Metarock Group Ltd v Broadfoot
[2024] QSC 159
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- Notable Unreported Decision
- Metarock Group Ltd v Broadfoot[2024] QSC 159
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Metarock Group Ltd v Broadfoot[2024] QSC 159
Metarock Group Ltd v Broadfoot[2024] QSC 159
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: | Metarock Group Limited v Broadfoot & Ors [2024] QSC 159 |
PARTIES: | METAROCK GROUP LIMITED ACN 142 490 579 (applicant) v ANDREW BROADFOOT (AN INSPECTOR UNDER THE COAL MINING SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 1999) (first respondent) AND THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (REPRESENTED BY RESOURCES SAFETY AND HEALTH QUEENSLAND) (second respondent) AND PHILIPPA JAYNE BECKINGSALE (A MAGISTRATE) (third respondent) AND VINCENTS (A PARTNERSHIP OF ALLARA VCA TRUST AND OTHERS TRADING UNDER ABN 69 984 359 704) (fourth respondent) |
FILE NO/S: | BS 6201 of 2024 |
DIVISION: | Trial Division |
PROCEEDING: | Application |
ORIGINATING COURT: | Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane |
DELIVERED ON: | 30 July 2024 |
DELIVERED AT: | Brisbane |
HEARING DATE: | 18 July 2024 |
JUDGE: | Copley J |
ORDERS: |
|
CATCHWORDS: | ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – PREROGATIVE WRITS AND ORDERS – CERTIORARI – GROUNDS FOR CERTIORARI TO QUASH – where the first respondent and an employee of the second respondent had a warrant under s 136 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (the Act) to enter the applicant’s office – where the first and fourth respondent made “images” of some 14,000 documents that were identified as likely to be within the scope of the warrant – where the applicant filed an application under s 43 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (JRA) for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision to issue a warrant – where the applicant alternatively seeks a declaration that the warrant is invalid, the seizure under the warrant was unlawful and that the first, second and fourth respondents deliver up all documents and things seizure under the warrant – where the applicant also seeks an order for disclosure of all the material provided to the third respondent when the warrant was issued – where the first and second respondents seeks orders that the application for review is stayed or dismissed pursuant to s 48 of the JRA or set aside pursuant to r 16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 – where the first and second respondents argue that pursuant to s 139(3)(c) and (d) of the Act the first respondent had authority to copy documents found at the workplace independently of any authority conferred by the warrant – where the applicant contends that the first respondent went beyond exercising those powers for the purpose of conducting an investigation under s 139(3)(c) or (d) of the Act – whether disclosure of the affidavit is in the public interest – whether the Court should grant relief in the nature of certiorari or a declaration about the validity of the warrant – whether there is a triable issue in relation to the originating application Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld), ss 41, 132A, 133, 136, 139 Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), ss 43, 48 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rr 16, 573 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld), s 8 Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, followed Attorney-General for New South Wales v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667, cited Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Saatchi & Saatchi Compton (Vic) (1985) 10 FCR 1, cited Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell (2020) 5 QR 367, cited Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 195, followed Harris v Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (1999) 162 ALR 651, cited JMA Accounting Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation & Others (2004) 139 FCR 537, cited Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408, followed National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation Ltd (1984) 151 CLR 296, followed Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69, followed Rolleston Coal Holdings Pty Limited & Ors v The Deputy Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships [2021] QSC 328, followed Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, followed Smethurst v Australian Federal Police (2020) 272 CLR 177 VAW (Kurri Kurri) Pty Ltd v Scientific Committee (Established under s 127 of The Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995) (2003) 58 NSWLR 631, followed |
COUNSEL: | C Murdoch KC, with J A S Ford, for the applicant A D Scott KC, with N L Morrison, for the first and second respondents No appearance for the third or fourth respondents |
SOLICITORS: | Mills Oakley Lawyers for the applicant Crown Law for the first and second respondents No appearance for the third or fourth respondents |
- [1]On 15 May 2024 the applicant applied by way of an application for review, pursuant to s 43 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), for:
- Orders in the nature of a writ of certiorari quashing the decision of the third respondent to issue a warrant concerning the applicant’s premises in Mackay on or about 18 April 2024 and setting aside the warrant;
- Additionally or alternatively:
- a declaration that the warrant is invalid;
- a declaration that the seizure by the first, second and fourth respondents of things under the warrant on or about 23 April 2024 is unlawful;
- orders that the first, second and fourth respondents deliver up to the applicant all the documents and things seized under the warrant as well as copies of all such documents, things or recordings (such as video recordings) created during the execution of the warrant.
