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White v Hertz Australia Pty Ltd[2017] QSC 82

White v Hertz Australia Pty Ltd[2017] QSC 82

 

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

 

CITATION:

White v Hertz Australia Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 82

PARTIES:

COLIN ARTHUR WHITE

(plaintiff)

v

HERTZ AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
ACN 004 407 087

(defendant)

FILE NO:

271 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

16 May 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

15 – 17 June 2016

Further written submissions provided by the parties on 15 July 2016

JUDGE:

Daubney J

ORDER:

  1. Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $312,506.45.
  2. I will hear the parties as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

DAMAGES – MEASURE AND REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES IN ACTIONS FOR TORT – MEASURE OF DAMAGES – PERSONAL INJURIES – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where the plaintiff was injured by a needle and syringe in the course of his employment – where liability admitted – where the plaintiff alleges ongoing psychiatric condition – whether the injury caused the present psychiatric condition – whether the defendant satisfies the evidential onus of proving effect of other pre-existing conditions on the plaintiff’s present condition

Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (Qld)

Workers Compensation Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld)

Malec v J C Hutton (1990) 169 CLR 638

Phillips v MCG Group Pty Ltd [2013] QCA 83

Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164

Schneider v Smith & Anor [2016] QSC 47

Seltsam Pty Ltd v Ghaleb [2005] NSWCA 208

Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158

COUNSEL:

A Arnold for the plaintiff

S P Gray for the defendant

SOLICITORS:

Swanwick Murray Roche Solicitors for the plaintiff

BT Lawyers for the defendant

  1. As at 4 March 2013, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a vehicle services attendant and leading hand.  His duties included the detailing of hire cars which had been returned, which involved ensuring that the pockets at the rear of the front seats were clean of rubbish.  On 4 March 2013, while performing this task, the plaintiff reached into one of those seat pockets, and his hand was pierced by a needle and syringe which had been left there as rubbish. 
  2. The plaintiff claimed, in paragraph 7(f) of his amended statement of claim, that as a consequence of this needle stick injury, he suffered a severe psychological decompensation, resulting in:
    1. Post traumatic stress disorder;
    2. Major depressive disorder;
    3. Generalised anxiety disorder with superimposed panic attacks and agoraphobia; or alternatively
    4. An adjustment disorder that is severe and chronic giving rise to a 12.5 per cent whole of person impairment.
  3. The defendant admitted that the needle stick injury arose from a breach of its duty of care as employer, but denied that the incident caused injury of the magnitude claimed by the plaintiff.  The defendant’s relevant case, as articulated in paragraph 4(g) of its amended defence was:

“(g) The Defendant denies that the Plaintiff suffered illnesses of the nature and extent as pleaded at paragraph 7(f) of the Amended Statement of Claim because the Defendant admits that at the time of the incident as pleaded at paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Claim the Plaintiff suffered an adjustment disorder, and the needle stick injury was one of a series of life stressors contributing at the time to the adjustment disorder and any other injury or condition of a psychiatric nature affecting the Plaintiff:

  1. Was not sustained as a consequence of the incident alleged in paragraph 7 of the Amended Statement of Claim;
  2. any injuries of a psychiatric or psychological nature suffered by the Plaintiff were Was caused by:
    1. Pre-existing factors not known to the Defendant;
    2. Pre-existing Depression
    3. Psychiatric illness arising independently of the Plaintiff’s employment with the First Defendant pleaded incident, particulars of which are as follows:
      1. ongoing shoulder pain;
      2. interpersonal difficulties in the workplace;
      3. loss of employment in November 2013;
      4. the breakdown of the relationship with the Plaintiff’s partner in late 2012 and early 2013;
      5. the Plaintiff’s shoulder injury and wrist injury aggravated the adjustment disorder; and
    4. Marital disharmony, relationship dysfunction and breakdown of the Plaintiff’s marriage and consequential financial hardship;”
  1. The defendant further pleaded in paragraph 7 of its amended defence:

“(h) Any psychiatric condition suffered by the Plaintiff:

  1. Is not related to any injury sustained in the course of employment with the Defendant pleaded incident.
  2. Has fully resolved causing no ongoing loss and damage.
  3. Is the consequence of the matters alleged in paragraph 4(e)(ii) (f) (g) and D hereof;
  1. If the Plaintiff suffers any impairment of earning capacity, such impairment is a consequence of the Plaintiff’s:
  1. Pre-existing left shoulder condition;
  2. Pre-existing right shoulder injury;
  3. Pre-existing left wrist condition;
  4. Pre-existing cervical spine condition
  5. Obesity matters alleged in paragraph 4(e) (f) (g) and D hereof;”
  1. In argument, counsel for the defendant:
    1. Acknowledged that the plaintiff had developed an adjustment disorder because of a fear of having contracted an infectious disease from the needle stick injury;
    2. Argued that the plaintiff was reassured three months after the event that he had not contracted any infectious disease;
    3. Said that the plaintiff was given this advice with the benefit of blood tests which had been performed;
    4. Argued that, despite this advice and reassurance, the plaintiff’s condition deteriorated because of matters unrelated to the needle stick injury;
    5. Contended that the plaintiff’s anxiety became worse after the aggravation of left shoulder symptoms in February 2014, which required treatment at the Prince Charles Hospital;
    6. Submitted that the deterioration of the plaintiff’s mental disorder arose because of matters occurring after the needle stick injury and which are unrelated to the cause of action in this proceeding.

The appropriate approach

  1. On the evidence to which I will refer later in this judgment, the plaintiff contended that he had established a causal connection between the initial needle stick injury and the consequent disability and losses.  With the defendant arguing that any present disability and incapacity was due to other causes unrelated to the initial injury, the plaintiff contended that it was for the defendant to establish this with precision.  Invoking Watts v Rake,[1] the plaintiff submitted that where it is the case that the defendant has failed to prove precisely the effect of other stressors on the present incapacity, the plaintiff will be entitled to the full amount of his damages.
  2. It is clear enough that, while the plaintiff bears the overall burden of proof, an evidential onus rests on the defendant in a case such as the present.  But insofar as the defendant points to pre-existing conditions as impacting on an assessment of the damages attributable to the subject incident, it is now necessary to have regard to assessments of degrees of probability, in accordance with Malec v J C Hutton.[2]  In that regard, in Seltsam Pty Ltd v Ghaleb,[3] Ipp JA, with whom Mason P agreed, said:

“[104] What was said in Watts v Rake and Purkess v Crittenden now has to be qualified by these principles (cf Commonwealth of Australia v Elliott [2004] NSWCA 360 at [81].  Malec has an important bearing, for example, on the way in which a court must determine whether a defendant has discharged the ‘disentangling’ evidentiary burden on it of showing that part of the plaintiff’s condition was traceable to causes other than the accident and that, had there been no accident, the plaintiff would have suffered disability from his pre-existing condition.

[105] Where a defendant alleges that the plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing condition, the evidential onus as explained in Watts v Rake and Purkess v Crittenden remains on the defendant and must be discharged by it.  Nevertheless, to the extent that the issues involve hypothetical situations of the past, future effects of physical injury or degeneration, and the chance of future or hypothetical events occurring, the exercise of ‘disentanglement’ discussed in those cases is more easily achieved.  That is because the court is required to evaluate possibilities in these situations – not proof on a balance of probabilities.

[106] Without intending to give an exhaustive list of possibilities, it may be that, had the defendant’s negligent act not occurred, a pre-existing condition might have given rise to the possibility that the plaintiff’s enjoyment of life and ability to work would have been reduced and to a susceptibility to further injury; in addition, other causes entirely unrelated to the defendant’s negligent act might have contributed to the plaintiff’s ultimate condition.

[107] Appropriate allowances must be made for these contingencies.  A proper assessment of damages requires the making of a judgment as to the economic and other consequences which might have been caused by a worsening of a pre-existing condition, had the plaintiff not been injured by the defendant’s negligence.  A pre-existing condition proved to have possible ongoing harmful consequences (capable of reasonable definition) to the plaintiff, even without any negligent conduct on the part of the defendant, cannot be disregarded in arriving at proper compensation.

[108] As was pointed out in Newell v Lucas [1964-5] NSWR 1597 (at 1601 per Walsh J, with whose judgment Hardie and Asprey JJ agreed), the court must determine whether a comparison may be made between the plaintiff’s condition prior to the injuries sustained by the defendant’s negligence (including the plaintiff’s economic and other prospects in that condition) and the plaintiff’s condition and prospects after the injuries.  Nothing in Watts v Rake and Purkess v Crittenden precludes the judge from carrying out this exercise.

[109] Of course, if the evidence does not adequately establish the pre-existing condition or its possible consequences (as was the case in Purkess v Crittenden), it would not be possible to carry out such a comparison and assessment.  In regard to the possible consequences, a scintilla of evidence would not suffice.  The evidence must be such that a reasonable person could draw from it the inference that the possible consequences contended for by the defendant existed (see McCormick, Evidence, 5th ed, para 338, p511).”

  1. That passage was cited with approval by White JA, with whom Fraser JA and I agreed, in Phillips v MCG Group Pty Ltd.[4] 
  2. With those principles in mind, I turn now to the evidence in this case.

LAY WITNESSES

The plaintiff

  1. The plaintiff described having moved to Brisbane from Rockhampton to assist in furthering his son’s cricket career.  He had worked in Rockhampton as a concrete framer.  He moved to Brisbane with his family about five years before this incident, and worked initially as a groundsman at a football stadium.  Shortly after that, he started working for the defendant, initially as a ferry car driver.  About six months after that, he obtained a position as a car detailer.  He had been working in that role for about four years before the incident.  He worked 38 hours a week, in eight hour shifts (plus 30 minutes for lunch).
  2. In 2010, he separated from his wife.  He saw a doctor at the time, complaining of being stressed and tired.  He was prescribed medication, but did not take it.  He did not receive any follow-up counselling after that consultation.
  3. In 2011 he had what he described as a “heart scare”.[5]  He was taken to the Royal Brisbane Hospital, where tests were done.  The following day he attended on his general practitioner.  He was not prescribed any medication for any mental health issues at that time.  Indeed, he denied having any mental health issues prior to 4 March 2013. 
  4. He described the incident in which he received the needle stick injury.  He said that when he withdrew his hand from the seat pocket and saw the needle sticking out of his finger, he “just went into shock”.[6]  He said he “got a headache” and “started sweating”.[7]  He was working on a night shift, and when he went home he organised to see a doctor to have blood tests done.  He had to wait three months for the results of those blood tests.  He said that during this time he was “having flashbacks all the time”[8] and could not sleep. He described waking up cold and sweating, and he would have to get up, have a shower, and get changed again.  This happened time and time again.  His son Preston and his youngest daughter Kolloah, who was 12 at the time, were living with him.  He described having specific concerns about Kolloah, saying “I just didn’t want her not to have a dad”.[9] 
  5. The plaintiff described an incident which occurred on 13 March 2013.  He said that, when he got to work and brought the first car in, he just “got the shakes and sweats”,[10] felt sick, and ended up driving himself to the Prince Charles Hospital where he was given a tablet to stop him from being nauseous.
  6. After the incident on 4 March 2013, the plaintiff never returned to full-time work.  He did go back part-time, on reduced hours.  Even working part-time, he experienced difficulties.  He would break out in sweats, and was incontinent.  He finally resigned in November 2013.  He was asked about the symptoms he was suffering when he had to work on a vehicle, and described shaking, sweating and being incontinent.
  7. The plaintiff said he was referred to a psychologist through his medical centre.  He saw her at least weekly for counselling, and still saw her occasionally at the time he gave evidence.  He said he saw her when he felt “down” or when he felt as if he wanted “to end things”.[11] 
  8. The plaintiff gave evidence about his social and sporting life before the incident.  He was engaged in fishing, cricket, and social activities with his family.
  9. He said that in February 2014 he saw a psychiatrist, Dr Kissoon, because he “just wanted to end everything”.[12]  This consultation led to him being hospitalised for about two weeks.  He said the symptoms that he had around this time “just got worse and worse and worse”, and described severely interrupted sleep.  After being in hospital, he undertook a course, which seems to have been some form of group therapy.  He described this as beneficial.  He said that he would have loved to have gone back to work to do something, but he could not. 
  10. The plaintiff described an incident in mid-2014 when he publicly suffered incontinence in a shopping centre. 
  11. In terms of social activities, he said that, at the time he gave evidence, they were “nearly non-existent” and that he “just can’t do it”.[13]  He said his children understand that. 
  12. He remembered being prescribed lithium carbonate, but did not recall the date when he commenced taking it.  He was unable to recall the names of the various drugs that he had taken.
  13. He described having gained a significant amount of weight, but then lost some recently. 
  14. He said that, at the time he gave evidence, his sleeping patterns had not changed.  He described night being “the worst part”.  He said:

