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Legal Services Commissioner v Li[2023] QCAT 383

Legal Services Commissioner v Li[2023] QCAT 383

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Legal Services Commissioner v Li [2023] QCAT 383

PARTIES:

LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSIONER

(applicant)

v

XIAOYU (LORRAINE) LI

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

OCR206-22

MATTER TYPE:

Occupational regulation matters

DELIVERED ON:

3 October 2023

HEARING DATE:

7 September 2023

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Williams J

ORDERS:

  1. The Respondent’s Application is dismissed.
  2. The Tribunal will hear further from the parties in respect of costs.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS – where the applicant alleges professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct by the respondent in respect of two contraventions of an undertaking given to the Queensland Law Society – where the respondent seeks various orders including striking out paragraphs of the discipline application and supporting affidavit filed on behalf of the applicant (the ‘identified paragraphs’) – whether the Tribunal has power to strikeout part of the discipline application and supporting affidavit – whether the identified paragraphs should be struck out

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE – DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS – QUEENSLAND – PROCEEDINGS IN TRIBUNALS – where the respondent submits that the matters in the identified paragraphs are not relevant, are prejudicial without being probative and constitute an abuse of the Tribunal’s process – where the respondent submits that it would be jurisdictional error for the Tribunal to consider matters in the identified paragraphs which go beyond the matters charged in the disciplinary application – where the applicant submits that the matters set out in the identified paragraphs provide necessary context to understand the nature and seriousness of the subsequent alleged breach of the undertaking and are logically probative to the Tribunal’s task of characterising the respondent’s conduct – where the Tribunal’s statutory task is to hear and determine the allegations in a discipline application – whether it would be jurisdictional error for the Tribunal to consider the matters in the identified paragraphs – whether there is any remaining basis to conclude the identified paragraphs should be struck out as frivolous, vexatious or misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 9, s 46, s 418, s 419, s 452, s 453, s 456, s 462, s 656D

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 3, s 4, s 6, s 7, s 10, s 28, s 47, s 62, s 64, s 66

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) s 115

Broadbent v Medical Board of Australia [2019] QCA 139

Cavill Business Solutions Pty Ltd v Jackson [2005] WASC 138

Council of the Law Society (NSW) v Fisher [2021] NSWCATOD 73

Cutbush v Team Maree Property Services (No 3) [2010] QCATA 89

Health Ombudsman v Shemer (No 2) [2019] QCAT 54 

J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10

Karimbla Construction Services P/L v President of the Industrial Court of Qld & Ors [2014] QSC 56

Kirk v Industrial Court of (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531

Langerak v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 327

Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214

Legal Services Commissioner v Bui [2018] QCAT 424

Legal Services Commissioner v CBD [2012] QCA 69

Legal Services Commissioner v Madden [2009] 1 Qd R 149

Legal Services Commissioner v Puryer [2010] QCAT 411

Legal Services Commissioner v XBV [2018] QCAT 332

McCarthy v Law Society of New South Wales (1997) 43 NSWLR 42

Rossage v Rossage & Ors [1960] 1 All ER 600

Sands Gold Coast Pty Ltd v Body Corporate of the Sands CTS 14967 [2016] QCAT 69

Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

 

Applicant:

O Cook instructed by the Legal Services Commissioner (D Chesterman KC and O Cook in respect of the further written submissions) 

Respondent:

A J Smith instructed by Robinson Locke Litigation Lawyers

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    This is an interlocutory application by the Respondent for various orders including striking out paragraphs of the discipline application and the supporting affidavit of Mr Craig Smiley sworn 14 November 2022 (Respondent’s Application).[1]
  2. [2]
    The Respondent’s Application is brought in a discipline application commenced by the Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) pursuant to s 452 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (LP Act) for disciplinary orders pursuant to s 456 of the LP Act.  The LSC alleges professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct by the Respondent in respect of two contraventions of an undertaking given to the Queensland Law Society (the QLS).
  3. [3]
    The Respondent’s Application raises three issues to be determined by the Tribunal:
    1. Does the Tribunal have power to strikeout part of the discipline application and the supporting affidavit?
    2. If so, should the paragraphs from the discipline application and affidavit be struck out?
    3. If so, what further orders are appropriate?
  4. [4]
    It is only if both the first and second issues are answered in the affirmative that it is necessary to consider the further orders sought in the Respondent’s Application.

Discipline application and response

  1. [5]
    The discipline application contains two charges against the Respondent, both in respect of contraventions of an undertaking given to the QLS on 21 June 2019.
  2. [6]
    Charge one (Charge 1) states as follows:

“On or about 12 March 2021, the respondent contravened an undertaking that she gave to the [QLS] on 21 June 2019.”

  1. [7]
    The LSC relies on particulars in paragraphs 1.1 through to 1.21 of the discipline application in respect of Charge 1.
  2. [8]
    The Respondent’s Application seeks to strike out paragraphs 1.4 to 1.11, 1.13 and 1.14 of the particulars to Charge 1.
  1. [9]
    Charge two (Charge 2) states as follows:

“On or about 19 May 2021, the respondent contravened an undertaking that she gave to the [QLS] on 21 June 2019.”

  1. [10]
    The LSC relies on particulars in paragraphs 2.1 through to 2.4 in respect of Charge 2.
  2. [11]
    The Respondent’s Application does not seek any express relief in respect of Charge 2 but logically the particulars at paragraph 2.1 would be similarly struck out to the extent that paragraphs 1.1 to 1.11, 1.13 to 1.14 are relied on.  
  3. [12]
    The LSC filed a supporting affidavit of Craig Smiley, General Manager, Regulation at the QLS sworn 14 November 2022.  The Respondent’s Application also seeks to strikeout paragraphs 8 to 25 of the supporting affidavit (which would include Exhibits “CS-1” to “CS-9”).
  4. [13]
    The Respondent filed a response to the discipline application on 4 October 2022. The Respondent in that response accepted Charge 1 but reserved her position with respect to Charge 2.
  5. [14]
    The Respondent’s position has since changed. In correspondence dated 21 April 2023, the Respondent provided an amended response to the discipline application indicating that the Respondent disputes both Charge 1 and Charge 2.
  6. [15]
    Further, by an affidavit of Malcolm Robinson affirmed and filed 6 June 2023, the Respondent provided a proposed further amended response to the discipline application. This further amended response maintains that the Respondent disputes both Charge 1 and Charge 2 but further amends the Respondent’s response in respect of both Charge 1 and Charge 2.
  7. [16]
    The Respondent has indicated a further response will be filed on behalf of the Respondent once the Respondent’s Application has been heard and determined.[2]
  8. [17]
    The Respondent:
  1. Is an Australian legal practitioner admitted to practice on 8 September 2008. 
  1. Held an unrestricted principal practising certificate between 16 May 2011 and 3 April 2019. 
  1. From 1 July 2019 held an unrestricted employee practising certificate. 

