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Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham (No 2)[2021] QSC 40

Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham (No 2)[2021] QSC 40

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors (No 2) [2021] QSC 40

PARTIES:

SYMBOLIC RESOURCES PTY LTD (ABN 55 604 407 426)

(Applicant)

v

FLEUR KINGHAM (PRESIDENT OF THE LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND)

(First Respondent)

and

MALCOLM ROBERT BURSTON

(Second Respondent)

and

DAVID GULLO

(Third Respondent)

and

SHANE ANDREW WATTS AND AMANDA RAE WATTS

(Fourth Respondents)

FILE NO:

SC No 11776 of 2019

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Application for a statutory order of review

ORIGINATING COURT:

Land Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

5 March 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

Heard on the papers

Submissions received 22 September 2020 (applicant),  20 October 2020 (third respondent and fourth respondents) and 27 October 2020 (applicant reply)

JUDGE:

Wilson J

ORDERS:

  1. [1]
    The fourth respondents pay the standard costs of the applicant thrown away by reason of the adjournment on 21 January 2020. 
  2. [2]
    The applicant otherwise pay the fourth respondents’ costs of the joinder application on the standard basis. 
  3. [3]
    No further order as to costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURES – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL RULE: COSTS FOLLOW EVENT – EVENT: WHAT CONSTITUTES – where the applicant unsuccessfully opposed a joinder application by the fourth respondents – where costs of the joinder application were reserved – where the applicant was ultimately successful in judicial review proceedings – whether the joinder application was an “event” for which costs should be determined separately

PROCEDURES – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – GENERAL RULE: COSTS FOLLOW EVENT – GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – where the applicant was successful on one of four grounds of review in judicial review proceedings – where each ground of review involved separate questions and issues – where considerable time and resources were expended on the three unsuccessful grounds of review – where the original proceedings were in the Land Court of Queensland (a “no cost jurisdiction”) – where the applicant briefed both senior and junior counsel but this was not necessary given the complexity of the matter – how costs should be apportioned

Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 (Qld)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 681, r 684

Aion Corporation Pty Ltd v Yolla Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] QSC 216, applied.

BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64, applied.

Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191, applied.

Kosho Pty Ltd & Anor v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd, Trilogy Funds Management Ltd & Ors v Fujino (No 2) [2013] QSC 170, applied.

McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Co (No 2) [2015] 1 Qd R 295; [2014] QSC 213, applied.

Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72; [1998] HCA 11, applied.

Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193, discussed.

COUNSEL:

D A Kelly QC and K J McIntyre for the applicant

No appearance for the first respondent

No appearance for the second respondent

David Gullo (self-represented) for the third respondent

M de Waard for the fourth respondent

SOLICITORS:

Sparke Helmore Lawyers for the applicant

No appearance for the first respondent

No appearance for the second respondent

David Gullo (self-represented) for the third respondent

Ruddy, Tomlins and Baxter for the fourth respondent

Background

  1. [1]
    Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd (“the applicant”) sought a gold mining lease over a rural property known as “Milwarpa Station”. However, pursuant to section 269 of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) (the “MRA”), the Land Court of Queensland recommended the applicant’s mining lease application be rejected. 
  2. [2]
    The applicant then reviewed this recommendation by the Land Court pursuant to the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (the “JR Act”). Senior and junior counsel appeared for the applicant at the hearing.
  1. [3]
    The first respondent is the President of the Land Court. On 29 October 2019, the first respondent lodged abiding submissions and sought leave to be excused from the Supreme Court proceedings, save as to the issue of costs. The first respondent did not participate in the judicial review proceedings.
  2. [4]
    The second respondent is Mr Malcolm Burston, who was self-represented at the Land Court hearing. At the time of the Land Court hearing, the second respondent was the owner of Milwarpa Station and he had lodged an objection under the MRA to the granting of the mining lease. However, Mr Burston then sold Milwarpa Station to the fourth respondents on 12 July 2019, and deposed that he did not have the finances, time, nor interest to participate in these proceedings. The second respondent did not appear at the judicial review hearing.
  3. [5]
    The third respondent is Mr David Gullo. The third respondent is the owner of the property “Sea Pearl”, which neighbours the applicant’s proposed mining site, and he also lodged an objection to the mining lease. He was self-represented at the Land Court hearing and also at the judicial review hearing.
  4. [6]
    The fourth respondents are Mr Shane Watts and Ms Amanda Watts, who became the registered proprietors of the land comprising Milwarpa Station on 12 July 2019, after the Land Court hearing. The fourth respondents were joined to this judicial review proceeding on 29 January 2020 and were legally represented in the judicial review hearing with junior counsel appearing on their behalf. 
  5. [7]
    At the hearing, the parties disavowed some matters raised in their written outlines and clarified and focussed their submissions on the issues in dispute. The conduct of the hearing was further assisted by the parties agreeing to:
    1. An indexed bundle of relevant documents;  
    2. A list of issues in dispute; and
    3. A statement of facts.
  6. [8]
    The applicant’s application for judicial review set out four grounds:
    1. The Land Court decision involved errors of law in relation to the construction and application of section 265(11) of the MRA, in that the third respondent’s objection was not a “properly made objection”; 
    2. The Land Court decision involved errors of law, in contravention of section 268(3) of the MRA, in relation to the scope of the objections; 
    3. The Land Court decision involved errors of law in relation to the construction and application of sections 269(1) and (4) of the MRA; and 
    4. The Land Court decision was made in breach of the rules of procedural fairness.
  7. [9]
    The parties acknowledged that if any one of the first three grounds were successful, then the Land Court decision would be invalid and, as such, should be set aside and referred back to the Land Court to be decided according to law. 
  8. [10]
    In relation to ground 4, for the Land Court decision to be set aside, the applicant was required to show that, by reason of procedural unfairness, the applicant was deprived of an opportunity that would have influenced the outcome in the Land Court as a matter of reality and not mere speculation.
  9. [11]
    The applicant was successful on ground 2 (i.e. that the Land Court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining evidence and submissions based on the applicant allegedly misleading the Department of Environment and Science). 
  10. [12]
    On 26 June 2020, I published my reasons and ordered that:
    1. The Land Court decision made on 27 September 2019, which recommended to the Minister for Natural Resources, Mines and Energy that the MLA100123 be rejected, be declared void and set aside.
    2. This matter is remitted to the Land Court to be decided according to law. 
    3. The question of costs is adjourned to a date to be fixed.[1]
  11. [13]
    In my reasons I stated that I would deal with the question of costs on the papers, unless any party requested a hearing. I invited the parties to make submissions on the question of costs. I have received written submissions from the applicant, the third respondent and the fourth respondents. 
  12. [14]
    No party requested an oral hearing on the matter of costs.