“It just feels like you’re in a coffin.  That’s what it feels like when the lights go out.  It just feels like you’re – you’re stuck in a coffin.  You wake up and all you see is dark.  I’ve been told to switch a light on but it doesn’t help.”[14]

  1. He described some improvement in being able to go out to places like shopping centres, and he had also started fishing again.  His son encourages this.  Only two weeks before he gave evidence he went out for the first time to his daughter’s school for a musical.  He described that as a daunting experience. 
  2. In terms of his attitude to work, he said:

“I want to work but I feel like if I get employed by somebody that they’re going to make me do something that I don’t want to do.  And if you don’t do it, you get the sack.”[15]

  1. He was unable to describe any plans for the future, and said that if he could not work for someone then he might start a business like lawn mowing.
  2. The plaintiff was then asked about problems he had with his left shoulder from late 2012.  He described it as soreness and being unable to rotate his shoulder.  He said he kept on working and warmed it up.  He said he did not take time off work because of the shoulder.  He received cortisone injections in his shoulder and his wrist.  He had suffered pain in his wrist through repeated use of a squirter bottle.  After he had the cortisone injections, he had time off work, but then it “came good”.  He was able to move and he said the pain in his wrist had gone.  The pains came back about eight or nine months later, at a time when he was off work as a result of the needle stick injury.  At that stage he went to see doctors.  The pain was only in his shoulder; his wrist was fine.  He saw Dr Ross and Dr Duke, and ultimately was seen by a physiotherapist, Mr Townsend.  He described Mr Townsend giving him exercises to assist his shoulder.  When giving evidence, he said his shoulder was “good” and moved his arm around while in the witness box to demonstrate his range of movement.
  3. Schedules were tendered through the plaintiff which set out his education and employment history,[16] his pre and post-accident earnings[17] and the out of pocket expenses he claimed to have incurred.[18]  He said that he was not presently taking any medication.  Also tendered through the plaintiff at the conclusion of his evidence-in-chief was a bundle of workers’ compensation medical certificates relating to the times for which the plaintiff was certified unfit for work as a consequence of the needle stick injury. 
  4. Under cross-examination, the plaintiff was asked about having spoken of being dissatisfied about the way he was treated at work after the incident on 4 March 2013.  He confirmed that he had told the psychiatrist, Dr Whiteford, that he had been abused by his manager, that the manager had accused him of being at fault, and that he had told Dr Whiteford that the abuse was something that also caused the plaintiff significant distress in relation to the injury. 
  5. He was questioned about the fact that, at about the time of the incident, the defendant was winding up its night shift, and moving workers across to day shifts.  He denied being concerned about this. 
  6. He was asked about having told his psychologist that the reason he did not feel he could work in a team environment was because he felt that he was not supported by his employer, and responded: “On the handling of what went on, I felt that I was a leper.”[19]
  7. He said he was very dissatisfied about the way he was treated in the workplace because of the needle stick injury.
  8. He confirmed that his manager, Mr King, had phoned him at home at about 10 am after the injury had occurred.  He did not recall Mr King asking him about an incident report, but said that Mr King was swearing at him.  He disagreed totally with the notion that Mr King in fact spoke to him in a very civilised way.  In response to a suggestion that it was Mr King who said the plaintiff should go to a doctor for blood tests, the plaintiff said that he was the one who told Mr King that he made the appointment.  He effectively conceded that, at the time of this telephone discussion, he was “groggy” because he had taken antihistamine medication, but denied having told Mr King this.  He said he was very bitter about the way in which he believed he was spoken to by Mr King. 
  9. The plaintiff was also asked about his reaction to one of the other supervisors, Mr Lal.  He said he went into see Mr Lal, but Mr Lal was on his phone, texting.  Mr Lal looked at the plaintiff, then looked down to his phone.  He said nothing.  The plaintiff had the impression that Mr Lal was simply not interested. 
  10. In relation to the shoulder injury, the plaintiff was asked about being hospitalised in 2014.  He was taken to hospital by ambulance, complaining of his shoulder being very sore and painful.  He said it felt like “it was going to snap”.  He was shown a number of entries he posted on Facebook on 6 February 2014:[20]

“Got taken to hospital by ambulance felt like my shoulder was goin to snap so much pain wish it would just end”

…

Shoulder screwed”

  1. He confirmed that he had been suffering symptoms in his shoulder and left wrist throughout 2013 but denied that these were causing him emotional distress.  He said they were hurting, but did not cause him emotional distress.
  2. The plaintiff was then cross-examined on the answers given by him in a Form 275 Notice of Claim for Damages dated 12 August 2014.  This was a form for making a workers’ compensation claim arising out of the plaintiff’s employment with the defendant and concerned injuries said to have been suffered over the period 1 November 2012 to 15 January 2013, with symptoms having commenced on 15 December 2012.  This form, signed by the plaintiff, contained the following description of the events which were the subject of that claim (Question 40):

“The claimant’s duties as a night shift Car Detailer involved driving and parking vehicles as needed, with a KPI of 15 minutes per car, checking for vehicle damage and that the vehicle is operational, checking the vehicle’s status (rentable/non rentable), ensuring the vehicle is fitted with petrol, etc, and the cleaning and washing of the vehicle – including the use of cleaning solutions, water, hoses, buckets, sponges, and the like.  He would also dry the mats and polish the wheels. 

…

During the months of November through to January, generally, the claimant asserts that this is one of the busiest time of the year for his specific work duties.  This is because of school and Christmas holidays.  Further, the claimant would often be performing his work duties on larger, 4WD vehicles (‘the Vehicles’) due to the amount of families hiring during this period.  More often than not, the Vehicles would be returned to the depot covered in sand and dirt.  The result of which required the claimant to apply greater force and strength to clean the Vehicles.  This is not the same for the vehicles used by singles or visiting professionals who briefly rent small vehicles.

Despite the significant difference between the two cleaning systems, the claimant was required by his employer to ensure that each car was cleaned within 15 minutes (‘the set KPI’).  After performing his work duties over a period of time, the claimant began to experience pain and discomfort in his left shoulder and wrist.  He initially thought that the injury was transitory and would subside with time.  He continued to perform his work duties.

On or around 15 January 2013 [sic], whilst cleaning a vehicle, the vacuum cleaner head the claimant was using became jammed on a seat rail.  The result of which caused the claimant to experience a sharp, severe pain shoot up through his left wrist, arm and shoulder. 

Consequently, on or around 16 January 2013, the claimant attended his doctor for treatment.”

  1. In answer to Question 48 on this form, the plaintiff listed a range of disabilities he claimed to have suffered, including aggravation to pain to his left shoulder and:

“(h) Sleep deprivation due to pain and discomfort;

  1. Fatigue and prolonged tiredness;
  2. Mood swings;
  3. Irritability and frustration;
  4. Reduced concentration;
  5. Loss of energy and confidence;”
  1. In response to Question 50, which required him to provide particulars of all steps, other than rehabilitation, the plaintiff had taken to mitigate his loss, the plaintiff gave the following answer:

“The claimant was certified unfit to work until 28 January 2013, treatment included a USS guided steroid injection to his left shoulder and left wrist in February 2013, which helped reduce his pain and enabled him return to work but he was advised that he would be require [sic] to return for a follow up injection 6 months later as this was a temporary measure in treating his injury.

On 4 March 2013, the claimant experienced a needle stick injury whilst at work which resulted in a debilitating psychological injury which he continues to receive treatment for and is not currently working as a result.  The Claimant had approximately 4 weeks off work after the needle stick injury and returned to full duties on 7 April 2013.

…

After a few weeks being back at work, the claimant’s left shoulder and wrist pain returned but this pain was overshadowed by the chronic nature of his psychological injury which rendered him unfit to work in November 2013 to present day.”

  1. The plaintiff was also cross-examined about his medical attendances in connection with his left shoulder, and a bundle of medical certificates detailing the time allowed to him off work in relation to that condition was tendered.  He confirmed that he was seeing Dr Kulkarni in January, February and March 2014. 
  2. He was also cross-examined about the fact that he had met a woman via the internet and married her in December 2012, but that marriage broke up almost immediately.  He was asked about having told Dr Whiteford that this caused him distress at the time, but said that it caused him no distress whatsoever.
  3. The plaintiff was also cross-examined about his letter of resignation dated 1 December 2014.[21]  This letter relevantly stated:

“As you are aware, I sustained injuries during the course of my employment with your company in November, 2012 and March, 2013.  Due to the injuries which I sustained whilst in your employ, I am now medically precluded from returning work to my previous position as a leading hand.”

  1. It was suggested to the plaintiff that the injuries about which he was speaking in that letter were the injuries to his shoulder, to which he responded that he honestly did not know. 
  2. I should note in passing that, on any objective view, the terms of the paragraph in that letter to which I have just referred clearly accommodate both the shoulder injury and the needle stick incident. 
  3. While giving his evidence-in-chief, the plaintiff was occasionally tearful and emotional.  This presentation was consistent with the way in which he presented to the psychiatrists who gave evidence before me.  Under cross-examination, he was defensive, and occasionally truculent.  He gave me the impression of a man who perceived that he was defending himself against attack.  He did not, however, strike me as a dishonest or discreditable witness.

Mr Hynard

  1. The plaintiff also called Mr Wayne Hynard as a witness.  Mr Hynard was one of the plaintiff’s co-workers at the time of the needle stick injury.  He described the plaintiff as a “real hard worker”.  He was with the plaintiff when the plaintiff suffered the needle stick injury.  He assisted the plaintiff and administered basic first aid.  He described the plaintiff being “in shock”, but said that the plaintiff did not complain of any symptoms.  Mr Hynard continued to work with the plaintiff from February until June of that year.  In relation to the plaintiff’s left shoulder, Mr Hynard observed that the plaintiff would occasionally rub his shoulder and occasionally say it was sore.  Mr Hynard did not perceive that this slowed the plaintiff up in performance of his duties.  He did not recall the plaintiff having time off after the needle stick injury.  He did, however, recall the plaintiff being more anxious and “more standoffish”.  He said the plaintiff was very cautious about what he did. 
  2. Mr Hynard said that he reported the needle stick injury to Mr Lal, but all Mr Lal did was chuckle.  He was challenged on this under cross-examination but asserted that his version was correct.  It was suggested that he had not even reported the incident to Mr Lal, but Mr Hynard said that he “certainly did”.  He said that he was not aware of the plaintiff ever having been issued with a warning or breach notice for poor performance, and said that to his observation the plaintiff was able to do his work.

Mr King

  1. The defendant called Mr Paul King, who was the defendant’s airport manager for its operations.  He said that he first heard about the plaintiff’s needle stick injury from comments made by several staff after he arrived at work that morning.  He said that a short time later, he telephoned the plaintiff and asked him if he had received a needle stick injury and whether the plaintiff had filled in an incident report form.  He said the plaintiff “seemed a little bit sleepy, a little bit groggy” when he spoke to him.  Mr King said he asked the plaintiff to go and see a doctor or to make an appointment with a hospital or a doctor to get tests.  The plaintiff told him that he would, and Mr King asked him to phone back after he had made the appointment.  He denied in any way being threatening or aggressive, and said that he did not swear at the plaintiff. 
  2. He did not hear back from the plaintiff that day, and first spoke with the plaintiff a couple of days later when the plaintiff returned to work.  Mr King agreed that he would have spoken assertively, but denied being in any way threatening or aggressive.  He denied expressing any view to the plaintiff to the effect that it was the plaintiff’s own fault.  He said that there were no occasions after that when he reprimanded the plaintiff in the workplace and certainly no occasion when he abused the plaintiff.
  3. Mr King gave evidence about the management decision made in 2013 to cancel the night shift.  One of the consequences of that would have been to transition the plaintiff into daytime shifts.  The plaintiff would have continued to be employed as a leading hand, so there would have been no demotion of position involved.  Mr King said that if the plaintiff had not left his employment with the defendant, the plaintiff would still be employed there now.
  4. Under cross-examination, Mr King said that he did not offer for the defendant to organise a doctor for the plaintiff, but saw it as the plaintiff’s responsibility to undertake the blood tests.

