Schultz v Rowe[2015] QSC 143

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND 

1. This is an application for orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (“VPA”).  In particular, the applicant seeks orders that:

(a)the respondent be declared a vexatious litigant;

(b)the respondent be prohibited from issuing proceedings in Queensland (apart from an appeal from this matter) without prior leave of the Court;

(c)Magistrates Court proceeding 50890/15 by the respondent against the applicant be stayed;

(d)District Court Appeal 4337/14 by the respondent against the applicant be stayed.

2. The respondent represented himself before me.  He was admitted, and for many years practised on his own account, as a solicitor.  However, he does not now hold a solicitor’s practising certificate.  On 5 February 2014, he was declared bankrupt.
3. The applicant is the respondent’s ex-wife.  She is a practising solicitor, and represented herself on this application.  The respondent did not oppose the applicant having leave under s 5(2) of the VPA to make this application, and, in the circumstances which will be stated shortly below, it is clearly appropriate that the applicant have such leave.
4. The Attorney-General also appeared, by counsel, as amicus curiae and made submissions in support of the applicant.
5. In argument before me, the respondent expressly conceded that, on the material, there are good grounds to determine that he is a vexatious litigant^[1] and that he did not oppose the making of an order under the VPA.^[2]  The only substantive issues raised by the respondent went to two particular aspects of the orders sought.  I will deal with those two points below.
6. The respondent’s express concessions mean that it is unnecessary to recite at great length his unfortunate and recalcitrant history as a litigant.  It is sufficient to note the following:

(a)Since May 2011, the respondent has instituted some 113 proceedings in various courts and tribunals, including this Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court of Australia, the District Court of Queensland, the Magistrates Court of Queensland, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Federal Court, the Federal Circuit Court, the Family Court, the Full Court of the Family Court, and the Social Security Appeals Tribunal;

(b)The applicant is, or has been, a party in at least 81 of those proceedings;

(c)Apart from the applicant (his ex-wife), the respondent’s other particular targets in litigation have included Emmanuel College (his daughter’s school) and Ms Mountford (his former partner). 

7. To get some flavour of the respondent’s single-minded pursuit of vexatious proceedings, it is also sufficient to refer to his proceedings in this Court against Emmanuel College.  For that purpose, I am indebted to Ann Lyons J who, on 6 March 2015, published her reasons for judgment in Rowe v Emmanuel College^[3] in which Her Honour set out the following informative history:

“[1]Since June 2013, the applicant has been involved in a number of proceedings in this Court involving the respondent, Emmanuel College (“the College”), and his former wife.  There have also been a number of applications in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“QCAT”) as well as the Federal Court, the Federal Circuit Court and the Magistrates Court.  Pursuant to undertakings he has previously given to this Court, the applicant is required to comply with the provisions of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld) (“VPA”) before he can institute any further proceedings in this Court. 

[2]On 19 January 2015, Mr Rowe filed an application seeking Orders pursuant to s 11 of the VPA to serve the College with a copy of his proposed application which seeks “leave to file an application to set aside” the following Orders and Undertakings:

1. the Order of Dalton J of 21 November 2013 as extended by Byrne SJA on 26 and 27 November 2013;
2. the Undertakings entered by the Registrar on 17 December 2013; and
3. Orders 1 and 3 of Atkinson J made on 29 September 2014.

History

[3]In order to understand the current application, it is necessary to outline some of the history of the litigation.^[4]  The applicant Mr Rowe and his ex-wife Alison Schultz are the parents of a young child who attends Emmanuel College.  A dispute arose between Mr Rowe and the College in 2013 about his daughter’s enrolment in the College and Mr Rowe commenced proceedings against the school in a number of jurisdictions which have included the following:

1. a claim for damages in the Federal Circuit Court claiming $755,000 in damages and a civil penalty of $1 million because he was allegedly misled or deceived by the College about an administrative charge for providing duplicate copies of material to separated parents; and
2. a claim in QCAT, for damages from the College for refusing to cancel his daughter’s enrolment.

[4]On 26 June 2013, the College commenced proceedings against Mr Rowe in this Court claiming various forms of relief including injunctions to restrain the applicant from publishing objectionable material about the College, and to restrain him from attending the College.  The College also sought orders that Mr Rowe be declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to the VPA.  An amended application was subsequently filed on 10 July 2013.  