Relevant legal principles

  1. [15]
    The general rule for costs is contained in rule 681 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“the UCPR”), which provides that:

“(1)  Costs of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court orders otherwise.

  1. (2)
    Subrule (1) applies unless these rules provide otherwise.”
  1. [16]
    There must be “special” or “exceptional” circumstances to depart from the general rule.[2] In Oshlack v Richmond River Council (“Oshlack”),[3] McHugh J (with whom Brennan CJ agreed) endorsed a statement of Devlin J in Smeaton Hanscomb & Co Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co (No 2)[4] that:

“[...] Prima facie, a successful party is entitled to his costs. To deprive him of his costs or to require him to pay a part of the costs of the other side is an exceptional measure.”

  1. [17]
    The rationale for that statement of general principle was explained by McHugh J in Oshlack in the following terms:

“[67] [...] The principle is grounded in reasons of fairness and policy and operates whether the successful party is the plaintiff or the defendant. Costs are not awarded to punish an unsuccessful party. The primary purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify the successful party. If the litigation had not been brought, or defended, by the unsuccessful party the successful party would not have incurred the expense which it did. As between the parties, fairness dictates that the unsuccessful party typically bears the liability for the costs of the unsuccessful litigation.” [5]

  1. [18]
    The discretion in awarding costs is a wide one, but it must be exercised judicially and not by reference to irrelevant considerations. The general rule that a successful party in litigation is entitled to an order of costs in its favour is grounded in reasons of fairness and policy, and should only be departed from where the other party can point to “some good reason”.
  2. [19]
    As was observed by Philippides J (as her Honour then was), in Bucknell v Robins,[6] there are limited exceptions to the general rule, which focus on:
  1. (a)
    the conduct of the successful party which disentitles it to such an order; or 
  1. (b)
    the existence of “special” or “exceptional” circumstances.
  1. [20]
    A Court may deprive a successful party of their costs relating to an issue on which it was unsuccessful when that issue or event is clearly dominant or separable.
  2. [21]
    The application of the general rule in rule 681 may lead to costs orders that reflect different results on separate events, unless the Court considers some other order is more appropriate.[7] 
  3. [22]
    In Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) (“Interchase”),[8] the Court of Appeal had to consider the effect of rule 681(1) (then numbered rule 689(1)) and McPherson JA noted: 

“[84]  Costs […] follow the ‘event’ which, when read distributively, means the events or issues, if more than one, arising in the proceedings unless the court makes some other order that is considered ‘more appropriate’.”[9] 

  1. [23]
    In McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Co (No 2),[10] P Lyons J noted:

“[30] It appears to me to follow from the decision of the Court in Interchase and by reference to the language of rr 681 and 684, that, under the current rules, events in an action are to be identified by reference to individual issues or questions in the action, and the event is not simply the result or outcome of the action; and, at least by implication, that the predilection for making orders for costs by reference to success on individual events within the action remains. In that case, no ground for depriving the fourth defendant, successful in the action, of his costs, other than his failure on a number of issues, was identified.”[11]

  1. [24]
    Rule 684 of the UCPR provides:

“(1)  The court may make an order for costs in relation to a particular question in, or a particular part of, a proceeding.

  1. (2)
    For subrule (1), the court may declare what percentage of the costs of the proceeding is attributable to the question or part of the proceeding to which the order relates.”
  1. [25]
    In BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2)[12] McMurdo J (as his Honour then was) referred to the application of rule 684: 

“[7]  [...] The general rule remains that costs should follow the event and r 684 provides an exception. Necessarily the circumstances which would engage r 684 are exceptional circumstances, and the enquiry must be: what is it about the present case which warrants a departure from the general rule? That this remains the approach under r 681 and r 684 comes not only from the terms of the rules themselves but also from the recognised purposes for it. [...]

[8]  Thus in Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch & Ors, Chesterman J approved this passage from the judgment of Einstein J in Mobile Innovations Ltd v Vodafone Pacific Ltd:

“Notwithstanding that the court has power to deprive a successful party of costs, or even order a successful party to pay costs, that is a course to be taken in unusual cases and with a degree of hesitancy.”

I adhere to the view I expressed in Australand Corporation (Qld) Pty Ltd v Johnson & Ors that ordinarily the fact that a successful plaintiff fails on particular issues does not mean that the plaintiff should be deprived of some of its costs, although it may be appropriate to award costs of a particular question or part of a proceeding where that matter is definable and severable and has occupied a significant part of the trial.”[13]

  1. [26]
    McMurdo J explained the position of a plaintiff who was not successful in all aspects of a claim as follows:

“[20]  […] If plaintiffs were to be at risk of adverse costs consequences simply by unsuccessfully advancing arguable points, then in a great deal of litigation the orders for costs would be quite different and with many unjust outcomes. The general rule as to costs following the event should not be departed from simply because a plaintiff’s alternative case for a higher award is not accepted.”[14]