Does the Tribunal have power to strikeout part of the discipline application and the supporting affidavit?

  1. [18]
    As the Respondent’s Application does not seek determination of the discipline application the Respondent’s Application can be heard by a judicial member sitting alone.
  2. [19]
    It does not appear to be controversial between the parties that the Tribunal has a discretion to strike out parts of a discipline application and supporting affidavit to the extent that the Tribunal considers that the particular parts of a discipline application are frivolous, vexatious or misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process.
  3. [20]
    Section 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) provides as follows:

“47  Dismissing, striking out or deciding if unjustified proceeding or part

  1. This section applies if the tribunal considers a proceeding or a part of a proceeding is—
    1. frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or
    2. lacking in substance; or
    3. otherwise an abuse of process.
  2. The tribunal may—
    1. if the party who brought the proceeding or part before the tribunal is the applicant for the proceeding, order the proceeding or part be dismissed or struck out; or
    2. for a part of a proceeding brought before the tribunal by a party other than the applicant for the proceeding—
      1. make its final decision in the proceeding in the applicant’s favour; or
      2. order that the party who brought the part before the tribunal be removed from the proceeding; or
    3. make a costs order against the party who brought the proceeding or part before the tribunal to compensate another party for any reasonable costs, expenses, loss, inconvenience and embarrassment resulting from the proceeding or part.

Note—

See section 108 for the tribunal’s power to order that the costs be paid before it continues with the proceeding.

  1. The tribunal may act under subsection (2) on the application of a party to the proceeding or on the tribunal’s own initiative.
  2. The tribunal’s power to act under subsection (2) is exercisable only by—
    1. the tribunal as constituted for the proceeding; or
    2. if the tribunal has not been constituted for the proceeding—a legally qualified member or an adjudicator.”
  1. [21]
    A “proceeding” is defined in Sch 3 to the QCAT Act to mean a proceeding before the Tribunal.
  2. [22]
    Section 47 of the QCAT Act operates to confer upon the Tribunal a statutory power which is analogous to the inherent power of a superior court to strike out proceedings of a kind that are regarded as an abuse of process. 
  3. [23]
    This was recognised in Broadbent v Medical Board of Australia [2019] QCA 139 at [39] where Fraser JA (with whom Philippides JA and Bond JA agreed) concluded that re-litigating issues concerning disciplinary proceedings was a collateral attack upon earlier decisions of the Tribunal and the courts and was an abuse of process pursuant to s 47 of the QCAT Act.
  4. [24]
    Justice Wilson, QCAT President, in Legal Services Commissioner v Puryer [2010] QCAT 411 at [9] considered the application of s 47 of the QCAT Act to affidavit material. In that case, his Honour was satisfied that the Tribunal could proceed on the basis that the power under s 47 of the QCAT Act was engaged in relation to affidavit material.  
  5. [25]
    In considering whether the words “part of a proceeding” in s 47 extended to a supporting affidavit, Justice Wilson considered:
  1. The emphasis in ss 3 and 4 of the QCAT Act on informality and expedition; and
  1. The Tribunal being excused from being bound by the rules of evidence in s 28(3)(b) of the QCAT Act.
  1. [26]
    His Honour concluded at [9]:

“… compels the conclusion that the power might sensibly be used, if it is available, here.  That said, in matters related to disciplinary applications, which give rise to serious questions about a practitioner’s conduct, it is appropriate for the Tribunal to consider any relevant rules of evidence[3].”

  1. [27]
    Accordingly:
  1. “[10]
    … an affidavit should only contain material facts relevant to the questions that have to be determined in a proceeding.  Relevant evidence is the kind that could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in a proceeding[4].
  2. [11]
    That same test applies to material filed before the Tribunal[5].”
  1. [28]
    A second basis for power is also identified in s 62(1) of the QCAT Act, which states as follows:

“The tribunal may give a direction at any time in a proceeding and do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding.”

  1. [29]
    Further:
  1. Pursuant to s 3(b) of the QCAT Act, the Tribunal is required to deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical, informal and quick. 
  2. Section 4(c) of the QCAT Act requires that in discharging that task, the Tribunal must, among other things, ensure that proceedings are conducted in an informal way that minimises costs to parties and is as quick as is consistent with achieving justice.
  1. [30]
    An alternative basis for the power is s 64 of the QCAT Act which empowers the Tribunal to amend a relevant document. A relevant document is defined to include an application or referral or a document responding to an application or referral on an application by a party or its own motion. 
  2. [31]
    The power in s 64 of the QCAT Act has been interpreted to extend, in appropriate circumstances, to striking out all or part of a relevant document.
  3. [32]
    Senior Member Browne commented in the Sands Gold Coast Pty Ltd v Body Corporate of the Sands CTS 14967 [2016] QCAT 69 at [36] as follows:

“… In exercising the power to require the amendment of a document which involves striking out all or part of an application or response, those matters the subject of consideration in an application under UCPR r 171 are, in my view, relevant. Ensuring that relevant documents filed in the Tribunal disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence, do not prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding, are not unnecessary or scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process are all considerations consistent with the objects and functions of the Tribunal.”

  1. [33]
    In the circumstances, the QCAT Act gives the Tribunal power to strike out parts of the discipline application and supporting affidavit to the extent that the paragraphs are frivolous, vexatious or misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process.

Should the paragraphs from the discipline application and affidavit be struck out?

  1. [34]
    It is now necessary to consider whether that discretion ought to be exercised given the nature of the parts of the discipline application and supporting affidavit identified in the Respondent’s Application and any other factors relevant to the exercise of that discretion.

