R v Polson[2020] QSC 355

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   The defendant is charged on indictment with three offences.  The first two were committed on 11 April 2019, involving one count of possessing the dangerous drug, methylamphetamine, in a quantity exceeding 2 grams and one count of possessing the dangerous drug diazepam (counts 1 and 2, respectively).  She pleaded guilty to those two counts when arraigned on 8 October 2020.  The third offence is alleged to have been committed on 14 April 2019, involving a further count of unlawful possession of methylamphetamine in a quantity exceeding 2 grams (count 4).
2. [2]
   The defendant pleads not guilty to count 4 on the indictment.
3. [3]
   On 28 October 2020 an order was made pursuant to s 615(1) of the Criminal Code that the defendant be tried by a judge sitting without a jury.  The trial proceeded before me yesterday, 25 November 2020.
4. [4]
   My verdict is that the defendant is guilty of the charge the subject of count 4, on the basis that she had constructive, or deemed, possession of the drugs, but not actual possession.  The following are my reasons for this verdict.
5. [5]
   In a trial by a judge sitting without a jury, the judge must apply, so far as practicable, the same principles of law and procedure as would be applied in a trial before a jury (s 615B(1)).  The judge may make any findings and give any verdict that a jury could have made or given if the trial had been before a jury, and any finding or verdict of the judge has, for all purposes, the same effect as a finding or verdict of a jury (s 615C(1)).
6. [6]
   As required by s 615C(3), I include in these reasons the principles of law that I have applied and the findings of fact on which I have relied.

The offence charged

7. [7]
   The alleged offence is that on 14 April 2019, at Ormeau in the state of Queensland, the defendant unlawfully had possession of the dangerous drug methylamphetamine, and the quantity of the dangerous drug exceeded 2 grams.^[1]
8. [8]
   The charge arose in the following circumstances.  The police went to a house at Ormeau on the evening of 14 April 2019.   They had been there three days earlier, on 11 April 2019, to execute a search warrant.  The charges the subject of counts 1 and 2 on the indictment, to which the defendant has pleaded guilty, arose from that earlier search. They went to the house again on 14 April 2019 after seeing a car parked outside, which belonged to a Mr van der Walt, who was wanted by police.  While at the house, they had cause to conduct a search of the garage, which is part of the house.  There was a Louis Vuitton handbag in the garage.  The defendant claimed it as her handbag.  She was present when a police officer searched the handbag.  Various things were found upon searching the handbag, including a substantial quantity of methylamphetamine. 

The elements of the offence

9. [9]
   The prosecution bears the onus of proving the elements of the offence charged, beyond reasonable doubt.
10. [10]
    For count 4, possessing a dangerous drug in excess of 2 grams, the prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that:

    1. (a)
       the defendant;
    2. (b)
       had possession;
    3. (c)
       of the dangerous drug methylamphetamine;
    4. (d)
       in a quantity exceeding 2 grams;
    5. (e)
       unlawfully, which means without authorisation, justification or excuse by law. 
11. [11]
    The key issue is the element of possession.  There were a number of factual matters which were not disputed by the defendant, including the following, as a result of which it is not necessary to address the other elements in any detail.  It is not disputed, and I am satisfied to the requisite standard, that:

    1. (a)
       the handbag in which the drugs were found belonged to the defendant;
    2. (b)
       the handbag was found in the garage, where it is shown in the video footage of the search;
    3. (c)
       the drug found in the handbag was methylamphetamine, which is a dangerous drug;
    4. (d)
       the quantity of the drug found in the handbag was 62.638 grams, comprising 47.033 grams pure methylamphetamine (see exhibit 2); and
    5. (e)
       if the drugs were possessed by the defendant (which is disputed), that possession was unlawful.
12. [12]
    In relation to “possession”, there are two bases on which the prosecution contends the defendant had possession of the drugs found in her handbag.
13. [13]
    First, the prosecution contends the defendant had actual possession of the drugs, in the sense that she had physical custody of the drugs, or control over the drugs, with knowledge that she had the drugs in her custody or control – that is, that they were her drugs.  In this regard, it is for the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant’s knowledge of the drugs found in her handbag.  But it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the defendant knew that the substance was methylamphetamine.  It is enough for the prosecution to prove, directly or by inference, that the defendant knowingly possessed a thing or substance which was in fact a dangerous drug.
14. [14]
    Alternatively, the prosecution contends the defendant had constructive, or deemed, possession of the drugs because she was an occupier of the place where the drugs were found, and knew the drugs were there or ought reasonably to have suspected the drugs were there.  In this regard:

    1. (a)
       The prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant was an occupier of the house.
    2. (b)
       The occupier of a place (such as a house) is someone who occupies (lives in, or stays at) the place, and who is able to exercise some degree of control over, or management of the place – for example, by being able to tell people to leave.  A person can jointly occupy a place with other people.
    3. (c)
       By operation of s 129(1)(c) of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986, a person who is an occupier of a place where dangerous drugs are found is deemed to be in possession of the drugs, unless the person shows that they did not know of, and had no reason to suspect, the presence of drugs in or on the place of which they are occupier. 
    4. (d)
       The defendant bears the burden of proving this defence, but it is sufficient if she satisfies me that it is more probable than not that she did not know of, and had no reason to suspect, the presence of drugs in the house. 
    5. (e)
       Having regard to the terms of s 129(1)(c), the relevant question is whether the defendant knew or had reason to suspect drugs were in or on the place of which she was an occupier.    Here, that is the house at Ormeau; not specifically or only the garage, although the garage is part of the house; and not specifically in her handbag, which is not a “place” within the meaning of that term in s 129(1)(c)).  The relevant “place” is the house, of which the garage is a part.^[2]  So to succeed in establishing this defence, the defendant needs to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that she neither knew nor had reason to suspect that there were drugs in the house.

Preliminary and general matters

15. [15]
    Before turning to the evidence, I will set out some preliminary and general matters.
16. [16]
    The starting point is the presumption of innocence.  The defendant is presumed to be innocent.  She may be convicted only if the prosecution establishes that she is guilty of the offence charged.  The burden of proving the guilt of the defendant rests on the prosecution.  There is no burden on the defendant to prove her innocence.
17. [17]
    For the prosecution to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the defendant, it is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty.  This means that in order to convict the defendant, I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of each element that goes to make up the offence charged.
18. [18]
    I do not have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of every fact in the case – what must be proved, beyond reasonable doubt, are the elements of the offence.
19. [19]
    I have determined the facts based only on the evidence that has been placed before me in the course of the trial – comprising the oral testimony of the witnesses, both those called by the prosecution and the defendant, the footage of the search which is exhibit 1 and the certificate of analysis which is exhibit 2.
20. [20]
    I was provided with a transcript of the footage of the search.  The evidence I have acted on is what is contained in the recording, not the transcript, although I have used the transcript as an aid.  I watched the footage again in the course of considering my verdict.
21. [21]
    As already noted, although there were no formal admissions made, there were a number of matters not disputed by the defendant.   A cooperative approach was adopted by the defendant (including in relation to the inclusion of references to the earlier search as part of the footage which is exhibit 1) enabling the trial to be completed efficiently, within one day.
22. [22]
    As to the earlier search, I proceed on the basis that evidence of the earlier search is relevant in so far as there was evidence of things said by the defendant to the police, on 11 April 2019, which was relied upon in support of the Crown’s case that she was an occupier of the place, and in a general sense as part of the factual context on which the Crown relies as demonstrating that the defendant knew, or ought to have known, there were drugs present at the house. 
23. [23]
    In proof of its case, the Crown invites the court to draw inferences, in particular as to the defendant’s knowledge.  Knowledge is relevant in two ways in this case – first, as an element of actual possession; and, second, in relation to the defence to deemed possession.  As to actual possession, the knowledge that must be proved, beyond reasonable doubt, is knowledge that the defendant had the drugs physically in her custody, or in her control, relevantly, in her handbag.  As to deemed possession, the Crown does not have to prove knowledge, beyond reasonable doubt.  It only needs to prove that the defendant was the occupier of the place in which they were found.   The issue of knowledge only arises in relation to the defence relied upon by the defendant, that she did not know of, and had no reason to suspect, the presence of drugs in the house (keeping in mind she does not have to have knowledge of the particular drugs, or the quantity, just that there were dangerous drugs in the house).
24. [24]
    So, on the first basis of its argument (actual possession), the Crown invites the Court to infer, from all the evidence, including circumstantial evidence, that the defendant knowingly possessed the drugs found in her handbag in the sense of having physical custody or control of them.   I have applied the principle that if there is an inference reasonably open which is adverse to the defendant (that is, one pointing to her guilt) and an inference in her favour (that is, one consistent with innocence), I may only draw an inference of guilt if it so overcomes any other possible inference as to leave no reasonable doubt in my mind.  Before I may find the defendant guilty, on the basis of actual possession, it is necessary that guilt should be the only rational inference that could be drawn from the circumstances.  If there is any reasonable possibility consistent with innocence in this regard, I must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt. This follows from the requirement that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
25. [25]
    The defendant gave evidence before me.  That she did so does not mean that she assumed a responsibility of proving her innocence.  The burden of proof has not shifted to her.  The prosecution has the burden of proving each of the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and it is upon the whole of the evidence that I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution has proved the case before the defendant may be convicted.  In this case, it is not a question of me making a choice between the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses, and the inferences the Crown invites me to draw, and the evidence of the defendant.  The prosecution case depends upon the court accepting that the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses was true and accurate beyond reasonable doubt, and that the inferences it invites the Court to draw are the only rational and reasonable inferences to be drawn, despite the sworn evidence by the defendant.  I do not have to believe that the defendant is telling the truth before she is entitled to be found not guilty. 

