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Re Diane Lawyers Pty Ltd (ACN 650 581 196)[2021] QSC 229

Re Diane Lawyers Pty Ltd (ACN 650 581 196)[2021] QSC 229

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Re Diane Lawyers Pty Ltd (ACN 650 581 196) [2021] QSC 229

PARTIES:

CGA LAW PTY LTD (ACN 623 155 180)

(first applicant)

AND

CGA CONSULTING PTY LTD (ACN 164 583 484) ATF CGA CONSULTING TRUST

(second applicant)

v

DIANE LAWYERS PTY LTD (ACN 650 581 196)

(first respondent)

AND

DIANE AMANDA MASSELOS

(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 7076 of 2021

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application filed 22 June 2021 and Interlocutory Application filed 20 August 2021

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

9 September 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

24 August 2021

JUDGE:

Jackson J

ORDER:

The order of the Court is that:

  1. The originating application filed on 22 June 2021 proceed as if started by claim.
  2. The first applicant provide security for the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding in a form satisfactory to the Registrar in the sum of $50,000.
  3. The proceeding is stayed until the security for costs is provided.
  4. Within seven (7) days of providing the security for costs the applicants file and serve a statement of claim.
  5. The application filed on 20 August 2021 for an injunction restraining the applicants from accessing the legal files of former clients of the first applicant and from contacting, directly or indirectly, or encouraging others to contact, clients or former clients of the first respondent is dismissed.
  6. The parties file and serve written submissions as to costs within fourteen (14) days.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COMMENCING PROCEEDINGS – CHOICE OF ORIGINATING PROCESS – where the applicants filed an originating application for an order that the first respondent be wound up, for an account by the first respondent and for declaratory relief that the second respondent contravened ss 181 to 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where there are factual disputes – whether the originating application should continue as if commenced by claim

CORPORATIONS – WINDING UP – OTHER GROUNDS FOR WINDING UP – JUST AND EQUITABLE – CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS OF COMPANY – where the second respondent was the legal practitioner director of the first applicant until her resignation on 8 June 2021 – where the first respondent was registered as a company with the second respondent as its sole director and shareholder on 28 May 2021 – where the respondents accessed the first applicant’s client files from 8 June 2021 and the first applicant has been denied access to the files – where the applicants submit that the first applicant is a creditor of the first respondent because it has a “lien” for its fees and outlays over moneys to be received by the first respondent for client matters – whether the first applicant has standing to apply for an order to wind up the first respondent – whether there is a prima facie case for a winding up order on the just and equitable ground under s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

CORPORATIONS – WINDING UP – APPLICATIONS FOR WINDING UP BY COURT – COSTS – where the first respondent submits that it is reasonable that the first applicant give security for the first respondent’s costs if the proceeding is to continue – whether it is appropriate that the first applicant provide security for costs – whether the application for an order that the first respondent be wound up may be heard before security for costs is provided

EQUITY – EQUITABLE REMEDIES – INJUNCTIONS – INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS – GENERALLY – where the respondents apply for an order restraining the applicants from accessing the files of the first applicant’s former clients and from contacting the first respondent’s clients or former clients – whether the respondents have a prima facie case of an entitlement to a final injunction – whether the respondents have the standing required for the grant of an interlocutory injunction

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 181, s 182, s 183, s 1317E, s 1317H(1), s 1317J(1), s 461(1)(k), s 462

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 6(1), s 111(1), s 114, s 116, s 117(1)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 14

ASIC v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 93 ASCR 189, applied

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, applied

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, applied

Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247, applied

Ex parte Patience; Makinson v The Minister (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96, cited

Firth v Centrelink (2002) NSWLR 451, cited

Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349, applied

Gognos Holdings Ltd v ASIC (2018) 129 ASCR 363, applied

Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435, applied

Loch v John Blackwood Ltd [1924] AC 783, applied

Phillipa Power & Associates v Primrose Couper Cronin Rudkin [1997] 2 Qd R 266, cited

