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Heathcote v Oaky Creek Coal Pty Ltd[2021] QSC 184

Heathcote v Oaky Creek Coal Pty Ltd[2021] QSC 184

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Heathcote v Oaky Creek Coal Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 184

PARTIES:

STEVEN ANDREW HEATHCOTE

(applicant)

v

OAKY CREEK COAL PTY LTD

ACN 010 202 936

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

SC No 31 of 2021

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Mackay

DELIVERED ON:

6 August 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Rockhampton

HEARING DATE:

15 July 2021

JUDGE:

Crow J

ORDER:

  1. The period of limitation within which to commence an action for damages for negligence and/or breach of statutory duty with respect to bodily injury arising from an incident in the course of the applicant’s employment on 27 March 2013 be extended up to and including 60 days from the date upon which the applicant complies with Section 295 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).
  2. The respondent file and serve written submissions as to costs within 7 days hereof and the applicant file and serve written submissions in reply within 3 days’ receipt of the respondent’s written submissions.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – LIMITATION OF PARTICULAR ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS OF DECISIVE CHARACTER – KNOWLEDGE – GENERALLY – where the applicant was employed by the respondent and had duties as part of the rescue team – where on 27 Match 2013 a dozer, whilst operating on the coal stockpile, fell into a void – where the applicant was part of the rescue team – where the applicant suffered a heart attack – where the applicant was informed by a doctor that the heart attack was by a blocked left ventricle which was hereditary – where the applicant was diagnosed in 2019 has having a 40% work impairment and was payed an advance by the respondents workers’ compensation insurers – where, in March 2021, the applicant received a copy of a report into the subject incident which made findings as to causation and liability – where the limitation period in which to commence proceedings expired on 27 March 2016 pursuant to s 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) – where the applicant seeks to extend the period in which to commence under s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) – whether an extension of time within which to file a claim ought to be granted

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 11, s 30, s 31

Baillie v Creber & Anor [2010] QSC 52, applied

Dick v University of Queensland [2000] 2 Qd R 476; [1999] QCA 474, followed

Do Carmo v. Ford Excavations Proprietary Limited (1984) 154 CLR 234; [1984] HCA 17, cited

HWC v The Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2009] QCA 168, cited

Opacic v Patane [1997] 1 Qd R 84, cited

Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106; [2015] QCA 74, followed

Wood v Glaxo Australia Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 431; [1993] QCA 114, cited

COUNSEL:

C C Heyworth-Smith QC for the applicant

A S Mellick for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Macrossan & Amiet Solicitors for the applicant

Minter Ellison for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The applicant, Steven Andrew Heathcote, seeks to pursue damages for personal injury arising from an incident which occurred whilst working at the Oaky Creek Coal Mine on 27 March 2013. The limitation period within which Mr Heathcote was permitted to commence such a proceeding expired on 27 March 2016.[1]
  2. [2]
    Mr Heathcote applies under s 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (LAA), to extend the limitation period applicable to the subject proceedings.

