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Black v Gold Coast Pickleball Association Inc[2025] QSC 106

Black v Gold Coast Pickleball Association Inc[2025] QSC 106

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Black v Gold Coast Pickleball Association Inc & Ors [2025] QSC 106

PARTIES:

PHILIP JOHN BLACK

(plaintiff)

v

GOLD COAST PICKLEBALL ASSOCIATION INC IA57679

(first defendant)

and

PICKLEBALL ASSOCIATION OF QUEENSLAND INC IA56750

(second defendant)

and

PICKLEBALL AUSTRALIA ASSOCIATION LTD

ACN 638 355 825

(third defendant)

FILE NO:

16137 of 2023

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Claim

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

20 May 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

9 May 2025

JUDGE:

Copley J

ORDERS:

Pursuant to r 293(2) of the UCPR judgment be entered for the defendants

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT; STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS – where the plaintiff was a member of sporting associations – where the associations resolved to terminate the plaintiff’s membership – where the plaintiff instituted proceedings seeking, amongst other remedies, reinstatement of his membership – where the defendant withdrew its notice of termination of the plaintiff’s membership during proceedings – where summary judgment application was brought after the plaintiff filed effectively the sixth statement of claim – whether remedies sought by the plaintiff are either unnecessary or outside of the court’s power – whether the plaintiff has a real prospect of success in his claim

Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld), s 71, s 72, s 73

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 171, r 293

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Bank of Queensland Ltd v Y & L Promising Pty Ltd (2022) 12 QR 326

Coldham-Fussell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 82 ACSR 439

Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co v Veitch [1942] AC 435

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232

Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421

Lonrho v Shell Petroleum (No 2) [1982] AC 173

Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc (2022) 10 QR 588

von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Company Limited [2005] 1 Qd R 681

Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30

COUNSEL:

The plaintiff appeared on his own behalf

K McGree for the defendants

SOLICITORS:

The plaintiff appeared on his own behalf

Lander & Rogers for the defendants

  1. [1]
    On 3 April 2025 the defendants in the substantive proceeding made application for orders that:
  1. Summary judgment be entered for the defendants as against the plaintiff for the claim made by the plaintiff in the claim and statement of claim filed on 20 November 2024.
  2. Paragraphs 36-88 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim are struck out.
  3. The plaintiff’s claim, in so far as it seeks relief as against the first and second defendants, is permanently stayed.
  4. The plaintiff, his servants and agents, be restrained from making any further application in proceeding 16137/23 or taking any further steps, including the issuing of any new proceedings in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Queensland against the first, second and third defendants, in or arising out of or concerning the allegations made in proceeding 16137/23 without the prior leave of a judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland. 
  5. The plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to this application, and the proceeding.
  1. [2]
    In the claim filed on 20 November 2024 the plaintiff claimed:
  1. A declaration that termination of his membership of the first defendant was invalid and, that there were no grounds or reason to hold an expulsion meeting, let alone to expel him.
  2. An order that the second defendant admit that it had no grounds or reason to call a meeting to expel him and remove the conditions on the withdrawal notice to expel him.
  3. An order that the third defendant conduct an inquiry into his complaints and evidence about some of the third defendant’s members that he has made complaints about and has provided evidence of as required by the third defendant’s constitution.
  4. A declaration that the constitution adopted by the first defendant in 2021 be declared null, void, invalid and ineffective and that an inquiry be initiated into the adoption of the constitution and what led up to its adoption and that the inquiry require sworn evidence. 
  5. That the perpetrators the plaintiff has identified/will identify go through his affidavits, other persons’ affidavits, exhibit affidavits, statements of claim, transcripts, recordings, his emails and text messages, and third party text messages and emails, and admit in an affidavit/statutory declaration to his approval and satisfaction what they have done and have not done, and that those affidavits/statutory declarations be available for public release.
  6. That each of the identified perpetrators, and any others that come to light, have their memberships of the pickleball associations investigated through an independent inquiry, under oath, on the grounds that their conduct has been injurious, prejudicial and detrimental to the associations and their members in violation of the constitutions and legislation.
  1. [3]
    Summary judgment will be entered for the defendants for the reasons which follow.

