LSA v Queensland[2024] QSC 102

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   The plaintiff claims damages totalling $5,989,300 from the defendant for false imprisonment, misfeasance in public office, collateral abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and negligence.
2. [2]
   All of the plaintiff’s claims arise from his interactions with various members of the Queensland Police Service (QPS).  Commencing in January 2019, the QPS investigated the plaintiff for weapons offences, domestic violence, and fraud.  In that context, the plaintiff alleges that QPS officers have acted unlawfully towards him.  He also complains about the way QPS officers investigated complaints he made concerning threats against him by his former partner, RBG, including threats to kill him.
3. [3]
   For the reasons which follow, the plaintiff has failed on each of his causes of action.  His claim must be dismissed.

The plaintiff’s central allegations

4. [4]
   The various causes of action the plaintiff has pursued are underpinned by two overarching allegations: first, that RBG is a covert police officer or a police informant; secondly, that there is a conspiracy on the part of members of the QPS to murder him.  At the outset, it is necessary to address these allegations.

The allegation that RBG is a covert police officer or a police informant

5. [5]
   The plaintiff has previously said, including in a statement he provided to police in March 2020,^[1] that he was in a business relationship and in an intimate relationship with RBG from October 2018 until January 2019.  The plaintiff also tendered an affidavit sworn by RBG confirming that she was involved in an intimate personal relationship with the plaintiff and involved in the operation of his kitchen business.^[2]
6. [6]
   Despite tendering this evidence, the plaintiff no longer accepts that he ever had a genuine relationship with RBG.  His case at trial was that his meeting RBG, and commencing a relationship with her, was orchestrated by a crown prosecutor who was in dispute with the plaintiff over the installation of a kitchen.  The plaintiff contended that RBG fraudulently commenced the relationship with the intention of causing harm to him.  He asserted that RBG and the crown prosecutor were connected by their mutual knowledge of a stonemason who worked for the plaintiff on the kitchen installation for the crown prosecutor.^[3]  The plaintiff argued that this is consistent with a text message RBG sent to him on 26 January 2019, less than a week after the events which precipitated the interactions with QPS officers which are the subject of this proceeding, stating:^[4]

“Maaatteeee u are so hilarious I can’t stop crying with laughter!!  U have done a fabulous job in ur role!  Better than I ever imagined actually!  U see, how do u know that I wasn’t sent to u by someone u have tried to extort before!  It’s going to be so funny when u go up in ‘FLAMES’.”

7. [7]
   The plaintiff tendered affidavits in which he deposed to RBG having disclosed to him that she was an “undercover police officer” who was involved in “covert police operations”.  He said that at the time RBG made these disclosures, he did not know what she meant and had some doubt about the authenticity of RBG’s claims.^[5]  Although the defendant did not object to the tender of this evidence,^[6] its hearsay character affects the weight which I am prepared to attribute to it.
8. [8]
   A further consideration affecting the weight of this evidence arises from the account which the plaintiff gave of RBG’s statements when he was interviewed by Dr Beech, a psychiatrist who provided an assessment of the plaintiff for the purposes of this proceeding in a report dated 19 June 2022.^[7]  In that report, Dr Beech recorded:^[8]

“[The plaintiff] said that when [RBG] first contacted him in October 2018 she came across as flirtatious.  She alluded to being a sex-worker.  They formed a relationship that lasted three months.  At the end, she essentially told him that she was a covert police operative (‘CPO’).  [The plaintiff] conceded, ‘she didn’t actually come out and say that’.  Rather, under pressure from him, she kept telling him that someone had said she was an operative but she had laughed this off.  That is, she relayed to him an incident when someone had said she was a CPO but she had dismissed it.  However, she said this so often that [the plaintiff] ‘drew from it that there was something more in it’.  He said there were many suspicious indications.  He found police officer cards around her.  There was a constant police presence in their area.  People kept coming to the residence.  She was always on the phone.  He ‘acted like I knew she was a [covert police officer] to bluff her’ and ultimately, ‘she broke down in tears’ and admitted to being a police informant.”

9. [9]
   There is an important difference between RBG telling the plaintiff that she was an undercover police officer involved in covert police operations (which is what the plaintiff said in his affidavits) and her telling the plaintiff that she was a police informant (which is what the plaintiff said to Dr Beech).  The version the plaintiff gave to Dr Beech is consistent with statements he made when he was first approached by police after RBG had made a complaint of domestic violence against him (see [70] below).  In that conversation, the plaintiff said that RBG was a registered informant.  He did not say anything about her being an undercover police officer or having told him that she was an undercover police officer.
10. [10]
    In my view, it is unlikely that if RBG was an undercover police officer, she would reveal that fact to the plaintiff, whether under pressure from him or otherwise.
11. [11]
    RBG referred to the plaintiff’s claim that she was an undercover police officer when she first complained of domestic violence by the plaintiff (see [65] below).  Rather than her saying anything to the plaintiff, RBG told police that it was the plaintiff who kept telling the “crackheads” he was involved with that she was an undercover police officer.  She said that these comments put her in “mega-danger” with those people.  Her demeanour during that part of the conversation was consistent with her being fearful of the consequences of the plaintiff telling others that she was an undercover police officer.  It was completely inconsistent with RBG having given that information to the plaintiff. 
12. [12]
    Ultimately, I do not accept the plaintiff’s evidence that RBG told him she was an undercover police officer.  There is no logical reason for her to have done so.
13. [13]
    The plaintiff further submitted that RBG is “highly likely” to be the same person identified as Jade Erin Langerak in a decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission: Langerak v State of Queensland.^[9]  That matter involved a dispute concerning disciplinary proceedings brought against Senior Constable Langerak who was a serving officer in the QPS. The decision in Langerak records that, in March 2018, there was an incident in Emerald involving a Mr Ericsson and his partner.  As a result of that incident, Mr Ericsson was charged with various domestic violence offences.  It was alleged that about six months later, SC Langerak commenced an intimate relationship with Mr Ericsson.
14. [14]
    The conduct alleged against SC Langerak involved altering templates of documents prepared by Mr Ericsson’s solicitor which were used to instruct a medical practitioner for the purpose of obtaining medical evidence to be called on Mr Ericsson’s behalf in his criminal proceeding.  It was also alleged that SC Langerak was present when Mr Ericsson attended upon the doctor, that she represented that she was an assistant to Mr Ericsson’s solicitor and that she provided the altered template to the doctor.  The QPS also alleged that SC Langerak had improperly involved herself in Mr Ericsson’s domestic violence legal proceedings outside her lawful duties.
15. [15]
    Importantly for the purposes of the plaintiff’s case, the decision in Langerak sets out the following:

    1. SC Langerak worked at Petrie police station;^[10]
    2. SC Langerak commenced a relationship with Mr Ericsson in September 2018;^[11]
    3. on 13 February 2019, SC Langerak completed an application for a private domestic violence order on behalf of Mr Ericsson against his former partner;^[12]
    4. during a disciplinary interview, SC Langerak stated that Mr Ericsson has adult ADHD and left school in year 9 and that is why she completed the application for a private domestic violence order;^[13]
    5. on 24 June 2019, SC Langerak completed an application to vary a domestic violence order on behalf of Mr Ericsson to include herself as a named person under the order and, in making that application, referred to a complaint from Mr Ericsson’s former partner that SC Langerak had unlawfully accessed the QPS database to obtain information about her;^[14]
    6. on 2 July 2019, SC Langerak emailed Mr Ericsson’s solicitor and referred to her affidavit being printed;^[15]
    7. the complaint by Mr Ericsson’s former partner that SC Langerak had unlawfully accessed the QPS database was made on 30 January 2019 which was “4 days after the property was dropped off and collected”, being 26 January 2019;^[16]
    8. SC Langerak was notified of the disciplinary proceeding against her on 8 November 2021.^[17]
16. [16]
    The plaintiff submits that the dates on which this conduct is said to have occurred and the nature of the conduct alleged against SC Langerak is consistent with relevant dates when events related to his matters occurred.  He relies on the following:^[18]

    1. RBG informed the plaintiff that she was employed at the Petrie police station;^[19]
    2. the plaintiff’s relationship with RBG commenced in October 2018;^[20]
    3. on 13 February 2019, RBG attended the Goondiwindi Police Station and complained that the plaintiff had breached the terms of a temporary protection order made against him (see [124]-[126] below);
    4. RBG was aware that the plaintiff left school in grade 9 and she used to say to the plaintiff that he had ADHD;^[21]
    5. on 24 June 2019, RBG obtained a protection order in her name, and on the same day the plaintiff made a complaint to the CCC that RBG had obtained his criminal history;^[22]
    6. RBG filed an affidavit in court on 9 July 2019;^[23]
    7. as to the relevance of 26 January 2019 and 30 January 2019:
       1. (i)
          an affidavit sworn by Plain Clothes Senior Constable Jon Gray in this proceeding wrongly stated that the plaintiff was held in custody on 30 January 2019 (a matter which was addressed and corrected when Officer Gray gave evidence at the trial – see [136] below);
       2. (ii)
          the plaintiff made a complaint about the way he was treated in the Caboolture watchhouse on 28 January 2019 and 29 January 2019 in circumstances where he contended that police were attempting to hold him in custody until 30 January 2019;^[24]
       3. (iii)
          the plaintiff stated that RBG’s children were taken to live with their father on 26 January 2019 and that RBG dropped some tools back at his workshop on the same date,^[25] this being consistent to the reference in the Langerak decision to property having been “dropped off and collected” on that date;
    8. RBG appeared in the Gladstone Magistrates Court on 30 November 2019 and 1 December 2019, that being consistent with the 21-day period set out in a notice to appear after notice of the disciplinary proceeding was given on 8 November 2021.^[26]
17. [17]
    The plaintiff also contended that the date of the first mention of the Langerak proceeding in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (22 January 2022) and the date judgment was delivered (19 August 2022) explains the timing of what he claims were attempts to kill him on 5 January 2022, 6 January 2022, and 16 September 2022.^[27]
18. [18]
    Whatever coincidences the plaintiff has identified between dates on which events in the two proceedings occurred do not provide a basis to find that RBG is, in fact, the QPS officer identified as Jade Erin Langerak in the Langerak decision.  To accept that submission would require accepting the following matters:

    1. the person the plaintiff knew as RBG, but who is in fact SC Langerak, has been the subject of a disciplinary investigation by the QPS because of her conduct towards him; and
    2. in the proceeding brought before the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission to determine whether the disciplinary proceeding against RBG/SC Langerak could continue, the information provided to the Commission about the disciplinary investigation was altered from what the plaintiff says occurred between him and RBG/SC Langerak.  That is; instead of referring to actions which (on the plaintiff’s case) RBG/SC Langerak took in connection with her allegations of domestic violence committed by the plaintiff against her, the information provided to the Commission referred to different conduct undertaken in support of (rather than contrary to) the interests of the person alleged to have committed domestic violence in a complaint made by someone other than RBG/SC Langerak.
19. [19]
    There is simply no logical reason to think that is what occurred when the Langerak proceeding was heard by the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, nor is there any evidence of this beyond the plaintiff’s assertions.  The Langerak decision provides no support for the plaintiff’s claim that RBG is a covert police officer.
20. [20]
    Against the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant led evidence of searches undertaken of various databases that recorded information relating to QPS officers and informants.  The identity of any person who provides information to police to assist in the prevention or detection of a crime on a confidential basis (referred to as a human source) is recorded on a centrally administered, secure database maintained by the QPS.  In September 2021, a search was conducted of those human source records.  That same search was conducted again in November 2023.  The results of both searches confirmed that RBG has never been a human source or agent of the QPS.^[28]  A search was also undertaken of the human resources management system used by the QPS for any employment records relating to RBG.  Again, that search confirmed that RBG has never been engaged as an employee of the QPS.^[29]
21. [21]
    Ultimately, I am not satisfied that there is any basis to find that RBG was an undercover police officer or a police informant.
22. [22]
    I also reject the plaintiff’s submission (based on his assertion that, unbeknown to him, RBG was a covert police officer sent to cause him harm) that there was never a relevant relationship between himself and RBG which engaged the provisions of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVP Act). 
23. [23]
    For the purposes of that legislation, domestic violence is defined to mean specified behaviour by a first person towards a second person with whom the first person is in a relevant relationship.^[30]  The powers of QPS officers under the DFVP Act, relevant to the plaintiff’s claims, include the issuing of a police protection notice and the making of a temporary protection order.  The power to issue a police protection notice only arises in circumstances where a police officer reasonably believes^[31] or reasonably suspects^[32] that the respondent to the notice has committed domestic violence (and therefore is in a relevant relationship with the person towards whom behaviour is directed).  Similarly, a court may only make a temporary protection order against a respondent if it is satisfied that a relevant relationship exists between the respondent and the aggrieved for whose benefit the order is made and that the respondent has committed domestic violence against the aggrieved.^[33]
24. [24]
    The phrase “relevant relationship” is defined to include an “intimate personal relationship”.^[34]  An “intimate personal relationship” is then defined to include a “couple relationship”.^[35]  A “couple relationship” will exist between two people if they have, or had, a relationship as a couple.^[36]  In deciding whether a couple relationship exists between two people, a court may have regard to a variety of factors including the degree of intimacy between them and whether the relationship involves, or involved, a relationship of a sexual nature.^[37]
25. [25]
    The evidence that I have referred to at [5] above, satisfies me that the plaintiff and RBG were in an intimate personal relationship in the period immediately prior to the events which have given rise to the plaintiff’s claims and, accordingly, that they were in a relevant relationship for the purposes of the DFVP Act.

The allegation that there is a conspiracy by QPS officers to murder the plaintiff

26. [26]
    In alleging the existence of a conspiracy to murder, the plaintiff relies heavily on the decision of Sheridan DCJ in SRV v Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service.^[38]  The plaintiff submitted that there was a finding in SRV that RBG had been involved in a conspiracy to murder him.^[39]  He further submitted that the result of SRV was that RBG had been convicted of that offence.^[40]  That submission cannot be accepted as it mischaracterises the effect of the judgment in SRV. 
27. [27]
    SRV was an appeal by the plaintiff against the decision of a magistrate on 2 December 2019:

    1. making a protection order under the DFVP Act against the plaintiff for the benefit of RBG;
    2. refusing to make a protection order under the DFVP against RBG for the benefit of the plaintiff.
28. [28]
    The appeal against the making of the protection order against the plaintiff was dismissed, but the appeal against the refusal to make a protection order against RBG for the benefit of the plaintiff was allowed.
29. [29]
    The question raised on the appeal against the refusal to make a protection order against RBG was whether Sheridan DCJ was satisfied that a protection order should be made under s 37(1) of the DFVP Act.  That required her Honour to be satisfied of three things: that a relevant relationship existed between the plaintiff and RBG; that RBG had committed domestic violence toward the plaintiff; and that a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the plaintiff from domestic violence.  The phrase “domestic violence” is defined in s 8(1) of the DFVP Act to include behaviour that is threatening, or which causes the subject of the behaviour to fear for that person’s safety or wellbeing. 
30. [30]
    As Sheridan DCJ recognised,^[41] the plaintiff’s appeal against the magistrate’s refusal to make a protection order against RBG was based upon allegations of incidents and threats of violence towards the plaintiff which RBG was either a party to or had conspired with others to have committed upon him.  Her Honour ultimately allowed the appeal on the basis that there was evidence of a threat to the plaintiff directly from RBG and reason to consider that a protection order was necessary and desirable to protect the plaintiff from physical harm.^[42]  This direct threat was made in a Facebook message which RBG sent to the plaintiff on 26 January 2019 in which she stated that it would be funny when the plaintiff went up in “flames”.^[43]  There was also evidence of screenshots of Facebook conversations between RBG and another party which indicated that RBG had procured the bashing of the plaintiff or the killing of his dog and that she was part of a conspiracy to have the plaintiff implicated in the possession of child pornography.^[44]  Sheridan DCJ did not appear to accept RBG’s assertions that the plaintiff had fabricated the evidence of these Facebook conversations.  Her Honour noted that RBG did not swear any affidavit in response to the plaintiff’s complaint about the social media conversations, particularly in circumstances where the Court would expect a respondent to the application to address a serious allegation.  On that basis, her Honour appears to have accepted that RBG was involved in the Facebook conversations with the third party.^[45] 
31. [31]
    The result of the successful appeal in SRV was that Sheridan DCJ was satisfied of the three matters identified in s 37(1) of the DFVP Act.  However, there was no finding that RBG’s Facebook conversations evidenced a conspiracy to murder the plaintiff.  RBG was certainly not convicted of that offence.
32. [32]
    The plaintiff also relied on later references to SRV to support of his submission that the judgment established the existence of a conspiracy to murder him involving RBG.
33. [33]
    First, the plaintiff referred to a summary of the decision in SRV set out in a QPS assessment of his complaint that QPS officers did not properly investigate RBG’s threats to kill him.^[46]  That summary includes the following statement:

“Paragraphs [1]-[34]: Background information.  Here, the Judge outlines the course of proceedings and what happened in the Magistrates Court.  Most importantly, the judge identifies the production of several screenshots of Facebook conversations said to be between [RBG] and others, amounting to a conspiracy to murder offence.”

34. [34]
    That statement simply records the submissions which the plaintiff made to the magistrate and repeated in the appeal heard by Sheridan DCJ.  It does not record a finding made by her Honour in determining the appeal.  The relevant findings were summarised in a later passage in the QPS assessment document as follows:

“Paragraphs [91]-[122]: [the plaintiff’s] cross application.  In these paragraphs, the Judge examines the Facebook messages provided by [the plaintiff] to police and the court allegedly between his ex-partner, [RBG], and two other persons.  Concerningly, these messages detail elaborate plans to install listening devices in [the plaintiff’s] house, plant child exploitation material on his computer and have [the plaintiff] arrested for other offences.  Another matter raised in some of these conversations are [sic] an apparent indication to have [the plaintiff] killed.

In the Magistrates Court hearing, [RBG] denied her involvement in this matter.  The Magistrate generally accepted her evidence.  However, no further argument on this point was advanced.  The appellant [sic] Judge formed the opinion there is no evidence to discount the Facebook conversations, nor is there anything to suggest to the relevant standard that they are not authentic.  On this point, [RBG] refused to provide an affidavit for the appeal proceedings.

On this basis the Facebook conversations were admissible, the judge was satisfied to the required standard that domestic violence against [the plaintiff] had occurred, he was in an intimate-personal relationship with [RBG] and it is necessary of desirable to protect [the plaintiff] against further acts of domestic violence.  In other words, the requirements under the [DFVP Act] ss 8(1) and 37 had been made out on the evidence.  For these reasons, the judge ordered a protection order in favour of [the plaintiff] against [RBG].”

35. [35]
    That is an accurate summary of the findings made by Sheridan DCJ in SRV.  There is no reference to any finding that a conspiracy to murder the plaintiff had been established.  That is because no finding to that effect was made.  The QPS assessment document provides no support for the plaintiff’s submission about the effect of the decision in SRV.
36. [36]
    Secondly, the plaintiff relies upon a statement made by Burns J during the hearing of an application in another proceeding the plaintiff brought against the Commissioner of the QPS.  After reading the judgment in SRV, Burns J indicated to the Commissioner’s legal representative that he was concerned by what he had read in SRV and asked whether the allegations referred to in that decision had been investigated by police.  Burns J then made the following statement which the plaintiff says confirms the finding of a conspiracy to murder:^[47]

“HIS HONOUR:  No.  No.  Just to be clear, I am very concerned about what I read under that heading about the content of social media messages.  As I understand it, her Honour left the – well, decided the issue on the basis that there was evidence before her which would support a conclusion of conspiracy to murder.”