[5]On 28 June 2013, Margaret Wilson J made interim orders adjourning the College’s application and granted injunctions restraining Mr Rowe essentially from publishing material in relation to the College, communicating with the College and from serving originating processes on the College. 

[6]On 1 July 2013, Mr Rowe appealed to the Court of Appeal in relation to two orders made on 28 June 2013, and also commenced proceedings claiming damages against the College and its board for $3.55 million.  

[7]On 15 July 2013, Mr Rowe gave a number of undertakings to the Court including an undertaking that he would not institute proceedings in Queensland against the College or any director or employee without bringing an application for leave to institute proceedings as if he were subject to a vexatious proceeding under the VPA. 

[8]On 31 October 2013, the Court of Appeal struck out Mr Rowe’s appeal for the following reasons:^[5]

“The appellant has appealed against order 2 of orders made in the trial division on the 28th of June 2013.  On that occasion, the appellant had applied for an adjournment, and order 2 was intended to impose conditions on which the learned primary Judge was prepared to grant it. Obviously, the appellant has had the benefit of that adjournment granted in those circumstances.  Order 2 was discharged a short time later by an order of another Judge in the trial division, made on the 15th of July 2013.  On that occasion, the appellant gave undertakings, one of which was related to a matter the subject of order 2, though substantially narrower in scope than the order. 

The appellant has been unable to identify any legitimate purpose for pursuing his appeal.  The ground advanced with most force was that it was relevant to the question of costs. Costs were reserved on the 28th of June 2013.  No doubt, if they are ever determined, they will be determined in light of all the circumstances; and the fact that a condition was imposed on the adjournment is unlikely to be decisive, particularly when the condition remained in force for a relatively short time.  There can be little doubt that the appeal has caused the respondents to incur costs.  The reasons given in the trial division on the 15th of July recorded the appellant’s inability to meet orders for costs.  Absent some better explanation than has been advanced by the appellant, it is not difficult to conclude that a purpose of the appeal is to harass the respondents, against whom he has also commenced other proceedings. 

It might be noted that, on the 15th of July, the proceedings were adjourned, one of the undertakings then given by the appellant being that he would not institute proceedings against the first respondent, with one exception, unless he first applied for leave as if he were the subject of an order made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005. 

The heading to the appellant’s outline of argument refers to bias, a matter not raised in his grounds of appeal, nor supported by any argument in his outline.  The appellant is a solicitor.  He is no doubt aware of the significance of an allegation of bias against a judicial officer.  The reference to bias seems to me indicative of the cavalier attitude taken by the appellant to the conduct of the appeal. 

One ground of appeal is that the appellant was denied procedural fairness in the proceedings at first instance.  The allegation is repeated in the appellant’s very brief outline of argument.  A reading of the transcript demonstrates that the allegation is baseless. 

In my view, it is clear that the appeal has been pursued vexatiously – see Mudie v Gainriver Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] 2 Qd R 271 at paragraph 35, Re Cameron [1996] 2 Qd R 218 at 220. It should be struck out.”

[9]On 13 November 2013, Mr Rowe entered into a Deed of Settlement with Emmanuel College and Ms Schultz with the aim of bringing to an end all of the litigation between the parties.  In Paragraph 3 of that Deed, Mr Rowe gave a permanent and irrevocable undertaking “To never again at any time publish, cause to be published, encourage, request or enable to be published … by any means whatsoever any comment about Emmanuel College or any of its officers or employees”. 

[10]On 21 November 2013, the College filed an application seeking interim relief against Mr Rowe, and Dalton J granted an interim injunction restraining Mr Rowe from publishing any comment about Emmanuel College or any of its officers, employees or agents.  It also required the solicitors for Emmanuel College to file by 22 November 2013 an application seeking orders to enforce the Deed of Settlement dated 13 November 2013.  

[11]The application was listed for hearing on the Civil List on 26 November 2013, and on 27 November 2013 Byrne SJA made orders on the application filed by the College and on an oral application made by Mr Rowe.  Those orders were that the claim by Mr Rowe to set aside the Deed of Settlement signed on 13 November 2013 was dismissed, and that Mr Rowe was to pay the costs of the College and Ms Schultz of and incidental to the trial on 26 and 27 November 2013.  It was further ordered that the Deed of Settlement signed on 13 November 2013 “be specifically performed and carried into effect”.  Mr Rowe was also required to sign a form of consent, and consent to the dismissal of matters before QCAT.  

