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CITE

Unreported Judgment

Legal Services Commissioner v Li[2024] QCAT 444Justice Williams
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Legal Services Commissioner v Li[2024] QCAT 444

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:	Legal Services Commissioner v Li [2024] QCAT 444
PARTIES:	LEGAL SERVICES cOMMISSIONER (Applicant) v XIAOYU (Lorraine) li (Respondent)
APPLICATION NO/S:	OCR 206-22
MATTER TYPE:	Occupational regulation matters
DELIVERED ON:	16 October 2024
HEARING DATE:	16 July 2024
HEARD AT:	Brisbane
DECISION OF:	Justice Williams Assisted by: Mr Ross Perrett, Practitioner Panel Member Mr Keith Revell, Lay Panel Member
ORDERS:	The Respondent’s conduct identified in respect of each of Charges 1 and 2 in the discipline application is found to constitute professional misconduct. The Respondent is publicly reprimanded. The Respondent not be granted a principal practising certificate before 1 September 2025. The Respondent complete the QLS Remedial Ethics Course within 12 months of the Tribunal’s order, at her own expense. The Respondent complete, at her own expense, the QLS Practice Management Course within 12 months prior to any application for a principal practising certificate. The Respondent must include a copy of the Tribunal’s order and reasons, together with evidence of completing the QLS Remedial Ethics Course and the QLS Practice Management Course, when the Respondent first re-applies for a principal practising certificate. The Respondent pay the LSC’s costs of and incidental to the discipline application, to be assessed on the standard basis as if this were a proceeding before the Supreme Court of Queensland.
CATCHWORDS:	PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS – where the respondent gave the QLS an undertaking that they will not make an application for a Principal Practising Certificate before a stipulated date – where the applicant alleges professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct by the respondent in respect of two contraventions of an undertaking given to the Queensland Law Society – whether the Respondent’s conduct is properly characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct, professional misconduct or neither. PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – ORDERS – where the respondent’s conduct is found to be unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct – where s 456 of the Legal Profession Act provides the Tribunal with a wide discretion to make any order the Tribunal thinks fit – whether orders made pursuant to s 456 of the Legal Profession Act are appropriate – consideration of the usual costs order pursuant to s 462(1) Legal Profession Act – whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ to support a costs order other than the usual costs order. Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 9, s 61, s 276(2)-(3), ss 418-420, s 437, s 453, s 456, s 462, s 656C Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9. Attorney-General (Qld) v Francis (2008) 250 ALR 555 Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. Brown v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian (2012) 10 ASTLR 164. Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Fisher [2021] NSWCATOD 73. Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Lewis [2019] NSWCATOD 100. Council of the Law Society of NSW v Marando [2019] NSWCATOD 194. Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Morgan [2015] NSWCATOD 71. Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Powell [2019] NSWCATOD 24. GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857; [2023] HCA 32. Law Society of NSW v Ling [2010] NSWADT 48. Law Society of New South Wales v Thompson [2018] NSWCATOD 57. Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214. Legal Services Commissioner v Bui [2018] QCAT 424. Legal Services Commissioner v Challen [2019] QCAT 273. Legal Services Commissioner v Doyle [2021] QCAT 347. Legal Services Commissioner v Laylee [2016] QCAT 237. Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No. 2) [2009] 1 Qd R 149. Legal Services Commissioner v McQuaid (2019) 1 QR 499. Legal Services Commissioner v O'Connor (No 2) [2006] LPT 002. Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66. Legal Services Commissioner v Wrightway Legal [2015] QCAT 174. Legal Services Commissioner v XBV [2018] QCAT 332. M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69. Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72. Pennisi v Legal Services Commissioner [2023] QCA 234. Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517.
APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:
Applicant:	Mr O Cook of Counsel instructed by the Legal Services Commission
Respondent:	Ms N Pearce of Counsel instructed by Robinson Locke

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1]
This is a discipline application by the Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) under s 452 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (LP Act) for disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 of the LP Act. The discipline application raises two charges against the Respondent, Ms Xiaoyu (Lorraine) Li (Respondent), being a contravention of an undertaking on or about 12 March 2021 and a further contravention of the same undertaking on or about 19 May 2021.
[2]
Many of the relevant facts are not in dispute between the LSC and the Respondent. However, there are some relevant facts in contention between the parties that need to be determined by the Tribunal.
[3]
Also in dispute is the proper characterisation of the conduct in each of Charge 1 and Charge 2, and the appropriate sanction in all of the circumstances.
[4]
The LSC contends that Charge 1 and Charge 2 are properly characterised as professional misconduct. Further, that the Tribunal should make disciplinary orders including a public reprimand; a prohibition on applying for or obtaining a principal practising certificate for two years from the date of the order; an order requiring completion of the Queensland Law Society (QLS) Remedial Ethics Course; an order requiring completion of the QLS Practice Management Course within 12 months prior to any application for a principal practising certificate; an order requiring a copy of the order and reasons of the Tribunal to be included in any application for a practising certificate in any Australian jurisdiction for a period of 5 years; an order including the order, reasons and evidence of completion of the above courses when re-applying for a principal practising certificate in Queensland; and costs.
[5]
The Respondent’s primary position is that the discipline application should be dismissed and no order as to costs. Alternatively, the Tribunal should find that Charge 1 and Charge 2 are no more than unsatisfactory professional conduct and the sanction should be no more than a public reprimand.
[6]
Accordingly, the issues to be determined by the Tribunal are as follows:
1. Is Charge 1 proved?
2. In respect of Charge 1, is the Respondent’s conduct properly characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct, professional misconduct or neither?
3. Is Charge 2 proved?
4. In respect of Charge 2, is the Respondent’s conduct properly characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct, professional misconduct or neither?
5. If the Respondent’s conduct is found to be unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, what are the appropriate disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 of the LP Act?
6. What is the appropriate order as to costs?

Relevant facts not in dispute and issues in dispute

[7]
A statement of agreed facts and issues in dispute was signed by both of the parties on 19 February 2024 (SOAFID). An amended statement of agreed facts and issues in dispute dated 16 July 2024 (Amended SOAFID) was subsequently filed.
[8]
The hearing proceeded on the basis of the Amended SOAFID. However, one contention raised by the Respondent in the written submissions and Further Amended Response to the discipline application (Further Amended Response) was conceded at the hearing.^[1]
[9]
Accordingly, the following facts are agreed between the LSC and the Respondent:
1. The Respondent was admitted to the legal profession by the Supreme Court of Queensland on 8 September 2008.
2. Between 16 May 2011 and 3 April 2019, the Respondent held an unrestricted principal practising certificate.
3. From 16 May 2011 until 17 December 2015, the Respondent was the legal practitioner director of Siong and Li Lawyers Pty Ltd ACN 150 653 124.
4. From 18 December 2015 until 3 April 2019, the Respondent was the legal practitioner director of Li Lawyers Pty Ltd ACN 608 313 784.
5. Prior to 21 June 2019, the QLS took issue with certain trust accounting matters related to the incorporated legal practice, Li Lawyers Pty Ltd, of which the Respondent was the legal practitioner director.
6. The Respondent failed to comply with three of the conditions on her principal practising certificate.
7. On 3 April 2019, the Respondent’s principal practising certificate was cancelled.
8. On 23 May 2019, the Respondent applied to the QLS for an employee practising certificate.
9. On 20 June 2019, the QLS granted the Respondent an employee practising certificate upon the Respondent giving an undertaking.
10. On 21 June 2019, the Respondent gave to the QLS an undertaking (Undertaking) in writing as follows:

“I will not make application for a solicitor’s Principal Practi[s]ing Certificate before 1 July 2021”.

[10]
In respect of Charge 1, the LSC and the Respondent agreed the following facts:
1. On 12 March 2021, the Respondent lodged an application with the QLS seeking a principal practising certificate (First Application).
2. The QLS refused the First Application.
3. The Respondent breached the Undertaking by making the First Application.
4. On 19 March 2021, the Respondent sent an email to the QLS which included the following words:

“I must apologise that I have overlooked the period limitation of my previous undertakings amongst my busy schedule.

Please advise if the Society will consider to grant a waiver of the remaining three months of my undertaking based on compassionate circumstances, as I have been working very hard and taxed heavily on my income with no relevant expenses can be claimed such as registration and CPD stuff. If this is not to be considered, I will have to withdraw my undertaking^[2] and reapply after 1/7/2021.”

[11]
In respect of Charge 2, the LSC and the Respondent agreed the following facts:
1. On 19 March 2021, the Respondent lodged an application with the QLS seeking a principal practising certificate for the period of 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 (Second Application).
2. On 15 June 2021, the QLS refused the Second Application.
[12]
The Amended SOAFID identifies the following issues as being in contention:
1. In respect of Charge 1, whether the Respondent’s breach of the Undertaking by making the First Application constitutes unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
2. In respect of Charge 2:
  1. (i)
    Whether the Respondent breached the Undertaking a second time, by making the Second Application.
  1. (ii)
    In the event it is found that the Respondent breached the Undertaking a second time by making the Second Application, whether that conduct should be characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.

Progression of discipline application

[13]
It is appropriate to consider the way that this matter has progressed to have a full understanding of all issues to be considered by the Tribunal. The discipline application raises two charges against the Respondent.
[14]
Charge 1 is a contravention of the Undertaking as follows:

“On or about 12 March 2021, the Respondent contravened an undertaking that she gave to the [QLS] on 21 June 2019.”

[15]
The discipline application then sets out 21 paragraphs containing the particulars of that charge.
[16]
The Respondent initially filed a response to the discipline application and a subsequent amended response. Ultimately, the Further Amended Response was filed on 31 January 2024.^[3]
[17]
The position of the Respondent has changed at various times as stated in the various iterations of the response to the discipline application.^[4]
[18]
In the Further Amended Response, in respect of Charge 1, the Respondent accepted that Charge 1 constituted a proper basis for a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct, but the Respondent did not accept that Charge 1 was a basis for a finding of professional misconduct.
[19]
The Further Amended Response then set out various matters in respect of preliminary factual matters and in respect of Charge 1. This response included statements of relevant circumstances as identified by the Respondent.
[20]
Charge 2 is a further alleged contravention of the Undertaking as follows:

“On or about 19 May 2021, the Respondent contravened an undertaking that she gave to the [QLS] on 21 June 2019.”

[21]
The discipline application then sets out four paragraphs containing the particulars in respect of Charge 2.
[22]
In the Respondent’s Further Amended Response, Charge 2 is not accepted as being either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
[23]
The Further Amended Response sets out various paragraphs in respect of Charge 2.
[24]
The position taken by the Respondent is not entirely clear from the Further Amended Response and is perhaps best understood by way of the summary of the Respondent’s position as set out in the submissions filed on behalf of the Respondent. The submissions on behalf of the Respondent state at [3] as follows:

“However, the Respondent resists the application on the basis that:

whilst she accepts that in error (which she had admitted),^[5] she engaged in the conduct comprising the first charge;

that error was not sufficiently substantial to allow the tribunal to be satisfied that her conduct ought to be characterised as either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. Rather, it was simply an error and should be treated as such;

whilst she accepts with hindsight that on one view, what occurred in the circumstances giving rise to the second charge was not in accordance with the strict terms of her undertaking;

the circumstances of the second charge, when considered as a whole (in the manner discussed below) demonstrate that either:

her conduct was not in breach of her undertaking at all, having obtained from the QLS a release from the undertaking; or

(ii)
if she did act in error, it either:

(A)
was not of the sort that falls short of the standard that a member of the public is reasonably entitled to expect of a legal practitioner; or

(B)
ought to be characterised as no more than unsatisfactory professional conduct.”

[25]
The Respondent’s position largely does not take issue with many of the matters traversed in the written submissions on behalf of the Applicant. The argument appears to be more nuanced including:
1. At paragraph 5:

“She disagrees with certain of the key premises underlying the Applicant’s ultimate position^[6] which she contends had been drawn improperly from the relevant facts. Once examined more closely, the Respondent contends that the facts do not support that ultimate position.”

At paragraph 7:

“The Respondent respectfully contends that the Applicant:

has adopted (and relied in these proceedings upon) a flawed interpretation of the relevant events; and

has drawn from that interpretation a series of inferences that underly and erroneously inform her ultimate position.”

At paragraph 8:

“Once certain aspects of the factual matrix are clarified, the Respondent contends that the Applicant’s ultimate position is not the appropriate outcome of these proceedings.”

[26]
In the circumstances, it is necessary to consider in detail the relevant provisions of the LP Act and the factual circumstances.

Characterisation of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct

[27]
Sections 418, 419 and 420 of the LP Act state as follows:

“418 Meaning of unsatisfactory professional conduct

Unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of an Australian legal practitioner happening in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner.

419 Meaning of professional misconduct

Professional misconduct includes—

unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, if the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and

conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, whether happening in connection with the practice of law or happening otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.

For finding that an Australian legal practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as mentioned in subsection (1), regard may be had to the suitability matters that would be considered if the practitioner were an applicant for admission to the legal profession under this Act or for the grant or renewal of a local practising certificate.

420 Conduct capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct

The following conduct is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct—

conduct consisting of a contravention of a relevant law, whether the conduct happened before or after the commencement of this section;

Note—

Under the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, section 7, and the Statutory Instruments Act 1992, section 7, a contravention in relation to this Act would include a contravention of a regulation or legal profession rules and a contravention in relation to a previous Act would include a contravention of a legal profession rule under the Legal Profession Act 2004.

charging of excessive legal costs in connection with the practice of law;
conduct for which there is a conviction for—

a serious offence; or

a tax offence; or

an offence involving dishonesty;

conduct of an Australian legal practitioner as or in becoming an insolvent under administration;
conduct of an Australian legal practitioner in becoming disqualified from managing or being involved in the management of any corporation under the Corporations Act;
conduct of an Australian legal practitioner in failing to comply with an order of a disciplinary body made under this Act or an order of a corresponding disciplinary body made under a corresponding law, including a failure to pay wholly or partly a fine imposed under this Act or a corresponding law;
conduct of an Australian legal practitioner in failing to comply with a compensation order made under this Act or a corresponding law.

Also, conduct that happened before the commencement of this subsection that, at the time it happened, consisted of a contravention of a relevant law or a corresponding law is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
This section does not limit section 418 or 419.”

