Attorney-General v Taylor[2008] QSC 183

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND 

1. The Attorney-General has applied, pursuant to Part 2 Division 3 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (‘the Act’), for final orders against the respondent, Ashley Taylor.  Whilst the application, as filed, sought a continuing detention order, or alternatively a supervision order, the relief pressed for by the applicant in the course of argument before me was a supervision order under s 13(5) of the Act.

Criminal history

2. The respondent is 47 years old, and has a significant criminal history involving sexual offences, particularly against young adolescent males. Most recently, he was sentenced, on 30 August 2002, to serve a term of six years’ imprisonment for a number of sexual offences. He was released from prison on 5 May 2008.

3. The respondent’s relevant criminal history may be summarised as follows:

4. The offences for which the respondent was convicted on 30 August 2008 involved such behaviour as masturbation, oral sex, digital penetration and exposing children to pornographic material. There were a total of 22 victims, aged between 12 and 15 years. The respondent sexually abused eight of those victims, and 16 of the counts involved one particular victim. Each new victim was met through the respondent’s café, where he employed those young people or to which they were customers. His conduct involved grooming the victims by making drugs available, speaking to them about sexual matters, showing them pornography, touching them sexually, and establishing physical closeness with them until sexual contact was made.

Personal Background

5. The respondent is the youngest of four siblings. His parents were devoutly religious, and it appears that his mother found it difficult to accept the respondent’s homosexuality. On the material before me, it appears that much of the respondent’s pre-and early adolescence featured him feeling different, including discovering that he was attracted to other males. When he was about 17 years old, he felt compelled to tell his family that he was homosexual, after one of his older brothers had told his parents.

6. The respondent attended a secondary boarding school in Brisbane.  He reported that he felt ostracised at that school, as he was regarded by his peers to be ‘in a lower social class’.   He performed poorly academically and, despite repeating his final year, was not able to gain entrance to university.  He lived at home until he was about 21, then spent time at his parents’ unit in Brisbane.  From 1985, he lived in Sydney as an openly gay man.  The respondent had a variety of jobs over the years.  In 1997, he purchased a fish and chip shop/café business, with financial assistance from his parents.  It was at about this time that he began to encourage boys to work in his café in order to satisfy his own sexual urges.  He installed a computer with internet access in the café.   This business was sold after he was imprisoned in 2001 on the drugs charges.  The respondent underwent a particularly traumatic experience in 2002 when his father died while visiting the respondent in prison. 

The scheme of the Act

7. In relation to the present application, the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Act was outlined by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General (Qld) v Francis [2006] QCA 324 at paras 25-29:

‘[25]The order which may be made by the court under s 13(5) of the Act, and confirmed under s 30 of the Act, is, in terms, an order made for “control, care or treatment” of a dangerous prisoner.  By virtue of s 13(2) of the Act, such an order may be made only if the court is satisfied that a prisoner would constitute a serious danger to the community in the form of “an unacceptable risk that the prisoner [would] commit a serious sexual offence”.  As an alternative to a continuing detention order, under s 13(5)(a), the court may order, under s 13(5)(b), that the prisoner be released from custody subject to appropriate conditions.

[26]The objects of the Act are expressed in s 3 of the Act as being:

“(a)   to provide for the continued detention in custody or supervised release of a particular class of prisoner to ensure adequate protection of the community;  and

(b)   to provide continuing control, care or treatment of a particular class of    prisoner to facilitate their rehabilitation.”

[27]Section 13(6) provides that, in deciding whether to make an order under s 13(5)(a) or (b), “the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of the community”.

[28]Section 13(5)(a), in speaking of a continuing detention order as an order “for control, care or treatment”, identifies the three purposes for which an order may be made:  control of the dangerous prisoner, care for the dangerous prisoner, or treatment of the dangerous prisoner.  These purposes are identified as alternatives.  The phrase “control, care or treatment” must, as a matter of ordinary language, be read disjunctively.

[29]This disjunctive reading suggests that there may be cases where the basis for an order may be, either

• the control of an incorrigible offender, or
• the care of an offender whose propensities endanger the offender as well as others, or
• the treatment of an offender with a view to rehabilitation.

It will often be the case that more than one of these considerations will inform the making of an order.’