Respondent’s position

  1. [35]
    The Respondent makes the Respondent’s Application on two distinct bases, namely:
    1. That the matters in paragraphs 1.4 to 1.11, 1.13 to 1.14 of the discipline application and paragraphs 8-25 of the supporting affidavit (the Identified Paragraphs) should be struck out as they are not relevant to a fact in issue, are prejudicial without being probative and constitute an abuse of process of the Tribunal.
    2. That the matters in the Identified Paragraphs are beyond jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine those matters.
  2. [36]
    The second basis is raised “further, or alternatively” to the first basis.  Accordingly, even if the Tribunal concludes that the Identified Paragraphs should not be struck out, the second basis may remain.
  3. [37]
    Counsel for the Respondent indicated that this jurisdictional issue may be raised in a revised response, even if the Respondent’s Application is dismissed.  This may, however, depend on the Tribunal’s reasoning in respect of this issue.
  4. [38]
    The Respondent contends that the Identified Paragraphs are an abuse of process of the Tribunal as they are scandalous and entirely irrelevant to the discipline application and beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  That is:
    1. The Identified Paragraphs make serious allegations about the professional conduct of the Respondent which are not the subject of Charge 1 or Charge 2.[6]
    2. Including these uncharged allegations in the particulars and the supporting affidavit:
  1. Is an impermissible collateral attack on the character of the Respondent.
  2. Is manifestly unfair to the Respondent, who will be forced to defend uncharged conduct which is not the subject of the proceeding.
  1. By including the uncharged allegations, the LSC is requiring the Tribunal to hear and determine matters which are irrelevant to its function and outside its jurisdiction.
  1. [39]
    The Respondent analyses the form of the discipline application as follows:
    1. ‘Part A’ alleges in general terms that the Respondent engaged in professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory professional conduct.
    2. ‘Part B’ charges the Respondent with two breaches of an undertaking[7] on 12 and 19 May 2021, respectively, by the words in Charge 1 and Charge 2. 
    3. The Identified Paragraphs introduce serious allegations of conduct by the Respondent in respect of matters which are not the subject of Charge 1 or Charge 2.  
    4. Further, the supporting affidavit seeks to provide evidence of the uncharged allegations in circumstances where those facts do not need to be proven for the LSC to make out the cause of action.
  2. [40]
    In respect of the submission that the Identified Paragraphs amount to an abuse of process, the Respondent refers to and relies on the High Court decision in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378.  In that case, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ observed:[8]

“… The jurisdiction of a superior court in such a case was correctly described by Lord Diplock in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police[9] as ‘inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people’.”

  1. [41]
    The Respondent submits that the power in s 47 of the QCAT Act is analogous.  This is also consistent with the objects of the Tribunal stated in s 3 of the QCAT Act. 
  2. [42]
    The Respondent submits that the Identified Paragraphs are properly characterised as an abuse of process as they:
    1. Are serious, irrelevant and prejudicial; and
    2. Undermine the integrity of the Tribunal’s process. 
  3. [43]
    In respect of the submission that the Identified Paragraphs are scandalous, the Respondent relies on a statement in the decision of Cavill Business Solutions Pty Ltd v Jackson [2005] WASC 138.  At [25], Hasluck J observed:

“… the mere allegation of a scandalous fact does not render the pleading liable to be struck out as scandalous, for material which is degrading and therefore scandalous will not be struck out unless it is also irrelevant.  Scandal consists in the allegation of anything which is unbecoming to the dignity of the Court to hear or is contrary to good manners or which charges some person with a crime not necessary to be shown in the cause: to which may be added that any unnecessary (not relevant to the subject) allegation bearing purely upon the moral character of an individual is also scandalous.”

  1. [44]
    Here, the Respondent submits that the Identified Paragraphs can only be included for the purpose of attacking the character of the Respondent and injuring her, as the Identified Paragraphs accuse the Respondent of contraventions of the law which are not charged.
  2. [45]
    Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the Identified Paragraphs should be struck out as an abuse of process as they raise uncharged allegations and are both irrelevant and scandalous.
  3. [46]
    In respect of the submission that the Identified Paragraphs are not relevant to Charge 1 and Charge 2, the Respondent analyses what the LSC needs to prove to establish the charges.  That is, for Charge 1 and Charge 2 the LSC will need to establish on admissible evidence:
    1. An undertaking was given;
    2. The undertaking was breached on the relevant dates;
    3. The breaches of the undertaking involved or were in connection with the practice of law and fell short of the standard of competence and diligence the public is entitled to expect from a reasonably competent legal practitioner; and/or
    4. That the conduct involved:
      1. A substantial or consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and
      2. Would justify a finding that the Respondent was not a fit and proper person to practice law.[10]
  4. [47]
    The Respondent contends that each of the matters outlined above:
    1. Is directed to the contravention of the undertaking; and
    2. Do not require an assessment of the historical conduct of the practitioner, their general character or unproven allegations of previous misconduct.
  5. [48]
    This submission is put as highly as none of the Identified Paragraphs can “rationally effect”:
    1. Whether or not the terms of the undertaking had been contravened; or
    2. Whether either of the alleged contraventions amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
  1. [49]
    Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the Identified Paragraphs are irrelevant as they do not prove, or does not go to prove, an allegation in issue.
  2. [50]
    In respect of the submission by the Respondent that the inclusion of the Identified Paragraphs is manifestly unfair, the Respondent identifies a number of ways in which the unfairness arises.  Namely, it:
    1. Will result in the Respondent effectively being tried in relation to allegations which are not the subject of the charges;
    2. Will prejudice the defence by increasing the costs of the hearing significantly; and
    3. Amounts to a collateral attack on the character of the Respondent.
  3. [51]
    In respect of the “collateral attack”, it is submitted that this would require the Respondent to respond to allegations of breach of her professional obligations in relation to matters she was not charged with.
  4. [52]
    It is submitted that given the manifest unfairness identified, allowing the proceeding to continue with the Identified Paragraphs included would bring the administration of justice into disrepute amongst right thinking people in that:
    1. It will turn a trial about whether particular contraventions of the law occurred into an inquiry into the Respondent’s moral character; and
    2. It will run contrary to the ordinarily accepted procedure in criminal cases, civil penalty cases, and Tribunal hearings.
  5. [53]
    In respect of the jurisdiction issue, the Respondent submits that ss 452 and 456 of the LP Act confine the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear “matters of complaint” (that is, matters which go to prove or disprove the substance of the complaint).  The sections do not allow a broad ranging inquiry into matters not directly relevant to the proceeding.
  6. [54]
    The Respondent submits that the discipline application here provides jurisdiction to the Tribunal to hear and determine whether two specific acts amounted to either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.  Any inquiry into the additional matters raised by the Identified Paragraphs would amount to jurisdictional error and would be beyond power of the Tribunal.
  7. [55]
    The Respondent relies on the High Court decision in Kirk v Industrial Court of (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 in support of this submission.  The Respondent submits that while this is a civil proceeding, the originating process is drawn in a manner akin to an “information”, so the observations in Kirk are apposite.
  8. [56]
    The Respondent submits that, consistent with Kirk, the particulars of the acts and omissions that found the charge need to be contained in the charge itself and not in the particulars.  Further, the charge needs to specify the time, place and manner of the acts or omissions.
  9. [57]
    Accordingly, the Respondent submits that the matters in the Identified Paragraphs go beyond the matters charged and for the Tribunal to consider them would be jurisdictional error.

