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SO v Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers[2022] QSC 302

Reported at (2022) 13 QR 363

SO v Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers[2022] QSC 302

Reported at (2022) 13 QR 363

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

SO v Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers; MP v Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers [2022] QSC 302

PARTIES:

SC No 923 of 2022:

SO

(applicant)

v

TRUSTEES OF THE DE LA SALLE BROTHERS

(respondent)

SC No 966 of 2022:

MP

(applicant)

v

TRUSTEES OF THE DE LA SALLE BROTHERS

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

SC No 923 of 2022

SC No 966 of 2022

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Applications

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Rockhampton

DELIVERED ON:

22 December 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Rockhampton

HEARING DATE:

5 August 2022

JUDGE:

Crow J

ORDER:

  1. Application adjourned to date to be fixed
  2. Costs reserved

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS – PERSONAL INJURY OR FATAL ACCIDENTS PROCEEDINGS – OTHER MATTERS – where both applicants were residents of the Boystown residential school in their youth – where the applicants allege they suffered sexual abuse at Boystown – where the applicants seek orders pursuant to s 35 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (PIPA) against the respondent to give proper answers in response to questions direct to trustees pursuant to s 27 of the PIPA – where the respondent has put a series of questions to the applicant regarding the proper construction of s 27 of the PIPA – where the parties have agreed to seven questions for the court to make a preliminary determination – whether the respondent is obliged to provide information with respect to allegations made in the amended Notice of Claim even if these allegations would be liable to be struck out if contained in a pleading – whether specified information pertaining to the allegations would be struck out if contained in a pleading – whether the responded is obliged to provide information with respect to allegations made in the amended Notice of Claim which go beyond the matters which the applicant needs to establish to make out their cause of action – whether the respondent is obliged by s 27(1)(b) of the PIPA to provide information on conduct of employees/members of the respondent other than those identified as perpetrators in amended Notice of Claim, conduct of employees/members of the respondent at other facilities operated by the respondent, acts of abuse by employees/members of the respondent different in nature to the allegations of the applicant, events or conduct more than 10 year prior to the applicant commencing residence at Boystown – whether the respondent is therefore obliged to provide information about prior similar incidents involving the conduct of the types of employees/members or events outlined immediately above – whether s 27(3) of the PIPA is satisfied by a statutory declaration and letter provided by the respondents in July/August 2022.

Corporation of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brisbane v Discovery Bay Developments Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 121, distinguished

Day v Woolworths [2016] QCA 337, distinguished

Di Cesare v Bird & Anor [2021] VSC 25, considered

Everingham v Commonwealth of Australia [1973] Qd R 185, distinguished

KQG v Trustees of the Marist Brothers [2018] NSWSC 1013, followed

S1 v Trustees of Marist Brothers [2016] NSWSC 970, distinguished

SDA v the Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2021] QCA 172; (2021) 8 QR 440, followed

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), Sch 1

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 4, s 9,  s 27, s 35

Personal Injuries Proceedings Regulation 2014 (Qld), s 3

COUNSEL:

C Wilson for the applicants

S J Deaves KC for the respondents

SOLICITORS:

Koffels Solicitors and Barristers for the applicants

Carroll and O'Dea Lawyers for the respondents

  1. [1]
    By applications filed 19 July 2022 in respect of SO and 29 July 2022 in respect of MP, the applicants seek orders pursuant to s 35 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (“PIPA”) against the respondent to give proper answers in response to questions directed to the trustees by SO and MP pursuant to s 27 of the PIPA.
  2. [2]
    The parties agree, following the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in SDA v the Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2021] QCA 172; (2021) 8 QR 440 (“SDA”) at [35], that this court ought to “deal with the construction of s 27(1)(b) as a preliminary issue and thereafter allow the parties an opportunity to make further submissions or agree upon suitable orders” dealing with any information the respondent was obliged to provide in light of the conclusion as to the construction of s 27(1)(b).

Procedural History - SO

  1. [3]
    SO was born in 1972 and was placed as a resident of Boystown at Beaudesert, between 1 March 1985 and November 1987 when he was aged between 12 years and 15 years.
  2. [4]
    On 7 August 2020, SO approached Koffels Solicitors to act on his behalf in respect of an abuse claim which he wished to bring against the respondent. A PIPA Notice of Claim Form 1 Part 1 (Part 1 Notice of Claim) was served on the respondent on 1 October 2020. It was a relatively straightforward handwritten document of the thirteen pages on the prescribed PIPA Notice of Claim Form 1 Part 1 with one additional page of type-written annexures.
  3. [5]
    The relevant parts of the Part 1 Notice of Claim include Item 7, the date of the incident being specified between 1 May 1985 and November 1987, the place where the incident occurred being identified as Boystown, Beaudesert; and Item 9 which required a brief description of the incident. In answer to Item 9, SO wrote:

“The applicant was routinely subjected to assaults and beatings (approx. weekly) manhandled and kicked, forced to do labour, encouraged to smoke, deprived of an education, strip searched, ogled in the shower.”

  1. [6]
    Item 14 listed the detail of witness to the incident as being Brothers [P], [A], [R], [BC] and [PS], all of Boystown, and “all other boys in residence at Boystown in the relevant period”.
  2. [7]
    As to Item 18, which required the detail of the reasons why the injured person believes that the person caused the incident, SO wrote:

“The respondent knew or should have known of the unlawful intentional, serious, tortious conduct of those in its employ/service and took no steps to prevent same prior to the applicant’s stay at Boystown.”

  1. [8]
    On 13 April 2021, SO issued a request for information to the respondent. On 29 April 2021, SO issued a second request for information, however, these requests were not pursued as SO’s solicitor had formed the view that the information had already been obtained through answers required by the respondent in relation to other, similar, matters that occurred at or about the same time, with specific reference being had to the matter of MP.
  2. [9]
    SO was medically examined and attempts were made to arrange a conference between the parties in May 2022, however, dates could not be agreed. On 4 April 2022, by email to the respondent’s solicitors, Koffels Solicitors enclosed by way of service an:

“…amended annexure to Part 1 notice. You shall now read the notice given to you to include the allegations therein. Our request for information per s 27 follows.”

