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Legal Services Commissioner v Moore[2021] QSC 280

Legal Services Commissioner v Moore[2021] QSC 280

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Legal Services Commissioner v Moore [2021] QSC 280

PARTIES:

LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER

(applicant)

v

NERISE DAWN MOORE

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 10541 of 2021

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

5 November 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 October 2021; supplementary outline of argument on behalf of the applicant dated 13 October 2021; further supplementary outline of argument on behalf of the applicant dated 21 October 2021

JUDGE:

Burns J

ORDER:

THE ORDER OF THE COURT IS THAT:

  1. 1.Pursuant to s 133(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), the respondent is permanently disqualified from managing a corporation that is an incorporated legal practice.
  2. 2.The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs of the application to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – UNQUALIFIED PERSONS AND DISQUALIFIED PRACTITIONERS – GENERALLY – where the applicant Commissioner sought an order pursuant to s 133(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) disqualifying the respondent from managing an incorporated legal practice – whether the respondent had engaged in conduct capable of supporting a disqualification under ss 206C, 206D, 206E or 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) from managing corporations – whether disqualification of the respondent from managing an incorporated legal practice is otherwise justified – whether any such disqualification should be permanent

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 180, s 181, s 182, s 206C, s 1317E

 

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 3, s 6, s 24, s 25, s 111, s 117, s 118, s 119, s 133, s 261, s 703

Legal Profession Regulation 2017 (Qld), reg 14, reg 31, reg 34, reg 35, reg 37, reg 39, reg 42, reg 44, reg 50, reg 53

Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 50, cited

ASIC v Vocation Ltd (2019) 371 ALR 15, cited

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Elm Financial Services Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 544, cited

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Ltd (No 10) [2017] QSC 96, cited

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v White (2006) 58 ACSR 261, cited

Australian Securities Commission v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 583, cited

Binns v Gardiner (2004) 151 A Crim R 1, cited

Cassimatis v ASIC (2020) 376 ALR 261, cited

Chew v The Queen (1991) 4 WAR 21, cited

Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2005) 227 CLR 18, cited

Kyriackou v Law Institute of Victoria (2014) 45 VR 540, cited

Legal Services Commissioner v Walter [2011] QSC 132, cited

R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501, cited

R v Tunde-Olarinde (1967) 51 Cr App Rep 249, cited

Re HIH Insurance Ltd; ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80, cited

Re Idylic Solutions Pty Ltd; ASIC v Hobbs & Ors (2013) 93 ACSR 421, cited

Rich v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129, cited

Strategic Management Australia AFL Pty Ltd v Precision Sports & Entertainment Group Pty Ltd (2016) 114 ACSR 1, cited

Termite Resources NL (in liq) v Meadows (2019) 370 ALR 191, cited

Vines v ASIC (2007) 63 ACSR 505, cited

COUNSEL:

P Kinchina for the applicant

No appearance for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Legal Services Commission