Applicant’s position

  1. [58]
    The LSC’s position is that the Respondent’s application should be dismissed on either of two bases, namely:
    1. The Identified Paragraphs form the matrix of facts and are relevant to the characterisation of the conduct; and
    2. The statutory construction of relevant provisions of the LP Act may make the Identified Paragraphs suitability matters relevant to the characterisation of the Respondent’s conduct.
  2. [59]
    In respect of the “matrix of facts” submission, the LSC relies on the comments of Wilson J, QCAT President, in Legal Services Commissioner v Puryer [2010] QCAT 411 as the basis of relevance, namely:

“[22]  … a copy of the Court of Appeal decision … concerning Mr Puryer’s application to set aside the decision of Dutney J.  Pages 5 – 11 of the judgment directly touch on all three of the charges in the disciplinary application.  The judgment does not, as the passage set out earlier shows, purport to answer the questions that arise before this Tribunal:  whether the court has been misled, intentionally or not.  Rather, it is simply part of the background or matrix of facts and events which led to the matter coming here and, for that reason, is relevant[11].”  (emphasis added)[12]

  1. [60]
    The LSC emphasises that in that case, the Court of Appeal decision was not probative of the facts being considered by the Tribunal but was referred to as part of the factual matrix.  It is submitted that the Identified Paragraphs are similarly part of the factual matrix.
  2. [61]
    Here, the LSC submits that the Identified Paragraphs are relevant to the consideration and characterisation of the conduct.  The Respondent gave the undertaking as identified in Charge 1 and Charge 2 on 21 June 2019.  The matters set out in the particulars, including the Identified Paragraphs, provide the necessary context to understand the nature and seriousness of the subsequent alleged breach of the undertaking.
  3. [62]
    In relation to this submission, reference is also made to the case of Legal Services Commissioner v Bui [2018] QCAT 424.[13] In that case Daubney J, QCAT President (assisted by the members of the Tribunal) in the reasons for decision:
    1. Identified that the first charge was the failure to honour an undertaking.
    2. Set out at [3] to [4] the relevant facts, including the particular factual circumstances that gave rise to an undertaking being given to the QLS and the nature of the undertaking.
  1. [63]
    While those facts were set out in a statement of agreed facts[14] for the purposes of the hearing of that discipline application, that does not detract from the LSC’s position that the factual matrix was not only relevant but assisted the Tribunal in the discharge of its function, including in properly characterising the conduct.
  2. [64]
    This assistance can be inferred from his Honour’s conclusion at [18] where the reasons for decision state:

“It is true that there is some authority for the proposition that in particular circumstances a breach of an undertaking may be regarded under the lesser category of unsatisfactory professional conduct.  This, however, is not such a case”.

  1. [65]
    The LSC refers to:
    1. The statutory provisions relevant to the discipline application, namely ss 452 and 456 of the LP Act.
    2. The statutory provisions relevant to the meaning of unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct, namely ss 418 and 419 of the LP Act.
    3. Section 115(3) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Rules).
  2. [66]
    I will consider these in turn.
  3. [67]
    A discipline application is made pursuant to s 452 of the LP Act.  Section 452 states:

“452 Starting proceeding before a disciplinary body

  1. The commissioner may apply—
  1. to the tribunal for an order against an Australian legal practitioner in relation to a complaint against the legal practitioner or an investigation matter; or
  2. to the committee for an order—
  1. against an Australian legal practitioner in relation to a complaint against the legal practitioner or an investigation matter; or
  1. against a law practice employee in relation to a complaint against the employee or an investigation matter involving the employee.
  1. An application under subsection (1) is a discipline application.” (underlining added)
  1. [68]
    Section 456(1) of the LP Act provides:

“456 Decisions of tribunal about an Australian legal practitioner

  1. If, after the tribunal has completed a hearing of a discipline application in relation to a complaint or an investigation matter against an Australian legal practitioner, the tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the tribunal may make any order as it thinks fit, including any 1 or more of the orders stated in this section.” (underlining added)
  1. [69]
    Subsections (2) to (6) of s 456 identify the range of orders that may be made following a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
  2. [70]
    Section 456(7) provides that the Tribunal may find a person has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct even though the discipline application alleged professional misconduct.
  3. [71]
    Section 418 of the LP Act defines unsatisfactory professional conduct as follows:

“418 Meaning of unsatisfactory professional conduct

Unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of an Australian legal practitioner happening in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner.”

  1. [72]
    Section 419 of the LPA defines professional misconduct as follows:

“419 Meaning of professional misconduct

  1. Professional misconduct includes—
    1. unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, if the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and
    2. conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, whether happening in connection with the practice of law or happening otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.
  2. For finding that an Australian legal practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as mentioned in subsection (1), regard may be had to the suitability matters that would be considered if the practitioner were an applicant for admission to the legal profession under this Act or for the grant or renewal of a local practising certificate.”
  1. [73]
    Section 419(1)(b) and (2) raise “suitability matters” which in turn raises ss 9(1) and 46(2) of the LP Act. 
  1. [74]
    Section 9(1) states:

“9 Suitability matters

  1. Each of the following is a suitability matter in relation to a natural person—
  1. whether the person is currently of good fame and character;
  2. whether the person is or has been an insolvent under administration;
  3. whether the person has been convicted of an offence in Australia or a foreign country, and if so—
    1. the nature of the offence; and
    2. how long ago the offence was committed; and
    3. the person’s age when the offence was committed;
  4. whether the person engaged in legal practice in Australia—
  1. when not admitted to the legal profession, or not holding a practising certificate, as required under a relevant law or a corresponding law; or
  2. if admitted to the legal profession, in contravention of a condition on which admission was granted; or
  3. if holding an Australian practising certificate, in contravention of a condition applicable to the certificate or while the certificate was suspended;
  1. whether the person has practised law in a foreign country—
    1. when not permitted under a law of that country to do so; or
    2. if permitted to do so, in contravention of a condition of the permission;
  2. whether the person is currently subject to an unresolved complaint, investigation, charge or order under any of the following—
    1. a relevant law;
    2. a corresponding law;
    3. a corresponding foreign law;
  3. whether the person—
  1. is the subject of current disciplinary action, however expressed, in another profession or occupation in Australia or a foreign country; or
  2. has been the subject of disciplinary action, however expressed, relating to another profession or occupation that involved a finding of guilt;
  1. whether the person’s name has been removed from—
    1. a local roll but has not since been restored to or entered on a local roll; or
    2. an interstate roll, but has not since been restored to or entered on an interstate roll; or
    3. a foreign roll;
  1. whether the person’s right to engage in legal practice has been suspended or cancelled in Australia or a foreign country;
  2. whether the person has contravened, in Australia or a foreign country, a law about trust money or trust accounts;
  3. whether, under a relevant law, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, a supervisor, manager or receiver, however described, is or has been appointed in relation to any legal practice engaged in by the person;
  4. whether the person is or has been subject to an order under this Act, a previous Act, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, disqualifying the person from being employed by, or a partner of, an Australian legal practitioner or from managing a corporation that is an incorporated legal practice;
  5. whether the person currently is unable to satisfactorily carry out the inherent requirements of practice as an Australian legal practitioner;
  6. a matter declared under an Act to be a suitability matter.”
  1. [75]
    Section 46(2) states:

“46 Suitability to hold local practising certificate

…

  1. A regulatory authority of this jurisdiction, in considering whether a person is, or is no longer, a fit and proper person to hold a local practising certificate, may take into account any suitability matter relating to the person, and any of the following, whether happening before or after the commencement of this section—
  1. whether the person obtained an Australian practising certificate because of incorrect or misleading information;
  2. whether the person has contravened a condition of an Australian practising certificate held by the person;
  3. whether the person has contravened a relevant law or a corresponding law;
  4. whether the person has contravened—
    1. an order of a disciplinary body or the Supreme Court; or
    2. an order of a corresponding disciplinary body, or of a court or tribunal of another jurisdiction exercising jurisdiction or powers by way of appeal or review of an order of a corresponding disciplinary body;
  5. without limiting any other paragraph, whether the person has failed to pay an amount for which the person is or was liable under a relevant law or a corresponding law, including, for example, an amount payable to the fidelity fund or other costs or expenses for which the person is liable under a relevant law;
  6. whether, without limiting paragraph (e), the person has contravened a provision of a relevant law or a corresponding law about professional indemnity insurance;
  7. other matters the authority thinks are appropriate.”
  1. [76]
    Further, s 115(3) of the QCAT Rules provides:

“115 Making a discipline application

…

(3) A discipline application must state particulars of the alleged unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct of the person to whom the application relates.

…”

  1. [77]
    In light of these provisions, the LSC submits:
    1. The discipline application must state the particulars of the alleged unsatisfactory professional conduct and/or the professional misconduct.
    2. It is a matter for the Tribunal to characterise the Respondent’s conduct as either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
    3. Section 419(1)(b) requires consideration of whether the conduct is a “substantial” departure from the relevant standard to determine whether the conduct is unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
  1. Suitability matters are relevant when considering professional misconduct under s 419(1)(b) and (2).  In considering whether a person is or is no longer a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate, any suitability matter relating to the person may be taken into account.
  2. Suitability matters include whether a legal practitioner’s right to engage in legal practice has been suspended or cancelled in Australia, whether the legal practitioner failed to pay an amount for which they was liable and whether the person was a legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice while the practice is or was insolvent.
  1. [78]
    In respect of the suitability matters raised by s 419(2) LP Act, it has been recognised that they may be relevant but regard to them is not necessarily required.  Muir JA, with whom Wilson AJA and Applegarth J agreed, stated in Legal Services Commissioner v CBD [2012] QCA 69 at [20]:

“Section 419(2) does not require that regard be had to ‘suitability matters’ in all circumstances in which it is being considered whether a legal practitioner is ‘a fit and proper person’.  Nevertheless, a consideration of ‘suitability matters’ will normally be relevant to such a determination …”.

  1. [79]
    Rule 6.1 of the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2012 (ASCR) also relevantly provides:

“A solicitor who has given an undertaking in the course of legal practice must honour that undertaking and ensure the timely and effective performance of the undertaking, unless released by the recipient or by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

  1. [80]
    Consideration of a contravention of rule 6.1:
    1. Is necessarily informed by the circumstances leading to the giving of the undertaking; and 
    2. Goes to the reasonable standard of competence and diligence and whether the contravening conduct is characterised as substantial within s 419(1)(a) or is otherwise within s 418 of the LP Act.
  2. [81]
    The LSC submits:
    1. The Identified Paragraphs concern issues relating to the Respondent’s previous principal practising certificate. The LSC submits that these issues are a suitability matter relevant to the considerations raised by s 419 of the LP Act.
    2. The Respondent’s affidavit deposes to the matters in the Identified Paragraphs and she accepted them in her original response to the discipline application.
    3. The Identified Paragraphs are “self-evidently relevant” to the question of whether the Respondent’s conduct is properly characterised as professional misconduct.
  3. [82]
    Further, the LSC addresses the issue that the Identified Paragraphs raise matters in the particulars.  The LSC submits:
    1. That the purpose of particulars is to add content and depth to the material facts.
    2. A function of particulars is to limit generality:  that is, to enable the person to know the case they have to meet.
  4. [83]
    The LSC also contends that the Respondent unduly narrows the LSC’s case against the Respondent and does so without proper regard to the relevant provisions of the LP Act.  The Respondent’s characterisation of the case against the Respondent fails to take into account that matters relevant to a finding of professional misconduct would include the Respondent’s past conduct as a legal practitioner and any disciplinary sanctions.
  5. [84]
    Reliance is placed on the decision in Rossage v Rossage & Ors [1960] 1 All ER 600[15] for the proposition that even if material might be considered scandalous, it cannot be struck out if it is relevant and goes to the matter to be considered by the Tribunal. 
  6. [85]
    Accordingly, the LSC submits that the Identified Paragraphs are relevant to the matters before the Tribunal in two ways:
    1. The matters raised in the Identified Paragraphs are logically probative to the Tribunal’s task of characterising the Respondent’s conduct, particularly having regard to the relevant provisions in the LP Act; and
  1. The matters raised in the Identified Paragraphs form part of the factual matrix of facts and events which led to the giving of the undertaking by the Respondent.
  1. [86]
    Where the Identified Paragraphs are relevant, the LSC contends that:
    1. An abuse of process or manifest unfairness cannot arise.
    2. Allowing the discipline application to continue with the inclusion of the Identified Paragraphs will not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
    3. There is no basis for the submission that the Identified Paragraphs can only be included for the purpose of injuring and or attacking the character of the Respondent.
  2. [87]
    The LSC also makes the point that the Respondent has previously in her affidavit accepted that the Identified Paragraphs adequately deal with the matters raised in the particulars.  The Respondent’s position taken in the Respondent’s Application is inconsistent with that previous position.
  3. [88]
    Ultimately, the LSC submits that the Tribunal should dismiss the Respondent’s Application to strike out the Identified Paragraphs as the matters in the Identified Paragraphs are relevant to:
    1. The Tribunal’s consideration of whether the Respondent’s conduct is appropriately characterised as professional misconduct; and
    2. The circumstances leading up to the giving of the undertaking by the Respondent and to that extent form part of the matrix of facts which led to the discipline application being before the Tribunal.
  4. [89]
    The Respondent is critical of the LSC’s position in respect of reliance on s 419(2) of the LP Act as no specific mention is made of that section in the LSC’s substantive submissions filed on 24 March 2023 or in relevant correspondence.  In particular:
    1. The Respondent contends that the Identified Paragraphs have no relevance to the consideration of whether the conduct is unsatisfactory professional conduct.  
    2. The basis for the conduct being characterised as professional misconduct in the LSC’s substantive submissions is that it is unsatisfactory professional conduct involving a substantial failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard of competence and diligence within s 419(1)(a) of the LP Act.
    3. The alternative basis of a consistent failure within s 419(1)(a) of the LP Act does not arise as there are two single acts of non-compliance with an undertaking. There are two separate charges and no course of conduct is alleged.
  1. The particulars cannot modify or alter the cause of action and/or the case that the Respondent has to meet as set out in the charges.[16]
  2. Consistent with Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [26], the essential factual ingredients must be set out in the charge.
  1. [90]
    Paragraph 19 of the Respondent’s submissions in reply states:

“An assessment of the Respondent’s conduct against section 419(1)(a) and (b) does not therefore require consideration of the impugned material.”

  1. [91]
    The reference to s 419(1)(b) in this context may be in error and the submission may properly understood as being a reference to “both limbs of s 419(1)(a)”.  This is because s 419(1)(b) of the LP Act does introduce the consideration of whether the legal practitioner is a “fit and proper person”.  Then regard is had to s 419(2) as to what can be had regard to for the purposes of making a finding of whether a person is not a “fit and proper person”.
  2. [92]
    Section 419(2) is not a standalone provision. It is linked to s 419(1)(b) which is a second basis which may constitute professional misconduct: that is, it is not linked directly to the definition of unsatisfactory professional conduct and is not necessarily in connection with the practice of law.
  3. [93]
    In respect of the LSC’s “matrix of facts” basis for relevance, the Respondent:
    1. Contends that this contention is not supported by Legal Services Commissioner v Puryer.  The document in Puryer was a decision of the Court of Appeal which “directly touched on all three charges” in that the conduct charged arose from what occurred in that litigation.  The decision was not really background but was squarely relevant.
    2. Submits that the material was in an agreed statement of facts in Legal Services Commissioner v Bui [2018] QCAT 424 and accordingly does not assist with the current issue.
  4. [94]
    In respect of the Respondent swearing to the Identified Paragraphs, the Respondent contends that:
    1. This cannot make the Identified Paragraphs relevant if they are not otherwise relevant.
    2. If the identified Paragraphs are not relevant the only purpose in including the material would be a collateral attack on character.

Further submissions

  1. [95]
    At the conclusion of the hearing on 7 September 2023, a direction was made for the LSC to provide further brief submissions in respect of the jurisdiction issue raised by the Respondent.
  2. [96]
    By an email to the parties on 8 September 2023, the Tribunal:
    1. Referred the parties to the Court of Appeal decision in Legal Services Commissioner v Madden [2009] 1 Qd R 149. 
    2. Particularly referred to [93] where the Court states:

“… Section 601 confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to hear and decide only the discipline application. Sections 453, 455 and 456 of the 2007 Act have the effect that a discipline application must include the allegations which, to the extent that the Tribunal accepts them, will inform the Tribunal’s decisions whether the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. …”

  1. Further, particularly referred to [80] where the Court states:

“… The disciplinary processes are not criminal in nature. But the 2007 Act does adopt the familiar adversarial procedure under which it is no part of the judicial function to determine what charges are to be brought or pursued: under this Act the decision to institute proceedings is the province of the executive and decisions directed to ensuring a fair trial and prevention of abuse of the Tribunal’s processes are the province of the Tribunal.”  [citations omitted]