[12]It was ordered that if Mr Rowe failed to comply in that respect, then the Registrar was authorised to make, execute and furnish to the solicitors for the College all documents Mr Rowe failed to execute.  The orders and injunctions granted by Dalton J on 21 November 2013 were then extended by Byrne SJA on 26 and 27 November 2013 until such time as the respondent had complied with the orders. The Registrar signed an Order pursuant to the Order of Byrne SJA of 27 November 2013 on 17 December 2013.

[13]On 18 June 2014, Emmanuel College made an application to the Court alleging that Mr Rowe had breached that undertaking and sought an order that he be punished for his contempt of court.

[14]On 29 September 2014, Atkinson J held as follows:^[6]

“Conclusion

72. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Rowe committed contempt by breaching:
    1. the order of Dalton J made on 21 November 2013 in proceeding No. BS 5853 of 2013 ("the principal proceeding") as extended by order of Byrne SJA on 26 November 2013 and further extended on 27 November 2013; and
    2. the undertakings recorded in the order entered by the Registrar on 17 December 2013 in the principal proceeding pursuant to the order of Byrne SJA of 27 November 2013.
73. I am satisfied that he committed those contempts as particularised in particulars 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

Punishment

74. Having been satisfied that Mr Rowe has committed contempt of court, I turn now to the question of punishment.
75. Notwithstanding the obvious emotional turmoil brought about by the end of his marriage and his bitter disputes with his daughter's school, Mr Rowe was in a position to know that he ought not do what he was doing.  He was a practising solicitor with expertise in information technology which enabled him to post the material and hide to a certain extent what he was doing.  As a solicitor he was more than ordinarily aware of the need to comply with orders made by and undertakings given to the court.  His explanation of why he initially formed the opinion that he did not have to comply with court orders lacked any credibility.
76. All of the posts were damaging to the applicant but some were particularly offensive and the offensiveness of the posts appeared to escalate.  Mr Rowe was extremely persistent in his behaviour and continued to post to the internet despite orders made to the contrary.  It appears that only the fear of imprisonment as a result of remarks made by Daubney J on the day this contempt application was first set down for hearing on 22 July 2014 caused him to remove those postings from the internet.  The breach of court orders and undertakings was wilful and deliberate and not casual, incidental or unintentional.
77. The purpose of penalty in a case such as this is both to punish the contemnor and to deter him from future offending behaviour.  In order to achieve these objectives, I sentence Chad Everett Rowe to 12 months imprisonment wholly suspended for a period of three years.  Any further publications by Mr Rowe in breach of the orders and undertakings during the period of suspension would lead to his having to serve the 12 months period of imprisonment in actual custody.
78. He should be ordered to pay the applicant's costs on an indemnity basis.”

[15]Accordingly, Atkinson J was satisfied that Mr Rowe had committed contempt of court by publishing or causing to be published a number of internet postings which breached orders of the Court.  I note that Mr Rowe had admitted the conduct complained of in relation to Particular 13 between 21 November 2013 and 5 February 2014.

[16]Mr Rowe was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment wholly suspended for a period of three years and ordered to pay the College’s costs on an indemnity basis.

[17]Whilst the current application was filed on 19 January 2015, Mr Rowe has previously brought two applications which are similar to the current application.  In Rowe v Emmanuel College,^[7] Mr Rowe sought leave to file an application to appeal to the Court of Appeal to set aside orders 1 and 3 made by Atkinson J on 29 September 2014, and in Rowe v Emmanuel College & Anor^[8] Mr Rowe sought leave to file an application to set aside the Orders of Dalton J and Byrne SJA and the Undertakings entered on 17 December 2013.  Those applications were dismissed by Martin J on 16 January 2015^[9] on the basis that Mr Rowe had not complied with the requirements of the VPA.”