8. By amendments to the Act which were effective from 29 August 2007, the Court is required to receive any submissions supplied by an ‘eligible person’. Such a person is required to be given notice of this hearing. An eligible person is defined as a person registered as an eligible person in relation to the prisoner on an ‘eligible person’s register’. Such a register is required to be kept under the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld).  On the evidence before me, there is no ‘eligible person’ able to be identified in respect of the respondent.  Accordingly, no submissions pursuant to s 9AA of the Act have been placed before the Court.

Psychiatric and psychological assessments

9. In February 2005, the respondent completed the Sexual Offender Treatment Program, and was described as having been an ‘active participant’.

10. In anticipation of the present application being made, Professor Barry Nurcombe, psychiatrist, was instructed to prepare a risk assessment report in relation to the respondent. In April 2007, a risk assessment interview was organised with the respondent, but he then advised Professor Nurcombe that he had been legally advised not to consent to participate in the interview. Accordingly, Professor Nurcombe’s diagnostic formulation in his report dated 24 April 2007 is based entirely on documents provided to him, including the prison file material, parole file material, and the files from the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

11. Professor Nurcombe, after reviewing the material, expressed the view that the respondent’s risk of re-offending was moderate to high, and that it was evident that he has a homosexual orientation with a preference for under-age, post-pubertal males. Professor Nurcombe reported:

‘Mr Taylor’s offences involve the attracting (by means of cannabis and computer pornography), grooming, seduction, fondling, masturbating, fellating and, and anally penetrating underage, post-pubertal males.  The offences are not of a violent nature.  They are motivated by Mr Taylor’s sexual preference for males in this age group.  His offences also apparently involve the accessing on the internet of homosexual pornography involving underage post-pubertal males.  It is not likely that the victims of any future offences would be exposed to physical harm.  However, psychological harm could be considerable.  There is little chance that the violence would escalate to life-threatening levels.  Mr Taylor’s re-offending, should it occur, would be unlikely to occur for some time.  Warning signs that might indicate that the risk of sexual offending is increasing or imminent, would be the use of internet pornography, and the seeking of proximity to adolescent males.  Should it occur again, the sexual re-offending is likely to occur on several occasions.  The risk of re-offending is chronic.  This is a common form of sexual offending ...

Circumstances that might increase his risk of re-offending are the failure to establish or maintain a stable adult homosexual relationship, social isolation, boredom, overwork, and continuing low self-esteem.’

12. He concluded that the respondent has paedophilia (not exclusive, fixated, involving post-pubertal under-aged males) and possible narcissistic personality traits.

13. After this application was made, orders were made under the Act by Martin J for the examination of the respondent by Dr Basil James and Dr Michael Beech. Dr James’ report dated 25 June 2008 and Dr Beech’s report dated 4 July 2008 were tendered. Both Dr James and Dr Beech gave evidence and were cross-examined.

14. Dr James’ report was prepared on the basis of an examination of the respondent on 4 April 2008 and the perusal of documentation, including the respondent’s Corrective Services file, parole file and prosecution documents. Dr James noted that although it appeared that the respondent had, in the past, suffered from a depressive disorder, it seemed that on each occasion this was in response to adverse life events involving loss. There was no evidence of depression at the time he examined the respondent. Nor was there any evidence that the respondent was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, notwithstanding what Dr James described as ‘the horrific nature of the death of his father in 2002, which [the respondent] witnessed’. Dr James considered that the respondent’s behaviour, and his record of criminal offences, made it clear that the respondent fulfilled the criteria for ‘paedophilia, non-exclusive, confined to males’.

15. After reviewing the psychological and other similar reports to hand, and reporting on the various diagnostic tests administered to the respondent, Dr James expressed the following opinions and conclusions:

‘The offences for which Mr Taylor has been imprisoned have involved the sexualisation by Mr Taylor of relationships with pre-pubescent and pubescent boys, whom he had apparently inveigled into a non-sexual relationship, though given his past history, and what subsequently transpired, there seems little doubt that he had a sexual intent in mind.  The offences involved penetrative and oral-genital contact of a variety of kinds, but there was no evidence of significant gratuitous violence or force.

Mr Taylor has been entirely of homosexual orientation throughout his adult life, and continues to be so at the present time.  He says that he had difficulty in gaining from his parents their acceptance of his homosexual orientation, and he has continued to feel under considerable pressure from his mother in particular to in some way abandon his homosexuality, and reorientate his sexual interest.