Background

  1. [4]
    The first and second defendants are incorporated associations pursuant to the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld). Each accept that s 71 of that Act confers jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of decisions affecting the rights of a member or former member.   They also accept that the plaintiff made reasonable attempts to resolve his dispute with each under the grievance procedure in each defendant’s rules.[1]  The third defendant is a public company limited by guarantee. 
  2. [5]
    The plaintiff is a former member of the first defendant.   He is a current member of the second defendant and the third defendant.
  3. [6]
    The factual background which led to the claim and statement of claim filed on 20 November 2024 can be briefly stated.
  4. [7]
    The plaintiff’s membership of the first defendant was terminated or purported to be terminated on 15 October 2021.  On 8 December 2023 the second defendant advised the plaintiff that it was considering terminating his membership of its association.   The plaintiff filed a statement of claim on 23 February 2024.   That statement of claim was struck out.  A second statement of claim was filed.   The Court ordered the plaintiff to replead the statement of claim.   The plaintiff filed a third statement of claim and applied to add the third defendant as a party.   The first and second defendants sought to have this statement of claim struck out, however, by consent the plaintiff withdrew the third statement of claim in order to replead.   The plaintiff filed the fourth statement of claim.   The fourth statement of claim was struck out.   The plaintiff was ordered to file an affidavit exhibiting any further proposed amended statement of claim and a draft amended claim.   At a further review an order was made joining the third defendant as a party and the matter was referred to mediation.  No settlement could be reached at the mediation. 
  5. [8]
    On 23 October 2024 the second defendant advised the plaintiff that its letter of 8 December 2023 was withdrawn.  In a letter dated 8 November 2024 the first defendant advised the plaintiff that it had withdrawn its decision to terminate his membership and he was entitled to have his membership reinstated.  Notwithstanding these developments the plaintiff filed the current claim and statement of claim on 20 November 2024.
  6. [9]
    On 29 January 2025 the defendants filed a notice of intention to defend the proceeding and a defence. 
  7. [10]
    On 8 February 2025 the plaintiff purported to make a formal complaint to the third defendant.  The third defendant considered the complaint.  This is apparent from correspondence sent on 24 February 2025 which provided reasons about why the complaint was not to be the subject of any further action. In the meantime, the plaintiff filed a reply.

Summary judgment

  1. [11]
    Rule 293 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) provides:

“293  Summary judgment for defendant

  1. A defendant may, at any time after filing a notice of intention to defend, apply to the court under this part for judgment against a plaintiff. 
  1. If the court is satisfied—
  1. the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on all or a part of the plaintiff’s claim; and
  1. there is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim;

the court may give judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for all or the part of the plaintiff’s claim and may make any other order the court considers appropriate.”

  1. [12]
    A court is to apply the words found in the rule.  The issue to be determined is whether the plaintiff has a real as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success.[2]  Summary judgment may be given only in the clearest of cases where there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome and where the plaintiff cannot improve his or her position by a proper amendment of the pleading.[3]  A court must be cautious in exercising the power to give summary judgment.[4]
  2. [13]
    The plaintiff submits that each paragraph of his claim definitely has a real chance of success and also that a trial is necessary as the defendants need to be compelled to answer questions.
  3. [14]
    Paragraph 1 of the claim is concerned with the first defendant.  A declaration is sought that the termination of the plaintiff’s membership of the association was “invalid” and that there were no grounds or reason to hold an expulsion meeting for him or to expel him.
  4. [15]
    On 17 August 2021 the first defendant wrote to the plaintiff informing him that the management committee was considering expelling the plaintiff from the association.  He was invited to attend a meeting in order that he might be heard.  The plaintiff attended the meeting.  On 12 October 2021 the plaintiff was advised that his membership had been terminated.  On 15 October 2021 the plaintiff was advised that the termination was due to his “injurious and detrimental conduct”.  On 8 November 2024 the first defendant advised the plaintiff that the process which resulted in termination of his membership was procedurally unfair and acknowledged and accepted that the decision to terminate was not validly made and that the decision was rescinded.  The plaintiff was advised that his membership was reinstated subject to him taking the necessary administrative steps to update his membership, including payment of the annual membership fee.
  5. [16]
    In Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said:[5]

“… declaratory relief must be directed to the determination of legal controversies and not to answering abstract or hypothetical questions.  The person seeking relief must have ‘a real interest’ and relief will not be granted if the question is ‘purely hypothetical’, … or if ‘the Court’s declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties’.” (Footnotes omitted)