8. That further application by the respondent for leave to institute proceedings against Emmanuel College was also dismissed by Ann Lyons J.
9. There is no shortage of statements by judges in a number of jurisdictions to the effect that the respondent has pursued proceedings vexatiously.  Again, in view of the respondent’s concessions, it is sufficient for present purposes to cite just a few recent examples:

(a)In Rowe v Emmanuel College,^[10] which was an appeal against an order by a judge which had subsequently been discharged, Peter Lyons J, with whom Fraser JA and McMeekin J agreed, noted that the appellant (i.e. the present respondent) had been unable to identify any legitimate purpose for pursuing the appeal, and said that it was “clear that the appeal has been pursued vexatiously”;

(b)In Rowe v Emmanuel College,^[11] to which I referred above, Ann Lyons J concluded:

“[46]I am satisfied that Mr Rowe has been making persistent attempts to use Court processes to circumvent the Orders and Undertakings which were made in 2013 so that the endless round of allegations and litigation could be brought to an end.  I am satisfied that Mr Rowe is, by his current application, trying to circumvent the appellate process by asking one judge of this Court to set aside the decision of another judge in circumstances where there is no jurisdiction or power to do so.  I am also satisfied that given the issues involved, it has been a waste of public resources to have judges of this Court involved in numerous applications which simply seek to re-agitate issues which have been fully determined in either 2013 or 2014.  I am satisfied that the proceedings which are sought to be instituted would be used to harass and annoy the College yet again.”

(c)In Rowe & Schultz & Anor (SSAT Appeal),^[12] Her Honour Judge Cassidy gave judgment in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on an application which had been made by the Child Support Registrar to dismiss as vexatious pursuant to s 111CA of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1998 a Notice of Appeal (Child Support) filed on 9 December 2014 by the present respondent.  Judge Cassidy concluded that the Notice of Appeal (Child Support) was vexatious because it was so obviously untenable and manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless.

10. The judgment of Her Honour Judge Cassidy to which I have just referred was given on 22 April 2015, the day before the hearing of the present application before me.  During the course of the hearing before me, the respondent expressly confirmed that he had that morning, before attending to argue this application before me, filed a Notice of Appeal against Judge Cassidy’s judgment in the Federal Court Registry.
11. The scheme of the VPA was comprehensively described by White JA (with whom McMurdo P and Cullinane J agreed) in Hambleton & Anor v Labaj,^[13] and I respectfully adopt all that was said there by Her Honour without repeating it at length. 
12. In Cooper v Mbuzi,^[14] Mullins J said:

“[65]The definition of “vexatious proceeding” in the schedule to the Act is: 

”vexatious proceeding includes-

(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b) a proceeding instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(c) a proceeding instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; and

(d) a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.”

[66]That definition of what can be a vexatious proceeding is expansive and not prescriptive.  That is consistent with the objective of the Act, as expressed in the Explanatory Notes for the Vexatious Proceedings Bill 2005 to address the problems created by vexatious litigants:

“A vexatious litigant is a person who demonstrates particular behaviours in the pursuance of legal actions through the courts. These behaviours include taking legal action without any reasonable grounds, a repetition of arguments which have already been rejected, disregard for the court’s practices and rulings, and persistent attempts to abuse the court’s processes. The consequences of pursuing such actions include wastage of public resources and the harassment and annoyance of defendants in litigation that lacks a reasonable basis.” 

[67]In Re Cameron [1996] 2 Qd R 218, 220, Fitzgerald P considered what makes legal proceedings vexatious:

“It is also necessary to decide what makes legal proceedings vexatious.  Although there are sometimes statutory indications, the broad test potentially concerns such factors as the legitimacy or otherwise of the motives of the person against whom the order is sought, the existence or lack of reasonable grounds for the claims sought to be made, repetition of similar allegations or arguments to those which have already been rejected, compliance with or disregard of the court’s practices, procedures and rulings, persistent attempts to use the court’s processes to circumvent its decisions or other abuse of process, the wastage of public resources and funds, and the harassment of those who are the subject of the litigation which lacks reasonable basis … .”

[68]The justification for imposing restrictions under the Act on a vexatious litigant was referred to by White JA in Hambleton & Anor v Labaj [2011] QCA 17 at [71] (Labaj):

“As Kirby J observed in Re Skyring it is a serious thing to keep a person out of the courts and the rule of law requires that, ordinarily, a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. But the resources of the court are not limitless and must be deployed responsibly. Those against whom proceedings are commenced which are vexatious at their inception, or which become so by frequent, irrational interlocutory processes, may expect to be protected from the abusive use of the court’s processes.” (footnote omitted)

[69]The term “frequently” is a relative term that must be considered in the context of the relevant litigation:  Jones v Cusack (1992) 66 ALJR 815, 816.  Making a mistake in bringing an application or using a particular means to proceed (such as r 668 of the UCPR) where it is not appropriate does not necessarily characterise the litigation as vexatious.  Persistence in repeating the mistaken application or inappropriate means of proceeding may result in characterising the litigation as vexatious.

