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J. Mac Constructions Pty. Ltd. v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2019] QCAT 233

J. Mac Constructions Pty. Ltd. v Queensland Building and Construction Commission[2019] QCAT 233

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

J.Mac Constructions Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2019] QCAT 233

PARTIES:

J.MAC CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD

(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO:

GAR203-18

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

25 February 2019

HEARING DATE:

26 November 2018

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Dr Collier, Member

DECISION:

  1. Has a ‘relevant company event’ occurred for the purposes of s 56AC(2)? No.
  2. Which version of s 56AC(2) applies, the old or the new? The New Version.

CATCHWORDS:

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) – a relevant company event – winding up a company ‘for the benefit of a creditor’ – distinguish winding up of solvent and insolvent companies

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) – excluded individual – permitted individual – unintended consequences of amendments – identifying Parliament’s apparent intention – inferring provisions into an Act based on Parliament’s apparent intention

STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – OPERATION AND EFFECT OF ACTS – provisions in an Act imposing strict liability on an individual –unintended removal of the right to seek a remedy – requirement for a regulator to make a deliberative decision before a consequence can flow

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A, s 14B

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 467(4)

Professional Engineers and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld)

Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), Part 3A, s 56AC, s 56AC(2), s 56AC(2)(a), s 56AC(2)(b), s 56AC(3), s 56AC(6), s 56AD, s 56AD(1), s 56AF(2), Schedule 1: s 57, s 57(1), s 57(2), s 58(1)(b), s 86(1)(k)

Queensland Building and Construction Commission and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) s 57, s 58, s 59

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297

Corcoran v Building Services Authority [2011] QCATA 158

D’Arro v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 100

D’Arro v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 76

D’Arro v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCA 90

Gallagher v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 383

Lowe v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 110

McClintock v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 340

Marangone v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 210

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322

Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 397

Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

 

Applicant:

M Hindman QC, barrister

Respondent:

S Tabaiwalu, in-house solicitor of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    In this Application the parties seek a decision concerning two preliminary questions involving this matter in accordance with Directions of the Tribunal dated 1 November 2018.
  1. [2]
    J.Mac Constructions Pty Ltd (‘J.Mac’) seeks the review, pursuant to s 86(1)(k) of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) (‘QBCC Act’), of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission’s (‘QBCC’) decision of 24 May 2018 under s 56AC of the QBCC Act to categorise Craig Mortensen as an ‘excluded individual’ by reason of him having been the company secretary of Colonial Properties Pty Ltd (‘Colonial Properties’) on 15 November 2013 when an order was made for its winding up (the ‘Winding-up Order’) pursuant to s 467(4) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and the consequential categorisation of J.Mac as an ‘excluded company’ by virtue of Mr Mortensen being a director of J.Mac at the relevant time.
  2. [3]
    Before the Tribunal reviews the decision of the QBCC in this matter the parties have requested the Tribunal to rule on two preliminary questions. The preliminary questions posed, in respect of the QBCC Act, are:
    1. (a)
      Has a ‘relevant company event’ occurred for the purposes of s 56AC(2)? (‘First Preliminary Question’); and
    2. (b)
      Which version of s 56AC(2) applies, the old or the new (the ‘old’ being the version in force on 15 November 2013 when the Winding-up Order was made (‘Old Version’), and the ‘new’ being the version in force when the QBCC decided on 24 May 2018 that J.Mac was an ‘excluded company’ (New Version))? (‘Second Preliminary Question’).
  3. [4]
    The parties agree that if the answer to the Second Preliminary Question is that the New Version of s 56AC(2) of the QBCC Act applies it is unnecessary to answer the First Preliminary Question. However, for reasons made clear in the decision below, it is necessary to consider the First Preliminary Question first.

Background facts

  1. [5]
    The facts relevant to the questions posed are not controversial, and are set out in the following paragraphs.
  2. [6]
    Colonial Properties was a company formed in 1996. By January 1998 all shares in Colonial Properties had been acquired by two shareholders: B.M.D. Constructions Pty Ltd (‘BMD’) and Patrick Property Investments Pty Ltd (‘PPI’). Each shareholder held 50% of the issued shares, with the intention of acquiring and developing a parcel of land in Townsville known as ‘Colonial Park’.
  3. [7]
    Differences between the shareholders of Colonial Properties started in 2006, and by 2013 the shareholders agreed that Colonial Properties should be wound up in order to liquidate the assets and return the proceeds to the shareholders. This was effected by a members’ voluntary winding up on the petition of BMD.
  4. [8]
    In accordance with the wishes of the members the Queensland Supreme Court made a Winding-up Order on 15 November 2013. On that same date Robert Humphreys of BRI Ferrier was appointed liquidator of Colonial Properties.
  5. [9]
    BRI Ferrier in its Report to Creditors dated 19 May 2015 reported that, following the liquidation of Colonial Properties, unsecured creditors would be paid 100c in the dollar, leaving a balance of more than $1.3 million available for distribution to the members.[1]
  6. [10]
    At the end of the liquidation, 21 January 2016, all unsecured creditors of Colonial Properties were paid 100c in the dollar and the remaining assets of the company were distributed to members. At no time was Colonial Properties unable to pay its bills as and when they fell due. These facts are supported by the statutory declaration of the liquidator, Robert Humphreys.[2]
  7. [11]
    At the date of the Winding-up Order, 15 November 2013, Craig Mortensen was secretary of Colonial Properties.
  8. [12]
    Since 30 July 2015 J.Mac has been a QBCC licence-holder in the class: Builder - Low Rise. Craig Mortensen was also a director and secretary of J.Mac at this time.
  9. [13]
    On 17 April 2018 J.Mac submitted an application to the QBCC seeking to be licenced also as: Builder - Medium Rise.
  10. [14]
    The QBCC notified Mr Mortensen on 24 May 2018 that he had been categorised as an excluded person under s 56AC of the QBCC Act as a result of him being secretary of Colonial Properties on the date of the Winding-up Order.
  11. [15]
    Furthermore, as a consequence of Mr Mortensen’s categorisation by the QBCC as an excluded person, J.Mac became an ‘excluded company’ so long as Mr Mortensen remained a director or secretary of, or an influential person for, the company because s 56AC(6) of the QBCC Act applied, as follows:

A company is an excluded company if an individual who is a director or secretary of, or an influential person for, the construction company is an excluded individual for a relevant event.

  1. [16]
    This led to Mr Mortensen retiring from his position with J.Mac and other construction companies for so long as he remained an excluded person. J.Mac seeks to have Mr Mortensen no longer categorised as an excluded individual so that he may return to his position with J.Mac.
  2. [17]
    In its material and at the hearing J.Mac argued that either: there had been no relevant company event and Craig Mortensen had never been an excluded individual; or that the New Version of the QBCC Act applied to Mr Mortensen, and he had never been an excluded individual under the New Version.
  3. [18]
    The QBCC argued that it was constrained to act according to the letter of the legislation: that Craig Mortensen had been an excluded individual under the Old Version of the QBCC Act; that the QBCC could only categorise him as an excluded individual under the Old Version of the QBCC Act; and that the law as it stood when the QBCC wrote to Mr Mortensen with its decision concerning his categorisation as an excluded individual, being after 1 July 2015, gave Mr Mortensen no avenue to seek review of the QBCC decision.
  4. [19]
    Turning first to an analysis of the Old Version of the QBCC Act, that was in force before 1 July 2015.

The law before 1 July 2015

  1. [20]
    Excluded and permitted individuals and excluded companies are dealt with in Part 3A of the QBCC Act. Before the revisions introduced by two amending Acts, the Professional Engineers and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) (‘PEOLA Act’) and the Queensland Building and Construction Commission and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld) (‘QBCCOLA Act’), the law and its consequences as they existed before 1 July 2015 are identified below.
  2. [21]
    The relevant provisions of s 56AC of the QBCC Act that applied at the time the Winding-up Order was made in relation to Colonial Properties were:

(2) This section also applies to an individual if—

(a) after the commencement of this section, a company, for the benefit of a creditor—

(i) has a provisional liquidator, liquidator, administrator or controller appointed; or

(ii) is wound up, or is ordered to be wound up; and

(b) 5 years have not elapsed since the event mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) (relevant company event) happened; and

(c) the individual—

(i) was, when the relevant company event happened, a director or secretary of, or an influential person for, the company; or

(ii) was, at any time after the commencement of this section and within the period of 1 year immediately before the relevant company event happened, a director or secretary of, or an influential person for, the company.

(4) If this section applies to an individual because of subsection (2), the individual is an excluded individual for the relevant company event.

  1. [22]
    Mr Mortensen was company secretary of Colonial Properties at the date of the Winding-up Order, so he was potentially affected by these provisions. He would become an excluded individual by operation of these provisions from 15 November 2013 until 14 November 2018 without anything more because:
    1. (a)
      He is an individual;
    2. (b)
      He was company secretary of Colonial Properties when it was subject to the Winding-up Order and had a liquidator appointed; and
    3. (c)
      5 years did not elapse after the date of the Winding-up Order until 14 November 2018,

always providing that Colonial Properties was wound up and had a liquidator appointed ‘for the benefit of a creditor’.

  1. [23]
    The relevant company event referred to in Preliminary Question 1 and in s 56AC(2), above, requires that two things occur:
    1. (a)
      The appointment of a liquidator or the making of a winding up order; and
    2. (b)
      That the appointment or order be made for the benefit of a creditor.

The meaning of relevant company event is important to both preliminary questions and is analysed first.

Relevant company event

  1. [24]
    There is authority in decisions of this Tribunal that the term ‘for the benefit of creditors’ is to be read widely: Gallagher v Queensland Building Services Authority,[3] Corcoran v Building Services Authority,[4] Marangone v Queensland Building Services Authority.[5]
  2. [25]
    In Gallagher’s case the Tribunal opined that

… In my view the very appointment of a liquidator can be said to be a benefit to creditors.[6]

  1. [26]
    In Marangone’s case the learned Member said it was sufficient benefit for creditors if:[7]

…no pecuniary benefit would accrue to creditors, however, apart from anything else, they do have the benefit of being able to crystallise their losses…

  1. [27]
    In McClintock v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 340 Mr McClintock sought to have his company wound-up following a matrimonial breakdown. Although he appeared to be the principal or only creditor, he was confirmed as an excluded individual because the Tribunal dismissed his argument that provisions dealing with a relevant company event were limited to ‘protecting members of the public and the industry, not a director of a company who chooses to arrange his affairs to suit his own purposes’. In this regard the Tribunal said:

…the fact remains that a principal motivation was to protect Mr McClintock’s inter party loans and director’s entitlements. In other words, the appointment of an administrator was for the benefit of a creditor; the creditor was Mr McClintock.[8]

The learned Member went on to approve the earlier formulation devised by the Consumer Credit Tribunal that, to avoid the severe consequences of the law, an affected individual would have to show:

…that the relevant event was entirely outside the responsibility of the individual concerned.[9]

  1. [28]
    In Lowe v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 110 the learned Member distinguished a voluntary winding up of an insolvent company from a solvent company, whether sought by members or creditors, and said:[10]

The purpose of winding up in circumstances of insolvency is to allow the orderly finalisation of the affairs of the company…

In this case it was irrelevant whether the winding up was done on the basis of a members’ petition, or accountant’s advice, or otherwise in order to streamline business operations, because there remained a debt owing to the Australian Taxation Office.

  1. [29]
    The cases above appear to recognise that there are differing circumstances in which a relevant company event may occur, depending on, inter alia:
    1. (a)
      Whether the petition for a company winding up is done for the benefit of creditors or members; and
    2. (b)
      Whether the company is solvent or insolvent.
  2. [30]
    The winding up of a company or the appointment of a liquidator to a company at the petition of members for the benefit of creditors would not be done unless the company was insolvent or at risk of insolvency. A failure by company officers to seek a winding up in such a case risks the officers becoming personally liable for the debts of the company in the event that it trades while insolvent.
  3. [31]
    The case here, though, is one where the members petitioned for the Winding-up Order while the company was solvent. Is this a case where the winding up and appointment of a liquidator is ‘for the benefit of a creditor’?
  4. [32]
    While several of the cases above suggest that ‘for the benefit of a creditor’ should be given a wide meaning, this approach is not supported by the law dealing with companies.
  5. [33]
    McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation makes it quite plain that in the case of a members’ voluntary liquidation of a solvent company the creditors play no role in the process because they will be paid out in full at the end of the liquidation:[11]

Where the members of a solvent company wish to put it into liquidation, the appropriate way of doing so is by members' voluntary winding up, in which case the winding up is brought about by a special resolution passed by the members (s 491(2)).[12] Control of affairs in this form of liquidation is vested in the company in general meeting, which appoints the liquidator, determines her or his salary, and exercises a general power of supervision over the performance of the liquidator's duties. At no point do the creditors participate in the process, but their exclusion is justified by the fact that they have no financial interest in the outcome of the liquidation, which proceeds throughout on the basis that the company will be able to pay all its debts in full. To ensure that this assumption does not prove false there are certain fairly stringent requirements which must be satisfied before winding up may take place in this form. These may conveniently be described as the prerequisites to members' voluntary winding up. [emphasis added]

It is reasonable to assume that the learned Supreme Court judge who granted the Winding-up Order in the case of Colonial Properties was satisfied that the ‘stringent requirements which must be satisfied before winding up may take place in this form’, principally, that the company was solvent, were, indeed, satisfied.

  1. [34]
    If creditors play no part in the liquidation process and have no financial interest in the outcome of the liquidation it cannot be said that, in any way, such liquidation occurs ‘for the benefit of a creditor’.
  2. [35]
    This much is evident in numerous judgments of Australian and foreign courts, and seemingly approved by Justice Kenneth Hayne writing extra-judicially in his essay ‘Directors’ Duties and a Company’s Creditors’[13] where he approves the sentiment that directors, having complied with all legal obligations owed to the firm’s creditors, should be free to take economic risk for the benefit of the firm’s equity owners.[14]
  3. [36]
    I am satisfied on the evidence that Colonial Properties was at all relevant times solvent, a fact reinforced by the results of the liquidation. As a result of this conclusion, the liquidation was not done nor did it occur ‘for the benefit of a creditor’.
  4. [37]
    This conclusion means that s 56AC was not activated, that there was no relevant company event, and that Craig Mortensen was not, at any time, an excluded individual.
  5. [38]
    This analysis also suggests that, looking at paragraph [29] above, any case involving the winding up of a solvent company may never be an event done ‘for the benefit of a creditor’.

But Craig Mortensen was categorised as an excluded individual by the QBCC

  1. [39]
    Whatever Mr Mortensen’s position at law, he had, in fact, been advised by the QBCC that he had been categorised as an excluded individual. Under the Old Version of the QBCC Act he would have had an avenue to seek review of this decision.
  2. [40]
    By virtue of s 56AD of the QBCC Act he could apply to become a permitted person on the following basis:

(1) An individual may apply to the commission, in the form approved by the Board, to be categorised as a permitted individual for a relevant event if the individual has been advised by the commission, or has otherwise been made aware, that the commission considers the individual to be an excluded individual for the relevant event.

  1. [41]
    If nothing more than the operation of s 56AC was required to make an individual an excluded individual, then an individual was, by operation of the statute alone, an excluded individual. Yet, before an individual may apply to be categorised as a permitted individual, the person affected must have been advised by the QBCC or otherwise become aware:

that the commission considers the individual to be an excluded individual for the relevant event.[15]

But, if a person had become an excluded individual by operation of the statute alone, why would the QBCC have to ‘consider the individual to be an excluded individual’? It would not have to ‘consider’ the status of the individual, it would simply have to rely on the consequence of the statutory categorisation.

  1. [42]
    The combined effect of s 56AC and s 56AD appears to have been that no consequences flowed from being an excluded individual until the QBCC categorised Mr Mortensen as an excluded individual and notified him of such or he otherwise became aware. The QBCC had to make a deliberative decision to categorise Mr Mortensen as an excluded individual before any consequences could flow from his status as an excluded individual.
  2. [43]
    The effect of this was that, under the pre-1 July 2015 law, an individual would be an excluded individual if the provisions of s 56AC applied to that person, but no consequences would flow from that status until the QBCC made a deliberative decision to so categorise a person.
  3. [44]
    This approach was adopted in two relevant cases before this Tribunal: Gallagher v Queensland Building Services Authority,[16] and Marangone v Queensland Building Services Authority.[17] In Gallagher,[18] Member Oliver had been asked to review the decision by the Queensland Building Services Authority (‘QBSA’)[19] to refuse to categorise Mr Gallagher as a permitted individual following his categorisation as an excluded individual following a relevant company event.[20] In his decision Member Oliver observed that Mr Gallagher became an excluded individual at the time of the relevant company event. At paragraph 14 of his decision he said:

On the making of the winding up order, by virtue of section 56AC(4) of the Queensland Building Services Authority Act (“the QBSA Act”) the Applicant became an excluded individual for the relevant company event, being the appointment of liquidators.[21]

In other words, nothing more was required: Mr Gallagher was an excluded person by operation of that provision of the Act without more.

  1. [45]
    In Marangone,[22] Member Peter Walker dealt with a case where a relevant company event occurred on 22 May 2008 and upon becoming aware of the event, the QBSA wrote to Mr Marangone on 1 March 2010 advising him that he had been categorised as an excluded individual and cancelled his licence from 6 April 2010. It was made clear in this decision that Mr Marangone could not invoke the provisions of s 56AD dealing with his application to be categorised as a permitted individual until the QBSA had made its deliberative decision.
  2. [46]
    Other cases touching on this point involved Mr Orazio D’Arro in his extended litigation with the Queensland Building and Construction Commission. Orazio Salvatore D’Arro was a Queensland builder licensed by the QBSA. On 22 May 2009 liquidators were appointed to Mr D’Arro’s companies and, under the law as it applied before 1 July 2015, Mr D’Arro was notified on 23 July 2009 that the QBSA had categorised him as an excluded individual.
  3. [47]
    Mr D’Arro sought a review of that decision by the QBSA before this Tribunal, which affirmed the decision of the QBSA;[23] he then appealed against that decision to the Appeal Tribunal which gave directions as to the law and remitted it to be re-heard;[24] he then appealed to the Court of Appeal which gave further directions and remitted the matter for re-hearing by the Tribunal.[25]
  4. [48]
    In his judgment in D’Arro v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCA 90 Fraser JA said ‘The respondent decided on 3 July 2009 that the applicant was an excluded individual for the appointments of liquidators to the four companies.’[26] This comment may suggest that His Honour held the view that becoming an excluded individual was not an automatic action upon the happening of a relevant bankruptcy event or relevant company event for the purposes of s 56AC, but that the QBSA had to make a deliberate decision to categorise the builder (in this case) as an excluded individual. On the other hand, His Honour said that the respondent decided that the applicant was an excluded individual, not that he became an excluded individual at the time of the QBSA’s decision, suggesting that the decision by the QBCC was simply affirmation of an existing fact. The judge’s judgment does not provide a clear answer to the question of when a person becomes an excluded individual.
  5. [49]
    The following results flow from this analysis:[27]
    1. (a)
      Upon the plain reading of s 56AC(2) of the QBCC Act and the balance of decisions involving this provision, if Mr Mortensen satisfied the relevant conditions set out in s 56AC, he was an excluded individual from the date on which the Winding-up Order was made, 15 November 2013, but no consequences flowed from that categorisation;
    2. (b)
      On 24 May 2018 Mr Mortensen was advised by the QBCC that he was categorised as an excluded individual; and
    3. (c)
      Mr Mortensen could not have applied to the QBCC before 24 May 2018 to be categorised as a permitted individual.
  6. [50]
    The QBCC position is that Mr Mortensen:
    1. (a)
      Had been categorised by the QBCC as an excluded individual under the Old Version of the law on 24 May 2018;
    2. (b)
      The provisions under the Old Version of the law permitting a person to apply to be categorised as a permitted individual were not carried forward in the transitional provisions in the PEOLA Act and the QBCCOLA Act[28] and, as a consequence, Mr Mortensen may not take advantage of these deleted provisions; and that, as a consequence,
    3. (c)
      Mr Mortensen was an excluded individual for the period of 5 years from 15 November 2013 with no available avenue to review this status.
  7. [51]
    The QBCC interpretation of the provisions of the several Acts involved here provide Mr Mortensen with the worst possible outcome: he became an excluded individual for 5 years with no avenue of review, meaning that Mr Mortensen faced a form of strict liability.
  8. [52]
    This QBCC interpretation relies on a literal reading of the several Acts, but such an approach may not lead to the result that Parliament intended in a case like this. For example, was Parliament’s intention that the provisions of the Old Version were to be replaced entirely by the New Version and that the categorisation of a person as an excluded individual by force of the statute alone was not carried forward from 1 July 2015 unless the QBCC had, before that date, made a deliberative decision that a person was an excluded individual?
  9. [53]
    Or was Parliament’s intention that the review provisions contained in s 56AD were carried forward and included a person who was an excluded individual under the earlier version of the Act but who had not been the subject of a deliberative decision by the QBCC categorising them as such?
  10. [54]
    If either of these interpretations of Parliament’s intention is correct, then the QBCC position described in paragraph [50], above, may be untenable. An examination of Parliament’s intention begins with an analysis of the revised QBCC Act after 1 July 2015, which incorporates the changes brought about by the PEOLA Act and the QBCCOLA Act.

The law from 1 July 2015

  1. [55]
    The law concerning excluded individuals changed on and from 1 July 2015 to become as set out in s 56AC of the QBCC Act, as follows:

  1. (2)
    This section also applies to an individual if—
  1. (a)
    a construction company, for the benefit of a creditor—
  1. (i)
    has a provisional liquidator, liquidator, administrator or controller appointed; or
  1. (ii)
    is wound up, or is ordered to be wound up; and
  1. (b)
    3 years have not elapsed since the event mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) (relevant company event) happened; and
  1. (c)
    the individual—
  1. (i)
    was, when the relevant company event happened, a director or secretary of, or an influential person for, the construction company; or
  1. (ii)
    was, within the period of 1 year immediately before the relevant company event happened, a director or secretary of, or an influential person for, the construction company.

  1. (4)
    If this section applies to an individual because of subsection (2), the individual is an excluded individual for the relevant company event.

(7) In this section—

construction company means a company that directly or indirectly carries out building work or building work services.

  1. [56]
    Section 56AD was repealed, so that, after a relevant company event occurring on or after 1 July 2015, an individual becomes an excluded individual for 3 years, but no longer has the opportunity to apply to be categorised as a permitted individual. As well as which, the QBCC does not have to make a deliberative decision for a person to be categorised as an excluded individual – it occurs by effect of the statute alone.
  2. [57]
    The transitional provisions of the QBCCOLA Act relevant to this matter are:[29]

57 Categorisation as excluded individual or permanently excluded individual continues

(1) An individual who, immediately before the commencement, was an excluded individual for a relevant bankruptcy or company event under former section 56AC continues to be an excluded individual for the relevant bankruptcy or company event under former section 56AC as if that section had not been amended by the Amendment Act.

Note— The individual would continue under former section 56AC to be an excluded individual until 5 years had elapsed from the day the relevant bankruptcy or company event happened.

58 Becoming a permitted individual after the commencement

  1. (1)
     Subsection (2) applies if—
  1. (a)
    the commission gave an individual a written notice under former section 56AF(2) before the commencement; and
  1. (b)
    at the commencement, 28 days have not elapsed from the day the commission gave the person the notice mentioned in paragraph (a).
  1. (2)
    The person may apply to the commission, and the commission may consider and decide the application, under former section 56AD, as if that section had not been repealed under the Amendment Act.
  1. (3)
    Subsection(4) applies if, before the commencement, an individual applied to the commission under former section 56AD and the commission had not finally dealt with the application.
  1. (4)
    The commission may continue to consider and decide the application, under former section 56AD, as if that section had not been repealed under the Amendment Act.
  1. (5)
    To remove any doubt it is declared that the commission may categorise the person as a permitted individual despite the repeal of former section 56AD by the Amendment Act.

59 Categorisation as permitted individual continues

  1. (1)
    A permitted individual for a relevant event continues to be taken not to be an excluded individual for the relevant event.
  1. (2)
    The relevant event must not be counted in deciding, under section 61, whether the individual is or continues to be a permanently excluded individual.
  1. (3)
    In this section—permitted individual means—
  1. (a)
    an individual categorised as a permitted individual for a relevant event under former section 56AD if—
  1. (i)
    the person continued to be categorised as a permitted individual immediately before the commencement; or
  1. (ii)
    the person is categorised as a permitted individual after the commencement because of schedule 1, section 58; or
  1. (b)
    an individual categorised as a permitted individual for a relevant event as result of the tribunal reversing the commission’s decision not to categorise the individual as a permitted individual for the relevant event after a review of the decision by the tribunal.
  1. [58]
    Applying these transitional provisions to this case, if Mr Mortensen had been an excluded individual immediately before the commencement of the amendments introduced by the QBCCOLA Act, he would be unable to apply to be categorised as a permitted individual because he had not been given a written notice of his categorisation by the QBCC under the former s 56AF(2). In this case he would be an excluded individual for 5 years from the date of the relevant company event[30] with no ability to apply to be categorised as a permitted individual. As observed earlier, this interpretation is that taken by the QBCC in this matter.

Interpreting the meaning of a statute

  1. [59]
    The Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (‘Acts Interpretation Act’) provides guidance on the interpretation of statutory provisions:[31]

14A Interpretation best achieving Act’s purpose

  1. (1)
    In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, the interpretation that will best achieve the purpose of the Act is to be preferred to any other interpretation.

14B Use of extrinsic material in interpretation

  1. (1)
    Subject to subsection (2), in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, consideration may be given to extrinsic material capable of assisting in the interpretation—
  1. (a)
    if the provision is ambiguous or obscure—to provide an interpretation of it; or
  1. (b)
    if the ordinary meaning of the provision leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable—to provide an interpretation that avoids such a result; or
  1. (c)
    in any other case—to confirm the interpretation conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the provision.
  1. (2)
    In determining whether consideration should be given to extrinsic material, and in determining the weight to be given to extrinsic material, regard is to be had to—
  1. (a)
    the desirability of a provision being interpreted as having its ordinary meaning; and
  1. (b)
    the undesirability of prolonging proceedings without compensating advantage; and
  1. (c)
    other relevant matters.

(3) In this section—

extrinsic material means relevant material not forming part of the Act concerned, including, for example—

  1. (a)
    material set out in an official copy of the Act; and
  2. (b)
    a report of a royal commission, law reform commission, commission or committee of inquiry, or a similar body, that was laid before the Legislative Assembly before the provision concerned was enacted; and
  3. (c)
    a report of a committee of the Legislative Assembly that was made to the Legislative Assembly before the provision was enacted; and
  4. (d)
    the desirability of a provision being interpreted as having its ordinary meaning; and
  5. (e)
    an explanatory note or memorandum relating to the Bill that contained the provision, or any other relevant document, that was laid before, or given to the members of, the Legislative Assembly by the member bringing in the Bill before the provision was enacted; and
  6. (f)
    the speech made to the Legislative Assembly by the member when introducing the Bill; and
  7. (g)
    material in an official record of proceedings in the Legislative Assembly; and
  8. (h)
    a document that is declared by an Act to be a relevant document for the purposes of this section.

ordinary meaning means the ordinary meaning conveyed by a provision having regard to its context in the Act and to the purpose of the Act.

  1. [60]
    Explanatory Notes associated with a Bill or a Minister’s second reading speech can provide guidance when interpreting statutory provisions. Explanatory Notes to the Queensland Building Construction Commission and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld) (‘QBCCOLA Bill’) explain, in part, the reason for the changes to
    s 56AC, but offer nothing in terms of guidance concerning the apparent strict liability created by the amendments:

Clause 19 removes references in section 56AC to the commencement of the section, as the references are redundant. By reducing the time frames mentioned in the section from 5 to 3 years, the amendments will relax the restrictions that currently exclude individuals from holding a contractor’s licence to work in the building industry.[32]

  1. [61]
    A perusal of extrinsic material that could assist in understanding the rationale behind the changes relevant to this matter turns up very little: not the Explanatory Notes to the PEOLA Act; nor the supplementary Explanatory Notes to either the QBCCOLA Act nor the PEOLA Act; nor the Parliamentary Committee Report into the Queensland Building and Construction Commission and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014;[33] nor the Queensland Government Response to the Transport, Housing and Local Government Committee Report No.14.[34] The only rationale for the change to s 56AC of the QBCC Act appears to be in the Explanatory Notes to the QBCCOLA Bill noted above.
  2. [62]
    The only additional guidance provided by the extrinsic material is that the Government wished to abolish the provisions allowing a person who had been categorised as an excluded individual to be re-categorised as a permitted individual because of the complexity this procedure had caused, including because:

In practice, the permitted individual provisions have also proved to be cumbersome and subject to much disputation. Most excluded building contractors as a matter of course seek a review of any Commission decision that does not allow them to be a permitted individual. Notably, almost half of all review decisions in QCAT involving the Commission relate to a decision about a permitted individual application.[35]

  1. [63]
    Herein lies the conundrum. The express meaning of the provisions contained in the QBCC Act after 1 July 2015 and the QBCCOLA Act put Mr Mortensen in the position of strict liability. But does this reading reflect the ‘intention’, ‘contemplation’, ‘purpose’, or ‘design’[36] of the legislature? And, how far may a judicial body stray from the express words of the legislature when interpreting those words?
  2. [64]
    In 1967 Kitto J in Sovar v Henry Lane Pty Ltd[37]explained the approach that modern jurisprudence would adopt when interpreting legislation:

The intention [is not] that [a judicial interpretation has been] conjured up by judges to give effect to their own ideas of policy and then ‘imputed’ to the legislature. The legitimate endeavour of the courts is to determine what inference really arises, on a balance of considerations, from the nature, scope and terms of the statute, including the nature of the evil against which it is directed, the nature of the conduct prescribed, the pre-existing state of the law, and, generally, the whole range of circumstances relevant upon a question of statutory interpretation.[38]

  1. [65]
    In a learned review published in 2015 dealing with the approach courts could, most likely should, adopt when interpreting legislative ‘words that are indistinct’ Justice Stephen Gageler writing extra-curially concluded:

For a court to approach the construction of a legislated text as if that text were the product of ‘reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably’, might sometimes be unrealistic. But as a working hypothesis in a liberal democracy, it is hardly unreasonable.[39]

  1. [66]
    While Justice Gageler was speaking in this context of ‘words that are indistinct’, there seems no reason why the same approach should not be adopted when interpreting legislation in cases where the words may be clear but their outcome is unreasonable and, probably, unintended. Certainly his suggested approach to divining statutory intent seems consistent with s 14A of the Acts Interpretation Act.
  2. [67]
    There is a flavour throughout the decided cases concerning statutory interpretation that courts have been more willing to adopt an interpretive function when criminal sanctions have been involved. Mr Mortensen’s case does not involve criminal sanctions, but it does involve him being subject to punitive sanctions, suggesting that a court or tribunal should interpret uncertain legislative words in a manner that does not involve unreasonable sanctions on an individual.
  3. [68]
    To what extent a court or tribunal may interpose when a statute involves clear words but unintended results was considered in Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297 where Mason and Wilson JJ said:

On the other hand, when the judge labels the operation of the statute as “absurd”, “extraordinary”, “capricious”, “irrational” or “obscure” he assigns a ground for concluding that the legislature could not have intended such an operation and that an alternative interpretation must be preferred. But the propriety of departing from the literal interpretation is not confined to situations described by these labels. It extends to any situation in which for good reason the operation of the statute on a literal reading does not conform to the legislative intent as ascertained from the provisions of the statute, including the policy which may be discerned from those provisions.[40]

  1. [69]
    Lord Diplock provided guidance in dealing with a case analogous to this in Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74, where he said:

My Lords, I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction; even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] AC 850 provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed. Such an attempt crosses the boundary between construction and legislation. It becomes a usurpation of a function which under the constitution of this country is vested in the legislature to the exclusion of the courts.[41]

  1. [70]
    Accepting, as I do, that the legislature could not have intended the effect of the legislation to produce a worse outcome for an individual than if either the Old Version or the New Version[42] were to apply, it is first necessary to analyse the possible outcomes that could have been intended by the draftsman or legislature. These could be one of either:
    1. (a)
      The Old Version continued to apply after 1 July 2015 to any person who was an excluded individual under the pre-1 July 2015 law, whether or not the QBCC had made a deliberative decision in respect of that person before 1 July 2015, but also carried forward the provisions of s 56AD allowing for an excluded individual to apply for a review of that person’s categorisation at any time after the QBCC had made a deliberative decision concerning that person (whether the QBCC made its deliberative decision before 1 July 2015, or at any time after, not only within the 28 days after 1 July 2015);[43] or
    2. (b)
      The New Version applied to all persons, including excluded individuals under the pre-1 July 2015 law unless that person had been the subject of a deliberative decision by the QBCC.
  2. [71]
    The next step is to identify which of these outcomes would meet the relevant tests as being the outcome intended by Parliament.
  3. [72]
    Adopting the approach suggested by Lord Diplock, the first step is to identify precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy. The analysis above identifies that the mischief identified would be eliminated by making three changes to the legislative scheme:
    1. (a)
      Eliminating the category of permitted individual from the legislation;
    2. (b)
      Removing the need for the QBCC to make a deliberative decision as to when a person was to be penalised as being an excluded individual – a person was to became so categorised by force of the statute alone;
    3. (c)
      Reducing the period during which a person was an excluded individual from 5 years to 3 years.
  4. [73]
    Second, the Tribunal needs to identify the eventuality that is required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved. In this case whether Mr Mortensen was to be subject to the regime in place before 1 July 2015, or the regime from 1 July 2015. That is, did the Old Version or the New Version apply?
  5. [74]
    If the Old Version had continued after 1 July 2015 it would have the following consequences:
    1. (a)
      It would not have eliminated the category of permitted individual, and the litigation this categorisation spawned, for up to a further 5 years from 1 July 2015;
    2. (b)
      It would not have eliminated the need for the QBCC to make a deliberative decision in relation to excluded individuals, meaning that excluded individuals who had not been the subject of a QBCC notice escaped effective sanction;
    3. (c)
      It would have made two classes of excluded individuals: those whose relevant event occurred before 1 July 2015, and those whose relevant event occurred on or after 1 July 2015.
  6. [75]
    If the New Version of the law had been the intended outcome of the legislature the consequences would have been:
    1. (a)
      No excluded individual could be subject to a deliberative decision by the QBCC after 1 July 2015;
    2. (b)
      Only persons categorised by the QBCC as an excluded individual before 1 July 2015 could apply to be re-categorised as a permitted person;
    3. (c)
      A person who was an excluded individual before 1 July 2015 would continue to be an excluded individual – whether for a relevant 5 year (Old Version) or 3 year (New Version) period, depending on the legislation as drafted.
  7. [76]
    Continuing the Old Version would not eliminate one of the major reasons that stimulated the amendments: eliminating the inconvenience and litigation caused by appeals sought by excluded individuals seeking to be re-categorised as permitted individuals. Further, there would exist two categories of excluded individual for up to 5 years after the commencement date of 1 July 2015, involving a continuation of the need for the QBCC to make deliberative decisions, allowing separate rights of appeal and providing for differing durations of categorisation.
  8. [77]
    Further, the fact that the legislature allowed only 28 days after the commencement date (1 July 2015) for excluded individuals to seek a review of their categorisation by the QBCC suggests strongly that the legislature intended that, after this period of 28 days, no more applications for review of a person’s categorisation would be allowed because no more people would be so categorised, given that the new rules would apply. For these reasons, the Old Version is with sufficient certainty not the choice that the legislature would have applied in this case. I am satisfied that, had it turned its attention to the issue, the legislature would have expected the New Version to apply to cases such as this.
  9. [78]
    The third part of Lord Diplock’s formulation requires that it be stated with certainty the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law.
  10. [79]
    In order to achieve the results intended by the draftsman and Parliament I am satisfied that the following formulation, or a similar formulation with the same result, would have been contemplated, namely, the QBCC Act in force from 1 July 2015 should be changed by amending Schedule 1, s 57, dealing with transitional provisions, in the following way:
    1. (a)
      Section 57(1) is amended by inserting at the beginning of the sub-section: ‘Subject to Subsection (4)’;
    2. (b)
      Section 57(2) is amended by inserting at the beginning of the sub-section: ‘Subject to Subsection (4)’; and
    3. (c)
      Inserting a new s 57(4):

‘An individual who, immediately before the commencement of this subsection was an excluded individual for a relevant bankruptcy or company event under the former s 56AC but had not received a written notice from the commission under s 56AF(2):

  1. (a)
    will be an excluded individual for a period of 3 years from the date of the relevant bankruptcy or company event whether it occurred before or after the commencement date; and
  2. (b)
    cannot be issued a written notice by the commission under s 56AF(2) after the commencement date.’
  1. [80]
    Because Mr Mortensen had not been issued a written notice by the QBCC before the commencement date, the effect of this formulation would be that only the law applying after 1 July 2015 (the New Version) would apply to him: his categorisation as an excluded individual would be limited to 3 years from the relevant event, and he could not be issued a written notice by the QBCC from 1 July 2015.
  2. [81]
    Before answering the preliminary questions, it is appropriate to comment on the letters and notices sent to Craig Mortensen and Colonial Properties on 24 May 2018 that started the series of events examined here.

Whether the decisions made by the QBCC are enforceable

  1. [82]
    On their face the notices dated 24 May 2018 sent by the QBCC to each of Craig Mortensen and J.Mac appear to be defective.
  2. [83]
    In its letter to Craig Mortensen dated 24 May 2018 the QBCC gave notice to Mr Mortensen that the QBCC considered him to be an excluded individual. In expressing this conclusion the QBCC said that:

A person becomes an excluded individual if the individual:

  • becomes a bankrupt or otherwise takes advantage of bankruptcy laws by entering into an agreement under Part IX or X of the Bankruptcy Act 1966; or
  • is a director, secretary or influential person for a company at any time up to one year before the company has a provisional liquidator, liquidator, administrator or controller appointed.

Why the QBCC considers you to be an excluded individual

QBCC has become aware of the following relevant event (the Event):

  • On or about 15 November 2013 Robert Collin Humphreys of BRI Ferrier was appointed as liquidator to Colonial Properties Pty Ltd (The Company).

TAKE NOTICE pursuant to Section 56AC of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (the QBCC Act), QBCC considers you to be an excluded individual for the following reason:

  • You were a director, secretary or influential person for the Company at the time of, or within one year of, the Event.
  1. [84]
    This letter and notice made no reference to s 56AC(2)(a) of the QBCC Act,[44] which says that s 56AC applies to an individual if a company has a liquidator (inter alia) appointed ‘for the benefit of a creditor’. The letter and notice made reference only to the fact that, in this case, a liquidator had been appointed to Colonial Properties. Because the letter and notice to Mr Mortensen made no mention of the QBCC having categorised Mr Mortensen as an excluded individual because the liquidator had been appointed ‘for the benefit of a creditor’, there can be no confidence that this factor had been taken into account by the QBCC when making its decision and categorising Mr Mortensen as an excluded individual.
  2. [85]
    Similarly, in its letter to J.Mac dated 24 May 2018 giving notice of reasons for the proposed cancellation of J.Mac’s builder’s licence, the QBCC explained the reasons for its decision. Again quoting the relevant portions of this letter and notice:

A company becomes an excluded company if an excluded individual is a director, secretary or influential person for the company.

A person becomes an excluded individual if the individual:

is a director, secretary or influential person for a company at any time up to one year before the company has a provisional liquidator, liquidator, administrator or controller appointed.

Why the QBCC consider the Company to be an excluded company

On or about 15 November 2013 Robert Collin Humphreys of BRI Ferrier was appointed as liquidator to Colonial Properties Pty Ltd (The Event).

  1. [86]
    As in the letter and notice given to Mr Mortensen, this letter and notice made no reference to the statutory requirement that, for a relevant company event to have occurred, the appointment of the liquidator, etc., must be ‘for the benefit of a creditor’.
  2. [87]
    In both instances the QBCC appears to have issued its notice based on the single fact that a liquidator had been appointed to Colonial Properties, without considering whether the appointment of the liquidator had been done ‘for the benefit of a creditor’. A decision made without taking account of all relevant factors prescribed by law is a defective exercise of a power. All the more so because it involves punitive consequences for the person and the company affected.
  3. [88]
    In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, Mason J, as he then was, summarised the situations when the failure of a statutory decision-maker to take into account all relevant considerations would be fatal to the decision made. In a situation similar to that here he expressed the view that:[45]

(b) What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors – and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider – are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act.

  1. [89]
    In that case the Minister had failed to take into account a relevant factor when making a decision and the judgment of the lower court to set aside the decision made by the Minister was affirmed by the High Court.
  2. [90]
    On the basis of this analysis I believe that a judicial decision maker could well be prepared to set aside the notices dated 24 May 2018 given by the QBCC to each of Craig Mortensen and Colonial Properties, but the parties have not invited the Tribunal to take this course at this time. No doubt the parties will take these comments into account when they assess the further course of their litigation.

Decision

  1. [91]
    In order to analyse the Second Preliminary Question it was necessary to answer the First Preliminary Question, so answers are given to both questions.
  2. [92]
    The First Preliminary Question is answered as follows:
    1. (a)
      Has a ‘relevant company event’ occurred for the purposes of s 56AC(2)? No.
  3. [93]
    The Second Preliminary Question is answered as follows:
    1. (a)
      Which version of s 56AC(2) applies, the old or the new? The New Version.

Footnotes

[1] Section 8 of that report.

[2] Statutory Declaration of Robert Humphreys made at Townsville on 17 September 2018.

[3] [2010] QCAT 383.

[4] [2011] QCATA 158.

[5] [2011] QCAT 210.

[6] Gallagher v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 383, [61].

[7] Marangone v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 210, [48].

[8] McClintock v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 340, [24].

[9] Ibid, [26].

[10] Lowe v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 110, [37].

[11] McPherson's Law of Company Liquidation, loose leaf service, [2.250] Members' voluntary winding up – general Last Review: 01/10/2016.

[12] A reference by the learned author to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

[13] (2014) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 795.

[14] Ibid, 815.

[15] QBCC Act s 56AD(1) as it was before 1 July 2015.

[16] [2010] QCAT 383.

[17] [2011] QCAT 210.

[18] Gallagher v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 383.

[19] The predecessor to the QBCC.

[20] A ‘relevant company event’ as defined in s 56AC(2)(b).

[21] Gallagher v Queensland Building Services Authority [2010] QCAT 383, [14].

[22] Marangone v Queensland Building Services Authority [2011] QCAT 210.

[23] D’Arro v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCAT 100.

[24] D’Arro v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2016] QCATA 76.

[25] D’Arro v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCA 90.

[26] Ibid, [11].

[27] Noting that the earlier analysis shows that Craig Mortensen did not satisfy the conditions to be categorised as an excluded person under s 56AC.

[28] Except that an excluded individual could apply within 28 days after the commencement date of the transitional provisions to seek a review of the QBCC decision to categorise him as an excluded individual, and seek to be categorised as a permitted individual: QBCC Act, Schedule 1, s 58.

[29] These transitional provisions are found in Schedule 1 of the QBCC Act as it became after 1 July 2015.

[30] As defined in s 56AC of the QBCC Act.

[31] Acts Interpretation Act, s 14A, s 14B.

[32] Explanatory Notes, QBCCOLA Bill.

[33] Transport, Housing and Local Government Committee, Parliamentary Committee Report No 54 (2014) which led to the relevant amendments.

[34] Inquiry into the Operation and Performance of the Queensland Building Services Authority 2012, May 2013.

[35] Transport, Housing and Local Government Committee, Parliamentary Committee Report No 54 (2014) [3.10], Submission by the Department.

[36] Singh v Commonwealth (2004) 222 CLR 322 (Gleeson CJ).

[37] (1967) 116 CLR 397.

[38] Ibid, [4] (Kitto J).

[39] Stephen Gageler J, ‘Legislative Intent’ (2015) 41 Monash University Law Review 1.

[40] Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297, 320.

[41] Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74, 105-106.

[42] Referring to the QBCC Act. See paragraph [3] above.

[43] As allowed in s 58(1)(b) of Schedule 1 of the QBCC Act.

[44] The same requirement exists in the QBCC Act at all relevant times: before and after 1 July 2015.

[45] Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-40.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    J. Mac Constructions Pty. Ltd.v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

  • Shortened Case Name:

    J. Mac Constructions Pty. Ltd. v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

  • MNC:

    [2019] QCAT 233

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Dr Collier

  • Date:

    25 Feb 2019

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

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