No appearance for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The Legal Services Commissioner applies for an order pursuant to s 133 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) that the respondent, Nerise Dawn Moore, be disqualified from managing an incorporated legal practice.
  1. [2]
    Although served with the application, Ms Moore failed to appear at the hearing and, as such, the question whether a banning order should be made falls to be determined solely on the affidavit material filed in support of the application.
  1. [3]
    The main objects of the LPA are to provide for the regulation of legal practices in the interests of the administration of justice and to protect consumers of the services of the legal profession as well as the public generally.[1] To those ends, there are several provisions of the LPA that are intended to ensure that providers of legal services in this State are both qualified and certified to do so. For example, a person must not engage in legal practice[2] unless the person is an Australian legal practitioner (s 24(1) LPA) and nor may a person represent or advertise that the person is entitled to engage in legal practice unless the person meets that description (s 25(1) LPA).[3]
  2. [4]
    With a couple of exceptions, a corporation is an incorporated legal practice if it engages in legal practice in this jurisdiction, and whether it provides non-legal services or not.[4] Importantly, an incorporated legal practice is required to have at least one director who is an Australian legal practitioner holding a practising certificate entitling the practitioner to practise as a principal of a law practice (s 117(1) LPA). Such a person is referred to in the legislation as a “legal practitioner director” (s 110 LPA) and, if acting in that role, is fixed with a number of important supervisory obligations in addition to his or her ordinary professional obligations. Indeed, each legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice is, for the purposes of the LPA, responsible for the management of the legal services provided by the practice,[5] and must ensure that appropriate management systems are implemented and kept to enable the provision of legal services by the practice.[6] Furthermore, if an incorporated legal practice ceases to have at least one legal practitioner director for a period exceeding seven days, it must give notice to the Queensland Law Society of that fact (s 119(1) and (2) LPA) and is prohibited from providing any legal services for so long as that remains the case (s 119(3) LPA). When the QLS receives such a notice, it may appoint an Australian legal practitioner with an unrestricted practising certificate to “perform or discharge the functions or duties conferred or imposed on a legal practitioner director” under the legislation (s 119(5) LPA).
  1. [5]
    By s 132 LPA, this court is empowered to disqualify a corporation from providing legal services in this jurisdiction for the period the court considers appropriate if satisfied, inter alia, that the incorporated legal practice has failed to implement satisfactory management and supervision of its provision of legal services or where an officer of the incorporated legal practice who is acting in the management of the incorporated legal practice is the subject of an order under s 133 LPA.
  1. [6]
    That made clear, on 6 January 2014, an incorporated legal practice sprang up at Mudgeeraba known as Stenton & Moore Pty Ltd. To the extent that this name was intended to convey the impression that two persons named Stenton and Moore were qualified providers of legal services was, to say the least, misleading. Although its legal practitioner director – Mr Graham Stenton – was legally qualified, Ms Moore was not then (nor at any subsequent time) admitted to the legal profession in any State or Territory in Australia. Nor was she otherwise qualified to run a legal practice or provide legal advice. In short, she was never an Australian legal practitioner within the meaning of the LPA or the holder of a practising certificate in any State or Territory of Australia. Nevertheless, Ms Moore commenced work in the practice from its inception and held herself out as the company’s “Executive Officer” and, at some point, was entered on a database maintained by the Queensland Law Society as a “non-practitioner director”.
    1. [7]
      Mr Stenton remained as the legal practitioner director for the company until 25 May 2018. What became of him is not revealed by the material before the court but he appears to have had nothing further to do with the practice after that date. There were then two deceitful attempts by Ms Moore to install someone as the legal practitioner director of the company, presumably so that it could keep up the necessary statutory appearances and thereby continue in operation as an incorporated legal practice.
    1. [8]
      First, Mr Blake Fraser was appointed to that role between 1 June 2018 and 7 August 2018, but that appointment occurred without his knowledge and, I am satisfied, was engineered by Ms Moore.
    1. [9]
      Second, Ms Judith Sheehan took on the role, but she was duped into doing so. Ms Sheehan was initially approached by a recruitment firm about an “opportunity” with Stenton & Moore in August 2018. Ms Sheehan was already in practice on her own account but was prepared to entertain the idea. There were then some discussions between Ms Sheehan and Ms Moore before the former took up the offer. Ms Moore told Ms Sheehan that she was admitted as a lawyer but was yet to complete the Practice Management Course and, accordingly, was not then entitled to a principal level practising certificate. Ms Moore told Ms Sheehan that she expected to complete the course and obtain her certificate by early October, at which time she would become the principal of the firm and, by implication, its legal practitioner director. Of course, none of that ever happened. Furthermore, Ms Sheehan was told that she would not be expected to do “any substantive legal work”. Rather, she would be asked to assist with the finalisation of the acquisition by Stenton & Moore of two other legal practices. Ms Shannon accepted an engagement on that basis and, relevantly to this application, became the legal practitioner director for the company. She continued in that role until 24 December 2018 but, along the way, Ms Moore asked Ms Sheehan to perform legal work for clients of the practice on a “consultancy” basis and Ms Sheehan agreed to do so. While there, Ms Sheehan did not approve or implement any management systems, did not have any involvement in the operation of the trust account for the practice and did not supervise Ms Moore in any relevant sense.
    1. [10]
      When Ms Sheehan left on 24 December 2018, there was no legal practitioner director and no attempt to find a replacement.
    1. [11]
      After discovering that Stenton & Moore did not have a legal practitioner director, the QLS appointed receivers on 7 February 2019 and, on 8 March 2019, Jackson J granted an injunction to restrain Ms Moore from engaging in legal practice or representing that she is entitled to engage in legal practice.[7] There was then a thorough investigation into the affairs of the practice. The investigation revealed that:
  1. (a)
    From early 2014, Ms Moore provided legal advice to any number of clients whilst holding herself out as a qualified solicitor, and this continued unabated during the periods when the practice did not have a legal practitioner director. There is evidence otherwise establishing that, for long periods of time, Ms Moore was effectively operating the practice alone (albeit with some assistance in respect of administrative work);
  2. (b)
    Again from an early stage, Ms Moore assumed responsibility for the management of the trust account for the practice. Indeed, Ms Moore had been responsible for all of the financial records for the practice from about May 2018 when Mr Stenton left until its receivership;
  3. (c)
    The trust account records were not properly maintained, contrary to the statutory requirements. These included: failing to maintain trust account records;[8] failing to issue trust account receipts[9] and statements;[10] failing to maintain trust account deposit records;[11] failing to record required particulars on trust account cheque butts;[12] failing to maintain trust account receipts and payments cashbooks;[13] failing to maintain trust account ledgers;[14] failing to prepare trust account reconciliation statements on a monthly basis and have them reviewed and signed by a principal of the law practice;[15] making EFT payments from the trust account when the practice was not approved to make such payments;[16] and overdrawing the trust account ledgers.[17]
  4. (d)
    There were also serious trust accounting issues in respect of 11 specific client files where, for example, the ledgers were overdrawn and/or the trust money appeared to have been misappropriated. Indeed, despite the best efforts of the receivers to reconstruct the accounts, there was a lack of proper accounting records, and many transactions still remain unexplained;
  5. (e)
    The total assessable deficiency of trust moneys was $433,690.03.[18] Subsequently, 42 clients of Stenton & Moore made claims against the Fidelity Fund. This resulted in compensation payments to those claimants totalling $570,427.13, which payments were ultimately made on a pro-rata basis at $0.65 in the dollar. There is no evidence that any person other than Ms Moore was the cause of (or contributed to) the trust account deficiency;
  1. (f)
    Finally, there are considerable grounds for concern about the provenance of a document purporting to be the copy of a grant of probate issued by this court and which was provided by Ms Moore to clients of the practice in connection with the deceased estate of their father. No application for probate was made to the Registry in the case of that estate and the copy document provided by Ms Moore to her clients appears to have been fabricated using a previous grant of probate issued to Stenton & Moore for a completely unrelated estate.
  1. [12]
    On 22 April 2020, Ms Moore pleaded guilty to engaging in legal practice when she was not an Australian legal practitioner contrary to s 24 of the LPA.[19] She was fined $5,000, ordered to pay costs, and no conviction was recorded. The further investigation of the general deficiency in the trust account for the practice has been referred to the Queensland Police Service.
  1. [13]
    Now, while Ms Moore has been restrained by order from engaging in legal practice or representing that she is entitled to engage in legal practice, she is presently at liberty to manage an incorporated legal practice in the absence of a further order under s 133(1) LPA and that is why this application has been brought.
  1. [14]
    Section 133 LPA is in these terms:

“133 Disqualification from managing incorporated legal practice

  1. (1)
    The Supreme Court may, on application of an ILP authority,[20] make an order disqualifying a person from managing a corporation that is an incorporated legal practice for the period the court considers appropriate if the court is satisfied that—
    1. the person is a person who could be disqualified under the Corporations Act, section 206C, 206D, 206E or 206F, from managing corporations; and
    2. the disqualification is justified.
  2. (2)
    The Supreme Court may, on application of a person subject to a disqualification order under this section, revoke the order.
  3. (3)
    A disqualification order made under subsection (1) has effect for the purposes only of this Act and does not affect the application or operation of the Corporations Act.
  4. (4)
    A regulation may provide for the publication and notification of orders made under this section.
  5. (5)
    A person who is disqualified from managing a corporation under provisions of a corresponding law that correspond to this section is taken to be disqualified from managing a corporation under this section.”
  1. [15]
    It will immediately be seen that before the court may disqualify a person from managing an incorporated legal practice, two requirements must be met: first, that the person could be disqualified from managing a corporation under one or more of the provisions of the Corporations Act specified in s 133(1)(a) of the LPA; and, second, that the disqualification is justified.
  1. [16]
    Of the Corporations Act provisions specified in s 133(1)(a) of the LPA, s 206C would appear to be apposite for the circumstances of this case.[21] It relevantly provides as follows:

“206C Court power of disqualification—contravention of civil penalty provision

  1. (1)
    On application by ASIC, the Court may disqualify a person from managing corporations for a period that the Court considers appropriate if:
    1. a declaration is made under:
      1. section 1317E (civil penalty provision) that the person has contravened a corporation/scheme civil penalty provision or subsection 670A(4), 727(6), 728(4) or 1309(12); or
      2. section 386-1 (civil penalty provision) of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 that the person has contravened a civil penalty provision (within the meaning of that Act); and
    2. the Court is satisfied that the disqualification is justified.
  2. (2)
    In determining whether the disqualification is justified, the Court may have regard to:
    1. the person's conduct in relation to the management, business or property of any corporation; and
    2. any other matters that the Court considers appropriate.”
  1. [17]
    The interplay between s 133 of the LPA and s 206C of the Corporations Act needs to be understood. Along with satisfaction that the proposed disqualification is justified, s 206C of the Corporations Act requires a declaration to be made under s 1317E or s 386-1 that the person in question has contravened a particular civil penalty provision before a disqualification can be made. Section 133 LPA does not go so far as to require the making of a declaration. Instead, provided the court is persuaded that the proposed disqualification is justified, an order may be made if the court is satisfied that a disqualification could be made under, relevantly s 206C and, as a necessary part of that, that a declaration could be made that the person in question has contravened a civil penalty provision.[22]
  2. [18]
    Here, the Commissioner submits that Ms Moore could be disqualified from managing a corporation under s 206C of the Corporations Act because such a disqualification is justified and, further, because a declaration could be made that she has contravened one or more of the following civil penalty provisions:
    1. (a)
      Section 180(1), which obliges a director or other officer of a corporation to exercise his or her powers and discharge his or her duties with a reasonable degree of care and diligence;
    2. (b)
      Section 181(1), which requires a director or other officer of a corporation to exercise his or her powers and discharge his or her duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose;
    3. (c)
      Section 182(1), which provides that a director, secretary or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use his or her position to gain an advantage for himself or herself or someone else or cause detriment to the corporation.
  1. [19]
    As to s 180(1) of the Corporations Act, whether a director has exercised reasonable care and diligence is to be answered by balancing the foreseeable risk of harm against the potential benefits which could be expected to accrue to the company from the conduct in question, along with the expense and difficulty of taking alleviating action and any conflicting responsibilities of the director or officer.[23] The question is what an ordinary person, with the knowledge and experience of the director or officer, could be expected to have done in the circumstances if he or she was acting on his or her own behalf.[24] The interests of the company that s 180(1) is concerned to protect include the interests of the corporate entity itself as well as its shareholders.[25]
  1. [20]
    Section 181(1) of the Corporations Act imposes several obligations on directors and officers including that he or she: must exercise powers in the interest of the company, must not misuse or abuse his or her power; must avoid conflict between personal interests and those of the company; must not take advantage of his or her position to make secret profits; and must not misappropriate the company’s assets.[26] The duties to act in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose, may overlap, but they are nevertheless separate duties.[27]
  2. [21]
    Section 182(1) of the Corporations Act, the improper use of position to gain an advantage or to cause detriment, is not restricted to abuses of power; it may consist of doing an act which a director or officer knows or ought to know he or she has no authority to do.[28] However, impropriety is to be determined objectively and does not depend upon the person’s consciousness of impropriety. A director or officer of a company may act improperly with no intention of acting dishonestly or otherwise than in the best interests of the company as a whole.[29] It will be enough if the conduct of the director, when considered objectively, amounts to a breach of the standards of conduct that would be expected of a person in his or her position by reasonable persons with knowledge of the duties, powers and authority of the position of director, and the circumstances of the case, including the commercial context.[30]
  3. [22]
    On the facts of this case, there is to my mind no room for doubting that a declaration could be made under s 206C of the Corporations Act to the effect that Ms Moore acted in contravention of at least two of the three civil penalty provisions that I have just examined and that, having regard to her conduct in relation to the management, business and property of Stenton & Moore, a court could be satisfied that she ought to be disqualified from managing corporations under s 206C of the Corporations Act. Leaving to one side the question whether Ms Moore exercised her powers and discharged her duties as a director of that company with reasonable care and skill (s 180(1) of the Corporations Act), for a long period of time she held herself out as qualified to provide legal advice to clients of the practice, and did purport to provide such advice, when she had no qualifications at all. For this she was remunerated as if she was a properly qualified and certified provider of legal advice. Then, when facedwith the departure of Mr Stenton, she dishonestly attempted to paper over the absence of a legal practitioner director of the company. Along the way, she paid scant if any regard to the statutory requirements for the management of the accounts of the practice and is responsible for a trust account shortfall of at least $433,690.03. Ms Moore also appears to have engaged in serious wrongdoing in relation to an estate. Her conduct overall should be regarded as a persistent and brazen fraud on consumers of the services of the legal profession in this State. In these respects at least, she abjectly failed to exercise her powers and discharge her duties as a director of Stenton & Moore in good faith and for a proper purpose (s 182(1) of the Corporations Act) and made improper use of her position to gain an advantage for herself (s 182 of the Corporations Act). The first limb of s 133(1) of the LPA is therefore satisfied.