In this and other ways, described in the body of the report, it seems very likely that Mr Taylor has felt flawed and inadequate, and this appears to have impeded the growth of a personality with a healthy degree of narcissism; but feeling inferior, Mr Taylor appears to have over-compensated for his inner self-perceptions; his manifest behaviour thus appears to have been somewhat narcissistic, and in particular to have been characterised by a sense of entitlement.  He has often sought to prop himself up, so to speak, by his close association with figures he sees as powerful and admirable role models.

...

Mr Taylor is also a man of considerable intelligence, and he has clearly given a good deal of thought to this situation, including his offending behaviour.  I would judge him to have gained considerable insight from this process of examination;  but I think it should also be borne in mind that he is a self-confessed “salesman” of considerable skill.  The depth of his insight, therefore, in my opinion has to be treated with some caution, though he has no doubt good intentions.  Although his twenty earlier traffic offences were of a different order to the offences involving sexual victims, they may also carry with them the implication that Mr Taylor has a dimension to his personality of grandiosity, essentially believing that he will not be caught, or that he is somehow not to be bound by legal sanctions.

It is my opinion, therefore that there is at least a moderate risk that Mr Taylor, were he to be released from prison without an accompanying Restriction Order, might be tempted again to revert to his offending behaviour.

...

It is my opinion that it is unlikely that this risk will be reduced by a further period of imprisonment, but that upon his release, he should be subject to a Restriction Order, the essential requirement of which should in my opinion be that he be forbidden, in terms of where he lives and the job that he pursues, as well as in terms of recreational activities, from being in a position where he might develop a relationship with boys under the age of sixteen.  It is my opinion that consideration should be given for this Restriction Order to extend for twenty years.’

16. Dr James’ references to a ‘Restriction Order’ clearly meant a supervision order.

17. In evidence before me, Dr James reaffirmed his opinion that release of the respondent under a supervision order was the method of most appropriately managing the risk of re-offence identified by the doctor, stating that the supervision order should ‘manage as far as possible the limitation of contact between [the respondent] and young men under 16’.

18. An issue which assumed some significance in the hearing before me concerned the ability and preparedness of the respondent to comply with conditions which the Court might impose in a supervision order. This arose out of evidence from the respondent’s parole officer, who raised issues as to the respondent’s behaviour during case management reviews becoming inappropriate (in terms of mode of address and topics of discussion) and persistent, albeit minor, breaches of his supervision order conditions. The parole officer stated that the respondent had demonstrated a generally negative attitude and non-compliant approach to supervision.

19. Notwithstanding the apparent propensity of the respondent to ‘push the limits’ so far as compliance with conditions is concerned, Dr James was of the view that the setting of limits at an early stage would likely result in the respondent recognising that he cannot ‘push the boundaries’ and that his behaviour could be contained.

20. Dr James also confirmed his view that a supervision order, with appropriate limiting conditions, should be in place for 20 years. Under cross-examination, he said that this opinion was based on his assessment of the respondent’s earlier offending and Dr James’ understanding of the natural history of sexual drive in the average male based on his own clinical experience.

21. Dr Beech interviewed the respondent on 30 April 2008.

22. After setting out the report of his examination of the respondent and conducting a review of the previous psychological and other assessments of the respondent, Dr Beech opined a somewhat different diagnosis to that advanced by Dr James, saying:

‘I would agree with Mr Taylor that his early childhood sexual abuse probably acted to distort his sense of appropriate age boundaries in sexual matters.  Together with his sense of entitlement, it has made him more prone to seek out inappropriate sexual relationships with teenage males.  I believe he has a non-exclusive preference for adolescent males which he probably resists generally by displacement to appropriately aged younger, fit and attractive male partners.  I would see this sexual interest as a Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified (DSMTR4 302.9) rather than Paedophilia because his victims appear to me to have all been post-pubescent adolescents.’

23. Dr Beech continued:

‘To his credit, he has successfully completed a high intensity Sexual Offender Treatment program and even progressed to a maintenance program in the community.  The program exit report indicates significant progress through the course and an appropriate relapse prevention plan on discharge.  Initially he seemed to have a number of distorted attitudes and beliefs which were successfully challenged and reformulated, although there is evidence that they are still present in some form at times.  While his institutional conduct shows some glimpses of his underlying narcissism, he appears to have been a generally behaved inmate without evidence of recklessness, impulsivity, or poor self control.  At interview, he described significant shame and there is evidence from the material that he has been remorseful for his actions.’