Mr Lal

  1. The defendant called Mr Larry Lal, who was employed as the “turnaround supervisor” at the defendant’s operation.  He said he first became aware of the plaintiff’s needle stick injury when he was informed of this by Mr King.  Mr Lal said that Mr King came to him and asked whether the plaintiff had seen Mr Lal regarding an incident, and Mr Lal replied that he had not.  Mr Lal said that Mr Hynard did not tell him about the plaintiff having suffered the needle stick injury.  He rejected as false a suggestion that he had laughed in Mr Hynard’s face, saying:

“If anyone brings anything regarding staff welfare, if there’s an incident, the first thing of – first thing for myself is making sure that that staff who was involved in that incident is okay.  So for him to say that I ignored or laughed at him – I’d say that’s false.”[22]

  1. Mr Lal said that the plaintiff never reported the needle stick injury to him.
  2. Under cross-examination, Mr Lal described the plaintiff as a “good bloke” and an “honest and reliable fellow”.  He again denied, however, that either the plaintiff or Mr Hynard had spoken to him about the incident. 

Psychiatrists’ evidence

Dr De Leacy

  1. The plaintiff called evidence from Dr Eric De Leacy, a consultant psychiatrist.  Dr De Leacy provided reports dated 12 March 2014 and 9 September 2015.[23] 
  2. In his report 12 March 2014, Dr De Leacy outlined the history of the plaintiff’s complaint as he had described it to the doctor.  As recorded by Dr De Leacy, the plaintiff reported attending on his general practitioner after suffering the needle stick injury and having tests.  Dr De Leacy’s report continued:

“Apparently the GP did reassure him that the likelihood of contracting a serious disease was low, but this did not allay his anxiety.  He said that he was told that he would have to wait three months for the results to determine if he had contracted an illness and he said he became very anxious during this time and he said that he almost felt paranoid.

Eventually he did have the “all clear” and there is now no evidence that he would have developed any illness, but he said that he still feels paranoid and is shocked by what had happened and still relives the incident. 

He was away from work for a period of time and then attempted to return to work but was overcome with anxiety and eventually ceased work again.  He said that he became so anxious at times he wet himself. 

He has been under the care of a psychologist and sees the psychologist every two weeks.  He has been referred to a psychiatrist, Dr Kissoon.  He has seen her once and is going to see her regularly.  This is hopefully going to offer some benefit.”

  1. The symptoms being experienced when Dr De Leacy saw the plaintiff on 12 March 2014 were described as follows:

“He continues to have high levels of anxiety and withdrawal.  He has headaches.  He is too anxious to drive on most occasions.  He withdraws.  He has given up most of his activities, such as fishing and going to sports with his son and daughter.  He avoids travelling and he now avoids cricket and golf, which he used to enjoy.  He feels that life has become extremely restrictive.”

  1. The plaintiff described to Dr De Leacy being depressed, anxious and worried, and suffering disturbed sleep.  He did not report any past psychiatric history or past medical history.  The plaintiff described having had a Workcover claim in the past for a shoulder injury, but said that he had recovered from this.
  2. Dr De Leacy then set out details of the plaintiff’s personal history, and his observations about the plaintiff’s presentation at the appointment.  The plaintiff presented as depressed and anxious, with the affect of having high levels of anxiety.  Whilst there was no abnormality of form, stream, or possession of thought, and the plaintiff was not delusional, Dr De Leacy said that the plaintiff’s thoughts were almost delusional in terms of having an overvalued idea about the possibility of having an infection.  He said the plaintiff certainly had paranoid ideations, but was not overly psychotic.  There was no abnormality in the plaintiff’s perception, and he was cognitively intact.  He did, however, appear to be distracted by his emotional state.  Dr De Leacy said that the plaintiff had partial insight, understanding that he had a stress-related disorder, but he did not see his concerns as unreasonable.  In terms of the plaintiff’s reliability, Dr De Leacy said that the plaintiff was quite emotional, but told his story truthfully as he saw it.
  3. At the time of preparing this report, Dr De Leacy considered that the plaintiff did not suffer post-traumatic stress disorder, but said that he had symptoms reminiscent of PTSD, with hyperarousal, avoidance and re-experiencing.  The original incident, however, was not a “Criterion A” event, i.e. it was not a life-threatening event, even though the plaintiff may have perceived it as such.  Dr De Leacy considered that the plaintiff was not suffering Major Depression.  He thought the plaintiff probably could have been diagnosed as having an adjustment disorder at an earlier stage, but by the time of his report this would be considered chronic.  He added, however, that this diagnosis cannot strictly be made, because the relevant stressor had been removed, i.e. the plaintiff had been reassured that he no infectious disease.  In this report, Dr De Leacy considered that the most appropriate diagnosis “given these unusual circumstances” is “Generalised Anxiety Disorder”.  Dr De Leacy noted that such a condition tends to persist while the stressors remain present, but when the stressors persist as in the case of an injury with ongoing distress related to the original stressors, the condition remains chronic.
  4. Dr De Leacy expressed the view that the plaintiff’s prognosis was guarded, and probably poor.  He said that the plaintiff had a permanent impairment and at that stage assessed a PIRS impairment rating of six per cent.
  5. In this report, Dr De Leacy expressed the following further opinions:

“6. Your client’s past medical and occupational history are detailed earlier in this report and there is no prior illness or injury that affects his ability to work in various jobs previously undertaken but the subject accident has significant effects as listed below.  Prior to the injury he was coping well, he was socialising and working and engaging in recreational activities with his children.  All this ceased after his needle stick injury.  He has become totally withdrawn.

7. In reviewing work performed by your client at the time of the injury, your client cannot go back to the work he was doing.  He could not go back to cleaning cars.  This is where he was injured.  He tried to do this but he could not cope.  He feels like he could be exposed to risk again.  If he tried to do this, he would become highly panicky and his paranoia would get out of control.  He would decompensate seriously. 

8. Regarding current work, your client is not working.  He has no capacity to work in the previous job and he would not be able to work in the cleaning industry.  He would have to work in another role, but it will be some time before he could envisage working at all because he needs to have his confidence boosted, but this may happen after several visits to Dr Kissoon.

9. In reviewing past work your client has performed, your client could conceivably go back to other roles he has done in the past.  He has worked on the railways and he has worked in vegetation management and as a greenkeeper.  These jobs could be undertaken but possibly not at the present time because he lacks confidence.  However, when he has improved he may be able to go back to some work of this nature. 

10. There are current occupational restrictions because of his high level of anxiety.  He could not work at all in any area where there is any risk of developing an infectious disease.  He could not work in cleaning.  He could not work in security or corrections.  He cannot afford to be exposed to any risk of infectious diseases.  He would not like to work in the health industry.  He could work in other industries where he perceives the risk is low.  He would like to work in a solitary position if possible.”

  1. Dr De Leacy also noted that the plaintiff could cope with housework and also referred to a need for psychological and psychiatric care.
  2. Dr De Leacy saw the plaintiff again on 9 September 2015, and prepared a report of that same date.  When outlining the history of the matter, Dr De Leacy noted in this report:

“When I last assessed Mr White he was still in a state of panic and almost paranoid about having a possibility of contracting a disease.  I found it difficult to reconcile how he could be so concerned with the amount of reassurance that he had from doctors.  I actually made the comment at my last assessment that it had been noticed that he had put on considerable weight since the incident from comfort eating, and I commented to him that this would not be likely to have occurred if he had a serious illness.”

  1. Dr De Leacy noted the psychological and psychiatric treatment that the plaintiff had been receiving, and noted that the plaintiff was still extremely anxious.  Dr De Leacy said:

“It was difficult for me to reconcile how a person could still be concerned about the effects of a needle stick injury but it became apparent on re-examining Mr White that there were other factors that amplified his stress at the time, and these include the way he was treated by his work colleagues and the fact that he knew someone who contracted HIV and witnessed the suffering.  He said that his boss actually abused him and he said that this actually destroyed trust.  He said he was let down.  He said that this lack of trust possibly contributed to his not trusting the system to clear him of a disease.  He became sceptical.

He is now more amenable to accepting that he does not have a serious infection but he is still highly anxious and highly depressed and his condition is being perpetuated by the ingrained nature of the condition itself that has been present for so long.”

  1. Dr De Leacy referred to the fact that, in the interim, the plaintiff had been assessed by the Medical Assessment Tribunal – Psychiatric as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with a 12.5 per cent permanent impairment rating.[24]  Dr De Leacy said that this appeared to be appropriate for the plaintiff’s level of disability.  The doctor continued:

“In regard to the diagnosis there is considerable disagreement amongst various assessors.  He has been diagnosed as having post-traumatic stress disorder by the Tribunal and at least one other psychiatrist.  He has been diagnosed as having Major Depression.  He has been diagnosed as having an Adjustment Disorder and when I last saw him I considered that he originally had an Adjustment Disorder that evolved into a Generalised Anxiety Disorder.  Dr Whiteford diagnosed an Adjustment Disorder but Dr Whiteford considered that the Adjustment Disorder due to the needle stick injury had resolved, but he had a condition that was being perpetuated by other stressors in his life. 

In terms of the diagnosis it is not overly significant that there is a diversion of opinion in relation to the diagnosis.  What is important is that Mr White has a serious psychiatric disorder and has features of a condition that spans various diagnoses.”

  1. At the time of this assessment, the plaintiff presented to Dr De Leacy as markedly depressed and anxious, with Dr De Leacy noting that he was far more anxious than depressed.  The plaintiff ruminated about what had happened, and had worried significantly about contracting an infectious disease, but was now able to be partially reassured that he may not have such a disease.  He continued to have disturbed sleep, had gained weight, and had a poor social life.  He had major problems with concentration and short-term memory, and was quite disorganised.  The plaintiff had major difficulties with trust, which Dr De Leacy described as a “driving force in maintaining his illness”.
  2. Dr De Leacy noted that the plaintiff’s presentation at this interview was tremulous.  He was sweating and very anxious.  He was almost in tears during the interview, and told his story with a high level of emotion.  He presented with a high anxiety affect.  There was no abnormality of form, stream or possession of thought, and no longer had the level of conviction about his infection that he had previously held.  It was no longer at the level of “almost delusional”. 
  3. Dr De Leacy described this as being a case where there was a mood disorder originally perpetuated by doubt and a feeling of being neglected by the employer.  The plaintiff was worried for a considerable period of time about having an infectious disease.  By the time of this report, the plaintiff was less concerned about this but he had been in such a state of anxiety and depression for such a considerable period of time that the condition had become self-perpetuating.  Dr De Leacy described the plaintiff as “definitely severely emotionally disturbed”.
  4. Dr De Leacy thought that the plaintiff’s diagnosis was still debatable.  He considered that an Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety and Depressed Mood was currently the most appropriate diagnosis.  He continued:

“I previously diagnosed General Anxiety Disorder but now his difficulties fall into the broader catchment of Adjustment Disorder.  PTSD is not an unreasonable diagnosis to make – he has features of PTSD but I feel the original incident just falls short of a criterion event.  As I have stated before, the diagnosis in itself is not the most important aspect of this case.  The fact that he has a severe disorder that is difficult to pigeon hole is the main issue.”

  1. Dr De Leacy confirmed that the plaintiff’s prognosis was quite poor, saying it had been a considerable time since he had assessed the plaintiff and the plaintiff had not improved and, in fact, may actually have deteriorated.  At this time, Dr De Leacy made an impairment assessment of 13 per cent, which he noted was in rough agreement with the 12.5 per cent determined by the Medical Assessment Tribunal.  Dr De Leacy also made observations on the definite need for further mental health care for the plaintiff.
  2. Dr De Leacy’s conclusions in this report included:

“7. Your client does require assistance with domestic tasks.  He is currently not able to organise himself.  He requires help from his children.  He is so disorganised he has been neglecting his home duties.  He would need two hours of home help per week and this needs to be funded.

8. Your client has significant impact from the injury of 4 March 2013 and this affects his ability to work.  He is so disorganised and so stressed he is not able to concentrate on work.  He is not able to take responsibility and he is not able to trust an employer.  In addition he has problems with socialising.  He is avoidant.  He cannot communicate easily with other people.  He is markedly emotional and feels that he cannot engage with people due to lack of trust.  In addition to this he has lost all motivation to engage in recreational activities.  These problems are likely to last for the foreseeable future.

