Ross-James v Turnbull[2017] QSC 275

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. Ross-James (the applicant) filed an application which came before me on 17 November 2017.
2. On 13 November 2017, before filing the application, the applicant had applied to me by way of oral application for an order that the filing fee be waived or reduced.  I dismissed that application.  In the course of dismissing that application I said this:

“This is an application brought by Ross-James in order to have either waived or reduced a filing fee in order to file proceedings that he wishes to file. There is, in fact, jurisdiction under regulation 9 of the Uniform Civil Procedure (Fees) Regulations 2009 to make such an order. However, Mr James does not make his application under that rule.

What he does is to challenge state legislation and presumably inferior legislation to the extent that it is inferior to what he says is the common law. He submits it seems that there is an inherent jurisdiction of the Court to waive the fee. That might or might not be correct. However, there is no point in making any order reducing the fee unless there is some point to the litigation which is sought to be commenced.

Before me Mr James has tendered a copy of the proceedings which he wishes to file. The proceedings seek to it seems have the Prime Minister of Australia, Malcolm Turnbull, declared a criminal. The proceedings or the argument and allegations which are set out in the document, which is exhibit 2, before me are completely insensible. They have no merit whatsoever on their face. At best they seek to commence criminal proceedings in the civil jurisdiction of the Court. Mr James has no right, it seems to me, to commence these proceedings as contemplated and therefore the application is dismissed.”^[1]

3. The application was then filed by the applicant, who paid the filing fee.  The application alleges that the Honourable Malcolm Bligh Turnbull, Prime Minister of Australia, has committed some criminal offence.  It is unclear what law is said to have been breached by the Prime Minister.
4. Bizarrely, annexed to the application is an image of a letter sent by the Prime Minister to the Premier of New South Wales concerning “Increasing Australia’s Childhood Vaccination Rates”.  The significance of that document to the application is unclear.
5. What is alleged is this:

“Malcolm TURNBULL made his “Oath of Office” to the “Queen of Australia” a meaning-less (a nothing) statute title created by legislation.  (And is not sworn to, the lawful sovereign of Australia.)

That an “OFFICER of the Crown” must swear an “Oath of allegiance” to the Crown and lawful sovereign of Australia, a juristic entity, at law.” [emphasis in original]

6. And then, later:

“The question the court is being asked is, does the defendant as NAMED (and, as a Public Official) have any right (at law) to act in any Office under the Crown and impose upon the inherent rights of men and women in this jural society (a body politic) called, AUSTRALIA?  Is he acting lawfully?

The allegation is that he isn’t acting lawfully.  And that this is a criminal offence under the Crown.” [emphasis in original]

7. The application does not clearly specify what relief is being sought.  However, the application contains this:

“Note that upon a pre-trial committal date being set by the court a copy of this (as filed) will then be served on the defendant in the matter who acts as the Honourable Prime Minister of AUSTRALIA by registered post and will be addressed to him at Parliament House, Canberra, ACT.”

8. The application refers to “the competent judicial authorities of the Vatican City State”, “purposes of Vatican criminal law” and that the application can be “heard only in the superior ecclesiastical law jurisdiction”.  The application is a complete nonsense.
9. The plaintiff had earlier brought an application filed in this court naming the defendant as “Queensland (a legal person created at law and by any other appellation)” in what was said to be the “ecclesiastical law jurisdiction”.  That application came before Boddice J on 3 November 2017.  Upon hearing submissions from the applicant and a solicitor of the Crown Solicitor’s office, Boddice J set aside the originating process and dismissed the proceeding.  In delivering reasons, his Honour said:

“On 1 November 2017, Ross-James, being his legal name and as a natural person with inherent rights and duties, filed a process before this Court naming the defendant as Queensland (a legal person created at law and by any other appellation). The jurisdiction was said to be the ecclesiastical law jurisdiction. A consideration of the document indicates that what is being sought is said to be a question at law (1) in relation to whether the matter can be heard by a judge of this Court in the superior ecclesiastical law court and, secondly, as to whether as a question the State election that is being called for 25 November 2017 has been called according to law.

The respondent State of Queensland submits that the process ought to be struck out as not being in accordance with the rules. They also submit that the proceedings should be permanently stayed as an abuse of process. Alternatively, they submit it ought to be treated as an application for judicial review or other application and that directions be set in respect of the matter. Ross-James submits that this Court ought to send the matter for hearing.