24. Dr Beech’s report had been prepared with him taking account of certain other charges brought against the respondent in 2007 involving, inter alia, child pornography. However, since the preparation by Dr Beech of his report, the Crown advised that it would not be proceeding with those charges. Accordingly, whilst the allegations in the charges had been made, no weight could properly be given to those particular allegations, the respondent being entitled to the presumption of innocence. When this further information was put to Dr Beech in the course of his evidence in chief, he revised his assessment of the respondent’s risk of re-offence to being ‘at least moderate risk of re-offending’.

25. Dr Beech also gave further evidence about the respondent’s history of tending to ‘push the boundaries’ of conditions imposed of him. In response to a question as to whether releasing the respondent on a supervision order, if the respondent does not understand or have insight into the seriousness of the need to comply with the conditions, would simply be setting the respondent up to fail, Dr Beech said that:

‘I think ultimately he understands the seriousness of his offences and ultimately I believe he would understand the seriousness of breaking the supervision order.  The difficulty would be he would be a difficult person simply to supervise.’

Against that, however, Dr Beech gave the respondent credit for good reports as to his behaviour in prison, the completion of courses, and demonstrating the ability to show self-restraint and self-control.

26. Further, Dr Beech described the basis for his diagnosis of paraphilia, rather than paedophilia, as based on the respondent’s preference for young adolescent males, rather than children.

27. Dr Beech also affirmed that the respondent’s risk of re-offence could reasonably be managed with release under supervision. He said in evidence that he thought that he believed that the risk of the respondent re-offending would go on ‘for at least 10 years, perhaps more’.

Supervision order

28. It was conceded before me on behalf of the respondent that he would be a serious danger to the community in the absence of the Division 3 order. I would, in any event, have reached that conclusion on the evidence before me, which persuades me to a high degree of probability that the evidence is of sufficient weight to justify me making a decision under s 13(1) that the respondent represents a serious danger to the community within the meaning of s 13(1).

29. It is appropriate to repeat some observations I made in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Downs [2008] QSC 87:

‘[28]  The making of a continuing detention order under the Act is clearly a serious incursion into an individual’s right to liberty after the expiration of a judicially imposed period of incarceration;  hence the need to resort to a continuing detention order only if the Court concludes that adequate protection of the community cannot be ensured by the making of a supervision order.  In Attorney-General (Qld) v Francis, the Court of Appeal said, at [39]:

‘The Act does not contemplate that arrangements to prevent such a risk must be “watertight”;  otherwise orders under s 13(5)(b) would never be made.  The question is whether the protection of the community is adequately ensured.  If supervision of the prisoner is apt to ensure adequate protection, having regard to the risk to the community posed by the prisoner, then an order for supervised release should, in principle, be preferred to a continuing detention order on the basis that the intrusions of the Act upon the liberty of the subject are exceptional, and the liberty of the subject should be constrained to no greater extent than is warranted by the statute which authorised such constraint.’

30. The applicant carries the onus of demonstrating that the risk of re-offending remains unacceptable if the prisoner is released under supervision. Accordingly, it is for the applicant to demonstrate that a continuing detention order should be preferred to a supervision order.^[1]

31. In the present case, none of the evidence pointed to the preference of a continuing detention order over a supervision order; indeed the evidence of both Dr James and Dr Beech supported the release of the respondent on a supervision order subject to appropriate conditions. In light of that evidence, it was expressly conceded on behalf of the applicant that ‘it would appear that there is insufficient evidence to displace the inclination that a supervision order ought be made’. That, it seems to me, was an appropriate concession on the evidence before me, and having regard to the paramount consideration of the need to ensure adequate protection of the community.

32. In anticipation of me reaching that conclusion, the terms of a proposed supervision order were canvassed with both Dr Beech and Dr James in evidence, and were also the subject of argument before me. As a consequence of that dialogue, there emerged really only two issues for determination:

(a)The duration of the supervision order;  and

(b)Whether the respondent should be entitled to recover for travel expenditure in certain circumstances.