  1. Asked the parties to provide further brief written submissions by 15 September, addressing (Tribunal request):
    1. Given the non-criminal nature of the discipline application, whether Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 is applicable.
    2. Whether the correct approach is to consider the discipline application against the statutory framework in the [LP Act] in accordance with Legal Services Commissioner v Madden. 
    3. Form 22 v. 2 of the “Application or referral – disciplinary proceeding” in Part C refers to “orders sought” and does not use the language of “charge” and “particulars”.  This is in contrast to the previous approved form identified at [6] of Legal Services Commissioner v Madden. The allegations by reference to charge and particulars in the discipline application considered in LSC v Madden is the same form as the current discipline application.  Whether the “allegations” to be heard and determined for the purposes of s 453 of the [LP Act] are the matters set out as the charge and particulars in the discipline application. 
  2. Gave the parties the opportunity to request more time or an oral hearing.  No request was made.
  1. [97]
    On Friday 15 September 2023 further brief written submissions were received from the Respondent and the LSC.[17]
  2. [98]
    The parties were given a further opportunity by an email on 19 September 2023 to request an opportunity to be heard by further written submissions or an oral hearing.  Both parties did not want an oral hearing or an opportunity to put in further submissions. 
  3. [99]
    In summary, the Respondent further submits:
    1. Whilst Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW)[18] arose in the context of criminal proceedings, the principles in respect of what is required to engage subject matter jurisdiction of statutory courts and tribunals are applicable here.
    2. There is no inconsistency between the principles in Kirk and those in Madden.
    3. The Tribunal is to consider the discipline application against the statutory framework and in accordance with the decision in Madden, together with:
  1. The general law applicable to the jurisdiction of statutory tribunals, including the principles in Kirk; and
  2. The general law in respect of the purpose of particulars.
  1. The allegations to be determined are the charges which are set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the discipline application.  The paragraphs under the heading “particulars” are not matters which are required to be determined, nor are they matters which enlarge (although they may limit) jurisdiction.
  1. The legislative intention of the LP Act was to confine the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to the particular allegations made: see Madden at [72] which references ss 452, 453, 455 and 456, and also [77].
  2. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider issues at large and does not exercise the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  The issues are framed as part of the ordinary adversarial process.[19]
  3. There are no statutory provisions which would support an argument that the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 2 can be enlarged by the allegations in the particulars to those paragraphs.  Further, the general law does not permit such an approach.
  4. Particulars can narrow the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but they cannot enlarge it.  They have no effect on jurisdiction and to the extent they go beyond the charge, they are not matters to be heard and determined in the proper exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
  5. Rule 115(3) of the QCAT Rules is subordinate legislation and can only apply in respect of matters in which the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal has already been engaged.
  1. [100]
    The LSC’s further submissions address the jurisdiction issue more generally as originally directed.  They also address the Tribunal’s request.
  2. [101]
    In respect of the jurisdiction issue, the LSC submits:
    1. The Tribunal is a court of record (s 64 of the QCAT Act) and has original jurisdiction pursuant to s 10(1)(b) of the QCAT Act as conferred by ss 452 and 453 of the LP Act.   
    2. Consequently, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to “hear and decide” whether to make “an order”[20] against a legal practitioner in relation to “each allegation stated in the discipline application”.
    3. This interpretation of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is consistent with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Madden.[21]
    4. The Tribunal expressly has jurisdiction to make an order under s 456 of the LP Act and such an order is what the LSC seeks in the discipline application.
    5. Consequently, it is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider the allegations put forward by the LSC as to:
      1. Why an order should be made (which necessarily includes the prerequisite of a finding of either professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct);[22] and
      2. What the appropriate order is.
    6. The Court of Appeal in Madden recognised that the allegations in the discipline application set the limit of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  It is the allegations in the discipline application which the Tribunal is empowered to hear and decide.
    7. In the current discipline application, the LSC has set out all of the allegations which she contends bear upon the proper disposition of the discipline application which the Tribunal must “hear and decide”.
    8. The Court of Appeal in Madden concluded at [91] that it is not a two-step process.  That is, the respondent’s conduct must be characterised and, if a relevant finding is made that the relevant standard has been transgressed, then penalised in the one decision.
    9. Further, the Court of Appeal in Madden appeared to conclude that it is a statutory requirement that a discipline application must include all allegations which will inter alia inform the penalty to be imposed.[23]
    10. In the current discipline application, it is clear that the particulars:
      1. Are relied on by the LSC as part of the allegations that the Respondent committed professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct.
      2. Are also relevant to penalty.
    11. Accordingly, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters in the particulars as part of the allegations stated in the discipline application.
    12. The jurisdiction to hear and determine the allegations in the discipline application includes:
      1. Determining whether the particulars relied upon by the LSC demonstrate that the Respondent engaged in professional misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct; and
      2. If so, what order or orders should be made as a consequence.
    13. In these circumstances, there could be no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal hearing and determining these two aspects of the discipline application after considering the particulars (to the extent that they are substantiated at a hearing).
  3. [102]
    The LSC also raises a further contention by reference to the Respondent’s position on penalty:
    1. The Respondent’s Application dated 5 May 2023 stated that the Identified Paragraphs “are not relevant to the prosecution of the Disciplinary Application (as apart from possible sanction)”.  (emphasis added) 
  1. The Respondent’s Application dated 6 June 2023[24] resiled from this position deleting words including those identified by underlining above.
  1. [103]
    In respect of penalty, the LSC submits that:
    1. The circumstances giving rise to an undertaking must bear upon the penalty to be imposed for breach of that undertaking.[25]
    2. Any history of disciplinary sanctions being imposed is also relevant to penalty.
  2. [104]
    Additionally, the Respondent has also deposed that she has “no disciplinary history” aside from the matters that are before the Tribunal.[26] The LSC contends that as the Respondent has put in issue her past conduct as a legal practitioner, including the matters identified in the particulars (including the Identified Paragraphs), the allegations that the Tribunal will need to hear and decide under s 453 of the LP Act include this issue.
  3. [105]
    If the LSC had not included all matters to be relied upon for orders against the Respondent, the Respondent would have had a basis to complain based on lack of procedural fairness, even if just raised in respect of penalty.[27]
  4. [106]
    In respect of the Tribunal’s request, the LSC submits:
    1. Kirk is not supportive of the Respondent’s submission that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction despite the terms of ss 452 and 453 of the LP Act.
    2. Kirk was dealing with criminal offences to be dealt with summarily by the Industrial Court of New South Wales. 
    3. A discipline application under the LP Act is not a criminal process.[28]
    4. It would be wrong to treat disciplinary proceedings as a criminal process.[29]
    5. Kirk involved the absence of meaningful particulars to a charge.[30] In contrast here the complaint is that the particulars “raise matters not directly relevant to the proceedings”.[31] Kirk was not decided on the basis of relevance.
    6. The correct approach is for the Tribunal to “hear and decide” each allegation in the discipline application in accordance with the LP Act and the QCAT Act.  This approach is consistent with the reasoning in Madden and there is no basis for the Tribunal to depart from the reasons in Madden.
    7. Accordingly, the allegations which the Tribunal is to hear and decide are those in the discipline application, which is that the Respondent engaged in professional misconduct and/or unsatisfactory conduct by the conduct identified and particularised in the two charges appearing under Part B of the discipline application.