  1. [17]
    The plaintiff has no real prospect of obtaining a declaration that termination of his membership was invalid because the first defendant has accepted that the decision to terminate was not validly made.  There is no legal controversy between the parties.  A declaration will serve no purpose.  There is no party concerned to contradict this aspect of the claim.[6]  There is no need for a trial in respect of this part of the claim.
  2. [18]
    The plaintiff asserts that the decision to terminate his membership damaged his reputation and that there was no admission in the correspondence of 8 November 2024 acknowledging that there was no ground to terminate his membership.  Reputation is an interest capable of attracting a declaration.[7]  However, there is no real prospect of the plaintiff obtaining a declaration that there were no grounds or reason to hold an expulsion meeting or expel him in view of the first defendant’s acknowledgment in the letter of 8 November 2024 that procedural unfairness attended its decision to terminate the plaintiff’s membership because the process was “afflicted” by errors and omissions and that his membership would be reinstated.  This was sufficient to restore his reputation.  There is no party concerned to contradict this aspect of the claim.  There is no need for a trial in respect of this aspect of the claim. 
  3. [19]
    The defendant has established that the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on paragraph 1 of the claim filed on 20 November 2024 and that there is no need for a trial of paragraph 1 of the claim.
  4. [20]
    Paragraph 2 of the claim is concerned with the second defendant.  A declaration is sought that the second defendant admit that it had no grounds or reason to call a meeting to expel the plaintiff and remove the conditions on the withdrawal notice to expel him. 
  5. [21]
    On or about 8 December 2023 the second defendant wrote to the plaintiff and advised that on 22 January 2024 a meeting would take place to give the plaintiff an opportunity to show why his membership should not be terminated.  The plaintiff was advised that his membership was under consideration due to conduct considered “injurious and prejudicial to the character and interests” of the second defendant.  On 21 January 2024 the second defendant wrote to the plaintiff and informed him the meeting was in abeyance pending further legal advice.  No further action occurred until 23 October 2024 when the second defendant wrote to the plaintiff and advised him that the December 2023 notice did not identify any particular conduct alleged to be injurious or prejudicial to the character and interests of the second defendant and may therefore have failed to accord procedural fairness.  The second defendant stated in the letter that it had withdrawn the notice.  The correspondence went on to remind the plaintiff that its constitution allowed it to terminate a member’s membership in particular circumstances. 
  6. [22]
    The Court has no power to compel the second defendant to make an admission. 
  7. [23]
    The second defendant submits that even if paragraph 2 of the claim is to be treated as a claim for a declaration that there were no grounds to convene a meeting, there is no real prospect that such a declaration would be made.  The second defendant submits that any issue raised by this paragraph is hypothetical.  The second defendant also submits that no conditions were imposed on the plaintiff’s membership when the second defendant gave notification of its withdrawal of the notice, the plaintiff was simply reminded about the conditions which all members were expected to observe.
  8. [24]
    There is no real prospect of the plaintiff succeeding on this aspect of the claim because in view of the withdrawal of the notice about the possibility of termination there is no legal controversy to resolve.  Whether the second defendant had grounds to call a meeting to consider the termination of the plaintiff’s membership is now hypothetical.  No conditions were imposed on the plaintiff’s continued membership of the association beyond the conditions of membership all members were required to observe.  There is no need for a trial of paragraph 2 of the claim. 
  9. [25]
    Paragraph 3 of the claim is concerned with the third defendant.   The claim is that in accordance with the requirements of the third defendant’s constitution it conduct an inquiry into the plaintiff’s complaints and evidence about some of the third defendant’s members who he had complained about and had provided evidence about.
  10. [26]
    The third defendant’s current constitution provides:[8]

“(b)  The Directors in their sole discretion may refer an allegation (which in the opinion of the Directors is not vexatious, trifling or frivolous) by a complainant (including a Director or a Member) that a Member has:

  1. breached, failed, refused or neglected to comply with a provision of this Constitution, the Policies or any other resolution or determination of the Directors or any duly authorised Committee; or
  1. acted in a manner unbecoming of a Member or prejudicial to the Objects and interests of the Company or Pickleball, or both; or
  1. prejudiced the Company or Pickleball or brought the Company or Pickleball or themselves into disrepute,

for investigation or determination either under the procedures set down in Policies or by such other procedure and/or persons as the Directors consider appropriate.”