Stark v Dennett [2008] 2 Qd R 72, cited

Twigg v Kung (2002) 55 NSWLR 485, cited

Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544, applied

COUNSEL:

C Coulsen for the applicants

A Morris QC for the respondents

SOLICITORS:

Morgan Conley Solicitors for the applicants

Australian Law Partners for the respondents

Jackson J:

  1. [1]
    This is the adjourned date for the hearing of an application for an order that the first respondent be wound up and other relief, including an account and a declaration that the second respondent contravened ss 181 to 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“CA”).  It is also the hearing of a cross-application by the respondents for an order restraining the applicants from accessing the legal files of the former clients of the first applicant and from contacting, directly or indirectly, or encouraging others to contact, clients or former clients of the first respondent. 
  2. [2]
    Upon the originating application, the applicants orally applied for an order that the proceeding continue as if started by claim with directions as to pleadings and other steps.  The respondents oppose that application and submit that the originating application should be dismissed or that the application to wind up the first respondent should be dismissed on the ground that there is no arguable case that the first respondent should be wound up on the just and equitable ground under s 461(1)(k) of the CA.  The respondents also apply for an order for security for costs of the winding up application if it is to be continued. 
  3. [3]
    In summary, the conclusions I have reached are as follows:  first, except for the claim for a winding up order the proceeding should continue as if started by claim, in any event;  second, on the application for a winding up order, there is a prima facie case that the first applicant is a contingent creditor and that it is just and equitable that the first respondent be wound up;  third, the first applicant should be ordered to give security for costs in the sum of $50,000;  fourth, the proceeding as a whole should be stayed until the security for costs is provided;  last, the cross-application for an interlocutory injunction should be dismissed.

Establishment of CGA Law

  1. [4]
    On 30 November 2017, the first applicant was incorporated.  The original directors were Alistair Bell and the second respondent.  During the time of recent events, they were both directors until the second respondent resigned as a director.  According to ASIC’s records, the shares in the first applicant are held by the second applicant as to 7 shares and by the second respondent as to 3 shares. 
  2. [5]
    From 12 December 2017, when presumably it gave notice to the Queensland Law Society,[1] the first applicant’s business was that of an incorporated legal practice.[2]  The second respondent was and is an Australian legal practitioner.[3]  She was the legal practitioner director[4] of the first applicant until her resignation as a director. 

Disputes about arrangements of CGA Law

  1. [6]
    Mr Bell is not a lawyer.  He is an accountant.  He arranged for the provision of accounting and financial services to the first applicant.
  2. [7]
    There is a dispute between the second respondent and Mr Bell and the second applicant over the shareholdings in the first applicant.   There were and may be other disputes between them about the financial services and working capital arrangements for the first applicant prior to the second respondent’s resignation as a director.
  3. [8]
    It is not necessary to consider those disputes to decide these applications.

