Re NYY[2025] QSC 29

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

1. [1]
   The applicant is self-represented. She has tried to file various documents in the registry, but the Registrar has refused to permit the filing of the documents pursuant to rule 15 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Queensland).^[1] The result is that, pursuant to rule 15(2)(b) of the UCPR, the applicant now applies to the court for leave to file the documents.
2. [2]
   It is necessary to anonymise the parties because of the nature of the allegations that the applicant wishes to ventilate, and because some of those allegations involve her children.
3. [3]
   The applicant’s application^[2] came before the court in the Applications List on 18 February 2025. On that day, the applicant made oral submissions on why she should be permitted to proceed with her application, and she gave me her written submissions, together with two lever arch files full of material, and an envelope which included some confidential material.
4. [4]
   Because of the exigencies of the Applications List, it was appropriate to hear the applicant, to take the material, and to reserve my decision so that the material could be properly digested.
5. [5]
   The identity of the proposed respondents seems apparent from the originating application that the applicant attempted to file in the registry.^[3]

The Background

6. [6]
   It is necessary to explain the background. The material tendered by the applicant shows that on 2 and 3 December 2019 there was a contested domestic violence hearing before Magistrate Dowse in the Southport Magistrates Court. Her Honour’s decision was handed down on 5 December 2019. Her Honour decided that the applicant had committed an act (or acts) of domestic violence against her former husband and decided to grant a 5-year protection order naming her former husband as the ‘aggrieved’ and the applicant as the ‘respondent’. Her Honour dismissed the applicant’s cross-application for a protection order against the applicant’s former husband.
7. [7]
   The applicant then appealed to the District Court. The appeal was on the basis that the Magistrate had erred, but also on the basis that the Magistrate had showed apprehended bias, and that she had conducted the proceeding unfairly. That appeal was heard by McGinness DCJ in the Southport District Court on 22 June 2020. On 17 September 2020, Her Honour dismissed the appeal. Her Honour’s decision^[4] explains much of the background to the disputes as well as the detail of the evidence at the hearing in both the Magistrates Court and in the Federal Circuit Court.
8. [8]
   There were also family law proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court. Ultimately, in 2020 that court gave primary custody of the three children to the applicant’s former husband.

The Application for Leave to File

9. [9]
   The application itself is a challenging document.
10. [10]
    The application, apart from seeking an urgent hearing, and some orders restricting service of material and seeking the waiver of filing fees, seeks the following:

“The Supreme Court with extreme urgency read the entirety of the Affidavit filed 6 January 2025 with the Court of Appeal, which has been refiled with this matter on 31 January 2025, and in judgement by declaration state the Affidavit contains prima facie child sexual abuse evidence and must be heard urgently in parens patriae to immediately remove the Children from risk of sexual harm with their Father.

The Supreme Court consider that the matter was filed on instruction from Her Honour Justice Mullins, heard in Brisbane in person on 23 January 2025, who already confirmed by her own Orders that the matter belongs within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and by her Orders stating “for want of jurisdiction”; is not an abuse of process, malicious or vexatious in nature.

The Supreme Court consider that delaying this process by totally unnecessary administrative pettifogging and minutia, three Children continue to be at risk of physical, sexual psychological and emotional harm; and likely being raped by their paedophile Father while the Court “considers” this Application.

Leave to withhold service of the Affidavit from all Respondents due to the sensitive information presenting extreme risk to the life and health of the … Children, as informants and witnesses to sexual abuse crimes of the Fifth Respondent.” [emphasis added]

Urgent Orders

11. [11]
    The orders sought in the applicant’s (proposed) ‘initiating application’ are then set out in some detail. Under the heading “Urgent Orders” the applicant seeks the following:

“

3. 1.
   The Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction in parens patriaein the Equity division.

3. 2.
   That all Risk of Sexual Harm and other Child Harm evidence put before the Court by the Applicant be admitted and immediately assessed for risk of harm to [names of children and their dates of birth deleted] while in the custody of the Fifth Respondent [the applicant’s former husband].

3. 3.
   Orders are made in equity to immediately remove the… Children from the Fifth Respondent and place them in the safe, protective care of the
   Applicant.

3. NOTE: This Application is being made on instruction from Justice Mullins during Show Cause hearing on 23 January 2025 at 2.30pm.

3. 4.
   Filing fees are waived in lieu of credit for the Hearing held 23 January 2025 as requested of the Registrar by Justice Mullins during Show Cause hearing on 23 January 2025 at 2.30pm.

3. 5.
   The Court grant Orders for substitute of service by email to the Parties.

3. 6.
   That the proceedings are conducted with Trauma-Informed Judicial Practice:

3. a.
   in an unbiased, non-prejudicial respectful manner toward the Applicant accounting for her Trauma (emotional) disability:

3. b.
   without any further injury or insult to the Applicant by Judges of the Court, or Respondents; including verbal abuse, harassment, undertones or rude remarks

3. c.
   using informal, conversational style for hearings

3. d.
   assistance by the Court to understand the Court process and procedures

3. e.
   complete consideration of her PTSD, Anxiety and Major Depressive Disorder be accounted for in respect of the conduct of the proceedings,

3. f.
   a relaxing of Rules of Conduct wherever necessary

3. g.
   the right to present her case in plain English, verbally or in writing

3. h.
   clear legible instructions provided to all Parties in writing or by Court Order” [emphasis added]

12. [12]
    Of course, the most concerning aspect of that list of proposed orders is the reference to the risk of sexual and other harm to the three children. From other material it is clear that the three children are the children of the applicant and her former husband. However, it is important to note that what seems to be sought is that the risk of harm be “immediately assessed”.
13. [13]
    The ‘urgent orders’ proposed by the application appear to envisage a proceeding in which a risk assessment will be conducted, but subject to certain specified procedural modifications, and on the basis that the children are to be immediately placed in the care of the applicant.
14. [14]
    Importantly, there is no claim here that the three children are in present danger. If they were presently in danger, then it would be appropriate for the applicant to call the police or the Department of Child Safety. Instead, the idea seems to be that there be a proceeding in this court which has, as its object, a ‘risk assessment’. As will be seen, there is also no evidence identified by the applicant in her application that establishes that the children are presently in harm’s way.
15. [15]
    At this point, it is necessary to mention two substantive problems.

First Substantive Problem – No Legal Basis for the Claim

16. [16]
    The first substantive problem is that the applicant does not identify the legal basis on which she seeks this ‘risk assessment’ proceeding. Identifying that as a problem is not, as the applicant appears to describe it, “totally unnecessary administrative pettifogging and minutia”.^[5] It is essential that a legal proceeding have some proper legal foundation, and that the legal foundation for the claim be articulated. That legal foundation is not established by vague reference to a variety of legal concepts.^[6]
17. [17]
    In any event, procedural fairness requires that the applicant’s claim identify some proper legal basis for her claim. The five proposed respondents are entitled to proper notice of the claim against them. That means that there must be an intelligible legal claim. The claim need not be proved by evidence. But the originating process does need to give proper notice of precisely what claim is being made and the legal foundation for it.^[7]
18. [18]
    And, the court is entitled to know the legal basis of the claims that are brought before it. Those are at least some of the reasons for rule 26 of the UCPR, particularly subrule (5).
19. [19]
    Here, there is no legal basis for the applicant’s claim which, at its core, seems to be a claim for the court to conduct an inquiry as to whether her three children are at risk in circumstances where she does not make a specific allegation that there is a particular risk or adduce evidence that they are presently at risk.  And that is in a context where a court with family law jurisdiction has ordered, in a contested hearing, that the applicant have custody of the three children.

Second Substantive Problem – No (or limited) Jurisdiction

20. [20]
    The second substantive problem is the issue of jurisdiction. The applicant has already contested the issue of custody of and access to the children. She lost that battle.^[8] What she really seeks is a variation of the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court^[9] in 2020 so that the children are now placed into her custody. Parenting orders in relation to the children of a marriage fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.^[10] That court has powers of arrest, injunctions and specific provisions where an interested person alleges that a child to whom the proceedings relate has been abused or is at risk of being abused.^[11]
21. [21]
    On the other hand, the extent to which State Supreme Courts retain any residual jurisdiction to hear and determine federal proceedings concerning a parenting order is doubtful.^[12] Queensland is one of a number of States^[13] that have transferred to the Commonwealth their powers in respect of the maintenance of children, the payment of expenses in relation to children or child bearing, and the custody and guardianship of, and access to, children.
22. [22]
    It is true that this court’s parens patriae jurisdiction is ancient, wide-ranging and far-reaching. It extends as far as necessary for the protection of children and those persons who from their legal disability cannot look after themselves and are in need of protection. Whilst broad, the jurisdiction is generally to be exercised only in exceptional cases and with considerable caution. It is a jurisdiction which, in general terms, is exercised when there is some risk to a child’s welfare.
23. [23]
    Those principles, and the parens patriae jurisdiction were recently discussed in some detail by Robb J of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Re Emma.^[14] That was a case where the evidence that was placed before the court made it obvious that Emma was in extreme and immediate need of being placed in secure accommodation. As I have explained, the applicant has not alleged or placed any material before this court that any of the three children are in extreme and immediate danger, let alone that the appropriate course of action is that they be placed in the applicant’s care, contrary to orders of the Federal Circuit Court. In fact, as I have mentioned, it appears that the applicant’s claim is for an inquiry to assess whether or not the children are subject to a risk of harm.  
24. [24]
    Unless there is some particular reason or exceptional circumstance justifying the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction, this court would generally decline to exercise that jurisdiction where there is a specialist court such as the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. As previously mentioned, that court has expertise and specialist staff and consultants and specific rules dealing with allegations of child abuse and family violence.
25. [25]
    Here, there is no sensible reason for this court to permit the applicant to commence a proceeding in this court designed to conduct a ‘risk assessment’, assuming that were possible as a matter of law, and to do so on the basis that the children are to be immediately placed in the care of the applicant. That is properly a matter to be commenced in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – which has already made orders concerning the custody of the children. 

Other Orders

26. [26]
    Returning to the orders sought by the applicant, under a further heading “Other Orders” the applicant appears to seek to litigate another proceeding, by way of a judicial review:

“

3. 7.
   A Common Law Judicial Review is performed against the judgement and orders of Judge McGinness made 17 September 2020 and Magistrate Dowse made 5 December 2019 in Southport Magistrate Court in the matter of [name of matter deleted] and all prior hearings in that matter.

3. NOTE: This Application is being made on instructions from Justice Mullins during Show Cause hearing on 23 January 2025 at 2.30pm.

3. 8.
   That the proceedings are conducted with Trauma-Informed Judicial Practice (as above).

3. 9.
   The Queensland Government respond to a Whole of Government subpoena for an electronic copy of all unredacted files and information (including all metadata) regarding [names and dates of birth of the children deleted] and the information be provided in electronic, readable and accessible form to the Applicant only, on USB or Data Storage Device.

3. a.
   The subpoena is to include all files and metadata belonging to those files in the form of:

3. i.
   emails,

3. ii.
   documents,

3. iii.
   phone records,

3. iv.
   database records (including QPRIME)

3. v.
   instant messaging,

3. vi.
   file notes,

3. vii.
   operational notebooks,

3. viii.
   bodycam footage,

3. ix.
   all surveillance information,

3. x.
   investigation records and notes,

3. xi.
   judicial records including all Court files and judges notes,

3. xii.
   court Administrative Registry records,

3. xiii.
   subpoena files held by Courts,

3. xiv.
   audio files,

3. xv.
   video files,

3. xvi.
   photographs,

3. xvii.
   scans and other medical imaging,

3. xviii.
   conversation notes,

3. between any persons, concerning any of the above parties, to and from any person in the Queensland Government or Queensland Courts or engaged by Queensland Legal Aid for the purposes of the [family name deleted] family.

3. 10.
   The Court issue subpoena to the Federal Government as a Whole of Government subpoena for an electronic copy of all unredacted files and information (including all metadata) regarding [names and dates of birth of the children deleted] and the information be provided in electronic, readable and accessible form to the Applicant only, on USB or Data Storage Device.

3. a.
   The subpoena is to include all files and metadata belonging to those files in the form of:

3. i.
   emails,

3. ii.
   documents,

3. iii.
   phone records,

3. iv.
   database records (including QPRIME)

3. v.
   instant messaging,

3. vi.
   file notes,

3. vii.
   operational notebooks,

3. viii.
   bodycam footage,

3. ix.
   all surveillance information,

3. x.
   investigation records and notes,

3. xi.
   judicial records including all Court files and judges notes,

3. xii.
   court Administrative Registry records,

3. xiii.
   subpoena files held by Courts,

3. xiv.
   audio files,

3. xv.
   video files,

3. xvi.
   photographs,

3. xvii.
   scans and other medical imaging,

3. xviii.
   conversation notes,

3. between any persons, concerning any of the above parties, to and from any person in the Queensland Government or Queensland Courts or engaged by Queensland Legal Aid for the purposes of the [family name deleted] family.”

27. [27]
    What appears to be proposed by paragraphs [7] to [10] is a broad judicial review against the judgment and orders of McGinness DCJ made on 17 September 2020, and Magistrate Dowse made on 5 December 2019, and all prior hearings in that matter, but with the State and the Commonwealth required to produce a very wide range of documents in any way connected with the applicant’s family.
28. [28]
    And so, the applicant seeks judicial review of those judicial decisions. Such a judicial review would be incompetent because the decisions of Magistrates and District Court Judges are susceptible to appeal, but not to judicial review.^[15]
29. [29]
    The subpoenas directed to the Queensland and Federal Governments are plainly oppressive. The idea seems to be to have both governments search for and provide electronic copies of any information relevant in any way to any of the five members of the applicant’s family. Almost anything at all would be comprehended by these subpoenas. For example, the subpoenas would require production of every one of the children’s educational records and every single medical record held by Queensland Health, and even, to give another example, details of any traffic infringements. All court files are sought – including all court files in both State and Commonwealth courts, most of which are readily accessible by search. Even judge’s notes are sought.
30. [30]
    All of these documents are sought without any identification of an issue to which the relevance of the documents can be tied. The objective seems to be for every single document held by either level of government to be produced and then, presumably, to be scrutinised by a tribunal in a public hearing, and it is assumed, for the purpose of undertaking the judicial review. To say the least, even if a judicial review were appropriate, judicial reviews are never, and should never, be conducted on such an open-ended and plenary basis. What the applicant seems to have in mind is something akin to a Royal Commission where three of the objects of this vast inquiry are children.^[16]
31. [31]
    The proposed originating application then specifies that the third respondent (Ms Simpson, the applicant’s former lawyer) and the fifth respondent (the applicant’s former husband) only be permitted access to some of the material to be subpoenaed.

Paragraphs 14-19

32. [32]
    And then the originating application seeks the following relief:

“

14. That the Domestic Violence Order made in favour of [the applicant’s former husband] on 5 December 2020 be quashed, and his Application in Southport Magistrates Court for extension of that Order be remitted to this Court and summarily dismissed.
15. That a Lifetime Domestic Violence Order be made against [the applicant’s former husband] in favour of [the applicant] with the named persons [children’s names deleted] containing the maximum level of protection available against [the applicant’s former husband], strict no contact, monitoring or surveillance orders (including by any third party, by electronic surveillance or by social media) and a 20km protection radius.
16. That the Applicant be granted permission to criminally and civilly prosecute the Fifth Respondent (and any other associated parties) in the Supreme Court of Queensland for all acts of abuse and violence committed against the Applicant and the [family name deleted] Children from 19 November 2017 and thereafter, and that all prosecutions be funded at the complete upfront cost of the Queensland Courts and/or the Queensland Government.
17. That the Third Respondent be assessed for breach of Legal Professional Practice Rules and associated legislation in respect of the original proceedings between [the applicant] and [the applicant’s former husband] in Southport Magistrates Court, Specialist Domestic Violence division in 2018-19.
18. That the Third Respondent be assessed for perjury and the making of false application for fees owing by the applicant in the Southport Magistrates Court in 2020.
19. That any orders made in favour of the Third Respondent against the Applicant be overturned.”

33. [33]
    Those claims are, in reality:

    1. a further appeal against Magistrate Dowse’s decision in circumstances where an appeal against that decision has already been heard and dismissed;
    2. a “lifetime” domestic violence order;^[17]
    3. an order of the court, not said to be authorised by any law, to permit prosecution of the applicant’s former husband “criminally and civilly” for unidentified acts of abuse and violence (in circumstances where both a Magistrate and a District Court Judge have concluded there were no acts of violence committed by the applicant’s former husband);
    4. an “assessment” of Ms Simpson’s alleged breach of unspecified legal practice rules;
    5. an “assessment” of Ms Simpson’s alleged perjury – without any details at all;
    6. an effective overturning, or appeal from, unspecified decisions in favour of Ms Simpson.
34. [34]
    None of that makes sense. Rule 26(5) of the UCPR requires that the applicant specify the name and section of any Act pursuant to which she makes her application. She has failed to do that and has failed to properly identify exactly what order she seeks – at least in clear language that enables the court and the proposed parties to identify the factual and legal basis for the claim.

Paragraphs 20-23

35. [35]
    The balance of the paragraphs in this section of the application are as follows:

“

20. All fees paid by the Applicant to the Respondent be returned within 3 days of Order, with interest of 10% per annum and indexation applied.
21. That the Applicant be permitted to civilly prosecute the Third Respondent in respect of the findings, at no further cost to the Applicant.
22. That the Fourth Respondent be assessed for misconduct, bias, non-compliance and breach of Police Powers, Responsibilities and Operational Practice Rules and associated legislation in respect of the treatment of matters between [the applicant] and [the applicant’s former husband] and the [family name deleted] Children from 2018 to the present day.
23. That the Applicant be permitted to civilly prosecute the Queensland Police Service in respect of the findings, at no further cost to the Applicant.”

36. [36]
    Paragraph 20 makes little sense. Possibly the applicant is seeking the return of fees paid to her lawyer for legal services. That would be the case if by ‘Respondent’ she means the ‘Third Respondent’ as identified in the proposed originating application. Paragraphs 21 and 23 make little sense and, contrary to rule 26 of the UCPR, do not specify the legal or legislative basis for the claim. 
37. [37]
    Paragraph 22 seeks to have the Police Commissioner ‘assessed’ for unspecified misconduct, bias, non-compliance and breaches of various legislation.

Costs and Interim Damages

38. [38]
    Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the applicant’s application are in these terms:

“

24. That Respondents and/or Queensland Government, within 30 days of Order, reimburse the Applicant for costs and losses of $13,000 per month (with 15% interest and indexation) and value of property loss from January 2018, until date of Order, in lieu of the cost and economic impact of proceedings. Total value at filing of Application is $2,909,815.59.
25. That Queensland Government, from day of Order, pay the cost of all Child-related costs including but not limited to:
    1. groceries,
    2. schooling,
    3. housing (emergency, short and/or long term rent),
    4. sporting,
    5. technology,
    6. recreation,
    7. vehicle purchase, fuel and maintenance,
    8. house and land purchase,
    9. medical, psychology, recovery costs,
    10. replacement clothing and personal belongings, and
    11. the necessities of life

at unlimited cost indefinitely; and

26. The Respondents pay the applicant’s costs of the application or as the case may be.”

39. [39]
    The legal basis for those claims is not specified and the State of Queensland is not a party.  Yet $3 million and on-going costs are sought in damages against the State.

The Serious Allegations

40. [40]
    The lack of a proper, identified legal basis for the claims is sufficient to justify refusing leave. Normally, on an application like this, the court need not examine the evidence sought to be tendered in support of the claim. A properly pleaded claim or properly articulated application is essential, and it is not appropriate or necessary on an application for leave under rule 15(2)(b) of the UCPR for the court to scrutinise the evidence sought to be tendered in support of the proposed application.
41. [41]
    However, this case is unusual, making it appropriate to address the fact that the applicant makes serious allegations regarding the safety of her children. She alleges that her former husband is sexually abusing them. But, for a number of reasons, the allegations made by the applicant do not bear scrutiny and should not be permitted to proceed in this court.
42. [42]
    In some cases, the very serious allegations are vague. For example, in her affidavit affirmed on 17 February 2025 the applicant says that a judicial review is necessary because of:

“an application by the Father to extend the Domestic Violence Order by a further 5 years so he can further abuse the Mother using Police, keep the Children from the Mother, and keep the Children under his strict coercive control in an environment of prima facie sexual harm.”