- [2]The applicant also claimed by way of interlocutory relief an order that the second respondent disclose to the applicant copies of all material provided to the third respondent when the warrant was sought.
- [3]On 3 June 2024 the first and second respondents applied to have the application for review stayed or dismissed pursuant to s 48 of the Judicial Review Act and/or set aside pursuant to r 16 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, on the basis that:
- it would be inappropriate for the proceedings in relation to the application to be continued or to otherwise grant the application; and/or
- no reasonable basis for the application was disclosed.
- [4]The written submissions filed on behalf of the first and second respondents were directed towards dismissal pursuant to s 48(1)(a) of the Judicial Review Act.
- [5]The application filed by the respondent and the applicant’s interlocutory application were heard together. Neither the third nor the fourth respondent appeared at the hearing.
- [6]During the course of the hearing counsel for the first and second respondents acknowledged that there may well be triable issues concerning the proper construction of the ambit of s 139 of the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’) such that it would not be appropriate to stay or dismiss or set aside paragraph 2(b) and (c) of the application for review. Paragraph 2(b) and (c) of the application appear at paragraph [1] above as (b)(ii) and (iii). Accordingly, consideration about whether the applicant is entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 2(b) and (c) of the application for review shall be determined at a final hearing.
Background
- [7]The circumstances which led to the application pursuant to s 43 of the Judicial Review Act and the application for an order for disclosure are as follows.
- [8]On 14 September 2021 an incident occurred at the Crinum Mine, one of a number of coal mines operated by the applicant through a subsidiary, Mastermyne Pty Ltd. One worker died and another was seriously injured. The first respondent, an inspector appointed under the Act and an employee of the second respondent, attended the applicant’s office in Mackay on 23 April 2024 accompanied by other employees of the second respondent and by Mr Hains, an employee of the fourth respondent. The first respondent provided Mr Erwin, the applicant’s General Manager HSEC, with a copy of a warrant and a copy of a document which the first respondent called a notice to occupier. The face of the warrant[1] showed that it purported to be issued under s 136 of the Act. The first respondent informed Mr Erwin that he had a warrant to enter under s 136 and that “its obviously in relation to our ongoing investigation into the incident at Crinum on the 14th of September 2021”.[2]
- [9]The warrant was addressed to the first respondent. It stated that the third respondent, after hearing an application by the first respondent, was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that there was a particular thing or activity that might provide evidence of an offence against the Act and that the evidence was at, or within the next seven days might be at, an address of the applicant’s subsidiary. It stated that the warrant was for the offence of “Section 41 of the [Act] – Obligations of coal mine operators”. It then recited one of the obligations contained in s 41.
- [10]The document given to Mr Erwin recorded that the warrant had been issued on 18 April 2024 and that the warrant enabled officers to enter the premises. It recorded that the fourth respondent’s employee was present pursuant to s 139(3)(e) of the Act to assist to “image” the Mastermyne server or a shared drive, Sharepoint facility, Crinum drives, Mr Erwin’s work computer and employee email accounts and ex‑employee email accounts, including those used by three named persons. It also stated that s 139(3)(a), (b), (d) and (f) of the Act would be relied on.[3]
- [11]About 14,000 documents were identified as “likely” to be “within the scope of the warrant”.[4] Those documents were copied at the applicant’s office by Mr Hains under the first respondent’s instruction. The first respondent deposed to the impracticality of inspecting all of the documents at the site and that copying them was necessary for the purposes of his investigation.[5] The documents copied have been secured at the premises of the fourth respondent and no inspection of them has been made by the first respondent, beyond the inspection he made on 23 April when determining which documents Mr Hains was to “image”. It has been agreed that no further inspection will occur prior to resolving claims of legal professional privilege.