  1. [23]
    As to the second limb, the court must be satisfied that disqualifying Ms Moore from managing an incorporated legal practice is justified: s 133(1)(b) LPA. For the reasons expressed in the preceding paragraph, such a conclusion should follow almost as night follows day in a case such as this, but the court is nonetheless obliged to consider the appropriateness of disqualification in light of all of the proven circumstances. In that regard, although the court was informed that this was the first occasion on which application had been made for a disqualification under s 133 of the LPA, there have been several decisions where the exercise of the discretion to do so in the context of similar legislative schemes has been considered, not the least of which are of course decisions concerned with the power conferred by s 206C of the Corporations Act.[31] Drawing from those decisions as well as a consideration of the context and purpose of s 133 of the LPA and the overall scheme of that statute, it is possible to state some general (and non-exhaustive) propositions about the exercise of the discretion:
    1. (a)
      The power exists to further the objects of the LPA, that is to say, to protect consumers of legal services and the public generally. The jurisdiction is accordingly protective and not punitive, although there may of course be a “penalising effect” on a respondent. In any such case, the impact that the disqualification will have on the person’s commercial or personal interests needs to be weighed against the risk that the person could once again subject an incorporated legal practice to the type of conduct that is in evidence before the court;
    2. (b)
      The protection of consumers of legal services and the public will also include protection of persons and entities who deal with incorporated legal practices, including creditors, shareholders and investors;
    3. (c)
      The court will be focused on whether the person who is the subject of such an application could be disqualified under the Corporations Act and, if so, whether the disqualification is justified. On the first of those questions, the requirements of the relevant provision of the Corporations Act must be considered and, in a case like this where s 206C is engaged, once the court is satisfied that a declaration could be made to the effect that the person has contravened a civil penalty provision, the court may have regard to the person’s conduct in relation to the management, business or property of the company, and any other matter that the court considers appropriate to determine whether a disqualification is justified;
  1. (d)
    Thus, consideration of all the circumstances of the conduct alleged to give rise to a need to disqualify a person from managing an incorporated legal practice will not necessarily be confined to conduct within a particular incorporated legal practice. Indeed, it may in a given case extend to external conduct (including conduct occurring prior to and/or subsequent to the person’s directorship with the company) if it is demonstrated that any such conduct bears on the person’s fitness to manage an incorporated legal practice;
  2. (e)
    So, too, will it be necessary to consider whether the conduct in question was isolated and unlikely to be repeated or whether it was part of a pattern of behaviour that has become so ingrained that it may very well happen again. In this respect, the extent to which the person has reformed should not be overlooked;
  3. (f)
    The court should consider not only the nature and extent of the alleged disqualifying conduct but also the risks to others from the continuation of that conduct and the actual harm caused to clients of the practice as well as to persons and entities who dealt with the practice;
  4. (g)
    As to the length of any disqualification, consideration will need to be given to the degree of seriousness of the conduct about which complaint is made, the likelihood that the person might engage in similar conduct in the future and the likely harm that may be caused to the public, should that occur. Whether the disqualifying conduct was persistent and/or concealed from view will also be relevant factors. Longer periods of disqualification will generally be reserved for cases where the disqualifying conduct was of a serious nature such as conduct involving dishonesty; and
  5. (h)
    Even though s 133(1) of the LPA provides for the making of a disqualification for “the period the court considers appropriate”, the power extends to the making of an order for permanent disqualification. Indeed, such an order will usually be called for where the disqualifying conduct is serious and the person has no automatic right to recommence working in a legal practice once his or her disqualification ends.[32]
  1. [24]
    With these propositions in mind, I am satisfied that disqualifying Ms Moore from managing an incorporated legal practice is justified. Moreover, given the nature and seriousness of Ms Moore’s conduct, the real likelihood that she might engage in similar conduct in the future, the likely harm that may be caused to consumers of legal services as well as creditors if she does, and the absence of any evidence to suggest to the contrary, her disqualification should be permanent. I will accordingly make an order to that effect along with an order for the costs of this application in favour of the Commissioner.
  1. [25]
    For the sake of completeness, the Commissioner also sought an order that she be at liberty to publish notice of the making of the disqualification order in variousprofessional journals and the like. Such an order is unnecessary. Section 133(4) of the LPA provides for the making of a regulation governing the publication and notification of orders and there exists a regulation to that effect: Legal Profession Regulation 2017 (Qld), reg 14. It empowers the Commissioner to publicise the making of a disqualification order in any way the Commissioner considers appropriate: LPR, reg 14(2). It also obliges the Commissioner to give written notice of the order to the corresponding authority of every other jurisdiction: LPR, reg 14(3)(a).