  1. [10]
    Whilst the original annexure to the Part 1 Notice of Claim consisted of one page of typed material, the amended annexure as forwarded on 4 April 2022 consisted of 34 pages of detailed typed information.
  2. [11]
    On 29 April 2022, by a further email, Koffels Solicitors enclosed by way of service an amended Part 1 Notice of Claim with annexures dated 6 April 2022 in the same form as that provided on 4 April 2022. The email of 29 April 2022 concluded with the sentence:

“After 28 days from this date, a motion will be filed where you have not answered the particulars previously provided.”

  1. [12]
    The first 14 pages of the amended Part 1 Notice of Claim are precisely the same as the original Part 1 Notice of Claim with the exception that on page 14 it was noted that the document was “re sworn on 6/4/22”. The subsequent 34 pages of annexures were the same as that which had been provided on 4 April 2022. There was, however, no request for particulars provided.
  2. [13]
    The solicitors for the respondent pointed this deficiency out in their email of 2 May 2022. On 3 May 2022, Koffels Solicitors responded by sending a request for information pursuant to s 27 of the PIPA for 23 distinct matters.
  3. [14]
    SO makes no complaint in respect of 10 answers (answers 1 to 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20) but alleges that the respondent has not made lawful responses to 13 of the requests (requests 5 to 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 23). SO filed an originating application on 19 July 2022 seeking an order that the respondent provide a lawful response to those 13 identified questions.

Procedural History – MP

  1. [15]
    MP was born in 1972 and was placed at Boystown from 1987 until 1989, from ages 15 to 17. MP’s case has a similar procedural history leading to a determination of the same issues as SO.

Questions for Determination

  1. [16]
    Given the factual complexity of both matters and the similarity in determination of principles to be applied to the facts in both matters, the parties agreed on seven questions for preliminary determination, the answers to which will provide guidance to the determination of the issues raised in the originating applications and upon which the parties reasonably request the right to confer and attempt to agree.
  2. [17]
    The preliminary questions for determination need to be determined sequentially.

Question 1: Is the respondent obliged to provide information with respect to allegations made in the amended Notice of Claim which would be liable to be struck out if contained in a pleading?

  1. [18]
    Section 4 of the PIPA provides:

“4 Main purpose

  1. (1)
    The main purpose of this Act is to assist the ongoing affordability of insurance through appropriate and sustainable awards of damages for personal injury.
  1. (2)
    The main purpose is to be achieved generally by—
  1. (a)
    providing a procedure for the speedy resolution of claims for damages for personal injury to which this Act applies; and
  1. (b)
    promoting settlement of claims at an early stage wherever possible; and
  1. (c)
    ensuring that a person may not start a proceeding in a court based on a claim without being fully prepared for resolution of the claim by settlement or trial; and
  1. (d)
    putting reasonable limits on awards of damages based on claims; and
  1. (e)
    minimising the costs of claims; and
  1. (f)
    regulating inappropriate advertising and touting; and
  1. (g)
    establishing measures directed at eliminating or reducing the practice of giving or receiving consideration for a claim referral or potential claim referral, or soliciting or inducing a claimant to make a claim, in contravention of this Act.”
  1. [19]
    Section 9(1A), (1B), (2), (3), (5), (9C) and (10) of the PIPA relevantly provide:

“9 Notice of a claim

[…]

(1A) The approved form must provide for the notice to be in 2 parts, namely part 1 and part 2.

(1B) The approved form may provide that some or all information included in the notice be verified by statutory declaration.

  1. (2)
    The notice must—
  1. (a)
    contain a statement of the information required under a regulation; and
  1. (b)
    authorise each of the following to have access to records and sources of information relevant to the claim specified under a regulation—
  1. (i)
    the person;
  1. (ii)
    if the person is insured against the claim, the person’s insurer for the claim; and

[…]

  1. (d)
    be accompanied by the documents required under a regulation.

[…]

  1. (3)
    Part 1 of the notice must be given within the period ending on the earlier of the following days—
  1. (a)
    the day 9 months after the day the incident giving rise to the personal injury happened or, if symptoms of the injury are not immediately apparent, the first appearance of symptoms of the injury;
  1. (b)
    the day 1 month after the day the claimant first instructs a law practice to act on the person’s behalf in seeking damages for the personal injury and the person against whom the proceeding is proposed to be started is identified.

[…]

  1. (5)
    If part 1 of the notice is not given within the period prescribed under subsection (3) or section 9A(9)(b), the obligation to give the notice under subsection (1) continues and a reasonable excuse for the delay must be given in part 1 of the notice or by separate notice to the person against whom the proceeding is proposed to be started.

[…]

(9C) Subsections (3), (5) and (6) do not apply to a claim based on a personal injury of a person resulting from the abuse of the person when the person was a child.

  1. (10)
    In this section—

abuse, of a child, means—

  1. (a)
    sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child; or
  1. (b)
    psychological abuse of the child perpetrated in connection with sexual abuse or serious physical abuse of the child.

 access, to records and sources of information, includes access to copy the records and sources of information.”

  1. [20]
    The scheme of the PIPA requires an early notification of claims to respondents in all cases other than cases where personal injuries are suffered by a person as a result of abuse of that person when that person was a child.
  2. [21]
    Section 3 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Regulation 2014 (Qld) (the Regulation) provides relevantly in s 3(1) and (3) as follows:

3 Notice of a claim—information required for Act, s 9(2)(a)

  1. (1)
    This section states the information required for section 9(2)(a) of the Act.

[…]

  1. (3)
    The following particulars about the incident alleged to have caused the personal injury to which the claim relates are required—
  1. (a)
    the date, time and place of the incident;
  1. (b)
    details of how the incident happened;
  1. (c)
    if appropriate, a diagram showing, to the best of the claimant’s knowledge, the scene of the incident;
  1. (d)
    the names, addresses and, if known, telephone numbers of any witnesses to the incident;
  1. (e)
    the names, addresses and, if known, telephone numbers of any other persons able to provide relevant particulars about the incident;
  1. (f)
    if an emergency response entity or an investigative entity attended the incident—
  1. (i)
    the name of the entity; and
  1. (ii)
    if known, the name of the person who attended the incident on behalf of the entity; and
  1. (iii)
    the entity’s and, if known, the person’s contact details; and
  1. (iv)
    if known, any reference number assigned to the incident by the entity;
  1. (g)
    the name, address and, if known, telephone number of the person or persons who were, in the claimant’s opinion, responsible for causing the incident;
  1. (h)
    the reasons the claimant attributes responsibility to the person or persons;
  1. (i)
    if a protective device was available for use—the nature of the device and whether the injured person was using the device when the incident happened.
  1. [22]
    Incident is defined in the dictionary in Schedule 1 to the PIPA as follows:

“incident, in relation to personal injury, means the accident, or other act, omission or circumstance, alleged to have caused all or part of the personal injury.”