Establishment of Diane Lawyers Pty Ltd and closure of CGA Law’s legal practice

  1. [9]
    On 28 May 2021, the first respondent was registered as a company with the second respondent as the sole director and shareholder.
  2. [10]
    On 1 June 2021, the second respondent withdrew the balance of funds in the first applicant’s law practice general trust account.
  3. [11]
    On 7 June 2021, the first respondent gave notice to the Queensland Law Society of its intention to start providing legal services.[5]
  4. [12]
    On 8 June 2021, the second respondent resigned as a director of the first applicant.  She sent the notice to Mr Bell and lodged a notice of change of particulars of officeholders with ASIC.
  5. [13]
    From 8 June 2021, the first applicant did not have a legal practitioner director.[6]  It did not have and has not had any other legal practitioner employed.
  6. [14]
    On 8 June 2021, the second respondent sent an email to the clients of the first applicant, advising them of her resignation as a director of the first applicant and that she had commenced her own legal practice, meaning the first respondent.  She invited the clients to “continue” engaging her and informed them that they may “choose to continue” their claim with another law firm should they wish to do so.  She advised the clients that she would no longer receive emails at her CGA email address or receive telephone calls at the CGA office number.
  7. [15]
    From 8 June 2021, the respondents accessed client files that were kept in an electronic form on a platform provided by a third party service provider.  The first applicant has been denied access to the files.
  8. [16]
    On 9 June 2021, the second respondent, purportedly on behalf of the first applicant, gave notice of termination of provision of legal services.[7]
  9. [17]
    On 25 June 2021, the second respondent sent an email to the software platform service provider stating that she had “transferred” client files to the first respondent and contended that Mr Bell had no involvement with the clients and their claims.
  10. [18]
    On 16 August 2021, the respondents acknowledged, by their solicitor’s letter to the applicants’ solicitor, that the first applicant has or may have a “lien” over moneys received by the first respondent for legal fees and outlays of the first applicant on a client file transferred to the first respondent.
  11. [19]
    On 20 August 2021, the second respondent stated that, in the normal course at the conclusion of a client matter, the first respondent would bill the file “including any work in progress of CGA Law which will be accounted for and the proceeds paid into a trust.”

Originating and interlocutory applications

  1. [20]
    On 22 June 2021, the applicants filed the originating application for an order that the first respondent be wound up, for an account by the first respondent and for declaratory relief that the second respondent has contravened ss 181 to 183 of the CA.  The originating application was given a date for hearing[8] of 3 August 2021.  That date was subsequently adjourned to 24 August 2021.
  2. [21]
    On 25 June 2021, the Court dismissed an interlocutory application by the applicants for the appointment of a provisional liquidator to the first respondent.
  3. [22]
    On 25 June 2021, the second respondent undertook to the Court to keep full and proper accounts and records until further order.

Proceeding on the originating application apart from the winding up application

  1. [23]
    The originating application applies for an order that the first respondent account to the first applicant for all amounts received by it in the discharge of its affairs and undertakings.
  2. [24]
    The account applied for is not usual.  It is directed to all receipts, as though that is a basis for relief in circumstances like this case.  Although the accounting basis for a defaulting fiduciary who appropriates a fiduciary object may be wider than in some other cases of an order for an account, it is still an account of profits, not receipts, after just allowance for the expenses and any profit that the accounting party can establish should be allowed in their favour.[9]
  3. [25]
    The originating application also applies for declaratory relief of contraventions by the second respondent of ss 181 to 183 of the CA.  Such relief may be granted in a proceeding under the CA,[10] at the suit of ASIC.[11]  However, unlike a compensation order for such a contravention,[12] no provision is made in the CA for a corporation which suffers damage by a contravention to apply for a declaration of contravention simpliciter.
  4. [26]
    However, the first applicant has provided a draft statement of claim for its proposed continuation of the proceeding, under which it proposes to claim a compensation order under s 1317H(1) for contravention of ss 181 to 183 of the CA,[13] so the proceeding in relation to alleged contraventions of ss 181 to 183 of the CA should not be prevented from going forward.[14]
  5. [27]
    It follows that these aspects of the originating application should be permitted to proceed.  Because there are factual disputes, and a variety of factual circumstances relied upon by the first applicant as justifying an order for an account as well as compensation for contraventions of ss 181 to 183 (or ss 180 to 182) of the CA, the proceeding in those respects[15] should be ordered to continue as if started by claim.[16]

Proceeding on the winding up application

  1. [28]
    The application for an order to wind up the first respondent is made on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company be wound up.[17]  As previously mentioned, the first applicant applies for directions that the winding up application proceed as if started by claim.[18]  The company raises three points in opposition to the application proceeding at all.
  2. [29]
    First, it submits that neither of the applicants is a creditor of the company and that it follows neither has standing to apply for an order to wind up the company.[19]  Second, it submits that the first applicant does not show a prima facie case for a winding up order on the just and equitable ground.[20]  Third, it submits that the first applicant has not given security for the costs of the company, if the application to wind up ultimately fails, as the Court thinks reasonable.[21]

