SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   On 17 April 2025, I published reasons in respect of the claim and counterclaim (Reasons).^[1] The final orders and costs remained outstanding, and directions were made for submissions and any further supporting material to be filed. 
2. [2]
   The defined terms in the Reasons are used in these reasons, unless stated to the contrary.
3. [3]
   These reasons deal with the form of the final orders, including the mandatory injunction sought by the defendants in respect of the counterclaim.
4. [4]
   Costs of the plaintiffs’ claim, the defendants’ counterclaim, and the dispute as to the final form of orders have been reserved and will be dealt with in separate reasons.
5. [5]
   The parties agree that the Court should make final orders that:

   1. the plaintiffs’ claim be dismissed; and
   2. judgment be entered for the defendants against the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff on the defendants’ counterclaim.
6. [6]
   As reflected in [24] of the Reasons, in respect of the counterclaim the defendants also seek relief by way of a mandatory injunction that the first and second plaintiffs remove the Temporary Levee (including any alterations by way of the further works done in 2023) and to reinstate the Area of Interest^[2] to the levels represented by the 2012 LiDAR as represented in the Fifth Markar Report.^[3]
7. [7]
   It is not contentious between the parties that the 2012 LiDAR contours are the appropriate survey data set to be used to determine the levels to be reinstated on Riverview.
8. [8]
   However, the parties in their written submissions did not agree on a number of issues, including as to the following:

   1. The timing of the remedial works.
   2. The scope of the remedial works, including:

1. Whether it includes restoration of the “Below Ground Drain” to “Natural Ground Level”.
2. What is the “Natural Ground Level”, in particular whether it includes an adjustment in respect of the “Dozer Spoil” pile.^[4]
3. Whether the wider area of the Area of Interest needs to be restored to the “Natural Ground Level”.
4. Whether the order should specify what is to be done with the soil that is removed pursuant to the order.

3. The process for a survey to be undertaken to verify compliance with the order.

9. [9]
   The defendants also initially sought additional factual findings in respect of the scope of the floodplain.
10. [10]
    A number of draft versions of the form of judgment have been prepared over time and considered by the parties and the Court.  As at the conclusion of the hearing on 25 June 2025 the draft form of judgment was largely agreed with only two remaining areas of dispute.
11. [11]
    The relevant versions of the draft form of judgment are as follows:

    1. Marked for Identification (MFI) D: Plaintiffs’ draft form of judgment dated 29 April 2025.
    2. MFI E:  Defendants’ draft form of judgment as at the date of the defendants’ submissions on final relief, 30 May 2025.
    3. MFI F: Plaintiffs’ revised draft form of judgment as at 24 June 2025.
    4. MFI G: Court’s draft form of judgment for discussion at the hearing on 24 June 2025.
    5. MFI H: Defendants’ revised draft form of judgment, with mark-up on MFI G.  Agreed by the plaintiffs, subject to the opposition to [3(d)] and the dates.
    6. MFI I: Plaintiffs’ further revised draft form of judgment, with revised [6(f)(ii)] and dates, subject to the opposition to [3(d)].
    7. MFI J: Defendants’ further revised draft form of judgment, with revised [6(f)] and dates.
12. [12]
    The ultimate position of the parties is that there is agreement on the draft form of judgment in MFI J apart from [3(d)] and [6(f)].  It is necessary to more broadly consider the issues and the orders sought, and in particular to reach a decision in respect of the appropriate form of the order in respect of the issues in dispute in [3(d)] and [6(f)].

Timing

13. [13]
    In respect of the timing of the orders, the Fifth Affidavit of the first plaintiff sworn 9 May 2025 deposes to the steps involved and the anticipated timing.  The first plaintiff identifies that the steps can be commenced on or about 7 July 2025 when the current cotton harvest is anticipated to be completed.

14. [14]
    The plaintiffs submit that it is “impracticable” to order the removal of the Temporary Levee by any date earlier than mid-July.  The estimate of time for completion of the necessary works is subject to wet weather which may delay the identified steps.
15. [15]
    The defendants contend that “[g]iven the passing of time, conduct of the works by mid-July would be reasonable”.
16. [16]
    Given the order is a mandatory injunction, it is reasonable to build in some contingency to allow for any wet weather delays.
17. [17]
    The parties have agreed, as reflected in [3] of MFI I and MFI J, that the remedial works are to be undertaken by “no later than 18 August 2025”. The agreement on this date was reached after an opportunity was provided for the plaintiffs to confirm a realistic date for the remedial works to be completed.^[5]
18. [18]
    Accordingly, I am satisfied that in all of the circumstances it is reasonable to order that the remedial works be completed by no later than 18 August 2025.