43. [43]
    It is bizarre to suggest, without proper evidence, that there is unidentified coercive control and, from that, the court should infer, on the face of it, sexual harm to the children.^[18]
44. [44]
    In paragraph 46 of the same affidavit the applicant says this:

“No Domestic Violence Order should ever have been issued against me as a victim of a raft of hideous indictable offences; including ongoing strangulation, assault, stalking, monitoring and surveillance by him and third parties, hacking and severe economic and psychological abuse. The Children should have been protected under an Order in my favour; due to the sexual, physical, emotional and psychological risk of harm presented by the Father on all the evidence provided by me to the lawyers and Court over time. The Father should have been prosecuted for every offence he committed, especially those he admitted to having committed.” [emphasis added]

45. [45]
    The words emphasized, and the content of her application, suggest that what the applicant is really speaking about is not actual harm or evidence of harm, but rather what she perceives to be a risk of harm. It is a peculiar approach, to say the least, to make serious allegations like this under the cloak of there being a risk of harm rather than actual harm or evidence of harm.^[19]
46. [46]
    The risk of harm seems to mature into an actual allegation of harm in paragraph 61 of the affidavit. But again, no instances or evidence is provided.
47. [47]
    In a domestic violence affidavit,^[20] the applicant speaks of some behaviour of their 6-year-old child in January 2019, including reference to photos^[21] and to the fact that both hospital staff and the Family Court rejected this evidence.
48. [48]
    Similarly, in her application, the applicant refers to the children as being at risk of physical, sexual psychological and emotional harm, but then says that they are likely to be raped by their “paedophile Father”. It is extraordinary that the applicant is prepared to use that label, but at the same time speak of the risk of harm rather than identifying any instances of actual harm or actual abuse or disclosing any proper evidence.
49. [49]
    In summary, no evidence has been placed before this court that the children are in imminent risk of harm. And, if there is proper evidence of harm or of sexual assault, the applicant should take it to the police, the Department of Child Safety or to the Federal Circuit and Family Court.

Written Submissions

50. [50]
    The applicant’s written submissions are incomprehensible. They start with a collection of legal principles. The applicant does not identify the relief she seeks of the legal and factual basis for that relief. Ironically, the submissions require the court to use plain English.
51. [51]
    Paragraph 6 of the written submissions is as follows:

The Respondents listed include all Judges and Magistrates of Inferior Courts, Police, Solicitors and the Children’s Father who contributed to the breach of natural justice resulting in dangerous child outcomes, and who failed to perform statutory duty to have the Court reach a particular predetermined outcome in favour of a criminal and likely paedophile. They include acts of criminal fraud and “match-fixing”. 

52. [52]
    It is difficult to understand that. And, again, the applicant uses the language of risk in referring to “dangerous child outcomes” and to “likely paedophile”. There is the same issue with paragraph 9 of the written submissions which is as follows: “The Children, on the evidence placed before the Court today, are at prima facie risk of sexual harm in their current residence.”
53. [53]
    Paragraph 13 of the written submissions is as follows:

Further new evidence found in March 2023 drawn by the eldest Child demonstrates the Father was in fact sexually abusing the Children, supporting the Mother original and rational fear.

54. [54]
    If there was actual evidence, and it was found in March 2023, two years ago, it must have and should have been referred to the police and/or to the Department of Child Safety and/or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

Conclusions

55. [55]
    In substance, what has happened is that the applicant sought domestic violence orders against the applicant’s former husband but failed. He succeeded in a similar application against her. The applicant failed in an appeal. That was in 2020.  The applicant’s former husband has custody of the children pursuant to orders of the Federal Circuit Court.
56. [56]
    Now, the applicant seeks to re-agitate her claims. There is no discernible basis for her to do so, especially in this court. And she seeks to prosecute various associated claims (for example, against her lawyer) but none appear to have any proper legal basis.
57. [57]
    The claims made make little sense. They are vexatious and should not be permitted to proceed.
58. [58]
    In summary:

    1. The claims which are sought to be advanced are not properly identified and no legal basis for the claims is set out;
    2. The proposed claims would prejudice the proposed respondents as the proposed claims are vexatious and lacking in a proper legal basis;
    3. The proposed claims, or at least some of them, are likely to be beyond the jurisdiction of this court, or clouded by doubts about jurisdiction; and
    4. In so far as they may be properly based, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) is the appropriate forum for the proposed claims.
59. [59]
    The applicant’s application is dismissed.