  1. [27]
    The mere fact that a plaintiff or an applicant fails on a particular issue, or issues, does not mean that it should be deprived of some of its costs. Generally there needs to be something more, such as that the issue or part of the proceeding in question is definable or severable and occupied a significant part of the trial.
  2. [28]
    Where the Court considers it appropriate to depart from the general rule, it may declare a percentage of the costs as attributable to the question or part of the proceeding to which the order relates. The apportionment is not merely arithmetical but involves some judgment and approximation.
  3. [29]
    As Jackson J observed in Aion Corporation Pty Ltd v Yolla Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor,[15] the discretion plainly extends so as to allow the Court to decide costs by reference to particular questions in, or parts of, a proceeding. His Honour further observed that the Courts have, from time to time, encouraged an “intelligently made” apportionment of costs, which fairly reflect both the outcome and the costs associated with the determination of different questions or parts.
  4. [30]
    The Court, in exercising its discretion in relation to costs, is entitled to take an impressionistic and pragmatic view as to what the real heads of controversy in the litigation were, and will strive to avoid assessments of costs in a complicated form, according to issues in a technical sense.[16]

No order of costs is sought against the first respondent  

  1. [31]
    No party seeks costs from the first respondent.[17]

Costs of the joinder application

Background

  1. [32]
    On 19 December 2019, the fourth respondents filed a joinder application pursuant to rule 69(1) of the UCPR to be added as a respondent to the application or, in the alternative, to be substituted for the second respondent. The fourth respondents submitted that:
  1. (a)
    They were persons whose presence before the Court was necessary to enable the Court to adjudicate effectually and completely on all matters in dispute in the proceeding; or
  1. (b)
    They were persons whose presence before the Court was desirable, just and convenient to enable the Court to adjudicate effectually and completely on all matters in dispute connected with the proceeding.
  1. [33]
    Central to the fourth respondents’ argument as to why they should be joined to the application was that:
  1. (a)
    The first respondent was not a proper contradictor;
  1. (b)
    The second respondent was no longer the owner of the Milwarpa Property and had minimal interest in the outcome; and
  1. (c)
    The third respondent only owned a small parcel of land.
  1. [34]
    Accordingly, the fourth respondents submitted that it was desirable, just and convenient for the fourth respondents to be included because there ought to be a proper contradictor to the proceedings.
  2. [35]
    On 21 January 2020, Daubney J ordered that the proceedings be adjourned to enable the fourth respondents to amend the joinder application. His Honour ordered that the fourth respondents pay the standard costs of the applicant thrown away by reason of the adjournment
  3. [36]
    On 29 January 2020, in delivering final judgment on the joinder application, Daubney J stated:

“In the particular circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the Watts, as the landowners, clearly have an interest in supporting the objector grounds which had been advanced by Burston. For the reasons given above, they would also be limited to effectively supporting those grounds, but it also follows that they have an interest in opposing any judicial review of the Land Court’s decision with respect to Burston’s objection. Given Mr Burston’s evinced disinclination and incapacity to pursue involvement in the judicial review, there are clear advantages to the joinder of the Watts on the basis that they would effectively take over the case which Burston otherwise would have run on the judicial review. At this early stage of the proceeding, it cannot be suggested that their joinder would adversely affect the efficiency and timeliness of the disposition of the judicial review. Given the limited ambit of the arguments which could properly be advanced by the Watts, that is, the same argument which Burston could have advanced, it is likely that the joinder of the Watts in light of the effective recusal by Burston will have an elucidating effect which will assist the Court in the disposition of the judicial review proceeding.

In the particular circumstances of this case I am, therefore, persuaded that the Watts should be joined as fourth respondents. On reflection, substitution for Burston is not appropriate. As I have sought to make abundantly clear, my view is that the Watts may not use this case as a vehicle to run any arguments which would not have been available to Burston as an objector. The Watts have no right to take over or be assigned Burston’s objection. He was and is the objector, and was and is a necessary party in that capacity.

There will, therefore, be the following orders:

  1. Shane Andrew Watts and Amanda Rae Watts are joined as fourth respondents in proceeding BS 11776 of 2019.
  2. The costs of the joinder application are reserved.”

The parties’ submissions

  1. [37]
    The applicant submits that the second respondent, third respondent and fourth respondents should pay the applicant’s costs of the joinder application on the standard basis. 
  2. [38]
    The applicant submits that under section 49(4) of the JR Act, the rules of the Court in relation to the awarding of costs apply to the proceeding, including rule 681 of the UCPR. Under this rule, costs are in the discretion of the Court but follow the event unless the Court orders otherwise.  
  3. [39]
    The applicant submits that it is important to bear in mind that, unlike the other respondents to the current proceeding, who were joined because of their respective involvement in the Land Court proceeding, the fourth respondents actively sought out involvement and, to that end, brought the joinder application. The applicant submits that the fourth respondents sought involvement as a means of protecting their own interests as landholders of land over which the mining lease application is sought; they did not bring the application and ultimately become joined to the proceeding out of some altruistic endeavour to assist the public interest or as a friend of the Court. 
  4. [40]
    The applicant submits that whilst the joinder was over the applicant’s opposition, it is trite now to suggest that the applicant bear the costs of the joinder application, which were reserved, because the fourth respondents’ involvement was expected to have an elucidating effect that would assist the Court in the disposition of the judicial review process.
  5. [41]
    Irrespective of whether or not the fourth respondents did in fact assist the Court in the disposition of the judicial review process, the fact remains that the costs of the joinder application were reserved.
  6. [42]
    The applicant submits that, in any event, nothing in rule 698 of the UCPR could or should displace the orders made by Daubney J on 21 January 2020 that the fourth respondents pay the standard costs of the applicant thrown away by reason of the adjournment.
  7. [43]
    The fourth respondents submit that the following is clear from Justice Daubney’s reasons on the joinder application:
    1. The fourth respondents were successful in the joinder application (they won);
    2. The fourth respondents were limited only to supporting grounds raised by the other parties to the proceeding (they were not permitted to add anything new);
    3. The joinder of the fourth respondents would not adversely affect the efficiency and timeliness of the originating application;
    4. The joinder of the fourth respondents would have an elucidating effect, which would assist the Court in the disposition of the originating application; and
    5. The second respondent was taking no active role in the originating application.
  8. [44]
    Accordingly, the fourth respondents submit that, as the applicant advances no argument that the fourth respondents’ conduct in relation to the joinder application was such as to disentitle them to a costs order, the appropriate order is that costs of that application follow the event.