Having considered the contents of the document and the submissions that have been made by Ross-James, I am satisfied the process ought to be set aside.  It is not in accordance with the rules. It does not seek orders that are properly matters for consideration by this Court. It is in a form which in itself is suggesting that the jurisdiction should be the ecclesiastical law jurisdiction.  The document is a document which does not give rise to any matter that is properly to be considered by this Court. I order that the originating process be set aside …”^[2]

10. The plaintiff has from time to time used the name “Ross-James Bradley”.  In that name he has brought proceedings which have ultimately resulted in hearings in the Court of Appeal.
11. The first of these is Ross-James Bradley v Natalie Barber.^[3]  An application was filed by the applicant in the Trial Division concerning a penalty infringement notice given to the applicant’s son in relation to a failure of the son to pay tolls.  The learned primary judge, in dismissing the application for judicial review, said:

“… The applicant in the originating application sought to make submissions about the source of authority or power of the court to interfere with the decision, relying on a number of propositions which I had difficulty following at times.  But ultimately they seem to be sourced in the concept that the powers of this court are - because the court is a court of plenary jurisdiction, derived ultimately from the principles or concepts that include who is a juridical person and the authority of the Pope in Rome.

In my view none of those propositions has any legal foundation.”^[4]

12. The applicant appealed and the Court of Appeal described the points on appeal as follows:

“As far as can be ascertained from the notice of appeal and written submissions and, indeed, his oral submissions before this Court, the appellant seeks to agitate concerns about -

1. whether the Registrar of SPER,^[5] a natural person, could take the course which was taken in relation to the applicant’s son and/or be represented in court by a legal practitioner;

2. whether the matters should properly be regarded as criminal not civil;

3. the significance of the decree made by Pope Francis concerning the application of criminal law in the Vatican; and

4. the inappropriateness of his application being dealt with summarily.”^[6]

13. The appeal was unanimously dismissed as having no merit.
14. On 27 February 2017, McMurdo JA struck out another appeal by the plaintiff.  This was Ross-James Bradley v Matthew James McDermott.^[7]  The applicant was in dispute with the Logan City Council who had obtained an order from the Magistrates Court entitling Council officers to enter his premises and undertake works.
15. The applicant appealed the decision of the magistrate to the District Court.  The appeal was struck out.  The applicant then filed an application for judicial review of the District Court’s decision striking out the appeal.  An application was made by an officer of the Council to strike out the application for judicial review and that application was successful.  The applicant then filed an application in this Court against Matthew James McDermott, who was a solicitor employed by the firm acting for the Council in the judicial review proceedings.  It was alleged that Mr McDermott had perverted the course of justice when representing the Council in the application to strike out the application for judicial review of the District Court order.
16. Flanagan J struck out the application against Mr McDermott and the applicant then appealed.  McMurdo JA said of the document filed, which originated the proceedings against Mr McDermott:

“The relief sought was the determination, presumably by declarations, of two questions.  The first was whether Mr McDermott had perverted the course of justice by: ‘Representing him in a matter that had no legal capacity’.  The second question was as follows:

‘When acting as a judicial person, has the defendant exercised control over myself, a living beneficiary of the Global Estate Trust (at law) being an entity directly dependent on the Holy See, listed in the registry of canonical juridical persons kept by the government of Vatican City State.’”^[8]

17. His Honour went on to say:

“Unsurprisingly, Justice Flanagan held that this document disclosed no cause of action.  He noted that any proceeding in respect of a crime, such as that under s 140 of the Criminal Code (Qld) must be brought either by the Crown or in accordance with the private prosecution proceedings, under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).”^[9]

18. His Honour then struck out the notice of appeal noting, “… The notice of appeal contains several pages of incoherent references to texts and other published sources on the broad subject of ‘ecclesiastical courts and papal law’.”^[10]
19. Then, the applicant filed an application in the Court of Appeal seeking to review the order of McMurdo JA.
20. In striking out what his Honour described as a notice of appeal, Fraser JA said: 

“The appellant also argues that errors were made by Justice McMurdo in failing to make the distinction between those differently expressed names and in failing to comply with canonical law or the law of the Roman Curia.  But at no point in the appellant’s submissions, that is to say in his oral submissions or in the lengthy notes he handed up which I have read, did he identify any arguable error made by Justice McMurdo. 

The appellant’s submissions make no sense at all.  They could not possibly justify a review of the decision made by Justice McMurdo.  The proposed review or appeal, if that is what it is, has no prospects of success.”^[11]

21. Importantly, Fraser JA went on to say:

“It is apparent, however, that the appellant strongly believes in the truth of his submissions and that they do have legal merit. He is very likely, it seems to me, to continue filing documents upon the same fundamentally mistaken view that he has identified some fundamental legal error which, before now, has never been identified. In the circumstances, I make the following orders.