The evidence

26. [26]
    On 11 April 2019 there was a police search of the house in Ormeau.   The defendant, and her partner, Mr Griffin, were there on that day.  Griffin was charged with drug offences, arrested and remanded in custody.
27. [27]
    The defendant was also charged with drug offences on that day (counts 1 and 2).
28. [28]
    Drugs were found in the garage on 11 April 2019.^[3]
29. [29]
    The police attended at the house again on 14 April 2019, after observing a vehicle parked outside, listed as owned by van der Walt, who was wanted by police.
30. [30]
    The first two police officers to enter the house were officers Wright and Reid.   The body worn camera footage which is in evidence (exhibit 1) shows that at 00:38 the police enter the front door saying “police”.  The defendant and another person can be seen immediately upon entry, to the left.   At 00:46 officer Wright can be seen looking in the (internal) door to the garage, which is to the right, and saying “police, come out here mate”.  But at least a couple of seconds before that the sound of a door opening can be heard, which I infer is the internal door to the garage.  Officer’s Wright’s evidence was that he had “eyes on him” [meaning van der Walt] immediately as he looked in the door.  His evidence is that it would have been less than five seconds between the time he first announced “police” and when he looked in the garage and saw van der Walt.  That is largely consistent with what can be seen on the footage. 
31. [31]
    Officer Wright then moved further along the corridor, but the police officer immediately behind him, officer Reid, looks into the garage straight away, keeping his eyes on van der Walt.
32. [32]
    Officer Wright’s evidence is that when he first saw the person in the garage, which was van der Walt, he was standing adjacent to the doorway opening, to the right as you look in the door, beside the sofa which is placed against that wall.  There was no one else in the garage. 
33. [33]
    Van der Walt exited the garage, as directed by the police, and was arrested a short time after that.  Officer Robinson, who was wearing the body worn footage which is in evidence, then entered the garage and looked around.  As a result of things he saw on the coffee table he declared an emergent search, issued the requisite warnings to the people who were present in the house, and then the search began.  Apart from van der Walt, and the defendant, it was not suggested any of the other people in the house on this night had anything to do with what was found.
34. [34]
    As mentioned, van der Walt was found standing by the edge of the sofa, nearest to the doorway.  In front of that sofa is a rectangular coffee table, on a rug.  The defendant’s handbag is located on the other side of the coffee table, about half way along the table, close to the edge of the rug (see at 08:46 and also at 9:51).  It can be seen to be sitting on the floor, open at the top.
35. [35]
    On the coffee table there was a clip seal bag containing a small quantity of white crystals, a bag with two glass pipes, a set of scales, a large amount of cash, and a couple of plungers.  On the floor there was a small coke bottle believed to contain GHB.   On the sofa there was a black backpack, claimed by van der Walt as his.  In the backpack there was found digital scales, a plunger, a large amount of cash and some ammunition.  The total amount of cash found was around $25,000.
36. [36]
    Officer Robinson described the handbag on the floor as being open, and about two thirds full.  To my observation, the bag is a tote bag style, perhaps about 30 cm high, and open at the top, with no zip.
37. [37]
    The first thing officer Robinson noticed was a glass pipe sitting on the top of the defendant’s bag.  Officer Robinson’s evidence was that when he asked her about that, she “made admissions that it’s her pipe, and she used it to smoke” (T 1-7).^[4]  He was not challenged about that. 
38. [38]
    At that point, officer Robinson asked the defendant to come into the garage while he searched her bag.  Without too much further effort, a fairly sizeable “rock” of what the officer believed to be methylamphetamine was found, also at the top of the bag (10:53).   He shows it to the defendant, and she says “that’s not mine”, and also that “it looks like it’s been knocked into my bag”.  The officer can be seen putting the “rock” back in the bag as he continues to search it. 
39. [39]
    The officer continues to search, this time taking things out and putting them on the floor next to the bag.  Among other pieces of paper, he found a notice to appear that had been previously issued in the defendant’s name.
40. [40]
    After removing a few more things, including a purse and a few pieces of paper, a box of chips, and a lock still in its wrapping, the officer finds a white paper bag, scrunched up (11:56).  Inside this paper bag is another fairly sizeable rock of what was believed to be methylamphetamine (12:16).  Officer Robinson said this was found approximately in the middle of all the rest of the contents of the bag.  He said it was not visible from the top, and was definitely not right at the bottom.  Again, the defendant says that it is not hers, adding that she doesn’t know if someone has just “tipped that in”, but “that is not mine”. 
41. [41]
    When asked by officer Robinson, the defendant denied the drugs were hers and said she did not know anything about it.  She said she couldn’t understand how the drugs would be throughout her bag, and that “if it was mine, it’d be in a bag”.
42. [42]
    A set of small clip seal bags inside a larger bag was also found.  At the bottom of the bag a considerable amount of white crystal substance was found.  Also at the bottom of the bag is a mobile phone, apparently face down in the bag, which has white crystal substance on the back of it (that is, the side of the phone which is facing upwards before it is picked up by the officer).
43. [43]
    The crystal substance in the bottom of the bag was poured into a clip seal bag by the police (around 17:44).  The rock in the white paper bag is later placed in the same clip seal bag (at first, in the paper bag, then removed from it).  It was not clear, and officer Robinson could not remember, exactly what happened to the first rock.  It is not seen in that form again in the footage.  I infer that when it was placed back in the bag, and in the course of the ensuing search of the bag, it crumbled to some extent and formed part of the crystal substance in the bottom of the bag (which has a mixed appearance, in terms of size of crystals).   I accept, and it was not suggested otherwise, that all of the drugs found in the bag was placed in the clip seal bag which was eventually analysed to contain 62.628 grams, comprising just over 47 grams pure methylamphetamine.
44. [44]
    The defendant’s evidence was that she recalled van der Walt arriving at the house on 14 April 2019, she thought about 10 or 15 minutes before the police got there.  She said he arrived, “just asking of Scott’s [Griffin’s] whereabouts”.  She had seen him once or twice with Griffin.  She accepted that Griffin was “involved in drugs”.  When it was put to her that the times she had seen Griffin and van der Walt together that may have had something to do with drugs, she said “not necessarily”, suggesting Griffin also had friends who did “normal things with their bikes and stuff”.  She said she didn’t have time to explain to van der Walt then, as there was madness going on, changing all the locks, so she told him to just wait in the garage, and either she or (presumably Griffin’s) mum will come and explain where Scott is.  She said she had no idea why he was there, other than looking for Griffin. 
45. [45]
    Having said earlier in her evidence that van der Walt was there about 10 or 15 minutes before the police arrived, the defendant later said she’d completely forgotten he was in the garage, that she continued doing what she was doing and it slipped her mind that he was there.  When pressed about the illogicality of this, she said she did explain, when van der Walt arrived, that Griffin was not there, but “then he was asking questions all worried and stuff” and that’s why she said just wait in the garage.
46. [46]
    I do not accept the defendant’s evidence about van der Walt simply making an innocent inquiry about Griffin’s whereabouts.   If there was an innocent explanation for van der Walt’s presence, and enquiry about Griffin’s whereabouts, it does not make sense that the defendant would not simply tell him, when he first arrived, that Griffin was not there, or even that he was not there because he had been arrested.
47. [47]
    The fact that he was ushered into the garage, suggests something more nefarious.  In all the circumstances, I consider it reasonable to infer that the defendant knew there was a link between van der Walt and Griffin, in relation to drugs; and that the defendant knew van der Walt’s presence at the house had something to do with drugs. 
48. [48]
    The defendant said before van der Walt arrived the only thing on the table in the garage was the bag of pipes which the police had left there after the previous search, and a set of scales that she found and put there. 
49. [49]
    She said her handbag had been in the garage all day.  She was in and out of the garage during the day, as she was clearing things out of the house, but denied going into the garage while van der Walt was there.  She denied any knowledge of the drugs in her bag, and denied having any reason to believe the drugs were in there.  The defendant’s evidence was to the effect that van der Walt must have put the drugs in her bag, because he is the only person who was in the garage and she had no reason to believe any of the other people in the house would have anything to do with it.
50. [50]
    In relation to the question of whether the defendant was an occupier of the house, on the occasion of the second search the defendant told officer Robinson she was clearing out the house, for an inspection, before moving out.  She told him she was cleaning out things and changing locks.  Officer Wright gave evidence that, on the occasion of the first search, he heard the defendant respond to a question by another police officer indicating that she was staying at the house and had bags and clothing in the master bedroom.  He also observed a child’s bedroom. 
51. [51]
    The house at Ormeau was where Griffin lived.  He had lived there for about six weeks at the most, possibly four weeks.  No other person lived there.  The defendant described Griffin as her partner, on and off.  They had been in a relationship for three or four years.  He is the father of the defendant’s daughter.   The defendant said she lived at an address in Daisy Hill, with a friend of her family and his wife.  The defendant’s mother, and Griffin’s mother, helped to look after the child, as both the defendant and Griffin had drug issues.   There was no formal custody arrangement in relation to the child.  The defendant would take the child to visit Griffin, periodically, for a couple of days at a time.  The defendant and her child would both stay at the house, with Griffin, for these visits.   The child never stayed there without the defendant.  The defendant stayed in the main bedroom when she was there, I infer, with Griffin.  She had some of her possessions at the house, including her clothes.  She confirmed there is a bedroom set up for their daughter at the house.
52. [52]
    After Griffin was arrested on 11 April 2019, the defendant and Griffin’s mother arranged for some of his possessions, in particular motor bikes, to go into storage.  The defendant agreed she thought he may not be coming back for a while and said she “just didn’t want anyone breaking in, in the meantime, and taking anything”.   The defendant said Griffin’s mother had asked her to help, but also said that she, the defendant, would be more aware of “what needed to go where, due to storage and all, because his mum wouldn’t be aware of those details”. 
53. [53]
    In the course of her interactions with police on 14 April 2019 the defendant makes reference to the police having been there a few days before, and says that she was clearing things out, knowing the police would probably be coming back.
54. [54]
    The defendant was at the house on 11 April 2019 for one of her visits with her daughter.  She says she did not stay there after Griffin was arrested, but returned on the morning of 14 April 2019, after going to Bunnings to buy new locks for the house.  She didn’t know if anyone (else) had keys to the house, and decided to change all the locks.  The other people who were there on the evening of 14 April (Griffin’s mum, the man the defendant otherwise lived with and his friend) were helping to install the locks.  Another person who was there was a neighbour just visiting. 
55. [55]
    The defendant bought all the locks; and gave direction to the people who were helping to install them, because “they needed direction” as “they don’t know the house”. 

Findings

56. [56]
    I am sceptical about the credibility of the defendant’s evidence.  As already mentioned, I do not accept her evidence about van der Walt, in so far as she denied knowing of a link between him and Griffin in relation to drugs, and as to his reason for being at the house on 14 April 2019.  She was at pains to distance herself from being an occupier of the house, and her evidence lacked credibility in that respect also.   That causes me to doubt the credibility of her denials of knowledge of the drugs in her bag.  Although I note there is consistency between her behaviour on the night of the search, as it can be observed in the footage, and what she said to police at that time, and her evidence before the court.
57. [57]
    In terms of the Crown’s actual possession case, the Crown invites the court to infer, as the only rational inference, that the drugs in the handbag were the defendant’s drugs – that is, that she had custody or control of them, with knowledge – having regard to the following:

    1. (a)
       the drugs were in her handbag, in the garage of the house where she left her handbag;
    2. (b)
       she was in and out of the garage during the day, and knew her handbag was there;
    3. (c)
       the unlikelihood of anyone else having put the drugs in the bag.  In this regard, the Crown contends it is “almost, not quite, but almost impossible” for van der Walt to have placed the drugs in her bag, because there was simply not enough time for him to have done so; and points to the “rocks” being found in two different positions in the handbag, one at the top (which might be consistent with hasty placement), but the other in the middle; and
    4. (d)
       the presence of clip seal bags also in the handbag, also consistent with drug activity.
58. [58]
    On the other hand, it is the defendant’s case (noting that she does not bear any onus in this respect) that she had no knowledge of the drugs being in her bag, and that the drugs were put in her bag by someone else, most likely van der Walt, as there was no other person at the house that day who could have done so.
59. [59]
    I accept there is an inference reasonably open that the defendant knew the drugs were in her bag.  But on careful consideration, I find there is also an inference reasonably open that she did not have that knowledge.  In this regard I take into account:

    1. (a)
       her observed behaviour at the time of the search, and consistent denials then and at trial – although I reiterate my hesitation about accepting her as a witness of truth, this is not a case where I am thoroughly persuaded to reject her evidence outright; and
    2. (b)
       it is possible that van der Walt could have put the drugs in the defendant’s handbag.  He had about five or six seconds, from the time when the police announced they were there.  When first spotted by police, he was standing (not sitting) back by the couch.  One of the rocks was right on top of the bag – consistent, as the Crown concedes, with “hasty placement”, and somewhat odd, if the drugs belonged to the defendant.  The other rock was in a paper bag, a bit further down.  But the bag was not so full of things that it would have been difficult to quickly drop that scrunched up paper bundle into the bag.  There was only a wallet and a few pieces of paper and the lock in its packaging pulled out, before the second rock was found.  On the evidence, the crushed up crystals on the bottom of the bag are explicable, at least in part, on the basis of the first rock crumbling as the search of the bag continued.  That the crumbles landed on the back of the mobile phone, which was facing upwards, is consistent with that.
60. [60]
    I have considered this conclusion carefully, because the arguments against the inference that van der Walt dropped the drugs in the handbag are strong.  However, applying the onus and standard of proof, and the principles in relation to the drawing of inferences, I am unable to conclude that the inference consistent with guilt (that is, that the defendant knew the drugs were there) so overcomes any other possible inference (relevantly, that the drugs were quickly dropped in the bag by van der Walt) as to leave no reasonable doubt in my mind.  I am not persuaded that knowledge on the part of the defendant is the only rational inference that can be drawn. I find that there is a reasonable possibility consistent with the defendant not having the requisite knowledge for actual possession – namely that the drugs were dropped into her open handbag quickly by van der Walt, when the police arrived at the house.   Although it seems likely that not all of the crushed up part of the crystal substance came from the first rock, that does not provide a basis to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substantial quantity of methylamphetamine found in the handbag – that coming from the two rocks found – was actually possessed by the defendant (even if some other small quantity was).
61. [61]
    Turning to the alternative basis for the prosecution’s case, I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant was an occupier of the place in which the drugs were found – that is, the house, which includes the garage, having regard to the following:

    1. (a)
       she stayed there intermittently, over the approximately four to six weeks that Griffin had been living there;
    2. (b)
       when she stayed there, she stayed for a couple of nights at a time, with her and Griffin’s daughter, in the context of their on and off relationship, and to enable their daughter to visit Griffin – she was not a mere visitor to the house;
    3. (c)
       she kept some of her clothes and belongings at the house; and her daughter had a dedicated room at the house;
    4. (d)
       she was present when police executed the search warrant on 11 April 2019, and told a police officer she was staying there; she was there again on 14 April 2019, the only person, with the possible exception of Griffin’s mother, with the entitlement to be (as opposed to the others who were visiting);
    5. (e)
       she was also clearing out the house, it seems for the purpose of moving out, and acknowledged she was the person who knew where things were and what had to be done with various things;
    6. (f)
       importantly, she was able to exercise a considerable degree of control over, or management of, the house – demonstrated by the fact that she decided to change all the locks, after Griffin was taken into custody, went to Bunnings to buy the locks and was directing the others who were there helping her to install the locks; and
    7. (g)
       the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that the defendant had the ability to permit people to enter and to tell people to leave the house, if she chose to.
62. [62]
    It follows from that conclusion that, by operation of s 129(1)(c), the defendant is deemed to have had possession of the drugs found in (her handbag, in the garage of) the house, unless she shows that “she then neither knew nor had reason to suspect that the drug was in or on that place”.
63. [63]
    In respect of the defence provided by s 129(1)(c), I am not persuaded that it is more probable than not that the defendant neither knew, nor had reason to suspect, there were drugs in the house, having regard to the following:

    1. (a)
       she was an occupier of the house, with her partner, Griffin, who she acknowledged was involved in drugs, to put it generically;
    2. (b)
       both she and Griffin had issues with drugs;
    3. (c)
       the house had been searched by the police, on the basis of a search warrant, three days earlier; drugs were found, including in the garage and including drugs acknowledged by the defendant to belong to her (based on her plea of guilty to counts 1 and 2);
    4. (d)
       as I have found, a person who the defendant knew to be an associate of Griffin’s, with some connection with drugs, came to the house on 14 April 2019, looking for Griffin and asking questions sufficiently pressingly to be invited to go into the garage and wait;
    5. (e)
       I consider it likely that some part of the crystal substance in the bottom of the handbag was already there (that is, it is not all explicable by the first rock found in the search); and
    6. (f)
       the defendant was clearing out the house on 14 April 2019, in part because she expected that, having been there on 11 April 2019, the police would inevitably return and she did not want them to find anything else, which I infer means anything else which it is unlawful to possess.
64. [64]
    The defendant has not discharged the onus on her under s 129(1)(c). 
65. [65]
    Accordingly, I find, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant possessed the drugs found in her handbag on 14 April 2019, on the basis of deemed possession under s 129(1)(c) of the Drugs Misuse Act.
66. [66]
    All other elements of the offence being proved, beyond reasonable doubt, I find the defendant guilty of count 4 on that basis.