[70]If the conditions for the making of a vexatious proceedings order under the Act are satisfied, the court must consider whether, in all the circumstances, the order should be made in the exercise of the court’s discretion.  Relevant matters include the serious implications of interfering with a person’s right of access to the courts and other powers available to the court to regulate and control its own proceedings:  Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, 484.”

13. Section 6 of the VPA provides:

“6Making vexatious proceedings orders

(1)This section applies if the Court is satisfied that a person is –

(a)a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia; or

(b)a person who, acting in concert with a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is mentioned in paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in Australia.

(2)The Court may make any or all of the following orders –

(a)an order staying all or part of any proceeding in Queensland already instituted by the person;

(b)an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings; or proceedings of a particular type, in Queensland;

(c)any other order the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.

Examples of another order for paragraph (c) –

• an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail
• an order to give security for costs
• an order for costs

(3)The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of a person mentioned in section 5(1).

(4)The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.

(5)For subsection (1), the Court may have regard to –

(a)proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal, including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section; and

(b)orders made by any Australian court or tribunal, including orders made before the commencement of this section.”

14. Even without the express concession made by the respondent, I would have been satisfied on the material before me that the respondent is a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia.  I am fortified in making that finding, which I do, by the respondent’s express and informed concessions.
15. As noted above, the respondent did not oppose the making of an order under the VPA, but raised two matters for argument.
16. First, the respondent raised the possible effect of an order if the respondent, at some (unidentified) time in the future, regains a practising certificate and is again engaged in the practice of a solicitor.  The applicant postulated that circumstances might arise, in the course of his practice as a solicitor, when he might be obliged to bring proceedings in his own name but on behalf of others, e.g. in the capacity as executor of a deceased estate.  The respondent went so far as to submit that a vexatious proceedings order would prevent him from practising law in the future.  The sorts of speculative scenarios put to me in this context by the respondent do not provide a basis for refusing an order under the VPA.  In any event, should any of the scenarios suggested by the respondent come to pass, he could apply for leave under s 11 of the VPA in respect of particular proposed proceedings.  If, in the hypothetical future scenario he posited, it became a regular necessity for him to engage in sorts of legal proceedings he suggested and the existence of an order presents a persistent problem, he would be able to apply under s 7 of the VPA for an order varying or setting aside the vexatious proceedings order.
17. Secondly, the respondent argued that the orders should not extend to stays of Magistrates Court proceeding 50890/15 and District Court Appeal 4337/14, both of which are proceedings by him against the applicant.
18. By the Magistrates Court claim, which the respondent issued on 16 March 2015, he purports to sue the applicant for $6,597.  He alleges that on 13 November 2013 he and the applicant entered into an agreement by which they agreed, inter alia, that the respondent would enter into a binding child support agreement and that the applicant would waive arrears of child support payments owed to her by the applicant, that in breach of that agreement the applicant had failed to enter into a binding child support agreement, and that the applicant is liable to the respondent for $6,597 in damages.  The sum of $6,597 claimed by the respondent is, in fact, the amount he owes the applicant as child support arrears.  It is clear from the material that it was, in fact, the respondent who refused to sign the binding child support agreement which was sent to him for execution.  This proceeding is baseless.
19. District Court Appeal 4337/14 was filed by the respondent on 5 November 2014.  It is an appeal against the whole of a decision made by a Magistrate on 4 November 2014 by which a Protection Order was made in favour of the applicant and the daughter.
20. There is a regrettable history of protection order proceedings between the respondent and the applicant:

(a)In August 2011, the respondent applied for a protection order against the applicant.  That application was dismissed.  The respondent had made various allegations of minor violence and disturbance against the applicant.  The learned Magistrate described the respondent’s evidence as “unconvincing”, “unsubstantiated” and “deficient in respect to essential elements”.^[15]  The learned Magistrate said that the respondent’s application was “frivolous and vexatious in nature” and observed that, not only did the application lack merit but the respondent’s “lack of objectivity in respect to the fact and events, as indicated in his material, is of a concern.”^[16]  The respondent appealed against this decision, but subsequently discontinued the appeal;

