Rado v Golden Casket (No 2)[2021] QSC 354

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

HENRY J: I gave a decision in Rado v Golden Casket [2021] QSC 20 on 4 February 2021.  The applicant in the present application is, again, Ms Rado and the respondent is, again, Golden Casket.  The relief sought in this application is, in a legal sense, not materially different from the relief sought last time.  The detail of some of the content of the application varies somewhat.  But as I have explained today to Ms Rado, at the heart of the application it is, in a legal sense, seeking an order that money be paid on the basis that she was the purchaser of a winning lotto ticket. 

Admittedly, she is not seeking the same amount of money as last time; only a proportion of the overall win, rather than the total win.  But that is neither here nor there, because, in a legal sense, the nature of the relief I have just identified demonstrates the unsuitability of it being pursued through an application.  It is sufficient to observe that the reasons I gave last time apply in the same way to today’s application.  I do not propose to repeat the substance of them, having made that indication. 

I would merely add that I have again endeavoured to explain why it is that a dispute such as this is not apt for pursuit through an application, but rather would be in the normal course, at least subject to arguments about limitation periods, pursued as a breach of contract case; that is to say, by a proceeding instituted by filing of a claim and pleadings. 

That pathway, should it survive any points about limitation periods, would ultimately lead to a trial at which I could actually hear evidence and determine where the truth lies.  An application is not an appropriate avenue for the pursuit of such an argument. 

I have turned my mind to the fact that I have powers under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules to order that an application be continued as if started by a claim and give directions for the filing of pleadings and so forth.  Neither party sought that that occur.  In the circumstances of this case, where there is, if I can put it as neutrally as I can, a cloud over whether or not such a claim would be statute barred, it seems unwise for the Court to initiate an order of that kind of its own volition. 

The upshot, then, is for the same reasons as last time, this application, too, must be dismissed.  Costs will follow the event.  The respondent might well have been entitled to indemnity costs this time around, but has fairly not pressed that point. 

My orders then are:

1. (1)
   Application dismissed.

2. (2)
   The applicant will pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be assessed on the standard basis, if not agreed.