Consideration

  1. [45]
    In my view, the joinder application was an “event” for which the costs are to be separately determined.
  2. [46]
    The fourth respondents were successful, despite the applicant’s opposition in their being joined to the proceedings.  
  3. [47]
    In my view, there are no special or exceptional circumstances that would disentitle the fourth respondents to their costs in respect of the joinder application.
  4. [48]
    However, on 21 January 2020, there was an adjournment of the fourth respondents’ joinder application to enable them to amend their application.
  5. [49]
    Justice Daubney made an order that the fourth respondents pay the standard costs of the applicant thrown away by reason of the adjournment.
  6. [50]
    There is nothing that should displace this order. 
  7. [51]
    Accordingly, the applicant should pay the fourth respondents’ costs of and incidental to the joinder application (except for the adjournment on 21 January 2020) on a standard basis, to be assessed.

Costs of the judicial review proceedings

The applicant seeks an order that the second, third and fourth respondents pay the applicant’s costs

  1. [52]
    The applicant seeks an order that the second, third and fourth respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the judicial review proceedings on a standard basis, to be assessed.  
  2. [53]
    The general rule that costs follow the event should only be departed from in the Court’s discretion with good reason. Notwithstanding that the Court has power to deprive a successful party of costs or even order a successful party to pay costs, that is a course to be taken in unusual cases and with a degree of hesitancy.[18]
  3. [54]
    The applicant submits that it has not engaged in any conduct that would disentitle it to the beneficial exercise of the Court’s discretion as to costs and that:
    1. The originating application for statutory order of review was necessary;
    2. The applicant actively limited the issues in contention before the Court, such that an agreed set of facts and an agreed list of issues, which included the specific questions on which the Court would need to decide, was provided to the Court to assist with the expeditious hearing of the matter;
    3. The conduct of the applicant was efficient having regard to the size, importance, seriousness and complexity of the issues in the application;
    4. The fourth respondents, unlike the first, second or third respondents, actively sought to be involved in the proceeding and such involvement ultimately caused the proceeding to take longer; and
    5. The fourth respondents did not confine themselves to matters of objection raised by the second respondent but also pursued argument regarding matters related to the third respondent.
  4. [55]
    The applicant submits that, as it succeeded in obtaining the orders sought, its costs should follow the event and be paid by the second, third and fourth respondents.  
  5. [56]
    Notwithstanding that the second respondent did not participate in the judicial review hearing, the applicant still seeks an order for costs against the second respondent.  
  6. [57]
    At the hearing for the joinder application, the second respondent provided submissions and an affidavit stating that he did not have the finances, time or interest to participate in these proceedings and the second respondent did not participate in the hearing in any respect. 
  7. [58]
    The applicant states that, despite the second respondent’s submissions and affidavit, the second respondent did not withdraw his objection, which he had the ability to do pursuant to section 261 of the MRA.
  8. [59]
    Consequently, the applicant submits that the second respondent has always remained a party to the proceeding, albeit one that has not actively agitated its position subsequent to the joinder application. 
  9. [60]
    In relation to the third respondent, the applicant submits that the third respondent was actively involved in the hearing and put on submissions in support of his position.
  10. [61]
    The applicant also submits that its successful ground of appeal was one that directly related to the third respondent’s submissions during the Land Court hearing. It submitted that, but for the erroneous submissions of the third respondent alleging that the applicant had misled the Department of Environment and Science, the current application for statutory order of review would not be required.
  11. [62]
    The applicant submits that there is no evidence regarding the third respondent’s lack of financial capacity to satisfy a costs order. Further, even if there was, the applicant submits that this does not justify the Court’s departure from the general rule.[19]

The third respondent seeks an order that all parties bear their own costs

  1. [63]
    The third respondent seeks the following orders:
    1. The third respondent bear his own costs of and incidental to the application on the basis that all other parties bear their own costs of an incidental to the application as it relates to the third respondent, given the original matter was heard in the Land Court (a “no cost jurisdiction”); and
    2. There be no orders as to costs against the second, third or fourth respondents.
  2. [64]
    In the alternative, if the Court is of the view that the applicant should be awarded costs, then the third respondent submits that all of the respondents are entitled to an indemnity certificate under the Appeal Costs Fund Act 1973 (Qld).
  3. [65]
    The third respondent and his wife are the owners of “Sea Pearl”, which is a 500-acre cattle farm. However, the third respondent states that he is not a wealthy landowner:

“We have saved our money over many years and bought the farm by the sweat of our brow to create a rural lifestyle for us and our two young children. We don’t have much in life but our farm and I have to work away to repay the farm, so we are by no means well-funded land barons.”

  1. [66]
    In his submissions, the third respondent outlines that the Land Court is generally a no cost jurisdiction. He states that this enabled him to self-represent in the Land Court in order to raise his environmental and rural aesthetic concerns associated with the proposed mining site, without the fear of being pursued by a mining company if he lost the Land Court hearing.
  2. [67]
    The third respondent submits:

“I suspect if the Land Court warned directly affected Landholders of the risk of having to pay the Mining Companies (sic) legal costs, no Landholder would ever object to new ML applications over fears if they lose (which mostly happens), they would be financially destroyed after paying their opponent’s legal costs.

[...]

While we had valid objections and hoped to win, we did not expect to win the Land Court hearing (decision made by President Kingham) as it seems historically in Queensland ML Application (sic) ordinarily succeed. We were even more surprised to be dragged into the Supreme Court for an appeal that threatened to charge us for the costs of the Applicant’s Appeal.”