Strike out the notice of appeal filed on the 28th of February 2017; order that the appellant not be permitted to file any document at the Court of Appeal registry relating to CA12753 of 2016 without the leave of the Court or a Judge of Appeal.”

22. When the present application came before me on the morning of 17 November 2017, I drew the applicant’s attention to the decision made by me on 13 November 2017, the decision made by Boddice J on 3 November 2017 and the decisions of the Court of Appeal to which I have referred in these reasons.  I then drew the plaintiff’s attention to s 6(3) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld).  That subsection empowers the Court to make “a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative”.  I placed the plaintiff on notice that I was considering making an order under the Vexatious Proceedings Act and I then adjourned the matter to 2.30 pm that day for him to consider his position.
23. When the matter came back before me at 2.30 pm, I asked the applicant what order he wished me to make on his application.  He then challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to make any order, which seemed odd, given that he had sought to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the application.  He was unable to articulate any order that he wished made.  I asked him to make submissions as to why an order should not be made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act and he responded that the Vexatious Proceedings Act was a State Act and therefore had no force.  The plaintiff then became abusive and unruly and I adjourned the Court reserving the decision on what appears to me to be the only question for determination and that is whether an order ought to be made under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. 
24. The Vexatious Proceedings Act defines “vexatious proceeding” as follows:

“vexatious proceeding includes—

1. a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

2. a proceeding instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

3. a proceeding instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; and

4. a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.”

25. The term “proceeding” is defined very widely as:

“proceeding includes—

1. any cause, matter, action, suit, proceeding, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal; and

2. any proceeding, including any interlocutory proceeding, taken in connection with or incidental to a proceeding pending before a court or tribunal; and

3. any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way.”

26. Sections 5 and 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act provide:

“5 Applications for vexatious proceedings orders

1. Any of the following persons may apply to the Court for a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person mentioned in section 6(1)(a) or (b)—

1. the Attorney-General;

2. the Crown solicitor;

3. the registrar of the Court;

4. a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding;

5. a person who has a sufficient interest in the matter.

2. An application may be made by a person mentioned in subsection (1)(d) or (e) only with the leave of the Court.

6 Making vexatious proceedings orders

1. This section applies if the Court is satisfied that a person is—

1. a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia; or

2. a person who, acting in concert with a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is mentioned in paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding in Australia.

2. The Court may make any or all of the following orders—

1. an order staying all or part of any proceeding in Queensland already instituted by the person;

2. an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, in Queensland;

3. any other order the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person.

Examples of another order for paragraph (c)—

• an order directing that the person may only file documents by mail

• an order to give security for costs

• an order for costs

3. The Court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of a person mentioned in section 5(1).

4. The Court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard.

5. For subsection (1), the Court may have regard to—

1. proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal, including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section; and

2. orders made by any Australian court or tribunal, including orders made before the commencement of this section.”

27. Over the last two years, the following proceedings have been commenced by the applicant, all of which appear to have had no reasonable grounds, and are therefore vexatious:

1. the application for judicial review of the penalty infringement notice issued against the applicant’s son;^[12]
2. the appeal from the dismissal of that application;^[13]
3. the application brought in the Trial Division against Mr McDermott, which was struck out by Flanagan J;^[14]
4. the appeal from the order of Flanagan J, which was struck out by McMurdo JA;^[15]
5. the application seeking to review the order of McMurdo JA, which came before, and was struck out by, Fraser JA;^[16]
6. the application which was set aside by Boddice J on 3 November 2017;^[17]
7. the applicant’s present application.

28. I am satisfied that the applicant is “a person who has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia” and a discretion arises to make orders identified in section 6(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. 
29. It is unclear to me as to how the applicant intends to prosecute the present application.  It has not yet been served upon the Prime Minister.  If it is served, the result is inevitable.  It will be struck out.  That will necessitate an application being brought with unavoidable associated cost and inconvenience and the waste of this Court’s resources.  The applicant’s application is baseless and irrational and further proceedings on it should be stayed.^[18]
30. The discretion has, in my view, arisen to make an order prohibiting the applicant from commencing proceedings in Queensland.^[19]  However, “[i]t is a rare thing to declare a person a vexatious litigant,” and thereby deny them access to the courts.^[20]  I am conscious that there is no application for such an order.  In this case then, I consider that the jurisdiction should only be exercised so as to bring to an end the applicant’s present application.
31. I order that further proceedings on application 11930 of 2017 be permanently stayed.