37. [37]
    That statement must be read in the context of further statements which Burns J made immediately afterwards:^[48]

“HIS HONOUR:  The contrary argument – all that was suggested by [RBG] was that they had been fabricated.  That is, the social media messages.  A conspiracy to murder may be putting it too highly, but a criminal conspiracy of some form to entrap or plant evidence against [the plaintiff] was alleged and supported by the content of social media posts. Correct?

MR O'BRIEN:  As they were presented before that court, yes.

HIS HONOUR:  All right.  And the suggestion was made – or the assertion was made by [RBG] that the posts were fabricated.  And her Honour deals with that at paragraph 11 [sic] of her judgment and says:

…

That may not be hard, but the conversations in the screenshots are not simple and the task of composing them would have been burdensome.  It is not clear that [the plaintiff] has the ability to perform such an elaborate falsehood.  Clearly, as the magistrate found, [the plaintiff] was and is concerned for his own safety.  This is not consistent with him fabricating the social media posts.

The point of it is if the social media posts were fabricated, well, that’s a matter for investigation, because fabricated evidence has been placed before a court.  But if then – if they haven’t been, that’s also a matter for investigation, because the content raises serious concerns about the conduct of people, vis a vis, [the plaintiff].”

38. [38]
    The full context of the statements of Burns J clearly demonstrates that his Honour was not saying that there had been a finding in SRV that there was a conspiracy to murder the plaintiff, or some other form of conspiracy against him.  Those statements only reflect his Honour’s concern to find out whether the allegations which were the subject of the plaintiff’s submissions in SRV, and of which there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements for a protection order to be made against RBG under s 37(1) of the DFVP Act, had been investigated by the QPS.  Nothing said by Burns J assists the plaintiff in seeking to prove to the required standard that there is a conspiracy to murder him.
39. [39]
    In his affidavits, the plaintiff has described numerous attempts to kill him which he says were procured or arranged by RBG.^[49]  That evidence has not been tested in this proceeding.  RBG is not a party to the proceeding and has not given evidence responding to the plaintiff’s account of her conduct.  Nor could the defendant reasonably be expected to challenge the plaintiff’s account of those matters.  In those circumstances, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations made by the plaintiff, I have not reached the state of actual persuasion required to find that the events described by the plaintiff in fact occurred.^[50]  Absent that state of actual persuasion, I am not satisfied that RBG has engaged in a conspiracy to murder the plaintiff.  
40. [40]
    Even if I had been satisfied about the existence of a conspiracy involving RBG, my conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish that RBG is a covert police officer or police informant means that I would not have been satisfied that such conspiracy involved any QPS members.  During his closing address, the plaintiff appeared to accept that this outcome must follow if (as I have done) I rejected his argument that RBG was connected in some way to the QPS.^[51]

Interactions between the plaintiff and the QPS

Discovery of a rifle at the plaintiff’s workshop and analysis by the QPS

41. [41]
    It is common ground that police located a rifle at the plaintiff’s workshop in a shed at a property at Burpengary on 21 January 2019.  The Burpengary property was owned by David Ebborn.  Mr Ebborn rented the shed to the plaintiff.
42. [42]
    The plaintiff’s evidence was that he came to be in possession of the rifle after an incident at his workshop in December 2018 which he described as an attempt to rob or shoot him.^[52]  The plaintiff referred, somewhat cryptically, to having set events in motion that would ultimately see him take the rifle, disassemble it into two parts and hide those separate parts in places only known to him.  The plaintiff described receiving threats and demands for the return of the rifle but said that those threats eventually ceased and he forgot that the rifle was hidden at his workshop.  The presence of the rifle was brought back to the plaintiff’s attention when RBG offered to help him clean the workshop on the night of 20 January 2019.  The plaintiff said that, after assisting in cleaning the workshop and not locating the firearm, RBG asked the plaintiff where it was and whether he wanted her to take it to the police. 
43. [43]
    The plaintiff said he showed RBG where the two pieces of the rifle were located at around 9:00pm on 20 January 2019.  In the early hours of the next day, he was at the workshop with four other people, including Eddie Ebborn (David Ebborn’s brother) and Joshua Ebborn (David Ebborn’s son).  At around 3:30am, the plaintiff revealed the location of the two pieces of the rifle to those four people as well.  The plaintiff believed that one of those people, Eddie Ebborn, had a weapons licence and that the plaintiff could trust him to hand in the rifle to police.  The plaintiff said that Eddie Ebborn agreed to hand the rifle in to police and that he told the plaintiff he would say he found the rifle in the gully next to the Burpengary property so that the plaintiff would not be connected to the firearm.
44. [44]
    At about 5:00pm on 21 January 2019, Senior Constable Heidi O'Connor and Senior Constable Kayne Hasler were tasked with investigating the possible presence of a firearm at the Burpengary property.  When they arrived at the property, Officers O'Connor and Hasler spoke with David Ebborn.  Mr Ebborn said he had been told by RBG that there was a firearm in the gutter of the shed.  Mr Ebborn gave permission for the officers to search the property.  Mr Ebborn then accompanied the officers to the rear of the shed and told them that he had had reports of gunshots from behind the shed and had found spent shell casings in the yard and in the shed.
45. [45]
    After climbing a ladder provided by Mr Ebborn, Officer O'Connor identified what she said looked to be a firearm in the gutter.  Officer O'Connor then moved the ladder to gain access to the gutter at the position where she had seen the firearm.  Upon climbing the ladder again, Officer O'Connor retrieved a rifle from the gutter and began to climb back down the ladder with it.  At that point, Officer Hasler suggested to Officer O'Connor that she should take a photograph of the rifle in position in the gutter.  Officer O'Connor then replaced the rifle in the gutter and, using her mobile phone, took some photographs of the approximate position she found the rifle. 
46. [46]
    Officer O'Connor then descended the ladder, leaving the rifle in the gutter, while Officer Hasler attempted to arrange for scenes of crime officers to attend the Burpengary property to photograph and take custody of the rifle.  Officer Hasler was eventually informed that scenes of crime officers were not able to attend at that time.  When she was informed of that, Officer O'Connor took further photographs of the rifle in the gutter, using her mobile phone, before retrieving it.  She noted as she brought the rifle down that it had the word “AGAPE” written on it. 
47. [47]
    During a discussion with David and Eddie Ebborn after Officer O'Connor had retrieved the rifle, Eddie Ebborn told Officer Hasler that he had seen the plaintiff take the rifle out the previous evening when the plaintiff offered to sell the rifle to him.
48. [48]
    The officers took the rifle, as well as five rounds of unused ammunition, from the property and provided a field property receipt to David Ebborn.  That property receipt recorded that the rifle was assigned property tag number P1900030406.  The receipt described the rifle as a Category A rim-fire rifle.^[53]
49. [49]
    Everything which occurred when Officers O'Connor and Hasler were at the Burpengary property was recorded on the officers’ body worn cameras.^[54]
50. [50]
    When the officers returned to the Burpengary police station, Officer O'Connor observed Officer Hasler deposit the rifle and the ammunition in the secure property room.^[55]  A QPS property evidence report for exhibit P1900030406 records that the placement of the rifle in the secure property room was temporary (i.e. overnight).  The following day, another QPS officer moved the rifle to a gun rack within the secure property section of the Burpengary police station.^[56]
51. [51]
    Officer O'Connor’s evidence at trial was that, in the days following her attendance at the Burpengary property, she attempted to download the photographs of the rifle which she had taken on her mobile phone.  That phone was faulty and Officer O'Connor was unable to download those photographs.  Officer O'Connor subsequently replaced her mobile phone, but before doing so she sought the assistance of the QPS Forensic Services Group to download the photographs she had taken of the rifle in the gutter of the shed.  All attempts to download or recover those photographs proved unsuccessful. 
52. [52]
    The plaintiff emphasises that when Officer O'Connor prepared a statement on 31 August 2019, which addressed the discovery and seizure of the rifle, she said that she had “deleted” the photographs which she took of the rifle in its original location.^[57]
53. [53]
    During cross-examination, Officer O'Connor identified photographs of a rifle as appearing to depict the firearm which she located in the gutter of the shed.^[58]  One of those photographs bears annotations showing certain measurements, including the length of the rifle (76.61 cm).  Although the photograph indicates that it was taken by the QPS Forensics Services Group, it is not clear from the evidence who annotated the photograph in that way.  There were other photographs in evidence which contained annotations suggesting the length of the rifle was different than that recorded in the photographs shown to Officer O'Connor.  Those lengths varied between 74.89 cm^[59] and 80.9 cm.^[60]
54. [54]
    The property evidence report for exhibit P1900030406 records that an audit of the secure property section at Burpengary police station was completed on 14 August 2019 (all items were found to be correct) and on 18 September 2019 Officer Sharp moved the rifle from the secure property section at the Burpengary police station to the Ballistics Exhibits Store at the QPS Forensic Services Group.^[61]
55. [55]
    On 3 October 2019, Sergeant Michael Clark from the QPS Forensic Services Group examined the rifle.  That examination revealed that a portion of the rifle’s stock had been removed giving it an overall length of approximately 74.7 cm.  Officer Clark also observed that the serial number had been substantially obliterated.^[62]  The following day, Officer Clark signed a certificate issued under s 163(2) of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld),^[63] certifying that the rifle was:

    1. a short firearm as defined by the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld); and
    2. a category H weapon under the Weapons Categories Regulation 1997 (Qld).^[64]
56. [56]
    On 3 October 2019, after Officer Clark’s examination, the rifle was moved to the secure property section of the QPS Forensic Services Group.  It was then checked out of that section on 9 October 2019 by Detective Sergeant Ross Hutton.^[65]  Officer Hutton later prepared a statement dated 12 May 2020 in which he said that he collected exhibit P1900030406 on 9 October 2019 and, on the same day, transported exhibit P1900040406 to Burpengary police station where he placed the exhibit in the property section drop safe.^[66]  During cross-examination, Officer Hutton said that his reference to exhibit P1900040406 was a typographical error in his statement.^[67]  He explained that it was common for him, when he came into the city, to collect exhibits which were required to be returned to the station he was working from at the relevant time.  He did not examine the weapon when he returned it to the Burpengary police station.^[68]
57. [57]
    On 26 October 2019, Senior Constable Douglas Sharp sent an email advising the plaintiff that he had measured the rifle as having a length of approximately 62 cm.^[69]  Officer Sharp also stated that the rifle was a category H weapon.

Investigation of RBG’s complaint of domestic violence

58. [58]
    At about 2:25am on 22 January 2019, Constable Alison Suen and Constable Luke McKeown were tasked with attending the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital (RBWH) at Herston to investigate a possible domestic violence offence involving RBG.
59. [59]
    The officers located RBG at about 2:35am.  Officer Suen then spoke to RBG about what had led to her being in hospital.  That conversation was recorded by Officer Suen’s body worn camera.^[70]  Officer Suen also took notes of the conversation in her notebook.^[71]
60. [60]
    During the conversation with Officer Suen, RBG said that the plaintiff had told her that the police had been called to his workshop and located the firearm.  The plaintiff had accused her of being involved in that.  RBG said that there had then been an argument in the driveway at the plaintiff’s house earlier the previous day (21 January 2019) and the plaintiff had held RBG’s wrists for a long time until the plaintiff’s mother had managed to prise the plaintiff off RBG. 
61. [61]
    RBG said that the plaintiff contacted her again later that day and said he needed her to pick him up.  She went to the airport and picked the plaintiff up at about 10:46pm.  RBG said the plaintiff told her that he needed a hire car.  He wanted to deposit money into RBG’s bank account so that she could hire the car for him as he did not have a licence.  RBG said that she and the plaintiff drove to Banyo looking for an ATM which the plaintiff could use to deposit money into RBG’s account. 
62. [62]
    There was another argument when RBG was driving the plaintiff back to the airport so he could hire a car.  RBG said that the plaintiff kept telling her that he knew she had “dobbed him in” for the firearm.  RBG stopped the car and told the plaintiff to get out.  The plaintiff refused.  He verbally abused RBG, grabbed her wrists, bit her left hand and headbutted her. The plaintiff screamed words to the effect of “Tonight is the night we are both going to die”.  He accused RBG of cheating on him.
63. [63]
    RBG said that she told the plaintiff that he had broken her wrists and that she needed him to take her to the hospital because she could not drive.  The plaintiff then agreed to drive RBG to the hospital.
64. [64]
    RBG told Officer Suen that she had been in a relationship with the plaintiff since about November 2018, but that they had never lived together.  They also had a kitchen business together.  RBG said that she was living with her children at her sister’s house and that the plaintiff had also made threats against her children and her sister.  She said that she was afraid of the plaintiff.
65. [65]
    During this conversation with Officer Suen, RBG also said that the plaintiff was involved with lots of “hectic” people.  She described those people as “crackheads”.  She said that the plaintiff had been telling those people that RBG was an undercover police officer and that this placed her in “mega-danger”.
66. [66]
    Towards the end of the conversation Officer Suen told RBG that the information she had provided indicated to Officer Suen that there had been domestic violence and that Officer Suen wanted to take out a protection order for RBG.
67. [67]
    RBG also showed Officer Suen text messages which she said had been sent to her by the plaintiff.  Officer Suen took photographs of those text messages.^[72]  One of those text messages stated in part:

“Your [sic] dead to me and now you have the biggest issue of your life because how dare you look me in the eye and fucking lie……. this is your biggest mistake to have me turn after me giving you the world…… I actually loved you and now I must destroy everything and everyone in my emotional spiral into the chaos that is me ……”

Another message stated:

“I’m coming over because I think now it’s time to show u the devil in which I warned you and begged you not to provoke”

68. [68]
    While Officer Suen was speaking to RBG, Senior Constable Samuel Pyke and Constable Matthew Strudwick were tasked with conducting patrols of the area surrounding the RBWH to locate the plaintiff.  At about 2:30am, the officers located the plaintiff in the RBWH carpark.  Their interaction with the plaintiff was recorded by Officer Strudwick’s body worn camera.^[73]
69. [69]
    When he was asked what had brought him to the hospital, the plaintiff stated that RBG had suffered an extreme emotional episode while she was driving him back to the airport after he had deposited money for a hire car into her account.  He said that RBG attempted to jump out of the car and run across the highway.  He said he had grabbed both of RBG’s wrists to stop her from jumping out of the car when there were trucks passing nearby.
70. [70]
    During the conversation with Officers Pyke and Strudwick, the plaintiff stated that he had found out that RBG was a “registered informant”.^[74]  He said that did not bother him because he was “out of the scene”.^[75]
71. [71]
    While Officer Pyke continued to talk to the plaintiff, Officer Strudwick received a call on his radio.  He walked a short distance away from where Officer Pyke and the plaintiff were standing.^[76]  Officer Strudwick responded to the radio call by saying: “We have got him^[77] on the second carpark floor”.  The caller on the radio then asked Officer Strudwick whether the radio was secure.^[78]  Officer Strudwick told the radio caller that he would call back on his mobile.  The body worn camera footage shows Officer Strudwick then took out his mobile phone and searched through his contact list.  He brought up a contact with the initials “LM” and called that contact.  This is consistent with Officer Strudwick’s evidence that he stepped away from the discussion with the plaintiff to attend to a phone call with Officer McKeown.^[79]
72. [72]
    During the phone call with Officer McKeown, Officer Strudwick referred to information about the plaintiff contained on the QPRIME system and discussed whether to search the plaintiff’s car.  Officer Strudwick did not search the car, other than by looking through the windows with the aid of his torch, because the plaintiff had locked the car and commenced walking away towards the exit of the carpark with Officer Pyke.  As Officer Strudwick began to follow Officer Pyke and the plaintiff through the carpark, he said to Officer McKeown: “We’ll take him back and we’ll see you at the station”.
73. [73]
    The plaintiff then accompanied Officers Strudwick and Pyke on foot through the carpark and towards the Emergency Department of the RBWH.  At about 3:05am, at the entrance to the Emergency Department, Officer Strudwick left Officer Pyke and the plaintiff and went inside the RBWH to speak with Officer Suen.  Officer Strudwick could not recall the content of his conversation with Officer Suen.^[80]  In her affidavit evidence, Officer Suen stated that Officer Strudwick told her that the plaintiff had been located in the carpark of the RBWH, but that she could not otherwise recall what was said in her conversation with Officer Strudwick.^[81]  However, in her cross-examination Officer Suen said that, because she made the determination that it was necessary and desirable to issue a Police Protection Notice after her conversation with Officer Strudwick, she believed that Officer Strudwick had provided her with sufficient information from his interactions with the plaintiff to make the determination.^[82]
74. [74]
    At about 3:08am, Officer Strudwick returned to where Officer Pyke was waiting with the plaintiff outside the RBWH.  This interaction with the plaintiff was also recorded on Officer Strudwick’s body worn camera.^[83]
75. [75]
    Officer Strudwick informed the plaintiff that he had spoken to the officers who were inside the RWBH with RBG and that RBG had been taken to have some x-rays.  He said he did not know how long that was going to take.  The conversation then proceeded to the following effect:

Officer Strudwick: “Rather than sit outside the front of the hospital … why don’t we head back to the station and we can sort it all out there.  They will finish up,^[84] and then come and have a chat.” 

Plaintiff: “So, what … I can just wait here, or …”

Officer Strudwick: “Nah mate … just come with us.”

Plaintiff “To the station?”

Officer Strudwick: “Yeah … well it’s better than standing out the front of a hospital isn’t it?”

Plaintiff: “Not really.”

76. [76]
    Officer Pyke then became involved in the conversation.  Although it is difficult to make out the first part of what he said from Officer Strudwick’s body worn camera footage, Officer Pyke can be clearly heard saying to the plaintiff: “You’re not being arrested or anything like that.”
77. [77]
    The conversation then continued to the following effect:

Plaintiff:  “Yeah … but then I’ve got to come back to the hospital later on.  See this happens all the time.  She’ll flip out and then half an hour later we’re all good again.”

Officer Strudwick: “You said you were going to go home weren’t you?”

Plaintiff “Yeah, I was.”

Officer Strudwick: “So why would you need to come back here then?”

Plaintiff: “She’ll probably ring me up in half an hour and say give me a lift home and all that sort of thing.”

Officer Strudwick: “Mate I guarantee you, she won’t be getting out of here in half an hour.”

Officer Pyke: “You’ll be done with us before [indistinct]”

Plaintiff: “So where are you going back to?  Hendra?”

Officer Strudwick: “No.  Fortitude Valley mate.  We’re literally two minutes around the corner.”

Plaintiff: “Yep.”

Officer Strudwick: “Just finish that one off^[85] and we’ll head around.”