Background

  1. [3]
    Mr Heathcote was born on 10 February 1968. Mr Heathcote completed his formal education to Grade 10 at Moranbah State High School and then obtained an apprenticeship as a Heavy Diesel Fitter Mechanic.[2] Mr Heathcote was trade qualified by the age of 19 in 1987 and was then in constant employment as a fitter, diesel fitter, boilermaker or mechanical fitter until he resigned on 7 November 2019.[3]
  2. [4]
    On Wednesday 27 March 2013, Mr Heathcote was working as an operator/maintainer on the coal handling and preparation plant at Oaky Creek Coal Mine. Mr Heathcote commenced his shift at 6:15 pm. At approximately 8:00 pm, Warren Nunn, who was operating a dozer pushing coal on a coal stockpile at Oaky Creek made an emergency call. Mr Nunn called on his radio to alert his work colleagues that his dozer had fallen backwards into the F22 feeder.
  3. [5]
    Mr Heathcote was a part of the emergency response. After receiving the emergency call, Mr Heathcote ran some 300 metres to the top of a stacker where he was able to observe that the large dozer being operated by Mr Nunn had been engulfed in coal with only the blade of the dozer being exposed.[4] 
  4. [6]
    Mr Heathcote then assisted in coordinating an excavator to move onto the stockpile and to dig the coal away from the dozer. This took time, and as the cabin of the bulldozer had become engulfed there was reasonable concern that the oxygen supply in the cabin could be exhausted. A retrieval ladder was obtained, and the emergency situation was assessed. Difficult decisions had to be made, namely whether to attempt a “snatch and grab”, that is, with the deployment of the ladder by putting the rescue workers’ lives at risk to attempt to save Mr Nunn’s life, or to continue with the excavation which may have caused the stockpile to further collapse, resulting in Mr Nunn’s death.
  5. [7]
    The mine manager made the difficult decision to attempt the snatch and grab and as a result, Mr Heathcote, as a part of the rescue team, was required to climb into the stockpile below the surface of the trench and place the ladder onto the dozer. Mr Nunn was then able to get out of the cabin of the dozer, climb up the ladder and was successfully rescued. The photographs attached to the “ICAM incident investigation report”[5] (“ICAM report”) show that the dozer was in an extremely precarious position in a large void, with the dozer having slid backward into a void, such that the dozer was almost vertical when the rescue occurred. In any event, the rescue was a great success as Mr Nunn was retrieved and ostensibly no other worker was injured.
  6. [8]
    After the incident, Mr Heathcote felt unwell. As described to Dr John Sowby on 17 December 2019,[6] Mr Heathcote felt that he suffered from indigestion (even though he had not eaten) he was sweating and feeling thirsty. Approximately three quarters of an hour after the onset of these symptoms, an ambulance attended upon Mr Heathcote and he was evacuated as an emergency to the Emerald Hospital. Mr Heathcote arrived at the Emerald Hospital one hour later and was assessed with “a ST elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI)”.[7] Mr Heathcote was then flown to the Prince Charles Hospital which took a further two hours.
  7. [9]
    At the Prince Charles Hospital, Mr Heathcote was stabilised and underwent a coronary angiogram on 28 March 2013, where a stent was inserted. Several days later, Mr Heathcote was discharged with a range of medication. Mr Heathcote took six weeks off work and then returned to work on suitable duties. The respondent, Mr Heathcote’s employer, sent a representative to the Prince Charles Hospital to visit Mr Heathcote to provide Mr Heathcote with forms so that Mr Heathcote could make an application for workers’ compensation.[8] Although the respondent acted compassionately and promptly in assisting Mr Heathcote by providing him with forms to apply for workers’ compensation, Mr Heathcote did not apply for workers’ compensation for approximately another six years.[9]
  8. [10]
    Mr Heathcote swore that he was told at the Prince Charles Hospital that his condition was hereditary.[10] Mr Heathcote’s general practitioner did not suggest that he ought to claim workers’ compensation. Although Mr Heathcote was off work between 27 March 2013 and 10 May 2013, he did not lose any wages as he was paid sick leave and holiday pay by his employer. Mr Heathcote returned to his normal employment and had regular assessments at the cardiac unit at the Mackay Base Hospital on:[11]
  • 9 December 2013;
  • 2 July 2014;
  • 21 July 2015;
  • 13 April 2017;
  • 20 July 2018; and
  • 22 August 2019.
  1. [11]
    On 19 August 2019, Mr Heathcote made application to XtraCare (Oaky Creek’s worker’s compensation insurer) to seek recovery of his sick leave and annual leave for when he was off work between 27 March 2013 and 10 May 2013. XtraCare was supportive of Mr Heathcote. XtraCare obtained a report from Dr Sowby, occupational physician, on 19 December 2019 and accepted Dr Sowby’s opinion that Mr Heathcote had suffered from a work-related injury and was properly assessed with a 40% whole person impairment. As a result of this assessment, Mr Heathcote was paid $425, 785 (40% gross compensation payable, $340,215, plus an additional lump sum of $85,570).[12]
  2. [12]
    Over the months leading up to November 2019, Mr Heathcote was suffering from increasing difficulties at work. Mr Heathcote had difficulty working in the hot conditions that he had worked in all his life. He found that he was breathless and dizzy if required to exert himself by walking up the stairs of the wash plant.[13] It is a statutory requirement for coal mine workers that they pass a coal board medical review every five years. Mr Heathcote’s assessing medical officer at Tieri Medical would not certify Mr Heathcote fit to return to work unless he had received a supportive report from a cardiologist. The report and the positive review was required prior to 8 November 2019.
  3. [13]
    On 22 August 2019 at review by Dr Khan at the Mackay Base Hospital cardio clinic, the echocardiogram had shown a decrease in Mr Heathcote’s left ventricular ejection fraction (LVEF). Although Mr Heathcote did not have his clearance to work and knew that he was not allowed on site on 8 November 2019, Mr Heathcote nonetheless drove to Tieri on Tuesday 5 November 2019 to commence his day shift tour on Wednesday 6 November 2019.[14]
  4. [14]
    After having worked in mining and heavy industry for approximately 36 years, Mr Heathcote did not want to be “blocked off site” on Saturday 9 November 2019, so he resigned his employment on 7 November 2019.
  5. [15]
    Mr Heathcote was earning in excess of $2,000 nett per week at the time that he resigned and I accept Mr Heathcote’s evidence that he resigned his employment as a result of his heart condition and its effect of causing Mr Heathcote to be unable to perform his usual work duties.  When he resigned, Mr Heathcote was 51 years of age.

Legal history

  1. [16]
    It would appear that Mr Heathcote was concerned with his circumstances and so he attended upon a lawyer at Shine Lawyers in November or December 2020.[15] Mr Heathcote deposed that he did not have confidence in the Shine lawyer, as the Shine lawyer did not understand mining procedures. Mr Heathcote swore that the Shine lawyer advised him that a personal injury claim had a limitation period of 3 years and that it had expired. There is no suggestion that the lawyer from Shine advised Mr Heathcote that the time limit could, in certain circumstances, be extended.
  2. [17]
    As Mr Heathcote explained,[16] he did not have confidence in Shine Lawyers, and Shine Lawyers advised him they would not act for him as he was outside the three-year limitation period. Mr Heathcote swore that he left Shine “feeling really dejected”.[17] Mr Heathcote then sought out Mr Carroll at Taylors Solicitors, as he was known to Mr Heathcote to be a “CFMEU lawyer” and Mr Heathcote was not happy with the advice from Shine and thought that he would “just get a second opinion”.[18]
  3. [18]
    Mr Heathcote then attended upon Taylors Solicitors on 2 December 2019 and was advised by experienced solicitor, Mr Greg Carroll, that the limitation period had expired on 27 March 2016 however an application could be made to extend the time limitation period. Mr Carroll accurately advised Mr Heathcote that he would need to obtain medical records from the Prince Charles Hospital, the Mackay Base Hospital, and the XtraCare records in order to enable him to provide advice.[19]
  4. [19]
    An authority was signed, allowing Mr Carrol access to the above records, it would appear, on or about 23 January 2020.[20]
  5. [20]
    After Mr Heathcote attended upon Mr Carroll, Mr Heathcote let Mr Carroll take care of matters as Mr Carroll had explained that he needed to obtain information. Mr Heathcote did go into Mr Caroll’s office to ask him whether the information had been obtained and was advised by Mr Carroll, that he had not got it all yet. Mr Heathcote says that he then waited for Mr Carroll to get back to him and was “hoping he might ring me but he never".[21]
  6. [21]
    Mr Heathcote said that he would quite often go and see Mr Carroll and “…he’d [Mr Carrol] would be out the front having a smoke, and I’d chat to him then, and [Mr Carroll] just went in – had to go into the office...”[22] It was not stated on how many occasions Mr Heathcote attended upon Mr Carroll, however the only evidence is that it occurred “quite often”.[23] Mr Heathcote did concede in cross examination that he did not push Mr Carroll as “I wanted him to be thorough I guess, in what he was doing”.[24] Mr Heathcote explained that “[t]here wasn’t many days that I went to see him. I just – I just wanted to leave him to do what he had to do. He knew what he had to do.”[25]
  7. [22]
    Importantly, in cross-examination the following exchange occurred:[26]

Mr Mellick:

“Did you have any idea what he was doing?”