9. Your client’s earning capacity is markedly affected.  He is so markedly impaired psychologically that he has limited capacity to concentrate and it is unlikely that he would have the capacity to concentrate sufficiently to work in any occupation for the next two years or until such time as his psychiatric condition improves, but of course as time progresses he is becoming older and less able to attract an employer.  In addition to this he is less able to adapt to learning new roles.  It is my view that considering his current medical history your client has little capacity to continue working.  Had the incident not occurred, and barring any other unforeseen event, it is likely your client would have been able to continue working as a leading hand in car detailing on a full time basis until the usual retirement age of 67.  This is no longer the case.

10. It is quite apparent that your client’s working life has been shortened.  Realistically it is unlikely that he will ever work again.”

  1. When cross-examined on these reports, Dr De Leacy confirmed that when he first saw the plaintiff on 12 March 2014, the plaintiff was not complaining of any shoulder injury.  The plaintiff did not give Dr De Leacy a history of having attended at the Prince Charles Hospital as recently as 6 February 2014 in relation to his shoulder.  When it was suggested to him that it was odd that the plaintiff had not described his shoulder pain to Dr De Leacy, the doctor said that it was information that he had not actually sought from the plaintiff.  He said that all he wanted to know was whether the plaintiff had a past history of claims, and the plaintiff had told him he did and that he had recovered from it. 
  2. It was suggested to Dr De Leacy that a person who developed an Adjustment Disorder as a consequence of suffering a needle stick injury could expect resolution of that condition within about six months, to which Dr De Leacy responded:[25]

“In a normal person, but in this business of psychiatry we deal with a spectrum of people with different vulnerabilities.  Mr White’s not the only person I have ever seen who has not got over a needle stick injury.”

Dr Kissoon

  1. The plaintiff also called evidence from Dr Usha Kissoon, who was the plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist.  Also in evidence were copies of Dr Kissoon’s records, which included copies of reports she had provided to Workcover dated 4 May 2014 and 3 September 2014.[26] 
  2. In her report dated 4 May 2014, Dr Kissoon noted that the plaintiff had been referred to her by the plaintiff’s general practitioner following a needle stick injury, and Dr Kissoon assessed him on 27 February 2014.  She recounted the history he provided her, including him saying that had experienced a resurgence of his left shoulder bursitis which necessitated having an intramuscular injection on the left shoulder on 31 January 2014.  She said that the plaintiff said that this “freaked him out” because he re-experienced the needle stick injury.  Dr Kissoon also recorded having been informed, on 17 March 2014, by the plaintiff’s treating psychologist that the plaintiff had threatened to overdose on Valium, but the psychologist managed to talk him out of it.  In formulating a diagnosis, Dr Kissoon noted that the work-related condition was not an aggravation of any pre-existing condition.  She said in a report dated 4 May 2014 that the plaintiff was then currently incapacitated for work, and his then current mental state was not conducive to work.  She anticipated a return to work timeframe of between nine to 12 months at that stage. 
  3. In a further report dated 3 September 2014, Dr Kissoon reported having consulted with the plaintiff on numerous occasions since 2 May 2014, including a period of hospitalisation between 12 May 2014 and 26 May 2014.  She said:

“Just prior to being hospitalised on 12 May 2014, Colin’s mental health was deteriorating.  He was becoming progressively depressed with hopelessness and helplessness, was experiencing extreme irritability, poor sleep, panic attacks with agoraphobia and suicidal ideation. 

Post-hospitalisation, there was an improvement of his mental state in that he was attending to his activities of daily living, showed more interest in self-care, started to find joy in doing things again, the intensity of anxiety and panic attacks decreased, he was progressing well with graded tasks of increasing socialisation, he said that he was able to laugh more, he became motivated to exercise and challenged himself to going beyond the local shop and into the shopping malls.  He was even able to attend a movie with his daughter.”

  1. Dr Kissoon said that the plaintiff experienced a setback in July 2014.  This was the incident when he suffered incontinence in the shopping centre.  Dr Kissoon said that since that episode the plaintiff has been very emotional again, suffering a subsequent panic attack.  Despite the setback, however, the plaintiff’s mental state had not reverted to its initial severity that required hospitalisation. 
  2. In the report dated 3 September 2014, Dr Kissoon said:

“I had hoped to gradate Colin back to work (preferably a host employer) at the end of September 2014 but due to the setback experienced in July 2014, it is evident that Colin’s mental state destabilises when subjected to moderate stressors.  He becomes very distrustful and fearful of abuse which affects his cognitive perceptions and increases his post-traumatic symptoms.”

  1. Dr Kissoon thought that the plaintiff had the potential to improve further and expressed some optimism that the plaintiff would be able to commence a suitable duties program for return to work in about February 2015.  She said:

“In the short term, Colin does not have the capacity to complete his ordinary job and ordinary hours.  I do have certain reservations as to whether Mr White would be able to fulfil his ordinary job as a leading car hand detailer in the long term for a complicating factor that does impact on his mental health is his chronic shoulder pain which I would anticipate could be aggravated by the job description of a car detailer.  Whilst I do not have the expertise to comment on his shoulder injury, there is the potential that the aggravation of this injury would certainly impact on his mental health.  I believe that there is further room to stabilise his anxiety as further treatments can be explored to this effect and I think that in the long term Mr White would be able to work normal hours in an ordinary job which may not necessarily be as a car detailer and definitely not at Hertz.”

  1. In evidence before me, Dr Kissoon referred to the notes she had made of the last occasion she saw the plaintiff on 13 March 2015.  At that time, the plaintiff told her that the severity of his symptoms was a bit better.  He was still getting intrusive, recurrent thoughts, and still having some panic attacks.  He reported difficulties sleeping, and ruminating about events that had led him to that point.  He told her that at times he needed to be reminded to shave and dress for others, but most of the time he was doing it himself.  He had regained interest in outside activities.  He described memory problems.  He mentioned feeling as if he was a burden on his family and guilt because of the impact of his condition on his family.  She described him as tending to become emotional when he related events.  She said there was no evidence of psychosis, and her impression at that time was that he was stable, but impaired. 
  2. Under cross-examination, Dr Kissoon said that her notes of that attendance on 13 March 2015 also confirmed that she had been told by the plaintiff that he was not working because he could not cope, and one of the specific matters referred to by the plaintiff in that context was an increase in his left shoulder pain.
  3. Dr Kissoon was also referred to a notation in her report of 4 May 2014 that she had been informed by the plaintiff that, after suffering the needle stick injury, he had been “subjected to further abuse by his manager the next day and was threatened with demotion when he met his manager a few days later”, and this reduced the plaintiff’s self-worth and made him feel anxious and hopeless.  She confirmed that these matters were included in what were described as the “cascading events” which contributed to her diagnosis of the injury which had been suffered by the plaintiff.
  4. Dr Kissoon confirmed that she had largely relied on the history as provided to her by the plaintiff.  In relation to his attendance at hospital for treatment of his shoulder in early 2014, Dr Kissoon was referred to the records from the Prince Charles Hospital, in which it was recorded that the plaintiff had told the treating doctors at the Prince Charles Hospital that he had been getting chronic pain in his left shoulder, and it had been getting worse over the two weeks prior to his attendance on 6 February 2014, and an increase in pain on that morning when he picked up a coffee cup had precipitated his presentation at the hospital.  It was put to Dr Kissoon that this was a somewhat different history to the one the plaintiff had given her during his consultation.  Dr Kissoon was cross-examined at some length on apparent differences between versions given to her by the plaintiff and by him to Prince Charles Hospital concerning the nature and extent of his shoulder problems, and the extent to which that impacted on the opinions she had expressed.  Her ultimate position on these differences was:[27]

“I was aware that there were many contributing factors and I was aware at that stage that the shoulder pain was impacting on him and I didn’t mention that it did impact on his mood as well.”

  1. Dr Kissoon was then cross-examined on the need for the plaintiff to be hospitalised, and her evidence was as follows:[28]

“And the reason for his hospitalisation was because of all of those matters that were causing his distress at the time?--- He was emotionally distressed and becoming suicidal at that time and I was concerned that he had been quite sleep deprived and it was impacting on him.  So I had advocated that he be [indistinct] hospitalisation, stabilisation and taking it from there.

So the sort of matters that you would’ve hospitalised him for would’ve been sleep deprivation due to pain and discomfort?  Well, let’s put it this way.  Sleep deprivation is one of the reasons why you thought he should be hospitalised?--- He hadn’t been sleeping well and it does contribute to altered metal states when you’re not sleeping well for whatever reason.

Fatigue and - - -?--- So it was a symptom - - -

Yes?--- - - - But the reason for the hospitalisation was significant depression, anxiety, panic attacks, PTSD.  And on [indistinct] three, the shoulder injury was contributing to his mental health.  So my focus of attention at that stage was admitting him for stabilisation of his depressive illness.

So again, Doctor, it’s not really – then, therefore, it’s just dealing with his mental illness at the time and not really the reasons why he might be hospitalised.  Is that correct?--- Sorry.  I didn’t understand you.

Yes.  It was a bad question.  The reason you were – you hospitalised him was simply to treat his psychiatric condition at the time.  It didn’t really matter what was contributing to that – that illness, that’s correct?--- Lots of factors can be contributing to a person’s metal illness at the time of hospitalisation and all would’ve been considered.

Yes?--- If there was a marked resurgence of his shoulder pain whilst at Pine Rivers, we have general practitioner support and he would’ve seen a general practitioner whilst admitted here, if there was marked bursitis at that time.”

Dr Whiteford

  1. The defendant called evidence from Dr Harvey Whiteford, a consultant psychiatrist who examined the plaintiff on 15 July 2015 and provided a report dated 20 July 2015.[29] 
  2. In recounting the history of the matter as reported to him by the plaintiff, Dr Whiteford noted that the plaintiff’s shoulder condition had been examined by Dr Duke and Dr Ross (to whom I will refer later in this judgment), and that the plaintiff told him that the shoulder pain “persisted until recently when he received physiotherapy on the shoulder (for the first time according to Mr White), with a significant improvement in the pain and range of movement”.
  3. Dr Whiteford noted that, separate to his shoulder problems, the plaintiff was said to have sustained a needle stick injury at work on 4 March 2013.  He then set out the version as recounted to him by the plaintiff.  This included reference to a supervisor who reportedly “kept his eyes down” and ignored the plaintiff, who was upset and angry at this.  He also referred to receiving a telephone call from the defendant’s manager who started swearing and abusing the plaintiff.  The plaintiff said he was accused of not following procedures and of being told that it was his fault that he has sustained the needle stick injury.  He told Dr Whiteford that he went to his GP and had blood tests, and later that day he was phoned again by the manager who asked about the results.  The plaintiff said that when he told the manager that it would be three months before he received any clearance, the plaintiff was abused again.  The plaintiff told Dr Whiteford that he continued at work, but there were “narky comments” from co-workers, and the plaintiff “continued to cop a gobful” from the manager.  The plaintiff said he was repeatedly told that he had not followed procedure, but was not told which procedure he had not followed.  He told Dr Whiteford that, over the subsequent months, his anxiety in the workplace progressively escalated and this was as “a result of the abuse from the manager”.  He described things going downhill, and said his anxiety reached the point where he was having with urinary urgency.  Dr Whiteford recorded:

“Mr White said he resigned his employment several months later (in November 2013) because he was ‘too stressed to continue’ at work.  He has not worked since.  Mr White did not mention to me the shoulder pain being a contributor despite the reports from orthopaedic surgeons (Dr Duke and Dr Ross) and an occupational physician (Dr Ballenden) indicating he could not work because of the shoulder injury.”

  1. Dr Whiteford referred to other psychiatric assessments which had been undertaken, including by Dr Kissoon and Dr De Leacy.  He also set out details of the plaintiff’s reporting of his current psychological symptoms.
  2. Dr Whiteford then set out details of the plaintiff’s personal history, as recounted to him by the plaintiff.  This included the brief marriage to the woman the plaintiff had met on the internet in January 2012.  The couple were married, but several days later, according to the plaintiff, he tried to get the marriage annulled.  Dr Whiteford recorded:

“They were still in contact when he had the needle stick injury in March 2013 but the relationship ended soon after this.  Mr White said his relationship with her was ‘the biggest mistake I’ve ever made’.”