  1. [27]
    It can clearly be seen that the third defendant’s directors have a discretion to refer for investigation or determination any allegation about a member which in their opinion is not vexatious, trifling or frivolous.  As already observed, by 24 February 2025 the third defendant had decided not to refer the plaintiff’s allegations for investigation.
  2. [28]
    A claim for an order, the nature of which is not identified, that the third defendant conduct an inquiry has no real prospects of success because the constitution does not oblige the Directors to refer any allegation for investigation or determination.  It is implicit that the Directors are to consider a complaint and decide how to proceed.  That has occurred.  There is no need for a trial of paragraph 3 of the claim.
  3. [29]
    Paragraph 4 of the claim concerns the first defendant. The plaintiff seeks a declaration that the constitution of the first defendant is null, void, invalid and ineffective.  He also seeks an inquiry into the adoption of the constitution and what led up to the adoption of the constitution and that the inquiry require sworn evidence.
  4. [30]
    The affairs of the first defendant are governed by a constitution.  The current constitution was adopted at a special general meeting of members on 23 August 2021.  The resolution to adopt the constitution was passed with 116 votes for and 9 votes against.
  5. [31]
    The Court has no power to order an inquiry.
  6. [32]
    In the statement of claim,[9] it is asserted “it appears that a tortious conspiracy was effected to deliberately dupe the members” to adopt a new constitution.   The plaintiff has no real prospect of obtaining a declaration that the constitution is null, void, invalid and ineffective on the basis of a tortious conspiracy.   He has no real prospect of proving he suffered harm or damage as a result of any alleged conspiracy.[10]  He has no real prospect of proving that the real purpose,[11] or predominant motive,[12] for the adoption of a new constitution was to injure him.  Also, none of these matters are pleaded in the statement of claim.  There is no need for a trial of this part of the claim.
  7. [33]
    Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the claim seek orders in relation to “perpetrators” the plaintiff either has identified or will identify.  Paragraph 5 claims that these persons be required to “go through” various documents and then provide affidavits or statutory declarations containing admissions about what they did or failed to do.  Paragraph 6 claims that each person’s membership be investigated at an independent inquiry.
  8. [34]
    The Court has no power to provide the relief sought in either paragraphs 5 or 6 of the claim.  Accordingly, the plaintiff has no prosect at all of succeeding on either of these parts of the claim and there is no need for a trial of these parts of the claim.

Strike out

  1. [35]
    The defendants submit that pursuant to the UCPR r 171(2), paragraphs 36-88 of the statement of claim should be struck out.  Fundamentally, the defendants submit that these paragraphs plead matters of evidence rather than material facts.  It is submitted that paragraphs 50, 76 and 85 do not disclose a proper cause of action against the third defendant and that paragraphs 58-63 do not disclose a cause of action against the first defendant.
  2. [36]
    As the defendants have made out their cases for summary judgment it is not necessary to deal with the application to strike out.

Permanent stay

  1. [37]
    Pursuant to s 73 of the Associations Incorporation Act the first and second defendants apply for a permanent stay of these proceedings insofar as they concern the first and second defendants. 
  2. [38]
    It has been held that s 73 of the Act contemplates the making of an order staying a proceeding brought against associations incorporated under the Act.[13]  As the first and second defendants have succeeded in obtaining summary judgment in their favour it is unnecessary to consider their application for a permanent stay.

Restraint on a further application

  1. [39]
    To protect the defendants from incurring costs of dealing with another proceeding in or arising out of or concerning the allegations made in the present proceeding an order is sought restraining the plaintiff from commencing any such proceeding without the leave of the Court.
  2. [40]
    An order of this nature is within the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to prevent an abuse of its process.[14]  This power is to be exercised with the utmost caution.[15]
  3. [41]
    The defendants submit that there is a real likelihood that the plaintiff will continue to pursue the issues the subject of the current claim and statement of claim notwithstanding judgment being entered for the defendants.  In this respect the defendants point to the fact that even after the withdrawal of the two decisions concerning membership and even after the solicitors for the third defendant wrote to the plaintiff and explained the availability and limitations of their complaints process the plaintiff continued this proceeding with the filing of what is effectively the sixth statement of claim on 20 November 2024.  The defendants also point to the plaintiff’s statement in his written submissions that he will never stop in his endeavour to have the Court hear his case.
  4. [42]
    For the following reasons I am not persuaded that the order sought by the defendants should be made.
  5. [43]
    Although the present statement of claim is the sixth version of the statement of claim that was first filed on 23 February 2024 the chronology of events helpfully prepared by the defendants’ counsel reveals that after the first statement of claim was struck out on 11 April 2024 the proceeding has been managed by the Court.  Through case management, the Court permitted the plaintiff to replead the second, third and fifth versions of his statement of claim.  The Court gave the plaintiff leave to file the amended statement of claim (the sixth version) and leave to file an amended claim to be consistent with the relief sought in the sixth version of the statement of claim. 
  6. [44]
    Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present statement of claim, which may be characterised as claims concerning a denial of procedural fairness were, so far as the case against the first defendant is concerned, discernible from paragraphs 30 to 36 of the fourth statement of claim which was filed on 27 June 2024.  As already noticed, the first defendant acknowledged on 8 November 2024 that the process by which the plaintiff’s membership was terminated gave rise to procedural unfairness with the result that the first defendant accepted that the decision  to terminate membership was not validly made.  Bearing this in mind there was a proper foundation for a part of the plaintiff’s claim, however, from 8 November 2024 there was no real prospect of success against the first defendant in relation to paragraph 1.

Orders

  1. [45]
    The order of the Court is:
  1. Pursuant to r 293(2) of the UCPR judgment be entered for the defendants.
  1. [46]
    I will hear the parties as to costs.

Footnotes

[1] Associations Incorporation Act 1981, s 72(2).

[2] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232 at 234-235 [11] and 236 [17] and Coldham-Fussell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 82 ACSR 439 at 465-467 [98]-[100].

[3] Bank of Queensland Ltd v Y & L Promising Pty Ltd (2022) 12 QR 326 at 356 [107].

[4] Coldham-Fussell at 467 [101]-[102].

[5]  (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 582.

[6] Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 437-438.

[7] Ainsworth at 578.

[8]  Clause 7.2(b).

[9]  Paragraph 63.

[10] Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30 at 78, 122; Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co v Veitch [1942] AC 435 at 471 and Lonrho v Shell Petroleum (No 2) [1982] AC 173 at 188.

[11] Williams at 123.

[12] Veitch at 453-454, 471, 478 and 490; Lonrho at 189.

[13] Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc (2022) 10 QR 588 at 611 [80].

[14] von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Company Limited [2005] 1 Qd R 681 at 685 [13] and 688 [25].

[15] von Risefer at 688 [25].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Black v Gold Coast Pickleball Association Inc & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Black v Gold Coast Pickleball Association Inc

  • MNC:

    [2025] QSC 106

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Copley J

  • Date:

    20 May 2025

Litigation History

EventCitation or FileDateNotes
Primary Judgment[2025] QSC 10620 May 2025-
Notice of Appeal FiledFile Number: CA 2498/2517 Jun 2025-

Appeal Status

Appeal Pending

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1992) 175 CLR 564
Cite 2 - (1992) 175 CLR 564
Bank of Queensland Limited v Y & L Promising Pty Ltd(2022) 12 QR 326; [2022] QCA 217
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2022) 12 QR 326
Cite 2 - (2022) 12 QR 326
Coldham-Fussell v Commissioner of Taxation (2011) 82 ACSR 439
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2011) 82 ACSR 439
Cite 2 - (2011) 82 ACSR 439
Crofter Handwoven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Vetch (1942) AC 435
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1942) AC 435
Cite 2 - (1942) AC 435
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo[2005] 2 Qd R 232; [2005] QCA 227
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] 2 Qd R 232
Cite 2 - [2005] 2 Qd R 232
Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd & Anor (1972) 127 CLR 421
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1972) 127 CLR 421
Cite 2 - (1972) 127 CLR 421
Lonhro Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (no 2) (1982) AC 173
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1982) AC 173
Cite 2 - (1982) AC 173
Thompson v Cavalier King Charles Spaniel Rescue (Qld) Inc(2022) 10 QR 588; [2022] QSC 82
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2022) 10 QR 588
Cite 2 - (2022) 10 QR 588
von Risefer v Permanent Trustee Co Pty Ltd[2005] 1 Qd R 681; [2005] QCA 109
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] 1 Qd R 681
Cite 2 - [2005] 1 Qd R 681
Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 C.L.R 30
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1959) 103 C.L.R 30
Cite 2 - (1959) 103 C.L.R 30

Cases Citing

No judgments on Queensland Judgments cite this judgment.

1

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