Relevant statutory provisions
- [12]The provisions of principal relevance are to be found in Part 9 Division 4 of the Act.
- [13]Section 133 provides:
“133Entry to places
- An officer may enter a place if—
- (a)its occupier consents to the entry; or
- (b)it is a public place and the entry is made when it is open to the public; or
- (c)the entry is authorised by a warrant; or
- (d)it is a coal mine; or
- (e)it is, or the officer reasonably suspects it is, a workplace.
- For subsection (1)(a), for the purpose of asking the occupier of a place for consent to enter, an officer may, without the occupier’s consent or a warrant—
- enter land around premises at the place to an extent that is reasonable to contact the occupier; or
- enter part of the place the officer reasonably considers members of the public ordinarily are allowed to enter when they wish to contact the occupier.
- For subsection (1)(e), an entry may be made with, or without, the consent of the person with management or control of the workplace.
- An officer who enters a coal mine or workplace must not unnecessarily impede production.”
- [14]Section 136 of the Act provides:
“136Issue of warrant
- The magistrate may issue a warrant only if the magistrate is satisfied there are reasonable grounds for suspecting—
- there is a particular thing or activity (the evidence) that may provide evidence of an offence against this Act; and
- the evidence is at the place, or may be at the place, within the next 7 days.
- The warrant must state—
- that a stated inspector may, with necessary and reasonable help and force—
- enter the place and any other place necessary for entry; and
- exercise the inspector’s powers under this part; and
- the offence for which the warrant is sought; and
- the evidence that may be seized under the warrant; and
- the hours of the day or night when the place may be entered; and
- the date, within 14 days after the warrant’s issue, the warrant ends.”
- [15]Section 139 provides:
“139General powers after entering coal mine or other places
- This section applies to an officer who enters a coal mine or other place.
- However, if an officer enters a place to get the occupier’s consent to enter premises, this section applies to the officer only if the consent is given or the entry is otherwise authorised.
- For monitoring and enforcing compliance with this Act, or for conducting an investigation under this Act, the officer may—
- search any part of the coal mine or other place; or
- inspect, measure, test, photograph or film any part of the coal mine or other place or anything at the coal mine or other place; or
- take a thing, or a sample of or from a thing, at the coal mine or other place for analysis or testing; or
- copy a document at the coal mine or other place; or
- take into or onto the coal mine or other place any persons, equipment and materials the officer reasonably requires for exercising a power under this division; or
- require a person at the coal mine or other place, to give the officer reasonable help to exercise the officer’s powers under paragraphs (a) to (e); or
- require a person at the coal mine or other place, to answer questions by the officer to help the officer ascertain whether this Act is being or has been complied with, or for the purpose of conducting an investigation under this Act.
- When making a requirement mentioned in subsection (3)(f) or (g), the officer must warn the person it is an offence to fail to comply with the requirement, unless the person has a reasonable excuse.”
Summary dismissal
- [16]Section 136(2) sets out the details that a warrant must state. It must state the offence for which the warrant is sought.[6] This was not stated in the warrant. Section 41 of the Act does not create an offence, it imposes obligations on a coal mine operator. The warrant must state the evidence that may be seized under the warrant.[7] This was not stated in the warrant. The document accompanying the warrant referred to a need to “image” certain things. The warrant must state the hours of the day or night when the place may be entered.[8] This was not stated in the warrant. The warrant must state the date, within 14 days after the warrant’s issue, the warrant ends.[9] This was not stated in the warrant.