  1. Dr Whiteford’s report then set out an extensive review of the plaintiff’s past medical and psychiatric records, and other matters relating to the plaintiff’s personal and family history.
  2. The doctor said that the plaintiff presented to him as “an overweight, agitated man who became progressively more labile (tearful) as the interview progressed”.  The plaintiff spoke clearly, with no evidence of formal thought disorder.  He presented with a depressed mood, with a restricted range of emotional reactivity and prominent lability.  He had depressive thought content, but no delusional thought content was noted, nor were perceptual disturbances reported. 
  3. Dr Whiteford summarised his observation of the plaintiff’s mental state examination as revealing “evidence of clinically significant anxiety and depression”. 
  4. In the summary to his report, Dr Whiteford noted that the plaintiff had developed left shoulder pain while working for the defendant in November 2012, and that this was aggravated in January 2013.  At the time he saw Dr Whiteford, the plaintiff told the doctor that, with recent physiotherapy, the shoulder pain was much better now. 
  5. Dr Whiteford’s summary continued:

“He sustained a needle stick injury at work on 4 March 2013 experiencing anxiety he had could have contracted an infectious disease.  He was cleared of this possibility three months later, but encountered difficulties with management and interpersonal conflict in the workplace.  These difficulties persisted throughout 2013, resulting in him developing anxiety and depressive symptoms considered to be an adjustment disorder.  He left work in November 2013 and has not worked since.

Mr White’s depression became severe and he was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder requiring hospitalisation from 6 to 12 May 2014.

…

Mr White reports other stressors, including a failed relationship with a woman in the USA in 2012, chronic shoulder pain, unemployment, the stress of the litigation as well as financial difficulties.  His chronic left shoulder pain has only improved in recent months with physiotherapy.

Mr White denied any past psychiatric history, however, his medical records from the Toombul Medical Centre contain a diagnosis of depression in May 2010 requiring antidepressant medication to be prescribed and his medical records from the Aboriginal and Islander Community Health Service at Logan Central indicating he received psychological treatment for an adjustment disorder in January 2011.

Mental state examination on 15 July 2015 revealed evidence of clinically significant anxiety and depression.”

  1. Dr Whiteford expressed the view, on the information available, that there was an anxiety disorder present following the needle stick injury in March 2013.  Even though the plaintiff was subsequently advised he had not contracted any infectious disease, the anxiety persisted because of interpersonal difficulties he was having in the workplace.  Dr Whiteford considered that the diagnosis would have been an adjustment disorder with anxiety at that time. 
  2. Dr Whiteford referred to the differing diagnoses between the different psychiatrists who had assessed the plaintiff.  By reference to the previous mental health symptoms referred to in the general practitioner records, Dr Whiteford considered it clear that the plaintiff did have a mental disorder in 2013, and this appears to have only been treated after the needle stick injury. 
  3. Dr Whiteford’s opinion was that, at the time he examined the plaintiff, the plaintiff met the DSM5 diagnostic criteria for a chronic adjustment disorder with both anxiety and depression.  He did not think the plaintiff had post-traumatic stress disorder.  He said:

“[The plaintiff] has a vulnerability to develop anxiety and depression and this has waxed and waned over many years.  His symptoms were either sub-threshold or in remission in late 2012 … until Mr White was exposed to a series of life stressors – the relationship breakdown, the shoulder injury and the needle stick injury.  The adjustment disorder then became prominent and was maintained by ongoing shoulder pain, the interpersonal difficulties in the workplace, loss of his employment in November 2013, financial difficulties and the litigation.”

  1. Dr Whiteford confirmed that the needle stick injury was “one of a series of life stressors contributing at the time to the adjustment disorder”.  He also referred to those “life stressors” as including the breakdown of the relationship with his partner in late 2012/early 2013 and the shoulder and wrist injuries suffered by the plaintiff.  He further expressed the view that the plaintiff’s “psychiatric symptoms increased, after he had been medically cleared of any blood borne disease” and said that this was “consistent with the emergence of other stressors, noted above, that were causing his symptoms”.  Dr Whiteford continued:

“6. A person of normal fortitude would have developed understandable anxiety (and in some psychologically vulnerable persons, a temporary adjustment disorder) at the prospect that he or she may have contracted an infectious disease.  However this anxiety would have remitted once the blood tests showed that an infectious disease had not been contracted.  By definition an adjustment disorder cannot persist for more than six months after the stressor which caused it had remitted.

7. Mr White does have a pre-existing vulnerability to develop anxiety and depressive symptoms as is evident from the fact that these symptoms occurred in 2010 and again in 2011 … .  This vulnerability made it more likely he would develop anxiety after the stressors he experienced in late 2012 (the relationship breakdown and the shoulder pain), the aggravation of the shoulder pain and wrist pain in January 2013, the needle stick injury in March 2013 and the subsequent interpersonal difficulties in the workplace throughout the remainder of 2013.

8. Given Mr White’s psychiatric symptoms were sub-threshold or in remission during 2012, it is not clear when they again reached the threshold for an active mental disorder following the stressors in late 2012/early 2013.  However treatment apparently did not start until he was prescribed Diazepam on 30 April 2013 and referred for psychological counselling on 31 May 2013. 

9. The history as best I can elucidate, is that Mr White’s adjustment disorder fluctuates and emerges to clinical significance in response to life stressors.  The needle stick injury was one in a series of life stressors.  The evidence from the medical records is that this was significant stressor.  However it was a transient stressor (as he was advised three months later that he had not contracted an infectious disease and being pricked by a needle was not a trauma that would cause a mental disorder, even in a vulnerable individual).  He continued at work until November 2012 [sic].  Subsequent life stressors have aggravated and maintained his adjustment disorder and this will continue while these stressors continue.”

  1. As a consequence of his examination of the plaintiff on 15 July 2015, Dr Whiteford assessed a ten per cent level of impairment.  However, Dr Whiteford said that “this impairment does not relate to the needle stick injury, the contribution this having made to his impairment ceasing in 2012 [sic].”
  2. Under cross-examination, Dr Whiteford was challenged as to his opinion that the plaintiff had a pre-existing vulnerability to develop anxiety and depression, that opinion having been based on the GP records which Dr Whiteford had reviewed.  Dr Whiteford said that he had asked the plaintiff whether the plaintiff had any pre-existing treatments for depression, to which the plaintiff had responded in the negative.  Dr Whiteford referred to the relevant GP records and noted that if these doctors had formed the opinions as they had recorded them, then Dr Whiteford had no reason to question those opinions.
  3. Dr Whiteford confirmed that, when the plaintiff presented to him, the plaintiff was distressed and easily moved to tears.  He described it as “moderately severe” presentation of anxiety and depression.
  4. Further under cross-examination, Dr Whiteford confirmed that it was his view that prior to 2013, the plaintiff had a vulnerability to adjustment disorder, but the adjustment disorder actually “came on” in 2013.  Dr Whiteford referred to there being two traumas – one being the trauma of being pricked by the needle itself, and the other being the trauma of believing he may have contracted an infectious disease from being pricked by the needle.
  5. Dr Whiteford was then cross-examined about the plaintiff’s subsequent presentations, and conceded that the plaintiff had suffered an “immediate and profound decompensation” from the needle prick incident.  Dr Whiteford said it was a “significant stressor that caused the emergence of what I considered to be an adjustment disorder.”[30]  Dr Whiteford then gave the following evidence:[31]

“And indeed, he was seriously mentally ill?--- Well, I didn’t examine him at the time, but it appeared he was very distressed and anxious according to the medical records.

That’s right.  And there is nothing that you can pinpoint, can you, to show any break in that symptomology between that time and the time that you saw him in 2015?--- I – no.  I think he had a continuous – although it fluctuated, but he had a continuous anxiety and depressive condition which actually worsened the following year, requiring him to be hospitalised.

All right.  Doctor, I put to you the fact that there’s a hospitalisation doesn’t necessary mean that it’s any worse than what it was it the beginning, does it?--- Yes.  It does.

Well, how could it – we – it may be that someone just made a clinical decision.  It could’ve been made in that early history as well?--- Yes.  It could’ve been, although it wasn’t.

That’s right.  So we can’t pinpoint a break in the – or you can’t, Doctor, can’t pinpoint a break in the symptoms between the needlestick injury and the time that you saw my client.  Just one more point, Doctor, one more point.  Could it be the case that the life stressors that you say that you’ve identified afterwards, could the reaction of my client, because of his obviously fragile state caused by the needle prick injury, have been enhanced and made more difficult by the fact of his mental state as at early March 2013?--- Sorry.  Could you just repeat the question?

What I’m saying is that did the needle prick injury and consequent mental disorder increase his vulnerability to life stressors after that date?--- Yes.  It would’ve, I’d imagine.  If he already had anxiety and depression from another cause, then he’s even more vulnerable than he would’ve been previously.”

Evidence concerning the plaintiff’s shoulder

Dr Mark Ross

  1. The plaintiff called Dr Mark Ross, orthopaedic surgeon, who had examined the plaintiff on 4 February 2015 and provided a report dated 18 March 2015.[32]  He recorded that the plaintiff reported the onset of left shoulder pain between November 2012 and January 2013, and described an incident in January 2013 of jamming a vacuum cleaner head under a car seat.  The plaintiff also informed Dr Ross of the needle stick incident, with Dr Ross recording:

“The needle stick injury did not result in the transmission of any disease, however he had post-traumatic stress disorder and continues to be treated for psychiatric issues, including depression, as a consequence of the needle stick injury.”

  1. Dr Ross’ report records the plaintiff stating that he was off work because of the needle stick injury since early 2013, and had not worked since that time.  He told Dr Ross that during the period when he was off work he was not experiencing any symptoms in his shoulder.
  2. The plaintiff told Dr Ross that he had a repeat cortisone injection in early 2014, which he said did not help. 
  3. At the time he saw Dr Ross, the plaintiff complained of soreness and stiffness in the shoulder, with pain in the neck and in the posterior aspect of the trapezius and scapula.  The plaintiff said that he also had some problems with wrist pain, but this had settled down after a cortisone injection for a presumptive diagnosis of De Quervain’s tendinitis.  He told Dr Ross that the wrist did not currently bother him.
  4. On examination, Dr Ross noted a slight decrease in range of motion in the cervical spine and some discomfort in the neck on cervical spine movements.  There was also some referral of pain from the neck into the trapezius.  Dr Ross said that there was insufficient range of motion to adequately test for impingement or other rotator cuff pathologies.
  5. Dr Ross referred to an MRI scan performed on 18 March 2014 which showed decreased capsular volume, consistent with adhesive capsulitis.  There were no tears of the rotator cuff.  There was some minor signal change in supraspinatus, which may be consistent with age-related cuff degeneration.
  6. Dr Ross’ assessment, based on his observations on the day of examination, was that the plaintiff presented with ongoing adhesive capsulitis.  He said that the plaintiff’s history, with slowly developing ache over a two to three month period followed by an aggravation when reaching forward, was typical for the spontaneous onset of idiopathic frozen shoulder.  Dr Ross thought that the plaintiff may have some underlying rotator cuff tendinopathy, but this was masked from Dr Ross’ examination on the day by a diminished range of motion.
  7. In his report, Dr Ross noted that he was unable readily to explain the discrepancy in range of motion between Dr Duke’s assessment and his assessment, but also noted that, in essence, while there was some variation in the diagnosis, both had reached the same conclusion, i.e. there is nothing in the history of workplace activities and potential mechanisms of injury to suggest that the workplace would be causative of either a frozen shoulder or rotator cuff tendinopathy.
  8. In terms of treatment, Dr Ross said that treatment of frozen shoulder is usually expectant, with there being some place for cortisone injections.  He said that most frozen shoulders can be expected to resolve over a period of three years.  There may be some place for assessment of rotator cuff pain and function once range of motion increases.  He thought it unlikely that surgical treatment would be indicated for the plaintiff for either frozen shoulder or rotator cuff tendinopathy.  On either diagnosis, Dr Ross thought there would be very little in the way of permanent impairment.
  9. In further oral evidence before me, Dr Ross confirmed that if the plaintiff presently had, on observation, full unrestricted movement in the shoulder, his opinion would be that the frozen shoulder had resolved.  He said that it would be consistent with a frozen shoulder that had come on sometime around 2012 or 2013, because that would be approximately a three year time span.  In relation to the MRI scan that Dr Ross had seen, he said it showed some minor signal change in the distal supraspinatus tendon without any structural compromise, which was a very common finding in people of that age.  He said that the diagnoses of frozen shoulder and rotator cuff tendinitis are not mutually exclusive – they can co-exist, and often for a temporary period of time frozen shoulder can limit the clinical assessment of rotator cuff tendinitis.  He thought the MRI did not indicate a severe tendinitis within the rotator cuff, and this was consistent with the assessment of severity set out in Dr Duke’s report.  Dr Ross also thought that if any input from the frozen shoulder was resolved, the residual changes in the rotator cuff would be unlikely to impact on a return to work for the plaintiff.
  10. Dr Ross also confirmed that, when he saw the plaintiff, there were no complaints about De Quervain’s syndrome.  He described the modalities of treatment for that condition, and confirmed that if a person had to do repetitive work as their occupation, the disease could be managed simply.
  11. Under cross-examination, Dr Ross confirmed that De Quervain’s syndrome is aggravated by particular repetitive activities that require repeated extension and radial deviation of the wrist and extension of the thumb.  It was not necessarily aggravated by heavy physical work, depending on the type of work.  It was, rather, related to the direction of movement that the wrist was travelling, for example, in repetitive hammering.  He conceded that it was conceivable that polishing a car was certainly possibly an aggravating factor for the syndrome.  He also referred to De Quervain’s syndrome being probably more an activity-related condition which is more common in individuals who may have an anatomic predisposition to develop the condition.  He was unable to assume whether or not the plaintiff has the anatomical predisposition to developing De Quervain’s syndrome.
  12. Dr Ross also confirmed that, at the time of his examination, the plaintiff had a frozen shoulder which would have made it difficult to do work such as car detailing, or any other type of work that would have involved lifting above shoulder height or bending forward with an outstretched arm.