(b)On 21 February 2014, the respondent filed a further application for a Protection Order against the applicant.  This application, which contained allegations by the respondent of violence and harassment by the applicant, was dismissed at its first mention.  The respondent appealed against that dismissal but subsequently discontinued the appeal;^[17]

(c)In May 2013, the respondent had also filed an application for a Protection Order, making claims of domestic violence and harassment.  This application was also dismissed at its mention.  The respondent appealed, but simultaneously lodged a further application for a Protection Order;

(d)This further application was filed in June 2013, and included allegations by the respondent of physical and psychological abuse.  This application, which was filed at a time when an appeal was pending from the respondent’s previous application, was dismissed, with the learned Magistrate observing that the respondent’s conduct bordered on an abuse of process.  The Magistrate said that the course adopted by the respondent was “misconceived” and took “no account of the effect on [Ms Schultz] of having multiple Court proceedings for the same issues”.^[18] 

21. Against that lamentable background of clearly vexatious applications by the respondent, the applicant then, on 4 November 2014, obtained a Protection Order against the respondent for her benefit and the benefit of her daughter.  The applicant said, and I accept, that the primary incentive in seeking this order arose from material published on the internet about her by the respondent.  It will be noted from the excerpt from the judgment of Ann Lyons J above that one of the tactics used by the respondent against his antagonists has been to publish information on the internet.
22. On 5 November 2014 (i.e. the day after the Protection Order was made), the respondent filed Notice of Appeal 4337/14.  To the extent that the Notice of Appeal discloses grounds of appeal, it contends that the Magistrate provided “inadequate reasons” and that the Magistrate “erred in [finding] that it was necessary or desirable” to grant a protection order in favour of the applicant and the daughter.^[19]  By the Notice of Appeal, and also by the Outline of Submissions filed in support of the appeal, the respondent made it clear that he sought a hearing de novo and also that he wold seek to lead fresh evidence, being “updates from proceedings in the Family and Supreme Court”.^[20]  In short, the respondent proposed to completely re-run the Protection Order application.  The respondent represented himself at all stages of this hearing.
23. Whilst the making of a stay order would prima facie interfere with the respondent’s right to have the Magistrate’s decision reviewed, it is appropriate, in the context of the present application, to have regard to, amongst other things, the legitimacy or otherwise of the respondent’s motives in pursuing that appeal.^[21]
24. My review of the recent history of Protection Order proceedings (albeit brought by the respondent rather than the applicant) leads me to conclude that the respondent’s desire to pursue District Court Appeal 4337/14 is motivated by the respondent’s ill-will and vexatious attitude towards the applicant.  That conclusion is only reinforced by my observation of the way in which the respondent conducted the present proceeding.  He insisted on cross-examining the applicant.  Many of his questions were simply irrelevant.  Many went to issues that were agitated for the purposes of the Protection Order hearing.  Otherwise, the questions largely went to issues concerning the November 2013 agreement between the parties which have already been dealt with by judgments in this Court such as the judgment of Byrne SJA on 26 November 2013^[22] or in the Magistrates Court.  The demeanour of the respondent during the questioning, and his persistence in pursuing irrelevant, but emotional, lines of inquiry made it apparent to me that his cross-examination was not for proper forensic purposes but was intended to vex the applicant.
25. In all those circumstances, I consider it appropriate to grant the stays sought by the applicant.
26. Given the bankrupt status of the respondent, neither the applicant nor the Attorney-General sought costs.
27. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, there will be the following orders:

1. The applicant has leave, pursuant to s 5(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (“the Act”), to apply for vexatious proceedings orders;

2. It is declared for the purposes of s 6(1)(a) of the Act that the respondent, Chad Everett Rowe, is a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia;

3. It is ordered that the respondent be prohibited from instituting proceedings in Queensland (apart from an appeal against these orders) without first obtaining leave under the Act;

4. It is ordered that the proceeding filed by the respondent against the applicant on
   16 March 2015 in the Magistrates Court of Queensland (matter number 50890 of 2015) be stayed;

5. It is ordered that the appeal filed by the respondent against the applicant on
   5 November 2015 in the District Court of Queensland (matter number 4337 of 2014) be stayed.