[28]
In considering the conduct, it is relevant that pursuant to s 420(1)(a) of the LP Act, conduct consisting of a contravention of a relevant law,^[7] which includes the Australian Solicitor Conduct Rules 2012 (the ASCR),^[8] is conduct capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
[29]
The LSC contends that the Respondent contravened Rule 6.1 of the ASCR by the conduct in Charges 1 and 2 and therefore the conduct is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
[30]
Rule 6.1 of the ASCR states as follows:

“Undertakings

6.1 A solicitor who has given an undertaking in the course of legal practice must honour that undertaking and ensure the timely and effective performance of the undertaking, unless released by the recipient or by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

[31]
Before considering the application of these provisions to the facts, it is necessary to consider whether each of Charge 1 and Charge 2 is proved.

Is Charge 1 proved?

[32]
Pursuant to s 453 of the LP Act the Tribunal must hear and decide each allegation in the discipline application and the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inform itself in any way.
[33]
In determining the discipline application:
1. Pursuant to section 656C(1) of the LP Act, if an allegation of fact is not admitted or is challenged at the hearing, the Tribunal must be satisfied of the allegations against the Respondent on the balance of probabilities.
2. Pursuant to section 656C(2) of the LP Act, satisfaction as to whether proof has been established depends upon the gravity of the allegations in question and the consequences for the Respondent.
[34]
The essential factual components of Charge 1 are:
1. The Respondent gave the Undertaking to the QLS on 21 June 2019 that the Respondent would not make an application for a solicitor’s principal practising certificate before 1 July 2021.
2. On 12 March 2021, the Respondent lodged the First Application with the QLS seeking a principal practising certificate “with immediate effect”.^[9]
3. On 18 March 2021, the QLS refused the First Application.
[35]
The Respondent does not contest these facts.
[36]
Further:
1. The Respondent expressly accepts that the Respondent breached the Undertaking by making the First Application.^[10]
2. The Respondent in an email sent on 19 March 2021 apologised that she “overlooked the period limitation of my previous undertakings amongst [her] busy schedule”.^[11]
3. In the same email the Respondent requested a waiver of “the remaining three months of [her] undertaking” but recognised that if the waiver would not be considered then she would withdraw the First Application and “reapply after 1/7/2021”.
[37]
The other matters raised by the LSC in the particulars to Charge 1 in the discipline application and by the Respondent in the Further Amended Response and submissions are relevant to the characterisation of the conduct. These will be considered further under the heading below.
[38]
On the basis of the admissions made by the Respondent (and further supported by the affidavit evidence), the Tribunal is satisfied that the relevant facts in relation to Charge 1 have been established, namely that on or about 12 March 2021 the Respondent contravened the Undertaking.

In respect of Charge 1, is the Respondent’s conduct properly characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct, professional misconduct or neither?

[39]
The LSC contends that the Respondent’s conduct in respect of Charge 1 is properly characterised as professional misconduct.
[40]
The Respondent no longer accepts that her conduct could be characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct.^[12] The Respondent contends that the error was not “sufficiently substantial” to be characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. That is, it was “simply an error”.
[41]
In these circumstances, the first step is to consider in detail the submissions and relevant evidence of both parties.
[42]
The LSC contends that it is necessary to consider the factual circumstances that resulted in the Respondent giving the Undertaking. The relevant facts are set out in the discipline application and relevant evidence is contained in the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022.^[13]
[43]
In addition to the matters set out at [9] above,^[14] the relevant facts include the following:^[15]
1. The QLS sent to the Respondent on 9 April 2018 a show cause notice pursuant to s 61(1) of the LP Act (First Show Cause Notice).
2. The First Show Cause Notice identified breaches of trust account requirements amounting to contraventions of s 276(2)(a) and (b), s 276(3)(a) and s 276(3)(b) of the LP Act and which were identified as suitability issues pursuant to s 9(1)(k) of the LP Act.
3. On 6 August 2018 the Respondent was notified that the Executive Committee of the Council of the QLS has resolved to impose a number of conditions on the Respondent’s practising certificate.
4. On or about 14 August 2018 conditions were imposed on the Respondent’s practising certificate including:
  1. (i)
    by 25 August 2018, the respondent engage the QLS to conduct an examination of the trust records of Siong and Li Lawyers Pty Ltd for the period 1 April 2015 to 17 December 2015 and 18 December 2015 to 27 May 2016;
  1. (ii)
    the respondent comply, within two business days, with all requests for assistance made to her by the QLS in conducting that examination;
  1. (iii)
    the respondent pay within 10 business days after it is rendered to her the QLS’s account for the conduct of those examinations;
  1. (iv)
    the respondent lodge with the QLS by 25 August 2018, a Statutory Declaration in the approved form required by s 276(3)(b) of the LP Act that Siong and Li Lawyers Pty Ltd had ceased to hold trust monies; and
  1. (v)
    the respondent provide to the QLS by 25 August 2018, a report of the progress in dispersing the stagnant balances in the trust account of Li Lawyers Pty Ltd, set out at pages 2 and 3 of the report by the QLS on the trust account investigation of Li Lawyers Pty Ltd dated 13 March 2017 and until those stagnant balances were disbursed, to provide to the QLS a report on the progress on the fifth day of every month.
5. The Respondent did not comply with conditions (i), (iv) and (v).
6. Following further correspondence on 6 September and 15 October 2018, on 14 December 2018 the QLS sent to the Respondent a further show cause notice pursuant to s 61(1) of the LP Act (Second Show Cause Notice).
7. The Second Show Cause Notice:
  1. (i)
    stated that the Executive Committee of the Council of the QLS resolved on 6 December 2018 that it believed grounds existed to cancel the Respondent’s practising certificate;
  1. (ii)
    outlined that the grounds included that the Respondent had breached a condition of the practising certificate, being a matter pursuant to s 46(2)(b) of the LP Act; and
  1. (iii)
    invited a response by 25 January 2019.
8. The Respondent provided submissions on 18 February 2019.
9. On 21 February 2019, the Executive Committee of the QLS determined that the Respondent was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate, with the decision effective from 3 April 2019.
10. On 13 March 2019 the Respondent was sent an information notice advising of the decision.
11. The Respondent applied to the Tribunal to review the decision, but that was later abandoned.
12. Following the cancellation of the Respondent’s practising certificate, the Respondent applied to the QLS on 23 May 2019 for an employee practising certificate.
13. On 20 June 2019, the Executive Committee of the QLS resolved to grant the Respondent an employee level practising certificate on a number of conditions and upon the Respondent giving the Undertaking.
14. The Respondent’s legal representatives were informed of this on 20 June 2019.
15. On 24 June 2019, the Respondent’s legal representatives emailed the QLS with a copy of the Undertaking signed and dated by the Respondent.
16. The First Application was made on 12 March 2021 and the application included that the Respondent intended to engage in sole practice under the name of LNJ Lawyers from 24 March 2021 at Waterfront Place in Brisbane. Further it attached an insurance questionnaire.
17. Relevantly, the First Application included the statement that the Respondent was “entitled to hold a principal practising certificate”.^[16]
18. On 18 March 2021 the QLS responded that the First Application was refused

“on the basis that the [QLS] cannot be satisfied that you are a fit and proper person to hold a Principal Practising Certificate given that [the Respondent] made the application … in breach of the [the Undertaking] to the [QLS] not to do so.”

On 19 March 2021 the Respondent responded and stated:

“I must apologise that I have overlooked the period limitation of my previous undertakings amongst my busy schedule.

Please advise if the [QLS] would consider to grant a waiver of the remaining three months of my undertaking based on compassionate circumstances … if this is not to be considered, I will have to withdraw my undertaking (sic) and reapply after 1/7/2021.”

The QLS responded:

“The [QLS] will not contemplate such an application.

I will have any fees paid by you for the upgrade of PC refunded.

I will refer the breach of undertaking to the Legal Services Commission.

If the Commission gives you notice of that complaint before renewals you must notify the [QLS] of that fact, on the application to renew. It is a suitability matter.

The [QLS] will then decide what to do regarding your application to renew”.

The Respondent sent a further response on 19 March 2021, which included as follows:

“I understand I am bound by my own undertakings given two years ago that I will not apply for a principal’s licence before 1/7/2021. I did try to seek a waiver of the remaining months from Mr Craig Smiley who has confirmed such waiver would not be considered.

Consequently, please accept my voluntary withdrawal of the above application.”

[44]
The LSC commenced an investigation into the First Application^[17] and pursuant to s 437 of the LP Act published the conduct to the Respondent on 23 June 2021.
[45]
The Respondent provided a response on 2 August 2021 which relevantly stated in respect of the First Application:

“I genuinely overlooked my undertaking timeline as my dispute with the QLS had been going on since 2015 that I believe everything was settled and finalised some time ago. I tehrefre (sic) applied for principal licence after April 2021. Then I received an email from Mr Craig Smiley accusing me for (sic) breach of undertaking, I realised my previous undertakings and then tried to discuss with Mr Craig Smiley whether he would consider allowing me to apply prior to 30 June 2021 due to issues aforementioned, Mr Craig Smiley expressively (sic) refused, I then decided to withdraw my application”.^[18]

[46]
On 27 April 2022, the Respondent provided to the Legal Services Commission public interest submissions which relevantly state in respect of the First Application:
1. “…on 21 June 2019, I reached the agreement with the QLS that the QLS would issue me an employee licence on the condition that [the Respondent] will not apply for legal principal licence on or before 1 July 2021.”
2. “The agreement therefore was that [the Respondent] will not apply for a principal certificate on or before 1 July 2021. There were no undertakings regarding trust account investigation. I genuinely believed that it was agreement between myself and the QLS, not by way of undertakings. I adopted the words “undertaking” as it was referred to by Mr Craig Smiley.”
3. When the QLS wrote to her on 18 March 2021 after the First Application, the Respondent “realised [her] omission, offered [her] sincerely (sic) apology for genuinely overlooked (sic) the time limit, and faithfully sought waiver of the remaining three months from the QLS but it was not granted”.
4. In the Respondent’s mind “it was an agreement between myself and the QLS which would be capable of being varied or amend (sic)”.
[47]
In the Respondent’s response to the discipline application dated 4 October 2022 (Initial Response) the Respondent accepted that she had breached the Undertaking when making the First Application. However, the Respondent’s position in respect of the characterisation of the conduct is as set out above.
[48]
The Respondent’s Further Amended Response sets out specific factual circumstances relied upon by the Respondent as relevant to the characterisation of the conduct. These include:^[19]
1. The breach of the Undertaking occurred in the “circumstances of error” by the Respondent.
2. The Respondent withdrew the First Application “almost immediately and apologised for the oversight”.
3. The Undertaking was given to the QLS and was “capable of, and in fact was” monitored by the QLS.
4. Given the nature of the Undertaking, there was “no real likelihood of any loss or damage to any third party” and there was in fact no loss or damage to any third party.
5. The Respondent had suffered a “recent acrimonious divorce” and her elderly parents and daughter had various health and other issues.
6. The Respondent was employed by a firm who the Respondent asserts had not paid wages for approximately three months.
[49]
The LSC addresses each of these issues in the exercise of considering the proper characterisation of the Respondent’s conduct in respect of Charge 1. In summary:
1. The “circumstances of error” is not particularised but could be understood to be the Respondent’s evidence that she “overlooked” the fact that the Undertaking was still in force.^[20]
2. The Respondent’s assertion that she withdrew the First Application “almost immediately and apologised for the oversight” is inconsistent with the evidence. The Respondent responded to the email reminder of the Undertaking by applying for a waiver of “the remaining three months”. The LSC contends that this in effect pressed the First Application, rather than being a withdrawal of the application following the reminder about the Undertaking.
3. The fact that the Undertaking was capable of being monitored by the QLS is largely irrelevant to the characterisation exercise. It is relevant that the Undertaking was given to the QLS, being a regulator/professional association.
4. The fact that there was no real likelihood of any loss or damage to any third party is also largely irrelevant to the characterisation exercise. The LSC contends that:
  1. (i)
    The ability to rely upon a legal practitioner’s undertaking is of fundamental importance and is central to dealings with practitioners.^[21]
  1. (ii)
    Breach of an undertaking can cause questioning of the confidence the profession, and the public at large, can have in the probity of the person as a legal practitioner.^[22]
5. In respect of the Respondent’s family circumstances and divorce, the evidence is equivocal.
6. In respect of the assertion regarding not being paid for three months, there is no explanation why the Respondent thought obtaining a principal’s practising certificate and establishing a legal practice were appropriate rather than a complaint regarding unpaid wages or seeking alternative employment.
[50]
Ultimately, the LSC submits that none of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the Respondent are such as to support a characterisation of the Respondent’s breach of the Undertaking to a regulator/professional association as unsatisfactory professional conduct, rather than professional misconduct.
[51]
In this regard, the LSC relies on the similar conclusions reached in Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata^[23] and Legal Services Commissioner v Bui.^[24] Further, the LSC notes that the Tribunal in Law Society of NSW v Ling^[25] and Council of the Law Society of NSW v Marando^[26] concluded that breaches of undertakings given to the New South Wales Law Society were professional misconduct.
[52]
The LSC also contends that Rule 6.1 of the ASCR in respect of a solicitor’s undertaking is a necessary incident of a solicitor’s paramount duty to the Court and the administration of justice (Rule 3 ASCR) and the fundamental ethical duties to be honest and avoid compromise to integrity (Rule 4 ASCR).
[53]
Further, the LSC submits that the authorities support the following propositions:
1. It is of critical importance that legal practitioners honour all undertakings given by them.^[27]
2. This applies, irrespective of intent to enter in an undertaking, erroneous understanding of the undertaking, any change in circumstances and despite any hardship to the legal practitioner in complying.^[28]
[54]
In Legal Services Commissioner v Bui^[29] the Tribunal considered charges including one of breaching an undertaking that the respondent’s law practice provide a report monthly to the QLS as to its progress in respect of a repayment plan with the Australian Taxation Office. The Tribunal stated:

“[16]
In the circumstances, it is necessary to properly characterise the conduct engaged in by the practitioner in respect of each of these charges. On any view, the breach of undertaking is the more serious of the two charges. That is not to suggest that the failure to respond to a request for information is not a serious matter but as I have had occasion to say previously, a failure to abide by an undertaking strikes at the heart of a solicitor’s call to practice. A solicitor’s word is his or her bond and a person in legal practice who fails to live up to their word commits a grave infraction of the minimum standards of probity which the community can expect of members of the legal profession. That is a long winded way of saying that the privilege of being a member of the legal profession carries with it the responsibility of being a trustworthy person. If a solicitor breaks their promise, as the Respondent did in this case and continues to do in this case, one can legitimately ask what confidence the rest of the profession and the public at large can have in the probity of that person as a legal practitioner.

[17]
There are many cases in which the courts and the various legal practice tribunals have commented on the importance of observing undertakings. It is sufficient to note the observations of this Tribunal in Legal Services Commissioner v Wrightway Legal,^[30] where the Tribunal said, at [26]:

“The ability to rely upon a legal practitioner’s undertaking is of utmost importance. It is central to dealings with practitioners. Because of its importance, noncompliance with the clear terms of an undertaking involves a substantial failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence and so amounts to professional misconduct as that term is described in s 419 of the Legal Profession Act.”

[18]
It is true that there is some authority for the proposition that in particular circumstances a breach of an undertaking may be regarded under the lesser category of unsatisfactory professional conduct. This, however, is not such a case. The present case is a clear example of a long standing and patent breach of one of the most fundamental aspects of the privilege to engage in legal practice. The Tribunal has no hesitation in holding that charge one has been proved and that the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct.”

[55]
Further, the LSC relies upon the decision of the Tribunal in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Powell^[31] and, in particular, the comments of the Tribunal at [20]:

“In determining whether to make the orders sought by the parties we must consider, for ourselves, whether it is appropriate to characterise the admitted misconduct of the respondent as professional misconduct. We observe firstly, as is well known, that the legal profession is an honourable one and legal practitioners are expected by the community, by fellow practitioners, and by the relevant regulatory authorities to behave honourably always. It is an everyday occurrence in all areas where lawyers practice that legal practitioners provide undertakings to fellow practitioners and to a wide range of commercial and statutory entities both on their own behalf and on behalf of clients. Other legal practitioners and commercial and statutory entities rely upon compliance with those undertakings in their everyday activities. Such reliance is integral to the efficient and effective functioning of a whole range of activities within our community. It is essential that undertakings given by legal practitioners be genuinely provided and that they be honoured. It is for these reasons that prima facie, a breach by a legal practitioner of an undertaking, whether given during legal practice or not, will arguably constitute a most serious matter, and may, in relevant circumstances, adversely impact upon the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.”

[56]
In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Fisher^[32] it was relevantly held as follows:
1. At [65]: “where an undertaking is given to the Law Society, the non-compliance is particularly serious… that non-compliance with an undertaking to a professional organisation is a more serious matter than non-compliance with an undertaking to a fellow practitioner”.
2. At [139]: “breach of undertakings to a regulator and/or professional association are particularly serious. Lawyers who give undertakings and who breach them should be brought to account. This is so regardless of whether the undertaking was given in the course of legal practice or not”.
[57]
In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Morgan^[33] the Tribunal considered an undertaking in the context of ongoing tax obligations, retaining an expert to supervise and report to the Law Society and also an obligation to notify the Law Society of any failure to comply with the undertaking. The Tribunal relevantly stated at [81]:

“… when the provision of an undertaking of this nature is required by the Law Society or the commissioner as a condition precedent to permitting a solicitor to resume or continue in practice, any breach of the undertaking is for that reason all the more serious”.

[58]
In respect of examples of a finding of professional misconduct in relation to a failure to comply with an undertaking given to a regulator/professional association, the LSC relies on various authorities including:
1. Legal Services Commissioner v Bui,^[34] which concerned an undertaking given by a practitioner to the QLS to provide monthly reports as to a payment plan with the Australian Taxation Office. The undertaking was not honoured in whole or part for over three years.
2. Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Bunton,^[35] which concerned an undertaking to the New South Wales Law Society that the practitioner would attain three CPD points by a date but failed to honour the undertaking in whole or in part.
3. Law Society of New South Wales v Thompson,^[36] which concerned an undertaking given to the Law Society of New South Wales that the practitioner would complete the next practice management course as a requirement to permit the respondent to practise as a principal solicitor. Based on the undertaking, the practitioner was given an unrestricted practising certificate, but the practitioner did not complete the course until over four and a half years later.
[59]
Reference is also made to the similar authorities of Council of the Law Society of new South Wales v Fisher;^[37] Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Powell^[38] and Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Lewis.^[39]
[60]
The LSC does acknowledge that the cases also support the proposition that not all breaches of undertakings will constitute professional misconduct.^[40] However, the cases where a tribunal has found a breach of an undertaking by a solicitor is unsatisfactory professional conduct have not involved a breach of an undertaking to a professional association.^[41]
[61]
Findings of unsatisfactory professional conduct have been made in the following factual circumstances:
1. An undertaking procured by deceit in relation to land tax liability.^[42]
2. An undertaking given by a legal practitioner, where at the time it could have been reasonably assumed that the performance of the undertaking would be by the experienced law clerk and the law clerk failed to perform the steps.^[43]
[62]
In respect of Charge 1, the LSC submits that the Respondent’s conduct is properly characterised as professional misconduct, taking into account all the circumstances including the following:
1. The Undertaking being given by the Respondent was relied upon by the QLS for the issuing of an employee practising certificate following the cancellation of the Respondent’s principal practising certificate.
2. The Respondent breached the Undertaking given to the QLS.
3. The terms of the Undertaking were unequivocal and not capable of being misinterpreted.
4. At the time of the First Application the Respondent had not been released by the QLS or by a Court of competent jurisdiction.
5. The conduct is more serious given the Respondent’s recent and relevant dealings with the QLS which resulted in her practising certificate being cancelled in 2019, as a result of her failure to comply with conditions of her practising certificate.
[63]
The Respondent agrees with the LSC’s submissions in respect to the “contextual matters”, the circumstances and terms of the undertaking given by the Respondent to the QLS in June 2019 and the facts of the First Application.^[44]
[64]
Further, the Respondent “broadly” agrees with the facts of the investigation outlined by the LSC but submits that this is irrelevant and “bordering on the vexatious”.^[45] This latter contention is not accepted by the LSC.
[65]
The Respondent contends that:
1. the LSC has adopted a flawed interpretation of the relevant events; and
2. has drawn a series of inferences that inform an erroneous position.
[66]
It is submitted that once the “factual matrix is clarified” the outcome of the proceeding is that the application is dismissed.
[67]
Some of the matters raised relate to Charge 2, but relevantly to Charge 1 the Respondent relies on the following circumstances as presenting the “whole of the circumstances”:
1. The interactions between the Respondent and the QLS in 2019 were about compliance with trust accounting matters arising in relation to the Respondent’s previous law firm. It is submitted that there was no suggestion of dishonesty, dereliction of duties to her clients or loss to any party.
2. Those interactions resulted in the Respondent giving the Undertaking.
3. The Respondent “wished to progress her career and financial position” and formed the desire to return to being a principal of her own firm.
4. To advance that progression, the Respondent made the First Application.
5. It is not in issue that the First Application was contrary to the terms of the Undertaking and ought not to have occurred.
6. The Respondent in her affidavit deposes to:
  1. (i)
    the passage of time since the Undertaking was given;
  1. (ii)
    she was focussed on some difficult personal circumstances; and
  1. (iii)
    she simply overlooked that the Undertaking was still in force.
7. The Respondent had complied with 21 of the 24-month period in the Undertaking, with three months remaining.
8. Over a period of about 26 hours the following events occurred in quick succession:
  1. (i)
    The QLS wrote to the Respondent informing her that the First Application was in breach of the Undertaking.
  1. (ii)
    The Respondent apologised for her error, provided an explanation in accordance with (f) above and asked if the QLS would consider a waiver of the Undertaking or if not, she would have to withdraw the First Application.
  1. (iii)
    The request for a waiver was declined.
  1. (iv)
    The Respondent withdrew the First Application.
[68]
In respect of Charge 1, the Respondent submits that the proper characterisation of the conduct needs to include consideration of the following:
1. The Respondent conceded at the time and in the proceeding that the First Application was made in breach of the Undertaking.
2. The conduct occurred over a short period of time, including the Respondent clearly explaining that she overlooked the Undertaking still being in force, apologised for her error, sought a release (which she was entitled to do) and upon refusal of that request she promptly withdrew the First Application.
[69]
The Respondent does not take issue with the LSC’s summary of the relevant caselaw relating to the seriousness of a solicitor’s undertaking and the importance of honouring it. These cases have been summarised above.
[70]
Further, the Respondent acknowledges the principle that an undertaking given to a regulator/professional association is particularly serious. Whilst acknowledging that a breach of an undertaking can constitute professional misconduct, the Respondent submits that the current circumstances identified above do not support that characterisation.
[71]
The Respondent submits that the proper approach is to consider whether the Respondent’s conduct makes out any charge. In this regard pursuant to s 418 to be unsatisfactory professional conduct the conduct must have happened “in connection with the practice of law” and fall sort of the “standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent legal practitioner”.
[72]
That is, not every error in the practice of law satisfies the test. The Respondent submits that “an isolated instance”^[46] or a “mere slip”, as here, is not sufficient.
[73]
In oral submissions, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the public do not expect perfection and a member of the public would see a single error. In the whole of the circumstances, it is submitted that mistakes can happen despite the highest ethical standards.
[74]
In respect of Charge 1, the Respondent points to the following particular circumstances as relevant to the Respondent’s conduct:
1. The First Application was an isolated instance.
2. The conduct cannot be conflated with the preceding events.
3. Involved a mere error, of short duration and was withdrawn promptly after the refusal of the request for a release.
[75]
The Respondent’s primary position is that s 418 of the LP Act is not made out. Alternatively, at the highest, the Respondent’s conduct was no more than unsatisfactory professional conduct.
[76]
In response to the Respondent’s contention in respect of the conduct not being “in connection with the practice of law”, the LSC relies to the words of s 418 of the LP Act, and in particular the word “includes”. Accordingly, the LSC submits that s 418 of the LP Act is not limited in the way the Respondent contends.
[77]
There are several features of Charge 1 that need to be considered.
[78]
A review of the document by which the First Application was made^[47] shows:
1. The Respondent was applying on 12 March 2021 to commence operation of a new firm, LNJ Lawyers Pty Ltd, on 24 March 2021. It also shows that the proposed address was Waterfront Place in Brisbane and includes a completed insurance questionnaire.
2. The Respondent represented by checking the relevant box that she was “entitled to hold a principal practising certificate”.
[79]
The submission that the oversight by the Respondent was “a mere slip” ignores that it was not simply a forgotten date. The Respondent forgot that she had given a signed pledge, promise or assurance to the QLS that she would not do the very thing that she was doing by way of the First Application before 1 July 2021.
[80]
The steps that were involved in getting a business address, a firm name and completing the insurance questionnaire would suggest that some thought went into the First Application. It is unlikely to have been spontaneous or on a whim. It was more likely to have been a careful and reasoned decision to set up a new law firm.
[81]
When this is considered, together with the requirement to make a declaration in respect of the information in the form (including that she was entitled to hold a principal practising certificate), it is difficult to characterise the conduct as a mere error or slip. The signing clause requires the person completing the form to “solemnly and sincerely declare that the information and the particulars set forth in the form are complete and accurate in every detail”. They plainly are not.
[82]
This is an aspect of the conduct in respect of Charge 1 that the Respondent does not address. A competent and diligent legal practitioner would be mindful of making a declaration that information provided to the QLS was “complete and accurate in every detail”, particularly when it was relevant to a practising certificate to be able to undertake work as a legal practitioner (and in particular, as a principal in this case).
[83]
A second aspect that the Respondent does not satisfactorily address is the operation of s 420(1)(a) of the LP Act. A contravention of a rule contained in the ASCR is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. While s 420 is expressly stated not to limit s 418 or s 419 of the LP Act,^[48] the section identifies particular circumstances that are capable of falling within the categories by their very nature.
[84]
Rule 6.1 of the ASCR expressly provides that an undertaking given in the course of legal practice must be honoured and the solicitor must “ensure the timely and effective performance of the undertaking”, unless released by the recipient or a Court of competent jurisdiction. Rule 6.1 of the ASCR forms part of wider rules that recognise the fundamental ethical duties of a solicitor.
[85]
Here, the undertaking was given in the course of legal practice in that it formed the very condition precedent to the QLS granting an employee practising certificate.
[86]
It is impossible to see how a breach of the Undertaking could be characterised as nothing more than an administrative error to warrant the discipline application in respect of Charge 1 being dismissed.
[87]
The features identified by the Respondent are relevant to sanction. However, those features do not cure the contravention of the Undertaking of being serious and substantial in nature.
[88]
While the conduct in respect of Charge 1 may have been of relevantly short duration, that does not reduce the serious and substantial nature of the failure to honour and effect performance of the Undertaking. Contravening the Undertaking by making the positive declaration of currently being entitled to a principal’s practising certificate is a relevant feature in the circumstances of this case.
[89]
The Respondent’s evidence in her affidavit that she “overlooked” the Undertaking still being in force does not provide a full explanation of the contravening conduct in light of the contents of the First Application. The requirement of the declaration and the checking of the box that she was “currently entitled” should have been a flag to the Respondent to at least check the position in respect of the term of the Undertaking.
[90]
Further, the Respondent’s conduct displayed a substantial failure by her to maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence.
[91]
Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that Charge 1 is appropriately characterised as professional misconduct pursuant to s 419(1)(a)^[49] of the LP Act. The Respondent’s conduct falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency.
[92]
The Tribunal finds that the conduct identified in respect of Charge 1 in the discipline application constitutes professional misconduct.

Is Charge 2 proved?

[93]
The same legal principles as outlined in respect of Charge 1 apply to proof of Charge 2. However, the breach of the undertaking is not admitted in the Amended SOAFID.
[94]
It is uncontentious that by the Second Application the Respondent applied for a principal practising certificate for the period 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022. That is the Second Application was made on 19 May 2021 within the period of the Undertaking (being before 1 July 2021) but was for a principal practising certificate for the period commencing on 1 July 2021.
[95]
The issue to be determined is whether the evidence proves that making the Second Application was an “application for a solicitor’s Principal Practi[s]ing Certificate before 1 July 2021” such that the Undertaking was breached.
[96]
The background facts set out at [9] above are relied upon by the LSC in respect of Charge 2 as particularised in the discipline application.
[97]
The LSC also particularises the conduct as including:
1. “On 19 May 2021, the respondent made another application to QLS for a principal level practising certificate, two months after being reminded of her undertaking by QLS” (as outlined above in respect of Charge 1).
2. when challenged by the QLS about another potential breach of her Undertaking on 15 June 2021, the Respondent stated:

“…

My current legal practice [sic] expires on 30 June 2021 and I intend to practice [sic] as a principal license holder from 1 July 2021, which is consistent with my undertaking. The intention was clearly expressed in my online application that the new practising certificate would commence on 1 July 2021, not any day prior to 1 July 2021. I believe what I have done is [what] any people [sic] with common sense would do under the circumstances and [I] never had any intention to be non-compliant with my undertaking.”

[98]
The Second Application was made through the annual QLS renewals process on the basis that the Respondent was seeking to upgrade her unrestricted employee practising certificate^[50] for the period 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 to a principal’s practising certificate.^[51]
[99]
On 15 June 2021 Craig Smiley of the QLS emailed the Respondent stating:

“You have lodged an application for renewal of a practising certificate and to upgrade to a Principal PC. That application was made on 19 May 2021. On the face of it that might be another breach of your undertaking to not apply for a Principal PC before 1 [J]uly 2021.

The Society is considering whether in light of that action, the earlier breach of undertaking and the long history of your persistent non compliance [sic] which has previously led to the imposition of conditions on your PC as awell [sic] as cancellation of your PC, you are a fit and proper person to hold any practising certificate. Thus your PC will not be renewed nor will your application for an upgrade be granted. Thus you cannot until this investigation is completed practice in your own account.

However you may, pursuant to s 47(3) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 continue to practice, on the basis of your current PC as an employee. That current PC holds over until the current process is completed.”^[52]

[100]
It was the Respondent’s response to that email which is, in part, relied on in the particulars of Charge 2. The Respondent responded to the email from the QLS as follows:

“I am very astonished to receive your email of the allegation. I do not believe your allegation is reasonable.

I did previously try to apply for a principal license, having genuinely forgotten the time limit condition of granting me the license at the time. As soon as you brought it to my attention, I withdrew my application, thanked you for your reminder, and genuinely apologi[s]ed for my oversight.

My current legal practice [sic] expires on 30 June 2021 and I intend to practice [sic] as a principal license holder from 1 July 2021, which is consistent with my undertaking. This intention was clearly expressed in my online application that the new practising certificate would commence on 1 July 2021, not any day prior to 1 July 2021. I believe what I have done is [what] any people [sic] with common sense would do under the circumstances and [I] never had any intention to be non-compliant with my undertaking.

If QLS believes I should renew my current employee licence for 1 July 2021 – 30 June 2021 [sic], and on 1 July 2021 again make another principal application to practice after 1 July 2021, I can certainly comply with that, notwithstanding, I strongly refute your allegation of me not being a fit and proper person to hold a principle license, as it appears to me your allegation would amount to undue attack against my integrity and personal reputation which I must not accept and would never agree.

I trust QLD [sic] would be a fair and reasonable professional body that will investigate this with proper consideration.”^[53]

[101]
Relevant to matters considered later in these reasons, the email sent at 10.34pm on 15 June 2021, being the first occasion after the Second Application that the Respondent addressed the circumstances of her making the application, there is no mention of any discussion with the QLS Ethics Centre or a member of the QLS Records Department in respect of that application.
[102]
Subsequent to that exchange:
1. On 24 June 2021 the Craig Smiley on behalf of the QLS emailed the Respondent that:

“I have been advised by the LSC that they are investigating your breach of undertaking and that the matter has been published to you.

That being the case the [QLS] will not conduct a parallel investigation. It will await the result of the Commission’s investigation and then make a decision regarding the renewal and upgrade to principal of your practising certificate.

In the meantime you may, on the continued basis of your current employee level PC continue to practice as an employee until the [QLS] makes a decision about your renewal and upgrade (see s 47(3) [LP Act]).”^[54]

On 14 September 2021 the Respondent emailed the QLS withdrawing the application for a principal practising certificate and making an application for the “employ licence instead. I will make a separate upgrade licence [sic] in due course.”^[55]

[103]
The Respondent’s Further Amended Response in respect of Charge 2 raised the following matters:
1. The wording of the Undertaking was “ambiguous”.
2. Stated:

“One reading of it permits an application for a Principal Practising Certificate to be made prior to 1 July 2021, provided the effective date of the certificate sought is not prior to 1 July 2021.”

Stated that was the reading the Respondent adopted.^[56]
Further stated:

“After seeking advice from the [QLS], [the Respondent] made an application she mistakenly believed to be permissible under the terms of the undertaking”.

Stated that “error was not unreasonable in the circumstances”.
Relies on these circumstances to conclude that the conduct of the Respondent was not unsatisfactory professional conduct, nor professional misconduct.

[104]
The Initial Response did not include reference to the Respondent seeking advice from the QLS but merely reserved the Respondent’s position in respect of Charge 2. The Amended Response denied the breach on the basis of the “plain wording” of the Undertaking permitting lodgement of an application prior to 1 July 2021 that did not take effect prior to 1 July 2021.
[105]
In the Supplementary Submissions dated 27 February 2024^[57] the LSC interprets the position taken by the Respondent in the Further Amended Response as:
1. On one view, a concession that the conduct was, in fact, not permissible under the terms of the Undertaking.
2. Wholly consistent with the Respondent’s affidavit of 31 January 2023 where the Respondent states at [32]:

“I acknowledge that, in my application of 19 May 2021, I breached my undertaking of 21 June 2019.”^[58]

[106]
As identified previously, at the hearing the Respondent did not press the contention that the Undertaking was ambiguous. This makes the Respondent’s position less clear and potentially bolsters the LSC’s contention that there is an inherent concession that the conduct was not permissible under the terms of the Undertaking.
[107]
Further, the LSC contends that the Respondent’s denial of the contravention is difficult to reconcile with the Respondent’s sworn evidence.
[108]
Prior to the concession about the Undertaking being ambiguous the LSC in any event submitted that the Respondent’s submission that it was ambiguous ought to be rejected. In this regard the LSC referred to matters including:^[59]
1. That “make” is a verb and is referable to the noun “application”.
2. The Respondent’s construction requires the reading in of additional words, which are not there, and ignores other words that are in the Undertaking.
3. The Respondent’s approach requires the Undertaking to be read as follows:

“I will not may make an application for a solicitor’s principal Practising Certificate before 1 July 2021 provided the effective date sought is after 1 July 2021.”

The LSC contends that this construction is not available on the words actually used in the Undertaking.
The Respondent’s own contemporaneous reading of the Undertaking set out in her email dated 19 March 2021 was inconsistent with alleged ambiguity. The Respondent clearly understood in respect of the First Application that the Undertaking was to remain in place for a further three months.^[60]

[109]
The LSC also addressed the alleged conversations with the QLS about the Second Application in the Supplementary Submissions. In particular, the LSC refers to the following:
1. On 5 May 2021, the Respondent called the QLS Ethics Centre and spoke with a law clerk about her practising certificate renewal and the law clerk attempted to transfer the Respondent to the QLS Records Department. It appears that the transfer of the Respondent’s call was unsuccessful.^[61]
2. Later the same day, the Respondent contacted the QLS Ethics Centre again and spoke with an administration assistant. The Respondent gave consent to her details to be passed on to the QLS Records Department. The QLS Ethics Centre provided the Respondent’s contact details to the QLS Records Department by email.^[62]
3. There is no record or recording of any subsequent conversation between the QLS Records Department and the Respondent.^[63]
4. The only evidence of the “advice” is the Respondent’s evidence and there is no contemporaneous file note.^[64]
[110]
The LSC submits that even if the Respondent’s evidence as to the telephone call with the QLS Records Department is accepted, it does not provide any reasonable justification for the Respondent’s conduct in making the Second Application.
[111]
In particular:
1. The Respondent did not contact Mr Smiley, the person at the QLS with whom she had been dealing, including in relation to the Undertaking and the making of her First Application.
2. The Respondent’s evidence does not suggest some particular reason for the Respondent to rely upon general guidance provided from the QLS Records Department.
3. The QLS Records Department is responsible for the maintenance of the QLS’s records of the issue of practising certificates and not matters related to undertakings given by practitioners.^[65]
4. Given the seriousness of the Undertaking, it was unreasonable for the Respondent to deal with the QLS Records Department:
  1. (i)
    given the issue concerned the Respondent’s compliance with the Undertaking;
  1. (ii)
    the QLS Records Department may not have had any authority to provide conclusive guidance about compliance with the Undertaking; and
  1. (iii)
    when Mr Smiley was the person the Respondent had previously dealt with in respect of the Undertaking.
[112]
The Respondent’s position is as follows:^[66]
1. A couple of months after the First Application, in May 2021, the Respondent received from the QLS the annual email regarding practising certificate renewals for the period from 1 July 2021.^[67]
2. The Respondent wished to move forward to being a principal but “with the recent events of the [First Application] firmly in mind” she was “well aware that she could not hold a principal practising certificate before 1 July 2021”.^[68]
3. Further, the Respondent did not wish to breach the Undertaking and wanted to do “the right thing”.^[69]
4. “[W]ith all of the foregoing in mind” and as she was unsure of the procedure of renewing her current employee certificate and also seeking an upgrade to a principal’s certificate from 1 July 2021, the Respondent contacted the QLS.^[70]
5. The Respondent called the QLS Ethics Centre and there was an attempt to transfer her to the QLS Records Department. This is supported by the Respondent’s telephone records which show two calls to the QLS on that day.^[71]
6. The Respondent’s evidence is that she spoke to someone at the QLS Records Department and explained the matters at (d) above and was told by a QLS staff member that she could make an application to both renew the existing certificate and to seek a principal’s certificate to take effect from 1 July 2021 by way of the annual renewal form.
[113]
It is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that:
1. It makes no sense that the Respondent would make two calls to the QLS to obtain advice from the QLS and then to proceed without obtaining it.
2. Further, it makes no sense that the Respondent would have made the efforts to obtain advice and then to disregard it.
3. It is likely that the Respondent proceeded with the Second Application based on what she was advised by the QLS staff member to do.
[114]
It is in these circumstances, that the Respondent contends that a release was received from the QLS by way of the telephone discussion. However, this contention was not developed further at the hearing and is not established on the evidence.^[72]
[115]
Alternatively, the Respondent contends that the Respondent made the Second Application:
1. Having been “focussed on ensuring she did not breach the Undertaking”;
2. Having sought guidance from the QLS on how to “best proceed without breaching the Undertaking”; and
3. Acting “in strict accordance with the advice she received”.
[116]
The evidence establishes that there is no recording of the Respondent’s conversation with the staff member of the QLS Records Department.^[73] Further, there is no file note of the conversation: either by the QLS or the Respondent. The Respondent submits that she should not be criticised for not making a file note where she was not to know that the call would not be recorded. While this is correct, it is difficult to understand why the Respondent did not keep any file note particularly when she had only recently had the First Application refused, had previously had conditions imposed on her practising certificate and had her practising certificate cancelled. A competent and diligent solicitor would ordinarily keep a file note of such an important discussion concerning a practising certificate and compliance with an undertaking.
[117]
The Respondent also submits that the criticism that she did not deal with Mr Smiley in respect of the procedure is also unwarranted.
[118]
The Respondent also deals with some of the correspondence referred to by the LSC after the Second Application and during the investigation by the Legal Services Commission.
1. In particular, the Respondent contends that care needs to be taken as some of the Respondent’s responses were in respect of the allegation that she was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and not the issue of breach of the Undertaking.
2. Further, the Respondent contends that these statements do not reflect a lack of insight but were consistent with her intention not to breach the Undertaking subsequent to the aftermath of the First Application.
[119]
The Tribunal must be satisfied of the allegation in Charge 2 on the balance of probabilities, depending upon the gravity of the allegations in question and the consequences for the Respondent. Here the consequences are potentially a finding of professional misconduct. These are serious consequences and this impacts the level of satisfaction required.
[120]
Whilst these are disciplinary proceedings, they are civil proceedings and:
1. the LSC bears the persuasive onus of proof in respect of this allegation; and
2. given the nature of the allegation,^[74] the higher evidentiary standard as articulated in Briginshaw v Briginshaw,^[75] and as more recently explained in M v M,^[76] is required to be satisfied.
[121]
The starting point is the case of Briginshaw v Briginshaw^[77] where the High Court considered the standard of proof in divorce proceedings on the ground of adultery. Dixon J’s reasons for judgment state the relevant principle:

“But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences”.^[78]

[122]
Dixon J went on later in the reasons to state:

“This does not mean that some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt required upon a criminal inquest and the reasonable satisfaction which in a civil issue may, not must, be based on a preponderance of probability. It means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained. When, in a civil proceeding, a question arises whether a crime has been committed, the standard of persuasion is, according to the better opinion, the same as upon other civil issues … But, consistently with this opinion, weight is given to the presumption of innocence and exactness of proof is expected.”^[79]

[123]
In the recent High Court decision in GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore,^[80] the majority of the High Court recognised that the adversarial system requires a plaintiff to prove its case and that “the gravity of the fact sought to be proved is relevant to ‘the degree of persuasion of the mind according to the balance of probabilities’.^[81]”^[82]
[124]
Further:

“[b]y this approach, the common law, in accepting but one standard of proof in civil cases (the balance of probabilities), ensures that ‘the degree of satisfaction for which the civil standard of proof calls may vary according to the gravity of the fact to be proved’^[83].”^[84]

[125]
Particularly relevant to the current context are the comments of the majority of the High Court as follows:

“[60] A court is not bound to accept uncontradicted evidence. Uncontradicted evidence may not be accepted for any number of reasons including its inherent implausibility, its objective unlikelihood given other evidence, or the trier of fact simply not reaching the state of ‘actual persuasion’ which is required before a fact may be found^[85]. ‘To satisfy an onus of proof on the balance of probabilities is not simply a matter of asking whether the evidence supporting that conclusion has greater weight than any opposing evidence … It is perfectly possible for there to be a scrap of evidence that favours one contention, and no countervailing evidence, but for the judge to not regard the scrap of evidence as enough to persuade him or her that the contention is correct.’^[86] The evidence must ‘give rise to a reasonable and definite inference’ to enable a factual finding to be made; mere conjecture based on ‘conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability’ is insufficient^[87].”^[88] (emphasis added)

[126]
The evidence establishes on the balance of probabilities that:
1. Subsequent to the First Application, the Respondent was aware of the Undertaking.
2. The terms of the Undertaking were clear and unambiguous: the Respondent was not to make an application for a principal practising certificate before 1 July 2021.
3. The Respondent was aware that the Undertaking meant that she was not to make an application for a principal practising certificate before 1 July 2021 as reflected in her contemporaneous correspondence in relation to the First Application.
4. By the Second Application, the Respondent technically made an application for a principal practising certificate before 1 July 2021 (even if it was not to operate before 1 July 2021).
[127]
The issue arises as to whether the “contextual” matters relied upon by the Respondent have the effect that there is no breach of the Undertaking by the Second Application.
[128]
The evidence in respect of the discussion with the QLS Records Department has many inconsistencies, even on the Respondent’s own evidence, and in the submissions made at the hearing.
[129]
In the Respondent’s initial response to the QLS on 15 June 2021 in respect of the Second Application, the Respondent:
1. asserts that what the Respondent did was “common sense”;
2. did not refer to any discussion with the staff member at the QLS Records Department; and
3. acknowledges that if the QLS required her to renew her employee practising certificate and then make another application for a principal certificate after 1 July 2021 she could “certainly comply with that”.
[130]
The Respondent’s response on 15 June 2021 was the logical and rational place for the Respondent to raise any discussion with a staff member of the QLS Records Department about the Undertaking and the renewals process. There is no reference to any discussion in the email dated 15 June 2021. The justification for the Second Application was that it was in fact consistent with the Undertaking and was “common sense”.
[131]
As part of the Legal Services Commission investigation the Respondent provided a detailed response on 2 August 2021 in respect of the First Application and the Second Application, including:
1. Under the heading “first application” the Respondent states:

“I then telephoned and emailed QLS staff making enquiries regarding my intention to apply for a principal licence and how exactly to upgrade my employee practicing licence, I was provided with detailed instructions regarding my enquiry. I was not aware that anything that would hinder my application. I am not saying that it is anyone else’s responsibility to remind myself about my undertaking, but it would certainly be helpful.”^[89]

Under the heading “second application” the Respondent states:

“My undertaking was “not to apply for a principal licence on or before 30 June 2021”.^[90]At all times, my understanding of this undertaking is that I will not be allowed to apply for a principal licence to practise on or before 30 June 2021.

Pursuant to this understanding, when I received an email notification from QLS to renew licence which I must do before 30 June 2021, to avoid issues of my undertaking, I have specifically requested that the principal licence for practice commencing 1 July 2021. I do not consider it practical and truthful that I should purport to renew an employee’s licence commencing 1/7/2021 by 30 June 2021 and then apply for a principal licence on 1 July 2021.”^[91]

[132]
The response given to the Legal Services Commission is not consistent with the current contention that the discussion with the staff member of the QLS Records Department occurred in respect of the Second Application. Again, the justification for the Second Application was that it was in effect consistent with the Undertaking.
[133]
In the Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023^[92] the Respondent:
1. Expressly accepted the particulars in the disciplinary application.^[93]
2. Acknowledged that the Second Application breached the Undertaking.^[94]
3. Referred to “important contextual features” which include telephone calls with the QLS on 5 May 2021.
4. Specifically in relation to the discussion with a staff member of the QLS Records Department, the Respondent’s evidence relevantly includes:
  1. (i)
    “[The QLS staff member] suggested that I should complete my renewal, and I could seek that my certificate be upgraded from 1 July 2021”.^[95] (emphasis added)
  1. (ii)
    “Taking into account my discussion with the Society on 5 May 2021, I completed my online renewal application on about 19 May 2021. I requested my practising certificate be upgraded to take effect from 1 July 2021. I made this upgrade application with my undertaking in mind – but I acknowledge that it was without sufficient consideration of the specific wording of the undertaking”.^[96] (emphasis added)
  1. (iii)
    “As a side note, I had until recently believed I was told by the QLS staff member to utilise the “comments section” on the renewal form to identify my request that the upgrade only take effect from 1 July 2021. On reflection I recognise that I was unlikely correct in that recollection. On further reflection, I have been unable to identify a comments section in the Society’s record of my 19 May 2021 renewal application. Given that my (then) current practising certificate was due to expire on 30 June 2021, an that the renewed practising certificate was only to commence from 1 July 2021, on further reflection I now believe I was told I could apply for the upgrade now because an upgrade application would only take effect form 1 July 2021. I proceeded with the upgrade request – without specifying any particular comment about the commencement date – but comfortable that it was permissible because the upgraded certificate would not commence until 1 July 2021”.^[97]
  1. (iv)
    “At the time, I believed that I was doing the right thing. I believed that my application (to upgrade effective 1 July 2021) was permissible within the terms of my undertaking because I was only applying for a principal practising certificate to take effect from 1 July 2021.”^[98]
  1. (v)
    “I realise now and accept that the terms of the undertaking were not to apply for a principal practising certificate before 1 July 2021, not merely to not apply to hold one before 1 July 2021.”^[99]
[134]
The Respondent’s evidence in her affidavit is inconsistent in a number of respects with the submissions made at the hearing, including in relation to whether the Second Application breached the Undertaking.
[135]
The Respondent’s then lawyers, Gilshenan & Luton, provided a detailed response to the LSC on 14 July 2022.^[100] In respect of the Second Application, the response identifies the telephone records for the two calls to the staff of the QLS Ethics Centre. The response also outlines the discussion with the QLS Records Department. It is in this response that there is a reference to the “comments field”. In this response:
1. The Respondent justifies the Second Application on the basis of:
  1. (i)
    The discussion with the QLS staff member that it was “appropriate” to complete the practising certificate renewal and seek that her practising certificate be upgraded to a principal’s practising certificate from 1 July 2021. Further the Respondent was “informed that she should ensure she noted in the “comment field” that she wished for the upgrade to only take effect from 1 July 2021”.
  1. (ii)
    It “seemed sensible” to the Respondent as it would be “unnecessarily cumbersome” to renew and then make a further application “within two months”.
  1. (iii)
    But for the conversation with the QLS staff member she was not aware that a practising certificate upgrade “should be completed through the renewal process”.
  1. (iv)
    Further, but for the conversation with the QLS staff member, the Respondent had never previously utilised the “comments field” in a practising certificate renewal and would not have thought to do so had the QLS representative not advised her to use it to “make clear the upgrade request was to only take effect after 1 July 2021”.
2. Concludes in respect of the Second application that the Respondent had “a reasonable excuse for lodging [the Second Application] even where that may have been technically inconsistent with the terms of [the Undertaking].
[136]
Given the inconsistencies in the Respondent’s own explanations of her “justification” for the Second Application and the discussions with the staff member of the QLS Records Department the Tribunal is confronted with considerable doubt as to the precise discussions that the Respondent had with the staff member of the QLS Records Department. This is highlighted by the discrepancy in the evidence relating to the “comments field”. Given these inconsistencies, it is difficult to see how the Respondent’s submission that she acted “in strict accordance with the advice she received” is supported by the evidence.
[137]
Further, if the Second Application was truly made in reliance on the statement of the staff member of the QLS Records Department, this would rationally have been at the front of the Respondent’s mind when the QLS first contacted her in relation to the Second Application. The fact that the discussion was not promptly raised tends to support that the Second Application was not made in reliance on any such statement. While it is more probable than not that some discussion with a staff member of the QLS Records Department occurred, it is also more probable than not that the Respondent made the Second Application based on her “common sense” approach to the practising certificate renewal and request for an upgrade to a principal’s certificate.
[138]
Further, relevantly to Charge 2:
1. There is no evidence that the Respondent’s discussions with staff members of the QLS Ethics Centre or the QLS Records Department constituted a release from the Undertaking.
2. On the evidence in her affidavit, at its highest the Respondent’s evidence is that the staff member of the QLS Records Department suggested a procedure and the Respondent remained conscious of the Undertaking, but the Respondent did not give sufficient consideration to the terms of the Undertaking.
3. On the Respondent’s evidence in her affidavit, the Respondent accepts that the Second Application breached the Undertaking.^[101]
[139]
For the Tribunal to be satisfied that the LSC has proved the allegation in Charge 2 on the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal:
1. is required to take into account, among other things, the gravity of the matters alleged; and
2. there must be an ‘actual persuasion’ as to the occurrence of those matters before they can be accepted to be proved.
[140]
Considering all of the evidence and the gravity of the matters alleged, the Tribunal is satisfied to the appropriate level of satisfaction that the Respondent contravened the Undertaking by the Second Application.
[141]
Accordingly, the relevant facts in relation to Charge 2 have been proved, namely that on or about 19 May 2021 the Respondent contravened the Undertaking.

In respect of Charge 2, is the Respondent’s conduct properly characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct, professional misconduct or neither?

[142]
Having found the conduct proved in respect of Charge 2, it is necessary to consider the proper characterisation of the Respondent’s conduct.
[143]
The LSC relies on the principles outlined in respect of the characterisation of Charge 1 outlined above and submits that in respect of Charge 2 the conduct is properly characterised as professional misconduct.
[144]
The relevant factors relied upon by the LSC include:
1. The Second Application was made after the First Application and following the QLS reminding the Respondent of the terms of the Undertaking and the Respondent confirming her understanding of the terms of the Undertaking.
2. The terms of the Undertaking were unequivocal and not capable of being misinterpreted.
3. The Respondent now concedes there is no ambiguity in the Undertaking.
4. At the time of making the Second Application the Respondent had not been released by the QLS or a Court of competent jurisdiction.
5. The Second Application occurred in the context of:
  1. (i)
    the Respondent’s dealings with the QLS which resulted in her practising certificate being cancelled in 2019 as a result of her failure to comply with certain conditions on the practising certificate issued to her; and
  1. (ii)
    the email from Mr Smiley on behalf of the QLS on 19 March 2021 in relation to the First Application stating that the breach of the Undertaking would be referred to the Legal Services Commission and if there was a notice of complaint it was a suitability matter.^[102]
6. The Respondent has a lack of insight into the seriousness of breaching the Undertaking.
7. The evidence does not clearly establish what was discussed between the Respondent and the staff member of the QLS Records Department prior to the making of the Second Application. There are inconsistencies in the Respondent’s reliance on the discussions in contemporaneous correspondence, including what was the justification for the Second Application.
8. The Respondent has admitted to breaching the Undertaking by making the Second Application.
[145]
The LSC contends that there is not a sufficient reason to depart from the general proposition that breach of an undertaking given to a regulator/professional association should be characterised as professional misconduct, particularly where the conduct was repeated.
[146]
Conversely, the Respondent contends that to constitute professional misconduct the conduct must be substantial or consistent or such as to conclude that the person is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice and that has not been established here. The Respondent also seeks to distinguish the authorities regarding undertakings given to a regulator/professional association.
[147]
In respect of the Second Application, the Respondent relies on a justification for the Second Application in that the Respondent sought advice from the QLS as to how to proceed and then acted on that advice.
[148]
The difficulty with this submission is that:
1. the contemporaneous evidence is not consistent with that being the basis on which the Respondent made the Second Application; and
2. the evidence of the discussion with the staff member of the QLS Records Department is not conclusive.
[149]
The Respondent’s initial correspondence with the QLS after the Second Application did not refer to the discussions with the staff member of the QLS Records Department. It was more than four months later on 30 September 2021 that the Respondent first raised the discussions with the staff member of the QLS Records Department.^[103]
[150]
There are numerous inconsistencies in the evidence. An example is the evidence in respect of the “comments field” to be used to explain the circumstances. The Respondent’s evidence subsequently was that this was mistaken but it formed a key plank of an earlier explanation of not only the discussion with the QLS Records Department but the justification for the Second Application.
[151]
The evidence does not establish a release from the Undertaking. Further, the evidence does not establish that there was an error in respect of the Second Application. The Respondent was aware of the terms of the Undertaking (having been recently reminded of them following the First Application). The terms plainly imposed a temporal limitation on the making of an application, as opposed to the date the practising certificate was effective or operational.
[152]
Effectively, it appears the Respondent adopted a single process of renewing her employee practising certificate and upgrading to a principal certificate. Her justification was that proceeding in one process was “common sense”, rather than requiring an application to upgrade to a principal practising certificate within a short period of time. However, that was what was required by the plain terms of the Undertaking and pragmatism was not a justification for conduct which was otherwise a breach of the Undertaking.
[153]
The Tribunal accepts the factors identified by the LSC as being relevant to the proper characterisation of the Respondent’s conduct in respect of Charge 2. Of particular concern is that the Second Application was made relatively shortly after the First Application, where the Respondent had shown she understood the terms of the Undertaking.
[154]
Parts of subsequent correspondence with the QLS and the Legal Services Commission and the conduct of these proceedings evidences a lack of insight by the Respondent as to the significance of an undertaking, and in particular an undertaking to the regulator.
[155]
In particular, the Respondent’s public interest submissions to the Legal Services Commission on 27 April 2022 attempt to retrospectively re-classify the Undertaking as an “agreement” between the QLS and the Respondent. The Respondent expressly states that she adopted the word “undertaking” as it was referred to by Mr Smiley. This is inconsistent with the Undertaking being a precondition to the grant of the employee practising certificate and effectively seeks to undervalue the promise that the Respondent gave to the QLS in 2019.^[104] This alone evidences serious lack of insight as to the significance of the Undertaking but also the regulatory scheme including Rule 6.1 of the ASCR.
[156]
The Respondent’s conduct falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency.
[157]
Further, the Plaintiff’s conduct is of such a substantial departure from the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner that the Tribunal is satisfied that the conduct amounts to professional misconduct.
[158]
Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that Charge 2 is appropriately characterised as professional misconduct pursuant to s 419(1)(a)^[105] of the LP Act and finds that the conduct identified in respect of Charge 2 in the discipline application constitutes professional misconduct.

If the Respondent’s conduct is found to be unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, what are the appropriate orders pursuant to s 456 of the LP Act?

[159]
Having made the findings as to professional misconduct, the discretion in s 456 of the LP Act arises.
[160]
Section 456 of the LP Act states:

“456 Decisions of tribunal about an Australian legal practitioner

If, after the tribunal has completed a hearing of a discipline application in relation to a complaint or an investigation matter against an Australian legal practitioner, the tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the tribunal may make any order as it thinks fit, including any 1 or more of the orders stated in this section.
The tribunal may, under this subsection, make 1 or more of the following in a way it considers appropriate—

an order recommending that the name of the Australian legal practitioner be removed from the local roll;
an order that the practitioner’s local practising certificate be suspended for a stated period or cancelled;
an order that a local practising certificate not be granted to the practitioner before the end of a stated period;
an order that—

imposes stated conditions on the practitioner’s practising certificate granted or to be issued under this Act; and

imposes the conditions for a stated period; and

specifies the time, if any, after which the practitioner may apply to the tribunal for the conditions to be amended or removed;

an order publicly reprimanding the practitioner or, if there are special circumstances, privately reprimanding the practitioner;
an order that no law practice in this jurisdiction may, for a period stated in the order of not more than 5 years—

employ or continue to employ the practitioner in a law practice in this jurisdiction; or

employ or continue to employ the practitioner in this jurisdiction unless the conditions of employment are subject to conditions stated in the order.

(3)
The tribunal may, under this subsection, make 1 or more of the following—

an order recommending that the name of the Australian legal practitioner be removed under a corresponding law from an interstate roll;
an order recommending that the practitioner’s interstate practising certificate be suspended for a stated period or cancelled under a corresponding law;
an order recommending that an interstate practising certificate not be, under a corresponding law, granted to the practitioner until the end of a stated period;
an order recommending—

that stated conditions be imposed on the practitioner’s interstate practising certificate; and

that the conditions be imposed for a stated period; and

a stated time, if any, after which the practitioner may apply to the tribunal for the conditions to be amended or removed.

The tribunal may, under this subsection, make 1 or more of the following—

an order that the Australian legal practitioner pay a penalty of a stated amount, not more than $100,000;
a compensation order;
an order that the practitioner undertake and complete a stated course of further legal education;
an order that, for a stated period, the practitioner engage in legal practice under supervision as stated in the order;
an order that the practitioner do or refrain from doing something in connection with the practitioner engaging in legal practice;
an order that the practitioner stop accepting instructions as a public notary in relation to notarial services;
an order that engaging in legal practice by the practitioner is to be managed for a stated period in a stated way or subject to stated conditions;
an order that engaging in legal practice by the practitioner is to be subject to periodic inspection by a person nominated by the relevant regulatory authority for a stated period;
an order that the practitioner seek advice from a stated person in relation to the practitioner’s management of engaging in legal practice;
an order that the practitioner must not apply for a local practising certificate for a stated period.

To remove any doubt, it is declared that the tribunal may make any number of orders mentioned in any or all of subsections (2), (3) and (4).
Also, the tribunal may make ancillary orders, including an order for payment by the Australian legal practitioner of expenses associated with orders under subsection (4), as assessed in or under the order or as agreed.
The tribunal may find a person has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct even though the discipline application alleged professional misconduct.”

[161]
The discretion to make any order the Tribunal thinks fit is a wide discretion and is exercised primarily in the protection of the public.^[106] Principles of personal and general deterrence are also relevant.^[107]
[162]
The maintenance and enforcement of proper standards in the profession is a further aim. Accordingly, it is relevant to consider the need to deter other practitioners from engaging in similar conduct and also to protect the public by enforcing standards upon which the public can rely.^[108]
[163]
The purposes of orders made under s 456 of the LP Act include “the preservation of the good standing of the legal profession and of the Roll as the Court’s endorsement of the fitness of those enrolled.”^[109]
[164]
In the particular circumstances of this case, the relevant objectives include:
1. to maintain and enforce proper standards in the profession;
2. personal deterrence for the Respondent; and
3. general deterrence by reminding practitioners that they must exercise care and vigilance in respect of complying with undertakings given in the course of legal practice, particularly to a regulator/professional association.
[165]
The LSC contends for orders as follows:
1. The Respondent be publicly reprimanded.
2. The Respondent be prohibited from applying for, or obtaining, a principal level practising certificate for a period of two years from the date of the Tribunal’s order.
3. The Respondent complete the QLS Remedial Ethics Course within 12 months of the Tribunal’s order, at her own expense.^[110]
4. The Respondent complete, at her own expense, the QLS Practice Management Course within the 12 months prior to any application for a principal level practising certificate.
5. The Respondent must include a copy of the Tribunal’s order and reasons in any application for a practising certificate in any Australian jurisdiction for a five-year period from the date of the order of the Tribunal.
6. The Respondent must include a copy of the Tribunal’s order and reasons, together with evidence of completing the QLS Remedial Ethics Course and the QLS Practice Management Course, when the Respondent first re-applies for a principal level practising certificate.
[166]
The Respondent contends, if relevant findings are made for the purpose of s 456 of the LP Act, then the following applies:
1. A sanction should be no more than a public reprimand.
2. The sanction may include the QLS Remedial Ethics Course, which the Respondent would do. However, the Respondent’s position is that she has learnt her lesson so the completion of this course would add nothing to the protection of the public.
3. Re-completing the QLS Practice Management Course is inappropriate and is “out of all proportion”.
4. A further two-year prohibition on applying for a principal practising certificate is also wholly out of proportion to the conduct charged. This would be an effective prohibition from being a principal for about five years. It would not protect the public and would punish the Respondent for conduct in respect of which she has already been sanctioned.
5. If the Tribunal was minded to order a further prohibition on holding a principal’s practising certificate, the period could be a further one year.
6. An order in respect of including material in any application in other Australian states is “overkill”. In any event, the obligations of disclosure in the uniform provisions would apply and offer protection to the extent necessary.
7. The Respondent would include a copy of the Tribunal’s order and reasons, together with evidence of completing any necessary courses ordered by the Tribunal, when the Respondent first re-applies for a principal level practising certificate. Accordingly, an order of that nature would give certainty and is not objected to.
[167]
The factors relevant to sanction include the level of insight and co-operation shown by the Respondent, as well as the conduct of the proceedings themselves. The LSC and the Respondent diverge on these factors.
[168]
The LSC identifies that the Respondent is an experienced practitioner and had been practising for about 13 years at the time of the charged conduct. Further, the LSC submits that the evidence establishes that the Respondent has failed to adequately appreciate the seriousness of the breaches of the Undertaking.
[169]
The LSC properly accepts that there is no evidence to support a finding that the Respondent’s breaches of the Undertaking were deliberate and the Respondent has since the discipline application was filed recognised that the conduct fell short of the appropriate standard and that she was remorseful and embarrassed.^[111] Further, the LSC does acknowledge that the Respondent offered a further undertaking not to apply for a principal practising certificate until 30 June 2023 and to undertake QLS courses prior to the commencement of the discipline application.
[170]
The LSC contends that while the Respondent says she has learnt her lesson, the conduct of the proceedings says otherwise. In this regard, the LSC points to:
1. The various changes in the Respondent’s position, including the positions reflected in the Initial Response, the Amended Response, the affidavit of the Respondent, the Respondent’s submissions and the Further Amended Response, together with the concession at the hearing.^[112]
2. The Respondent’s application to strikeout parts of the discipline application and affidavit of Craig Smiley, which resulted in the order of the Tribunal dismissing the application.^[113]
3. The application to amend the Respondent’s position to that reflected in the Further Amended Response and the orders of Mellifont J dated 16 January 2024.
4. The further change in respect of Charge 1 that the conduct was neither unsatisfactory professional conduct, nor professional misconduct.^[114]
5. The further change at the hearing that the Respondent did not press the arguments that the wording of the Undertaking was ambiguous or the Respondent’s subjective understanding of the Undertaking.
[171]
The Respondent contends that the request for a release from the Undertaking in respect of the Charge 1 is not reflective of a lack of insight but was a legal process available. Further, the Respondent contends that running a defence is not reflective of a lack of insight or a failure to cooperate. The Respondent points to the Respondent’s affidavit as supporting insight and remorse.
[172]
The difficulty with the factors of insight, remorse and cooperation is that this discipline application has become more complex over time given the change in position of the Respondent, which has given rise to some inconsistencies between the evidence^[115] and the submissions. Given this, it is difficult to accept that the Respondent truly understands the magnitude and seriousness of a contravention of an undertaking to the QLS about a practising certificate: the very licence to undertake the practice of the law and to hold oneself out as a solicitor.
[173]
To maintain the argument that a breach of such an undertaking, particularly in light of the clear provision in Rule 6.1 of the ASCR, is a “mere slip” gives rise to doubt as to whether the Respondent does in fact have real insight.
[174]
The conduct of the proceeding by the Respondent is also a relevant factor. The changing position of the Respondent has already been addressed previously in these reasons. It is also relevant that the Respondent applied to have paragraphs of the discipline affidavit and the affidavit of Mr Smiley struck out as irrelevant, prejudicial and involving an abuse of process because they were scandalous and irrelevant.
[175]
The Respondent’s application was heard after the LSC’s primary submissions had been provided. The Tribunal dismissed the application in Legal Services Commissioner v Li.^[116] Whilst the Tribunal did have power to strikeout parts of the discipline application and supporting affidavit to the extent that the paragraphs were frivolous, vexatious or misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process, there was no basis to do so in this matter. The Respondent also raised a jurisdictional issue, which was also dismissed by the Tribunal.
[176]
While the Respondent has the right to bring such applications, this may be relevant to the consideration of insight and remorse. This is particularly so when the argument on the application appeared to seek to distance the context in which the Undertaking was given from the discipline application in respect of the alleged contraventions of the Undertaking. The Undertaking, as demonstrated in these reasons, fell to be considered in the context of it being given and also the context of the alleged breaches.
[177]
In all of the circumstances, in considering the appropriate sanction, minimal weight should be given to the statement of the Respondent at [56] of her affidavit that she now understands the gravity of entering into undertakings and the ramifications and consequences of breaching undertakings.
[178]
Given the changing nature of the response of the Respondent to the discipline application, a finding of genuine remorse by the Respondent is also not without difficulty. In her affidavit, the Respondent does state that she is embarrassed and recognises that it was “stupid”. Further, the Respondent does acknowledge that she regrets her failures as a legal professional. This is some evidence of remorse.
[179]
However, the arguments that there was no real likelihood of any loss or damage to any third party (and has been no loss or damage to a third party) and that the QLS could and did monitor compliance, fail to recognise the potential damage to the legal profession consequent upon a legal practitioner failing to honour an undertaking. This forms part of the wider matrix in the ASCR, including not bringing the profession into disrepute and the paramount duty to the Court and the administration of justice.
[180]
Further, some of the Respondent’s statements are in the nature of an attempt to excuse or justify the conduct. For example:
1. “… I have overlooked the period limitation of my previous undertakings amongst my busy schedule”;^[117]
2. “having genuinely forgotten the time limit condition of granting me the license at the time”;^[118] and
3. “I am very astonished to receive your email of the allegation. I do not believe your allegation is reasonable”.^[119]
[181]
It is also relevant in respect of Charge 2 that the Respondent did not raise in the initial response to the QLS that she had had discussions with someone from the QLS Records Department. The Respondent raised that subsequently, and without any real details. Whilst the Respondent originally contended this amounted to a release from the Undertaking that was ultimately not established on the evidence.
[182]
To the extent that the discussions with someone from the QLS Records Department are relied upon by the Respondent, they cannot and do not excuse or justify the Respondent’s conduct. The Respondent gave the Undertaking and clearly understood its unambiguous terms as reflected in her emails following the First Application. A competent and diligent legal practitioner mindful of the Undertaking and the importance of complying with an undertaking given to the regulator/professional association would have reflected further on the timing of the Second Application, notwithstanding any discussions with a staff member at the QLS Records Department.
[183]
In all of the circumstances, in considering the appropriate sanction, minimal weight should be given to the statements of the Respondent at [52] to [58] of her affidavit to the extent that they are relied upon to show genuine remorse.
[184]
Given the finding of professional misconduct in respect of Charges 1 and 2 and balancing the various factors in all of the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that the appropriate orders include a period of suspension.
[185]
An order that a legal practitioner be suspended from legal practice may be structured in two ways under s 456(2) of the LP Act, namely:
1. section 456(2)(b): an order that the practitioner’s local practising certificate be suspended for a stated period or cancelled.
2. section 456(2)(c): an order that a local practising certificate not be granted to the practitioner before the end of a stated period.
[186]
The Respondent’s principal’s practising certificate was cancelled effective from 3 April 2019 and the Respondent was subsequently granted an employee practising certificate with conditions (including the Undertaking) from 1 July 2019. While the effect of the Undertaking signed on 21 June 2019 was that the Respondent could not apply for a principal practising certificate for a period of just over two years, the Respondent has been unable to hold a principal’s practising certificate for an effective period of over five years.
[187]
In the circumstances where the period in the Undertaking has come to an end and there has been a substantial intervening period, an order in the form of s 456(2)(c) of the LP Act is the most appropriate structure. It also avoids any potential uncertainty in respect of the cumulative effect of the order by providing a temporal limitation on a grant of a practising certificate.
[188]
Accordingly, the Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to order that the Respondent not be granted a principal practising certificate before 1 September 2025. This includes a further period from the date of the Tribunal orders and takes into account the period in which the Respondent has been unable to hold a principal’s practising certificate.
[189]
An order publicly reprimanding the practitioner may be imposed pursuant to s 456(2)(e) of the LP Act. The Respondent concedes that a public reprimand is an appropriate order.
[190]
The impact of a public reprimand has been recognised previously by the Tribunal. In Legal Services Commissioner v Challen,^[120] the Tribunal said:

“[39]
First, there will be an order that the respondent be publicly reprimanded. The respondent conceded that this was an appropriate order in this case. The impact of such an order being made cannot be understated, particularly when it is made against a practitioner of significant seniority and an otherwise unblemished professional record. As this Tribunal has previously said:^[121]

The making of a public reprimand is a serious step by the Tribunal and not one which should be taken or regarded lightly. The public reprimand is and will continue to be a permanent public blemish on the respondent’s professional record. It is and will continue to stand as a permanent reminder to the respondent, to the profession and to the public at large that there are adverse personal consequences when one engages in professional misconduct of this kind.”

[191]
In the current case, an order that the Respondent be publicly reprimanded is appropriate.
[192]
An order that a legal practitioner must undertake a course such as a QLS Remedial Ethics Course may be ordered pursuant to s 456(4)(c) of the LP Act. Such an order is directed at both the protection of the public and maintaining professional standards.
[193]
The QLS Remedial Ethics Course is a refresher course run by the QLS that includes an opportunity for focussed reflections on particular topics covered in the course. Given the particular conduct here of compliance with undertakings, particularly in the context of the obligations in the ASCR, a focus on that topic would meet the objectives of the protection of the public and maintaining professional standards.
[194]
An order that a legal practitioner attend the QLS Remedial Ethics Course at her own expense is appropriate.
[195]
Given the Respondent will not have practiced as a principal for an effective five-year period, the Respondent should be required to undertake the QLS Practice Management Course again in relation to obtaining a principal’s practising certificate. Rule 31 of the QLS Administration Rule 2005 arguably requires the Respondent to undertake the QLS Practice Management Course again as part of any application for a principal’s practising certificate.
[196]
To provide certainty in this regard, the Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to make an order requiring the Respondent to complete the QLS Practice Management Course prior to being granted a principal’s practising certificate and that the Respondent undertake the course at her own expense.
[197]
Section 456(4)(a) of the LP Act provides that the Tribunal may make “an order that the Australian legal practitioner pay a penalty of a stated amount, not more than $100,000.” The payment of a pecuniary penalty is directed at general deterrence rather than as a punishment.
[198]
Neither party contended that a monetary penalty was appropriate or necessary. By the orders above, the Respondent will be liable for the costs of registration to attend both the QLS Remedial Ethics Couse and the QLS Practice Management Course. In these circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that the totality of the orders does not warrant the imposition of a pecuniary penalty in addition to the other orders, which are directed at the particular conduct and risks, taking into account both personal and general deterrence.
[199]
In respect of the proposed order that the Respondent must include a copy of the Tribunal’s order and reasons in any application for a practising certificate in any Australian jurisdiction for a five-year period from the date of the order of the Tribunal, this is adequately covered in the disclosure obligations in the legislative scheme. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that it is appropriate to make this proposed order.
[200]
The Respondent does not oppose an order that the Respondent must include a copy of the Tribunal’s order and reasons, together with evidence of completing the QLS Remedial Ethics Course and the QLS Practice Management Course, when the Respondent first re-applies for a principal level practising certificate. An order of this nature provides some certainty as to what is required in respect of the Respondent applying for a principal practising certificate. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to make that order.

What is the appropriate order as to costs?

[201]
Section 462(1) of the LP Act states:

“462 Costs

A disciplinary body must make an order requiring a person whom it has found to have engaged in prescribed conduct to pay costs, including costs of the commissioner and the complainant, unless the disciplinary body is satisfied exceptional circumstances exist.”

[202]
The Respondent submits that there ought to be no order as to costs having regard to the role of the QLS in the Second Application. The Respondent’s position is that the QLS staff member played a “causative role” in the Respondent’s error as discussed in Legal Services Commissioner v XBV.^[122] Further, the Respondent contends that this constitutes “exceptional circumstances” pursuant to s 462 of the LP Act allowing the Tribunal to depart from the usual position as to costs.
[203]
In response to this submission, the LSC contends that “exceptional circumstances” are not established on the facts to justify a departure from the ordinary order as to costs. In particular:
1. The evidence of the Respondent as to her interaction with the QLS Records team member is that it was “suggested” that the Respondent “could” seek that her certificate be upgraded from 1 July 2021.^[123] That is, the Respondent was not told to make the Second Application.
2. The Second Application was within the Respondent’s control and is to be considered in light of her objective understanding that the Undertaking prohibited an application before 1 July 2021.^[124]
[204]
In Legal Services Commissioner v XBV^[125]:
1. The respondent argued there should be no order as to costs on the basis of “exceptional circumstances” as:

“…the failure by the applicant’s agent to appreciate the significance of the reference to certain documents which … played a key role in the circumstances which led to the respondent’s errors”.^[126]

The applicant submitted that conduct of the applicant or agent of the applicant could only be exceptional circumstances if it was causative of the respondent’s error. It was contended that it was not causative as:

“[t]he relevant material was in the respondent’s brief, and he had a duty to exercise an independent judgment on the basis of it.”^[127]

[205]
Ultimately, the Tribunal found that the applicant’s agent played a causative role in the respondent’s errors but acknowledged that the role played by the applicant’s agent was “highly unusual” and consequently did amount to “exceptional circumstances”.^[128]
[206]
The relevant facts in Legal Services Commissioner v XBV include:
1. The charges related to statements made by the respondent barrister without reasonable grounds for believing that the factual material available to the respondent provided a proper basis for them.
2. The respondent failed to read with sufficient care all the material briefed to him. It was not contentious that the respondent had a duty to master the brief and to exercise independent judgment in relation to the matter.
3. The respondent had instructions for making the statements which were the subject of the charges.
4. If the respondent had exercised reasonable competence and diligence, he would have realised the instructions were in error.
5. The failure to detect a fundamental document which demonstrated the instructions on a critical point were wrong, when the existence and effect of the document was pointed out in the opponent’s material, would seem to be a substantial failure to maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, so as to be professional misconduct.
6. However, the role of the instructing solicitor complicated the issue. Consequently, the parties submitted that the conduct was unsatisfactory professional conduct.
[207]
The reference to “applicant’s agent” in the paragraphs of the reasons dealing with costs uses different terminology to the earlier part of the reasons. The applicant in that case was the LSC and if it was an agent of the LSC that was the instructing solicitor who gave the instructions that is not entirely clear.
[208]
If that is the intended meaning of the reasons, then in that case the instructions of the agent were more directly causative of the relevant conduct than here. At best, here the evidence was that a procedure was identified by someone at the QLS and then the Respondent made the Second Application in the circumstances outlined previously in these reasons.
[209]
The Court of Appeal decision in Pennisi v Legal Services Commissioner^[129] considered the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in s 462 of the LP Act in the context of the LSC being successful on one charge but unsuccessful on another where the conduct related to separate conduct in respect of two clients. The Court ultimately determined costs on the basis of the mixed success by the interpretation of s 462 to focus on the outcome of the individual complaints.
[210]
That issue does not arise here as the two charges have been found proven and also both found to constitute professional misconduct. However, the Court of Appeal’s comments in respect of “exceptional circumstances” are relevant.
[211]
The Chief Justice^[130] commented in regard to “exceptional circumstances” as follows:
1. At [57]: “What might constitute “exceptional circumstances” is a matter of fact, to be determined on a case by case basis, and not capable of definition.^[131] It requires a qualitative assessment,^[132] directing attention to what it is, about the circumstances of the case, which would justify departure from the rule articulated in s 462(1). The rule that, where a practitioner has been found to have engaged in “prescribed conduct”, they must pay the costs of the proceeding, is justified by the fact that the Commissioner brings the proceeding in the public interest, to further the interests of the administration of justice and for the protection of consumers of services of the legal profession and the public generally. In order to displace that rule, something qualitatively “exceptional” is required.”
2. At [59]: in Legal Services Commissioner v Doyle^[133] exceptional circumstances was found where there was “extraordinary delay” in the prosecution of the matter, which had a “devasting” impact on the practitioner. The delay in that case justified “a refusal to further burden [the practitioner] with an order as to costs.”
3. At [60]: Legal Services Commissioner v O'Connor (No 2)^[134] is a further example where the charge at the hearing was different in terms and particulars from that when the application was commenced. Consequently, costs were wasted by both parties and this was sufficient to found exceptional circumstances. The rule was displaced and the practitioner was order to pay two-thirds of the Commissioner’s costs.
4. At [62]: “I do not accept, as a matter of principle, that the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in s 462(1) is appropriately informed by the meaning given to that concept in the context of the broader discretion to award costs in other contexts. As this Court held in Baker and McQuaid, s 462(1) is not designed to confer or preserve the broader discretion over costs commonly found in other statutory provisions. The context and purpose of the provision is quite different. Whereas costs provision such as r 681 UCPR have a compensatory purpose,^[135] the purpose of s 462(1) is protective – of the Commissioner^[136] - which justifies a narrower approach to what might be “exceptional” than might apply in the course of a general costs discretion.”
5. At [64]: in respect of charge 2 no exceptional circumstances were established to displace the mandatory rule under s 462(1).
[212]
Considering the particular circumstances here:
1. The LSC has been successful on both Charge 1 and Charge 2.
2. In respect of Charge 1, nothing is raised that is potentially “exceptional circumstances”, so the mandatory costs rule should apply in respect of Charge 1.
3. In respect of Charge 2, the Respondent’s discussion with an unidentified person at the QLS Records Department prior to making the Second Application is raised as a potential basis to find “exceptional circumstances”.
4. The involvement of someone from the QLS Records Department prior to the Second Application is distinct from the involvement of an agent of the LSC, as appears to have been the case in Legal Services Commissioner v XBV.^[137]
5. Further, the involvement of someone from the QLS Records Department prior to the Second Application was not directly causative of the breach of the Undertaking as discussed previously in these reasons in respect of Charge 2.
[213]
In respect of Charge 2, in all of the circumstances, no exceptional circumstances are established that justify a departure from an order in accordance with s 462(1) of the LP Act.
[214]
Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to order that the Respondent pay the LSC’s costs of and incidental to the disciplinary application to be assessed.
[215]
For the purpose of s 462(5)(b) of the LP Act, it is appropriate that costs be assessed on the standard basis as if this were a proceeding before the Supreme Court of Queensland.

Orders

[216]
For the reasons stated above, the Tribunal orders that:

The Respondent’s conduct identified in respect of each of Charges 1 and 2 in the discipline application is found to constitute professional misconduct.
The Respondent is publicly reprimanded.
The Respondent not be granted a principal practising certificate before 1 September 2025.
The Respondent complete the QLS Remedial Ethics Course within 12 months of the Tribunal’s order, at her own expense.
The Respondent complete, at her own expense, the QLS Practice Management Course within 12 months prior to any application for a principal practising certificate.
The Respondent must include a copy of the Tribunal’s order and reasons, together with evidence of completing the QLS Remedial Ethics Course and the QLS Practice Management Course, when the Respondent first re-applies for a principal practising certificate.
The Respondent pay the LSC’s costs of and incidental to the discipline application, to be assessed on the standard basis as if this were a proceeding before the Supreme Court of Queensland.

Footnotes

[1] The Further Amended Response was filed on 31 January 2024. The contention that the terms of the Undertaking were ambiguous was expressly conceded at the hearing: See T 1-12 line 9 to T1-13 line 45.

[2] At the hearing it was agreed that this reference to the “undertaking” should be read as a reference to the First Application.

[3] The Further Amended Response was filed following orders of Mellifont J, President of QCAT, dated 16 January 2024. These directions were made after the decision of Williams J on 3 October 2023 in relation to the Respondent’s application to strikeout parts of the discipline application and affidavit of Mr Smiley. See LSC v Li [2023] QCAT 383.

[4] Initial Response filed 4 October 2022; Amended Response to Discipline Application filed 28 April 2023; Further Amended Response to Discipline Application filed on 31 January 2024 and Submissions on behalf of the Respondent filed on 3 June 2024.

[5] See the affidavit of Respondent sworn 31 January 2023 at [16] and [29], Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[6] Applicant’s submissions at [5] and supplementary submissions at [5].

[7] The term “relevant law” is defined in Schedule 2 of the LP Act to mean “this Act” and see also s 1 of the LP Act.

[8] Section 420(1)(a) of the LP Act includes a note that a contravention in relation to the LP Act, includes a contravention of a regulation or legal profession rules.

[9] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [18] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book. That is, it would be a principal practising certificate for the balance of the financial year up to 30 June 2021.

[10] At [14] Amended SOAFID. At [7] of the Further Amended Response the Respondent “admits that on or about 12 March 2021 she contravened an undertaking”.

[11] Exhibit “CS-13” to the Affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[12] This is a change from the Further Amended Response where the Respondent expressly accepted that Charge 1 “constitutes a proper basis for a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct”. The LSC’s Supplementary Submissions dated 27 February 2024 reflect that at that time it was thought that the issue in respect of Charge 1 was whether it was professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct. The LSC’s Submissions in Reply dated 14 June 2024, which respond to the Respondent’s submissions dated 2 June 2024, identify that the Respondent’s position had changed such that the Respondent was contending, in effect, that the conduct was neither professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct.

[13] Tab 6 of Exhibit 1.

[14] Which are admitted as preliminary factual matters in the Amended SOAFID.

[15] Affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[16] See Exhibit “CS-11” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 December 2022 at Tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book, that this statement has been selected in the completion of the form.

[17] And the Second Application.

[18] The response also identified that the Respondent had telephoned and emailed QLS staff making enquires regarding her intention to apply for an upgrade and was provided with detailed instructions. There is no other evidence of these enquiries, in contrast to the Second Application. The Respondent’s affidavit does not refer to the telephone and email enquiries in respect of the First Application.

[19] The references to the applicant in the Further Amended Response at [9(a) to (g)] logically should be understood as references to the Respondent.

[20] Affidavit of the Respondent sworn 31 January 2023 at [29] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[21] Legal Services Commissioner v Wrightway Legal [2015] QCAT 174 at [26] per Thomas J.

[22] Legal Services Commissioner v Bui [2018] QCAT 424 at [16] per Daubney J.

[23] [2012] WASCA 214.

[24] [2018] QCAT 424.

[25] [2010] NSWADT 48.

[26] [2019] NSWCATOD 194.

[27] Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214 at [48]–[54] and Law Society of New South Wales v Thompson [2018] NSWCATOD 57 at [4] and [9].

[28] Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214 at [52] and Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Fisher [2021] NSWCATOD 73 at [104] and [143].

[29] [2018] QCAT 424.

[30] [2015] QCAT 174.

[31] [2019] NSWCATOD 24.

[32] [2021] NSWCATOD 73.

[33] [2015] NSWCATOD 71.