Dr Phillip Duke

  1. The defendant called Dr Phillip Duke, orthopaedic surgeon, who had assessed the plaintiff on 3 December 2014 and provided a report of that same date.[33]  The “injury timeframe” referred to by Dr Duke was a period of some ten weeks from 1 November 2012 to 15 January 2013.  Dr Duke’s diagnosis of the condition suffered during that period was:

“1. Left shoulder no clinical evidence of frozen shoulder.  Rotator cuff tendinopathy with temporary aggravation from 10 weeks work.  No tear or harm. 

  1.  Left De Quervain’s stenosing tenosynovitis now resolved.”
  1. Dr Duke noted that the plaintiff agreed with the ten week timeframe, and informed Dr Duke that the plaintiff first noticed trouble when coming home from work when he experienced a small throbbing pain in the shoulder and wrist.  This gradually became worse.  The plaintiff told Dr Duke that on 15 January 2013 the plaintiff was using a vacuum cleaner when the nozzle became jammed under a seat.  The plaintiff noticed a sharp pain up the whole of his left arm, from the point of the shoulder down to the hand.  He kept working at the time, and said it became worse one hour later.  The plaintiff could not recall when he actually saw a doctor, but thought he was off work for a week soon afterwards.  After that he was able to keep working on light duties, with decreased hours for about one to two weeks, and then returned to work in full capacity.
  2. When recording the plaintiff’s medical history, Dr Duke noted that the plaintiff was currently under consideration for other injuries, and he informed Dr Duke that he had PTSD as a consequence of the needle stick injury.  The plaintiff admitted to having depression, and specifically denied any history of depression or PTSD or left shoulder problems.  The plaintiff confirmed that he had previously injured his right shoulder in a motorcycle accident five years previously, and had successful surgery.
  3. At the time he saw Dr Duke, the plaintiff complained of pain in the left shoulder radiating up towards his neck and down the arm.  He described a constant ache which was worse in the morning and said that he “can’t do anything because of the pain”.  The plaintiff said his sleep was disturbed when he slept on his side. 
  4. Dr Duke reviewed the medical documentation which had been provided to him, including the MRI of the left shoulder which had been performed on 18 March 2014.  The MRI report indicated some swelling in the axillary pouch and some calcification.  The radiologist opined consistency with adhesive capsulitis as well as rotator cuff tendinopathy. 
  5. Dr Duke conducted an examination of Mr White’s left shoulder and left wrist.  Examination of the left wrist showed a normal wrist, with no tender spots and a full range of movement.  A negative Finkelstein’s test ruled out ongoing De Quervain’s stenosing tenosynovitis.  Examination of the left shoulder showed an almost full range of movement. 
  6. On reviewing the MRI image, Dr Duke said that he did not consider the plaintiff had a frozen shoulder on the MRI.
  7. Dr Duke concluded in his report that the plaintiff did not present with clinical evidence of a frozen shoulder.  He had clinical evidence of rotator cuff tendinopathy.  This, said Dr Duke, is a pre-existing constitutionally developing condition that is endemic in the community, and the plaintiff had developed it.  The work between 1 November 2012 and 15 January 2013 temporarily aggravated this condition.  It was cured by a cortisone injection, and then reoccurred in about November 2013.  Since that time, the plaintiff had not done any work and had not had any further treatment, but pain persisted.  The hand problem had resolved.
  8. Dr Duke was of the opinion that there was no ongoing relationship between the plaintiff’s then current symptoms and the ten week period between 1 November 2012 and 15 January 2013.  The condition from which the plaintiff then suffered resolved completely after appropriate treatment.  Dr Duke said that any ongoing problem was now related to the constitutional tendinopathy and/or further aggravations in the workplace.  He noted that these further aggravations have long since ceased.  Dr Duke considered the prognosis for the plaintiff’s shoulder pain to be poor without appropriate treatment.
  9. In relation to the recurrence of the shoulder condition in early 2014, after the plaintiff had ceased work, Dr Duke said that the significance was that a shoulder condition that developed when a person was not working demonstrates no relationship to the workplace.  He said the plaintiff had a condition which resolved with appropriate treatment and did not reoccur until after he ceased work for other reasons.   Dr Duke said this suggested that the current shoulder condition was unrelated to work duties, particularly the work duties in the timeframe mentioned, but also the work duties that he performed until he ceased work in November 2013.
  10. At the time of his report, Dr Duke considered the plaintiff was unsuited to work.  He said:

“If he were to develop the ability in a psychiatric sense and in a physical fitness sense to return to the workforce, I would place restrictions on him in that he should not perform repetitive tasks.  This would be solely because of his underlying predisposition to Left wrist problems and also because of his underlying constitutional rotator cuff degenerative tendinopathy.”

  1. Dr Duke further expressly noted that the plaintiff’s future working ability was impacted by what he described as “a significant psychiatric illness as well as being very overweight and physically unfit with a significant nicotine habit”.
  2. Under cross-examination, Dr Duke confirmed that when he saw the plaintiff, he diagnosed rotator cuff tendinopathy.  He also confirmed, by reference to his report, that he had understood there was a complete resolution of clinically important symptoms in the shoulder after the cortisone injection in early 2013.  He said, however, that it was not necessarily the case that this condition could be managed in the future by cortisone injections and physiotherapy.  Cortisone will temporarily mask the pain, but does not cure a condition.  He did, however, think it would be able to be utilised in conjunction with education of a patient not to engage in activity that would aggravate the condition, coupled with appropriate advice from a shoulder physiotherapist to strengthen the rotator cuff muscles and ensure good movement of the shoulder joint.  He said that this treatment would, over a period of about three to six months, give about 50 or 60 per cent of people resolution from their symptoms.  This, however, did not guarantee that the symptoms would not reoccur down the track.
  3. Dr Duke also confirmed that the plaintiff had a zero per cent impairment according to AMA 5 criteria.  Dr Duke said that the plaintiff had experienced an orthopaedic disability, but at the time of Dr Duke’s examination the plaintiff did not have an orthopaedic impairment that was rateable.
  4. Dr Duke said that he disagreed with Dr Ross as to whether it was necessary for there to be surgical intervention in order to ascertain whether a person had a predisposition to De Quervain’s syndrome.  Dr Duke said that the plaintiff had told him he had no pain in the wrist, and based on that, Dr Duke resolved that the plaintiff had no De Quervain’s syndrome.  Dr Duke also described the treatment options available for patients suffering from De Quervain’s syndrome, commencing with managing by way of a cortisone injection, and then moving to a simple surgical procedure which has a very high rate of success.

Mr Lawrence Townsend

  1. The defendant agreed to the plaintiff tendering a report dated 9 June 2016 from Mr Lawrence Townsend, physiotherapist.[34]  Mr Townsend was the plaintiff’s treating physiotherapist.  The plaintiff initially presented to Mr Townsend on 10 March 2015.  On examination on that occasion, all movements of the plaintiff’s shoulder were restricted with stiffness dominating over pain.  The plaintiff then attended on three further occasions in March and April 2015. 
  2. Mr Townsend’s report concludes that the plaintiff was discharged after his final treatment on 21 April 2015 with “an approximate 90% recovery and with advice to continue self-management stretching to achieve a full and complete recovery”.

OTHER MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Health Service Brisbane Limited (“ATSICHS”)

  1. The plaintiff’s ATSICHS records were admitted by consent.[35] 
  2. The records refer to an attendance by the plaintiff on a doctor on 18 January 2011.  Numerous “reasons for contact” were listed, including “adjustment disorder with depressed mood”.  The “management” entries for that attendance include “needs mental health review”.  From an entry in the records dated 19 January 2011, it appears that the doctor wrote a number of referrals for the plaintiff, including one to a wellness centre. 
  3. On 16 January 2013, the plaintiff attended at ATSICHS complaining of a painful wrist and left upper arm.  There was a further attendance on 17 January 2013, and it appears that an ultrasound guided cortisone injection into the shoulder and wrist was requested on 18 January 2013.  When the plaintiff was seen on 24 January 2013, these injections had been performed, and it was reported that the plaintiff felt “much improved” in both sites.  At a further attendance on 14 February 2013, it was recorded that the plaintiff had had “great response” to the injections in his shoulder and wrist.
  4. Then, on 4 March 2013, the plaintiff attended at ATSICHS, giving a history of having suffered the needle stick injury.  Pathology tests were ordered.
  5. The next entry relates to the plaintiff’s attendance on 13 March 2013.  It records that the plaintiff reported being stressed following the needle stick injury.  The blood reports were discussed.  The plaintiff was worried about the outcome of a three month report.  He was disappointed with the attitude of his employer.  He had been getting headaches, was unable to sleep, and had lost his appetite.  He was worried about his daughter’s future.  He reported having been to the Prince Charles Hospital on the previous evening, and had been referred for counselling.  The plaintiff presented as teary and emotional, and was offered medication which he refused.  The ATSICHS entry records that the doctor contacted Prince Charles Hospital to confirm the counselling.  The ATSICHS note recorded the “reason for contact” as “stress following workplace injury”. 
  6. On 18 March 2013, the plaintiff was seen at the medical centre complaining of stress in relation to his return to work issue.  He was seen again the following day, complaining of being unable to sleep, unable to concentrate on anything, and having no appetite.  He was still undergoing counselling, and appeared anxious and very emotional. 
  7. He was seen again at the medical centre on 26 March 2013, where he complained of being still quite stressed and anxious, with his mind racing all the time, and he confirmed he was still seeing a counsellor, which helped a lot.  The plaintiff at that stage denied suicidal ideations, and also declined medication.
  8. He was seen again on 5 April 2013, when he told the doctor that he was slowly improving, and was happy to start back at work.  The doctor’s notes of the examination record that the plaintiff looked much better, and was not emotional.  The management recorded on that day was to continue with counselling. 
  9. The plaintiff was seen again at the medical centre on 30 April 2013.  At that time he complained of anxiety and insomnia, said that he kept thinking about the incident, and that he was worried about the outcomes of the blood tests.  The relevant file note records that the plaintiff was “teary” during his attendance, and the “reason for contact” records “? Depression”.  On this occasion, the plaintiff was prescribed Valium.
  10. Without recounting them in detail, it is sufficient to note that the ATSICHS records reveal that the plaintiff attended on numerous occasions during the balance of 2013 complaining of stress and anxiety following the needle stick injury.  So, for example, the attendance notes of the plaintiff’s consultation with Dr Page at the medical centre on 1 October 2013 records a history of the plaintiff having suffered the needle stick injury and having “remained with PTSD and depression/anxiety ever since”.  The doctor’s record of discussions with the plaintiff noted that several issues had been identified since then, including a weight gain of more than 20 kilograms, urinary hesitancy and incontinence, episodes of sweating/shakes/pallor, and dry mouth and blurred vision.  There was also reference to insomnia and nightmares, and the plaintiff being “unhappy at work as fault betrayed/abused at time of initial injury and was threatened with demotion so lost sense of loyalty”.
  11. The first entry in the records for 2014 relates to an attendance by the plaintiff on Dr Kulkarni on 7 January 2014, when the plaintiff said that he felt like he could go back to work for a few hours a week.  He said he still had panic attacks and suffered from sweating, but he was happy to go on a return to work program. 
  12. Then, however, on 8 January 2014, the plaintiff attended on Dr Kulkarni with left shoulder pain.  The examination was reported as showing restricted movements and there was possible adhesive capsulitis. 
  13. When the plaintiff was reviewed by Dr Kulkarni on 14 January 2014, he said that he could not work because of the pain.  Dr Kulkarni noted that this was a different Workcover claim from the needle stick injury claim.  At that time, Dr Kulkarni also wrote a referral for the plaintiff to Dr Kissoon, psychiatrist.
  14. The plaintiff saw Dr Kulkarni again on 28 January 2014.  The reason for this visit was “subacromial bursitis”.  The relevant entry records that the plaintiff told Dr Kulkarni that his shoulder was quite painful and he almost ended up in hospital on the previous day.
  15. On 31 January 2014, the plaintiff’s left shoulder was treated with an ultrasound guided injection into the subacromial bursa. 
  16. The plaintiff saw Dr Kulkarni again on 10 February 2014, when he reported that his shoulder pain had been worse, and he had been to the hospital on 6 February 2014.  The notes record the plaintiff saying that his “anxiety [was] getting worse now”. 
  17. Thereafter, there were regular attendances by the plaintiff at the medical centre, at which he complained about his sore shoulder. 