33. A supervision order has effect in accordance with its terms for the period stated in the order – s 15(b). A supervision order must be made for a definite term.^[2]  The difficulties in fixing a period, involving as that exercise does the necessity to attempt to predict conduct and circumstances many years in the future, have been recognised on several occasions.  For example, in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Van Dessel, Holmes JA said:^[3]

‘[31]The selection of the term of a period of supervision appropriate to “ensure adequate protection of the community”, the paramount consideration identified in s 13(6) of the Act, must have elements of the arbitrary about it, given the increasing difficulties of prediction the further one attempts to look into the future.  It is, however, relevant, in my view, to take into account that the Act, while not providing for review, allows for a number of courses of action to be taken in the event of actual or prospective contravention of a supervision order.  Section 22 enables the court, if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the person under supervision is likely to contravene or has contravened the order, to amend its conditions;  to rescind it and replace it with a detention order;  or to make any other order it considers appropriate to achieve compliance or to ensure adequate protection of the community.  It is possible that the last power (contained in s 22(d)(ii)) might permit extension of the order’s duration;  but it is unnecessary, for present purposes, to reach any conclusion as to that.

[32]I consider that an order of 20 years duration would provide adequate community protection in this case.  If the appellant significantly contravened its requirements at any point in that lengthy period, there is the real prospect of its rescission and replacement with detention.  If, on the other hand, he were able to conduct himself for the entirety of the period without contravention or apprehended contravention (and the order’s conditions are many and rigorous) one could expect that the risk of re-offending would be much diminished at the end of that period.’

See also the observations of McMurdo J in Attorney-General (Qld) v Sutherland [2006] QSC 268 at [51]. 

34. Having regard to the respondent’s still relatively young age, I consider that the fixing of a period of 20 years duration of the supervision order in this case, as recommended by Dr James, is appropriate to meet the paramount consideration of seeking to ensure adequate community protection.

35. The second matter of debate was whether the Department of Corrective Services should be required to meet the respondent’s ‘reasonable public transport expenses when such expense is incurred at their direction’. It was submitted for the respondent that a condition should be framed to require the Department to reimburse the respondent for the cost of using public transport if he is directed to use such transport in order to attend upon professional services as required by the conditions of the supervision order.

36. Even if I had the power to impose such a qualified condition, I would not do so in this case. Section 16(1)(db) requires a supervision order to contain a requirement that the respondent ‘comply with every reasonable direction of a Corrective Services officer'. The supervision order which I will make in this case will also, as permitted by s 16(2)(b), contain requirements for the respondent’s rehabilitation, care and treatment. It would be quite inappropriate for me at this stage to prejudge the reasonableness or otherwise of any direction by a Corrective Services officer as to the means of transport which the respondent should utilise when attending medical and other such appointments. It may well be, for example, that for the purposes of monitoring and supervision, it is appropriate for the respondent to have a fixed travel timetable, regulated by the movement of public transport. Should it transpire that the respondent, once subject to the supervision order regime, wishes to contend that particular travel directions given to him by a Corrective Services officer are not reasonable, then the respondent may have a basis for application for amendment pursuant to s 18 and s 19 of the Act. The outcome of any such application would, of course, depend on the evidence then put before the Court.

37. Accordingly, there will be a supervision order, pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the Act in the terms set out in Annexure A to these reasons for judgment.

ANNEXURE A

THE ORDER OF THE COURT IS THAT:

1. The Court is satisfied to the requisite standard that the respondent, Ashley Earle TAYLOR, is a serious danger to the community in the absence of an order pursuant to Division 3 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003.

2. The respondent be subject to the following requirements until 21 August 2028:

The Respondent must:

1. be under the supervision of an authorised corrective services officer for the duration of the order
2. report to an authorised corrective services officer at the Queensland Corrective Services Probation and Parole Office closest to his place of residence between 9am and 4pm on the day of release from custody and at that time advise the officer of the respondent’s current name and address
3. report to, and receive visits from, an authorised corrective services officer at such times and at such frequency as determined by Queensland Corrective Services
4. notify and obtain the approval of an authorised corrective services officer for every change of the prisoners name at least two business days before the change occurs
5. comply with a curfew direction or monitoring direction
6. notify an authorised corrective services officer of the nature of his employment, or offers of employment, the hours of work each day, the name of his employer and the address of the premises where he is or will be employed
7. seek permission and obtain approval from an authorised corrective services officer prior to entering into an employment agreement or engaging in volunteer work or paid or unpaid employment
8. reside at a place within the State of Queensland as approved by a corrective services officer by way of a suitability assessment
9. not reside at a place by way of short term accommodation including overnight stays without the permission of an authorised corrective services officer
10. seek permission and obtain the approval of an authorised corrective services officer prior to any change of residence
11. not leave or stay out of Queensland without the written permission of an authorised corrective services officer
12. not commit an offence of a sexual nature during the period of the order
13. not commit an indictable offence during the period of the order
14. comply with every reasonable direction of an authorised corrective services officer
15. respond truthfully to appropriate and relevant enquiries by authorised corrective services officers about his sexual behaviours, relationships, associates, whereabouts and movements generally
16. not have any direct or indirect contact with a victim of his sexual offences without the prior approval of an authorised corrective services officer
17. notify an authorised corrective services officer of the make, model, colour and registration number of any vehicle owned by or generally driven by him, whether hired or otherwise obtained for his use
18. submit to medical, psychiatric, psychological or other forms of assessment and/or treatment as directed by an authorised corrective services officer
19. submit to and discuss with an authorised corrective services officer a schedule of his planned and proposed activities on a weekly basis or as otherwise directed
20. abstain from illicit drugs for the duration of this order
21. take prescribed drugs as directed by a medical practitioner
22. submit to any form of drug and alcohol testing including both random urinalysis and breath testing as directed by an authorised corrective services officer
23. attend upon and submit to assessment and/or treatment by a psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker, counsellor or other mental health professional as directed by an authorised corrective services officer at a frequency and duration which shall be recommended by the treating intervention specialist, the expense of which is to be met by Queensland Corrective Services
24. agree to undergo medical testing or treatment (including the testing of testosterone levels by an endocrinologist) as deemed necessary by the treating psychiatrist and supervising corrective services officer, and permit the release of the results and details of the testing to Queensland Corrective Services, if such a request is made for the purposes of updating or amending the supervision order or for ensuring compliance with this order, the expense of which is to be met by Queensland Corrective Services
25. permit any medical, psychiatric, psychological or other mental health practitioner to disclose details of treatment, intervention and opinions relating to level of risk of re-offending and compliance with this order to Queensland Corrective Services if such a request is made for the purposes of updating or amending the supervision order and/or ensuring compliance with this order
26. attend any program, course, psychologist or counsellor, in a group or individual capacity, as directed by an authorised corrective services officer in consultation with treating medical, psychiatric, psychological or other mental health practitioners where appropriate
27. not have any supervised or unsupervised contact with male children under 16 years of age except with prior written approval of an authorised corrective services officer.  The respondent is required to fully disclose the terms of this order and nature of offences to the guardians and caregivers of the children before any such contact can take place; Queensland Corrective Services may disclose information pertaining to the offender to guardians or caregivers and external agencies (i.e. Department of Child Safety) in the interests of ensuring the safety of the children
28. not without reasonable excuse be within 100 metres of schools between 8:00am to 9:30am and 2:30pm to 4:30pm
29. not access schools at any time without prior written approval
30. not establish and maintain contact with male children under 16 years of age without written prior approval by an authorised corrective services officer
31. seek written permission from an authorised corrective services officer prior to joining, affiliating with or attending on the premises of any club, organisation or group
32. not join, affiliate with, attend on the premises of or attend at the activities carried on by any club or organisation in respect of which there are reasonable grounds for believing there is either child membership or child participation
33. not be on the premises of any shopping centre, without reasonable excuse, between 8am to 9.30am and between 2.30pm and 4.30pm on school days other than for the purpose of:
    • approved employment
    • attending an approved bona fide pre-arranged appointment with a Government agency, medical practitioner or the like
34. advise his supervising corrective services officer of any repeated contact with a parent of a male child under the age of 16. The offender shall if directed by his supervising corrective services officer make complete disclosure of the terms of this order and the nature of his past offences to any person as nominated by the supervising corrective services officer who may contact such persons to verify that full disclosure has occurred
35. not access pornographic images that display photographs or images of children on a computer or on the internet or in any other format
36. obtain the prior written approval of an authorised corrective services officer before accessing a computer or the internet
37. upon the request of an authorised corrective services officer, provide the telephone number and PIN of any mobile telephone service held by him to allow the corrective services officer to access any and all records of internet access obtained through the telephone