Contingent or prospective creditor

  1. [30]
    The second applicant is not alleged to be a creditor of the company. 
  2. [31]
    The applicants submit that because the first applicant has or may have a “lien” for its fees and outlays over moneys to be received by the company in respect of client matters, sometimes called the “fruits of the litigation”,[22] it is a creditor of the company, as defined.  As relevantly defined,[23] a creditor includes a “contingent or prospective creditor”. 
  3. [32]
    The nature of a solicitor’s “lien” for fees and outlays over moneys received for a client was not explored in submissions.  The relevant factual assumptions require brief articulation.  One is that the moneys that may be subject to the “lien” have been or are to be received by the company from a third party or the client and are attributable to work that was carried out for the client by the first applicant.
  4. [33]
    When a client of a legal practice terminates the retainer of that practice and engages another legal practice, the first practice entity may hold a lien or equitable security rights, depending on the circumstances.  Not all the liens or rights are possessory liens of the usual kinds. 
  5. [34]
    Where the second legal practice receives a settlement sum for a matter that was conducted at an earlier stage by the first practice it does not automatically follow that the first practice will have a “lien” over the sum in the second practice’s trust account.  Absent agreement, the second law practice has no legal basis to collect any fees or outlays owing by the client to the first law practice, as the second law practice is a stranger to that contractual relationship of retainer.  
  6. [35]
    Usually, funds received by the second law practice into its trust account on behalf of the client are in law a debt owing by a bank to the second law practice that the second law practice holds on trust for the client.  Let it be assumed that the client is indebted to the first law practice for legal fees and outlays incurred while the first law practice conducted the matter.  Still, that does not make the second law practice a debtor of the first law practice.
  7. [36]
    The basis of the debt alleged by the first applicant to be owing or contingently or prospectively to become owing by the company is that a solicitor whose efforts result in the recovery of money for his client has an equitable right to have his proper costs and disbursements paid from the money so recovered,[24] sometimes described as a “lien” over the fruits of litigation, although it is better characterised and described as an equitable right than a lien.[25]
  8. [37]
    No submissions were made by the respondents that such an equitable right was not capable of constituting the first applicant as a “creditor (including a contingent or prospective creditor)” within the meaning of s 462(2) of the CA.
  9. [38]
    Accordingly, in my view, there is a prima facie basis for the first applicant to contend that it is a contingent or prospective creditor of the first respondent, that is sufficient for the winding up application to proceed.