  1. [68]
    The third respondent states that he never would have entertained the thought of objecting to the Symbolic Resources’ mining application if he had known that he would ultimately be threatened with the costs of the applicant’s legal fees.
  2. [69]
    The third respondent submits:

“I feel it is a travesty of justice that my family could be threatened with paying the Applicant’s Legal Costs when the Land Court is generally considered a ‘no cost jurisdiction’ designed to allow Landholders a forum to raise their concerns with new mining projects, and yet, if a decision is appealed, we stand to lose everything if we lose.”

  1. [70]
    In terms of the legal costs incurred by the applicant in the judicial review proceedings, the third respondent submits:

“The Applicant also engaged Barristers and Queens Counsel to fight the Appeal, which seems to be quite excessive force to take against a self-represented Landholder like myself. I do not consider that this mater (sic) was of sufficient complexity to justify the applicant needing Queens Council (sic) as well as a Barrister and Solicitor to run their judicial review. The costs incurred by the Applicant to bring in a heavy handed legal team is significant and it is totally unreasonable for me to be expected to pay the costs of their excessive force on a matter the applicant sought to appeal.”

  1. [71]
    In addition, the third respondent highlights that the applicant won only one of its four grounds of appeal. The third respondent submits that a lot of time and expenses went into preparing the three unsuccessful grounds of appeal.

The fourth respondents seeks an order that the applicant pay 75% of their costs

  1. [72]
    The fourth respondents state that the classic statement considering what constitutes “the event” is that of McPherson JA in Interchase, and that when considering costs the Court ought not simply look to whether the Court remitted the matter back to the Land Court, but instead consider who was successful on each of the issues, together with considerations of fairness and reasonableness.
  2. [73]
    The fourth respondents submit that if costs also follow the event for the originating application, then the applicant ought to pay 75% of the fourth respondents’ costs because the fourth respondents were 75% successful on the originating application.
  3. [74]
    The applicant pursued four grounds of judicial review (from a decision made in what the third respondent submits is a no cost jurisdiction). The originating application ran over two hearing days (involving both senior and junior counsel) and required two separate sets of written submissions. The fourth respondents note that this was despite all of the active parties conducting themselves in a manner that effectively limited Court time, through agreeing to a bundle of documents, a list of issues in dispute and a statement of facts.
  4. [75]
    When one looks at each of the grounds of judicial review being pursued by the applicant, the primary material in relation to each ground and the time spent arguing each ground, the fourth respondents submit one can safely conclude that there were four equal yet separate and distinct issues or questions in this proceeding.
  5. [76]
    Using the concepts and words adopted by McPherson JA in Interchase, the fourth respondents note that each of the four grounds of judicial review “gave rise to an ‘event’ for which the costs were to be determined separately.”[20]
  6. [77]
    The fourth respondents argue that there can be no question that rule 684 of the UCPR expressly allows the Court to attribute or proportion costs of a particular question or part of a proceeding.
  7. [78]
    In the current circumstances, the fourth respondents were successful in relation to three of the four issues (or “events”).  Accordingly, the fourth respondents submit that they were 75% successful and, as such, costs should be proportioned apportioned so that the applicant pays 75% of the fourth respondents’ costs of the originating application.
  8. [79]
    It is noted that in response to this submission by the fourth respondents, the applicant submits that this is a simplistic and inaccurate assessment:

“Whilst the parties could delve into the specific time that was taken in respect of each ground, to do so would be a relatively fruitless exercise and cause the parties to incur considerable additional costs, which the applicant has sought to conserve throughout the course of the proceeding [...] grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 were inherently interrelated and are not able to be separated in the way suggested by the fourth respondent because both submissions and evidence overlapped.”

  1. [80]
    The applicant emphasises that, although it was only successful in respect of ground 2, the outcome has caused the matter to be remitted to the Land Court, this being the ultimate order sought irrespective of the grounds. The applicant cites BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2),[21] in which Justice McMurdo stated:

“I adhere to the view I expressed in Australand Corporation (Qld) Pty Ltd v Johnson & Ors that ordinarily the fact that a successful plaintiff fails on particular issues does not mean that the plaintiff should be deprived of some of its costs, although it may be appropriate to award costs of a particular question or part of a proceeding where that matter is definable and severable and has occupied a significant part of the trial.”[22]

  1. [81]
    The applicant submits that the grounds of appeal are not definable and severable in the way suggested by the fourth respondents.
  2. [82]
    Further, the applicant submits that, while the apportionment does not need to be precise where the issues or grounds are interrelated, this involves some judgment and approximation.[23] In the decision of BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2), the Court reduced the costs recoverable by 10%. The applicant submits that if the Court is persuaded by the respondents that a reduction is warranted, any such reduction should not exceed 10%.
  3. [83]
    The fourth respondents alternatively submit that, if their primary submission that the applicant pay 75% of their costs is not accepted, then there are three special circumstances which ought to disentitle the applicant to its costs in any case.
  4. [84]
    First, the fourth respondents submit that the applicant never sought its costs against the fourth respondents. At no point prior to filing the applicant’s costs submissions did the applicant apply for an order of costs against the fourth respondents. It is only now, after the fourth respondents participated in the proceeding, that the applicant applies for costs against them. The fourth respondents submit that if the applicant was going to seek costs against the fourth respondents, they ought to have sought such an order when they amended the originating application to add the fourth respondents as parties.
  5. [85]
    Second, as noted by his Honour Justice Daubney in the joinder application judgment, the fourth respondents’ role in this proceeding was one which:
    1. Would not adversely affect the efficiency and timeliness of the originating application; and
    2. Would have an “elucidating effect which will assist the Court in the disposition of the judicial review proceeding”.
  6. [86]
    The fourth respondents submit that this is what their role in the proceeding ultimately achieved. They contend that they did not adversely affect the efficiency of the proceeding, and their role (assisted by a solicitor and junior counsel) was one that assisted the Court. Had the fourth respondents not participated in the proceeding, only the applicant would have been legally represented. In these circumstances, the fourth respondents submit that it is not just to award any costs against the fourth respondents.
  7. [87]
    Third, ground 2, being the only ground upon which the applicant was successful, was an error on behalf of the first respondent only. The fourth respondents were not parties to the proceeding in the Land Court. They did not contribute to the first respondent’s error and nor could they have done anything to prevent it. The current situation is very different, for example, to a situation whereby a respondent has led a court below into error.
  8. [88]
    In these circumstances, the fourth respondents submit that it would be unjust to make any costs order against the fourth respondents.