Does the “Below Ground Drain” also need to be restored to “Natural Ground Level”?

19. [19]
    The defendants contend at [3(b)] that the form of judgment should include that the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff “restore the Below-Ground Drain to Natural Ground Level”.^[6]
20. [20]
    The plaintiffs agree with the inclusion of [3(b)] in the scope of the remedial works, as reflected in MFI I.
21. [21]
    Accordingly, I am satisfied that including [3(b)] in the scope of the remedial work is appropriate.

Should the “Natural Ground Level” include an adjustment for the “Dozer Spoil”?

22. [22]
    The defendants also proposed that the “Dozer Spoil” present in the 2012 LiDAR be specifically addressed in the scope of the remedial works by including a definition, identifying its specific location in Schedule C, and providing for it to be an adjustment to the 2012 LiDAR in the definition of “Natural Ground Level”.^[7]
23. [23]
    The defendants contend that the origins of the “Dozer Spoil” are uncontroversial and refer to the following background:

    1. The plaintiffs deposited a pile of silt and other soil onto Block 9 on Riverview with a bulldozer as part of the cleanup after the 2011 Flood Event,^[8] being the “Dozer Spoil”.
    2. The “Dozer Spoil” was present at the time of the 2012 LiDAR.

3. The “Dozer Spoil” was not part of the natural ground level of Riverview.
4. For the purposes of his modelling for the proceeding, Mr Giles removed the “Dozer Spoil” from the “pre-works conditions” on instructions from the plaintiffs.^[9]

5. This was also adopted by Dr Markar in his “pre-works conditions” modelling.^[10]
6. A photograph taken on 16 January 2011 (after the 2011 Flood Event but before the “Dozer Spoil” was deposited) shows ground level which is flat and level with the surrounding area.^[11]

24. [24]
    In these circumstances, the defendants submit that the “Dozer Spoil” does not form part of the natural ground level of Riverview and the order should not permit the plaintiffs to reinstate the area to include an earthen mound to replicate the “Dozer Spoil”.  
25. [25]
    Given the “Dozer Spoil” did not form a part of the natural contours of Riverview before December 2010 and is a deviation from the natural ground level, the defendants submit that the reinstatement work should exclude the “Dozer Spoil” being reinstated.  Otherwise, to do so runs the risk of itself being an interference with Mikandra or other neighbours.
26. [26]
    The defendants have undertaken the exercise of extrapolating the “Natural Ground Level” excluding the “Dozer Spoil” and this is reflected in Schedule C.  It is submitted that so long as the relevant area is within a tolerance of +/- 0.15 (that is +/- 150 mm) of the heights of the areas of Block 9 surrounding the area of the “Dozer Spoil”, then the true “Natural Ground Level” will be achieved.
27. [27]
    It is proposed that this outcome can be achieved by the inclusion of the following in the final orders:

    1. A definition: “‘Dozer Spoil’ means the area, generally marked on Schedule B, present in the 2012 LiDAR as set out in Schedule C above the Natural Ground Level on Riverview.”
    2. A qualification to the definition of “Natural Ground Level” by reference to the 2012 LiDAR data, namely that: “save for the area of ‘Dozer Spoil’ depicted in Schedule B which is taken as having the height AHD269 within +/-0.15 (i.e. +/- 150mm)”.
28. [28]
    The objective is to restore the relevant area to the natural ground level and the “Dozer Spoil” is an historical anomaly.  The defendants’ proposal is a pragmatic solution to give certainty and clarity in respect of the works to be undertaken and is most consistent with the objective of removing the nuisance.
29. [29]
    The plaintiffs now agree with the inclusion of the definition of “Dozer Spoil” and the qualification included in the definition of “Natural Ground Level” for the purpose of the scope of the remedial works, as reflected in MFI I. 
30. [30]
    Accordingly, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to include the definition of “Dozer Spoil” and the “save for” qualification in the definition of “Natural Ground Level” for the purpose of the scope of the remedial works, as reflected in MFI J.

Should the order require that the contours within the Area of Interest be restored to the “Natural Ground Level”?