Footnotes

[1]LPA, s 3.

[2]The expression, “legal practice”, is considered and discussed in Legal Services Commissioner v Walter [2011] QSC 132, [11] to [22].

[3]An Australian legal practitioner is an Australian lawyer who holds a current local practising certificate or a current interstate practising certificate: LPA, s 6(1).

[4]LPA, s 111(1). The exceptions include in-house legal services and services that are not legally required to be provided by an Australian legal practitioner: s 111(2).

[5]LPA, s 117(2). And see LPA, s 118.

[6]LPA, s 117(3).

[7]Pursuant to LPA, s 703.

[8]Contrary to LPA, s 261.

[9]Contrary to Legal Profession Regulation 2017 (Qld) reg 34.

[10]Contrary to LPR, reg 53.

[11]Contrary to LPR, reg 35.

[12]Contrary to LPR, reg 37(6).

[13]Contrary to LPR, reg 39.

[14]Contrary to LPR, reg 42.

[15]Contrary to LPR, reg 44.

[16]Contrary to LPR, reg 50(1).

[17]Contrary to LPR, reg 31(1).

[18]This deficiency is comprised of funds that should have been held in the trust account and which had not been repaid.

[19]It should be recorded that this charge did not cover all of Ms Moore’s dealings whilst operating the practice. The charge related to Ms Moore’s conduct in respect of certain clients she dealt with between 14 October 2018 and 19 January 2019.

[20]An ILP authority means the Commissioner, the QLS or the Commissioner and the QLS acting jointly under an arrangement made between them: LPA, Schedule 2.

[21]Section 206D provides a power of disqualification to the court in the case of insolvent corporations, s 206E provides the same power when there have been repeated contraventions of the Corporations Act and s 206F confers a power on ASIC in similar terms to the power conferred on the court by s 206C.

[22]A conclusion that is fortified by the content of s 133(3) LPA, providing as it does that a disqualification made under sub-s (1) has effect for the purposes only of the LPA and does not affect the application or operation of the Corporations Act.

[23]Termite Resources NL (in liq) v Meadows (2019) 370 ALR 191, [183]; ASIC v Vocation Ltd (2019) 371 ALR 155, [733].

[24]Termite Resources NL (in liq) v Meadows (2019) 370 ALR 191, [181].

[25]Cassimatis v ASIC (2020) 376 ALR 261, [194]-[197].