Consideration

  1. [89]
    This was a matter where the applicant was successful in their judicial review application. Prima facie, a successful party is entitled to their costs. To deprive a successful party of their costs, or to require them to pay a part of the costs of the other side, is an exceptional measure.[24]
  2. [90]
    The applicant’s primary submission is that the second, third and fourth respondents pay the applicant’s costs. If there should be any reduction, then it should be only by 10%.
  3. [91]
    The third respondent’s primary submission is that there should be no order as to costs.
  4. [92]
    The fourth respondents’ primary submissions is that the applicant pay 75% of their costs.
  5. [93]
    The phenomenon of each party claiming to have been successful, or to have each enjoyed a substantial measure of success, was noted by Applegarth J in Kosho Pty Ltd & Anor v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd, Trilogy Funds Management Ltd & Ors v Fujino (No 2)[25]:

“[5]  Ordinarily, the fact that a successful plaintiff fails on particular issues does not mean that it should be deprived of some of its costs. As Muir JA observed in Alborn v Stephens, “a party which has not been entirely successful is not inevitably or even, perhaps, normally deprived of some of its costs.” Still, a successful party which has failed on certain issues may not only be deprived of the costs of those issues but may be ordered as well to pay the other party’s costs of them.

[6]  The proposition that a successful party will be deprived of its costs or be ordered to pay part of the other parties’ costs only in special circumstances or for good reason is well-established. Principles or even rules of thumb which refer to “a successful party” beg the question of the standard by which success is to be measured. Is a plaintiff which makes a multi-million dollar claim on a variety of legal grounds but obtains a judgment for nominal damages, namely $10, based upon limited success on only one of the various causes of action pursued by it successful?

[7]  In one sense such a plaintiff has been successful, namely in establishing the defendant’s liability, and unsuccessful in establishing an entitlement to anything of value. Equally, it might be said that the defendant in such a case has been successful, namely in defending the plaintiff’s multi-million dollar claim for damages, and that the plaintiff’s success in establishing a single breach of contract is no real success at all in litigation which has a commercial objective, namely an award of substantial damages.

[8]  The phenomenon of each party claiming to have been successful, or to have each enjoyed a substantial measure of success, is familiar.”[26]

  1. [94]
    The starting point is that costs follow the event and the question is whether there is sufficient reason to depart from that position to any extent. In deciding whether a departure is justified in a particular case, it is important to bear in mind, the fundamental principles of fairness favouring the prima facie approach stipulated by the rule. A court will hesitate before departing from it and will depart only in an unusual case.
  2. [95]
    So, what is it about this case that warrants a departure from the general rule? 
  3. [96]
    In this matter the applicant claimed four grounds of review but was only successful on one ground. The parties enjoyed a mixed bag of success.
  4. [97]
    The applicant submits that all four grounds were inherently related and are not able to be separated in a way suggested by the fourth respondents because both submissions and evidence overlapped.
  5. [98]
    However, I do not accept this characterisation. In my view, each of the four issues raised by the applicant involved discrete issues which required different considerations. 
  6. [99]
    The first ground was that the Land Court recommendation involved errors of law in relation to the construction and application of section 265(11) of the MRA. The agreed list of issues in dispute framed ground 1 in this way:

“Whether the Third Respondent’s objection was a ‘properly made objection’ pursuant to s. 265(11) and s. 260 of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld)”.[27]

  1. [100]
    Essentially, the applicant submitted that as the third respondent’s objection was not served within the objection period it was not “a properly made objection” pursuant to the Act.
  2. [101]
    The third and fourth respondents submitted that the third respondent’s objection was served within time. I found otherwise.
  3. [102]
    I found upon a proper construction of section 265(11) that the third respondent’s objection was “a properly made objection”.
  4. [103]
    This ground involved matters of statutory construction to determine the proper construction of section 265(11).
  5. [104]
    The applicant was not successful on this ground.
  6. [105]
    The second ground was that the Land Court recommendation involved errors of law in relation to the scope of the objections. I found that the Land Court:
  1. (a)
    Could not receive evidence and consider issues on matters not otherwise included in the objections; and
  1. (b)
    Did receive evidence and consider issues on matters not otherwise included in the objections.
  1. [106]
    Essentially, this ground came down to whether paragraph 17 of the third respondent’s objection could anchor any of the submissions, evidence and findings of the Land Court about the applicant misleading the Department of Environment and Science, within the boundaries established by section 268(3) of the MRA.
  2. [107]
    I found that the issue about the applicant misleading the Department of Environment and Science was beyond the scope of paragraph 17 of the objection. The Land Court was precluded from entertaining the Environmental Authority issue as it was not raised in an objection that was duly lodged in respect of the application. The Land Court was in error to do so.[28] In my reasons I noted the following:

“The Land Court exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining evidence or any submissions based on the applicant allegedly misleading the Department of Environment and Science.  The Land Court was precluded from doing so pursuant to section 268(3) of the MRA. The generality of paragraph 100 of the Land Court decision, where the Land Court stated that on the evidence it cannot assume that the Department of Environment and Science has conditioned the Mining Lease Application in a way that properly protects the environmental value at risk from the activity, must encompass the evidence of the applicant misleading the Department of Environment and Science. Accordingly, this issue clouds or infects the ultimate conclusions made by the Land Court.”[29]