31. [31]
    The defendants also contend that the final judgment should provide that the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff “restore the contours within the Area of Interest to the Natural Ground Level” as provided for in [3(d)].^[12]
32. [32]
    This is opposed by the plaintiffs.

33. [33]
    The defendants contend that the restoration should apply to the whole Area of Interest and not be limited to:

    1. “reinstate that part of Riverview on which the Temporary Levee stands” as the plaintiffs’ previously proposed;^[13] or
    2. be limited to:
       1. (i)
          “remove the Temporary Levee”; and 
       1. (ii)
          “restore the Below-Ground Drain to Natural Ground Level”.^[14]
34. [34]
    In their written submissions the plaintiffs did not engage with this contention despite the definition of “Area of Interest” being included in the plaintiff’s proposed form of judgment.^[15]
35. [35]
    Given the specific relief sought by the defendants, and the fact that there are aspects of the works which are wider than just removing the Temporary Levee, there is a need for certainty in relation to this issue.
36. [36]
    In respect of this issue, the defendants contend that:

    1. As reflected in the Reasons, the defendants were wholly successful on the counterclaim.
    2. The counterclaim sought relief in respect of the whole of the Area of Interest.
    3. The Court accepted the evidence of Dr Markar and Mr Byrom.  Relevantly, this evidence included the Fifth Markar Report^[16] and the Fourth Byrom Report.^[17]   The Joint Survey Report^[18] does not identify any areas of difference as to the levels on Riverview.
    4. In particular: 
       1. (i)
          The Fifth Markar Report at [22] shows the Area of Interest by reference to the cross-sections.
       1. (ii)
          Figures 3-1 to 3-13 of the Fifth Markar Report show the changes to the Temporary Levee in the Area of Interest.
       1. (iii)
          The Joint Survey Report compares the 2012 LiDAR and the 2024 Survey from the Fourth Byrom Report, showing the changes made in 2023.
37. [37]
    The defendants submit that their proposed form of words^[19] provides certainty and gives effect to the Reasons.  That is, it gives effect to the Reasons by “removing once and for all the only levee erected on the floodplain on its passage through Mikandra and Riverview”.^[20]
38. [38]
    Consistent with the Reasons, the remedial works should apply to the whole Area of Interest to effectively remove the nuisance and should not be limited as the plaintiffs purpose. The objective is to in effect “back out” the works that were done on Riverview to alter the natural level in the Area of Interest, which includes what is understood as the Temporary Levee but is not limited to that.  This is also consistent with the inclusion of [3(b)] to restore the “Below-Ground Drain” to “Natural Ground Level”.  
39. [39]
    Accordingly, I am satisfied that the final orders should include the definition of Area of Interest and the order in [3(d)] that the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff restore the contours within the Area of Interest to the “Natural Ground Level” as part of the remedial works.

Should additional findings be made in respect of the scope of the floodplain?

40. [40]
    The defendants contended:

“In addition to what already appears at paragraphs [66] and [67] of the Reasons, there should be findings as to the extent of the floodplain which will then identify the parts of Riverview which should not be built up.  It would be inappropriate, for example, for the [p]laintiffs to be able to remove the Temporary Levee but deposit the soil just north of the Area of Interest in the form of an earthen wall.”^[21]

41. [41]
    In particular, the defendants pointed to and relied on the following evidence in respect of this submission:

    1. The Third Markar Report^[22] in respect of the floodplain and the flow of water across Riverview, including the Area of Interest, during flood events.
    2. The First Affidavit of the first defendant sworn 3 March 2023 at [32].^[23]
    3. The Affidavit of Ross Sydney Yesberg sworn 4 March 2024 at [27] to [29].^[24] 
    4. The GHD Report^[25] obtained by the plaintiffs prior to the commencement of the proceeding and which is consistent with the Third Markar Report.
42. [42]
    At the hearing on 24 June 2025 and in the context of the revised draft form of judgment MFI H, the defendants accepted that given the findings in the Reasons there was no need for the Court to make further factual findings.  Further, the defendants’ concerns could be addressed by the proposed revised wording in [3(c)], which is discussed further below.
43. [43]
    Accordingly, it is not necessary to further consider the submission in respect of further factual findings in relation to the floodplain.

Whether the order should specify what is to be done with the soil that is removed pursuant to the order?