  1. [23]
    Section 3(3)(b) of the Regulation requires particulars to be included in a Notice of Claim of “details of how the incident happened” and s 3(3)(h) requires “the reasons the claimant attributes responsibility to the person or persons”. The phrase in s 3(3)(b), “details as to how the incident happened”, is quite broad, as is the use of the term in s 3(3)(h) of “the reasons the claimant attributes responsibility to the person or persons”.  It remains an accurate conclusion that the particulars required by s 3(3) do not necessarily have to accord with that which would be required to properly particularise a claim in a court document.[1]
  2. [24]
    The issue in the present case, unlike that raised in Graham v State of Queensland [2022] QSC 228, is not whether a Notice of Claim is so unparticularised that it could not possibly meet the requirements of a pleaded case, but rather the reverse. That is, where it is so broadly particularised that it may be liable to be struck out if it were included in a court proceeding, such that the respondent ought not be obliged to provide information about matters which may be struck out.
  3. [25]
    The answer to the question whether information must be disclosed is determined by the proper interpretation of s 27 of the PIPA. As explained by the Court of Appeal in SDA, the obligation to provide information provided under s 27(1)(b) is not to be construed narrowly, but rather “ a broad, remedial construction”[2] is to be preferred. As explained by Fraser JA at [20], even if the respondent receives information which it believes to be false, it will be obliged to discover that information as the respondent will only be relieved from providing information which the respondent knows is false.
  4. [26]
    As Morrison JA concluded at [133], if an institution does not receive a complaint for decades, the fact that a complaint was made 25 or 30 years later may be relevant because that complaint may allege that that victim had made the complaint of abuse some 25 or 30 years previously and the allegation by any other victim of having made a complaint some 25 or 30 years ago “could be argued as a fact that would have put the diocese on notice…” of the perpetrator’s child abuse.
  5. [27]
    The test, as Morrison JA concluded, is not whether such an allegation would in fact have put a diocese on notice, but rather whether it could be argued it may have put the diocese on notice. If such allegation were ordinarily made in a pleading, it is likely that such allegation would be struck out as the case would need to be re-pled in a narrower form confined to the school and named perpetrators. However, as Harrison AsJ pointed out in KQG v Trustees of the Marist Brothers [2018] NSWSC 1013[3] (“KQG”) if, following discovery, the plaintiff’s legal representatives become aware of further prior incidents of sexual abuse at the particular school “or at other Marist Brothers Schools or by teachers or priests” then they may be included in a further pleading.
  6. [28]
    As demonstrated by the decisions of S1 v Trustees of Marist Brothers [2016] NSWSC 970 (“S1”); Miller v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2018] NSWSC 24 and KQG v Trustees of the Marist Brothers [2018] NSWSC 1013, if Item 18 of the amended annexure to the Part 1 Notices of Claim in both applications were pleaded allegations in a statement of claim, then many of the paragraphs would be struck out. However, the fact that Item 18 is a detailed 32 page quasi statement of claim which contains several paragraphs that would be struck out if it were a pleadings does not mean that Item 18 is not “details as to how the incident happened”, as required by s 3(3)(b) of the Regulation or “reasons the claimant attribute responsibility to the “persons or persons”” as required by s 3(3)(h). The main purpose of the PIPA as set out in s 4 does not encourage or require a detailed quasi pleading to be included in a notice of claim, but it does not prevent it.
  7. [29]
    The broader interpretation of the obligations to provide information under s 27(1)(b) of the PIPA as explained by the Court of Appeal in SDA leads to the conclusion that the respondent is obliged to provide information with respect to allegations made in the amended Part 1 Notice of Claim even if these allegations would be liable to be struck out if contained in a pleading. The answer to question one is affirmative.

Question 2(a) if the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, would allegations relating to the conduct of employees or members of the respondent, other than those identified as perpetrators of acts against the applicant in the amended notice of claim, be struck out if contained in a pleading?

  1. [30]
    The question as framed raises a hypothetical question which is incapable of an answer insofar as it refers to “a pleading”. The question is, however, answerable if it is framed, as all pleadings disputes are, with reference to the nature of the case as set out in “the pleading”. For the purposes of the answer, therefore, it is necessary to consider the information contained under the heading “#18 Pleadings and Particulars” of the amended annexures to the Part 1 Notice of Claim as set out between pages 118 and 150 of the affidavit of Zoe Brindle filed 4 August 2022 and hereinafter referred to as “the pleading”. 
  2. [31]
    The pleading consists of 60 paragraphs with numerous subparagraphs. Whilst it is unnecessary to set out each of the 60 paragraphs, it is necessary to consider the nature of the case which the applicant seems to bring with reference to the structure of the paragraphs within the pleading.
  3. [32]
    Paragraphs 2 to 4 set out the particulars of the plaintiff. Paragraphs 5 to 7 set out the particulars of the respondent and its organisation. Paragraph 7 alleges that the respondent accommodated boys under the age of 18 years at Boystown since 1961, with Boystown being:

“Staffed or partly staffed by so called “brothers” who were appointed to work at Boystown by either the Provincial of the De La Salle Brothers or the Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers throughout its leadership team.”

  1. [33]
    Paragraphs 8 to 12 then set out the governing authority of Boystown as residing within New South Wales. Paragraphs 13 and 14 make detailed allegations relating to “the years and decades before, and as at, a date in early May 1985” alleging the respondent allowed, perpetrated and promoted at Boystown a culture of physical and psychological abuse at the hands of the most senior members of the respondent permanently stationed at Boystown, including house parents, teachers, religious brothers and other boys. Paragraph 13(d) alleges a system promoting the failure to report such abuse due to a culture of silence, denial, mistrust and blame in respect to abuse with particulars alleging one in four boys at Boystown were sexually abused and naming several persons as perpetrating the abuse from 1962 through to 1997.
  2. [34]
    Paragraph 14 brings an allegation intended to particularise a culture of abuse within the respondent in relation to school institutions they operated throughout Australia. The particulars provided are of abuse being perpetrated by ES since the 1960s at De La Salle College, Bankstown, New South Wales and by FK at De La Salle College, Melbourne, Victoria, between 1972 and 1978, including a specific allegation that FK:

“was transferred by the Respondent DLS College, Scarborough, Queensland, after the Respondent learnt that he had sexually abused children in Victoria”

with the further allegation that prior to 1991, FK sexually abused at least 12 boys on 33 occasions at De La Salle College, Scarborough.

  1. [35]
    There was a further allegation that FB sexually abused at least nine children at Boystown between 1978 and 1983 and had been sentenced for child sex offences in August 2017.
  2. [36]
    Paragraphs 15 to 18 raise allegations against PS, said to be the person in charge of Boystown and the most senior brother permanently stationed in Boystown between 1985 and 1987, alleging that PS had physically abused one boy in or about 1982, was in receipt of information from two unidentified boys that they had been sexually abused by Brothers CB and SG and by another person, PB, and chose to take no action in respect of such reports.
  3. [37]
    Paragraphs 19 to 26 make allegations with respect to several named individuals, each alleged to be an employee, delegate or agent of the respondent.
  4. [38]
    Paragraph 27 alleges the respondent knew at all material times, or ought to have known, that paedophilia and child abuse were widespread at Boystown, and that PS “was probably a paedophile and tolerant of other adults at Boystown engaging in paedophilia and abuse of boys.”
  5. [39]
    Paragraphs 28 and 29 specify the abuse that SO says he suffered between 13 May 1985 and 8 November 1987 whilst a resident at Boystown and alleges that the applicant was subjected to sexual, serious physical, and connected psychological abuse by four named brothers, two named teachers, and “other residents (all unnamed)”. As to the allegation of sexual, serious physical abuse, and connected psychological abuse by other residents as set out in paragraph 29(d)(vii), that is only further referred to in paragraphs 29(e)(xi) where it is alleged in respect of the applicant that “on many occasions the plaintiff was bashed by other residents”.
  6. [40]
    Paragraphs 30 to 31 make allegations of risk of harm being material, foreseeable and not insignificant. Paragraph 34 specifies the duty of care alleged by the applicant against the respondent. Paragraph 35 alleges that the duty was non-delegable. Paragraph 36 alleges a duty of care.
  7. [41]
    Paragraph 37 alleges a statutory duty of care pursuant to s 33(1) and s 40(a) of the Children’s Services Act 1965 (Qld) (now repealed) that the respondent owed the plaintiff a statutory duty to provide the plaintiff with adequate care.
  8. [42]
    Paragraphs 38 to 41 set out numerous breaches of the duty of care. Paragraphs 42 to 44 set out particulars of causation and loss and damage. Paragraph 45 alleges factual causation.
  9. [43]
    Paragraphs 46 to 58 plead particulars of a case for vicarious liability to be imposed upon the respondent in respect of the actions of the brothers and teachers, being employees of the respondent who the applicant alleges perpetrated the abuse on him.
  10. [44]
    Paragraph 59 brings a detailed claim for aggravated and exemplary damages.
  11. [45]
    It can be reasonably concluded, even from the above summary of the pleading, that the applicant wishes to include as a part of his case against the respondent that the respondent had a negligent system that was the product of a systemic pattern. The answer, therefore, to question 2(a) is assisted by the reasons of Morrison JA in SDA at [124] where his Honour said:

“[124] In my view, the phrase “act, omission or circumstance” refers to factual matters in each case. It refers to the facts that explain what is alleged to have caused the personal injury. Where what is alleged as the cause is an omission to take reasonable care, one can see that facts that might explain why the omission occurred could comprehend that other things happened which served to put the respondent on notice. In that respect, I respectfully agree with the comments of Jackson J in Day v Woolworths Ltd, at least as it relates to “reasons for” the incident:

[109] In my view the existence of prior similar incidents, if any, may be information about the circumstances or reasons for the incident. Those circumstances could include that the respondent was on notice of the risk in a way that made the measures adopted to avoid the risk inadequate. That would be a circumstance of the incident for the purposes of s 27(1)(b)(i) of PIPA, read in the context of ch 2 pt 1 div 2 generally.”

[footnotes omitted]

  1. [46]
    Morrison JA’s reference to the decision of Jackson J in Day v Woolworths[4] referred to [109] of the reasons of Jackson J. When placed in its proper context, it is necessary to consider the reasons of Jackson J from [107] to [110], where his Honour said:

“[107] The primary Judge held that because Question 26 relates to all slip and fall incidents at the store before and after the incident it did not bear on the circumstances or reasons for the applicant’s fall.

[108] The applicant submits that disclosure will show that the incident was the “product of a systemic pattern” of a “negligent system”. She relies on Broadhead v Queensland.

[109] In my view the existence of prior similar incidents, if any, may be information about the circumstances or reasons for the incident. Those circumstances could include that the respondent was on notice of the risk in a way that made the measures adopted to avoid the risk inadequate. That would be a circumstance of the incident for the purposes of s 27(1)(b)(i) of PIPA, read in the context of Ch 2 Pt 1 Div 2 generally.

[110] It may be that Question 26 should have been be answered as to any relevant prior incident for a reasonable period. In my view, that would be confined in time to no more than say five years beforehand and to slip and fall incidents where the slip was caused by a substance dropped on the floor making it slippery. However, the applicant’s question was not so confined. Therefore it may not have been erroneous for the first respondent to decline to answer. In my view, it is ultimately unnecessary to answer that question in the circumstances of this case.”

[footnotes omitted]

  1. [47]
    On behalf of the respondent, it is argued that the reference by Morrison JA to the reasons of Jackson J in Day v Woolworths suggests the pleaded case (and discovery of information) ought to be limited to a specific place, such as the Woolworths store, and for a specific and limited period which supports a negative answer to question 2(a) and questions 2(b) to 2(f) inclusive.
  2. [48]
    I cannot, however, accept that submission. The negligent system or systemic pattern type of case brought in Day v Woolworths relates to the physical condition of a particular store at a particular time as being the cause of the slip and fall suffered by Ms Day.
  3. [49]
    The claim that the applicant seeks to bring cannot be so characterised or limited. The claim that the applicant seeks to bring has nothing to do with the physical characteristics of a particular place at a particular time. That is, the slip resistance and cleaning systems of a retail store, but rather the actions of individuals who moved within a religious order and the system, if any, of safeguarding children from sexual abuse or mistreatment.
  4. [50]
    As demonstrated by the detailed pleading of the case the applicant wishes to bring, the applicant wishes to argue that there were decades of actual sexual abuse and mistreatment at several institutions conducted by the respondent throughout Australia by individuals within the same system, that being the care of children. In Di Cesare v Bird & Anor [2021] VSC 25, Keogh J said:

“[37] CCI’s submissions focused on the issue of whether the diocese knew or ought to have known that Claffey was a paedophile before the abuse occurred. The plaintiff alleges the diocese, in particular Bishop Mulkearns, should have known Claffey was sexually abusing children in part by reason of the extensive abuse perpetrated by him since 1970. There is no doubt that Claffey abused a number of children in the diocese before November 1984 and that CCI holds claim files which include records relating to claims of abuse, the claimants and Claffey. There will be documents recording the circumstances in which the abuse occurred. Of course it is possible that Bishop Mulkearns and other priests of the diocese did not know of Claffey’s offending. However there is a reasonable possibility that knowledge of surrounding circumstances which falls short of showing that the diocese knew Claffey was abusing children and was a paedophile may, when all the evidence is considered, assist the plaintiff to establish that, with reasonable supervision and enquiry, Bishop Mulkearns or others in the diocese should have known this was occurring. On this basis category 1, and probably category 2, are unobjectionable.

[38]  The plaintiff’s negligence case is not so narrow as CCI’s submissions suggest and is not based solely on proof that the diocese knew or ought to have known that Claffey was a paedophile. The pleadings raise more generally the alleged duty to protect the plaintiff from sexual abuse by diocesan priests, the foreseeability of the risk of harm to the plaintiff from sexual abuse by Claffey and, in relation to breach, issues of training, supervision, instruction, reporting, education and the systems which allowed Claffey to regularly have unsupervised access to children. Documents within category 1, and probably category 2, may assist in showing that Claffey had a history of isolating children in his care, and how children responded to that experience. The circumstances in which other children were abused by Claffey before November 1984 may show how it was he was able to gain access to and isolate children and whether there were diocesan procedures and systems which authorised or allowed this to occur, or that Claffey did so pursuant to his authority and power as a priest in the diocese. Those documents may be relevant to foreseeability of risk and the content of the duty owed to the plaintiff by the diocese.

[39] Documents in all categories may be relevant to the systems, procedures and laws which governed the operation of the diocese and regulated the activities of priests and their interaction with children. The plaintiff may be able to use documents in all categories to assist to prove breach by establishing that there were systemic deficiencies by the diocese in supervision, instruction, training, reporting, education or access by Claffey to children, which were a cause of the abuse.”

  1. [51]
    The manner in which the applicant had framed his present case is similar to Di Cesare’s case, in that it raises more general allegations of a duty to protect SO from sexual abuse by employees of the respondent, the foreseeability of the risk of harm and, in respect of breach issues, of training instruction, boarding, education and systems which allowed the several alleged abusers in the present case to regularly have unsupervised access to children.
  2. [52]
    Information relating to past events may be relevant to foreseeability of risk, content of the duty of care, and breach of duty of care. This is made plain by Di Cesare (supra), Stephenson v The Salesian Society Inc [2018] VSC 602; Lenscak v Trustees of the Marist Brothers No 2 [2021] VSC 49 and JCB v Bishop Paul Bird of the Diocese of Ballarat (2019) 58 VR 426. The importance of the knowledge of prior or other abuse is established by authority,[5] however, the authorities themselves are decisions based upon the nature of the claim which is pled and where systems type cases are pled, the importance of knowledge of prior or other abuse is relevant and therefore would not be struck out if the pleading contained an appropriately pled systems case.
  3. [53]
    There are a series of decisions in New South Wales where allegations of prior sexual abuse were struck out.[6] In S1, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the proposed amended statement of claim set out allegations detailing abuse perpetuated by Brother Chute from 1960 to 1972 and sexual abuse by the teacher Robert Dunn from 1970 as well as abuse by several other Marist Brothers and teachers both in Australia and in New Zealand. The plaintiff’s case in S1 related to abuse that he sustained between 1980 and 1982 at Marist College Penshurst.
  4. [54]
    Harrison AsJ did strike out paragraphs 9 and 10 of the proposed amended statement of claim. Her Honour provided reasoning at [36]:

“[36] I accept that if the school principal (the fourteenth defendant), the trustees or other teachers of the school were aware of prior sexual abuse at the school, particularly by the teacher in the period of shortly before 1980 and up to 1982 (when the plaintiff left the school), those particulars would be relevant to the scope of the duty of care. Sexual abuse of a pupil at another school from 1960 onwards and after the period when the plaintiff was allegedly sexually abused does not inform the scope of the duty of care owed to the student who attended the school from 1980 to 1982. Hence, paragraphs [2], [9] and [10] are far too wide and are embarrassing. They should be struck out.

Paragraph [11]

 Paragraph [11] is an extension of paragraph [9]. It pleads that between 1980 and 1987, after the plaintiff’s abuse, the defendants knew or ought to have known of the specified incidents of sexual abuse in Marist Brothers schools. Most of these incidents took place in other Marist Brothers schools across Australia and after the plaintiff left the school. Senior counsel for the defendants submitted firstly, that this pleading prejudices the defendants and also results in protracted delay; secondly, it is unrelated to any alleged material fact giving rise to duty, breach or damage; and finally, it is embarrassing, an abuse of process and ought to be struck out.”

  1. [55]
    It is to be recalled that part of the reasoning of [36] are the words “if the school principal (the fourteenth defendant), the trustees or other teachers of the school were aware of prior sexual abuse at the school”. However, as set out in [27], the pleading did not make an allegation as to how the prior instances of abuse gave rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action, nor that the defendants had knowledge of those prior instances of sexual abuse. So, as may be observed from [32] of the decision in S1, the plaintiff’s claim was not that the defendants had a tendency to abuse children, but rather because of the amount of knowledge vested in the defendant of the sexual abuse, it had a duty to prevent sexual abuse.
  2. [56]
    That is significantly different from the present case which is more than a case of knowledge of sexual abuse but rather a positive case of allowing, perpetuating and promoting abuse.
  3. [57]
    Paragraph 27 of the pleading expressly alleges the respondents knew or ought to have known not only that paedophilia and child abuse was general and widespread at Boystown but additionally that the then-senior PS “was probably a paedophile and tolerant of other adults at Boystown engaging in paedophilia and the use of boys.”
  4. [58]
    In KQG, Harrison AsJ struck out paragraphs 42, 43, 51, 55, 62(j), (l), (n) and (dd), 88 and 89 but with leave to re-plead. KQG’s case related to an allegation that he was sexually abused whilst a student at Marist Brothers Penhurst in 1976 by two specified persons, Brother Keyes and Robert Dunn, a lay-teacher.
  5. [59]
    In KQG the paragraphs in issue contained historical allegations of sexual abuse without the pleading of the defendant’s knowledge of those occasions and thus suffered from the same deficiency as identified in S1. That difficulty was corrected by an agreement by counsel for the plaintiff to amend paragraphs 42 and 43 to plead knowledge of the prior instances of sexual abuse.
  6. [60]
    Harrison AsJ struck out paragraphs 51 and 55 as:

“[50]  Paragraphs 51 and 55 as currently pleaded should be struck out as they are too wide and embarrassing. They refer to the whole of the Marist Brothers schools’ practices of firstly, not keeping written records of sexual abuse by a Marist Brother (not keeping records); and secondly, not reporting to the Police or other external authority allegations of childhood sexual abuse or known instances of sexual abuse (failure to report).

[51] To investigate the lack of records and failure to report over the whole of the Marist Brothers schools is an onerous and expensive task that does not go to the real issues in dispute. These paragraphs should be struck out and repleaded in a narrower form confined to the school, including Brother Chute, Dolly Dunn and Brother Keyes. If after discovery, the plaintiff’s legal representatives become aware of further prior incidents of sexual abuse at the school or at other Marist Brothers schools or by teachers or priests, they can be included in a second further amended statement of claim. (“2FASC”).”

  1. [61]
    In determining that paragraphs 51 and 55 were too wide and embarrassing and ought to be struck out, her Honour had already ruled at [33] that by striking out paragraph 43, with leave to re-plead, that the defendants had knowledge of previous instances of abuse by Brother Chute at the school and other Marist Brothers schools, that would allow the plaintiff to seek to rely upon the evidence that was before the Royal Commission concerning the knowledge of the complaints concerning Brother Chute and that was capable of informing the scope of the duty of care.
  2. [62]
    In those circumstances, Harrison AsJ ruled it was unnecessary, and an onerous and expensive task to allow an enquiry into child abuse in Marist Schools generally over an undefined period of time. An acceptance of those facts, if proved, would have led to the same conclusion regarding knowledge which could more easily be established by the information contained in a Royal Commission Report.
  3. [63]
    As Harrison AsJ commented both in S1 and KQG, the decision to strike out depends upon a review of the whole of the pleading and that importantly includes the admissions made by the defendant as to its state of knowledge. In the present application there is reference to the Ford Inquiry report.[7] In view of the broad systems case which has been “plead” by the plaintiff and in the absence of any pleadings from the respondent, it cannot at this stage be determined that broad and historical allegations ought to be struck out.
  4. [64]
    The conclusion I have in respect of question 2(a) is that on the assumption that ‘#18 Pleadings and Particulars’ is considered a pleading on the basis of the evidence which is currently available, the allegation which related to the conduct of employees or members of the respondent other than those listed as perpetrators of acts against SO would not be struck out. In this regard, I take a similar view to that expressed by Harrison AsJ in KQG, that the alleged abusers of KQG were Brother Keyes and Robert Dunn and not Brother Chute but the allegations of Brother Chute’s sexual abuse of other children (if known to the respondent or if it ought to be known to the respondent)[8] was relevant to the scope of the duty of care. Accordingly, the answer to 2(a) is no.

2(b) allegations relating to the conduct of employees and members of the respondent at facilities operated by the respondent other than Boystown Beaudesert.

  1. [65]
    In my view, for the reasons expressed above these allegations would also not be struck out.

2(c) allegations relating to acts of abuse by employees or members of the respondent different in nature to the allegations of abuse made by the applicant.

  1. [66]
    Paragraph 28(e) of the pleading contains thirteen allegations of what is alleged to be “a pervasive atmosphere of sexual, physical, and connected psychological abuse.” Whilst a pleading in that manner would be struck out as a “pervasive atmosphere” is prima facie irrelevant, the particulars themselves are particulars of sexual and serious physical abuse which is the subject of the allegations in paragraph 29(d). Thus it would be likely that paragraph 29(e) would be struck out on application with leave to re-plead in respect of sexual and serious physical abuse required to be particularised in paragraph 29(d) but which may well lead to the particularisation in terms of that contained in paragraph 29(e).
  2. [67]
    Of the thirteen subparagraphs in 29(e), paragraph xi alleges “on many occasions the plaintiff was bashed by other residents” and that would likely be struck out as being embarrassing but with leave to re-plead. It cannot be accepted that open allegations of assaults by unnamed persons at unnamed times be the proper subject of enquiry in court as opposed to admissions made to a Royal Commission.
  3. [68]
    Paragraphs 29(e)(xii) and (xiii) are too broad to be meaningful and would be struck out. Paragraphs 29(e) (i) to (ix) however, provide specific examples of the plaintiff being seriously physically assaulted and would not be struck out.
  4. [69]
    Paragraph 29(e)(x) acknowledges multiple instances of the applicant being not only strip searched but sexually touched by Brothers PS, BC, R and P. The nature of the assaults alleged by the applicant therefore are physical assaults and sexual assaults.
  5. [70]
    In my view, the answer to the question posed in paragraph 2(c) is that allegations relating to acts of abuse by employees or members of the respondent different in nature to the allegations of abuse made by the applicant would likely be struck out if contained in a pleading. That is, allegations of prior abuse which were not physical assaults or not sexual assaults ought to be struck out.

2(d) allegations relating to the culture of the respondent in general.

2(e) allegations relating to the culture of the respondent of Boystown Beaudesert

  1. [71]
    For the reasons provided in answer 2(a), I conclude that allegations relating to the culture of the respondent in general in 2(d) and 2(e) ought not be struck out.

2(f) allegations relating to events or conduct more than 10 years prior to the applicant commencing residence at Boystown Beaudesert.

  1. [72]
    The applicants have agreed to limit any request for information to information relating to events or conduct not more than 10 years before the applicants were placed in Boystown.

Question 3: Is the respondent obliged to provide information with respect to allegations made in the amended Notice of Claim which go beyond the matters that the applicant needs to establish to make out his cause of action?

  1. [73]
    The short answer to question 3 is yes. As discussed above, the statutory requirements for a Notice of Claim do, when regard is had to the purposes of the legislation as set out in s 4 of the PIPA, encourage the conclusion that details of the incident as required by s 3(3) of the Regulation are not intended to require a level of detail that would ordinarily be required in a statement of claim, however, when great detail is included that is permitted. Section 27(1)(a) of the PIPA is framed to require disclosure of documents “directly relevant to a matter of issue in the claim”, not directly relevant to allow a claimant to make out his cause of action..

Question 4

  1. [74]
    As the answer to question 3 was in the affirmative, question 4 does not require an answer.

Question 5: Is the respondent required by s 27(1)(b) of the PIPA to provide information:

  1. (a)
    relating to the conduct of employees or members of the respondent other than those identified as perpetrators of acts against the applicant in the amended Notice of Claim
  2. (b)
    relating to the conduct of employees or members of the respondent at facilities operated by the respondent other than Boystown Beaudesert
  3. (c)
    relating to acts of abuse by employees or members of the respondent different in nature to the allegations of abuse made by the applicant
  4. (d)
    relating to events or conduct more than 10 years prior to the applicant commencing residence at Boystown Beaudesert
  1. [75]
    The answer to questions 5(a) and (b) is yes and the reasons for that conclusion are stated above. The respondent’s concession that information relating to events or conduct more than 10 years prior to the applicant commencing as a resident at Boystown, Beaudesert is not required answers 5(d) in the negative.
  2. [76]
    As to 5(c), as discussed above, the nature of the allegations of abuse made by the applicant are physical abuse and sexual abuse. Accordingly, allegations of abuse which do not constitute physical abuse or sexual abuse are different in nature and the respondent is not obliged to provide information with respect to those categories of information.

Question 6: To the extent that the respondent is obliged to provide information about prior similar incidents, does the obligation extend to prior similar incidents involving:

  1. (a)
    employees or members of the respondent other than those identified as perpetrators of the acts against the applicant in the amended Notice of Claim
  2. (b)
    employees or members of the respondent at facilities operated by the respondent other than Boystown Beaudesert
  3. (c)
    acts of abuse by employees or members of the respondent different in nature to the allegations of abuse made by the applicant
  4. (d)
    incidents that took place more than 10 years prior to the applicant commencing residence at Boystown Beaudesert
  1. [77]
    The answer to questions 6(a) and (b) is yes and the reasons for that conclusion are stated above. The respondent’s concession that information relating to events or conduct more than 10 years prior to the applicant commencing as a resident at Boystown Beaudesert not being required in the answer to question 6(d) is in the negative.
  2. [78]
    As to 5(c), as discussed above, the nature of the allegations of abuse made by the applicant are physical abuse and sexual abuse. Accordingly, allegations of abuse which do not constitute physical abuse or sexual abuse are different in nature and the respondent is not obliged to provide information with respect to those categories of information.

Question 7: Leaving aside the adequacy of any particular answer, does the statutory declaration of Kenneth Payne, taken together with the letter of Carroll & O'Dea dated (28 July 2022/1 August 2022), satisfy the respondent’s obligations under section 27(3) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 to provide information in the form of a statutory declaration.

  1. [79]
    Section 27(3) of the PIPA provides:

“27 Duty of respondent to give documents and information to claimant

[…]

  1. (3)
    If the claimant requires information provided by a respondent under this section to be verified by statutory declaration, the respondent must verify the information by statutory declaration.”
  1. [80]
    The Koffels letter of 3 May 2022, setting out the 23 requests for information, includes a request from Koffels of receiving “your statutory declaration”.
  2. [81]
    A statutory declaration is defined in Sch 1 to the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) as:

“Statutory declaration means –

  1. (a)
    A declaration made under the Oaths Act 1867; or
  1. (b)
    A declaration made under another Act, or under a Commonwealth Act, or an Act of another State or a Territory, that authorises a declaration to be made otherwise than in the course of a judicial proceeding.”
  1. [82]
    Part 4 s 14 of the Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) provides for the form of the statutory declaration as follows:

“I A. B. do solemnly and sincerely declare that [let the person declare the facts] and I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provision of the Oaths Act 1867.”

  1. [83]
    The document signed by Mr Payne contains each of those words. The applicant argues that as the declarations are not stated to be based on enquiry by Mr Payne of other officers, employees and agents of the respondent in respect of their knowledge that the statutory declaration has not been properly provided. The applicants submit that it is necessary for Mr Payne to have deposed that he has made reasonable enquiries of the respondent’s officers, employees or agents and that the answers must contain an appropriate reference to the enquiries made.
  2. [84]
    The applicant further submits that the answers must contain appropriate reference to the enquires made, citing Everingham v Commonwealth of Australia [1973] Qd R 185 (“Everingham”) at 192 and submitting that Everingham was “cited with apparent approval” by White J in Corporation of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brisbane v Discovery Bay Developments Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 121 at 126 (“Discovery Bay case”).
  3. [85]
    White J however did not cite the decision of Hoare J in Everingham with approval. The Discovery Bay case and Everingham dealt with answers to interrogatories and not a statutory declaration. White J said in the Discovery Bay case at page 126 to 127:

“(b) Inquiries of Former Servants and Agents

The first defendant has maintained in its answers that it is required to make inquiry only of its servants and agents and not of former servants and agents. If this position is not upheld, an affidavit filed on behalf of the first defendant deposes to difficulties likely to be encountered in seeking out and obtaining information from certain former officers of the company.

The principal authority relied upon on behalf of the first defendant is Everingham v. The Commonwealth [1973] Qd.R. 185. That was a personal injury claim in which a former member of the Australian Army sued the Commonwealth for damages sustained by him whilst flying under instruction in a helicopter under the control of a person then, but no longer at the time of administering the interrogatories, a member of the army. In order to answer fully the interrogatories administered by the plaintiff the defendant would need to have made inquiries of its former member and objection was taken, inter alia, on that ground. Hoare J. concluded that the army was an entity which must answer interrogatories in much the same fashion as a corporation and therefore the answers must contain an appropriate reference to the inquiries made but his Honour added at 192:

“It cannot be required to make enquiries of former members just as a company cannot be required to make enquiries of former servants.”

No authority is cited for that proposition and the argument of counsel is not included in the report. Mr Sheahan submitted that Strugnell v. Orr [1985] 2 Qd.R. 233 is consistent with this approach, but that was a case concerning executors who are held not to be obliged to make inquiries of former servants and agents of the deceased, on the ground that the executors should not be regarded as standing in the shoes of the deceased, and is accordingly of no assistance in this case.

The weight of authority is in favour of the view that a company, no less than an individual is obliged to answer interrogatories from its own knowledge and upon information and belief derived after reasonable inquiry from its officers, employees or agents where the company has or can obtain information from them, including persons who were its officers, employees or agents at the material time even though those persons were not so at the time of interrogation, Derham v. Amev Life Insurance Co. Ltd (1978) 20 A.C.T.R. 23; Stanfield Properties Ltd v. National Westminster Bank P.L.C. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 568; and Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq.) v. Bank of New Zealand (No. 2) (1992) 10 A.C.L.C. 92. There may have been features about the army in Everingham’s case which would have dictated the decision in that case which are not expressed, but to the extent that his Honour’s observations encompassed the obligation of companies, it was obiter and the above mentioned authorities are to be preferred.”

  1. [86]
    Furthermore, when reference is had to Everingham and the view expressed by Hoare J, the reference to having stated what due and proper enquiries were made is contained at page 192 as follows:

“So far as concerns some of the interrogatories asked, the deponent, having made due and proper enquires and having stated what they are may say in effect “I don’t know”.”

  1. [87]
    Accordingly, far from there being authorities establishing the necessity of a statutory declaration to state what enquiries had been made by an officer of the corporation, the primary authority referred to in Everingham suggests that ought to occur, but in answer to interrogatory and only when the answer is “I don’t know”.
  2. [88]
    The reasons of White J in the Discovery Bay case do not deal with this particular aspect but rather are directed towards the rejection of the obiter of Hoare J that the defendant, the Commonwealth of Australia, similar to a company, had no obligation to make enquiries of its former members.
  3. [89]
    The document required in the present case is not an answer to interrogatory but a statutory declaration. The document provided was a statutory declaration. There is nothing in s 27(3) of the PIPA which requires more than the statutory requirements for a statutory declaration.
  4. [90]
    As set out in s 4(1), the main purpose of the PIPA is to assist in the ongoing affordability of insurance through appropriate and sustainable awards of damages for personal injury, and that may be achieved by providing a procedure for speedy resolution of claims, promoting settlement of claims at an early stage, and minimising costs of claims. The statutory direction is towards less formality rather than more formality. Question 7 is answered in the affirmative.
  5. [91]
    The further hearing of the application is adjourned to a date to be fixed.

Footnotes

[1] Scott v K&S Freighters [1999] QSC 427 at 5 to 6.

[2] SDA v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Rockhampton & Anor [2021] QCA 172, at [121] per Morrison JA.

[3] at [51].

[4] [2016] QCA 337.

[5] See Lenscak v Trustees of the Marist Brothers No 2 [2021] VSC 49 at [42].

[6] S1 v Trustees of Marist Brothers [2016] NSWSC 970; KQG v Trustees of Marist Brothers [2018] NSWSC 1013; Barbour v the trustees of De La Salle Brothers [2021] NSWSC 1254.

[7] The contents of any information or submissions in the Ford Inquiry was not the subject of any evidence in the application. However, in paragraph 32(f) of the pleading, the report of the Ford Inquiry is particularised as a means of proof that the risk of harm was publicly notorious.

[8] Per Morrison JA in SJA at [133]

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    SO v Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers; MP v Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers

  • Shortened Case Name:

    SO v Trustees of the De La Salle Brothers

  • Reported Citation:

    (2022) 13 QR 363

  • MNC:

    [2022] QSC 302

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Crow J

  • Date:

    22 Dec 2022

  • Selected for Reporting:

    Editor's Note

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Barbour v the trustees of De La Salle Brothers [2021] NSWSC 1254
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] NSWSC 1254
Corporation of the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brisbane v Discovery Bay Developments Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 121
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] 2 Qd R 121
Cite 2 - [1995] 2 Qd R 121
Cite 3 - [1995] 2 Qd R 121
Day v Woolworths Ltd [2016] QCA 337
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCA 337
Cite 2 - [2016] QCA 337
Derham v Amev Life Insurance Co. Ltd (1978) 20 ACTR 23
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1978) 20 ACTR 23
Di Cesare v Bird & Anor [2021] VSC 25
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] VSC 25
Cite 2 - [2021] VSC 25
Everingham v Commonwealth of Australia [1973] Qd R 185
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1973] Qd R 185
Cite 2 - [1973] Qd R 185
Cite 3 - [1973] Qd R 185
Graham v State of Queensland [2022] QSC 228
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QSC 228
JCB v Bishop Paul Bird of the Diocese of Ballarat (2019) 58 VR 426
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2019) 58 VR 426
KQG v Trustees of the Marist Brothers [2018] NSWSC 1013
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] NSWSC 1013
Cite 2 - [2018] NSWSC 1013
Cite 3 - [2018] NSWSC 1013
Cite 4 - [2018] NSWSC 1013
Lenscak v Trustees of the Marist Brothers No 2 [2021] VSC 49
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] VSC 49
Cite 2 - [2021] VSC 49
Miller v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2018] NSWSC 24
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] NSWSC 24
Noel Scott v K & S Freighters [1999] QSC 427
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1999] QSC 427
S1 v Trustees of Marist Brothers [2016] NSWSC 970
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] NSWSC 970
Cite 2 - [2016] NSWSC 970
Cite 3 - [2016] NSWSC 970
SDA v Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Rockhampton(2021) 8 QR 440; [2021] QCA 172
6 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] QCA 172
Cite 2 - [2021] QCA 172
Cite 3 - [2021] QCA 172
Cite 4 - (2021) 8 QR 440
Cite 5 - (2021) 8 QR 440
Cite 6 - (2021) 8 QR 440
Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq.) v Bank of New Zealand (No. 2) (1992) 10 ACLC 92
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 10 ACLC 92
Stanfield Properties Ltd v National Westminster Bank P.L.C. (1983) 1 WLR 568
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1983) 1 WLR 568
Stephenson v The Salesian Society Inc [2018] VSC 602
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] VSC 602
Strugnell v Orr [1985] 2 Qd R 233
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1985] 2 Qd R 233

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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