Mr Heathcote:

“He told me he was getting – getting information from doctors and Extracare [sic] and all the relevant stuff. Whatever he required. I signed for them. And I was waiting for him to get back to me about when he had it all – I guess – and when he was happy with it all”

  1. [23]
    It is vital to bear in mind, in 2020, Mr Heathcote was a 51-year-old, Grade 10 educated tradesman. Mr Carroll, on the other hand was an extremely experienced personal injury solicitor. [27]
  2. [24]
    On 21 January 2021, Mr Heathcote, seemingly dissatisfied with the progress of his claim, attended upon another solicitor, Mr Paterson of Macrossan & Amiet Solicitors.

Extension of time

  1. [25]
    Section 31(2) of the LAA provides:

“(2) Where on application to a court by a person claiming to have a right of action to which this section applies, it appears to the court—

  1. (a)
    that a material fact of a decisive character relating to the right of action was not within the means of knowledge of the applicant until a date after the commencement of the year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action; and
  1. (b)
    that there is evidence to establish the right of action apart from a defence founded on the expiration of a period of limitation;

 the court may order that the period of limitation for the action be extended so that it expires at the end of 1 year after that date and thereupon, for the purposes of the action brought by the applicant in that court, the period of limitation is extended accordingly.”

  1. [26]
    Section 30 of the LAA provides:

“30  Interpretation

  1. (1)
    For the purposes of this section and sections 31, 32, 33 and 34—
  1. (a)
    the material facts relating to a right of action include the following—
  1. (i)
    the fact of the occurrence of negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty on which the right of action is founded;
  1. (ii)
    the identity of the person against whom the right of action lies;
  1. (iii)
    the fact that the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty causes personal injury;
  1. (iv)
    the nature and extent of the personal injury so caused;
  1. (v)
    the extent to which the personal injury is caused by the negligence, trespass, nuisance or breach of duty;
  1. (b)
    material facts relating to a right of action are of a decisive character if but only if a reasonable person knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice on those facts, would regard those facts as showing—
  1. (i)
    that an action on the right of action would (apart from the effect of the expiration of a period of limitation) have a reasonable prospect of success and of resulting in an award of damages sufficient to justify the bringing of an action on the right of action; and
  1. (ii)
    that the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account to bring an action on the right of action;
  1. (c)
    a fact is not within the means of knowledge of a person at a particular time if, but only if—
  1. (i)
    the person does not know the fact at that time; and
  1. (ii)
    as far as the fact is able to be found out by the person—the person has taken all reasonable steps to find out the fact before that time.
  1. (2)
    In this section—

appropriate advice, in relation to facts, means the advice of competent persons qualified in their respective fields to advise on the medical, legal and other aspects of the facts.”

  1. [27]
    In Wilson v Mackay Hospital & Health Service [2021] QSC 178, I relied upon my earlier decision of Ferrier v WorkCover Queensland,[28] where I set out the approach which is required to be undertaken in considering an application for extension of time under s 31(2) of the LAA. As I said in both Wilson and Ferrier, there are five steps that an applicant must establish to obtain an extension pursuant to s 31, acknowledging however that the first two steps are a composite test. Therefore, the applicant bears the onus of showing that:
    1. (a)
      all material facts;
    2. (b)
      of a decisive character;
    3. (c)
      were not within the applicant’s means of knowledge until a date no more than 12 months prior to the relevant date (the filing of a claim and statement of claim or the equivalent under the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld);
    4. (d)
      there is evidence to establish a right of action – “something like a prima facie case”;[29] and
    5. (e)
      no prejudice, in the relevant sense, would be occasioned to the respondent that would justify disallowing the application.
  1. [28]
    The relevant date in respect of an application to which the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (“WCRA”) applies is not the date that a Notice of Claim was lodged, but rather the date that it was made compliant.[30] Mr Heathcote’s Notice of Claim was made compliant on 18 March 2021 and accordingly in order for Mr Heathcote to succeed, he must point to a material fact of a decisive nature coming into his means of knowledge after 19 March 2020.[31]