  1. [108]
    The list of issues framed the third ground in this way:
    1. Whether the Land Court hearing was confined to objections in relation to the grant of a mining lease pursuant to section 245 of the MRA; and
    2. Whether the Land Court had jurisdiction under section 269(4) of the MRA to consider matters dealt with under a separate statutory regime.[30]
  2. [109]
    The applicant’s written submissions were not wholly relied upon at trial. At the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that their written submissions for ground 3 did not clearly articulate their argument and they sought to refine these points in oral submissions. [31]
  3. [110]
    At the hearing, the applicant clarified that ground 3 rested upon how the Court should construe section 269(4)(j) of the MRA, which provides that the Land Court is entitled to consider whether there will be any adverse environmental impact caused by the applicant’s mining operations and, if so, the extent thereof.
  4. [111]
    The applicant stated that the Land Court never in fact engaged with the adequacy of conditions A5 and A6, which was the subject of expert evidence in response to the applicant’s mining activity.
  5. [112]
    However, I found that the Land Court had engaged with the adequacy of conditions A5 and A6.[32]
  6. [113]
    In my judgment, I noted that there was some, albeit limited, connection between grounds 2 and ground 3.

“[171] I do note that the issue, as raised in ground 2, about the Department of Environment and Science being misled by the applicant, does cloud, or infect, paragraph 100 of the Land Court decision. On the evidence, the Land Court could not assume that the Department of Environment and Science conditioned the Mining Lease Application in a way that properly protects the environmental values at risk from the activity. Such a finding must encompass the evidence about the Department of Environment and Science being misled. 

[172]  However, in my view, after considering the reasons, it was not the case that conditions A5 and A6 were only ever considered in the context of the Department of Environment and Science being misled. The Land Court’s reasons demonstrate, with some particularity, that it did engage with the adequacy of condition A5 and A6, which was the subject of expert evidence in response to the applicant’s mining activity. 

[173]  The applicant’s arguments in relation to ground 3, as refined and articulated at the hearing, have no substance.”[33]

  1. [114]
    The fourth and final ground was that the decision was made in breach of the rules of procedural fairness.
  2. [115]
    In their agreed list of issues, the parties separated ground 4 into three sub-issues:
    1. Whether the applicant was given a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence in response to the lay witness evidence of the second respondent and the third respondent (“the Mr Pott issue”);
    2. Whether the applicant was given a reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence in response to the expert evidence of the second respondent and the third respondent (“the expert report issue”); and
    3. Whether any of these matters amount to a breach of procedural fairness sufficient to give rise to the relief sought by the applicant.[34]
  3. [116]
    Each of these issues were addressed and the applicant was unsuccessful on each.  I found that there was no breach of procedural fairness by the President of the Land Court. There was no substance to any of these issues raised by the applicant and in my view, the litigation of such, unnecessarily extended the proceeding.
  4. [117]
    I note that the applicant briefed both a senior and junior counsel. The applicant submits that their legal representation was appropriate in the circumstances of an application for statutory order of review and having regard to the complexity of the legal argument the subject of such an application. It is submitted that the applicant did not engage excessive representation but rather provided an adequate presentation to enable justice to be done. 
  5. [118]
    In my view, this was not a case that the complexity of the legal argument necessarily required both a senior and junior counsel. I note that the fourth respondents engaged a junior counsel who more than adequately dealt with all of the issues.
  6. [119]
    I note that Daubney J stated in his disposition in the joinder application that it is likely the joinder of the fourth respondents would have an elucidating effect which would assist the Court in the disposition of the judicial review proceeding. It did. The fourth respondents’ legal and factual analysis greatly assisted with the disposition of this matter.  
  7. [120]
    It is clear that in relation to the four grounds of review, the applicant and the third and fourth respondents all enjoyed a measure of success. 
  8. [121]
    The parties acknowledged that if any one of the first three grounds were successful then the Land Court decision would be invalid and, as such, should be set aside and referred back to the Land Court to be decided according to law. 
  9. [122]
    In relation to ground 4, for the Land Court decision to be set aside then the applicant was required to show that, by reason of procedural unfairness, the applicant was deprived of an opportunity that would have influenced the outcome of the Land Court as a matter of reality and not mere speculation.
  10. [123]
    The applicant was successful on one ground with the consequence that the Land Court’s recommendation was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Land Court to be decided according to law. 
  11. [124]
    The third and fourth respondents were successful in defending the remaining three grounds.  
  12. [125]
    Each of the four grounds involved separate questions and issues; they were different events.  Each was an event that was definable and severable from each other.
  13. [126]
    In my view, grounds 1, 3 and 4 were definable and severable and occupied a significant part of the hearing. Although I noted that there was some slight connection between ground 2 and ground 3, they were still definable and severable from each other (and the other grounds).
  14. [127]
    I noted in my judgment that a considerable amount of material and time was expended by the parties in relation to litigating the other three unsuccessful grounds. Indeed, in my view, the disposition of the applicant’s three unsuccessful issues or questions dominated the proceedings.
  15. [128]
    In my view, it is desirable to avoid the difficulties of assessment of costs based on separate events or questions decided in the application. An order which divides the costs according to the questions raised, would be difficult or potentially difficult to assess.
  16. [129]
    I am satisfied that this is a case where it is appropriate to depart from the general rule that costs follow each event.
  17. [130]
    In my view, the most sensible and pragmatic way to deal with the issue of costs is to make no order.  I appreciate that this is an unusual outcome, or an exceptional measure, when the applicant was ultimately successful in the remedy it sought. However, such an outcome, in my view, is appropriate in the circumstances of this case as it fairly reflects the outcome and the costs associated with the determination of the different questions or issues in the proceedings.  
  18. [131]
    A fair and reasonable outcome, in the circumstances of this case, is for each party to bear their own costs.

Orders

  1. The fourth respondents pay the standard costs of the applicant thrown away by reason of the adjournment on 21 January 2020. 
  2. The applicant otherwise pay the fourth respondent’s costs of the joinder application on the standard basis. 
  3. No further order as to costs.