44. [44]
    The defendants initially sought an order that the work be carried out “in a way that will not alter the contours of any other part of Riverview in or about the area of the natural watercourse”.
45. [45]
    The defendants contended:

    1. “The [p]laintiffs adduce no evidence to explain why any part of the soil from the Area of Interest should be displaced anywhere near the passage of the floodplain.  The safest and most reasonable way of ensuring that no further nuisance is caused to Mikandra or any downstream neighbour is by ensuring that the soil is deposited elsewhere.”^[26]
    2. There is a sufficient basis for the Court “to be astute not to leave decision as to the placement of the soil removed from the Area of Interest to the [p]laintiffs”.^[27]

3. That “any soil removed from the Area of Interest should not be placed in the flood plain on Riverview”.^[28]

46. [46]
    In particular, the defendants initially contended that the soil removed from the Area of Interest could be placed on Block 3 or Block 5 on Riverview, as those two blocks received no damage during the 2010/2011 flood “such as that they are unlikely to cause a nuisance to Mikandra by blocking riparian flows”.^[29]
47. [47]
    This submission is based on the plaintiffs’ evidence at trial, including:

    1. In the First Affidavit of the first plaintiff, the assertion that Blocks 3 and 5 on Riverview received no damage during the 2010/2011 flood;^[30] and
    2. In the First Affidavit of Brett Enkelmann, the assertion that Blocks 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9 on Riverview had “extreme erosion”.^[31] 
48. [48]
    I do not consider that it would be appropriate for the final order to identify where the soil that is removed from the Area of Interest could or should be placed, whether on Riverview or elsewhere.
49. [49]
    By way of the issues raised in the proceeding, the plaintiffs are on notice of the potential impact of alterations to, and the building of structures on, the floodplain.  In particular, the potential impact on the natural watercourse and the risk of creating a further nuisance should firmly be in contemplation.
50. [50]
    What is readily apparent from this case is that the floodplain and the natural watercourse are susceptible to impacts from alterations and structures. The hydrological impacts of any changes should be considered before any such alterations are made or structures erected. This includes considering the impact on neighbours.
51. [51]
    It would be prudent for the plaintiffs to seek appropriate advice and to be mindful to avoid the creation of a further nuisance in removing the nuisance found in the Reasons.  As is evident from the issues in the counterclaim, this includes consideration of the risk of works altering contours on parts of Riverview, thereby impacting the area of the natural watercourse and possibly creating further concerns.
52. [52]
    Ultimately, the defendants proposed in the draft form of judgment MFI H that the order provide some certainty as to where the soil removed from the Area of Interest should not be placed.  Paragraph [3(c)] provides as follows:

“carry out the works in paragraphs (a) and (b)^[32] in a way that that any soil removed from the Area of Interest is not placed on Riverview Blocks 4, 8 or 9 or on that part of Riverview Block 7 to the west of the eastern-most border of the Area of Interest, as the Blocks are identified at Figure 1-2 of the First Markar Report [DEF.012.001.1502_0014]”.

53. [53]
    The plaintiffs agree to [3(c)] being included.^[33]
54. [54]
    Given the evidence that has been accepted in the Reasons, I consider that there is an evidentiary basis for the inclusion of [3(c)].  The provision does not stipulate where the soil is to be placed but rather where it is not to be placed, as supported by the evidence at the trial and the findings in the Reasons.

What process is appropriate for a survey to be undertaken to verify compliance with the order?

55. [55]
    The plaintiffs originally proposed a process as follows:^[34]

    1. The plaintiffs nominate three registered surveyors for the purpose of preparing a survey report following the remediation work being undertaken.
    2. The defendants select one of the nominated surveyors.
    3. The plaintiffs instruct the surveyor to prepare a survey report and provide any documents or data required. 
    4. Two business days before providing any instructions, documents or data to the surveyor, the plaintiffs are to provide those instructions, documents or data to the defendants.
    5. The plaintiffs serve the survey report on the defendants.
    6. The plaintiffs are deemed to have complied with the order to remove the “Temporary Levee and reinstate that part of Riverview on which the Temporary Levee stands… to Natural Ground Level” by serving a survey report demonstrating “that no point of the Relevant Area differs from the height of the Relevant Area as measured in the 2012 LiDAR by more than the margin of error of the 2012 LiDAR”.
56. [56]
    The defendants opposed this process, in particular the deeming provision.
57. [57]
    The defendants originally proposed in MFI E an approach as follows:

    1. The plaintiffs are expected to comply with the final orders.
    2. The works should be performed.
    3. The defendants should be furnished with reasonable material to enable them to ascertain whether the works have been carried out in compliance with the final orders.
    4. The defendants may make any application that may be necessary if the works do not appear to comply with the final orders.
58. [58]
    This proposed approach is more consistent with the orthodox principle that the Court will not become involved in the ongoing supervision of an order.
59. [59]
    The defendants went on to propose in MFI E a prescriptive process in light of concerns about whether the plaintiffs will comply with the final orders and the desire to “avoid a controversy about the confirmatory survey”.^[35]
60. [60]
    The defendants submitted that the following process would be appropriate:

    1. The first plaintiff and the second plaintiff must give the defendants written notice upon completion of the remediation works.
    2. At the expense of the first plaintiff and the second plaintiff, the parties to the counterclaim jointly appoint a suitably qualified surveyor to survey and prepare a report in compliance with the code of conduct in schedule 1C of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 depicting “the contours of Riverview in the Area of Interest prevailing at the date of a survey conducted after the Remedial Works have been completed and reporting whether any point of the Area of Interest differs from the Natural Ground Level”.
    3. All communications with the surveyor are to be made and received jointly and each party is entitled to receive all documents and data used, considered, or adjusted in the report. 
    4. The defendants must permit the surveyor, but not the plaintiffs or Brett Enkelmann, to have reasonable access to Mikandra on two business days’ notice in writing.

5. The first plaintiff and the second plaintiff are to file the report.^[36]

61. [61]
    Alternatively, the defendants contended that if the Court did not accept that approach and the plaintiffs were to have the carriage of the provision of instructions to the surveyor, then:

    1. the defendant should be given ten business days, rather than two, to consider any instructions or data given; and
    2. the order should include a mechanism for the defendants to be able to include text in the instructions to the surveyor.^[37]
62. [62]
    The defendants contended that this last provision would avoid the plaintiffs being able to reject any request by the defendants for particular information or instructions being given to the surveyor.
63. [63]
    It is for the first and second plaintiffs to comply with the final orders of the Court for removal of the nuisance. The appointment of a joint expert blurs the lines of accountability.^[38]
64. [64]
    Further, the deeming provision process proposed by the plaintiffs is likely to lead to further controversy between the parties in respect of transparency and evaluating compliance with the final orders.
65. [65]
    In all of these circumstances, the process contained in MFI G was prepared for discussion with the parties, being a hybrid of the two approaches to meet the objectives of transparency and the evaluation of compliance.  
66. [66]
    The parties were given the opportunity to consider MFI G.  MFI H shows marked-up suggested changes to the hybrid process, including that a copy of the order be provided to the Agreed Surveyor and that all communications with the Agreed Surveyor must be in writing.  The changes in MFI H were agreed by both parties.^[39]
67. [67]
    At the resumed hearing on 25 June 2025, it was agreed that this process should be completed by “no later than 30 September 2025”. This date was nominated after an opportunity to consider the practicalities and likely time estimates for the steps involved.  The parties are in agreement as to the date.^[40]
68. [68]
    Further, the parties are in agreement as to the dates at [6(a)] and [6(b)], being 27 June 2025 and 4 July 2025 respectively.^[41]  The defendants also agreed to the proposed six business days notice in [6(d)].^[42] 
69. [69]
    One further area of disagreement emerged.  Order [6(f)] of MFI H provided that “all communications with the surveyor, their employees or agents must be in writing and are to be provided to the Defendants”.
70. [70]
    The plaintiffs identified a concern in respect of the approach if the Agreed Surveyor appointed under the process was on site and asked a question.  Consequently, the plaintiffs proposed an amendment to [6(f)] as follows:

“all communications with the surveyor, their employees or agents which provide instructions, documents or data, or seek opinions of any kind, must be in writing and are to be provided to the Defendants.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Plaintiffs will not be in breach of this order by the Plaintiffs or their solicitors engaging in oral communication with a proposed surveyor or the Agreed Surveyor:

1. which are of an administrative nature, such as enquiries as to availability or as to travel or access arrangement; or
2. which are initiated by the Agreed Surveyor.”^[43]

71. [71]
    In response the defendants proposed an alternative solution to the concern by a revised [6(f)] as follows:

“all communications with the surveyor, their employees or agents which provide instructions, documents or data, or seek opinions of any kind, must be in writing and are to be provided to the Defendants.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Plaintiffs will not be in breach of this order by the Plaintiffs or their solicitors engaging in oral communication with a proposed surveyor or the Agreed Surveyor which are of an administrative nature, such as enquiries as to availability or as to travel or access arrangements.”^[44]

72. [72]
    At the hearing on 25 June 2025, Senior Counsel for the defendants also suggested some additional wording that may meet the concern about matters raised orally by the Agreed Surveyor as follows:

“all communications with the surveyor, their employees or agents which provide instructions, documents or data, or seek opinions of any kind, must be in writing and are to be provided to the Defendants.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Plaintiffs will not be in breach of this order by the Plaintiffs or their solicitors engaging in oral communication with a proposed surveyor or the Agreed Surveyor which:

1. are of an administrative nature, such as enquiries as to availability or as to travel or access arrangements; or
2. constitute a request for information, documents or data from the Agreed Surveyor provided the response is given in writing.”^[45]

(additional words in underlining and reformatting)  

73. [73]
    Given the history of this matter, I am satisfied that it is necessary for there to be a further revision to [6(f)] to reflect the possibility of an oral request from the Agreed Surveyor so there is an agreed method of response, which is consistent with the objectives of transparency and evaluating compliance with the final orders.  I consider that the proposed amendment in MFI J and the additional wording proposed at the hearing on 25 June 2025 best meets those objectives.
74. [74]
    Accordingly, I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the final orders to include the procedure contained in [6] of MFI J with the additional amendment to [6(f)] as identified by the defendants.

Orders

75. [75]
    Given that the final judgment includes a mandatory injunction, it is also appropriate to include that each party has liberty to apply.
76. [76]
    The parties proposed an order that:

“The costs of the Plaintiffs’ Claim, the Defendants’ Counterclaim, the application by the Defendants for indemnity costs and the dispute as to the form of final orders are reserved.”^[46]

77. [77]
    As indicated at the outset of these reasons, submission in respect of the issues of the costs of the claim, the counterclaim and the dispute as to the form of final orders have been heard and reserved and will be dealt with in separate reasons and orders.  Accordingly, there is no need for these orders to deal with costs.
78. [78]
    For the reasons outlined above, the final orders are in the form of MFI J with the additional wording included in [6(f)] and the deletion of [8] in respect of costs.
79. [79]
    Accordingly, the final orders are as set out in the Annexure to these reasons.

ANNEXURE

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

REGISTRY: Brisbane

NUMBER: BS12984/16

FIRST PLAINTIFF: PETER ROBERT ENKELMANN

AND

SECOND PLAINTIFF: MARGARET ANNE ENKELMANN

AND

THIRD PLAINTIFF: PREEMA PARTNERSHIP

AND

FIRST DEFENDANT: MICHAEL ALLAN STEWART

AND

SECOND DEFENDANT: ANDREA ISABEL STEWART

JUDGMENT

In this Judgment:

1. “Riverview” means the real property more particularly described as Lots 1, 3, 4 and 6 on RP 27650, Lots 69 and 72 (Lot 72) on RP 27647;

2. “Mikandra” means the property owned by the Defendants and situated adjacent to Riverview;
3. “Area of Interest” means the yellow banded polygon situated in or about Lot 72 and depicted in Schedule B;
4. “Temporary Levee” means the earthen embankment:
   1. I.
      situated in or about the Area of Interest;
   1. II.
      located in or about the red hatched area on the map at Schedule A;
   1. III.
      aligned generally in accordance with the orange dashed line in Schedule B.
5. “Below Ground Drain” means the below-ground channel:
   1. I.
      situated in or about Lot 72 but generally to the south of the Temporary Levee;
   1. II.
      entered by waters flowing in a northerly direction at or immediately after the entry of the Fairdale-Leafdale Gully into Riverview; then
   1. III.
      running parallel to the boundary between Mikandra and Riverview in a west/south-westerly direction; then
   1. IV.
      exiting Riverview in a general north-westerly direction away from Riverview and towards Hansen’s Gully.
6. “Dozer Spoil” means the area, generally marked on Schedule B, present in the 2012 LiDAR as set out in Schedule C above the Natural Ground Level on Riverview.
7. “Natural Ground Level” means the contours prevailing on Riverview before construction of the Temporary Levee started, as represented by the Light Detection And Ranging (LiDAR) meta data captured in or about August 2012 for the Department of Environment and Resource Management and contained in one or more of the data files mentioned in the project report at Annexure G to the Survey Report prepared by Alistair Byrom and dated 6 August 2020 [starting at DEF.012.001.1504_0052] , save for the area of the “Dozer Spoil” depicted in Schedule B which is to be taken as having the height AHD269 within  +/- 0.15 (i.e. +/-150mm).