78. [78]
    The plaintiff then accompanied Officers Strudwick and Pyke to their police van.  Before the plaintiff got into the vehicle the officers asked him to empty his pockets and place his personal items into a large clipseal bag.  They told the plaintiff that he could not keep his mobile phone with him while he was in a police vehicle.  After the plaintiff handed over his personal items, Officer Strudwick performed a search to confirm the plaintiff was not carrying any other items.  The plaintiff appeared to co-operate willingly with the performance of that search.  The officers then placed the plaintiff into the back of the police van and drove to Fortitude Valley police station. 
79. [79]
    Officer Strudwick and Officer Pyke then took the plaintiff out of the police van and escorted him into the station.  They asked him to take a seat in front of one of the charge counters.
80. [80]
    At about 3:20am, Officer Suen telephoned her supervising officer, Senior Sergeant Mark Dwyer and sought his approval to issue a police protection notice, with “no contact” conditions, to be issued against the plaintiff.  Under s 102(1) of the DFVP Act, it was a requirement that Officer Suen obtain that approval before issuing a police protection notice. 
81. [81]
    Officer Dwyer’s evidence was that he could not recall the details of the conversation he had with Officer Suen.  At the time the officers spoke, Officer Dwyer was rostered to work as the District Duty Officer for the City Valley Patrol Group.  In that role he would generally receive multiple calls from officers relating to domestic violence incidents each shift.  He gave evidence about his standard practice in relation to domestic violence matters, including the matters he would satisfy himself of before he gave approval for the issue of a police protection notice: that a relevant relationship existed for the purpose of the DFVP Act; that domestic violence had occurred; and the party that was most in need of protection.
82. [82]
    After speaking with Officer Suen, Officer Dwyer was satisfied of the relevant matters and approved the issue of a police protection notice with “no contact” conditions against the plaintiff.
83. [83]
    At about 3:30am, Officer Suen completed police protection notice 222276 (PPN)^[86] using Form QP 0899.  The PPN named RBG as the aggrieved and the plaintiff as respondent. 
84. [84]
    Form QP 0899 requires that the officer who issues a police protection notice indicate, by circling the appropriate statutory provision, that the officer was satisfied that the grounds for issuing the notice under either s 101 or 101A of the DFVP Act had been met.  Section 101 applies in circumstances where the officer believes that the respondent to the notice should not be taken into custody.  Section 101A applies when the respondent has been taken into custody.
85. [85]
    That is, Officer Suen should have indicated, on the PPN, the provision under which it was issued.  Officer Suen did not complete that part of the form when she issued the PPN.  In her affidavit, Officer Suen stated that this was due to inadvertence and that she should have circled s 101.^[87]
86. [86]
    Once Officer Suen had completed the PPN she gave a copy of it to RBG while she was still at the RBWH.  Officer Suen told RBG that the PPN would be in place once she served it on the plaintiff and she would do that as soon as she returned to Fortitude Valley police station.
87. [87]
    It is common ground that, at the time she completed the PPN and gave a copy to RBG, Officer Suen had not spoken to the plaintiff.  That is relevant because it was a condition of the power to issue a notice under s 101 of the DFVP Act, the provision which Officer Suen says she relied on to issue the PPN, that if the respondent against whom the notice is to be issued is not present at the same location as the issuing police officer, the officer has made a reasonable attempt to locate and talk to that respondent, including by telephone, to afford that person natural justice in relation to the issuing of a notice.^[88]
88. [88]
    At about 4:02am, shortly after she had returned to Fortitude Valley police station, Officer Suen introduced herself to the plaintiff and spoke to him about RBG’s complaint.  That conversation was recorded by Officer Suen’s body worn camera.^[89]
89. [89]
    When Officer Suen approached the plaintiff, he was sitting on a seat in front of one of the charge desks.  Officer Suen explained that she wanted the plaintiff to go with her to an interview room so that she could speak to him.  The plaintiff asked if he could get his phone back because there was something on it which he believed Officer Suen would want to see.  Officer Suen explained to the plaintiff that she wanted to get his version of what had happened that night. 
90. [90]
    Once the plaintiff and Officer Suen were seated in the interview room, Officer Suen told the plaintiff that she was going to go down the path of issuing a domestic violence order against him.  In response, the plaintiff asked whether he could get a cross-order.  He stated that RBG would come at him, and he was the one who had to defuse those situations.
91. [91]
    Officer Suen then asked the plaintiff to provide his version of the events leading to RBG attending the RBWH.  The plaintiff said that he had seen RBG at the shed at the Burpengary property at 10:00am the previous day.  When RBG dropped the plaintiff home, she started an argument with him.  During that argument RBG spat at the plaintiff and hit him in the face in the presence of the plaintiff’s mother. 
92. [92]
    The plaintiff said that he saw RBG again at about 10:00pm the previous evening.  She picked him up at the airport so that he could deposit money into her account.  He wanted RBG to hire a car for him, in her name.  After they had deposited money into RBG’s account and were driving back along the highway towards the airport, RBG “flipped out” and stopped the car on the side of the road near an on-ramp at Nudgee.  RBG attempted to jump out of the car in circumstances where trucks were coming along the highway from behind.  The plaintiff said he grabbed RBG’s wrists and told her to calm down.  He said that RBG tried to bite him and tried to head butt him.  Eventually RBG calmed down but complained about her wrists being broken.  The plaintiff took RBG to the RBWH.  
93. [93]
    The plaintiff told Officer Suen that if there was to be a domestic violence order made against him then he would need a cross-order because when RBG was given power over things she exploited it.  Officer Suen told the plaintiff that she would have to make the order for the benefit of the person she believed was most in need of protection.  Officer Suen informed the plaintiff that she had completed the PPN naming RBG as the aggrieved and explained the conditions of that notice to the plaintiff.  In response, the plaintiff said that he was aware that Officer Suen would have done that.  Later in the conversation, the plaintiff complained that when she determined who was most in need of protection, Officer Suen had heard RBG’s side of the story but had not heard his side of the story.
94. [94]
    At one point during the conversation, in response to Officer Suen saying that there would be a court hearing for the PPN later that morning, the plaintiff asked whether he was being remanded.  Officer Suen told him he was not being remanded.
95. [95]
    At other points during the conversation, the plaintiff referred to problems he would have with his kitchen business if he could not talk to RBG.  He also raised difficulties the “no contact” condition would cause when RBG had left some of her possessions at his workshop.  Officer Suen told the plaintiff that the issues the PPN would create because RBG was the plaintiff’s business partner was not her problem at that time.  Officer Suen said her focus was on finishing the paperwork associated with the PPN and serving the PPN on the plaintiff. 
96. [96]
    After she had spoken to the plaintiff, Officer Suen completed a document titled “Statement – Police Protection Notice” (PPN Statement) using Form QP 0899A.^[90]  Section 3 of the PPN Statement set out the grounds Officer Suen relied on in concluding that it was necessary or desirable to make a protection order to protect RBG as the aggrieved.  In that section, in addition to setting out the version of the night’s events provided by RBG and by the plaintiff, Officer Suen made the following statement:

“Police conducted mobile patrols and located [the plaintiff] in the hospital carpark where he was detained under the provisions of the [DFVP Act] and transported back to Fortitude Valley Police Station.”

97. [97]
    The contents of the PPN Statement, including Officer Suen’s statement that the plaintiff had been detained before being transported to the police station, was loaded onto QPRIME.^[91]
98. [98]
    At about 6:00am on 22 January 2019, Officer Suen served a copy of the PPN on the plaintiff at the Fortitude Valley police station.  The plaintiff then left the station.  There was conflicting evidence as to whether Officer Suen also served a copy of the PPN Statement on the plaintiff before he left Fortitude Valley Police Station.  During cross-examination, Officer Suen accepted that she may have served the PPN Statement by email a short time after the plaintiff left the station.^[92]  Ultimately, nothing turns on this question because the plaintiff’s own affidavits clearly state that he was served with both documents on the morning of 22 January 2019.^[93]
99. [99]
    The PPN:

    1. required that the plaintiff be of good behaviour towards RBG, her children and her sister and not commit domestic violence against those persons;
    2. prohibited the plaintiff from:
       1. (i)
          approaching, or attempting to approach, within 100 metres of RBG, her children or her sister;
       2. (ii)
          contacting, or attempting to contact, or asking someone else to contact RBG, her children or her sister;
       3. (iii)
          locating, or attempting to locate, or someone to locate RBG, her children or her sister;
    3. advised the plaintiff that the notice was also taken to be an application for a protection order made by a police officer (QPS Application);^[94]
    4. gave notice to the plaintiff that he was required to appear at the hearing of the QPS Application at 8:30am on 23 January 2019 before the Magistrates Court at 363 George Street, Brisbane.
100. [100]
     Officer Suen later prepared a certificate under s 189(3) of the DFVP Act, signed by Senior Sergeant Christopher Pemberton on 19 June 2020, which stated, among other things, that Officer Suen was a releasing officer under s 125 of the DFVP Act and that the plaintiff had been released from police custody at 5:55am on 22 January 2019 on stated release conditions.^[95] 

RBG’s first complaint that the plaintiff breached the PPN

101. [101]
     At about 9:00pm on 22 January 2019, Senior Constable Koroniria Ngawhika and Senior Constable Cameron Calder were tasked with attending 7 Link Street, Narangba with respect to a domestic violence complaint.
102. [102]
     When the officers arrived at that address, Officer Ngawhika spoke with RBG.  She informed him that:

     1. the plaintiff had been attempting to call RBG and he had attended the address earlier while she was there;
     2. the plaintiff had left the address before the officers arrived;
     3. a police protection notice had been issued that morning against the plaintiff for the benefit of RBG and the conditions of that notice included that the plaintiff was not to contact RBG or to come within 100 metres of her.
103. [103]
     Officer Ngawhika conducted inquiries through the QPRIME system and confirmed the PPN had been issued and that it contained the conditions described by RBG.  He told RBG that if she wanted to make a formal complaint she would have to attend the Burpengary police station and provide a statement.  The officers then left the property.
104. [104]
     Later that night, RBG attended the Burpengary police station and provided a statement confirming what she had previously said to Officer Ngawhika.^[96]

Making of a temporary protection order against the plaintiff

105. [105]
     At about 9:40am on 23 January 2019, the QPS Application came before Magistrate Strofield in the Brisbane Magistrates Court.  The plaintiff did not appear.  He had sent an email to the court earlier that morning seeking an adjournment until 30 January 2019.^[97]
106. [106]
     Magistrate Strofield adjourned the QPS Application to 30 January 2019 and made a temporary protection order against the plaintiff.  In making those orders, Magistrate Strofield said:^[98]

“Adjourned till the 30^th.  Temporary protection order is made.  The mandatory conditions, together with the three by no contact conditions, no locate conditions, not follow or approach within 100 metres condition, except when coming to this Court.  I also name the four named people.  Same conditions in respect to those four people.”

107. [107]
     The four people referred to in this passage are RBG’s three children and her sister.
108. [108]
     Following this hearing, a written temporary protection order was prepared and signed by Magistrate Strofield which named Officer Suen as the applicant (in her role as the officer who issued the PPN), the plaintiff as respondent and RBG as the aggrieved (TPO).^[99]  The TPO provided as follows:

“It is ordered that:

1. The respondent must be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved and not commit domestic violence against the aggrieved.

2. The respondent must be of good behaviour towards the named person/s and must not commit associated domestic violence against the named person/s.

3. The respondent is prohibited from contacting or attempting to contact or asking someone else to contact the aggrieved.

4. The respondent is prohibited from using the internet or any other communication device (including social networking sites) to communicate with, publish pictures of or make comments concerning the aggrieved.

5. The respondent is prohibited from making telephone calls or sending text messages to the aggrieved.

6. The respondent is prohibited from locating, attempting to locate or asking someone else to locate the aggrieved.

7. The respondent is prohibited from following or approaching or approaching to within 100 metres of the aggrieved when the aggrieved is at any place.  This condition does not apply to the extent that it is necessary for the respondent to appear personally before a Court or Tribunal

UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED THIS ORDER CONTINUES IN FORCE TO AND INCLUDING UNTIL A FURTHER ORDER IS MADE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE RESPONDENT OR THE RESPONDENT IS SERVED WITH OR THE RESPONDENT IS TOLD BY A POLICE OFFICER ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH FURTHER ORDER OR THE APPLICATION FOR A PROTECTION ORDER IS WITHDRAWN OR DISMISSED BY THE COURT.”

RBG’s second complaint that the plaintiff had breached the PPN

109. [109]
     At about 12:20pm on 28 January 2019, Officer Ngawhika and Officer Calder were again tasked with attending 7 Link Street, Narangba in relation to the plaintiff having allegedly breached the terms of the PPN.
110. [110]
     When the officers arrived at the address, Officer Ngawhika initially spoke to a person named Aaron Glenane (an associate of both the plaintiff and RBG) who informed him that both the plaintiff and RBG were present at the address. 
111. [111]
     Officer Ngawhika informed Mr Glenane that he needed to speak with RBG.  When RBG came outside she told Officer Ngawhika that the plaintiff had come to the address knowing she was there, that she had told him that he had to go but that he was refusing to leave.  She said that the plaintiff had sent her text messages the previous day from a new phone.  She had been forced to turn her phone off.
112. [112]
     Officer Ngawhika then spoke with the plaintiff outside.  The plaintiff complained about his situation where Mr Glenane was the stonemason who worked for the plaintiff’s kitchen business and RBG was the plaintiff’s partner in that business.  The plaintiff said he had gone to Mr Glenane’s house to talk to him about a job.  When asked by Officer Ngawhika, the plaintiff confirmed that he recalled being given a copy of the PPN and he was aware of its conditions, including the condition that he not contact or go within 100 metres of RBG.  The plaintiff continued to tell Officer Ngawhika that he needed to talk to Mr Glenane about work matters. 
113. [113]
     Officer Nagwhika’s conversations with both RBG and the plaintiff were recorded by his body worn camera.^[100] 
114. [114]
     Having spoken to the plaintiff, Officer Ngawhika concluded that he had contravened the conditions of the PPN and would continue to do so.  On that basis, Officer Ngawhika arrested the plaintiff.  The officers transported the plaintiff to the Burpengary police station and placed him in a holding cell.
115. [115]
     Officer Ngawhika then charged the plaintiff under s 178 of the DFVP Act with two counts of contravening the PPN.  The first count related to the contravention on 22 January 2019.  The second count related to the contravention on 28 January 2019.
116. [116]
     The plaintiff was refused bail and he was eventually transported to the Caboolture watchhouse where he was held in custody to appear in the Caboolture Magistrates Court the following day, 29 January 2019.
117. [117]
     At about 3:47pm on 29 January 2019, the plaintiff appeared in the Caboolture Magistrates Court and pleaded guilty to the two charges of contravening the PPN.^[101]  Acting Magistrate Wilkinson fined the plaintiff $200 and did not record a conviction.^[102]  The plaintiff was then released from custody.

Further events relating to the QPS Application and the TPO

118. [118]
     On 30 January 2019, the QPS Application came back on before Magistrate Strofield.^[103]  When the matter was called, the police prosecutor informed the magistrate that “some service is still not complete”. 
119. [119]
     The plaintiff submits that this was an admission that the PPN had not been served on him and, consequently, there was no valid application before Magistrate Strofield when the TPO was made on 23 January 2019 or in subsequent hearings.^[104]  I do not accept that submission.  I accept the evidence of Officer Suen that she served the PPN on the plaintiff before he left the Fortitude Valley police station on the morning of 22 January 2019 (see [98] above).  During the plaintiff’s conversation with Officer Ngawhika on 28 January 2019, he accepted that the PPN had been handed to him on 22 January 2019.  During the same conversation, and in the conversation with RBG at the Narangba address on 28 January 2019, Officer Ngawhika referred to the TPO not having been served by that date.  It seems likely that remained the position which the police prosecutor was referring to at the hearing on 30 January 2019, but it is not necessary to form a concluded view about that.  Once the PPN was served on the plaintiff it took effect, both by imposing conditions on the plaintiff (until the plaintiff was served with the TPO) and as an application for a protection order.  There is no substance to the plaintiff’s submission on this point.
120. [120]
     In a brief exchange with Magistrate Strofield, the police prosecutor also referred to having a note that “it’s been finalised”.  There is no further indication in the transcript as to what the police prosecutor was referring to when making that statement.  The police prosecutor’s statement to the magistrate appears to have the character of a question raised in that person’s mind by something he or she had seen, rather than a definitive statement about the status of the QPS Application.  Nevertheless, the plaintiff submits that this was a statement that the PPN had been withdrawn by the police.^[105]  I do not accept that submission.  During her cross-examination, Officer Suen stated that although, as the police officer who issued the PPN, she had authority to withdraw the QPS Application^[106] she did not do so.^[107]  I accept that evidence. 
121. [121]
     Consistently with the QPS Application not having been finalised or withdrawn, the hearing on 30 January 2019 concluded with Magistrate Strofield:

     1. adjourning the QPS Application to 13 February 2019;
     2. ordering that the TPO was to continue; and
     3. directing that notice of the adjournment was to be sent to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was to be informed that his appearance was required at the adjourned hearing on 13 February 2019, otherwise the QPS Application might be dealt with in his absence.
122. [122]
     On 13 February 2019, the QPS Application came back on before Magistrate Strofield.^[108]  On that occasion, the police prosecutor informed the magistrate that the matter could not proceed that day because “the PPN still needs to be served”.  The police prosecutor then referred to material evidencing service of the TPO and the notice of adjournment.  When the magistrate asked for confirmation that the PPN hadn’t been served, the police prosecutor responded: “Well, I think it has, but I don’t have the statement of service.”  For the reasons already given at [119] above, I reject the plaintiff’s submission that the police prosecutor’s statement during this hearing is further evidence that the PPN was not served.  Plainly, the police prosecutor misspoke when stating that the PPN needed to be served.  The later clarifying statement makes it clear that the police prosecutor did not have any personal knowledge about the fact of service but was intending to inform the magistrate that the material required to prove service had not yet been provided.  That does not undermine in any way the evidence of Officer Suen that she served the PPN on the plaintiff on 22 January 2019.
123. [123]
     The hearing on 13 February 2019 concluded with Magistrate Strofield adjourning the QPS Application to 13 March 2019 and ordering that the TPO continue.
124. [124]
     Also on 13 February 2019, RBG attended the Goondiwindi police station and made a complaint to Senior Constable Vaughan Clacher that the plaintiff had breached the terms of the TPO.  Upon receiving that complaint, Officer Clacher looked up RBG on QPRIME and viewed the conditions which the TPO imposed on the plaintiff.
125. [125]
     RBG provided her mobile phone to Officer Clacher and showed him voice messages left between 24 January 2019 and 13 February 2019.  She said that the messages had been left by the plaintiff.  Officer Clacher listened to the messages which all had the same voice.  Officer Clacher recorded one of the messages played from RBG’s phone on his body worn camera.^[109]
126. [126]
     Officer Clacher proceeded to take a statement from RBG.^[110]  During that process, he took photographs of RBG’s mobile phone which showed the number of voicemail messages she had received from the plaintiff.^[111]  While making the statement, RBG received a call on her mobile phone from the plaintiff.  RBG answered that call and Officer Clacher recorded part of the conversation between RBG and the plaintiff on his body worn camera.^[112]
127. [127]
     On 13 March 2019, the QPS Application came on for Magistrate Strofield.^[113]  The plaintiff appeared in court at the hearing and was represented by the duty lawyer, Ms Bier, who requested that the matter be set down for hearing.  Magistrate Strofield made various directions for the matter to proceed to trial, listed that trial for 17 June 2019 and ordered that the TPO continue.

Plaintiff’s arrest for weapons and DFVP Act offences

128. [128]
     On 26 March 2019, the plaintiff attended Burpengary police station believing he was to be served with documents.  He was met by Officer Hasler at the counter and placed under arrest in relation to breaches of a domestic violence order and for possessing the firearm which Officers O'Connor and Hasler located at the plaintiff’s workshop on 21 January 2019.  After his arrest, the plaintiff was put into a holding cell.  That interaction was recorded by Officer Hasler’s body worn camera.^[114]
129. [129]
     As he was nearing the end of his shift, Officer Hasler spoke with Senior Constable Douglas Sharp.  Officer Hasler said:

     1. he had arrested the plaintiff in respect of an alleged firearms offence and that the plaintiff was being detained in the holding cell;
     2. some time ago, he and his partner had been called to the Burpengary property to investigate a possible firearms offence and located a shortened firearm which was believed to be the plaintiff’s;
     3. he believed that the plaintiff would take part in an interview in relation to the firearm, but that he needed to hand the job over because he was nearing the end of his shift;
     4. the plaintiff was also wanted for questioning about breach of a domestic violence order.
130. [130]
     After conducting inquiries on QPRIME, Officer Sharp spoke to the plaintiff and asked if he was willing to participate in an electronic record of interview in relation to the breach of domestic violence order and weapons offences.  The plaintiff declined. 
131. [131]
     Officer Sharp then charged the plaintiff with four offences:^[115]

     1. contravention of a police protection notice (being the PPN) between 25 January 2019 and 28 January 2019;
     2. contravention of a domestic violence order (being the TPO) between 28 January 2019 and 13 February 2019;
     3. possession of a shortened firearm;
     4. possession of a firearm with altered identification marks.
132. [132]
     The plaintiff was granted bail for those charges.  The conditions of his bail required that he reside at an address in Burpengary and report to the Burpengary police station three times per week.
133. [133]
     Officer Sharp also served the plaintiff with the notice of adjournment of the hearing of the QPS Application to 17 June 2019 and the directions for the progression of that matter to trial.
134. [134]
     Officer Sharp’s interactions with the plaintiff were recorded by his body worn camera.^[116]
135. [135]
     The four charges laid by Officer Sharp on 26 March 2019 were stayed by order of Magistrate Blanch in the Caboolture Magistrates Court on 30 August 2021, pending the outcome of this proceeding.^[117]

Arrest of the plaintiff for a further contravention of the TPO

136. [136]
     On 29 July 2019, the plaintiff attended the Burpengary police station to sign in under his bail conditions.  At that time, the plaintiff was arrested by Senior Constable Jon Gray for a further contravention of the TPO and subsequently charged with that offence the same day.^[118]  The plaintiff was remanded in custody at the Burpengary police station and, subsequently at the Caboolture Watchhouse from 29 July 2019 to 30 July 2019.^[119]  The plaintiff then appeared before the Caboolture Magistrates Court on 30 July 2019 and pleaded guilty to this further contravention of the TPO.  He was sentenced to imprisonment for one month, wholly suspended for an operational period of 18 months.^[120]  In his affidavit, Officer Gray mistakenly referred to the plaintiff being held in custody on 29 January 2019 and 30 January 2019.^[121]  That mistake was corrected during his oral testimony.^[122]

The plaintiff’s complaint to QPS about threats against him

137. [137]
     On 15 June 2019, the plaintiff attended the Caboolture police station and made a complaint to Constable Dylan Knights about threats against him which were set out in documents left outside his residence at Burpengary.  The documents which the plaintiff showed to Officer Knights comprised screen shots of Facebook conversations.^[123]  Officer Knights scanned the documents into QPRIME before returning them to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff told Officer Knights that he believed RBG and his stonemason, Aaron Glenane (see [110]-[112] above), were responsible for the threats.  Officer Knights recorded the plaintiff’s complaint in QPRIME under the QPS identifying number QP1901157824.^[124]

Filing of the plaintiff’s application for a protection order against RBG

138. [138]
     On 17 June 2019, the QPS Application came on before Acting Magistrate Tynan in the Brisbane Magistrates Court.^[125]  Courtney Rantala, the QPS legal officer who appeared at that hearing, requested an adjournment because there had been a delay in Officer Suen filing the necessary material and the plaintiff had not had sufficient opportunity to file material in response.  Ms Rantala also expressed concerns about the plaintiff’s mental health based on her observations of him outside the courtroom.  She informed the magistrate that the plaintiff appeared to be distressed and agitated and was talking about a conspiracy to murder him.^[126]
139. [139]
     After an adjournment, Ms Rantala informed Acting Magistrate Tynan that she had advised the plaintiff to bring an urgent application for a cross-order against RBG if he wished to have the court consider his concerns.^[127]  The magistrate then spoke with the plaintiff and informed him that he would need to make an application if he wished to have the court make orders against RBG.^[128]  The plaintiff confirmed he would file that application.  The magistrate indicated that the plaintiff’s application would be heard that afternoon.  The QPS Application was adjourned for mention on 9 July 2019 and linked to any application filed by the plaintiff.  The matter was then adjourned to permit the plaintiff to file his application for a cross-order against RBG (Cross-Application).
140. [140]
     Acting Magistrate Tynan heard the Cross-Application later that afternoon.  After considering the material filed by the plaintiff, the magistrate made a temporary protection order against RBG for the benefit of the plaintiff (Cross-TPO).^[129]  The Cross-Application was then adjourned for mention, along with the QPS Application, on 9 July 2019.
141. [141]
     In his affidavits, the plaintiff asserts that RBG took steps on 24 June 2019 to vary the terms of the Cross-TPO to make it appear that this order had been made for her benefit, not that of the plaintiff.^[130]  The bases for these assertions appear to be: (i) the recording in QPS Intelligence Log Summary QI1901230114^[131] of a “Domestic Violence – Application Private” on 24 June 2019 as a “Linked Event”;^[132] (ii) what the plaintiff asserts amounts to a recording in QPS occurrence report QP1901219369^[133] to Officer Knights having made an application for a protection order on 24 June 2019;^[134] and (iii) that the Langerak decision demonstrates that RBG made an application to vary the Cross-TPO on 24 June 2019 at the Brisbane Magistrates Court.^[135]
142. [142]
     There is no substance to the plaintiff’s claim that RBG “stole” the Cross-TPO.  As to QPS Intelligence Log Summary QI1901230114, the plaintiff did not establish what the entry referring to a private application on 24 June 2019 related to.  On its face, the document does not support the plaintiff’s contention.  As to QPS occurrence report QP1901219369, that document makes no reference to Officer Knights having made any application for a protection order.  When Officer Knights was shown that document during cross-examination, he stated clearly that it was not an application for a protection order.^[136]  I have already explained at [18]-[19] above that there is no basis for the plaintiff’s submission that any conduct described in the Langerak decision is, in fact, conduct on the part of RBG.

Determination of the QPS Application and the Cross-Application

143. [143]
     On 9 July 2019, the QPS Application and the Cross-Application were mentioned before Magistrate Kelly in the Brisbane Magistrates Court.  Both applications were listed for final hearing on 19 August 2019 and further directions were made for the filing of evidence.
144. [144]
     On 19 August 2019, the trial of the QPS Application and the Cross-Application came on for hearing before Magistrate Bradford-Morgan in the Brisbane Magistrates Court.  RBG did not appear at court that day.  Ms Rantala, who appeared for the QPS in the QPS Application, advised the magistrate that RBG had indicated she wished to file affidavit material in response to the Cross-Application.  The trial of both the QPS Application and the Cross-Application were adjourned until 2 December 2019.  Magistrate Bradford-Morgan also made an order in the QPS Application under s 151 of the DFVP Act prohibiting the plaintiff from cross-examining RBG in circumstances where the plaintiff was self-represented.
145. [145]
     The plaintiff asserts that there was a secret hearing of the Cross-Application, conducted in his absence, on 19 August 2019 at which Officer Knights, Officer Thew, Officer Ledermann and RBG gave evidence.^[137]  The basis for the plaintiff’s assertions appears to be a reference in the transcript of the hearing before Magistrate Bradford-Morgan to two other hearings, referred to the matters of Young and Black, which had to be attended to that day.^[138]  The transcript provides no basis for the plaintiff’s assertions.  It reveals nothing more than the magistrate discussing whether other matters were able to proceed at a point where the plaintiff’s matters were to be stood down for a time.  The plaintiff’s assertion that the reference to the matters of Young and Black should be understood as relating to his application must be considered in light of evidence of Dr Beech that the plaintiff suffers from a delusional disorder (see [327] and [328] below).  Likewise, his evidence about having seen the relevant officers at court that day must be considered in light of his submission that what happened on that day occurred outside his “conscious awareness”.^[139] 
146. [146]
     Aside from the plaintiff’s own assertions, there was no evidence of a secret hearing of any matter involving him at the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 19 August 2019.  The plaintiff put it to both Officer Knights^[140] and Officer Thew^[141] that they had attended a hearing on that date at the Brisbane Magistrates Court.  Both those officers denied the assertion.  The plaintiff did not put the assertion to Officer Ledermann during his cross-examination.
147. [147]
     I reject the plaintiff’s submission that there was any secret hearing, of any matter involving the plaintiff, at the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 19 August 2019.
148. [148]
     On 2 December 2019, the trial of the QPS Application and the Cross-Application resumed before Magistrate Bradford-Morgan.  At the conclusion of that trial, her Honour granted the QPS Application and dismissed the Cross-Application.  A protection order was made in RBG’s favour against the plaintiff.  The Cross-TPO was removed.
149. [149]
     On 17 February 2020, the plaintiff applied for an extension of time in which to appeal the decision of Magistrate Strofield on 23 January 2019 to make the TPO.  By that application, the plaintiff sought to have the TPO set aside on the basis that the PPN was deficient and, consequently, invalid.  The first basis of invalidity the plaintiff identified was Officer Suen’s failure to circle s 101 or s 101A to signify under which provision she had issued the PPN.  The second basis of invalidity the plaintiff identified was that, on the copy of the PPN he was given, Officer Suen’s signature was not witnessed.  On the version of the PPN filed in the Court in the QPS Application Officer Suen’s signature had been witnessed by another police officer.  On 24 February 2020, Rinaudo AM DCJ dismissed the application.^[142]  In doing so, his Honour made an express finding that the PPN was valid.^[143]
150. [150]
     On 4 August 2020, the plaintiff appealed the decision of Magistrate Bradford Morgan on 2 December 2019 to grant the QPS Application and to dismiss the Cross-Application.  On 1 September 2020, Sheridan DCJ gave judgment in that appeal in SRV, addressed at [26] to [31] above.

Investigation of the plaintiff for fraud

151. [151]
     On 19 February 2019, Detective Senior Constable Jade Fleming was tasked with investigating a complaint made against the plaintiff by Brendan Alchin and Melissa Smith.  The complaint was that Mr Alchin and Ms Smith had engaged the plaintiff to build them a new kitchen and paid a deposit of $8,450 in cash.  After they paid the deposit, the plaintiff did not commence construction of the kitchen and eventually stopped answering calls and messages from Mr Alchin.  The plaintiff did not return the deposit.
152. [152]
     Officer Fleming met with Mr Alchin on 6 April 2019 and took a statement from him about, among other details, payment of the deposit and the plaintiff’s failure to undertake any work on the new kitchen.^[144]  Mr Alchin also identified the plaintiff from a photo board as the person who he had paid $8,450 cash to as the deposit for the construction of the new kitchen.  Officer Fleming reviewed text messages between the plaintiff and Mr Alchin relating to the work the plaintiff had agreed to perform and subsequently arranged for photographs of those text messages to be taken.^[145]
153. [153]
     Based on that material, on 7 April 2019, Officer Fleming attended the plaintiff’s residential address and informed him of the complaint by Mr Alchin and Ms Smith.  The plaintiff declined Officer Fleming’s offer to take part in an interview in relation to that complaint.  Officer Fleming then issued the plaintiff with a Notice to Appear to answer a charge of fraud.
154. [154]
     On 9 October 2019, the plaintiff contacted Officer Fleming and indicated that he wished to take part in an interview in relation to the fraud charge.  The interview took place later that day.^[146] 
155. [155]
     During the interview, the plaintiff told Officer Fleming that the job for Mr Alchin and Ms Smith was contracted to be performed by the company EK Kitchens which was a business he ran in partnership with RBG.  As to the complaint itself, the plaintiff told Officer Fleming that, in December 2018, RBG had taken $3,500 from the deposit paid by Mr Alchin and Ms Smith.  She wanted this money to buy Christmas presents for her children and to make car repayments and rent payments.  The plaintiff said that RBG had told him that she would replace the money from a payment from her superannuation fund which was due to be paid a few days later.  He said that work contracted to be done by EK Kitchens was to be outsourced.  The plaintiff provided Officer Fleming with an email from the company he had engaged to manufacture and install the kitchen for Mr Alchin and Ms Smith and said that RBG’s failure to repay the $3,500 taken from the deposit meant that he was unable for pay for that work to be done.  He also said that he was unable to work after the PPN was issued, in circumstances where his tools were in RBG’s car and he could not use his workshop at Burpengary because he did not know if RBG would go there to feed her dog and complain about him breaching the PPN.  He told Officer Fleming that, on 30 January 2019 (while he was in police custody), RBG had arranged to have the remaining equipment and materials stolen from his workshop. 
156. [156]
     The plaintiff told Officer Fleming that his brother had installed the kitchen for Mr Alchin and Ms Smith.  The installation was completed on 8 April 2019.  The plaintiff said this was done because of the state he was in after the PPN was issued and the events which followed.  He said that no part of the deposit which he had received from Mr Alchin and Ms Smith was used to pay for the kitchen installed by his brother.  The plaintiff did not pay anything to his brother for that work.
157. [157]
     Following the interview with the plaintiff, Officer Fleming continued to investigate the complaint made by Mr Alchin and Ms Smith.  On 30 October 2019, Officer Fleming took a statement from RBG^[147] and a statement from Ms Smith.^[148]  On 5 November 2019, Officer Fleming to an addendum statement from Mr Alchin.^[149]  Both Mr Alchin and Ms Smith confirmed that the plaintiff’s brother had completed their kitchen.  Mr Alchin stated that he had paid the plaintiff’s brother for the work he did and that he and Ms Smith remained out of pocket for the deposit they paid to the plaintiff.
158. [158]
     In February 2020, after discussions with QPS prosecutions, Officer Fleming agreed that a charge of stealing was more appropriate than a charge of fraud in circumstances where the plaintiff had not completed the kitchen for Mr Alchin and Ms Smith after receiving the deposit.  Officer Fleming completed a replacement Bench Charge Sheet setting out the amended charge.^[150]
159. [159]
     A decision was made by QPS prosecutions later in February 2020 to no longer pursue the amended charge against the plaintiff.  Officer Fleming was not involved in that decision but was advised that the amended charge would not be pursued.

Investigation of the plaintiff’s complaint about RBG’s threats against him

160. [160]
     On 13 July 2019, the plaintiff attended the Caboolture police station and provided a statement to Constable Eloise Down relating to the matters about which he had complained to Officer Knights on 15 June 2019.^[151]  Later the same day, Officer Down briefed Detective Sergeant Ross Hutton with respect to the plaintiff’s complaint about RBG’s threats against him.  At that time, Officer Hutton was working in the Moreton North Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB), stationed at Burpengary police station.  Officer Hutton formed the view that the complaint did not need to be investigated by CIB at that time, in circumstances where it involved allegations of domestic violence.  Officer Hutton entered a further report into QPRIME.^[152]  In that further report, Officer Hutton observed that the plaintiff’s explanation as to how he came into possession of the screenshots of the Facebook conversations did not seem believable.  Nevertheless, Officer Hutton noted that it may be appropriate to interview the parties to the Facebook conversations to identify if any offence had occurred.
161. [161]
     On 14 July 2019, Officer Down sent an email to Officer Knights and Sergeant Glenn Peatling (Officer Knights’ supervising officer), informing them of the plaintiff’s attendance at Caboolture police station and that Officer Down had taken a statement from the plaintiff.^[153]
162. [162]
     On 15 July 2019, Officer Peatling forwarded to Officer Knights a chain of emails which recorded that the plaintiff had attended Petrie police station on 12 July 2019 (as well as other police stations) and asserted that Officer Knights was not taking his complaint about RBG’s threats seriously.^[154]  The same day, Officer Peatling caused the following tasks relating to the plaintiff’s complaint to be generated in QPRIME:^[155]

     1. Senior Constable David Ledermann from Deception Bay police station to interview Aaron Glenane;
     2. Senior Constable Skye Thew from Goondiwindi police station to interview RBG; and
     3. Officer Knights to obtain a statement from Anthony Bartlett.
163. [163]
     On 23 July 2019, Officer Thew interviewed RBG at Goondiwindi police station about the plaintiff’s complaint that she had made threats against him.  That interview was recorded.^[156]  During the interview RBG confirmed that she met the plaintiff in October 2018 and started working for him.  She said that their relationship had been one of “friends with benefits” but that the relationship ended when the plaintiff became obsessive, controlling, possessive and threatening. 
164. [164]
     As to the Facebook messages, RBG said that she received a Facebook message from Anthony Bartlett on 14 June 2019.  She said that she and Bartlett were friends, although she had not heard from him for some time when she received the first message.  She initially believed that she was communicating with Bartlett.  However, she quickly came to realise from the responses she was receiving to her messages that she was not talking to Bartlett.  She said the messages which appeared to be coming from Bartlett were pushing her towards giving specific responses and, from that, she came to believe that the plaintiff was sending the messages.  She said that she knew the plaintiff had access to Bartlett’s social media accounts because, in November or December 2018, he had seen a piece of paper at RBG’s place on which Bartlett had written the passwords to his accounts.  RBG referred to the numerous complaints she had made about the plaintiff’s conduct towards her and the fact that he was continuing to contact her.  She said that the plaintiff’s behaviour towards her had caused her to “egg him on” when she realised he was sending the messages from Bartlett’s Facebook account.  She said that nobody had left copies of the Facebook messages at the plaintiff’s house because he was sending the messages from his phone using Bartlett’s account.  She said that the plaintiff had created the event to make it appear as though she was threatening him.  She denied making any threats against the plaintiff in any of the messages she sent during the exchange. 
165. [165]
     RBG also confirmed that she knew Aaron Glenane.  He had once been her best friend.  She said that Glenane had messaged her on Instagram about a week after the exchange of messages with “Anthony Bartlett”.  She said that Glenane asked her to go to Hungry Jacks at Morayfield when she was back in Brisbane so that the two of them could catch up.  When RBG got to Hungry Jacks, she could not see Glenane and got the feeling that he was about to set her up (in the sense of giving the plaintiff the chance to see her in person).  She said that she left the Hungry Jacks and did not hear from Glenane for the rest of that day asking why she had not met him.
166. [166]
     Officer Thew prepared a report on the interview which she entered in QPRIME.^[157]
167. [167]
     On 31 July 2019, Officer Ledermann attended Aaron Glenane’s residence and interviewed him about the plaintiff’s complaints of threats made against him.  That interview was recorded on Officer Ledermann’s body worn camera.^[158]
168. [168]
     During the interview, Glenane stated that he had proof that the plaintiff had hacked into other people’s social media accounts, including the account of Anthony Bartlett.  He confirmed that he had engaged in a Facebook conversation with “Anthony Bartlett”, but he realised during the conversation that it was the plaintiff who was sending the messages.  Glenane denied that he made any statements during the conversation about killing the plaintiff.  He said that he had sent the messages, knowing that the plaintiff was impersonating Bartlett, with the intention of “geeing him up”.  He had no intention of harming the plaintiff.  He described the plaintiff’s description of the threats against him as “complete bullshit”.
169. [169]
     Officer Ledermann prepared a report on the interview which he entered in QPRIME.^[159]
170. [170]
     Unfortunately, Officer Ledermann exhibited a dismissive attitude towards the plaintiff’s complaint when he interviewed Glenane.  He commenced the interview by describing the complaint as “retarded” but said he had to speak to Glenane about it anyway.  Officer Ledermann’s tone when he described the material which the plaintiff had produced to the police and the account the plaintiff gave of finding that material on the doghouse at his residence indicated his view that there was no substance to the plaintiff’s complaint.  Towards the end of the interview, Officer Ledermann repeated his statement that the plaintiff’s complaint was a “retarded file” but said that he was speaking to Glenane so that he could “get rid of it”.  He told Glenane that the plaintiff’s explanation of the circumstances in which he came into possession of the Facebook conversations and the wording of the statement which the plaintiff had given to the QPS “doesn’t make any sense”.
171. [171]
     In the end, Officer Ledermann’s role in the QPS investigation of the plaintiff’s complaint was limited to interviewing Aaron Glenane.  Consequently, his personal assessment of the complaint as being “retarded” had no bearing on the course of the investigation.
172. [172]
     On 8 August 2019, Officer Knights identified that Anthony Bartlett had not been interviewed and that he was residing at an address at Beenleigh.  Officer Knights requested that his shift supervisor issue a task to the Beenleigh police station to interview Bartlett.  That task was issued and recorded in QPRIME.^[160]  However, it appears that the task was not actioned at that time.
173. [173]
     In the period between 8 August 2019 and 9 December 2019, it became apparent to Officer Knights that he had previously met and socialised with the plaintiff, although he had not recalled this when the plaintiff made his complaint on 15 June 2019.  A friend of Officer Knights had previously dated the plaintiff’s younger sister and, in that context, Officer Knights had visited the plaintiff’s parents’ house a number of times.  Under cross-examination, Officer Knights said that he had a negative view of the plaintiff based on things which the plaintiff’s younger sister had said to him in the past and thought that in those circumstances he should cease acting as reporting officer on the plaintiff’s complaint.  Officer Knights gave evidence that he raised this issue of a conflict with Officer Peatling and that Officer Peatling agreed with him that he should not be the reporting officer in relation to the plaintiff’s complaint.
174. [174]
     Between 9 December 2019 and 11 December 2019, Officer Knights exchanged emails with Officer Peatling in which Officer Knights referred to his friendship with the plaintiff’s sister and stated that he did not believe that he should investigate the plaintiff’s complaint any further.^[161]
175. [175]
     On 27 January 2020, Sergeant Brett Perkins from the Caboolture police station attempted to telephone the plaintiff but received no answer.  Officer Perkins left a message for the plaintiff stating that there was insufficient evidence concerning his complaint about the threats he said were made against him by RBG and that police had closed the case.^[162]  No steps were then taken in the QPS investigation for more than a year.
176. [176]
     On about 7 April 2021, Officer Peatling identified that QPS records did not confirm that a statement had ever been taken from Anthony Bartlett.  I infer that Officer Peatling was prompted to review the status of the QPS investigation of the plaintiff’s complaint following the concerns which Burns J had expressed in the hearings in March 2021 referred to at [36] to [38] above.  Officer Peatling made inquiries and established that, at that time, Anthony Bartlett was serving a term of imprisonment at the Borallon Correctional Centre.
177. [177]
     On 14 April 2021, Officer Peatling attended the Borallon Correctional Centre and interviewed Mr Bartlett about the plaintiff’s complaints.  After the interview, Officer Peatling prepared a supplementary report which summarised what Bartlett had said to him.^[163]  That supplementary report recorded that when Bartlett was living at Morayfield in early 2019 his Facebook, Messenger, Gmail and Commonwealth Bank accounts were hacked.  He confirmed that he knew RBG and had spoken to her from time to time on Facebook but that the two of them had fallen out after RBG called him (in the period after his accounts had been hacked) and abused him over the contents of Facebook posts which Bartlett had no knowledge of.  Bartlett told Officer Peatling that he believed it was the plaintiff who had hacked his accounts.  He categorically denied having any involvement in conversations with either RBG or Aaron Glenane about killing or harming the plaintiff.  He also denied printing out the Facebook messages or leaving them on the doghouse at the plaintiff’s home.
178. [178]
     In the days following his interview with Bartlett, Officer Peatling reviewed the QPS investigation of the plaintiff’s complaint.  Having reviewed the evidence gathered during the QPS investigation, Officer Peatling concluded that it was highly unlikely that the QPS could successfully prosecute any of RBG, Glenane or Bartlett on charges arising from the plaintiff’s complaint.  That conclusion was explained in a report which Officer Peatling prepared on 20 April 2021.^[164]

False imprisonment

179. [179]
     The plaintiff pleads that he was falsely imprisoned on two occasions:^[165]

     1. the period which he spent at the Fortitude Valley police station on the morning of 22 January 2019, prior to him being served with the PPN;
     2. the period between his arrest on 28 January 2019 for two contraventions of the PPN and his release from custody on 29 January 2019 after he had pleaded guilty and been sentenced for those two contraventions.  
180. [180]
     In McFadzean v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union,^[166] the Victorian Court of Appeal observed that the essence of the action for false imprisonment is the compelling of a person to stay at a particular place against his or her will.  It is not sufficient that conduct of the defendant has contributed to or influenced the plaintiff’s decision to remain at the place unless the conduct has overborne the plaintiff’s will.  It must be shown that, but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not have yielded to the restraint on his or her liberty to leave the place.^[167] 
181. [181]
     There is no requirement, however, that the imprisonment be effected by force.^[168]  It is a question of fact in each case whether a restriction is so severe as to be characterised as false imprisonment.^[169]  The restraint on the plaintiff’s liberty must be intentional on the part of the defendant,^[170] but it is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish malice or any improper motive to succeed in the action.^[171]  If a plaintiff proves that he or she has been imprisoned, the onus passes to the defendant to establish that the imprisonment was lawful.^[172]

Was the plaintiff falsely imprisoned on 22 January 2019?

182. [182]
     The plaintiff claims that he did not attend the Fortitude Valley police station voluntarily.  He says that when he arrived at the Fortitude Valley police station he was delivered into the custody of the watch house keeper and told to sit on a chair located at the front of the watch house keeper’s desk.^[173]  He submits that this action is consistent with the requirement that a person taken into custody under Pt 4, Div 2 of the DFVP Act be taken by a police officer to either a holding cell at a police station (and delivered into the custody of the most senior officer on duty) or to the watch-house (and delivered into the custody of the watch-house manager).^[174]  He accepted in cross-examination that Officer Strudwick and Officer Pyke did not handcuff him,^[175] put him in a cell^[176] or tell him that he was under arrest.^[177]  However, he said that when he was in the police station, he felt that he could not move from the seat he had been directed to or he would be arrested and put in a cell.^[178]
183. [183]
     The plaintiff also relies upon statements made by Officer Suen that he had been detained under the provisions of the DFVP Act.  As already noted in [96] above, the PPN Statement which Officer Suen prepared on 22 January 2019 contained a statement to that effect.  Officer Suen also prepared the certificate issued under s 189(3) of the DFVP Act on 19 June 2019 (see [100] above).  When Officer Pemberton signed that certificate, he believed that the plaintiff had been detained under the provisions of the DFVP Act on 22 January 2019.  Before he signed that certificate, Officer Pemberton reviewed information recorded in QPRIME concerning the investigation of RBG’s domestic violence complaint against the plaintiff, and spoke with Officer Suen.  As a result of those actions, Officer Pemberton believed that the plaintiff had been detained at the RBWH under the provisions of the DFVP Act.^[179]  I infer from Officer Pemberton’s evidence that, when he spoke to Officer Suen about the matters set out in the s 189(3) certificate, she confirmed to him that the plaintiff had been detained.  Finally, on 1 June 2020, Officer Suen prepared and signed a QPS statement which also referred to the plaintiff being detained under the provisions of the DFVP Act.^[180] 
184. [184]
     When cross-examined at the trial, Officer Suen stated that she made a mistake in the PPN Statement in referring to the plaintiff having been detained,^[181] and in the s 189(3) certificate which she prepared for Officer Pemberton in referring to herself as a releasing officer and to the plaintiff having been released from custody under stated release conditions.^[182]  She also gave evidence that her reference to the plaintiff having been detained in the QPS statement which she prepared on 1 June 2020 was an error and stated that it has always been her understanding that the plaintiff attended the Fortitude Valley police station of his own free will.^[183]
185. [185]
     It is difficult to accept Officer Suen’s evidence that it has always been her understanding that the plaintiff attended the police station of his own free will.  That would mean that, despite that being her understanding, she made the same mistake (in referring to the plaintiff having been detained) in three different documents which she prepared on three different dates.  It is more likely that Officer Suen’s repeated references to the plaintiff having been detained were the product of a belief on her part that Officer Strudwick and Officer Pyke detained the plaintiff at the RBWH before taking him to the police station. 
186. [186]
     That this was Officer Suen’s understanding does not establish that the plaintiff was, in fact, detained.  Officer Suen was not present when the plaintiff accompanied Officer Strudwick and Officer Pyke to the police station.  The explanation for Officer Suen’s understanding that the plaintiff was detained is not entirely clear, although she said in cross-examination that she made an assumption to that effect^[184] and that her reference in the PPN Statement to the plaintiff being detained was one she made “out of habit”.^[185]  Be that as it may, upon considering the available evidence, I am satisfied that Officer Suen’s understanding was mistaken.
187. [187]
     It seems clear from Officer Pyke’s statement to Officer McKeown after the plaintiff had been located in the carpark of the RWBH (see [72] above) that a decision was made that the plaintiff should be taken back to the Fortitude Valley police station.  That the officers had made this decision does not, however, compel a finding that the plaintiff was detained.  The officers could seek the plaintiff’s agreement to accompany them to the station voluntarily.  It would only be in circumstances where the plaintiff refused to accompany the officers voluntarily that it would become necessary for him to be detained.
188. [188]
     The evidence of both Officer Strudwick^[186] and Officer Pyke^[187] was that the plaintiff accompanied them voluntarily to the station and that he was never placed under arrest.  I accept that evidence.  It is consistent with Officer Pyke’s statement recorded on the body worn camera footage of the discussion with the plaintiff outside the entrance to the emergency department at the RBWH (see [75] to [77] above).  Having viewed the body worn camera footage, I accept that it does not reveal any threat, promise or inducement on the part of the officers in their discussion with the plaintiff about accompanying them to the police station.  The plaintiff conceded this when he was cross-examined.^[188]  Further, the plaintiff accepted that, in going to the police station, he wanted to give his version of events to the police.^[189] 
189. [189]
     The plaintiff’s contention that he was delivered into the custody of the watchhouse keeper was denied by both Officer Strudwick and Officer Pyke.  Both officers explained that Fortitude Valley police station is not a watch-house.^[190]  They said that the plaintiff was taken to a waiting area near the shift supervisor’s desk at the police station.^[191]  They said that the plaintiff was free to leave the police station, unless a decision was made to detain him.^[192]  Officer Pyke said that if the plaintiff had attempted to leave then Officer Pyke would have spoken to Officer Suen to find out whether she wanted to him to be detained, but that situation never arose.^[193]  I accept this evidence of Officer Strudwick and Officer Pyke.  They did not detain the plaintiff.  Nor did they deliver the plaintiff into the custody of the watchhouse keeper.
190. [190]
     I am not satisfied that the conduct of any of the QPS officers who engaged with the plaintiff on the morning of 22 January 2019 compelled the plaintiff to remain at Fortitude Valley police station.  To the contrary, I am satisfied that the plaintiff accompanied Officer Strudwick and Officer Pyke to the police station voluntarily and remained at the police station voluntarily to provide his version of events to Officer Suen.  In these circumstances, the plaintiff has not established that he was imprisoned during the period he spent at the Fortitude Valley police station on the morning of 22 January 2019.  That aspect of his claim for false imprisonment must be dismissed.

Was the plaintiff falsely imprisoned between 28 and 29 January 2019?

191. [191]
     It is common ground that the plaintiff was imprisoned from the time that he was arrested by Officer Ngawhika on 28 January 2019 for two contraventions of the PPN until his release from custody on 29 January 2019 after he had pleaded guilty and been sentenced for those two contraventions.  Consequently, on this aspect of the plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment the onus is on the defendant to demonstrate a lawful basis for that imprisonment.

Arrest by Officer Ngawhika

192. [192]
     The defendant submits that Officer Ngawhika lawfully arrested the plaintiff pursuant to s 365(1) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (PPRA), which relevantly provides:

“(1) It is lawful for a police officer, without warrant, to arrest an adult the police officer reasonably suspects has committed or is committing an offence if it is reasonably necessary for 1 or more of the following reasons—

1. to prevent the continuation or repetition of an offence or the commission of another offence;

…

5. to prevent the harassment of, or interference with, a person who may be required to give evidence relating to the offence;

…

7. to preserve the safety or welfare of any person, including the person arrested;

…

10. because the offence is an offence against the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012, section 177, 178 or 179; …”

193. [193]
     For there to be a lawful basis for the plaintiff’s arrest, the defendant must establish that:

     1. Officer Ngawhika reasonably suspected that the plaintiff had committed or was committing an offence; and
     2. it was reasonably necessary for Officer Ngawhika to arrest the plaintiff for one or more of the reasons prescribed by s 365(1) of the PPRA.

Reasonable suspicion

194. [194]
     The term “reasonably suspects” is defined in Sch 6 of the PPRA to mean “suspects on grounds that are reasonable in the circumstances”.  This concept was summarised by Dalton J (as her Honour then was) in R v Bossley:^[194]

“There is also well-established common law authority in relation to both the concept of suspicion and the concept of reasonable suspicion.  The meaning of suspicion in this context is discussed by the High Court in George v Rockett.  A suspicion and a belief are different states of mind.  A suspicion is a state of conjecture or surmise.  It is more than idle wondering.  It is positive feeling of apprehension or mistrust, but it is a slight opinion without sufficient evidence.  Facts which reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient to reasonably ground a belief.  Nonetheless, to have a reasonable suspicion some factual basis for the suspicion must exist.  There must be sufficient factual grounds reasonably to induce the suspicion.  The facts must be sufficient to induce the suspicion in the mind of a reasonable person.  The suspicion must be reasonable, as opposed to arbitrary, irrational or prejudiced. …”

195. [195]
     A suspicion is a state of mind informed by circumstances as they appear to the holder to be at the relevant time rather than the circumstances as they actually are at that time.^[195]  The requirement that the officer who purports to exercise power under s 365(1) reasonably suspect that a person has committed or is committing an offence means that the officer must personally hold the suspicion at the time the decision is taken to exercise the power of arrest and that the suspicion be objectively reasonable in the sense that it is based on facts which would create such a suspicion in the mind of a reasonable person.
196. [196]
     I accept Officer Ngawhika’s evidence that, when he arrested the plaintiff, he believed that the plaintiff was breaching the PPN conditions and that he would continue to do so if he was not stopped.^[196]  Further, Officer Nagwhika’s suspicion was reasonably based in circumstances where:

     1. he had been called to 7 Link Street, Narangba on the evening of 22 January 2019 and RBG had made a complaint that the plaintiff had come to that address while she was there;
     2. while he was taking the details of RBG’s complaint on 22 January 2019, he confirmed through inquiries on QPRIME that the PPN was in place and that it imposed a condition that the plaintiff not contact or go within 100 metres of RBG;
     3. when he arrived at 7 Link Street, Narangba on 28 January 2019 both the plaintiff and RBG were present and RBG informed him that the plaintiff was refusing to leave;
     4. when he spoke to the plaintiff on 28 January 2019, the plaintiff confirmed that he recalled being given a copy of the PPN and he was aware of its conditions, including the condition that he not contact or go within 100 metres of RBG.
197. [197]
     It was an offence under s 178 of the PPRA for the respondent to contravene the condition of the PPN that he not contact or go within 100 metres of RBG.
198. [198]
     In those circumstances, the requirement that Officer Ngawhika reasonable suspect that the plaintiff had committed, or was committing, an offence was satisfied.

Reasonable necessity for the arrest

199. [199]
     The same matters which provided a reasonable basis for Officer Ngawhika’s suspicion that the plaintiff had committed an offence on 22 January 2019, and was committing an offence on 28 January 2019, also satisfied the requirement that his arrest be reasonably necessary for at least the purposes prescribed by ss 365(1)(a) and (j) of the PPRA.

Lawfulness of the arrest

200. [200]
     I am therefore satisfied that there was a lawful basis for Officer Ngawhika to arrest the plaintiff on 28 January 2019 in circumstances where:

     1. Officer Ngawhika reasonably suspected that the plaintiff had committed the offence of contravening the conditions of the PPN on two occasions; and
     2. it was reasonably necessary for Officer Ngawhika to arrest the plaintiff, when he did, for at least two of the reasons prescribed by s 365(1) of the PPRA.

Detention after arrest

201. [201]
     Section 393(1)(a) of the PPRA provides that a police officer who arrests a person, without a warrant, must take the person before a court as soon as reasonably practicable.  However, that provision does not apply if the person arrested is delivered into the custody of a watchhouse manager or the officer in charge of a police establishment: s 393(2)(e) of the PPRA.
202. [202]
     Following the arrest on 28 January 2019, Officer Ngawhika delivered the plaintiff into the custody of the officer in charge of the Burpengary police station and, later, the watchhouse manager of the Caboolture watchhouse.^[197]  The plaintiff was refused bail (s 394(2)(a) of the PPRA) and held at the Caboolture watchhouse overnight.  I am satisfied that, in the circumstances where the plaintiff had contravened the PPN on two occasions in the week after it had been served on him that it was reasonable to refuse him bail.  The plaintiff was then taken before the Caboolture Magistrates Court the following day, 29 January 2019, and released after being dealt with for the two offences of contravening the PPN.  That met the requirement that the watchhouse manager of the Caboolture watchhouse take the plaintiff before a court as soon as reasonably practicable to be dealt with according to law: s 394(2)(d) of the PPRA.
203. [203]
     I am satisfied that the plaintiff was lawfully held in custody from the time that he was arrested by Officer Ngawhika on 28 January 2019 for two contraventions of the PPN until his release from custody on 29 January 2019 after he had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced for those two contraventions.

The plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the PPN

204. [204]
     The plaintiff alleges that he was falsely imprisoned upon his arrest on 28 January 2019 because the PPN was not validly issued.^[198]  He identifies various reasons why he says the PPN is invalid.
205. [205]
     There are two reasons why it is not necessary to set out the plaintiff’s arguments as to why he says the PPN is invalid. 
206. [206]
     First, I accept evidence given by Officer Ngawhika to the effect that the facts as they appeared to him when he arrested the plaintiff included that the PPN had been issued to the plaintiff.^[199]  The reasonableness of Officer Ngawhika’s suspicion that the plaintiff was in breach of the conditions of the PPN is to be assessed based on those facts.  It is not to be assessed in hindsight, even if the PPN was ultimately found to have been invalidly issued (see [195] above).  There is no evidence to suggest that Officer Ngawhika had any reason to think that the PPN was invalid or of no effect against the plaintiff.  No suggestion was put to Officer Ngawhika in cross-examination that he was aware, or that he should have been aware, that there was some issue with the validity of the PPN at the time he arrested the plaintiff.  As the defendant submits, what follows from this is that the facts as they appeared to Officer Ngawhika at the time of the arrest satisfied the requirements of s 365(1) of the PPRA, even if it was later to be determined that the PPN was invalidly issued.
207. [207]
     Secondly, the plaintiff challenged the validity of the PPN in arguing his application for an extension of time in which to appeal the decision of Magistrate Strofield on 23 January 2019 to make the TPO.  That challenge was rejected by Rinaudo AM DCJ (see [149] above).  The plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the PPN in this proceeding, in circumstances where he had (and took) the opportunity of contesting that issue in the application heard by Rinaudo AM DCJ, constitutes a collateral attack on the earlier decision and amounts to an abuse of process.^[200]  It has been accepted in decisions of the High Court^[201] and of the Queensland Court of Appeal^[202] that there is a need, as a matter of public policy which is part of the common law, for decisions of the courts to be accepted as incontrovertibly correct unless set aside or quashed.  To permit the plaintiff to challenge the validity of the PPN for a second time in this proceeding would be contrary to this public policy against collateral attack on a judgment.  Consequently, I accept the defendant’s submission that I should not entertain the plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the PPN in this proceeding.

Conclusion on the claim for false imprisonment

208. [208]
     For the reasons above, the plaintiff has failed to establish that he was falsely imprisoned on either 22 January 2019 or on 28-29 January 2019.  His claim for damages for false imprisonment must be dismissed.

Misfeasance in public office

209. [209]
     The tort of misfeasance in public officer is constituted by:^[203]

     1. an invalid or unauthorised act;
     2. done by a public officer;
     3. in the purported exercise of the officer’s powers or the purported discharge of the officer’s public duties;
     4. maliciously, in that the officer:
        1. (i)
           intends to cause harm to the plaintiff;
        2. (ii)
           knows that the act is invalid or in excess of power and knows it would cause, or be likely to cause, harm to the plaintiff; or
        3. (iii)
           acts with reckless indifference or wilful blindness to the invalidity or lack of power and the likely harm;
     5. loss or harm being caused to the plaintiff by the act.
210. [210]
     In pleading his claim for misfeasance in public office, the plaintiff has identified the invalid or unauthorised act as being the falsification of the TPO by including conditions on the order which were not authorised by Magistrate Strofield (see [106] to [108] above). The plaintiff further pleads that this act was done by Officer Suen.^[204]
211. [211]
     I understood the plaintiff’s argument to be that the TPO contained orders (paragraphs 4 and 5) which Magistrate Strofield did not include when the order was pronounced on 23 January 2019.^[205]  I do not accept this submission. 
212. [212]
     It is important to recognise that Magistrate Strofield made the TPO because the plaintiff had sent an email to the court seeking an adjournment of the QPS Application.^[206]  Thus the TPO was made under s 44(1)(a) of the DFVP Act. There was no application by the police for a temporary protection order.  Consequently, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions,^[207] ss 130 to 132 of the DFVP Act were not engaged.
213. [213]
     In identifying the conditions of the TPO, Magistrate Strofield commenced by stating that it would contain “the mandatory conditions”.  This was a reference to the requirement that a court making a domestic violence order, which includes a temporary protection order,^[208] must impose a condition that the respondent (a) be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved and not commit domestic violence towards the aggrieved, and (b) be of good behaviour towards a named person and not commit associated domestic violence against the named person.^[209]  These standard conditions, or “mandatory conditions” as Magistrate Strofield referred to them, were included as paragraphs 1 and 2 of the TPO.
214. [214]
     In addition to imposing those standard conditions, Magistrate Strofield also imposed further conditions which his Honour was authorised to do.^[210]  His Honour identified these further conditions as “the three by no contact conditions, no locate conditions, not follow or approach within 100 meters condition except when coming to this Court.” 
215. [215]
     In the TPO, the “no locate condition” is set out in paragraph 6 and the “not follow or approach “condition” is set out in paragraph 7. 
216. [216]
     That leaves the “three by no contact conditions” which can only be understood as being the conditions which are set out in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the TPO.  Each of those paragraphs prohibits the respondent from contacting RBG.  Paragraph 3 does so in general terms, while paragraphs 4 and 5 both refer to specific means of communication.  In my view, Magistrate Strofield’s use of the words “the three by no contact conditions” was simply a shorthand way of stating that there would be three forms of no contact condition made as part of the TPO. 
217. [217]
     In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the inclusion of paragraphs 4 and 5 in the TPO amounted to a falsification of the court order.  The plaintiff has failed to establish that the issuing of the TPO which included those paragraphs was an invalid or unauthorised act.
218. [218]
     Even if the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing the first element of the tort, there is no evidence that Officer Suen prepared the TPO. 
219. [219]
     During cross-examination at the end of the first day of the trial, the plaintiff was referred to an earlier version of his claim in which he alleged that the TPO was falsified by an unknown member of the QPS.^[211]  There was then the following exchange:^[212]

“Now, I understand that you don’t any longer say that person is unknown?‑‑‑No, but it’s still unknown.  I don’t know who exactly altered it, but I – all I know is it’s been altered.

Okay.  Well, can I suggest to you that in your statement of claim ‑ ‑ ‑?‑‑‑I alleged that Alison Suen did it.”

220. [220]
     When the cross-examination resumed on the second day of the trial, there was a further exchange as follows:

“And where we got to on that was, originally, in your claim, It was an unknown officer.  You weren’t certain who was the person that falsified the instrument?‑‑‑Yes.

But you’ve since come to allege that it is Allison Suen that has done so?‑‑‑That it’s more probably than it isn’t that it’s Allison Suen than anyone.  Yes.

Yes, but that’s – just so we can be clear – the only person that you say has done it is Allison Suen?‑‑‑Well, the – I’m saying that because she’s done a lot of other documents that weren’t, like, legitimate, that it’s more probable than it isn’t that it was her.  I’m not ruling out any other officer; I’m just saying that that’s the conclusion.  I can’t say for certain it was her, because I don’t have access to that sort of ‑ ‑ ‑

So you’re speculating that it might be her?‑‑‑Oh, it’s – on balance, I’ve weighed up the odds of it – of who it would be.”

221. [221]
     Officer Suen’s evidence was that she was not in the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 23 January 2019 and was not aware that the TPO had been made.^[213]  She said that she did not create the document which was issued as the TPO.^[214]  On that basis, she expressly denied having falsified the TPO.^[215]
222. [222]
     I accept the evidence of Officer Suen on this issue.  There is no credible evidence that Officer Suen was involved in the preparation of the TPO, or that she falsified that document.  The plaintiff’s allegation that Officer Suen falsified the TPO is pure speculation.
223. [223]
     The plaintiff has failed to establish that there was an invalid or unauthorised act done by a public officer.  In those circumstances, his claim for misfeasance in public office must be dismissed.

Collateral abuse of process

224. [224]
     In Butler v Simmonds Crowley & Galvin,^[216] the Court of Appeal held that for a plaintiff to succeed in an action for collateral abuse of process, it is not sufficient to assert that a legal process has been instituted for an improper motive.  The plaintiff must show that the defendant instituted the legal process to effect an object beyond that which the legal process offered, which can be seen as the predominant purpose of the legal process and as outweighing any legitimate purpose that it might otherwise have.^[217]  The reference to “motive” in this context is used in the sense of the reason the defendant instituted the legal process, as distinct from “purpose” which is used in the sense of the object sought to be effected by the institution of the legal process.^[218]
225. [225]
     Further, the Court of Appeal held that an improper act in the prosecution of the process is also a necessary element of the tort of collateral abuse of process.^[219]
226. [226]
     Consistently with this, in Burton v Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions,^[220] Bell P (as his Honour then was) summarised the elements of the tort of collateral abuse of process as follows:

“(1) The alleged tortfeasor must have instituted a legal process for an improper purpose.

2. The legal process in question must have been misused in order to obtain some advantage or benefit ‘entirely outside’ that afforded by the legal process invoked – hence, a collateral advantage.

3. The process in question must have been deployed in furtherance of the alleged tortfeasor’s improper purpose by way of an overt act or threat, distinct from pursuit of the proceeding itself according to its ordinary course – though in certain circumstances, the commencement of proceedings can be a sufficient act where there has been some improper conduct on the part of the alleged tortfeasor.”

227. [227]
     In pleading his action for collateral abuse of process, the plaintiff has identified two forms of legal process which he claims have been the subject of collateral abuse by the QPS:

     1. the bringing and maintaining of the QPS Application against the plaintiff;^[221]
     2. charging the plaintiff on 26 March 2019 with the offences referred to at [131] above: breach of the PPN, breach of the TPO and two offences under the Weapons Act.^[222]  

Pursuing the QPS Application

228. [228]
     The essence of this aspect of the plaintiff’s claim appears to be:

     1. Officer Suen (and others who the plaintiff does not identify but says were acting in “an official capacity”) acted on behalf of RBG in bringing the QPS Application against the plaintiff;^[223]
     2. the QPS Application was commenced not long after RBG had told the plaintiff that she was an “undercover police officer”;^[224]
     3. the QPS Application was used by RBG as a tool to inflict domestic violence on the plaintiff while rendering him helpless and defenceless to her attacks;^[225]
     4. the QPS Application was made based upon fabricated evidence and false allegations that RBG had made against the plaintiff.^[226]
229. [229]
     From this I understand that, expressed by reference to the elements of the tort of collateral abuse of process, the plaintiff’s case is:

     1. the ulterior objective or collateral advantage which Officer Suen and others sought to effect by pursuing the QPS Application was to hinder the plaintiff’s ability to resist or otherwise respond to actions RBG was taking against him;
     2. the improper act in the prosecution of the QPS Application was either fabricating evidence used in that application or relying upon evidence which was known to have been fabricated by RBG.
230. [230]
     Framed in this way, this aspect of the plaintiff’s action for collateral abuse of process depends on an acceptance that RBG was an undercover police officer and that the actions of Officer Suen and others in the conduct of the QPS Application were intended to benefit RBG because she had that purported connection with the QPS.  I have already concluded that there is no basis in the evidence to find that RBG was an undercover police officer or a police informant.  Nor is there any basis in the evidence to find that Officer Suen (or anyone else) inquired into RBG’s complaint of domestic violence, issued the PPN to the plaintiff or pursued the QPS Application for any purpose beyond that which the processes under the DFVP Act offered: that is, the making of a protection order for the benefit of RBG which prohibited the plaintiff from committing domestic violence against her.  There is no evidence that Officer Suen (or anyone else) invoked the process under the DFVP Act to hinder the plaintiff’s ability to resist the commission of domestic violence against him by RBG.  There is no basis to conclude that such an ulterior objective was the predominant purpose of pursuing the QPS Application, outweighing the legitimate purpose of obtaining a protection order for the benefit of RBG.
231. [231]
     In any event, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has proved that there was any improper act in the prosecution of the QPS Application.
232. [232]
     There is no evidence that Officer Suen (or anyone else) sought to maintain the QPS Application based on evidence which that person knew to have been fabricated by RBG.
233. [233]
     As to the allegation that QPS officers fabricated evidence themselves, the plaintiff appeared to rely upon four matters.
234. [234]
     First, is the plaintiff’s assertion that Officer Suen falsified the TPO.  I have already found that there is no basis in the evidence to support that assertion.
235. [235]
     Secondly, the plaintiff alleges that Officer Suen fabricated the certificate issued under s 189(3) of the DFVP Act on 19 June 2019 (see [100] above).^[227]  I have already addressed the error in that certificate and concluded it was the result of Officer Suen’s mistaken belief that the plaintiff had been detained when he was taken to Fortitude Valley police station on 22 January 2019 (see [183]–[186] above).  I do not accept that Officer Suen fabricated the certificate in the sense of preparing a certificate which she knew to be false.
236. [236]
     Thirdly, the plaintiff alleges that Constable Chai-I (Zoy) Lin knowingly filed a false document in the Brisbane Magistrates Court, being a statement of police service, in an attempt to mislead the Court.^[228]  Officer Lin signed the statement of police service on 20 February 2019.^[229]  In that statement, Officer Lin affirmed that at 8:00 pm on Thursday, 20 February 2019 she had personally served the plaintiff with a notice of adjournment of the QPS Application.  In her evidence at the trial, Officer Lin confirmed that the contents of the statement of police service were true.
237. [237]
     The plaintiff deposed that the notice of adjournment was not in fact served upon him.  In support of that position he relied on the circumstances that: the address included on that notice was the address from which the plaintiff had conducted his kitchen business before the PPN was issued, not his residential address; that on the date Officer Lin says that she served him with the notice of adjournment he was experiencing trauma and had shut himself away and was in fear for his life; and that 20 February 2019 was a Wednesday, not a Thursday as stated by Officer Lin.^[230]  When the plaintiff cross-examined Officer Lin about these matters she said that she could not recall the address where she served the plaintiff with the notice of adjournment but maintained that she had done so.  She also said that she was not aware of the error concerning the day of the week.
238. [238]
     I do not accept the plaintiff’s evidence that he was not served with the notice of adjournment by Officer Lin.  The plaintiff attended the Burpengary police station on 26 March 2019 under the belief that he was to be served with documents (see [128] above).  He provides no explanation for why he would do this only about a month after he claims to have been so scared for his life that he had shut himself away from the world.  Further, the notice of adjournment recorded that the QPS Application had been adjourned to 13 March 2019.  The plaintiff appeared in court on that date when the adjourned application came back on for further mention (see [127] above).  He provides no explanation as to how he was made aware of the requirement for him to appear on the date to which the QPS Application had been adjourned if he had not been served with the notice of adjournment.  Against those matters, the plaintiff has not identified any reason why Officer Lin would falsely state that she served him with the notice of adjournment.  Nor can I identify any reason why Officer Lin would act in such a way. 
239. [239]
     I accept Officer Lin’s evidence that she personally served the plaintiff with the notice of adjournment at 8:00 pm on 20 February 2019.  Neither the incorrect reference to 20 February 2019 being a Thursday, nor Officer Lin’s failure to recall, more than four years later, the address where she served the plaintiff causes me to doubt that Officer Lin served the notice of adjournment.  It follows that I am not satisfied that Officer Lin fabricated the statement of police service in the sense of preparing a statement which she knew to be false.
240. [240]
     Fourthly, the plaintiff alleges that on 29 March 2019, Officer Sharp knowingly filed a misleading document in the Brisbane Magistrates Court, being a statement of police service, in an attempt to mislead the Court.^[231]  In response to this allegation, the defendant admitted that Officer Sharp made a statement of police service in which he stated that, on 26 March 2019, he personally served the plaintiff with a copy of a notice of adjournment dated 13 March 2019 but denied that Officer Sharp had made a false statement.  The statement of police service was not exhibited to Officer Sharp’s affidavit.^[232]  The plaintiff did not tender a copy of the statement of police service which he alleges was falsely made.
241. [241]
     The plaintiff deposed that an application “was falsely alleged to have been served on the 26^th of March 2019”,^[233] when charges were laid against him at the Burpengary police station (see [128]–[132] above).  I understand this to be a reference to the statement of police service prepared by Officer Sharp, although the plaintiff did not say so in express terms.
242. [242]
     It is clear that, on 26 March 2019, Officer Sharp served the plaintiff with a notice of adjournment of the QPS Application and the directions made by Magistrate Strofield on 13 March 2019.  That occurred after the plaintiff had signed his bail undertaking in respect of the charges laid by Officer Sharp at the Burpengary police station.  The service of the documents was captured on the footage recorded by Officer Sharp’s body worn camera.^[234] 
243. [243]
     In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that there is a basis to find that Officer Sharp fabricated the statement of police service in the sense of preparing a statement which he knew to be false.  The plaintiff did not clearly identify what part or parts of the statement of police service he alleges were made falsely.  Even if he had done so, without the terms of the statement of police service being in evidence it is not possible to conclude that any part of it was false.
244. [244]
     The plaintiff’s claim that bringing and maintaining the QPS Application constituted a collateral abuse of process must be dismissed.

Arrest and charging on 26 March 2019

245. [245]
     The plaintiff pleads that Officer Hasler arrested him, and Officer Sharp subsequently charged him, with offences which those officers knew he had not committed.  He further pleads that QPS officers tampered with the rifle which Officer O'Connor and Officer Hasler had located on 21 January 2019 at the shed which housed the plaintiff’s workshop.  He also pleads that QPS officers falsified a court order.^[235]  I understand this last matter to be reference to the plaintiff’s allegation that Officer Suen falsified the TPO.
246. [246]
     The plaintiff expressly pleads that Officer Sharp sought to achieve a collateral purpose by charging him and imposing bail conditions which required that he report to Burpengary police station three times per week, but does not identify in the pleading what the collateral purpose was.  In his evidence, the plaintiff asserted that the bail conditions which were imposed after he was charged on 26 March 2019 meant that he was unable to escape the threat which he was subject to (I infer from RBG).^[236]  Elsewhere in his evidence, the plaintiff asserted that he was charged and made subject to bail conditions in order to conceal the unlawful issuing of the PPN on 22 January 2019 and to justify the conditions contained on the TPO that had expired upon the withdrawal of the PPN.^[237]
247. [247]
     From this I understand that, expressed by reference to the elements of the tort of collateral abuse of process, the plaintiff’s claim is that:

     1. the ulterior objective or collateral advantage which Officer Sharp sought to achieve by charging the plaintiff and releasing him upon bail conditions which required him to regularly report to police was to either:
        1. (i)
           hinder the plaintiff’s ability to escape from the threat posed by actions that RBG was taking against him; or
        2. (ii)
           conceal the unlawful issuing of the PPN on 22 January 2019 and to justify the conditions contained on the TPO that had expired upon the withdrawal of the PPN.
     2. the improper act in charging him and imposing bail conditions was (in the case of the weapons offences) tampering with the rifle and (in the case of the DFVP Act offences) falsifying the TPO.
248. [248]
     As already observed in [230] above, understood in this way, this aspect of the plaintiff’s action for collateral abuse of process depends on an acceptance that RBG was an undercover police officer and that the actions of Officer Sharp in charging the plaintiff and imposing bail conditions were intended to benefit RBG because she had that connection with the QPS.  I have already concluded that there is no basis in the evidence to find that RBG was an undercover police officer or a police informant. 
249. [249]
     Nor is there any basis in the evidence to find that Officer Sharp charged the plaintiff for any purpose beyond enforcing the law, or that he imposed bail conditions for any purpose beyond that provided for under the Bail Act 1980 (Qld). 
250. [250]
     As to the basis for laying charges for the weapons offences, Officer Sharp’s evidence was that he had regard to information that:

     1. Officer O'Connor and Officer Hasler had located and seized the rifle from the shed where the plaintiff operated his workshop;
     2. the informant with respect to the rifle (David Ebborn) had told Officer O'Connor and Officer Hasler that he had heard reports of gunshots from behind the shed and had located spent shell casings in the yard and the shed;
     3. the informant’s brother (Eddie Ebborn) had told Officer O'Connor and Officer Hasler that the plaintiff had tried to sell the rifle to him;
     4. Officer Hasler had the rifle looked at by an officer from Scenes of Crime who believed the firearm had been shortened.
251. [251]
     Officer Sharp also said that he had regard to photographs of the rifle which showed marks similar to those that a grinder would make in the location where the serial number would normally be located on the rifle.
252. [252]
     As to the basis for laying charges for the DFVP Act offences, Officer Sharp’s evidence was that he reviewed QPRIME and found that the PPN was in force at the time which prohibited the plaintiff from contacting RBG.  He had regard to information he obtained from QPRIME that RBG had complained to police that the plaintiff had breached the PPN by calling her and texting her, and that similar behaviour continued after the TPO had been made and served on the plaintiff.
253. [253]
     Officer Sharp said that, from these matters, he formed the view that there was reasonable and probable cause to charge the plaintiff with the weapons offences and the DFVP Act offences.
254. [254]
     During cross-examination, the plaintiff did not put to Officer Sharp that, when he charged the plaintiff and imposed bail conditions, he:

     1. knew that the plaintiff was not guilty of the weapons offences or the DFVP Act offences;
     2. did not believe there was reasonable and probable cause to lay the charges and to impose the bail conditions;
     3. laid the charges and imposed the bail conditions for a collateral purpose, whether that be either of the purposes identified at [247](a) above or any other purpose.
255. [255]
     I am not satisfied that Officer Sharp charged the plaintiff or imposed bail conditions for any collateral purpose.  There is no basis to conclude that any ulterior objective was the predominant purpose of charging the plaintiff or imposing bail conditions, outweighing the legitimate purposes for taking those steps.
256. [256]
     I am also not satisfied that the plaintiff has demonstrated any improper conduct on the part of QPS officers in pursuing the DFVP Act charges or in imposing bail conditions in respect of those charges.  I have rejected the plaintiff’s submission that Officer Suen falsified the TPO and, consequently, do not accept that was improper conduct related to the bringing or maintaining of the DFVP Act charges. 
257. [257]
     As to the allegation that police tampered with the rifle, the plaintiff’s evidence was that the firearm was a 0.22 calibre rifle with a 24-inch barrel which did not have any grinder marks or gouges on it.  It had a shortened stock, but it was over 80cm in length when the plaintiff last had control over it.  He said it was a category A weapon for the purposes of the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld),^[238] because it was a rim-fire rifle.^[239]  The plaintiff also tendered an affidavit which attached documents which he asserted proved the facts alleged in his pleading, including the allegation that police tampered with the rifle recovered from the shed at Burpengary.^[240]  I have set out the relevant parts of that evidence in addressing the dealings which QPS officers had with the rifle after it was seized (see [48]–[57] above).
258. [258]
     From that material, the plaintiff identified the following matters which he submits are sufficient to establish on the balance of probabilities that the firearm which is the subject of the weapons charges is not the same as the rifle taken from the shed at Burpengary on 21 January 2019:

     1. Officer O'Connor’s statement that she “deleted” what the plaintiff argues were “the only photographs that could have proven for certain that it was not the same firearm” as that in respect of which he has been charged;
     2. storage of the rifle in a temporary room overnight from 6:00 pm on 21 January 2019 until 10:00 am on 22 January 2019;
     3. an assertion (without reference to supporting evidence) that the rifle went missing during an audit on 14 August 2019 and reappeared a month later without being checked out or checked in to the ballistics store of the QPS Forensic Services Group;
     4. the existence of QPS photographs showing the rifle to be over 75 cm long;
     5. the existence of a photograph showing that the barrel of the had not been cut down;
     6. the reference on the property receipt to the rifle as being a category A rimfire rifle;
     7. the reference to two different exhibit numbers in Officer Hutton’s statement of 12 May 2020;^[241]
     8. the failure by the defendant to call Officer Hasler as a witness at the trial;^[242]
     9. Officer O'Connor’s incorrect description of the weapon as a “shotgun” during cross-examination.^[243]
259. [259]
     There are a number of discrepancies in the evidence concerning the rifle and the weapons charges laid against the plaintiff: conflicting descriptions of the rifle as a category A weapon in some documents and a category H weapons in other documents; varying descriptions of the length of the rifle, with some being less than 75 cm and others more than 75 cm; Officer O'Connor’s reference in her statement to having “deleted” photographs whereas her evidence at trial was that she was prevented from downloading the photographs by her faulty mobile phone.  Nevertheless, none of the matters identified by the plaintiff satisfy me that QPS officers have tampered with the rifle seized from the shed at Burpengary or switched that rifle with another weapon.  That is a serious allegation.  The evidence which the plaintiff relies upon falls well short of supporting a finding that QPS officers engaged in such serious misconduct.
260. [260]
     From this, it follows that I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has demonstrated any improper conduct on the part of QPS Officers in pursuing the weapons charges or in imposing bail conditions in respect of those charges. 
261. [261]
     The plaintiff’s claim for collateral abuse of process concerning the charges laid against him on 26 March 2019 must also be dismissed.

Malicious prosecution

262. [262]
     The plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution concerns the fraud charge laid by Officer Fleming on 7 April 2019 arising from the failure to install the kitchen for Mr Alchin and Ms Smith.^[244]  The plaintiff alleges that Officer Fleming laid the fraud charge without having reasonable cause or evidence to support the charge and were maintained after he had provided information which supported his innocence. 
263. [263]
     To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must establish: (1) that criminal proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) that the proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff; (3) that the defendant, in initiating or maintaining the proceedings acted maliciously; and (4) that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause.^[245]
264. [264]
     The defendant accepts that the first two elements are satisfied: that is, Officer Fleming prosecuted the fraud charge (and subsequently the replacement stealing charge) against the plaintiff and the proceedings terminated in favour of the plaintiff.  It is the third and fourth elements, malice and absence of reasonable and probable cause, that must be considered in this case.

Reasonable and probable cause

265. [265]
     The plaintiff may seek to establish the negative proposition that Officer Fleming acted without reasonable and probable cause in either or both of two ways: first, that Officer Fleming did not honestly believe the charge that she brought and maintained against him; secondly, that there was no sufficient basis for such a belief.^[246] 
266. [266]
     The first issue raises a subjective inquiry as to what Officer Fleming made of the material which was available to her when she decided to bring or maintain the charge.  The plaintiff would succeed on this first issue if Officer Fleming could be shown not to have honestly concluded that the material before her was such as to warrant setting the processes of the criminal law in motion.  That might be done by showing that Officer Fleming was of the view that the charge would likely fail at committal or would likely be abandoned by the Director of Public Prosecutions, if or when that officer became involved in the prosecution.^[247]
267. [267]
     Officer Fleming’s evidence at trial was that, when she issued the notice to appear, she considered the text messages from the plaintiff to Mr Alchin delaying the installation of the kitchen and his conduct in avoiding Mr Alchin to be evidence that the plaintiff did not intend to undertake the kitchen installation when he received the deposit from Mr Alchin and Ms Smith.  Consequently, she was satisfied that there was a prima facie case against the plaintiff for having committed the offence of fraud by dishonestly gaining a benefit or advantage.^[248]  I accept that evidence.  I am satisfied that, when Officer Fleming issued the notice to appear, she honestly believed that the fraud charge was justified.
268. [268]
     The second issue involves an objective assessment to ascertain what Officer Fleming should have made of the material which was available to her.  That is, whether that material would have led a reasonable person to the conclusion that the plaintiff was probably guilty of the fraud charge.
269. [269]
     Although not conceding the point, the defendant accepts that it is open to find that the plaintiff’s avoidance of Mr Alchin after he had received the deposit was not evidence of an intention to defraud.  That conduct could be equally consistent with the plaintiff having intended to instal the kitchen but finding himself unable, for other reasons, to make good on that intention.  On that basis, the defendant accepts that it is open to find that there was not reasonable and probable cause for Officer Fleming to bring the fraud charge.
270. [270]
     Ultimately, it has not been necessary for me to reach a concluded view on whether there was a sufficient basis for Officer Fleming’s honest belief.  That is because the plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution must fail in any event because he has not established that Officer Fleming acted maliciously when she brought and maintained the charge against the plaintiff.

Malice

271. [271]
     To establish malice on the part of Officer Fleming, the plaintiff must show that her purpose in bringing or maintaining the charge was a purpose other than the proper invocation of the criminal law.  The improper purpose must be shown to be the sole or dominant purpose actuating Officer Fleming.  This requires that the plaintiff identify the improper purpose and prove its existence.  Such proof can be a matter of inference, but conjecture or suspicion is not sufficient.^[249]
272. [272]
     The plaintiff submits that the following matters establish the element of malice:

     1. the complaint made by Mr Alchin and Ms Smith should have been treated as a civil matter in circumstances where they had a kitchen installed by the plaintiff’s brother for a cost that was only $900 more than the plaintiff had quoted;
     2. Officer Fleming refused to prosecute RBG for (on the plaintiff’s account) stealing $5,700 from the deposit monies;
     3. Officer Fleming maintained the charge even though the plaintiff produced what he considered to be sufficient evidence to establish his innocence;
     4. Officer Fleming was made aware by the plaintiff that RBG had arranged a meeting with Mr Alchin and Ms Smith to form a plan of attack to bring false accusations against him in circumstances where RBG’s intention was to ensure that he was falsely imprisoned and murdered while in custody;
     5. RBG, as a police officer and a witness in the fraud proceeding, was driven by malice towards him.^[250] 
273. [273]
     None of the matters which the plaintiff relies upon identify the improper purpose for which Officer Fleming brought and maintained the charge against him.  To the extent that the plaintiff relies on his overarching submission of a police conspiracy to murder him, I have already rejected the submission that Officer Fleming (or any other QPS officer) was part of any such conspiracy.
274. [274]
     In considering the issue of reasonable and probable cause I concluded that, when she brought the fraud charge, Officer Fleming honestly believed that the fraud charge was justified.  During cross-examination, Officer Fleming specifically denied the suggestion that she bore any ill will towards the plaintiff.  She explained that, in circumstances where Mr Alchin had paid the plaintiff $8450 to install a kitchen, the plaintiff had not installed the kitchen and had also failed to return Mr Alchin’s money, she considered that the plaintiff had committed a crime.  That is why she brought the charge against the plaintiff.
275. [275]
     Officer Fleming also confirmed that none of the information which the plaintiff provided to her during his recorded interview, or any information she received during her further investigation of the complaint after that interview, changed her view that the charge was justified. 
276. [276]
     As to the plaintiff’s claim that RBG had taken part of the deposit money, Officer Fleming said that she had turned her mind to the question whether RBG should also be charged with fraud.  Officer Fleming interviewed RBG as a suspect, but ultimately concluded that there was not enough evidence to proceed with a charge against her.  That is, there was insufficient evidence that RBG was involved in promising to install the kitchen, receiving the deposit for the installation and failing to undertake the kitchen installation.  After reaching that conclusion, Officer Fleming treated RBG as a witness.
277. [277]
     As to the completion of the kitchen by the plaintiff’s brother, Officer Fleming referred to a telephone conversation in which the plaintiff’s brother had said words to the effect that he had done that at cost in circumstances where the plaintiff had ripped off Mr Alchin and Ms Smith and they had begun raising the complaint with the plaintiff’s father.  To Officer Fleming’s mind, the fact that the plaintiff’s brother had installed a kitchen did not alter the criminality of the plaintiff’s conduct.
278. [278]
     I accept Officer Fleming’s evidence.  I am satisfied that when she brought and maintained the charge against the plaintiff, she did so for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law.  I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has established that Officer Fleming acted for any other purpose.
279. [279]
     Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution must be dismissed.

Negligence

280. [280]
     As I understand the plaintiff’s pleaded case, his action for negligence has two components:

     1. that, in investigating RBG’s complaint of domestic violence and issuing the PPN, Officer Suen breached a duty of care which she owed to the plaintiff thereby causing him economic loss;^[251]
     2. that, the QPS officers the plaintiff complained to about RBG’s threats to harm him breached a duty of care which they owed to him to investigate the complaint and protect the plaintiff from the threatened harm.^[252]

General principles as to the existence of a duty of care

281. [281]
     The plaintiff’s action for negligence raises the issue whether a statutory authority (in this case, the QPS) owes a common law duty of care to an individual or to a member of a particular class of persons.
282. [282]
     In Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan,^[253] Gleeson CJ drew a distinction between a statutory duty owed to the public in general and a duty owed to a particular member of the public, observing that:^[254]

“… A legislative grant of power to protect the general public does not ordinarily give rise to a duty owed to an individual or to the members of a particular class.”

283. [283]
     In the same case, Gummow and Hayne JJ addressed the issue as follows:^[255]

“[146] The existence or otherwise of a common law duty of care allegedly owed by a statutory authority turns on a close examination of the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statutory regime.  The question is whether that regime erects or facilitates a relationship between the authority and a class of persons that, in all the circumstances, displays sufficient characteristics answering the criteria for intervention by the tort of negligence.

[147] Where the question posed above is answered in the affirmative, the common law imposes a duty in tort which operates alongside the rights, duties and liabilities created by statute.  In some instances, a statutory regime may itself, in express terms or by necessary implication, exclude the concurrent operation of a duty at common law. …

…

[149] An evaluation of whether a relationship between a statutory authority and a class of persons imports a common law duty of care is necessarily a multi-faceted inquiry.  Each of the salient features of the relationship must be considered.  The focus of analysis is the relevant legislation and the positions occupied by the parties on the facts as found at trial.  It ordinarily will be necessary to consider the degree and nature of control exercised by the authority over the risk of harm that eventuated; the degree of vulnerability of those who depend on the proper exercise by the authority of its powers; and the consistency or otherwise of the asserted duty of care with the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant statute.”

284. [284]
     Further to their Honours’ reference in [149] of that passage to “salient features”, in Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar^[256] Allsop P (as his Honour then was) identified a non-exhaustive list of such features that might be considered in appropriate circumstances in considering whether a duty of care exists and in identifying its scope and content.  As Basten JA observed in Fuller-Wilson v New South Wales,^[257] although the factors identified in Stavar (a case involving private parties) were expressed in terms equally applicable to private parties and to public authorities, a case involving a public authority requires a different focus.  To similar effect, in Jennings v Police,^[258] Kourakis CJ noted that applying the considerations identified in [149] of Graham Barclay Oysters to the common law and statutory obligations of police officers can be problematic.
285. [285]
     It is important to note that the two aspects of the plaintiff’s negligence claim each require consideration of a different form of relationship between the plaintiff and the QPS officers alleged to be subject to the duty of care.
286. [286]
     As to the first aspect of the claim, Officer Suen was investigating a claim of domestic violence made by RBG against the plaintiff.  In Sullivan v Moody,^[259] the High Court stated:

“… when public authorities, or their officers, are charged with the responsibility of conducting investigations, or exercising powers, in the public interest, or in the interests of a specified class of persons, the law would not ordinarily subject them to a duty to have regard to the interests of another class of persons where that would impose upon them conflicting claims or obligations.”

287. [287]
     This passage was cited by Campbell JA in New South Wales v Tyszyk^[260] in support of the principle that a common law duty of care cannot be imposed on a statutory duty if the observance of such common law duty of care would be inconsistent with, or have a tendency to discourage, the due performance of the statutory duty.
288. [288]
     To similar effect, several of the judgments in Tame v New South Wales^[261] contained statements to the effect that a police officer will not usually have any duty of care to a person under investigation.  As explained by Gummow and Kirby JJ,^[262] that is because such a duty would appear to be inconsistent with the police officer’s duty, based in the statutory framework by which the relevant police service is established and maintained, to fully investigate the conduct in question.
289. [289]
     In Jennings,^[263] Kourakis CJ recognised that, although the ratio of the decision in Tame may not strictly extend to the preclusion of a duty of care because of its incompatibility with the public duty of the police, the observations made by the High Court in that case compel a close consideration of the way in which the proposed duty of care affects, compromises or detracts from any identified policing duty owed to the public. 
290. [290]
     As to the second aspect of the claim, the QPS officers alleged to be subject to the duty of care were responding to a complaint by the plaintiff of criminal conduct against him by RBG.  In Peat v Lin,^[264] Atkinson J observed that the trend of authority is comprehensively against the proposition that a police officer has a duty in tort to an individual member of the public to prevent a crime from happening to a particular person,^[265] referring, among other authorities, to the decision of the House of Lords in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire^[266] and the High Court’s approval of that decision in Sullivan v Moody.^[267]  Her Honour went on to observe:^[268]

“There is, however, no binding authority that police officers enjoy a blanket immunity from liability in tort in the investigation and prevention of crime although they are ‘generally exempt’ from liability.  Ordinarily, remedies by members of the public against the police are found in public law or the torts of false imprisonment or malicious prosecution.  A police officer may assume a duty of care to a member of the public in situations where the police have custody of the person or where the police have committed criminal acts against an accused person by fabricating evidence or conspiring to give false evidence.  This is not such a case.”

291. [291]
     A similar position was expressed more recently in the Victorian decision of Smith v State of Victoria,^[269] where John Dixon J concluded, after reviewing earlier authorities,^[270] that a duty of care to investigate criminal conduct will not arise other than in exceptional circumstances.

The conduct of Officer Suen

Duty of care

292. [292]
     The statutory scheme that formed the background to the conduct of Officer Suen on 22 January 2019 was one in which the safety, protection and wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence are paramount.^[271]
293. [293]
     When Officer Suen spoke to RBG at the RBWH, and subsequently to the plaintiff at the Fortitude Valley police station, she was performing the statutory duty of a police officer to investigate a complaint, report or circumstance which causes that officer to reasonably suspect that domestic violence has been committed.^[272] 
294. [294]
     If, having undertaken the investigation, the officer reasonably believes domestic violence has been committed then the officer must consider whether it is either necessary or desirable to take any action to protect a person from further domestic violence.  Issuing a police protection notice is one of the actions which the officer must consider taking in such circumstances.^[273]  If the person who the officer reasonably believes has committed domestic violence is not taken into custody then the officer may issue that person with a police protection notice if, among other things, the officer reasonably believes that such a notice is either necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved person from domestic violence.^[274]  A police officer who issues a police protection notice may impose a no-contact condition if that officer reasonably believes that the condition is necessary or desirable to, among other things, protect the aggrieved from domestic violence.^[275]
295. [295]
     Where the same two parties are involved, if the officer issues a police protection notice that names a person as a respondent and another person as the aggrieved, then  the officer cannot issue a cross-notice that names the respondent to the first notice as the aggrieved and the aggrieved named in the first notice as a respondent until that first notice stops having effect.^[276]  This statutory constraint on police officers issuing cross-notices means that an officer confronted with conflicting allegations of domestic violence is required to identify the person who is most in need of protection in the relationship and issue a police protection notice which acts to protect that person from domestic violence.^[277]
296. [296]
     The effective discharge of the police functions just described requires that police officers are free to act without apprehension as to possible adverse consequences for a person that an officer reasonably believes has committed domestic violence or legal liability to such a person.  Further, to subject police officers to a duty to take care to protect persons who are reasonably believed to have committed domestic violence would conflict with the officers’ statutory obligation to treat the safety, protection and wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence as paramount. 
297. [297]
     In these circumstances, the imposition of a duty of care owed to a person in the plaintiff’s position would be inconsistent with the proper and effective discharge of the statutory duties which Officer Suen performed on 22 January 2019.  This important feature of the relationship between Officer Suen and the plaintiff weighs heavily against the imposition of a duty of care.  I do not consider that any of the other salient features referred to in Stavar,^[278] or pleaded by the plaintiff (many of which are difficult to understand in the context of the claim of negligence on the part of Officer Suen),^[279] justify a different conclusion.
298. [298]
     For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the relationship between Officer Suen and the plaintiff was of such a character that it would be reasonable to require that, in investigating RBG’s complaint of domestic violence and determining to issue the PPN, she should have regard to the danger that the plaintiff might suffer economic loss, or any other form of loss, because of her actions. 

Causation and loss

299. [299]
     My finding that Officer Suen was not subject to a duty of care is sufficient to dispose of the first aspect of the plaintiff’s action for negligence.  There are, however, further reasons why that aspect of the claim must be dismissed: the plaintiff failed to establish that Officer Suen’s actions caused the pleaded loss and failed to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the quantum of that alleged loss.
300. [300]
     The loss the plaintiff claims to have suffered arises from the closure of his kitchen business.  In cross-examination, the plaintiff confirmed that it was the closure of the kitchen business he operated before he met RBG (original business) which had caused him loss and that the business he claimed to have run in partnership with RBG “never really went anywhere”.^[280]
301. [301]
     The plaintiff’s claim was that the requirement of the PPN that he not contact RBG meant that he could not attend his workshop, in circumstances where RBG had left some belongings and her dog at the shed, and therefore could no longer operate the original business.  There are difficulties with this claim.  During cross-examination, the plaintiff accepted that he returned to his workshop shortly after the PPN was issued without contravening the PPN.^[281]  He also confirmed that by about 26 or 27 January 2019 he had retrieved tools which were in RBG’s car when he took her to the RBWH and that this allowed him to continue to work on job sites.^[282]  According to the plaintiff’s cross-examination, the reason the original business failed was that, by 29 January 2019, equipment required for the continued operations of the original business was stolen from his workshop.^[283]  I do not accept the plaintiff’s submission that Officer Suen’s conduct in issuing the PPN caused the theft of equipment which prevented the original business from operating.
302. [302]
     As to the quantum of the alleged loss, the plaintiff did not adduce any objective evidence which properly corroborates statements in his affidavits concerning the earnings of the original business.^[284] 
303. [303]
     In cross-examination, the plaintiff referred to bank records which show substantial deposits in the 12-month period before January 2019.^[285]  Those records^[286] are statements for:

     1. a Westpac Business One account in the name of the plaintiff:
        1. (i)
           for the period 17 October 2017 to 17 January 2018 showing credits in the amount of $63,507.46 and debits in the amount of $64,062.03;
        2. (ii)
           for the period 17 January 2018 to 17 April 2018 showing credits in the amount of $56,644.62 and debits in the amount of $56,060.22;
     2. a Westpac Choice account in the name of the plaintiff for the period 15 December 2017 and 15 June 2018 showing credits of $71,285.62 and debits in the amount of $69,686.13;
     3. a Suncorp Everyday Basics account in the name of the plaintiff for the period 26 August 2018 to 25 February 2019 showing credits of $52,363.20 and debits of $52,432.32.
304. [304]
     It is impossible from the bank statements to determine with any degree of confidence:

     1. which credits represent payments by customers of the original business and which credits come from some other source;
     2. which debits represents payments of costs incurred by the original business and which debits are of a different character.
305. [305]
     Consequently, the bank statements do not provide a sufficient basis to determine the earnings of the original business which the plaintiff claims to have lost.
306. [306]
     The plaintiff did not tender any tax returns or BAS statements setting out the revenue and costs of the original business.  His statement during cross-examination that RBG stole all his business records^[287] (which is inconsistent with the position that his bank records somehow evidence the earnings of the original business) does not alter the fact that there is no documentary evidence supporting the quantum of the claimed loss.

The conduct of the investigation into the plaintiff’s complaints about RBG

Duty of care

307. [307]
     The test for whether the officers who took the plaintiff’s complaint about RBG’s conduct, and subsequently investigated that complaint, owed him a duty of care requires analysis of the facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the relevant officers by reference to the salient features or facts affecting the appropriateness of imputing a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury.  In the context of the plaintiff’s complaint about RBG’s conduct, that analysis must also have regard to the legislative and policy framework that governs the QPS’ role in addressing domestic and family violence and its functions more generally.
308. [308]
     The preamble to the DFVP Act relevantly states:

309. [309]
     The main objects of the DFVP Act are then set out in s 3:

“3 Main objects

1. The main objects of this Act are—

1. to maximise the safety, protection and wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence, and to minimise disruption to their lives; and

2. to prevent or reduce domestic violence and the exposure of children to domestic violence; and

3. to ensure that people who commit domestic violence are held accountable for their actions.

2. The objects are to be achieved mainly by—

1. allowing a court to make a domestic violence order to provide protection against further domestic violence; and

2. giving police particular powers to respond to domestic violence, including the power to issue a police protection notice; and

3. imposing consequences for contravening a domestic violence order or police protection notice, in particular, liability for the commission of an offence.”

310. [310]
     The principles which are to be applied in administering the DFVP Act are then set out in s 4:

“4 Principles for administering Act

1. This Act is to be administered under the principle that the safety, protection and wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence, including children, are paramount.

2. Subject to subsection (1), this Act is also to be administered under the following principles—

1. people who fear or experience domestic violence, including children, should be treated with respect and disruption to their lives should be minimised;

2. to the extent that it is appropriate and practicable, the views and wishes of people who fear or experience domestic violence should be sought before a decision affecting them is made under this Act;

3. perpetrators of domestic violence should be held accountable for their use of violence and its impact on other people and, if possible, provided with an opportunity to change;

4. if people have characteristics that may make them particularly vulnerable to domestic violence, any response to the domestic violence should take account of those characteristics;

…

5. in circumstances in which there are conflicting allegations of domestic violence or indications that both persons in a relationship are committing acts of violence, including for their self-protection—

1. the person who is most in need of protection in the relationship should be identified; and

2. only 1 domestic violence order protecting that person should be in force unless, in exceptional circumstances, there is clear evidence that each of the persons in the relationship is in need of protection from the other;

6. a civil response under this Act should operate in conjunction with, not instead of, the criminal law.”

311. [311]
     The relevant functions of the QPS are described in s 2.3 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld):

“2.3 Functions of service

The functions of the police service are the following—

1. the preservation of peace and good order—

1. in all areas of the State; and

2. in all areas outside the State where the laws of the State may lawfully be applied, when occasion demands;

2. the protection of all communities in the State and all members thereof—

1. from unlawful disruption of peace and good order that results, or is likely to result, from—

1. (A)
   actions of criminal offenders;

2. (B)
   actions or omissions of other persons;

2. from commission of offences against the law generally;

3. the prevention of crime;

4. the detection of offenders and bringing of offenders to justice;

5. the upholding of the law generally;

6. the administration, in a responsible, fair and efficient manner and subject to due process of law and directions of the commissioner, of—

1. the provisions of the Criminal Code;

2. the provisions of all other Acts or laws for the time being committed to the responsibility of the service;

3. the powers, duties and discretions prescribed for officers by any Act;

7. the provision of the services, and the rendering of help reasonably sought, in an emergency or otherwise, as are—

1. required of officers under any Act or law or the reasonable expectations of the community; or

2. reasonably sought of officers by members of the community.

…”

312. [312]
     Against, that legislative and policy framework, the plaintiff identifies the salient features of the relationship between himself and the police officers to whom he complained about RBG’s conduct as being:^[288]

“(a) The police’s duty to personally serve and explain domestic violence orders made by a court in a reasonable and timely manner.

2. Queensland’s domestic and family violence policies stipulating that the QPS would protect people affected by domestic and family violence, enforce compliance of [sic] Domestic Violence Orders and comply with the policies such as the recommendation of the Not now, Not ever report of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland, the QPS Operational Procedures Manual and the statutory obligations under the DFVPA.

3. Police officers’ control over compliance with domestic violence orders.

4. The reasonable foreseeability of harm to the Plaintiff if [RBG] breached the domestic violence orders.

5. There are no countervailing policy reasons that negate the imposition of a novel common law duty of care on police to prevent breaches of Domestic Violence Orders.

6. Senior officers’ knowledge of the repeated acts of domestic violence and the breaches of the domestic violence orders.

7. The public interest in police responses to Domestic Violence being one that warrants a duty of care to arise at common law.

8. The Plaintiff was a vulnerable adult whom [sic] was suffering from a psychiatric impairment at the time a novel duty of care is alleged to have arisen.”

313. [313]
     The plaintiff also pleads what he describes as exceptional circumstances warranting the imputation of a legal duty to take reasonable care.  Those exceptional circumstances are primarily based upon the plaintiff’s assertions that:^[289]

     1. RBG is, or was, a senior officer in the QPS;
     2. RBG had committed domestic violence against him;
     3. he was the subject of a criminal conspiracy to murder him;
     4. QPS officers tampered with evidence, tampered with court files and falsified court transcripts and other court records in an attempt to ensure the plaintiff did not obtain a protection order against RBG;
     5. by issuing the PPN and imposing bail conditions which required him to reside at an address known to RBG, the QPS had prevented him from protecting himself against the threat RBG posed.
314. [314]
     I accept that police may be found to owe a duty of care where the salient features test is satisfied in circumstances involving complaints about domestic and family violence and the police response to those complaints.  In Smith, John Dixon J dismissed an application for summary dismissal of claims of negligence based upon the conduct of certain members of Victoria Police in relation to repeated instances of family violence.  That application was decided on the assumption that the plaintiffs (a mother and her three children) could establish the pleaded facts at trial.  Those pleaded facts concerned numerous instances of family violence perpetrated on the plaintiffs by the children’s father and the police response to those various incidents.^[290]  The plaintiffs alleged that the police officers who responded to their complaints about the father’s conduct and senior police officers owed duties of care to them as victims of family violence and that, as a result of breaches of those duties, they suffered psychological harm.
315. [315]
     The salient features identified by the plaintiffs in Smith which made it appropriate to impute a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury were:^[291] (i) the reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiffs required protection from breaches of domestic violence orders by the father and the potential for injury if police failed to take reasonable care to enforce extant orders; (ii) that the police officers knew or ought to have known of the terms of the domestic violence orders, the conduct of the father and the risk of injury to the plaintiffs if the police failed to take reasonable care to enforce the orders; (iii) the police officers’ control over the risk to the plaintiffs; and (iv) the police officers’ assumption of responsibility to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs having acted in reliance on that assumption of responsibility.
316. [316]
     In dismissing the application for summary dismissal in Smith, John Dixon J observed that, although there were many cases in which it has been held that police and the police force as a whole do not owe a duty of care to a plaintiff in the particular circumstances of those cases, there was no case in which a court has determined that no duty of care was owed in circumstances which demonstrate the degree of proximity between the plaintiffs and the police likely to be demonstrated on the evidence in Smith at trial.^[292]
317. [317]
     In the present case, the facts which the plaintiff relies upon to establish the salient features or exceptional circumstances making it appropriate to impute a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury are not to be assumed but must be proved by the plaintiff.  I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged that burden.
318. [318]
     As I have explained, I am not satisfied that there is any basis to find that:

     1. RBG was an undercover police officer or a police informant (see [5]-[21] above);
     2. QPS officers tampered with evidence (see [257]-[260] above) or falsified court documents (see [210]-[217] and [233]-[244] above);
     3. QPS officers charged the plaintiff with offences and imposed bail conditions for any collateral purpose of the type identified by the plaintiff (see [246]-[255] above).
319. [319]
     I also have not reached the state of actual persuasion required to find that the events described by the plaintiff as forming part of a conspiracy to murder him in fact occurred (see [26]-[39] above).
320. [320]
     That RBG committed domestic violence against the plaintiff is established by the judgment of Sheridan DCJ in SRV (see [26]-[31] above).  However, the conduct which Sheridan DCJ was satisfied amounted to domestic violence on RBG’s part (sending the text message extracted at [6] above) is of a very different character to the repeated instances of domestic violence assumed in Smith.
321. [321]
     In the end, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff has proved facts bearing on the relationship between himself and the relevant officers which establish the salient features or exceptional circumstances he relies upon to contend it is appropriate to impute a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury in the circumstances of this case.  In those circumstances, the plaintiff has not satisfied me that the defendant owed him a duty of care in relation to its investigation of his complaints about RBG’s conduct towards him.  That is particularly so where the imposition of a duty of care in this case would interfere in the operational decisions of the QPS, including decisions as to priorities in the deployment of resources required to investigate complaints of criminal conduct.^[293]

Breach

322. [322]
     Even if I had found that the relevant QPS officers owed a duty of care in relation to the plaintiff’s complaint, I would not have been satisfied that anything those officers did, or omitted to do, during that investigation was a breach of the alleged duty.
323. [323]
     The plaintiff did not identify, either in his pleading of this aspect of the negligence claim or in the presentation of his case at trial, what specific aspects of the investigation he says were undertaken negligently and how those matters amounted to a breach of the alleged duty of care.  Nor did his pleading or presentation of his case at trial identify what specific further investigatory or other steps he says the QPS officers were required (but failed) to take in conformity with the alleged duty.
324. [324]
     The course of the QPS investigation and its outcome is set out at [137] and [160] to [178] above.  After receiving the plaintiff’s complaint, QPS officers interviewed the persons alleged to have been involved in the exchange of messages referred to in SRV.  Both RBG and Mr Glenane told QPS officers that they were involved in the exchange of messages but explained that they did so on the basis that they believed the plaintiff was impersonating Mr Bartlett.  They each said that the statements they made in those messages were intended to wind up the plaintiff.  They denied having any intention to harm the plaintiff.  Mr Bartlett denied having any involvement in the exchange of messages.  He also told Officer Peatling about his social media accounts having been hacked. 
325. [325]
     Although the QPS Officers did not act with the speed with which the plaintiff wanted them to investigate his complaint, particularly as regards the delay in interviewing Mr Bartlett, there does not seem to be any basis in the evidence to conclude that the outcome of the investigation would have been any different if it had been undertaken with greater speed.  Nor is it obvious what further steps the QPS officers could have taken that might have altered the outcome of the investigation or avoided the harm the plaintiff claims to have suffered.  At its essence, this aspect of the plaintiff’s negligence claim seems to stem from his dissatisfaction with Officer Peatling’s conclusion that it was highly unlikely that the QPS could successfully prosecute any of RBG, Mr Glenane or Mr Bartlett on charges arising from his complaint.  Based on the evidence at trial, I am not satisfied that, in reaching that conclusion, Officer Peatling (or any other QPS officer) breached the alleged duty of care.  Nor am I satisfied that anything done, or not done, by any of the relevant QPS officers in the investigation which led to that conclusion amounted to a breach of the alleged duty of care.

Causation and loss

326. [326]
     Finally, I would not have been satisfied that the plaintiff has proved that the way the QPS investigated his complaint caused him to suffer loss.
327. [327]
     The plaintiff alleges that he suffered a psychiatric injury because of the breach of the alleged duty of care.^[294]  In seeking to prove both the existence and cause of his alleged injury, he relied on the report of Dr Beech referred to at [8] above.  Dr Beech diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from:^[295]

     1. methamphetamine dependence;
     2. a delusional disorder; and
     3. a secondary anxiety disorder, probably an adjustment disorder with anxious mood.
328. [328]
     As to the cause of the plaintiff’s conditions, Dr Beech stated:^[296]

“Methamphetamine dependence is diagnosed on the basis of his heavy daily methamphetamine use and the effects on him.  The delusional disorder is diagnosed on the basis of the extent of his persecutory beliefs, the nature of the widespread-inferences he makes, and the narrowing of his focus that impairs his perception of matters.  The nature of the delusional disorder is unconfirmed.  The most likely cause is his persistent heavy methamphetamine use, a chronic drug-induced psychotic disorder.  Alternatively, his heavy drug use may have precipitated a Delusional Disorder regardless of the continued drug use.  It would take a substantial drug-free period to discriminate between these two.  The anxiety disorder is secondary to the distress he suffers as a result of his beliefs, his perception of events, and the issues and experiences he has faced since 2019.

It is likely that the delusional disorder commenced during the course of his relationship with [RBG].  He may have been vulnerable to this from his earlier drug use, possibly from some of the behaviours and verbalisations of [RBG] herself, and the generally heightened psychological and emotional state that comes with using drugs and associating with the people involved with drug manufacturing, drug possession, and drug selling.  Influencing him as well may be the elements of more realistic if hypervigilant concerns of infiltrations by covert police officers and police informants generally, and possibly the revelations of police conduct in the media over recent years, domestic, interstate, and foreign.

It is likely that the delusional beliefs are perpetuated by his continued drug use, the possible actions by [RBG] and her associates, and the coincidences that Mr Lewis is hyper-vigilant to interpret as part of the conspiracy.  It is also likely that his own behaviour invokes in others reactions that he in turn misinterprets or misperceives.  One can imagine that when he speaks to his associates and tells them that [RBG] is a police operative, they are shocked and do react.  One can also imagine that a police officer’s demeanour towards him might change after the police officer types [the plaintiff’s] name into a database and reads the information held there.  To the extent that [RBG] may have colluded with others to talk about harm towards [the plaintiff], or made plans to do this or to [sic] acted on them, this would simply fuel his beliefs and expand them.  Over time, one difficulty is the likelihood that he misperceives all errors and omissions as part of the wider conspiracy.”

329. [329]
     Later in the report, Dr Beech states that the plaintiff’s secondary anxiety disorder is:

“… always fuelled in the background by his underlying delusional beliefs.  Those delusional beliefs in turn are likely to have been precipitated and perpetuated by the methamphetamine dependence.”

330. [330]
     Dr Beech’s evidence as to the significant role which the plaintiff’s heavy drug use have had in his psychological conditions means that, even if I had found a duty of care existed and was breached, I would not have been satisfied that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence to conclude that the plaintiff suffered a psychological injury by reason of the QPS investigation of his complaint about RBG.

Conclusion on negligence

331. [331]
     For the reasons given above, both aspects of the plaintiff’s negligence claim fail.

The plaintiff’s complaints about the transcripts

332. [332]
     Prior to making his closing submissions, the plaintiff raised a concern about the accuracy of the trial transcripts.^[297]  He referred to the names of people mentioned during the hearing having been spelt differently at different points in the transcript and submitted that this meant the evidence referred to two different people.  He stated that parts of the transcript recorded him saying the opposite of what he said.  He submitted that there had been deliberate interference with the audio recording of the trial to make it sound that a question asked about events on 2 December 2019 had instead been asked about a different date, 2 December 2009.
333. [333]
     Directions were made for the plaintiff to prepare a schedule identifying material errors in the transcript and for the defendant to respond to that schedule.  Unfortunately, the plaintiff did not limit himself to identifying material errors.  The schedule setting out errors identified by the plaintiff and the defendant’s responses extended to 78 pages. 
334. [334]
     The defendant accepted some of the plaintiff’s proposed corrections, including those which addressed the misspelling of names.  None of those corrections altered the substance of the evidence led at trial or had any impact on the conclusions I have reached.
335. [335]
     The defendant could not accept other corrections proposed by the plaintiff on the basis that it did not have access to the audio recording to satisfy itself that the proposed correction accurately reflected the audio recording.  It was not necessary for me to resolve whether the proposed corrections which the defendant did not accept accurately reflected the audio recording of the trial.  That is because, having reviewed the unaccepted corrections in the plaintiff’s schedule I am satisfied that those corrections, if made, would have no bearing on the conclusions I have reached.

Conclusion

336. [336]
     The plaintiff has failed on each of his causes of action.  His claim must be dismissed.