p 162.

[714] Transcript of the proceeding, p 163.

[715] Transcript of the proceeding, p 163. See also p 474.

[716] Transcript of the proceeding, p 163.

[717] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 176-180, 471-472, 858-860, 863-865.

[718] Transcript of the proceeding, p 176, 471.

[719] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 177, 471.

[720] Transcript of the proceeding, p 177.

[721] Transcript of the proceeding, p 471.

[722] Transcript of the proceeding, p 177, 471.

[723] Transcript of the proceeding, p 178.

[724] Transcript of the proceeding, p 178.

[725] Transcript of the proceeding, p 472.

[726] Transcript of the proceeding, p 179, 472.

[727] Transcript of the proceeding, pp 858-859.

[728] Transcript of the proceeding, p 863.

[729] Transcript of the proceeding, p 860.

[730] Exhibit 59.

[731] Transcript of the proceeding, p 860.

[732] Transcript of the proceeding, p 864.

[733] Transcript of the proceeding, p 864.

[734] Transcript of the proceeding, p 180.

[735] Transcript of the proceeding, p 180, 472.

[736] Transcript of the proceeding, p 180.

[737] Transcript of the proceeding, p 472.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service

  • MNC:

    [2007] QSC 90

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Wilson J

  • Date:

    01 May 2007

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2007] QSC 9001 May 2007Trial of personal injury claim arising from employment as ambulance officer; alleged negligence, breach of contract and breach of statutory duty; breached duty by failing to provide adequate training to supervisors: Wilson J.
Primary Judgment[2007] QSC 11018 May 2007Costs following trial judgment; offers to settle rejected; defendant pay costs on indemnity basis: Wilson J.
Appeal Determined (QCA)[2007] QCA 36626 Oct 2007Appeal allowed dismissing plaintiff's action; claim for negligence, breach of contract and breach of statutory duty arising from employment as ambulance officer; oeven if the defendant had adopted the system of training, there is no sufficient basis for a finding that the defendant's supervisors would have concluded from their discussion that the only reasonable course was to advise the plaintiff to seek psychological assessment and treatment: Jerrard and Keane JJA and Douglas J.
Special Leave Refused (HCA)[2008] HCATrans 12107 Mar 2008Special leave refused; not convinced that an appeal to this Court would enjoy reasonable prospects of success: Kirby and Hayne JJ.

Appeal Status

Appeal Determined - Special Leave Refused (HCA)

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Calvert v Mayne Nickless Ltd[2006] 1 Qd R 106; [2005] QCA 263
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QCA 263
Cite 2 - [2006] 1 Qd R 106
Cite 3 - [2006] 1 Qd R 106
Cite 4 - [2006] 1 Qd R 106
Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 410
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1973) 47 ALJR 410
Cite 2 - (1973) 47 ALJR 410
Cite 3 - (1973) 47 ALJR 410
Cite 4 - (1973) 47 ALJR 410
Fink v Fink (1946) 74 CLR 127
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1946) 74 CLR 127
Cite 2 - (1946) 74 CLR 127
Fox v Wood (1981) 148 CLR 438
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1981) 148 CLR 438
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 C.L.R 161
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1977) 139 C.L.R 161
Cite 2 - (1977) 139 C.L.R 161
Cite 3 - (1977) 139 C.L.R 161
Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 201 CLR 321
Cite 2 - (2000) 201 CLR 321
Hodges v Frost (1984) 53 ALR 373
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 53 ALR 373
Cite 2 - (1984) 53 ALR 373
Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 201 ALR 470
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) 201 ALR 470
Cite 2 - (2003) 201 ALR 470
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 155 CLR 549
Cite 2 - (1984) 155 CLR 549
Cite 3 - (1984) 155 CLR 549
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 54 ALR 417
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 54 ALR 417
Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 169 CLR 638
Cite 2 - (1990) 169 CLR 638
Mott v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd[2000] 2 Qd R 34; [1999] QCA 220
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1999] QCA 220
Cite 2 - [2000] 2 Qd R 34
Cite 3 - [2000] 2 Qd R 34
New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2000) 217 ALR 583
Cite 2 - (2000) 217 ALR 583
Cite 3 - (2000) 217 ALR 583
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2001) 205 CLR 434
Cite 2 - (2001) 205 CLR 434
Schiliro v Peppercorn Child Care Centres Pty Ltd[2001] 1 Qd R 518; [2000] QCA 18
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] QCA 18
Cite 2 - [2001] 1 Qd R 518
Cite 3 - [2001] 1 Qd R 518
Cite 4 - [2001] 1 Qd R 518
Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1994) 179 CLR 332
Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1992-1994) 179 CLR 332
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992-1994) 179 CLR 332
South Wales v Fahy [2006] HCA Trans 615
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] HCA Trans 615
State of New South Wales v Burton [2006] NSWCA 12
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2006] NSWCA 12
Cite 2 - [2006] NSWCA 12
State of New South Wales v Seedsman [2000] NSWCA 119
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] NSWCA 119
Cite 2 - [2000] NSWCA 119
Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317
7 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2002) 211 CLR 317
Cite 2 - (2002) 211 CLR 317
Cite 3 - (2002) 211 CLR 317
Cite 4 - (2002) 211 CLR 317
Cite 5 - (2002) 211 CLR 317
Cite 6 - (2002) 211 CLR 317
Cite 7 - (2002) 211 CLR 317
Vernon v Bosley (No 1) (1997) 1 All ER 577
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 1 All ER 577
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 C.L. R. 40
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1980) 146 C.L. R. 40
Cite 2 - (1980) 146 C.L. R. 40

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
BJE v Spoor [2007] QDC 3451 citation
Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] QCA 366 15 citations
James v State of Queensland [2018] QSC 188 2 citations
Palmer v State of Queensland [2015] QDC 631 citation
TRG v Board of Trustees of the Brisbane Grammar School [2019] QSC 1572 citations
1

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