Prince Charles Hospital

  1. The plaintiff’s patient records from the Prince Charles Hospital were tendered by consent.[36]
  2. The records include those relating to the plaintiff’s attendance at the hospital on 13 March 2013.  The clinical notes created by the doctor who saw him on that occasion relevantly record:

“Patient is now here as things are getting too much for him.  He is feeling ‘physically sick’ with nerves and threw up at work today.  He has involved a lawyer as he is unhappy with how work responded to his problems.

Otherwise fit and healthy.

I’ve explained medically there is nothing to be done.  Transmission risk is very low, even if the needle had been in contact with infected patient. 

Patient claims to have a friend who contracted HIV from a needle sick working at a recycling plant – he is concerned he will do the same.

He is very angry with work bosses who he feels are targeting him for not following procedure rather than offering him support.”

  1. A mental health assessment completed during that attendance on 13 March 2013 recorded the plaintiff reporting that he had been extremely concerned about the outcome of the blood tests.  It seems from the notes that the doctor discussed “reality based practical issues” with the plaintiff and provided reassurance that the plaintiff’s children were not at risk.  The plaintiff also apparently reported not having any support from his employer, and said that he believed the employer was “attempting to intimidate him into accepting responsibility for injury”.  It was noted that the plaintiff presented as anxious and tearful at the beginning of the assessment, but calmed down throughout the interview.
  2. The hospital records also relate to the plaintiff’s attendance at the hospital on 6 February 2014, complaining of acute shoulder pain.  According to the hospital notes, the history he gave the doctor was one of long-standing pain in the left shoulder for one year.  He had steroid injections.  The last steroid injection the previous Friday led to no improvement.  He also informed the doctor of a history of anxiety/depression and hypertension.  It appears that the plaintiff was administered analgesia, and released with a referral for outpatient physiotherapy treatment.

Pine Rivers Private Hospital

  1. I note also for completeness that the records of the Pine Rivers Private Hospital[37] included the records of the plaintiff’s admission to that hospital in May 2014.  The referral letter for that admission from Dr Kissoon dated 6 May 2014 for Workcover stated:

“Kindly note that on review today, 6/5/14, Colin’s mental state remains very depressed and anxious and his frustration tolerance is very low.

He would need a period of hospitalisation from 12/5/15 to 26/5/14 for stabilisation on medication and therapy.  He will require a single room due to clinical features of his mood.”

DISCUSSION AND ASSESSMENT

  1. I have already referred to the principles which apply to the evidential burden resting on a defendant in a case such as the present. 
  2. But a prerequisite to the application of those principles:

“… is that the ‘plaintiff has, by direct or circumstantial evidence, made out a prima facie case that incapacity has resulted from the defendant’s negligence’ and the persuasive burden remains on the plaintiff ‘upon the whole of the evidence to satisfy the tribunal of fact of the extent of the injury caused by the defendant’s negligence’.”[38]

  1. It must also be recalled that the only claim advanced in this proceeding is for the loss and damage suffered as a consequence of the needle stick incident on 4 March 2013.  It is not a claim in respect of any other alleged misfeasances by the plaintiff’s employer.
  2. The defendant’s submission was that the evidence led by the plaintiff did not discharge the evidential onus of proving a causal connection between the needle stick incident and the entirety of the ongoing loss and damage claimed by the plaintiff.  The defendant accepted that the plaintiff did suffer from an adjustment disorder because of the needle stick incident, but said that this could not be described as severe because, in the ordinary course, it should have resolved within a period of about six months.
  3. The defendant argued that:
    1. the plaintiff had not established a direct unbroken causal relationship between the needle stick incident and his present mental illness because of the presence of many other intervening factors;
    2. Dr De Leacy was unable to reconcile the extent of the plaintiff’s ongoing injury or incapacity and could only do so by matters which were not pleaded or proved in evidence’
    3. the aggravating event with the shoulder in February 2014 is what led to the attendance at the Prince Charles Hospital and the subsequent hospitalisation in the Pine Rivers Hospital under the supervision of Dr Kissoon;
    4. the plaintiff’s present claim is gainsaid by the notice of claim he made relating to his shoulder.
  4. In considering these arguments, it needs to be recalled that the defendant expressly conceded that the needle stick incident caused the plaintiff to suffer an adjustment disorder.  The gist of the defendant’s argument is that by 6 February 2014, the needle stick incident ceased to be a stressor which contributed to the plaintiff’s ongoing mental health issues, i.e. from 6 February 2014 it was only matters unrelated to the needle stick incident which were then and thereafter causative of the plaintiff’s mental disorder.
  5. In my view, this position cannot be maintained on the evidence.
  6. The defendant’s concession that the needle stick incident resulted in the plaintiff suffering an adjustment disorder is hardly surprising in light of the psychiatrists’ evidence, including that of Dr Whiteford who, as noted, said that the plaintiff had suffered an immediate and profound decompensation after the needlestick incident. 
  7. It is also not particularly to the point that the different psychiatrists who have examined the plaintiff at different times when he was subjected to different combinations of stressors have formulated differential diagnoses.  I accept, in this regard, the position advanced by Dr De Leacy that what is important is that the plaintiff undoubtedly has a serious psychiatric disorder and has features of a condition that spans various diagnoses.
  8. The defendant’s argument on this point really relies on an unequivocal acceptance of the view expressed by Dr Whiteford that the plaintiff’s adjustment disorder “fluctuates and emerges to clinical significance in response to life stressors”, that the needle stick incident was a significant but transient stressor, and that subsequent life stressors had aggravated and maintained the plaintiff’s adjustment disorder. 
  9. In my view, however, the matter is not at all as clear cut as the defendant would seek to portray.  Dr Whiteford himself described the needle stick incident as causing the emergence of the anxiety disorder, and subsequently confirmed that thereafter the plaintiff had what he described as a continuous anxiety and depressive condition which fluctuated, and worsened in the following year when the plaintiff was hospitalised. 
  10. Dr Whiteford also confirmed that, having suffered the needle stick injury and consequent mental disorder, the plaintiff would have been even more vulnerable to being adversely affected by other life stressors.
  11. The observation in his report that the needle stick incident was a “transient stressor” needs to be read, I think, in light of Dr Whiteford’s observations in the preceding paragraphs of his report about the effect of such an incident on a “person of normal fortitude”.  As to that, it will be recalled that Dr De Leacy had effectively agreed with Dr Whiteford in relation to the effect of a needle stick injury on a “normal person”, but then immediately referred to psychiatrists dealing with a spectrum of people with different vulnerabilities.  Dr De Leacy’s observation that the plaintiff was not the only person he had seen who has not got over a needle stick injury is apposite. 
  12. It is clear from the ATSICHS records that the plaintiff’s mental state fluctuated in the course of 2013 after the needle stick incident, but it is equally clear that the mental disturbance which had been instigated by the needle stick incident continued throughout 2013 and into 2014, when the plaintiff first consulted Dr Kissoon.  By that time, of course, the plaintiff had suffered the acute incident of shoulder pain which led to him being treated at Prince Charles Hospital on 6 February 2014.  But even if the severe recurrence of the shoulder condition in early 2014 was a stressor which contributed to a deterioration of the plaintiff’s mental state, it simply cannot be said on the evidence before me that it was a stressor which completely supplanted the ongoing effect of the needle stick incident.  Rather, as was consistent with Dr Whiteford’s evidence, the onset of the shoulder symptoms in early 2014 was a further life stressor which was overlaid on the condition of an already vulnerable plaintiff who, not being a “normal person”, was continuing to suffer from the effects of the needle stick incident.  Certainly by the time he was admitted to the Pine Rivers Hospital in May 2014, the shoulder injury was contributing to the plaintiff’s deteriorating mental health, and Dr Kissoon confirmed as such.  But the shoulder condition was but one of several factors which had contributed to his then state of depressive mental health.  In my view, it is clear on the evidence as a whole that the needle stick incident also continued to be a significant contributing factor.
  13. On the defendant’s argument, there being no evidence of any further intervening significant stressors, the plaintiff’s mental health issues should have resolved with the resolution of the shoulder problems in the first half of 2015.  But that obviously did not happen, and so much is clear from the reports of Dr De Leacy and Dr Whiteford, both of whom saw the plaintiff later in 2015.
  14. As to the defendant’s submission concerning Dr De Leacy’s difficulty in reconciling the plaintiff’s ongoing concern with the effects of the needle stick injury, several things may be said.  First, it was clear that Dr De Leacy accepted that the plaintiff in fact continued to harbour such a concern.  In this passage of the report, Dr De Leacy sought to explain why it was that the plaintiff still harboured the concern after such a considerable period of time.  Secondly, the fact that Dr De Leacy found that explanation in external factors which he said amplified the stress at the time does not mean that the underlying concerns were not actually held by the plaintiff.  Finally, and probably most helpfully, Dr De Leacy concluded with the observation that the plaintiff was not more amenable to accepting that he does not have a serious infection “but he is still highly anxious and highly depressed and his condition is being perpetuated by the ingrained nature of the condition itself that has been present for so long”.
  15. As to the reliance by the defendant on the contents of the notice of claim prepared for the plaintiff in respect of a claim relating to his shoulder, I have set out the relevant parts of that document above.  That claim form expressly incorporated reference to the plaintiff’s ongoing mental health issues consequent upon the needle stick injury.  There is some overlap in the symptoms complained of.  Given the chronology of the shoulder “incident” shortly preceding the needle stick incident, that is hardly surprising.  In my view, nothing in that claim form proves a cessation of the causative effect of the needle stick incident on the plaintiff’s ongoing mental health issues.
  16. As noted, the defendant conceded that the needle stick incident was causative of the plaintiff’s mental health issues, albeit only for a limited period of time after the incident.  For the reasons I have just given, however, I find on all the evidence that the plaintiff has satisfied the persuasive burden of demonstrating that the needle stick incident was causative of his ongoing mental health issues.
  17. Having made that finding, it is now necessary to turn to consider whether the defendant has discharged the evidential burden which rested on it in respect of any of the other matters to which it pointed as impacting on the assessment of damages in this case.
  18. The most significant of those factors was undoubtedly the plaintiff’s shoulder condition.  That, clearly enough, was a condition which had manifested itself prior to the needle stick incident.  As will be seen from my discussion of their evidence, Dr Ross and Dr Duke gave differential diagnoses of the condition suffered by the plaintiff in his left shoulder.  For the purposes of the present case, I do not think anything turns on their difference in opinion.  On any view of their evidence, the shoulder condition, in and of itself, caused the plaintiff to be considerably disabled orthopaedically for a significant period of time.  That orthopaedic disability seems to have abated.
  19. What is, however, relevant for the present case is the impact which the suffering of the shoulder condition had on the plaintiff’s mental state.  I accept, particularly in light of Dr Kissoon’s evidence, that the deterioration in the shoulder condition leading to the hospital attendance on 6 February 2014 was of itself a significant stressor which contributed to a deterioration in the plaintiff’s already vulnerable mental health, and was one of the significant contributing factors which led to the necessity for the plaintiff to be hospitalised in the Pine Rivers Hospital.
  20. I also consider that the evidence sufficiently establishes that, even if the needle stick incident had not occurred, a continuation of the pre-existing shoulder condition, and the incident in February 2014 which was of such severity as to cause the plaintiff to seek hospital treatment for his shoulder, would, of themselves, more likely than not have caused the plaintiff to suffer a degree of mental decompensation.
  21. In that regard, it will be recalled that the evidence establishes that the plaintiff’s medical records point to a number of previous references to the plaintiff suffering from anxiety or an adjustment disorder.  The defendant, of course, must take the plaintiff in the condition he is found to be, with such inherent vulnerabilities as he might possess.  But equally, it is relevant to note that the evidence does clearly give an indication of a man who would, in any event, have been prone to mental decompensation, in the absence of the needle stick incident, with the application of a stressor of sufficiently significant magnitude.  As I have said, it seems to me, considering the evidence as a whole, that the plaintiff’s shoulder condition is likely to have been such a stressor in any event.
  22. I am not, however, so persuaded with respect to the defendant’s contentions concerning the plaintiff’s wrist.  I cannot be satisfied on the evidence that the plaintiff does, in fact, suffer from De Quervain’s syndrome, let alone that the impact of an onset of an incident of wrist pain would be a sufficient stressor to adversely affect the plaintiff’s mental health.
  23. In relation to the breakup of the plaintiff’s short-lived marriage, I note that this was one of the stressors relied on by Dr Whiteford in formulating his opinion.  Despite that, it seems to me, with respect, that there is very little evidence from which I could form a conclusion that the breakup of that relationship in fact had, or would have been likely to have had, such a significantly stressful impact on the plaintiff’s mental health as to cause him decompensation.  I note, for example, that even though the plaintiff was attending on his GP in relation to his shoulder at about the time of this breakup, there is no mention in the medical records of him complaining of any stress or anxiety as a consequence of the marital issues.
  24. The other matters relied on by the defendant are what are described as “interpersonal difficulties in the workplace” and “loss of employment in November 2013”.  The first of these seems to be a reference to the plaintiff’s perception of how he was treated by his managers after the needle stick incident, and the degree to which that contributed to the decompensation he suffered.  Having heard the relevant actors give evidence, I would not be inclined to find that Mr King was as aggressive as was sought to be portrayed by the plaintiff or that Mr Lal was as completely disinterested as was suggested.  That being said, I think it more likely that Mr King was not as sympathetic a manager as the plaintiff perhaps would have liked him to be, and equally I think that Mr Lal was not overcome with concern for the plaintiff’s predicament.  Given the apparently immediate adverse psychological reaction suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the incident, it is hardly surprising that the plaintiff’s perception of the attitudes of both of those men may well have been magnified.  I do not, however, consider it to have been established on the evidence that the conduct of either Mr King or Mr Lal, of themselves, was such significant stressors as to have independently adversely affected the plaintiff’s mental health.  At worst, his perception of their attitudes contributed to the condition from which he was suffering as a consequence of the needle stick incident.
  25. The plaintiff resigned from his employment in November 2013.  I have referred above to the terms of his letter of resignation.  There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the fact of his resignation, of itself, independently contributed to his ongoing anxiety disorder.
  26. Having made those findings, I turn now to assess the damages recoverable by the plaintiff.