Material fact of decisive nature

  1. [29]
    In her written submissions,[32] senior counsel for the applicant argues that there are two matters capable of being material facts of a decisive nature. The first identified fact is the fact of occurrence of negligence upon which the right of action is founded, that is a material fact as defined in s 30(1)(a)(i) of the LAA. The second is said to be the fact that negligence has caused personal injury pursuant to s 30(1)(a)(iii).
  2. [30]
    In respect of the latter, the argument which is advanced is that the applicant had considered that he was suffering from a hereditary condition and that his injury was not causally related to the events of 27 March 2013 until Mr Heathcote received the report of Dr Matthew Ricard of 12 November 2019, which was not in fact received by Mr Heathcote until 9 February 2021.[33]
  3. [31]
    Nearly all of the applicant’s submissions addressed this ordinarily complicated issue as to whether medical advice received at a certain point could satisfy the five-point test required for an application under s 30(1) of the LAA. In my view, however, insofar as this case is concerned, the proper application of the test is uncomplicated.
  4. [32]
    I accept the submissions of counsel for the respondent, Mr Mellick, that the receipt by Mr Heathcote on or about 17 January 2020 of the Notice of Assessment from XtraCare[34] that Mr Heathcote could not help but appreciate, properly advised, that the incident of 27 March 2013 had caused his heart attack, that the injury was work-related, and given the 40% whole person impairment diagnosis, it was a significant injury.
  5. [33]
    Furthermore, as Mr Heathcote had resigned his employment on 7 November 2019 and was earning in excess of $2,000 npw, Mr Heathcote could not have failed to appreciate, assuming he had received competent advice, that he had, but for one matter, an economically worthwhile claim, and it was in his interest to pursue it.
  6. [34]
    The more difficult aspect of the case relates to the applicant’s extremely brief (i.e. two paragraph) argument that the fact that negligence occurred was unknown.[35] The applicant’s argument is that until he received and read the ICAM report on 30 March 2021,[36] he did not have knowledge of the fact of occurrence of negligence or breach of duty upon which the right of action may be founded; such a “fact” is considered a material fact under the LAA.[37]
  7. [35]
    As to the circumstances of the injury, they are set out above. Mr Heathcote has sworn, and I accept, that when he returned to work onsite, he was not interviewed in respect of the incident. The ICAM report into the incident of 27 March 2013 does not make any reference at all to Mr Heathcote.[38] Mr Heathcote swore the when he returned to site his fellow workers did not wish to speak to him about the incident and so he could not gather information as to what had occurred. Mr Heathcote was, in effect, left to his own devices.[39]
  8. [36]
    Mr Heathcote deposed that he had suspicions as to what may have occurred, that is, there had not been a dozer working on the stockpile on some earlier occasion and that there may have not been communication about what had occurred upon the stockpile, however, I accept that Mr Heathcote had no knowledge of what had occurred in terms of the cause of the accident or any investigation into the incident.[40]
  9. [37]
    After Mr Heathcote had consulted Mr Carroll for approximately a year and his case had not been advanced, Mr Heathcote took the step of attending upon his third solicitor, Mr Gene Paterson of Macrossan & Amiet Solicitors on 21 January 2021.[41] Mr Paterson was able to obtain a copy of the ICAM investigation report some two months and nine days later on 30 March 2021.
  10. [38]
    The ICAM report is a detailed document setting out the results of a thorough investigation as to what occurred on 27 March 2013. The report includes information regarding the personnel involved, plant, equipment, procedures, the cause of the void (or “dome out feeder”), other contributing factors, and defects in the stockpile management plan and work instructions. The report notes that the “root cause” of the incident was that “the loop stockpile was used to load 2,000-3,000 tonne of coal onto the first train (U616) through both feeders 21 & 22. A void was established above feeder 22 following the loading of this train”.[42] This information, and more importantly the recommendations made in the ICAM report to minimise or eliminate the risk of injury in such a situation,  is a material fact within s 30(1)(a)(i) of the LAA. It is also one of a decisive character within s 30(1)(b), as it was the missing piece (establishing liability) to establish a worthwhile action. The causation and quantum aspects of such an action having already been satisfied by the notice of assessment received 17 January 2020. 
  11. [39]
    Mr Heathcote deposed that he had “suspicions”  that, prior to his shift on 27 March 2013 commencing, there was not a dozer managing the stockpile and that there had not been proper communication between the feeder operator and the dozer operator prior to the incident.[43] Mr Heathcote’s suspicion was that the failure by the other dozer operators to properly manage the stockpile and/or the feeder operators lack of communication with the dozer operator at the time led to the incident occurring.
  12. [40]
    The question then is, if Mr Heathcote had suspicions as outlined above, did he also have the knowledge of a material fact speaking to liability, that is that the incident was caused by his employers (or fellow employees) negligence?
  13. [41]
    Whilst it may be said that Mr Heathcote had his suspicions, that is the highest it may be taken. Mr Heathcote did approach his co-workers regarding the incident to either confirm or alleviate his suspicions, but they were very reluctant to discuss the incident.[44] I accept Mr Heathcote’s evidence that he didn’t know “how the cavity come about” until he read the ICAM report.[45] To say then, that Mr Heathcote had knowledge of the fact of his employer’s negligence and liability, to the extent that the knowledge would justify or mandate an action being brought, stretches the usual boundaries of logic.
  14. [42]
    Almost every claimant or potential claimant would have their own suspicions or theory as to how a particular incident occurred and it cannot be said that such suspicions would be sufficient to establish (even to a prima facie level) a liability case against the alleged tortfeasor.

Therefore, I conclude that despite Mr Heathcote’s mining knowledge and experience, it was not until he received the ICAM report that a material fact of a decisive nature, speaking to liability, came into Mr Heathcote’s knowledge to the level required to justify or mandate the bringing of an action.

Means of knowledge

  1. [43]
    Mr Heathcote’s application is unusual insofar as he deposes that the important facts leading to the cause of the stockpile collapse were not in fact known to him and I accept Mr Heathcote’s evidence in this regard. However, Mr Heathcote must also show that those facts were not within his means of knowledge prior to 19 March 2020. According to s 30(1)(c)(ii) Mr Heathcote is required to show that, as far as the facts are able to be found out by Mr Heathcote, he has taken all reasonable steps to find out the facts before that time.
  2. [44]
    As to reasonable steps, the respondent submits that Mr Heathcote could have asked his fellow employees involved in the incident, however, I accept Mr Heathcote’s evidence that he did, and that they were not forthcoming with information. In order, therefore, to obtain information as to the likely facts as set out in the investigation report, it was necessary for Mr Heathcote to engage a solicitor. Mr Heathcote obtained the ICAM report only after he had attended upon three different solicitors’ firms. The question is whether Mr Heathcote has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the information contained in the ICAM report.
  3. [45]
    The proper approach to consider this s 30(1)(a)(ii) issue are the subject of the Court of Appeal judgments of Dick v University of Queensland and Wolverson v Todman.[46] In Dick v University of Queensland [2000] 2 Qd R 476, Thomas JA said:[47]

“[30] As to the third step, the question was whether the existence of an alternative safe system of work was ‘within the means of knowledge’ of the plaintiff during the relevant period. His Honour observed that it is not enough that the plaintiff did not know; it is a question of his means of knowledge. His Honour then emphasised that it is the means of knowledge of the plaintiff which are relevant and not the means of knowledge of a hypothetical reasonable man, citing the remarks of Lord Reid in Smith v. Central Asbestos Co. such as ‘the plaintiff must have taken all such action as it was reasonable for him to take to find out’ and ‘… this test is subjective. We are not concerned with “the reasonable man”’. Dawson J. observed that s. 58(2) [Qld s. 30(1)(c)] unlike s. 57(1)(c) [Qld s. 30(1)(b)] ‘makes no assumption that appropriate advice was received when it was sought. What is important is the means of knowledge which were reasonably available to the appellant. And that must mean available in a practical and not a theoretical sense’.

[31] It is necessary for the court to find the date by which the necessary material fact was ‘within the means of knowledge’ of the claimant. The jurisdiction of the court to extend the limitation period is limited to an extension one year after that date. Dawson J. continued:

 ‘The master found … that the appellant had not failed to take, before the specified time, reasonable steps to ascertain those facts which would have provided him with knowledge of an alternative safe system of work.’

 His Honour then referred to the actual conduct of the claimant in which he initially saw his union representative, was referred to the union solicitors, was medically examined and subsequently sought advice from other solicitors. It was not until some time after he had sought advice from those solicitors that he or those solicitors learned that the risk of injury from dust could be minimised by hosing the area of operations with water and the wearing of face masks, and that such information would have been generally available at the relevant time. Those solicitors then commenced action a month later. His Honour concluded that ‘it could not have been said that during the relevant time the appellant had within his means of knowledge at least one material fact of a decisive character’. The master’s decision, which had found that the material fact was not within the claimant’s means of knowledge until his solicitors ascertained that fact and who extended the time accordingly to the date of commencement of the action, was restored.

[32] It is significant that in ascertaining the period over which the necessary material fact was not within the means of knowledge of the claimant, and conversely in identifying the time by which he did have the means of such knowledge, his Honour examined the personal actions of the claimant. He did not, as Deane J. seems to have done, postulate the necessary additional advice as having already been taken from such experts as might need to have been consulted.”

 (Citations omitted; Original Emphasis.)

  1. [46]
    The present case has some parallels with Do Carmo[48] in that the applicant had sought the assistance of his union solicitor but did not obtain the necessary material facts until after he had obtained the assistance of another solicitor. In Do Carmo, the material obtained by the latter non-union solicitor provided evidence of the steps which might have been taken to minimise or eliminate the risk of injury to Mr Do Carmo (the contraction of silicosis by exposure to silica dust) that occurred in the course of employment with his employer Ford Excavations Pty Ltd.
  2. [47]
    In the present case, the ICAM report includes not only material information to prove the facts as to what had occurred but also, importantly, reasonable recommendations as to the steps which might have been taken to minimise or eliminate the risk of injury to Mr Heathcote. 
  3. [48]
    In my view Mr Heathcote had a worthwhile case when he received the ICAM report on 30 March 2021. It is irrelevant that the material fact of a deceive nature was obtained after Mr Heathcote’s Notice of Claim was deemed compliant.[49]
  4. [49]
    Wolverson v Todman[50] involved two appeals by Ms Wolverson, one against Dr Todman, neurologist, and the other against four radiologists employed by Queensland Diagnostic Imaging Pty Ltd. Dr Todman, neurologist, diagnosed Ms Wolverson as suffering from multiple sclerosis in 1994 and treated her for multiple sclerosis between 1994 and 2009. Ms Wolverson had undergone MRI scans on 16 May 2002, 21 June 2004, 30 May 2006 and 17 May 2007, all read by different radiologists in the employ of Queensland Diagnostic Imaging.
  5. [50]
    On 7 April 2009, a different radiologist viewed an MRI and raised for the first time the possibility that Ms Wolverson was suffering from Chiari Type 1 malformation. Another specialist confirmed the diagnosis of Chiari Type 1 malformation, a malformation which may be relieved by decompressive surgery. Mrs Wolverson underwent the surgery on 26 June 2009. Dr Todman had misdiagnosed multiple sclerosis and each of the four earlier reporting radiologists had failed to identify the Chiari Type 1 malformation that was present on each of those MRI scans. Ms Wolverson applied for and obtained leave pursuant to s 33 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (“PIPA”) to start proceedings against Dr Todman on 27 May 2010. Three years later on 30 July 2013, Ms Wolverson applied for and received leave pursuant to s 43 of PIPA to start proceedings against the radiologists.
  6. [51]
    The trial judge dismissed s 31 LAA applications against both the neurologist and radiologists. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal against Dr Todman but Ms Wolverson’s appeal against the radiologists was dismissed.
  7. [52]
    In Wolverson v Todman,[51] Holmes JA (as her Honour then was) said:[52]

“[2]  There is no dispute that it is the means of knowledge of the appellant herself which is relevant, and the question is whether she had taken all reasonable steps to find out that connection before 31 July 2012. But it must be a question of fact in any given case whether to leave everything to a solicitor amounts to taking reasonable steps. The present case was not one like that of the worker in Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd, where the solicitors, in response to his enquiries about his rights, gave him no indication of what was necessary to his case: that an alternative system of work was available. Here, in contrast, the appellant was informed of what was needed. She knew of the Chiari Type 1 malformation; she had had surgery to relieve her symptoms in mid-2009, and was reporting by the end of that year that a number of her symptoms had resolved; and she knew that the opinion of an expert radiologist was needed and that legal aid was available to obtain it. This was at a time when the appellant was no longer a novice in the legal process; she had already obtained consent orders allowing her to commence proceedings against Dr Todman, conditional on steps which involved obtaining an independent specialist’s report and applying for an extension of the limitation period.”

 (Emphasis added.)

  1. [53]
    In Wolverson v Todman,[53] Gotterson JA (Holmes JA, as her Honour then was, agreeing and McMeekin J, agreeing in partial dissent) said:[54]

“[63]  Ms Wolverson engaged a solicitor to investigate the possibility of making a claim for damages in May 2010. The solicitor continued to act for her during all material times. As was appropriate for him to do, his Honour analysed the events that ensued, mindful of two principles which had been articulated by McPherson J in Neilson v Peters Ship Repair Pty Ltd. One is that, as a matter of statutory construction, where a solicitor is engaged, the person whose knowledge is relevant for s 31(2) purposes is the client, not the solicitor. The other is one that offers practical guidance. It is that ‘[p]lacing the matter in the hands of apparently competent solicitors with adequate instructions including information relevant to the cause of action would ordinarily amount to taking all reasonable steps to ascertain the relevant facts, provided that the plaintiff did his best to ensure that the solicitors did not languish in the prosecution of the action’.

[64]  The material facts before the learned primary judge revealed the following sequence of key events. In May 2010, Ms Wolverson’s solicitor submitted an application for legal aid to fund an independent radiologist’s report. The application was granted in mid-June 2010. In cross-examination, the solicitor accepted that by the end of October 2010, she had all the documents that she required for briefing a radiologist with one exception.

[65]  The exception comprised original MRI scans which had been in her possession from May until July 2010. The solicitor provided the scans to the Health Quality and Complaints Commission (‘HQCC’) on 26 July 2010.

[66]  Ms Wolverson had lodged a written complaint about Dr Todman with HQCC on 21 May 2010. It requested the MRI scans and they were provided to it on its undertaking to copy them and return them as soon as possible. Notwithstanding the undertaking, the MRI scans were not returned promptly nor was their return pursued by the solicitor at that point.

[67]  The HQCC complaint process is one that may lead to a conciliated settlement. Apparently in February 2011, HQCC indicated to the solicitor that it had resolved to conciliate the complaint. In May 2011, Ms Wolverson instructed the solicitor to hold the proceeding against Dr Todman in abeyance while the conciliation was on-foot. The conciliation process stalled and by late October 2011, it had been discontinued by HQCC. The original MRI scans were returned to the solicitor by HQCC on 31 May 2012. Dr Earwaker was then briefed to prepare his report.

[68]  Dr Earwaker’s report dated 23 July 2012 expressed a clear opinion that the failure to detect the Chiari 1 malformation was a failure to meet an appropriate radiological standard of care. The concluding paragraph to the supplementary report which elaborated the concluding paragraph of its predecessor as outlined earlier in these reasons, was an answer to a question posed by the solicitor in a letter to Dr Earwaker dated 1 November 2013. The question asked him to provide comment based on the material briefed as to whether Ms Wolverson suffered a personal injury as a result of a failure to meet the appropriate standard of care. It was that answer which facilitated proof of the causal link (as did the report of Dr Mellick).

[69]  The promptness with which Dr Earwaker supplied his reports, within less than two months of being briefed in the case of the first report and within a matter of several days of being asked for it in the case of the supplementary report, strongly suggests that had Dr Earwaker’s opinion been sought at the end of October 2010 then, by early 2011, both the first report and the supplementary report would have been provided by him. I agree generally with the conclusion of the learned primary judge in this regard.

[70]  According to the solicitor, the opinion of Dr Earwaker was not sought at that time (nor was the return of the original MRIs followed up then) because she and Ms Wolverson, after discussion of the potential benefits of the HQCC process, decided not to progress personal injury proceedings.

[71]  From this factual background, the issue for consideration is refined to whether Ms Wolverson had taken all reasonable steps in the period before 31 July 2012 to obtain Dr Earwaker’s opinion in its supplemented form. The relevant frame of reference is what she knew and did.

[72]  In April 2009, Ms Wolverson knew that Dr Kua had recently detected the possible Chiari 1 malformation, and by May 2009 she knew that its existence had been confirmed. She also knew that she had undergone successive radiological examinations in the past and that the possibility of the existence of the malformation had not been reported to her at those times.

[73]  At the time that legal aid was sought in 2010, Ms Wolverson  knew that it was important that an independent radiologist be engaged to express an opinion about what was observable on the MRI scans that had previously been taken. She knew also that legal aid for such a report had been requested. She acknowledged that her solicitor kept her up-to-date with the outcome of such requests.

[74]  The decision to defer the radiological opinion for which funding had been approved was one in which Ms Wolverson participated. The reason given for the deferral does not withstand scrutiny. That proceeding concerned Dr Todman, the neurologist, only. It did not concern the radiologists who were potential defendants and whose professional work was to have been the subject of the opinion. It may be that the deferral was motivated by expediency on Ms Wolverson’s part, namely, were the HQCC process to lead to a sufficiently satisfactory outcome for her, she might not wish to progress litigation against the radiologists. That, however, does not paint the decision to defer the opinion as reasonable. In circumstances where, to her knowledge, the opinion was required for a proceeding against the radiologists and funding for the opinion had been secured, judged objectively, it was not, in my view, reasonable for her to defer obtaining it.”

(Emphasis added. Citations omitted.)

  1. [54]
    In the present case, the respondent argues that Mr Heathcote did not do his best to ensure his solicitors did not languish in prosecution of the action.
  2. [55]
    As to the relevant issue of inaction on behalf of an applicant (and not the applicant’s solicitor) it is important to bear in mind that many of Ms Wolverson’s symptoms had resolved by November 2009, that is, five months after the surgery on 26 June 2009. Ms Wolverson then engaged solicitors who had obtained consent orders under the PIPA by 27 May 2010 with respect to an action against the neurologist but did not obtain a s 43 PIPA leave in respect to the radiologist action until 30 July 2013.
  3. [56]
    The comment of Holmes JA’s in Wolverson v Todman at [2] that the appellant “was no longer a novice to the legal process” directly refers to the obtaining by the appellant of the s 43 PIPA consent order on 27 May 2010 and accordingly, the focus was whether Ms Wolverson herself had taken all reasonable steps to investigate her claim (in that case, the possible link between the surgery and the alleviation of Ms Wolverson’s symptoms, indicating the misdiagnosis of her condition).
  4. [57]
    The inquiry in that case was therefore what steps in fact were taken by the applicant between May 2010 and 31 July 2012, a period of some 2 years and 3 months. As can be seen by paragraphs [2] and [4] of her Honour’s reasons, Ms Wolverson’s solicitor, in fact, advised that a radiologist’s opinion was required in order to prove the case against the radiologists, the solicitor did not advise that such report should not be obtained. The question therefore was as to why the radiologist’s report, which was advised ought to be obtained, was not obtained and whether in all the circumstances it could be concluded that Ms Wolverson had taken all reasonable steps to obtain that radiologist’s report. Importantly, as Holmes JA (as her Honour then was) said the proper conclusion was “mutually agreed inaction”.[55]
  5. [58]
    In the present case, I do not consider, with regard to the applicant’s apparent failure to obtain the ICAM report (or similar information), that the proper conclusion is that such a failure was the result of mutually agreed inaction. There is a considerable difference in the factual circumstances between Wolverson and Mr Heathcote’s position. Ms Wolverson was in fact advised that a radiologist’s opinion ought to be obtained and it would appear Ms Wolverson did nothing to see that such an opinion was obtained over a period of 2 years and 3 months. Mr Heathcote was not advised that the ICAM investigation report or similar information was needed to be obtained. Mr Heathcote had attended upon Mr Carroll it would seem on a few occasions after 23 January 2020 and was advised by Mr Carroll that he was obtaining information. Unlike Ms Wolverson, Mr Heathcote was a “novice of the legal process”.[56]
  6. [59]
    The practical guidance offered by Gotterson JA in Wolverson v Todman[57] at [63] is important in Mr Heathcote’s application. In my view there is little doubt that Mr Heathcote placed the matter in the hands of a competent solicitor and provided adequate instructions relevant to the cause of action. Ordinarily, that amounts to taking all reasonable steps to ascertain the relevant facts, however, the applicant is obliged to “do his best” to ensure his solicitor does not languish in the prosecution of the action.
  7. [60]
    On behalf of the respondent, Mr Mellick argues that Mr Heathcote did not do his best to ensure that the solicitors did not languish in the prosecution of the action and that Mr Heathcote was “quite capable of doing a good deal more”.[58] Mr Mellick was particularly critical of the applicant in failing to call explanatory evidence from Mr Carroll and invited me to draw the inference that, as Mr Carroll’s office is physically opposite the Mackay Courthouse, the evidence obtained from Mr Carroll would not assist the applicant.
  8. [61]
    As may be observed from Wolverson v Todman, the solicitor Ms Wolverson had engaged was called to provide evidence and gave evidence as to what had occurred prior to the relevant date. The benefit in calling Mr Carroll was that there would be a clear record of the dates that Mr Heathcote attended upon him which may or may not have assisted Mr Heathcote in showing that Mr Heathcote did his best to ensure that his solicitors did not languish in the prosecution of the action.
  9. [62]
    Absent Mr Carroll’s evidence, all that I am provided with is Mr Heathcote’s evidence. As set out above, Mr Heathcote attended upon one solicitor at Shine Lawyers, another solicitor, Mr Carroll at Taylors Solicitors, and then attended upon Mr Carroll on 2 December 2019, 23 January 2020 and on a few other occasions. More importantly, Mr Heathcote, a “legal novice”, was provided advice that Mr Carroll was waiting on information to be obtained. I accept Mr Heathcote’s evidence and I accept that he is a witness of credit. Mr Heathcote did not make or join in any decision to delay obtaining the ICAM report (or similar information). Unlike Ms Wovlerson in Wolverson v Todman, Mr Heathcote was not kept up to date with the progress of Mr Carroll.
  10. [63]
    The question then is when was it reasonable for Mr Heathcote to have done more to ensure Mr Carroll progressed this case? Mr Carroll was Mr Heathcote’s solicitor, for a little over a year, in circumstances where he had received no assistance from Shine and worse still, was not advised of his ability to bring an application to extend the time limitation period. Mr Heathcote’s response to Shine’s inaction was to seek the assistance of Mr Carroll, who was experienced in mining litigation as he was “the CFMEU solicitor”. That, in my view, was a reasonable course of action for a person such as Mr Heathcote.
  11. [64]
    In my view, on proper analysis of these facts and taking into account Mr Heathcote’s circumstances of a limited formal education, Mr Heathcote has acted reasonably in obtaining the second opinion from Mr Carroll, an experienced solicitor, and accepting his advice that information was still forthcoming. In my view it was reasonable for Mr Heathcote to persist with Mr Carroll for a period a little more than one year, prior to seeking the assistance of his third solicitor, Mr Paterson. 
  12. [65]
    It is apparent that the steps taken by Mr Heathcote to ensure that his solicitor Mr Carroll did not languish the prosecution was to call upon him. After calling upon him on a few occasions, in a period between 23 January 2020 and 21 January 2021 and having been advised that Mr Carroll was acting and obtaining information, I consider it is reasonable for Mr Heathcote to have delayed obtaining his third opinion from Mr Paterson until 21 January 2021.
  13. [66]
    In determining whether a plaintiff has done “his best” to ensure solicitors do not languish in the prosecution of the action, it is necessary to have reference to the applicant’s education, experience and personality, to take into account the history of the applicant’s interactions with his current solicitors and any former solicitor. In my view, when considering each of these matters, this case falls within the general category of those where the proper conclusion is that Mr Heathcote has taken all reasonable steps to ascertain the relevant facts by engaging a solicitor, Mr Carroll, and adequately instructing him.
  14. [67]
    Accordingly, I conclude that Mr Heathcote has shown that he was not in possession of all material facts of a relevant nature, nor were they within his means of knowledge until his receipt of the ICAM report on 30 March 2021, which is subsequent to 19 March 2020.

Prejudice

  1. [68]
    The respondent does not allege prejudice. That is an appropriate concession as there is a detailed investigation report upon liability issues, and as to quantum, Mr Heathcote’s heart condition is medically well documented. In this case, Mr Heathcote was injured on 27 March 2013, had appropriate surgery, did not suffer a loss of income and then returned to full and productive employment for a further six and a half years before being forced into early retirement.
  2. [69]
    In HWC v The Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2009] QCA 168, Keane JA (as his Honour then was) said:[59]

“[44] …It is not the policy of the courts in the application of s 31 of the Act to penalise an injured person who makes a reasonable decision to try to get on with life rather than a decision to litigate upon a questionable basis…”

  1. [70]
    In my view, Mr Heathcote did make a reasonable decision to try to get on with his life, rather than a decision to litigate upon a questionable basis and accordingly this application is granted.
  2. [71]
    The LAA is remedial in nature and in my view, it is appropriate to exercise the discretion under s 31 of the LAA in favour of Mr Heathcote.
  3. [72]
    Therefore, I order that:
  1. The period of limitation within which to commence an action for damages for negligence and/or breach of statutory duty with respect to bodily injury arising from an incident in the course of the applicant’s employment on 27 March 2013 be extended up to and including 60 days from the date upon which the Applicant complies with Section 295 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld).
  2. The respondent file and serve written submissions as to costs within 7 days hereof and the applicant file and serve written submissions in reply within 3 days’ receipt of the respondent’s written submissions.

Footnotes

[1] Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 11.

[2]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 3-5.

[3]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 6-14, 37.

[4]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 18.

[5]  Exhibit GCP7 to the affidavit of Gene Christopher Paterson filed 1 July 2021, page 268.

[6]  Exhibit GCP4 to the affidavit of Gene Christopher Paterson filed 1 July 2021, page 141.

[7]  Exhibit GCP4 to the affidavit of Gene Christopher Paterson filed 1 July 2021, page 141.

[8]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 40.

[9]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 45.

[10]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 27.

[11]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 44.

[12]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 48.

[13]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 52.

[14]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 54.

[15]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 59; Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 12 July 2021, paragraph 1-2.

[16]  T1-17, lines 9-15.

[17]  T1-17, line 11-12.

[18]  T1-17, line 16.

[19]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 61.

[20]  T1-17, line 25-30; Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 62.

[21]  T1-17, line 30.

[22]  T1-17, line 36-40.

[23]  T1-17, line 37.

[24]  T1-18, lines 5-6.

[25]  T1-19, lines 15-20.

[26]  T1-19, lines 20-25.

[27]  Mr Carroll having been admitted on 14 September 1981.

[28]  [2019] QSC 11 at [23].

[29] Wood v Glaxo Australia Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 431 at 434.

[30] Baillie v Creber & Anor [2010] QSC 52 at [8].

[31] Opacic v Patane [1997] 1 Qd R 84.

[32]  Exhibit 1 to the hearing of 15 July 2021.

[33]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 49-50.

[34]  Assessing Mr Heathcote as suffering from a 40% work related impairment caused by the incident of 27 March 2013.

[35]  Exhibit 1 to the hearing of 15 July 2021, paragraph 6-7.

[36]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 77.

[37] Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 30(1)(a)(i).

[38]  Exhibit GCP7 to the affidavit of Gene Christopher Paterson filed 1 July 2021, page 268.

[39]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 35-36.

[40]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 72.

[41]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 66-67.

[42]  Exhibit GCP7 to the affidavit of Gene Christopher Paterson filed 1 July 2021, page 268.

[43]  Affidavit of Steven Andrew Heathcote filed 1 July 2021, paragraph 72.

[44]  T1-12, line 44-46.

[45]  T1-12 to T1-13.

[46]Dick v University of Queensland [2000] 2 Qd R 476; Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106.

[47] Dick v University of Queensland [2000] 2 Qd R 476 at 486-487 [30]-[32].

[48] Do Carmo v. Ford Excavations Proprietary Limited (1984) 154 CLR 234.

[49] Opacic v Patane [1997] 1 Qd R 84.

[50] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106.

[51] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106.

[52] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106 at 119 [2].

[53] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106.

[54] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106 at 134-137 [63]-[74].

[55] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106 at 120 [4].

[56] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106 at 120 [2].

[57] Wolverson v Todman [2016] 2 Qd R 106.

[58]  Exhibit 3 to the hearing of 15 July 2021.

[59] HWC v The Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2009] QCA 168 at [44].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Heathcote v Oaky Creek Coal Pty Ltd

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Heathcote v Oaky Creek Coal Pty Ltd

  • MNC:

    [2021] QSC 184

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Crow J

  • Date:

    06 Aug 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Baillie v Creber [2010] QSC 52
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QSC 52
Cite 2 - [2010] QSC 52
Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 C.L.R 234
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1984) 154 C.L.R 234
Cite 2 - (1984) 154 C.L.R 234
Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd [1984] HCA 17
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1984] HCA 17
Ferrier v WorkCover Queensland [2019] QSC 11
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QSC 11
HWC v The Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane [2009] QCA 168
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QCA 168
Cite 2 - [2009] QCA 168
Cite 3 - [2009] QCA 168
Opacic v Patane [1997] 1 Qd R 84
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1997] 1 Qd R 84
Cite 2 - [1997] 1 Qd R 84
Cite 3 - [1997] 1 Qd R 84
University of Queensland v Dick[2000] 2 Qd R 476; [1999] QCA 474
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1999] QCA 474
Cite 2 - [2000] 2 Qd R 476
Cite 3 - [2000] 2 Qd R 476
Cite 4 - [2000] 2 Qd R 476
Cite 5 - [2000] 2 Qd R 476
Wilson v Mackay Hospital and Health Service [2021] QSC 178
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QSC 178
Wolverson v Todman[2016] 2 Qd R 106; [2015] QCA 74
11 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QCA 74
Cite 2 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 3 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 4 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 5 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 6 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 7 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 8 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 9 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 10 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Cite 11 - [2016] 2 Qd R 106
Wood v Glaxo Australia Pty Ltd[1994] 2 Qd R 431; [1993] QCA 114
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1993] QCA 114
Cite 2 - [1994] 2 Qd R 431
Cite 3 - [1994] 2 Qd R 431

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Heathcote v Oaky Creek Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] QSC 2184 citations
1

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