[26]Chew v The Queen (1991) 4 WAR 21, 49.

[27]Strategic Management Australia AFL Pty Ltd v Precision Sports & Entertainment Group Pty Ltd (2016) 114 ACSR 1, [87].

[28]R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501.

[29]R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501; Doyle v ASIC (2005) 227 CLR 18; Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 507.

[30]Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2005) 227 CLR 18, [35].

[31]Such as Australian Securities Commission v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 583; Re HIH Insurance Ltd: ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80; Rich v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129; Vines v ASIC (2007) 63 ACSR 505; Re Idylic Solutions Pty Ltd; ASIC v Hobbs & Ors (2013) 93 ACSR 421. And see: Kyriackou v Law Institute of Victoria (2014) 45 VR 540.

[32]R v Tunde-Olarinde (1967) 51 Cr App Rep 249; 20; Binns v Gardiner (2004) 151 A Crim R 1; Re Idylic Solutions Pty Ltd; ASIC v Hobbs & Ors (2013) 93 ACSR 421, [45] (citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Elm Financial Services Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 544; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v White (2006) 58 ACSR 261); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Ltd (No 10) [2017] QSC 96.

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Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Legal Services Commissioner v Moore

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Legal Services Commissioner v Moore

  • MNC:

    [2021] QSC 280

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Burns J

  • Date:

    05 Nov 2021

  • White Star Case:

    Yes

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 507
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 226 CLR 507
Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas (2005) 226 CLR 50
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 226 CLR 50
ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2002) 42 ACSR 80
Cite 2 - (2002) 42 ACSR 80
ASIC v Vocation Ltd (2019) 371 ALR 15
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 371 ALR 15
ASIC v Vocation Ltd (2019) 371 ALR 155
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 371 ALR 155
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Beekink (2006) 58 ACSR 261
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2006) 58 ACSR 261
Cite 2 - (2006) 58 ACSR 261
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Elm Financial Services Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 544
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 55 ACSR 544
Cite 2 - (2005) 55 ACSR 544
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hobbs (2013) 93 ACSR 421
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2013) 93 ACSR 421
Cite 2 - (2013) 93 ACSR 421
Cite 3 - (2013) 93 ACSR 421
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Ltd (No 10) [2017] QSC 96
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QSC 96
Cite 2 - [2017] QSC 96
Australian Securities Commission v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 583
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 28 ACSR 583
Cite 2 - (1998) 28 ACSR 583
Binns v Gardiner (2004) 5 A Crim R 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 5 A Crim R 1
Cite 2 - (2004) 5 A Crim R 1
Cassimatis v ASIC (2020) 376 ALR 261
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2020) 376 ALR 261
Cite 2 - (2020) 376 ALR 261
Chew v The Queen (1991) 4 WAR 21
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1991) 4 WAR 21
Cite 2 - (1991) 4 WAR 21
Doyle v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2005) 227 CLR 18
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 227 CLR 18
Cite 2 - (2005) 227 CLR 18
Cite 3 - (2005) 227 CLR 18
Kyriackou v Law Institute of Victoria (2014) 45 VR 540
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2014) 45 VR 540
Cite 2 - (2014) 45 VR 540
Legal Services Commissioner v Walter [2011] QSC 132
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QSC 132
Cite 2 - [2011] QSC 132
R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1995) 183 CLR 501
Cite 2 - (1995) 183 CLR 501
Cite 3 - (1995) 183 CLR 501
R v Tunde-Olarinde (1967) 51 Cr App Rep 249
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1967) 51 Cr App Rep 249
Cite 2 - (1967) 51 Cr App Rep 249
Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2004) 220 CLR 129
Cite 2 - (2004) 220 CLR 129
Strategic Management Australia AFL Pty Ltd v Precision Sports & Entertainment Group Pty Ltd (2016) 4 ACSR 1
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2016) 4 ACSR 1
Cite 2 - (2016) 4 ACSR 1
Termite Resources NL (in liq) v Meadows (2019) 370 ALR 191
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 370 ALR 191
Cite 2 - (2019) 370 ALR 191
Cite 3 - (2019) 370 ALR 191
Vines v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 63 ACSR 505
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2007) 63 ACSR 505
Cite 2 - (2007) 63 ACSR 505

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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