Footnotes

[1]Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193.

[2] Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 120 and 126 per Kirby J.

[3]Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 96 per McHugh J.

[4]Smeaton Hanscomb & Co Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co (No 2) [1953] 2 All ER 1588 at 1590 per Devlin J.

[5] Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97 [67] per McHugh J (footnotes omitted).

[6] Bucknell v Robins [2004] QCA 474 at [17].

[7] Sequel Drill & Blast P/L v Whitsunday Crushers P/L (No 2) [2009] QCA 239 at [4], citing Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq.) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26 at [84] per McPherson JA.

[8] Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26.

[9] Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26 at 61 per McPherson JA.

[10] McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Co (No 2) [2015] 1 Qd R 295.

[11] McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Co (No 2) [2015] 1 Qd R 295 at 302 (footnotes omitted).

[12] BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64.

[13]BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64 at [7], [8] (footnotes omitted).

[14] BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64 at [20] per McMurdo J (as his Honour then was).

[15] Aion Corporation Pty Ltd v Yolla Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] QSC 216 at [5]

[16] Bruce & Anor v LM Investment Management Limited & Ors (No 2) [2013] QSC 347 at [2] per Dalton J.

[17]  The applicant states that, as the first respondent did not participate in the proceedings, and consistently with the principles in R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13, no order is sought against the first respondent.

[18] Mobile Innovations Ltd v Vodafone Pacific Ltd [2003] NSWSC 423 at [4] per Einstein J, as approved by Chesterman J in Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch (No. 2) [2008] 2 Qd R 95 at 99 [21].

[19] Rintoul v State of Queensland & Ors [2018] QCA 20 at [40] per Applegarth J, with whom Morrison and Philippides JJA agreed.

[20]Interchase Corporation Limited (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2003] 1 Qd R 26 at 61 [83]. 

[21] BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64

[22] BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG & Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64 at [8] per McMurdo J (footnotes omitted).

[23] BHP Coal Pty Ltd & Ors v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG and Ors (No 2) [2009] QSC 64 at [17] per McMurdo J.

[24] Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 96 per McHugh J.

[25] Kosho Pty Ltd & Anor v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd, Trilogy Funds Management Ltd & Ors v Fujino (No 2) [2013] QSC 170.

[26] Kosho Pty Ltd & Anor v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd, Trilogy Funds Management Ltd & Ors v Fujino (No 2) [2013] QSC 170 at [5] – [6] per Applegarth J (footnotes omitted).

[27] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [28].

[28] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [132].

[29] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [136] - [137].

[30] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [140].

[31] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [141] – [142].

[32] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [165] – [166].

[33] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [171] – [172].

[34] Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors [2020] QSC 193 at [174].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham & Ors (No 2)

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham (No 2)

  • MNC:

    [2021] QSC 40

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Wilson J

  • Date:

    05 Mar 2021

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Aion Corporation Pty Ltd v Yolla Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 216
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QSC 216
Cite 2 - [2013] QSC 216
BHP Coal Pty Ltd v O & K Orenstein & Koppel AG (No 2) [2009] QSC 64
7 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QSC 64
Cite 2 - [2009] QSC 64
Cite 3 - [2009] QSC 64
Cite 4 - [2009] QSC 64
Cite 5 - [2009] QSC 64
Cite 6 - [2009] QSC 64
Cite 7 - [2009] QSC 64
Bruce v LM Investment Management Ltd (No 2) [2013] QSC 347
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QSC 347
Bucknell v Robins [2004] QCA 474
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2004] QCA 474
Interchase Corporation Limited v ACN 010 087 573 Pty Ltd[2003] 1 Qd R 26; [2001] QCA 191
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2001] QCA 191
Cite 2 - [2003] 1 Qd R 26
Cite 3 - [2003] 1 Qd R 26
Cite 4 - [2003] 1 Qd R 26
Cite 5 - [2003] 1 Qd R 26
Cite 6 - [2003] 1 Qd R 26
Kosho Pty Ltd v Trilogy Funds Management Ltd (No 2) [2013] QSC 170
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QSC 170
Cite 2 - [2013] QSC 170
Cite 3 - [2013] QSC 170
McDermott v Robinson Helicopter Company (No 2)[2015] 1 Qd R 295; [2014] QSC 213
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QSC 213
Cite 2 - [2015] 1 Qd R 295
Cite 3 - [2015] 1 Qd R 295
Cite 4 - [2015] 1 Qd R 295
Mobile Innovations Ltd v Vodafone Pacific Ltd (2003) NSWSC 423
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2003) NSWSC 423
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) 193 CLR 72
Cite 2 - (1998) 193 CLR 72
Cite 3 - (1998) 193 CLR 72
Cite 4 - (1998) 193 CLR 72
Cite 5 - (1998) 193 CLR 72
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) HCA 11
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1998) HCA 11
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal &Ors; Ex parte Hardiman & Ors (1980) 144 CLR 13
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1980) 144 CLR 13
Rintoul v State of Queensland [2018] QCA 20
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCA 20
Sequel Drill & Blast Pty Ltd v Whitsunday Crushers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] QCA 239
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] QCA 239
Smeaton Hanscomb & Co. Ltd v Sassoon I Setty, Son & Co. [1953] 2 All ER 1588
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1953] 2 All ER 1588
Symbolic Resources Pty Ltd v Kingham(2020) 5 QR 155; [2020] QSC 193
10 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 2 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 3 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 4 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 5 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 6 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 7 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 8 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 9 - [2020] QSC 193
Cite 10 - [2020] QSC 193
Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch[2008] 2 Qd R 95; [2007] QSC 386
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2008] 2 Qd R 95

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ausipile Pty Ltd v Bothar Boring and Tunnelling (Australia) Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 1222 citations
Pott v Clayton Utz [2021] QDC 1472 citations
Zou v Yang [No 2] [2024] QDC 392 citations
1

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