[34] [2018] QCAT 424.

[35] [2020] NSWCATOD 67.

[36] [2018] NSWCATOD 57.

[37] [2021] NSWCATOD 73.

[38] [2019] NSWCATOD 24.

[39] [2019] NSWCATOD 100.

[40] Law Society of New South Wales v Waterhouse [2002] NSWADT 204.

[41] Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Fisher [2021] NSWCATOD 73.

[42] Law Society of New South Wales v Waterhouse [2002] NSWADT 204.

[43] Law Society of New South Wales v Konstantinidis [2019] NSWCATOD 104.

[44] See Respondent’s written submissions at [6(b)- (d)] at tab 1 of the Supplementary Hearing Book (in Exhibit 1 Hearing Book).

[45] See Respondent’s written submissions at [6(e)] at Tab 1 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[46] Legal Services Commissioner v Laylee [2016] QCAT 237,[31]–[36] and [42]–[44].

[47] Exhibit “CS-21” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022, at 191 at tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[48] Section 420(3) of the LP Act.

[49] And s 420(1)(a) of the LP Act.

[50] With the then current unrestricted employee practising certificate expiring on 30 June 2021.

[51] Exhibit “CS-14” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022, Tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[52] Exhibit “CS-15” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022, Tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[53] Exhibit “CS-15” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[54] Exhibit “CS-16” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[55] Exhibit “CS-17” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022, Tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[56] The reference to the Applicant at [17] of the Amended Response is to be understood as the Respondent.

[57] Filed pursuant to the orders of Mellifont J dated 16 January 2024 and addressing the Further Amended Response.

[58] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[59] Applicant’s Supplementary Submissions dated 27 February 2024.

[60] Exhibit “CS-12” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 December 2022 at Tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[61] Affidavit of Grace van Baarle sworn 23 February 2023 at [5] at tab 10 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[62] Affidavit of Grace van Baarle sworn 23 February 2023 at [5] and Exhibit “GVB-1”at tab 10 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[63] Affidavit of Rachael Leeding sworn 24 February 2023, at [6] at tab 11 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book. The evidence is also that the Respondent could have elected for any telephone conversation with the QLS Records Department to be recorded.

[64] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023, at [39]–[47] at tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[65] Affidavit of Rachael Leeding sworn 24 February 2023 at [2], at Tab 11of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[66] See Respondent’s Submissions dated 2 June 2024.

[67] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023, at [35] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[68] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023, at [36] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[69] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023, at [36] and [38] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[70] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023, at [37] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[71] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [39] and Exhibit “XL-01” at tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[72] For example, the Respondent has not established that the relevant QLS staff member was authorised to give a release from the Undertaking. The Respondent’s affidavit evidence does not support a finding that there was a release from the Undertaking.

[73] See affidavit of Rachael Leeding sworn 24 February 2023 at [5(a)] at tab 11 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book, and Applicant’s Supplementary Submissions dated 27 February 2024 at [32(e)] (added to tab 1 of the Exhibit 1 Hearing Book).

[74] And the potential consequences.

[75] (1938) 60 CLR 336.

[76] (1988) 166 CLR 69.

[77] (1938) 60 CLR 336.

[78] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362.

[79] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362-363.

[80] (2023) 97 ALJR 857; [2023] HCA 32.

[81] Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521.

[82] Whether at common law or pursuant to s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857 at 875; [2023] HCA 32 at [57].

[83] Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521, citing, amongst other cases, Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362.

[84] GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857 at 875; [2023] HCA 32 at [57].

[85] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361.

[86] Brown v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian (2012) 10 ASTLR 164 at [51].

[87] Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 at 5.

[88] GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857 at 875; [2023] HCA 32 at [57].

[89] Affidavit of Caroline Jane Snell sworn 16 December 2022 at [7] and Exhibit “CJS-1” at tab 11 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[90] Note, this is not the Undertaking. The Undertaking was “not make an application for a solicitor’s Principal Practi[s]ing Certificate before 1 July 2021”.

[91] Affidavit of Caroline Jane Snell sworn 16 December 2022, at [7] and Exhibit “CJS-1” at tab 11 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[92] At Tab 8 of the Hearing Book.

[93] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [31] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[94] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [32] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[95] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [42] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[96] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [46] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[97] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [47] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[98] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [49] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[99] Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at [51] at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[100] Exhibit “XL-03” to the Respondent’s affidavit sworn 31 January 2023 at Tab 8 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[101] Contrary to what was submitted at the hearing and in the written submissions.

[102] Exhibit “CS-12” to the affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at Tab 6 of exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[103] Exhibit “CS-18” to the Affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at 125-220, at tab 6 of Exhibit 1 Hearing Book: emails sent by the Respondent on 15 June, 24 June and 30 September 2021.

[104] Affidavit of Caroline Jane Snell sworn 16 December 2022 at [14] and Exhibit “CJS-7” at tab 7 of exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[105] And s 420(1)(a) of the LP Act.

[106] Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No. 2) [2009] 1 Qd R 149 at [122].

[107] Attorney-General v Bax [1999] 2 Qd R 9, 22.

[108] Legal Services Commissioner v Wrightway Legal [2015] QCAT 174 at [28].

[109] Legal Services Commissioner v Shand [2018] QCA 66 at [58].

[110] This form of order was proposed at the hearing, rather than the form of order contained in the Applicant’s written submissions at [76(c)].

[111] At least in respect of Charge 1. It is less clear whether this can operate in respect of Charge 2.

[112] T1-31 line 36 to T1-32 line 16.

[113] Legal Services Commissioner v Li [2023] QCAT 383.

[114] Reflected in the Respondent’s written submissions.

[115] In particular contemporaneous evidence.

[116] [2023] QCAT 383.

[117] Affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022, Exhibit “CS-12”, at Tab 6 of exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[118] Affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at [32] and Exhibit “CS-15”, at Tab 6 of exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[119] Affidavit of Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 at [32] and Exhibit “CS-15”, at Tab 6 of exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[120] [2019] QCAT 273.

[121] Legal Services Commissioner v Brown [2018] QCAT 263 at [42].

[122] [2018] QCAT 332 at [52].

[123] Affidavit of the Respondent at [42], at Tab 8 of exhibit 1 Hearing Book.

[124] See contemporaneous emails as outlined at [43(s) and (u)] above.

[125] [2018] QCAT 332. The full reasons of the Tribunal were only published to the parties. A modified version of the reasons was published.

[126] Legal Services Commissioner v XBV [2018] QCAT 332 at [50].

[127] Legal Services Commissioner v XBV [2018] QCAT 332 at [51].

[128] Legal Services Commissioner v XBV [2018] QCAT 332 at [52].

[129] [2023] QCA 234.

[130] With whom Dalton JA and Kelly J agreed.

[131] See Attorney-General (Qld) v Francis (2008) 250 ALR 555 at 577 [92] per Mackenzie AJA (Fryberg J agreeing), in the context of the phrase “exceptional circumstances” in s 21(4) of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003, applied to s 462(1) in Legal Services Commissioner v Scott (No 2) [2009] LPT 9 at [19] (Fryberg J).

[132] See, by analogy, R v Yaroslavceff [2022] SASCA 123 at [71] per Doyle JA.

[133] [2021] QCAT 347 at [54]–[56].

[134] [2006] LPT 002.

[135] Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at 97.

[136] Legal Services Commissioner v McQuaid (2019) 1 QR 499 at [26].

[137] [2018] QCAT 332.

Editorial Notes

Published Case Name:
Legal Services Commissioner v Li
Shortened Case Name:
Legal Services Commissioner v Li
MNC:
[2024] QCAT 444
Court:
QCAT
Judge(s):
Justice Williams
Date:
16 Oct 2024

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited List of Cases Cited by this judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Attorney-General v Bax	[1999] 2 Qd R 9	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [1999] 2 Qd R 9 Cite 2 - [1999] 2 Qd R 9
Attorney-General v Francis	(2008) 250 ALR 555	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2008) 250 ALR 555 Cite 2 - (2008) 250 ALR 555
Attorney-General v Legal Services Commissioner	[2018] QCA 66	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2018] QCA 66 Cite 2 - [2018] QCA 66
Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd	(1951) 217 ALR 1	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1951) 217 ALR 1 Cite 2 - (1951) 217 ALR 1
Briginshaw v Briginshaw	View on:JADE(1938) 60 C.L.R 336	7 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336 Cite 2 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336 Cite 3 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336 Cite 4 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336 Cite 5 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336 Cite 6 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336 Cite 7 - (1938) 60 C.L.R 336
Brown v New South Wales Trustee and Guardian	(2012) 10 ASTLR 164	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2012) 10 ASTLR 164 Cite 2 - (2012) 10 ASTLR 164
Council of the Law Society (NSW) v Fisher	View on:JADE[2021] NSWCATOD 73	5 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73 Cite 2 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73 Cite 3 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73 Cite 4 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73 Cite 5 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Bunton	View on:JADE[2020] NSWCATOD 67	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2020] NSWCATOD 67
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Lewis	View on:JADE[2019] NSWCATOD 100	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2019] NSWCATOD 100 Cite 2 - [2019] NSWCATOD 100
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Morgan	View on:JADE[2015] NSWCATOD 71	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2015] NSWCATOD 71 Cite 2 - [2015] NSWCATOD 71
Council of the Law Society of NSW v Marando	View on:JADE[2019] NSWCATOD 194	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2019] NSWCATOD 194 Cite 2 - [2019] NSWCATOD 194
Council of the Law Society of NSW v Powell	View on:JADE[2019] NSWCATOD 24	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2019] NSWCATOD 24 Cite 2 - [2019] NSWCATOD 24 Cite 3 - [2019] NSWCATOD 24
GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore	(2023) 97 ALJR 857	5 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2023) 97 ALJR 857 Cite 2 - (2023) 97 ALJR 857 Cite 3 - (2023) 97 ALJR 857 Cite 4 - (2023) 97 ALJR 857 Cite 5 - (2023) 97 ALJR 857
GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore	View on:JADE[2023] HCA 32	5 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2023] HCA 32 Cite 2 - [2023] HCA 32 Cite 3 - [2023] HCA 32 Cite 4 - [2023] HCA 32 Cite 5 - [2023] HCA 32
Law Society of New South Wales v Konstantinidis	View on:JADE[2019] NSWCATOD 104	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2019] NSWCATOD 104
Law Society of New South Wales v Thompson	View on:JADE[2018] NSWCATOD 57	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2018] NSWCATOD 57 Cite 2 - [2018] NSWCATOD 57 Cite 3 - [2018] NSWCATOD 57
Law Society of New South Wales v Waterhouse	View on:JADE[2002] NSWADT 204	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2002] NSWADT 204 Cite 2 - [2002] NSWADT 204
Law Society of NSW v Ling	View on:JADE[2010] NSWADT 48	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2010] NSWADT 48 Cite 2 - [2010] NSWADT 48
Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata	View on:JADE[2012] WASCA 214	4 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2012] WASCA 214 Cite 2 - [2012] WASCA 214 Cite 3 - [2012] WASCA 214 Cite 4 - [2012] WASCA 214
Legal Services Commissioner v Brown	[2018] QCAT 263	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2018] QCAT 263
Legal Services Commissioner v Bui	[2018] QCAT 424	5 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2018] QCAT 424 Cite 2 - [2018] QCAT 424 Cite 3 - [2018] QCAT 424 Cite 4 - [2018] QCAT 424 Cite 5 - [2018] QCAT 424
Legal Services Commissioner v Doyle	[2021] QCAT 347	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2021] QCAT 347 Cite 2 - [2021] QCAT 347
Legal Services Commissioner v Laylee	[2016] QCAT 237	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2016] QCAT 237 Cite 2 - [2016] QCAT 237
Legal Services Commissioner v Li	[2023] QCAT 383	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2023] QCAT 383 Cite 2 - [2023] QCAT 383 Cite 3 - [2023] QCAT 383
Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2)	[2009] 1 Qd R 149; [2008] QCA 301	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2009] 1 Qd R 149 Cite 2 - [2009] 1 Qd R 149
Legal Services Commissioner v McQuaid	(2019) 1 QR 499; [2019] QCA 136	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (2019) 1 QR 499 Cite 2 - (2019) 1 QR 499
Legal Services Commissioner v O'Connor (No 2)	[2006] LPT 2	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2006] LPT 2 Cite 2 - [2006] LPT 2
Legal Services Commissioner v Peter Leslie Challen	[2019] QCAT 273	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2019] QCAT 273 Cite 2 - [2019] QCAT 273
Legal Services Commissioner v Scott (No 2)	[2009] LPT 9	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2009] LPT 9
Legal Services Commissioner v Wrightway Legal	[2015] QCAT 174	4 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2015] QCAT 174 Cite 2 - [2015] QCAT 174 Cite 3 - [2015] QCAT 174 Cite 4 - [2015] QCAT 174
LSC v XBV	[2018] QCAT 332	7 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2018] QCAT 332 Cite 2 - [2018] QCAT 332 Cite 3 - [2018] QCAT 332 Cite 4 - [2018] QCAT 332 Cite 5 - [2018] QCAT 332 Cite 6 - [2018] QCAT 332 Cite 7 - [2018] QCAT 332
M v M	View on:JADE(1988) 166 CLR 69	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1988) 166 CLR 69 Cite 2 - (1988) 166 CLR 69
Oshlack v Richmond River Council	View on:JADE(1998) 193 CLR 72	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1998) 193 CLR 72 Cite 2 - (1998) 193 CLR 72
Pennisi v Legal Services Commissioner	[2023] QCA 234	2 citations Jump To Cite 1 - [2023] QCA 234 Cite 2 - [2023] QCA 234
R v Yaroslavceff	[2022] SasCA 123	1 citation Jump To Cite 1 - [2022] SasCA 123
Rejfek v McElroy	View on:JADE(1965) 112 CLR 517	3 citations Jump To Cite 1 - (1965) 112 CLR 517 Cite 2 - (1965) 112 CLR 517 Cite 3 - (1965) 112 CLR 517

Cases Citing List of cases on Queensland Judgments citing this Judgment

Case Name	Full Citation	Frequency
Legal Services Commissioner v Cavanagh	[2025] QCAT 290	2 citations

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Legal Services Commissioner v Li[2024] QCAT 444