THE ORDER OF THE COURT IS THAT:

Plaintiffs’ claim

1. 1
   The Plaintiffs’ claim be dismissed.

Defendants’ counterclaim

1. 2
   Judgment be entered for the Defendants against the First Plaintiff and Second Plaintiff on the Defendants’ Amended Counterclaim filed on 19 March 2024.

1. 3
   By no later than 18 August 2025, the First Plaintiff and Second Plaintiff, whether by themselves, their employees or agents or otherwise howsoever:

1. remove the Temporary Levee; and
2. restore the Below-Ground Drain to Natural Ground Level; and
3. carry out the works in paragraphs (a) and (b) in a way that that any soil removed from the Area of Interest is not placed on Riverview Blocks 4, 8 or 9 or on that part of Riverview Block 7 to the west of the eastern-most border of the Area of Interest, as the Blocks are identified at Figure 1-2 of the First Markar Report [DEF.012.001.1502_0014]; and
4. restore the contours within the Area of Interest to the Natural Ground Level.  

(the Remedial Works)

1. 4
   The First Plaintiff and Second Plaintiff must give the Defendants written notice upon completion of the Remedial Works.

1. 5
   By no later than 30 September 2025:

1. at the expense of the First Plaintiff and Second Plaintiff, First Plaintiff and Second Plaintiff appoint the Agreed Surveyor to:

1. survey; and
2. prepare a report in compliance with the code of conduct (in Schedule 1C of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999) depicting,

the contours of Riverview in the Area of Interest prevailing at the date of a survey conducted after the Remedial Works have been completed and reporting whether any point of the Area of Interest differs from the Natural Ground Level (the Survey Report); and

2. the First Plaintiff and Second Plaintiff are to file and serve the Survey Report.

1. 6
   For the purposes of the survey and the Survey Report:

1. by 4pm on 27 June 2025, the First Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff are to nominate three suitably qualified registered surveyors for the purpose of undertaking the survey and preparing the Survey Report.
2. by 4pm on 4 July 2025, the Defendants are to select one of the surveyors nominated (Agreed Surveyor).
3. the First Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff are to:
   1. (i)
      provide the Agreed Surveyor with a copy of this order;
   1. (ii)
      instruct the Agreed Surveyor to undertake any work necessary for the survey and to prepare the Survey Report; and
   1. (iii)
      provide the agreed Surveyor with any documents or data which he or she requires.
   1. (d)
      at least six business days before providing any instructions, documents or data to the Agreed Surveyor, the First Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff are to provide the instructions, document or data to the Defendants.
   1. (e)
      the First Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff are to include in the instructions and/or the documents or data provided to the Agreed Surveyor any specified instructions, information, documents and/or data reasonably requested by the Defendants.
   1. (f)
      all communications with the surveyor, their employees or agents which provide instructions, documents or data, or seek opinions of any kind, must be in writing and are to be provided to the Defendants.  For the avoidance of doubt, the Plaintiffs will not be in breach of this order by the Plaintiffs or their solicitors engaging in oral communication with a proposed surveyor or the Agreed Surveyor which:
4. the First Plaintiff and the Second Plaintiff are to:
   1. (i)
      are of an administrative nature, such as enquiries as to availability or as to travel or access arrangements; or
   1. (ii)
      constitute a request for information, documents or data from the Agreed Surveyor provided the response is given in writing.
   1. (g)
      the Defendants are entitled to receive all documents and data used, considered or adjusted in preparation of the Survey Report.
   1. (h)
      the Defendants must permit the Agreed Surveyor and any persons authorised by her or him, but not the Plaintiffs or Brett Enkelmann, to have reasonable access to Mikandra on two business days’ notice in writing.
1. 7
   Each party has liberty to apply.

SCHEDULE A | MAP OF APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TEMPORARY LEVEE

SCHEDULE B | AREA OF INTEREST

Figure 3-1 – Area of interest and cross section locations and extents

ANNEXURE C | DOZER SPOIL LOCATION: