R v Collier[2003] QCA 314

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

MACKENZIE J:  This is the judgment in the matter of the Queen against Steven Michael Collier.  The applicant, who was 18 at the time of the offence, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving with a circumstance of aggravation that he was adversely affected by alcohol.  When breath tested soon after the incident, he had 0.163 per cent alcohol in his blood.  He was sentenced to three months imprisonment, followed by 12 months probation.

The offence occurred in Warwick on the 14th of June 2003 at about 11 p.m.  His only previous offences were for obstructing police about 10 months previously and common assault about six months previously.  Police on patrol saw the applicant driving a vehicle which belonged to a friend without headlights illuminated.  The police activated the warning lights on their vehicle.

The applicant accelerated away with the police car following about 30 metres behind over the distance of about two kilometres before the vehicle came to rest when the applicant voluntarily pulled over.  The applicant drove at speeds of up to 90 kilometres per hour in a 50 kilometre zone, turned corners at inappropriate speeds, spun the wheels when cornering and caused the vehicle to fishtail on one occasion that was observed.

His driving caused one motorist to take evasive action during this period.  The applicant also activated indicators on his vehicle, but turned in a different direction to that indicated on more than one occasion.  On one occasion, he approached a set of red traffic lights showing red against him.  Instead of turning, as he had indicated, he went straight ahead, almost colliding with another police car which was turning at the intersection with its flashing lights activated.  Shortly after that, the applicant stopped the vehicle and gave himself up.  He was alone in the vehicle.

He pleaded guilty to an ex officio indictment.  He apologised in writing to the owner of the vehicle for damage caused to it.  He also apologised in writing to the police.  Before the matter came on for sentence, about a month after the offence, he had been to Alcoholics Anonymous and to another course run by Queensland Health concerning drugs and alcohol.  He had a good employment record and good references.

In addition to the matters just mentioned, the sentencing Judge was told that the applicant came from a good family and background.  The offence was one where the vehicle was driven at high speed in a residential area in a manner where there was a risk of losing control of it.  Driving through the red light was a particularly dangerous act.

Nevertheless, it was submitted that, given the age of the applicant, there were more preferable options than sentencing him to actual imprisonment and that in all of the circumstances, the sentence was manifestly excessive.

It was submitted that the proper range was from a long period of community service and probation with a special condition relating to undergoing a programme relating to alcohol abuse through to a term of imprisonment, but fully suspended, ought to be served by way of an intensive correction order.

It was conceded that the offence was a relatively serious one, but submitted that actual imprisonment was not the only proper option.  Those submissions must be balanced against the need for deterrence of highly irresponsible behaviour with considerable potential to harm others and the fact that one of the more common sectors of the community who are likely engage in it is young drivers.

A clear expression of principle in relation to cases where there is a combination of a high concentration of alcohol, driving at excessive speed and in a manner otherwise likely to put other road users at risk and an attempt to outrun the police who try to apprehend the offender is to be found in the Queen against Coake, Court of Appeal No 403 of 1998.  The President, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr Justice McPherson agreed, said:

"In my view, a deterrent sentence is necessary in such a case to stress to the community that dangerous driving, particularly in a police chase situation and whilst heavily under the influence of alcohol or drugs, will not be tolerated because of the potential danger created.  The consequences that will follow for those who take part in such conduct, will usually include a prison sentence."

The other authorities to which attention was drawn in submissions also support the conclusion that, generally, a sentence of imprisonment of two years with a suspension after a period of actual custody may not be outside a proper exercise of discretion for serious cases with a lesser head sentence of which a relatively brief period is served in custody, being an available option in less serious cases.

Since applications for leave to appeal by offenders only involve a determination whether the sentence is manifestly excessive, absolute consistency cannot be found in the cases.  However, the general proposition holds good.  Unlike the majority of cases to which we were referred, the three months actual imprisonment to which the applicant was sentenced was not part of a longer suspended sentence.  He was sentenced to a term of three months imprisonment with probation for 12 months upon release.

In crafting the sentence in that way, in my view the learned sentencing Judge reached a balance between deterrence and rehabilitation that cannot be characterised as manifestly excessive and I would refuse the application.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE:  I agree.

HELMAN J:  I agree.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE:  The application is refused.