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O'Connell v Kawana Tennis Club Inc[2025] QSC 60

O'Connell v Kawana Tennis Club Inc[2025] QSC 60

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

O'Connell v Kawana Tennis Club Inc [2025] QSC 60

PARTIES:

JOSIE MAREE O'CONNELL

(Applicant)

v

KAWANA TENNIS CLUB INC

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 793 of 2025

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

DELIVERED ON:

28 March 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

25 March 2025

JUDGE:

Bowskill CJ

ORDERS:

  1. Declare that the decision made by the management committee of the Kawana Tennis Club Inc on 11 December 2024, terminating the applicant’s membership of the Club, is void; and
  2. Order that the decision made by the management committee of the Kawana Tennis Club Inc on 11 December 2024, terminating the applicant’s membership of the Club, be set aside.

CATCHWORDS:

ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS – INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS – MEMBERS – where the applicant’s membership of the respondent Club was terminated on the basis of allegations of conduct considered to be injurious or prejudicial to the character or interests of the Club – where the applicant contends she was denied an opportunity to present her case before the decision to terminate was made – whether the notices purportedly sent to the applicant were received by her – whether there had been a breach of natural justice – whether the respondent’s decision should be set aside

Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld), s 71, s 72, s 73

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Gould v Isis Club Inc [2016] 1 Qd R 363; [2015] QSC 253

Shipton v South East Queensland Sport Aircraft Club Inc (2022) 10 QR 1; [2022] QSC 5

COUNSEL:

C J Conway, for the applicant

J Nickless, sol, for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Swanston & Associates, for the applicant

Gosai Law, for the respondent

  1. [1]
    The applicant has been a member of the Kawana Tennis Club since December 2022.  Her membership was terminated by the management committee of the Club on 11 December 2024, in circumstances in which the applicant says she was denied procedural fairness because she did not receive notice of the termination; the notice purportedly given did not properly articulate the basis on which the decision to terminate was made; and the decision purportedly made was affected by apprehended bias because it was based on complaints made by the decision-makers themselves.  By this proceeding, she seeks the following, under s 72(2) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld):
    1. a declaration that the decision made by the Club on 11 December 2024 terminating the applicant’s membership of the Club is void;
    2. an order that that decision be set aside; and
    3. an order that the Club pay her costs.
  2. [2]
    The Club opposes the application, on the basis that the decision was fairly made, the applicant was given notice of it, the notice set out sufficient detail of the basis of the complaints leading to the decision to terminate her membership, and the decision was not affected by bias.  In addition, the Club submits this application is premature, because the applicant should have pursued the avenue of an appeal available under the Club’s constitution, before initiating proceedings in Court.
  3. [3]
    There is no dispute about this Court having jurisdiction to deal with the application.[1]
  4. [4]
    The Club is governed by a written constitution.  The administration of its affairs, property and funds is controlled and managed by a management committee (cl 14).  The management committee comprises the president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer of the Club, as well as other members appointed at a general meeting of the Club.  Among other responsibilities, the “conditions and privileges pertaining to [classes of membership] .. are determined by the management committee” (cl 4(2)).
  5. [5]
    The applicant was a member of the management committee from December 2023 to September 2024.  During that time, she was vice president from 20 March 2024 and president from 8 July to 15 August 2024.
  6. [6]
    On 9 September 2024, at a special general meeting of the Club, a new management committee was elected.  A “handover” email the applicant says she sent to the “new committee”, on 16 September 2024, gives some context to this, as it commences with the words “[g]iven the previous committee have been accused of lying to members, withholding information and general incompetence, we trust the information you find contained here is comprehensive…”.
  7. [7]
    The relevant provisions of the Club’s constitution dealing with termination of membership are contained in clauses 8 and 9, as follows:

“TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP

8.(1)A member may resign from the association at any time by giving notice in writing to the secretary.  Such resignation shall take effect at the time such notice is received by the secretary unless a later date is specified in the notice when it shall take effect on that later date.

(2)If a member:-

  1. i)
    Is convicted of an indicatable [sic] offence; or
  1. ii)
    Fails to comply with any of the provisions or rules; or
  1. iii)
    Has membership fees in arrears for a period of two months or more; or
  1. iv)
    Conducts himself in a manner considered to be injurious or prejudicial to the character or interests of the Association.

The Management Committee shall consider whether his membership shall be terminated.

  1. The member concerned shall be given a full and fair opportunity of presenting his case and if the Management Committee resolves to terminate his membership it shall instruct the secretary to advise the member in writing accordingly.

APPEAL AGAINST REJECTION OR TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP

9.(1) A person whose application for membership has been rejected or whose membership has been terminated may within one month of receiving written notification thereof, lodge with the secretary written notice of his intention to appeal against the decision of the Management Committee.

  1. Upon receipt of a notification of intention to appeal against rejection or termination of membership the secretary shall convene, within three months of the date of receipt by him of such notice, a general meeting to determine the appeal.  At any such meeting the applicant shall be given the opportunity to fully present his case and the Management Committee or those members thereof who rejected the application for membership or terminated the membership subsequently shall likewise have the opportunity of presenting its or their case.  The appeal shall be determined by the vote of the members present at such meeting.”[2]
  1. [8]
    The applicant says that on Thursday, 12 December 2024, she arrived at the Club at around 7.20 am.  She says that the current president, Ms Pinfold, approached her and “stated that I was banned and needed to leave”.  The applicant said she had “no idea what she was talking about”, and tried to make her way to the courts to play tennis.  Ms Pinfold said she would call the police.  The applicant proceeded to play tennis and then went home shortly after 9.00 am.  The applicant says that when she got home, she saw two voice messages on her mobile phone from a police officer.  According to the applicant:

“He stated words to the effect that his information was that I had receive[d] an email from KTCI’s [the Club’s] committee on Wednesday 11 December 2024 at 10.30 am … advising my membership was cancelled and if I set foot on the grounds of the tennis club I would be charged with trespassing.  I informed [the officer] that I had not received any email of the type he described from KTCI, that no one from KTCI had tried to give me anything which I attended the venue that morning and that I had no idea why my membership would have been cancelled.”

  1. [9]
    Later on 12 December 2024, the applicant sent an email to Ms Pinfold and others, whom the applicant says are members of the management committee, as well as to the Club’s general email address, saying:

“I am writing to express my concern and disappointment regarding the apparent termination of my membership at the Kawana Tennis Club.  I have not received any written communication via post, email or any other medium.  This morning, upon returning from Social Tennis, I received a verbal notification from the Police that my membership has been terminated and that I would be charged with trespassing if I entered club grounds.  According to the police, an email was sent to me yesterday at 10:30 AM by this committee; however, I have not received any such email.

  In fact, I have sent multiple emails to you as a Committee expressing my concerns and have not received any acknowledgement, let alone a response.  This lack of communication is unacceptable.

  I do not understand why my membership has been terminated, but I must point out that this action is unconstitutional.  As a former President of this Club, I am well-versed in the Constitution, and I have attached a copy for your reference.  I have not received any written notification of this termination, and as per Section 8-3 of the Constitution, I am entitled to a reply before my membership is terminated.  I have the right to know the reason for my membership termination, and according to the Constitution, I must be given a full and fair opportunity to respond.

I demand that this decision be reversed immediately, allowing my membership to stand as is.  Alternatively, you must provide me with a full and fair opportunity to present my case.  As it stands constitutionally, my membership is still valid, and I am entitled to attend the club and play tennis as a member, in accordance with the club’s Constitution.”

  1. [10]
    The management committee of the Club responded to the applicant, by email also sent on 12 December 2024, saying:

“… we confirm that the termination of your membership remains in effect.

Regarding your claim of not receiving prior notices sent to this email address, please note that the absence of acknowledgment does not negate the fact that these communications were sent.  To clarify, we have attached the formal Notice of Termination to this reply for your reference.  This notice was drafted and executed in full compliance with the Club’s Constitution and clearly outlines the process for lodging an appeal should you choose to do so. …”

  1. [11]
    Attached to that email was a letter addressed to the applicant, at her email address, dated 11 December 2024.  This letter includes the following:

“This letter serves as formal notification from the Kawana Tennis Club Committee that your membership has been terminated with immediate effect.  As a result, you are hereby prohibited from attending or accessing any part of the Kawana Tennis Club grounds or events indefinitely.

The Committee has deliberated extensively regarding your recent conduct, which was formally raised with you on 25 November 2024 and 9 December 2024.  These notifications provided you with an opportunity to address and correct the issues identified.

Despite these opportunities, your actions have persisted and have been deemed inconsistent with the values, expectations, and standards outlined in the Club’s Constitution. Specifically, your behaviour has been determined to negatively impact the safety, well-being, and enjoyment of other members and staff, leaving the Committee with no option but to terminate your membership. …”

  1. [12]
    The applicant engaged a solicitor the next day, and correspondence ensued between the applicant’s solicitor and the management committee of the Club.  It is unnecessary to refer to this correspondence, other than to note that, in a lengthy letter dated 8 January 2025, the applicant by her solicitor offered to resolved the matter on terms that the management committee resolve to set aside its decision to terminate the applicant’s membership, reinstate her membership rights, publish an apology in its next newsletter, follow the “grievance procedures” under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981, and pay the applicants costs to that point in time, fixed at $3,000.  The offer was said to be open until 17 January 2025.  On the same date, “under protest”, the applicant also lodged an appeal, under rule 9 of the constitution.
  2. [13]
    The applicant submits that the purported decision to terminate her membership should be set aside because:
    1. she was not informed, or given any particulars, of the conduct that purportedly instigated the decision to terminate her membership prior to the termination;
    2. she was not given notice or an opportunity to respond as required by the constitution prior to the purported termination of her membership;
    3. the purported termination of her membership was done unilaterally by the management committee with immediate effect, bypassing her right to a full and fair opportunity to present her case;
    4. the appeal process provided for by the constitution does not cure the foundational deficiencies in the decision-making process of the management committee, which involved a breach of the rules of natural justice.
  3. [14]
    The first question is whether the applicant was informed, or given particulars, of the conduct which is said to have led to her membership being terminated, to enable her to exercise the right conferred by clause 8(3) of the constitution – of having “a full and fair opportunity of presenting [her] case” before the management committee made its decision to terminate her membership.
  4. [15]
    As to this, Mr Chester, who is a member of the management committee, says at [5] of his affidavit that:

“On 26 November 2024, the Committee caused an email titled ‘First and Final warning’, which detailed the allegations against the Applicant, to be sent to the Applicant via the email address registered as the Applicant’s email address in the records of the Club.”

  1. [16]
    Mr Chester exhibits a copy of the email, which is dated 26 November 2024, and what is said to be the attachment, which is a letter bearing the same date.  I note the wording of [5] of Mr Chester’s affidavit does not identify who caused the email to be sent (merely referring to “the Committee”).  Mr Chester also exhibits an “email log”, which is said to show that the email was sent on 26 November 2024 at 13.44.36; and “delivered to an SMTP server”, with a particular IP address, at precisely the same time. 
  2. [17]
    The email address to which the email was sent is the applicant’s email address.  It is not clear, on the evidence, whether the IP address identified in the email log is associated with the applicant’s computer.  The applicant contended it was not, by reference to a screen shot of the IP address for her home computer, which shows a different number.  Whilst I accept the submission by the solicitor for the respondent that this seems to be an IP address for a Wi-Fi device, I am left in doubt about whether the IP address to which the email is said to have been “delivered” is one associated with the applicant’s computer. 
  3. [18]
    The letter of 26 November 2024, said to have been attached to the email, is not signed.  It states that:

“The following incidents have been formally reported and reviewed by the Committee:

  1. Between 14 October 2024 and 25 November 2025: Multiple instances of inappropriate behaviour during social tennis events. These incidents include, but are not limited to, disruptive conduct during matches, verbal abuse, and the use of intimidating and offensive language toward other participants and members. This ongoing behaviour has discouraged member participation and disrupted the enjoyment and continuity of social tennis activities.
  2. 20 October 2024: During a Special Olympics-hosted event, you were observed engaging in behaviour that was both inappropriate and misrepresentative. This included the use of inappropriate language and leveraging yourself as ‘Former President’. Such actions undermine the Club’s reputation and jeopardise its ability to host prestigious and inclusive events in the future.
  3. 14 November 2024: You accosted a Club member and Premier Tennis employee in an aggressive and unwarranted manner over a matter unrelated to your role as a member. This behaviour has negatively impacted the workplace environment for contractors and placed the Club’s relationships with staff at risk.
  4. 18 November 2024: You engaged aggressively and inappropriately with other members and the Coaching contractor while facilitating payment of social tennis fees. This confrontational behaviour created discomfort and concern among members and staff.
  5. 19 November 2024: You involved yourself inappropriately in a matter concerning a venue hire client, a situation unrelated to your role as a member. This intervention created a hostile environment, potentially damaging the Club’s reputation and jeopardising future venue hire opportunities.”
  1. [19]
    Mr Chester goes on to say that on 9 December 2024, “the Committee” caused an email titled “Corrective Notice”, to be sent to the applicant, which detailed further allegations against the applicant (at [10]).  He says that exhibit BC-3 is a copy of this “Corrective Notice”.  Exhibit BC-3 is an unsigned letter from the Club to the applicant, dated 6 December 2024, with the subject line “Formal Directive Regarding Conduct at Social Tennis”.  No copy of the email said to have been sent to the applicant is exhibited to the affidavit.
  2. [20]
    The management committee resolved on 11 December 2024 to terminate the applicant’s membership.  This is recorded in a “flying minute”, seemingly agreed to “by email circular”.  Mr Chester says, in [16], that the committee gave written notice of this decision to the applicant on 11 December 2024, exhibiting a copy of the (also unsigned) letter dated 11 December 2024, which has been referred to above.  There is no evidence in Mr Chester’s affidavit about how this written notice was given to the applicant.
  3. [21]
    Mr Chester says in his affidavit, at [26], that exhibit BC-9 contains copies of “some of the complaints” received by the Club in relation to the applicant’s conduct.  The “complaints” are made by Ms Fu and Mr Batzofin, who are management committee members, as well as Ms Cabral, who is described as the Director of “Premier Tennis” (which is said to be the Club’s coaching contractor).   Of the four complaints made by Ms Cabral, one is (expressly) based on hearsay, and another relates to conduct of the applicant, said to have been directed to another member, Mr McGann, who has sworn an affidavit strongly supportive of the applicant. Exhibit BC-9 also includes an email from another person, who is not said to be a committee member, but it does not refer the conduct of one person, or name any person – rather it seems to suggest poor behaviour on the part of “some members of the social group”.   These “complaints” are addressed by the applicant in her second affidavit.  It is clear there is a substantial dispute as to the factual foundation of the complaints.
  4. [22]
    Mr Batzofin has sworn an affidavit outlining a number of his complaints.  Another management committee member, Mr Bourke, outlines in his affidavit what he describes as the applicant’s problematic behaviours, and his attempts to speak with her about this in November 2024, following a resolution that he do so following a meeting of the management committee meeting on 14 November 2024.  The minutes of that meeting (exhibit JB-1) record that “the ongoing disruptive behaviour of [the applicant] was discussed at length”, “[p]articularly around aggressive and intimidating behaviours and reminder of her appropriate language standards”.
  5. [23]
    On the other hand, the applicant relies on affidavits obtained from five other members of the Club, including Mr McGann, who express their support for her, and their concern about the process adopted by the management committee
  6. [24]
    The applicant, in her two affidavits, swears that she did not receive the letters dated 26 November, 9 December[3] or 11 December 2024.  She deposes to checking her inbox, deleted items and junk mail, and not locating any of the documents said to have been sent to her.  She also says that, had she received those letters, she would have responded and engaged with the processes available to her under the constitution.
  7. [25]
    The applicant was cross-examined at the hearing of this application, by the solicitor for the respondent, predominantly in relation to the matter of the IP address. 
  8. [26]
    In order to reject the applicant’s evidence, that she did not receive these letters, I would need to find that she is a dishonest witness who has lied on oath.  Given the serious adverse consequence of such a finding, the Briginshaw[4] principle applies, requiring proof to a high standard.
  9. [27]
    There is no basis, on the evidence before me, to reject the applicant’s sworn evidence and find that she has lied on oath.   Although the affidavit of Mr Chester includes a copy of an email purportedly sent to the email address of the applicant on 26 November 2024, and an “email log”, that does no more than point to the sending of the email and, possibly, the delivery of it to a particular IP address.  That does not, objectively, prove receipt of it by the applicant, sufficient for me to reject her evidence that she did not receive this letter (or the subsequent ones, about which there is even less evidence of sending or delivery).  The respondent relied upon s 24 of the Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 (Qld), which provides for the time of receipt of an electronic communication, as the time when that communication “becomes capable of being retrieved by the addressee at an electronic address designated by the addressee” (s 24(1)(a)).  The evidence does not enable me to make a finding about when the email became capable of being retrieved by the applicant, as the address.  The evidence is that it was not retrieved by the applicant, because she did not receive it.
  10. [28]
    As counsel for the applicant submitted, it is possible that the email(s), even if sent, were not delivered or received because of a technical error.  In support of this submission, counsel for the applicant directed attention to the minutes of the management committee meeting on 14 November 2024, which record discussions about a “new email system”; an email sent by Mr Batzofin to the applicant and another Club member on 21 October 2024, demanding access to the Club’s gmail account so that the Club can continue to run effectively “while we resolve the ownership issue and set up a new email account”; as well as an email from the applicant to (I infer) management committee members dated 22 November 2024, which notes that “not all members are receiving your communications”.
  11. [29]
    I also accept as persuasive the submission that it is implausible that, if the applicant had received the emails of 26 November, 9 and 11 December, she would not have responded and sought to exercise her rights under the Club’s constitution.   The material filed by the applicant in this proceeding demonstrates that she is very well aware of the provisions of the constitution, and proactive about advocating for her rights and interests.  I accept her evidence that, had she received these emails, she would have done something immediately.
  12. [30]
    I therefore find that the applicant did not receive the letters dated 26 November, 6 December and 11 December 2024.
  13. [31]
    The next question is, what is the relevance of that for the purposes of this application?
  14. [32]
    The starting point is that the Club is bound by the rules of natural justice in adjudicating upon the rights of its members conferred by the rules of the Club and set out in its constitution.[5]  As to the application of these rules, I gratefully adopt the summary of relevant principles from the reasons of McMeekin J in Gould v Isis Club Inc [2016] 1 Qd R 363 (with some references omitted), as follows:

“[10]It is well established that the requirements of natural justice are not inflexible but depend on ‘the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth’ …

[11] Where the tribunal is a social club as here the strict rules applicable to judicial tribunals are relaxed. The principle was explained by Dixon J (as he then was) in Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen (No 2) [1948] HCA 35; (1948) 77 CLR 601 at 628:

‘It is important to keep steadily in mind that we are dealing with a domestic forum acting under rules resting upon a consensual basis. It is a tribunal that has no rules of evidence and can inform itself in any way it chooses. Members may act upon their own knowledge and upon hearsay if they are satisfied of the truth of what they so learn and if they give the member with whom they are dealing a proper opportunity of answering the charge and defending himself.’

[12]Some things though are fundamental. Samuels JA in Hall v The NSW Trotting Club Limited [1997] 1 NSWLR 378, in speaking of the rules that applied to a stewards’ enquiry, said at 388:

‘It is necessary first to establish what rules of natural justice the stewards were required to observe. In my view, they were these. The stewards were bound to inform the appellant of the nature of the accusations made against him, and to give him ‘a fair opportunity of make any relevant statement which he may desire to bring forward and a fair opportunity to correct to controvert any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice’ …  Moreover, I respectfully agree with what Adam J said in R v Brewer; Ex parte Renzella [1973] VicRp 36; [1973] VR 375 at 381: ‘As it is the duty of the stewards to give a fair hearing to the person charged, they must of course, until he has been heard in his defence, keep their minds open in the sense of being ready and willing to be persuaded by the party charged’’.

[13] As will be seen the committee has gathered evidence, or at least information, against Ms Gould. The committee evidently accepts as accurate the information they have received. That the committee might properly do so on a provisional basis seems appropriate, otherwise why bother Ms Gould with the charges? However the source of the information that the committee acted upon is not revealed. If the source of information is a committee member who is to determine the charge then that is not necessarily fatal, as the earlier citation of the judgment of Dixon J shows, but there are limits. Mahoney JA in Hall put the principle this way (at 398 omitting references):

‘It is now firmly established that, where a member of the tribunal not merely provides information but acts in substance as (to use the words used in the cases) accuser, prosecutor or interested party, the tribunal proceedings will be vitiated. These terms are not definitions of the proscribed relationships. But whenever a tribunal members occupies such a position, then, irrespective of actual bias, his participation will vitiate the tribunal’s deliberations.’

[14] While there are differences between a stewards’ enquiry into a race meeting and the termination of membership of a social club, both in respect of the statutory and contractual framework under which each operates and the impact on the subject of the enquiry, in my view these basic principles still apply here.”[6]

  1. [33]
    Those basic requirements of the rules of natural justice are reflected in clause 8 of the constitution.  By clause 8(3), a member must be “given a full and fair opportunity of presenting [their] case” before any decision is made regarding termination.  In order for this to be a substantive right, the member must have been given notice of the case being put against them by the management committee.  As generally flexible as the rules of natural justice may be, particularly in the case of a social club, this element of them is fundamental. 
  2. [34]
    Given that the applicant did not receive notification of the management committee’s concerns, and therefore was not given any, let alone a “full and fair”, opportunity of presenting her case, before the decision was made to terminate her membership, the decision to do so is invalid, because of the failure to abide the rules of natural justice in this fundamental respect.
  3. [35]
    I do not accept the submission that this application was premature, and that the applicant ought to have availed herself of the appeal process under the constitution before engaging the jurisdiction of this Court.  The appeal process proceeds upon the assumption of the existence of a valid decision to terminate membership.  I have found that decision was not valid.  Under the constitution, the applicant is entitled to the opportunity to be heard twice – once by the management committee, prior to the decision being made to terminate her membership, under clause 8(3) of the constitution; and then, if a valid decision to terminate has been made, and an appeal is lodged, at a general meeting of the members of the Club, under clause 9(2) of the constitution.  The appeal process does not cure the deficiencies in the process adopted by the management committee prior to making the decision to terminate.[7] 
  4. [36]
    Given my finding, that the applicant was not notified, and given a full and fair opportunity of presenting her case, prior to the decision to terminate her membership, it is unnecessary to address the other matters argued on her behalf, in terms of whether (if it had been received) the letter of 26 November sufficiently particularised the complaints against the applicant; and whether the decision is also vitiated on the basis of apprehended bias, given that the complaints which were said to be the basis for the decision emanated from committee members, or a person said to be closely associated to them (Ms Cabral).  The respondent now has the benefit of legal advice, from the solicitor who appeared on its behalf at the hearing of this application, and it may be expected that, if it decides to embark on this process again, in compliance with the rights conferred by clause 8 of the constitution, it will be mindful of the issues which have been raised in this regard, both as to particularisation and apprehended bias.
  5. [37]
    For those reasons, it is appropriate to:
    1. declare that the decision made by the management committee of the Kawana Tennis Club Inc on 11 December 2024, terminating the applicant’s membership of the Club, is void; and
    2. order that the decision made by the management committee of the Club on 11 December 2024, terminating the applicant’s membership of the Club, be set aside.
  6. [38]
    The parties indicated that they wished to be heard in relation to costs, so I will hear submissions from them at the time of delivery of judgment.

Footnotes

[1]  See ss 71 to 73 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 and Shipton v South East Queensland Sport Aircraft Club Inc (2022) 10 QR 1 at [41]-[42].

[2]  Emphasis added.

[3]  As it appears from Mr Chester’s affidavit, there was no letter dated 9 December – the unsigned letter exhibited to Mr Chester’s affidavit is dated 6 December 2024.

[4]Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362.

[5]  Section 71(3) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981.

[6]  Emphasis added.

[7]Shipton v South East Queensland Sport Aircraft Club Inc (2022) 10 QR 1 at [77].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    O'Connell v Kawana Tennis Club Inc

  • Shortened Case Name:

    O'Connell v Kawana Tennis Club Inc

  • MNC:

    [2025] QSC 60

  • Court:

    QSC

  • Judge(s):

    Bowskill CJ

  • Date:

    28 Mar 2025

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Australian Workers' Union v Bowen (No 2) (1948) 77 CLR 601
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1948) 77 CLR 601
Australian Workers' Union v Bowen (No 2) [1948] HCA 35
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1948] HCA 35
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Cite 2 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Gould v Isis Club Incorporated[2016] 1 Qd R 363; [2015] QSC 253
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2015] QSC 253
Cite 2 - [2016] 1 Qd R 363
Cite 3 - [2016] 1 Qd R 363
Hall v NSW Trotting Club Ltd [1997] 1 NSWLR 378
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1997] 1 NSWLR 378
R v Brewer Ex Parte Renzella (1973) VR 375
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1973) VR 375
R v Brewer; Ex parte Renzella [1973] VR 36
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1973] VR 36
Shipton v South East Queensland Sport Aircraft Club Incorporated(2022) 10 QR 1; [2022] QSC 5
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QSC 5
Cite 2 - (2022) 10 QR 1
Cite 3 - (2022) 10 QR 1
Cite 4 - (2022) 10 QR 1

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
O'Connell v Kawana Tennis Club Inc (No 2) [2025] QSC 791 citation
1

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