Attorney-General v Jacob[2020] QSC 299

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   The respondent is subject to a supervision order made on 22 September 2015 by Lyons SJA (the supervision order) under the provisions of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (the DPSOA).
2. [2]
   The term of the supervision order^[1] was five years ending on 22 September 2020.^[2]
3. [3]
   On 15 August 2019, while subject to the supervision order, the respondent was convicted of one count of possessing dangerous drugs^[3] and two counts of contravening the supervision order.^[4]  The acts which contravened the supervision order were not of a sexual nature.
4. [4]
   The respondent was fined $100 on the charge of possession and on the charges of contravention of the supervision order, the respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for one month and three months, both suspended forthwith.  A good behaviour bond was also imposed.
5. [5]
   The respondent was held on remand in relation to the charge of possession and the two charges of breaching of the supervision order from 12 August 2019 until the date of his sentence in the Magistrates Court on 15 August 2019;  a period of four days.
6. [6]
   Sections 23 and 24 of the DPSOA provide as follows:

“23 Application of division

This division applies if, after being released from custody under a supervision order or interim supervision order, a released prisoner is sentenced to a term or period of imprisonment for any offence, other than an offence of a sexual nature.

24 Period in custody not counted

1. (1)
   The released prisoner’s supervision order or interim supervision order is suspended for any period the released prisoner is detained in custody on remand or serving the term of imprisonment.

2. (2)
   The period for which the released prisoner’s supervision order or interim supervision order has effect as stated in the order is extended by any period the released prisoner is detained in custody.”

7. [7]
   These sections operate so as to extend the term of the supervision order by a period equivalent to the time spent by a prisoner in custody serving sentences for offences other than those of a sexual nature.  The extension of the order is not dependent on, or effected by, the exercise of judicial power.^[5]
8. [8]
   Neither the possession of a dangerous drug, nor the breaches of a supervision order are offences “of a sexual nature”.^[6]
9. [9]
   Here, the supervision order has, by force of ss 23 and 24, been extended by four days and will expire on 26 September 2020.
10. [10]
    The respondent agrees that the supervision order has been extended as submitted by the applicant.
11. [11]
    Declaratory relief is a discretionary remedy.  Here, there is no dispute between the parties.  However, as I explained in Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Ruhland,^[7] supervision orders under the DPSOA vest significant and important powers upon corrective services officers to control and manage persons under supervision.  There are serious consequences for the respondent upon a breach of the order.  For those reasons, it is in the interests of the parties, Corrective Services and the public that the effect of the operation of ss 23 and 24 of the DPSOA upon the supervision order be the subject of declaration.
12. [12]
    For those reasons, I made the orders which I did.