Pain and suffering

  1. The assessment must be made in accordance with the Injury Scale Values (ISVs) set out in the Civil Liability Regulation 2014 (“CLR”).
  2. The plaintiff submits that his condition should be characterised as a “serious mental disorder” under Item 11 of the CLR Schedule 4 table.  That item prescribes an ISV range of 11 – 40.  The plaintiff says that, having regard to the expert evidence, the appropriate ISV is 20.
  3. The defendant relied particularly on Dr Whiteford’s opinion, especially that relating to the needle stick incident being a significant but transient stressor.  I have made observations about that above.  The defendant also referred to the fact that Dr Whiteford gave a PIRS rating for the condition in which the plaintiff presented to him, but said that this impairment did not relate to the needle stick injury because the contribution of that to the plaintiff’s impairment had ceased in 2013.  Again, for the reasons given above, I would not make an assessment with that qualification.  The defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s condition ought be classified as, at best, a “moderate mental disorder” with an ISV of 5.
  4. Having regard to the assessments made by each of the psychiatrists of the degree of mental disorder suffered by the plaintiff, I am satisfied that the plaintiff falls into the lower end of “serious mental disorder” under Item 11.  In that context, I would ascribe an ISV of 15.
  5. By reference to the relevant table of general damages calculations under the CLR (Table 4), that yields an award of $23,050 for general damages.

Past economic loss

  1. The parties were agreed that the applicable net wage figures for this plaintiff were $800 per week up to 30 June 2015 and $840 per week thereafter.
  2. Without anything else, and allowing for net amounts which the plaintiff received by way of income during the financial years ended 30 June 2013 and 30 June 2014, the net amount which the plaintiff would have earned to date would have been $158,410, calculated as follows:
–5 March 2013 – 30 June 2013$13,600 net
–1 July 2013 – 30 June 2014$21,730 net
–1 July 2014 – 30 June 2015$41,600
–1 July 2015 – 30 June 2016$43,680
–1 July 2016 to date (45 weeks)$37,800
  1. It is clear, however, that for a significant period of time the plaintiff’s capacity to earn income was also independently adversely impacted by his shoulder injury.  So much was expressly conceded by the plaintiff, with a submission that this should be reflected with a relatively minor deduction across the period 6 February 2014 to 21 April 2015 (the date by which the plaintiff’s shoulder had recovered as a result of Mr Townsend’s treatment). 
  2. Further to that, however, it seems to me that there must in any event be a significant discount to have regard to the fact, as I have found, that I consider it likely that, even if the needle stick injury had not occurred, the onset of the shoulder injury would have caused the plaintiff to suffer mental decompensation.
  3. In all the circumstances, it seems appropriate to me to reflect these matters simply by applying a discount of 50 per cent across the entirety of the plaintiff’s past economic loss.
  4. That yields an award under this head of $79,205.
  5. Interest on that amount for 4.2 years at 1.41 per cent is $4,690.
  6. The parties agreed on the applicable rates for lost past and future superannuation.  On that award, the allowance for lost past superannuation at 9.5 per cent is $7,525.

Future economic loss

  1. The plaintiff is now 55 years old.  I accept that he could otherwise have expected to have worked to the age of 67.  A loss of $840 net per week for 12 years, using a multiplier of 474, yields a starting figure of $398,160. 
  2. That figure would, in any event, have been discounted for the usual vicissitudes.  But again, in this case, it must be subject to a further significant discount to take effect of what I regard as the likelihood of the plaintiff suffering mental decompensation as a consequence of his pre-existing shoulder condition.
  3. In those circumstances, I consider it appropriate to apply a discount of 50 per cent in relation to the calculation of future economic loss.  That yields an award under this year of $199,080. 
  4. The lost future superannuation, at the agreed rate of 10.15 per cent, is $20,210.

Fox v Wood

  1. The defendant accepts that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the taxation instalments deducted from the weekly benefits paid by Workcover.  That is the sum of $6,378.

Past special damages

  1. The plaintiff’s out of pocket expenses were particularised in Exhibit 21, and totalled $41,720.  None of these expenses were challenged by the defendant. 
  2. The defendant’s contention, rather, was that the plaintiff’s entitlement to recover those out of pocket expenses ceased at 6 February 2014, and contended that the plaintiff’s entitlement to recover should be restricted to expenses incurred up to that date.
  3. For the reasons I have given above, I do not accept the “line in the sand” approach urged by the defendant.  There is no reason why the plaintiff ought not recover the full amount of his special damages of $41,720.
  4. Interest on that amount at 1.41 per cent for 4.2 years is $2,471.

Future expenses

  1. The plaintiff claimed a total of $87,100 for future medical and recurring expenses.  This included claims for the cost of visiting a general practitioner every three months, three visits per year to a psychologist, one visit per year to a psychiatrist, and the cost of various drugs. 
  2. There was, however, a paucity of evidence to back up these claims, and some of the claims seemed frankly inconsistent with the plaintiff’s own evidence.  It is difficult, for example, to justify making an allowance for regular ongoing future medication, when the plaintiff’s evidence before me was that he was no longer taking any medication.  Dr De Leacy referred to the plaintiff having a need for ongoing psychiatric and psychological care, and gave estimates of the costs involved with attending on those professionals.  No opinion was expressed, however, as to the necessary frequency for those attendances.  Moreover, on the evidence before me, the plaintiff has not in fact had any psychiatric treatment since he last saw Dr Kissoon in early 2015, nor is there any evidence that the plaintiff has seen a psychologist since the end of 2014.
  3. Further, and in any event, any amount allowed for future expenses would need to be significantly discounted having regard to my finding of the probability of the plaintiff’s shoulder condition contributing to a mental decompensation regardless of the needle stick incident.
  4. I accept that the plaintiff will have a need in the future for both care and medication, which will be at a cost to him.  Doing the best I can on the material before me, I will simply allow a global amount under this head of $20,000.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

  1. Accordingly, I assess the damages recoverable by the plaintiff as follows:
Pain and suffering$23,050
Past economic loss$79,205
Interest on past economic loss$4,690
Lost past superannuation$7,525
Future economic loss$199,080
Lost future superannuation$20,210
Fox v Wood$6,378
Past expenses$41,720
Interest on past expenses$2,471
Future expenses$20,000
Total$404,329
  1. Section 270(1) of the Workers Compensation Rehabilitation Act requires the plaintiff’s damages to be reduced by the total amount paid by an insurer by way of compensation for the injury.  In this case, the Workcover refund is $91,822.55, and the amount of the plaintiff’s award needs to be reduced by that amount, yielding $312,506.45.
  2. Accordingly, there will be the following orders:
    1. Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $312,506.45.
    2. I will hear the parties as to costs.

 

Footnotes

[1] (1960) 108 CLR 158 per Dixon CJ at 159 – 160.

[2] (1990) 169 CLR 638.

[3] [2005] NSWCA 208.

[4] [2013] QCA 83.

[5] T 1-34.

[6] T 1-34.

[7] T 1-35.

[8] T 1-36.

[9] T 1-36.

[10] T 1-36.

[11] T 1-39.

[12] T 1-39.

[13] T 1-40.

[14] T 1-41.

[15] T 1-42.

[16] Exhibit 19.

[17] Exhibit 20.

[18] Exhibit 21.

[19] T 1-49.

[20] Exhibit 26.

[21] Exhibit 29.

[22] T 2-41.

[23] Exhibit 8.

[24] The decision of the Medical Assessment Tribunal dated 1 October 2014 was before me as Exhibit 5.

[25] T 1-64.

[26] Exhibit 2.

[27] T 2-32.

[28] T 2-32; T 2-33.

[29] Exhibit 23.

[30] T 2-19.

[31]T 2-20.

[32] Exhibit 10.

[33] Exhibit 24.

[34] Exhibit 9.

[35]Exhibit 1.

[36] Exhibit 22.

[37] Exhibit 3.

[38] Schneider v Smith & Anor [2016] QSC 47, per McMeekin J at [124], quoting from Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    White v Hertz Australia Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    White v Hertz Australia Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2017] QSC 82

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Daubney J

  • Date:

    16 May 2017

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2017] QSC 8216 May 2017-

Appeal Status

No Status

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Commonwealth of Australia v Elliott [2004] NSWCA 360
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] NSWCA 360
Malec v J C Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1990) 169 CLR 638
Cite 2 - (1990) 169 CLR 638
Newell v Lucas [1964-5] NSWR 1597
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1964-5] NSWR 1597
Phillips v MCG Group Pty Ltd [2013] QCA 83
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCA 83
Cite 2 - [2013] QCA 83
Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1965) 114 CLR 164
Cite 2 - (1965) 114 CLR 164
Schneider v Smith [2016] QSC 47
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QSC 47
Cite 2 - [2016] QSC 47
Seltsam Pty Ltd v Ghaleb [2005] NSWCA 208
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] NSWCA 208
Cite 2 - [2005] NSWCA 208
Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1960) 108 CLR 158
Cite 2 - (1960) 108 CLR 158

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Pearce v Prescare [2020] QDC 1493 citations
1

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