- [17]The statutory condition that the object of a search be specified by reference to a particular offence is essential.[10] A warrant that fails to identify an offence is invalid.[11] The statutory condition that a warrant identify or state the evidence that may be seized is to ensure that a person affected by the warrant can know the object of the search. A warrant that fails to do this is invalid.[12] An invalid warrant is liable to be quashed by an order for certiorari.[13]
- [18]The summary dismissal of the applicant’s claim for relief in the nature of certiorari is sought on the basis that an order in the nature of certiorari is not available because the decision to issue the warrant did not affect any rights.[14] The summary dismissal of the applicant’s claim for a declaration is sought on the basis that a declaration should not be granted because it would produce no foreseeable consequences.[15] The first and second respondents contend that pursuant to s 133(1)(e) of the Act the first respondent had authority to enter the applicant’s workplace independently of any authority conferred by the warrant. The first and second respondents contend that pursuant to s 139(3)(c) and (d) the first respondent had authority to copy documents found at the workplace independently of any authority conferred by the warrant. The first and second respondents contend that any mistake on the first respondent’s part as to the source of authority to enter and/or to make copies of documents did not render either the entry or the copying invalid.[16]
- [19]In resisting summary dismissal the applicant primarily submitted that because the first respondent swore an affidavit to obtain the warrant it can be inferred he thought a warrant was required to authorise entry and that as a matter of fact entry was effected in reliance on the warrant (s 133(1)(c)) and not in reliance upon s 133(1)(e). The applicant also argued that validity depended upon there being no different consequences flowing from the exercise of a power. For this reliance was placed upon Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Saatchi & Saatchi Compton (Vic).[17]
- [20]The applicant’s primary submission is an argument that the first respondent is bound by his belief as to what was necessary to authorise entry irrespective of the broader authorisation to enter contained in s 133(1)(e). The argument cannot prevail as the position is that “a mistake in the source of power works no invalidity. Validity depends simply on whether a relevant power existed”.[18] The statement from Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Saatchi & Saatchi Compton (Vic) has been doubted.[19] After observing that the statement stood in stark contrast to a number of other statements, including those contained in Johns and Brown[20] Spigelman CJ said that the appropriate test for determining the issue of validity:[21]
“… is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in reliance on an inappropriate statutory power, but which could be supported by another statutory power, should be invalid.”
- [21]No purpose of this nature is discernible from an examination of Part 9 Division 4 of the Act.
- [22]It is not in dispute that the first respondent was an officer[22] and it is not disputed that the premises entered on 23 April 2024 was a workplace.[23] It is clear from the terms of s 133(1)(e) that the first respondent had authority to enter the applicant’s workplace even in the absence of a warrant authorising entry. The validity or otherwise of the warrant upon which the first respondent relied to enter had no effect on the applicant’s rights because the applicant had no right to refuse the first respondent entry. Any belief held by the first respondent that he was obliged to obtain a warrant before entering cannot render an entry authorised by s 133(1)(e) an unauthorised entry or otherwise invalidate the entry.
- [23]Section 139(1) makes it clear that the section applies to an officer who enters a coal mine or other place. There was no dispute that a workplace was a place. The powers conferred on an officer by s 139(3) may only be utilized for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the Act or for conducting an investigation under the Act. The first respondent has deposed that he was an investigator in the Serious Accident Investigation Unit. That unit was investigating the cause of the serious accident at Crinum Mine where a worker died and another worker was injured and whether all statutory position holders complied with their statutory safety and health obligations.[24]
- [24]The applicant says that if the first respondent exercised powers in apparent reliance on s 139(3)(c) or (d), then the first respondent went beyond exercising those powers for the purpose of conducting an investigation under the Act. By way of example, it is said the first respondent caused the taking of or the copying of all the emails of four persons sent or received between 1 July 2021 and 30 September 2021.[25] However, such a complaint may be agitated pursuant to paragraph 2(b) and (c) of the application for review,[26] but it does not have relevance to whether this Court should grant relief in the nature of certiorari or a declaration about the validity of the warrant.
- [25]The first respondent had, as I have found, authority to enter under s 133(1)(e). Therefore, he could take things or copy documents pursuant to s 139(3)(c) and (d) regardless of whether he relied on the warrant to enter and regardless of any limitations contained in the warrant. In the present case the face of the warrant was devoid of limits about what could be seized. The validity or otherwise of the warrant had no effect on the applicant’s rights to resist the taking or copying. As the first respondent’s entry was authorised by s 133(1)(e) there was power pursuant to s 139(1), (3)(c) and (d) to take things or copy documents provided the taking or copying was, relevantly to this case, for conducting an investigation under the Act.
- [26]Even if the third respondent had erred in issuing the warrant no practical consequences would follow if certiorari was granted or a declaration was made. The absence of practical consequences is a state of affairs where dismissal pursuant to s 48 of the Judicial Review Act is appropriate.[27]
- [27]Accordingly, pursuant to s 48(1)(a)(ii) of the Judicial Review Act, those parts of the application (being paragraphs 1 and 2(a)) for an order in the nature of certiorari and a declaration that the warrant is invalid should be dismissed. There being triable issues though in relation to paragraph 2(b) and (c) of the application any order for summary dismissal should not extend to paragraph 2(b) and (c).
Disclosure
- [28]The Court has a discretion to order disclosure in judicial review proceedings provided the document sought is relevant to an issue.[28]
- [29]Under s 135(2) an application for a warrant need be sworn and state the grounds on which the warrant is sought.[29] The application for the warrant issued in this case was supported by an affidavit affirmed by the first respondent on 18 April 2024.[30] Disclosure of this affidavit is sought on the basis that it is relevant to the application for review. The relevance is said to be the fact this material led the third respondent to be satisfied the grounds for issuing the warrant were established and so disclosure of the affidavit is necessary to aid an argument that insufficient information had been provided to the third respondent to allow her to be satisfied of the matters set out in s 136(1). Although the applicant accepted that there would be no need to determine the application for disclosure if the entirety of the application for review was summarily dismissed no such concession was made if the outcome was only partial summary dismissal.
- [30]The respondent’s position, if the application for certiorari and/or a declaration was to be dismissed, was that the application for disclosure should be refused as the affidavit could have no relevance to the triable issues raised by paragraph 2(b) and (c). The argument is that the affidavit cannot be shown to be relevant to whether the taking or copying of documents was authorised by s 139(3)(c) or (d), which would be the only issues remaining.
- [31]The respondents also argue that it is in the public interest that information obtained in the course of an investigation into an offence should not be disclosed if the information might reveal details about ongoing inquiries. For this the respondents rely on Attorney-General for New South Wales v Stuart.[31] It is said the investigation into possible offences arising out of the accident is continuing, and if any persons the target of the investigation gain knowledge of an inspector’s interest in them such persons may take steps to deflect the inspector’s interest.
- [32]
“It is in all cases the duty of the court, and not the privilege of the executive government, to decide whether a document will be produced or may be withheld. The court must decide which aspect of the public interest predominates, or in other words whether the public interest which requires that the document should not be produced outweighs the public interest that a court of justice in performing its functions should not be denied access to relevant evidence. In some cases, therefore, the court must weigh the one competing aspect of the public interest against the other, and decide where the balance lies.”
- [33]Mr Lonton, the director of the Serious Investigation Unit, deposed that the affidavit contained information about an ongoing investigation of potential offences suspected to have been committed by the applicant and by others. Mr Lonton said it contained information about the evidential basis for the suspicions and about the types of documents reasonably suspected to be at the applicant’s workplace and the bearing such documents could have on the safety and health obligations of persons mentioned in the affidavit. He also said that the affidavit revealed inspectors’ methods of investigation.[33]
- [34]Mr Lonton deposed that he had considered the information contained in the affidavit. He asserted that among other things disclosure of the affidavit would alert persons of interest to the progress of the investigation into their conduct, enable them to possibly affect the integrity of the investigation through destruction or concealment of evidence, influence witnesses or tailor their own accounts if interviewed. Further, Mr Lonton stated that disclosure would reveal steps yet to be taken in the investigation.[34]
- [35]I accept Mr Lonton’s evidence. His evidence is sufficient to sustain a claim to public interest immunity. The applicant did not seek to cross-examine him. The Act imposes obligations on a range of persons. The applicant, a coal mine operator, has obligations.[35] Others who have obligations include a site senior executive for a coal mine[36] and a contractor at a coal mine.[37] In these circumstances it can be accepted that a range of statutory duty holders could be the subject of suspicion and therefore investigation.
- [36]Notwithstanding Mr Lonton’s affidavit, the applicant submitted that the passage relied on from Stuart was not relevant to this case because the investigation concerned officers and executives of a listed company carrying on a legitimate business about which there was no hint of organised criminal activity. However, in the context of offences suspected of being committed by corporations it has been said:[38]
“It is of the very nature of an investigation that the investigator proceeds to gather relevant information from as wide a range of sources as possible without the suspect looking over his shoulder all the time to see how the inquiry is going. For an investigator to disclose his hand prematurely will not only alert the suspect to the progress of the investigation but may well close off other sources of inquiry.”
- [37]Having regard to the nature of the information asserted to be contained in the first respondent’s affidavit of 18 April 2024 I am satisfied of a real possibility or of a real risk that disclosure of his affidavit could harm the public interest in the effective investigation of offences. The public interest in the Court performing its function would not appear to be in jeopardy if the affidavit is not disclosed. This is because the affidavit has no bearing upon whether the copying of the documents on 23 April 2024 was authorised by or within the ambit of s 139(3)(c) or (d). It is therefore not necessary to address the balancing of the two interests. If it was I would have concluded that the balance lay against disclosure. Accordingly, the application for disclosure should be refused.
Orders
- [38]I make the following orders:
- Pursuant to s 48(1)(a)(ii) of the Judicial Review Act 1991, paragraphs 1 and 2(a) of the application for review filed on 15 May 2024 are dismissed.
- The application for an order for disclosure of the affidavit of the first respondent dated 18 April 2024 is refused.
- [39]I will hear the parties as to costs.
Footnotes
[1]Affidavit of Norman Roderick Erwin, exhibit RE1.
[2]Affidavit of Andrew Broadfoot affirmed 11 June 2024, paragraph 11.
[3]Affidavit of Andrew Broadfoot affirmed 11 June 2024, Exhibit AB-2.
[4]Affidavit of Andrew Broadfoot affirmed 11 June 2024, paragraph 18.
[5]Affidavit of Andrew Broadfoot affirmed 11 June 2024, paragraph 18
[6]Section 136(2)(b).
[7]Section 136(2)(c).
[8]Section 136(2)(d).
[9]Section 136(2)(e).
[10]Smethurst v Australian Federal Police (2020) 272 CLR 177 at 200 [23] (“Smethurst”).
[11]Smethurst at 200 [26].
[12]Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69 at 106-107.
[13]Smethurst at 206[45].
[14]Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 580-581 (“Ainsworth”).
[15]Ainsworth at 582.
[16]Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408 at 426 (“Johns”); Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 195 at 203.
[17](1985) 10 FCR 1 at 10.
[18]Johns at 426.
[19]Harris v Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (1999) 162 ALR 651 at 655 [16]–656 [19] per Kiefel J; VAW (Kurri Kurri) Pty Ltd v Scientific Committee (Established under s 127 of The Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995) (2003) 58 NSWLR 631 at 637 [20] per Spigelman CJ (“VAW”).
[20]VAW at 637 [21]–[24].
[21]VAW at 638–639 [33].
[22]Section 132A.
[23]Schedule 3 of the Act definition of “workplace” and Work Health and Safety Act 2011, s 8.
[24]Affidavit of Andrew Broadfoot affirmed 11 June 2024, paragraph 6.
[25]The applicant points to the first respondent’s affidavit affirmed 11 June 2024 at paragraph 17.
[26]JMA Accounting Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation & Others (2004) 139 FCR 537 at 544 [24]–546 [30].
[27]Brisbane City Child Care Pty Ltd v Kadell (2020) 5 QR 367 at 388 [55].
[28]Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 573(1) and Rolleston Coal Holdings Pty Limited & Ors v The Deputy Premier, Treasurer and Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships [2021] QSC 328 at [93]-[95].
[29]Section 135(2).
[30]Affidavit of David Lonton sworn on 4 June 2024, paragraphs 11 and 14.
[31](1994) 34 NSWLR 667 at 675B – C.
[32](1978) 142 CLR 1 at 38-39.
[33]Affidavit of David Lonton sworn 4 June 2024, paragraph 13 and 14.
[34]Affidavit of David Lonton sworn 4 June 2024, paragraphs 12, 15 and 18.
[35]Section 41.
[36]Section 42.
[37]Section 43.
[38]National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation Ltd (1984) 151 CLR 296 at 323–324.