Just and equitable ground to wind up

  1. [39]
    The company submits that the factual basis raised by the first applicant’s application to wind up the company on the just and equitable ground is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement under s 462(4) of the CA that there is a prima facie case for a winding up order.
  2. [40]
    The just and equitable ground for an order to wind up a company or corporation has a long history, extending back to the original companies legislation providing for the incorporation of a company by registration at the instance of the corporators and its winding up by the Court.  It has been applied in diverse circumstances across many cases.  Yet it is rarely invoked when a corporation is solvent and there is neither a deadlock nor oppression or other similar behaviour in the conduct of its affairs, or where there is other relief that will sufficiently recognise and satisfy the plaintiff’s rights and claims.  However, there is a recognised category of cases where the just and equitable ground may be engaged if the Court concludes there is a justifiable lack of confidence that the company will be managed and conduct its affairs in compliance with fundamental legal requirements.[26] 
  3. [41]
    The essence of the first applicant’s application to wind up the company is that the second respondent suddenly left the work she had been carrying out for the first applicant’s incorporated legal practice in a calculated manner so as to destroy the first applicant’s business and so as to quickly transfer or appropriate all of the first applicant’s clients to a new incorporated legal practice that she had established as the business of the company, all without notice to the first applicant.
  4. [42]
    The substance of the company’s response is that the second respondent believed that client confidentiality justified, indeed precluded, her and the company from disclosing to the first applicant’s non-lawyer director even the names of the first applicant’s clients or former clients, as well as their files.  She seems to retain exclusive access to those files which are held in electronic form on a third party platform provider.  In effect, she has appropriated them to the company’s business, at least where the client has agreed for the company to act for the client in the future. 
  5. [43]
    The second respondent’s conduct is also said to have been justified by unfair commercial pressure applied and commercial threats made to her by the first applicant’s other director, Mr Bell, in the context of a dispute between them as to the financial arrangements to conduct the first applicant’s business and the terms of a possible sale of the second applicant’s shares in the first applicant to the second respondent.
  6. [44]
    An important aspect of the cases concerning whether there is a justifiable lack of confidence that the company will be managed and conduct its affairs in accordance with fundamental legal requirements is that it is in the public interest that the order be made.  For example, a risk that members of the public who invest in the company or deal with the company will be likely disadvantaged or prejudiced by the future management or conduct of the company’s affairs may support the making of an order to wind up on the just and equitable ground.
  7. [45]
    In the present case, the company’s business is that of an incorporated legal practice supplying legal services to clients.  It specialises in personal injuries litigation for claimants and plaintiffs on a “no win no fee” basis.  There is no suggestion that the company or the second respondent has acted in any way intended to or that has prejudiced any of the clients, so far.  Were the company ordered to be wound up, it would cease to supply services to clients immediately or within a short time.  The clients could well be prejudiced, or at least have to find yet another legal practice to act for them.
  8. [46]
    I also note that the second respondent has undertaken to the Court to keep proper accounts,[27] and acknowledged that the first applicant has or will have a “lien” over settlement sums received on account of former clients of the first applicant in a matter where there are legal fees or outlays payable to the first applicant for work done on the file.
  9. [47]
    Accordingly, it might be thought that the present case is not a strong one for a winding up order, based on the just and equitable ground.  The company is not like a “phoenix” company created to pretend to suppliers and customers and other creditors that there is a continuing business when a company has ceased trading, so as to leave the creditors of the first company behind.
  10. [48]
    However, although the company submitted to the contrary in oral argument, this is not the final hearing of the application to wind up the company.  The statutory requirement that the final hearing not proceed until the matters in s 462(4)(a) and (b) of the CA are satisfied means that this is not the final hearing.  It is the hearing of the anterior step, specifically provided for by the CA, in effect whether the application to wind up can be finally heard or the proceeding should be dismissed or stayed under s 462(4) because the first applicant does not have a prima facie case and has not given security.
  11. [49]
    With some hesitation, I have concluded that at this stage it would be an error to conclude that, at final hearing, the company’s conduct and the risk to the public could not be considered sufficiently serious for the Court to be able to make a winding up order on the just and equitable ground.  That result may be unlikely, but the witnesses have not been cross-examined and there may be further evidence available at the final hearing.  Accordingly, in my view, the first applicant has shown a prima facie case under s 462(4) of the CA.  Although the context was different, I have reached this conclusion using the concept of a prima face case as explained by the High Court in respect of the grant of an interlocutory injunction.[28]

Security for costs

  1. [50]
    Section 462(4) of the CA provides that the application to wind up brought by a contingent or prospective creditor must not be heard unless and until such security for costs has been given as the Court thinks reasonable.  It impliedly confers power to order that the applicant or applicants give security for costs and that the Court may think it reasonable for no security to be given.
  2. [51]
    The company submits that it is reasonable that the first applicant give security for costs.  In my view, bearing in mind the strength of the company’s case in opposition to the proposed order, it is appropriate that the first applicant give some security for costs.
  3. [52]
    As to the amount, the scope of the factual dispute in the proceeding should not be all that extensive.  It appears that the period over which the second respondent acted to remove herself from the first applicant’s affairs was relatively brief.  It seems unlikely that many witnesses will be involved.  In my view, it is reasonable that the first applicant provide security for costs in the sum of $50,000.  Until that is done, the application for a winding up order must not be heard.

Cross-application for an injunction

  1. [53]
    The respondents’ application for an injunction is based on the contention that the first applicant threatens to misuse confidential documents of clients and former clients.
  2. [54]
    There is no question that a client or former client of a legal practice who is owed an obligation of confidence may obtain an injunction to restrain a threatened breach of confidence.
  3. [55]
    But neither of the respondents is a client or former client.  It is axiomatic that a party who seeks an interlocutory injunction to restrain an alleged threatened breach of confidence must have a prima facie case of an entitlement to a final injunction.[29]  For the alleged threatened breaches of confidence in the present case, the person or persons who might have an entitlement to a final injunction are the clients or former clients.  They do not include the respondents.
  4. [56]
    The respondents also rely on the fact that since 8 June 2021 the first applicant has not had a legal practitioner or legal practitioner director and it was asserted that the Queensland Law Society in some way had encouraged or supported the respondents’ application for an injunction.  It may be suggested that there would be a breach of some regulatory law in using a client’s or former client’s information.  But that would be a matter of regulatory law enforcement.  That is not a function of the respondents and they do not have a prima facie interest that would support a final injunction or, therefore, an interlocutory injunction on that basis.[30]  The respondents did not submit that this was a case where modern authority supported an expansion of the concept of a sufficient interest to enable the respondents to apply for the order.
  5. [57]
    Accordingly, the respondents lack the standing required for the grant of an interlocutory injunction.  It is unnecessary to discuss the strengths or weaknesses of the alleged threatened breaches by the first applicant further.  The respondents’ cross-application for an injunction must be dismissed.
  6. [58]
    I will hear the parties on the costs of the applications.

Footnotes

[1] Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 114.

[2] Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 111(1).

[3] Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 6(1).

[4]Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 117(1).

[5] Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 114.

[6] Legal Profession Act 20087 (Qld), s 117(1).

[7] Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 116.

[8] Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), sch 1A, r 2.3(a).

[9] Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544, 557-560.

[10] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1317E.

[11] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1317J(1).

[12] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 1317J(2) and 1317H(1).

[13]  I note that the draft statement of claim does not allege a contravention of s 183 of the CA, but does allege a contravention of s 180, although it does not seek relief for such a contravention.

[14]  I note that the applicants also propose by the draft statement of claim to claim relief against the respondents under s 598 of the CA.  However, neither of the applicants is an “eligible applicant” as defined in s 9 of the CA who may apply for relief under that section.

[15]  I note that the draft statement of claim alleges other causes of action.  It is not necessary to deal with them separately.

[16]Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 14.

[17]Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 461(1)(k).

[18]Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 14.

[19] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 462(2).

[20] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 462(4)(b).

[21] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 462(4)(a).

[22] Stark v Dennett [2008] 2 Qd R 72, 93 [50]; Phillipa Power & Associates v Primrose Couper Cronin Rudkin [1997] 2 Qd R 266.

[23] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 462(2).

[24] Stark v Dennett [2008] 2 Qd R 72, 93 [50]; Twigg v Kung (2002) 55 NSWLR 485, 489-493; Firth v Centrelink (2002) NSWLR 451, 462-467 [33]-[44].

[25]Ex parte Patience; Makinson v The Minister (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96, 100-101.  Generally, see Firth v Centrelink & Anor (2002) NSWLR 451, 462-467 [34]-[42].

[26]Gognos Holdings Ltd v ASIC (2018) 129 ACSR 363, 383-384 [90]; Loch v John Blackwood Ltd [1924] AC 783, 788; ASIC v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 93 ASCR 189, 195 [20]-[21].

[27]  Order Applegarth J made on 25 June 2021.

[28] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, 81-82 [65].

[29] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 241 [91]; Fraser v Evans [1969] 1 QB 349.

[30] Batemans Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247, 260-267 [33]-[48]; Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435, 483 and 495.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Re Diane Lawyers Pty Ltd (ACN 650 581 196)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Re Diane Lawyers Pty Ltd (ACN 650 581 196)

  • MNC:

    [2021] QSC 229

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Jackson J

  • Date:

    09 Sep 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

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