Consideration

  1. [107]
    At the outset it is helpful to deal with a couple of matters arising from the submissions.
  2. [108]
    First, the LSC concedes that the matters set out in the Identified Paragraphs do not constitute separate acts and are not relied upon to establish a course of conduct.  
  3. [109]
    Secondly, the Identified Paragraphs are raised by the LSC in the discipline application as part of the allegations to be heard and determined in that they provide relevant factual context.  They are also relevant to the Tribunal’s task here of considering and determining whether the two instances of alleged breach of the undertaking constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct and/or professional misconduct and if so, the appropriate penalty.
  4. [110]
    Further, pursuant to s 419 of the LP Act, there are three different bases for a finding of professional misconduct:
    1. The first limb of s 419(1)(a) – unsatisfactory professional conduct involving a substantial degree of departure from the relevant standard.
    2. The second limb of s 419(1)(a) – unsatisfactory professional conduct involving a consistent failure to reach or keep the relevant standard.
    3. Sections 419(1)(b) and 420 – conduct in connection with the practice of law or otherwise that justifies a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.
  1. [111]
    Based on the LSC’s concession above, the basis in the second limb of s 419(1)(a) does not arise in the current discipline application.  The other two bases remain for consideration by the Tribunal. 
  2. [112]
    The Respondent’s submission that the LSC did not identify ss 419(1)(b) and 420 of the LP Act in its substantive written submissions needs to be considered in light of how this discipline proceeding has progressed.  
  3. [113]
    The affidavit of Bradley Fitzgerald sworn 22 May 2023 helpfully summarises this, including:
    1. On 28 October 2022, directions were made to progress the proceeding, with any agreed statement of facts due on 10 March 2023, the LSC’s submissions due 24 March 2023 and the Respondent’s submissions due 10 April 2023.
    2. On 31 January 2023, the Respondent filed and served an affidavit which addressed the allegations raised in the discipline application.  The Respondent accepted the particulars as outlined in the discipline application and acknowledged that she breached the undertaking on 12 March 2012 and 19 May 2021.
    3. The LSC provided a draft statement of agreed facts on 8 March 2023 for consideration by the then solicitors acting for the Respondent.
    4. The then solicitors for the Respondent in an email to the LSC dated 22 March 2023[32] indicated there was some delay in finalising instructions and noted “the particulars in the matter were quite detailed, and that Ms Li’s affidavit filed to date makes her position quite clear”.  It was then raised whether the LSC would consider finalising its submissions without an agreed statement of facts.
    5. The LSC proceeded to finalise the submissions and filed and served the LSC’s submissions on 24 March 2023 as required by the Tribunal’s directions.
    6. On 24 March 2023, the Respondent’s then solicitors wrote to the LSC advising that they no longer acted for the Respondent as “an ethical issue ha[d] arisen which ha[d] rendered [them] unable to continue to act”.
    7. The Respondent did not file and serve submissions by 10 April 2023 in accordance with the Tribunal’s directions.
    8. The matter was listed for further directions on 20 April 2023.  Around this time the Respondent retained her current solicitors.  The review was adjourned to 23 May 2023 to provide further time for the Respondent’s new solicitors to consider the matter.
    9. On 21 April 2023, the Respondent first raised the issue with respect to the identified Paragraphs and indicated an amended response would be provided.
    10. On 28 April 2023, the Respondent filed and served the Respondent’s amended response to the discipline application, with the Respondent no longer accepting Charge 1 and now disputing both Charge 1 and Charge 2.
    11. On 5 May 2023, the Respondent’s Application in its original form was filed and served.
    12. The Respondent’s amended response and the Respondent’s Application were subsequently further amended. 
  4. [114]
    At the time that the LSC filed and served her substantive submissions, this was understandably done on the basis of the sworn evidence of the Respondent, in the absence of a final position on the proposed statement of facts.  The LSC’s substantive submissions:
    1. State at [4] that the “facts underlying the charges are largely agreed”.
    2. Submitted that both Charge 1 and Charge 2 constituted professional misconduct and identified the statutory basis in respect of both charges as being s 419(1)(a) of the LP Act.
  5. [115]
    The LSC filed and served the substantive submissions as required by the Tribunal’s directions.  The LSC is likely to have made pragmatic decisions as to the content and approach of the substantive submissions to ensure they were provided by the date in the directions and addressed the facts as they were then understood.
  6. [116]
    In all of these circumstances, it would be inappropriate and unfair to limit the LSC to the analysis articulated in the substantive written submissions in circumstances where the Respondent’s position has substantially changed from that previously articulated in the Respondent’s response to the discipline application, the Respondent’s affidavit and the correspondence.  
  7. [117]
    Accordingly, the fact that ss 419(1)(b) and 420 of the LP Act were not referred to in the LSC’s substantive submissions is not determinative of the relevance of that basis for professional misconduct to the allegations in the discipline application.
  8. [118]
    Now turning to the Respondent’s Application more broadly.  It is convenient to deal with the jurisdiction issue first.
  9. [119]
    The Court of Appeal decision in Legal Services Commissioner v Madden is binding authority on the issue of jurisdiction of the relevant disciplinary body under the LP Act.  Further, it is authority that:
    1. A discipline application under the LP Act is not criminal in nature and the statutory task is to hear and determine the allegations in a discipline application.
    2. A discipline application under the LP Act does not involve a two-step process and the Tribunal is to consider the characterisation of the conduct and appropriate order in the one decision.
    3. A discipline application is therefore to raise the allegations relied upon to support why an order should be made (that is, whether the alleged conduct constitutes unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct) as well as the appropriate orders pursuant to s 456 of the LP Act.
  1. [120]
    Section 115(3) of the QCAT Rules states that a discipline application must state particulars of the alleged unsatisfactory conduct or professional misconduct.  This is consistent with the particulars forming part of the allegations in the discipline application as they go to why an order should be made.
  2. [121]
    QCAT Form 22 v. 2 “Application or referral – disciplinary proceeding” is the current prescribed form.  In Part C, the form refers to “orders sought” and does not use the language of “charge” and “particulars”.  Again, this language is consistent with the language in s 452 of applying “for an order”, which links to s 456 of the LP Act.
  3. [122]
    QCAT Form 22 v. 2 is different from the previous approved form identified at [6] of Madden. The allegations by reference to charge and particulars in the discipline application considered in Madden is the same structure as the current discipline application (which was attached to the QCAT Form 22 v.2).
  4. [123]
    In Madden, the Court of Appeal described the discipline application as setting out the “charges … and gave detailed particulars of those charges”.[33] The charges and particulars were set out in full in the reasons.  No criticism was made as to the matters raised in the charges and particulars.  
  5. [124]
    Looking at the nature of the charges and particulars in Madden:
    1. The particulars to Charges 3 and 4 repeated and relied on the particulars to Charges 1 and 2.  In effect these particulars were facts, matters or events that occurred prior to the date of the relevant conduct in the charge.  This is, in effect, similar in nature to the matters in the Identified Paragraphs.
    2. The particulars to Charge 6 repeated and relied on the particulars to Charge 5.  Again, the particulars included facts, matters or events that occurred prior to the date of the relevant conduct in the charge.  Again, this is, in effect, similar in nature to the matters in the Identified Paragraphs.
  6. [125]
    Whilst the language of “charge” and “particulars” are used, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Madden supports the conclusion that the allegations raised in the discipline application which the Tribunal must hear and determine include all the matters described as “charge” and “particulars”.
  7. [126]
    The decision in Kirk does not particularly assist the Tribunal in the consideration of its jurisdiction in the particular statutory framework under the LP Act.[34]
  8. [127]
    Jackson J in Karimbla Construction Services P/L v President of the Industrial Court of Qld & Ors [2014] QSC 56 had to consider the validity of a complaint “gauged against the statutory framework”.[35] Reliance was placed on the decision in Kirk for the submission that the complaint suffered a fatal defect as it lacked allegations of acts or omissions constituting the offence.  His Honour concluded that Kirk did not answer the question as to the validity of the complaint in that case given the particular statutory framework.
  9. [128]
    That case is an example of the need to consider the particular statutory framework and the terms of the charge and particulars in the complaint to determine whether the statutory requirements have been met.
  10. [129]
    The LSC also refers to the decision in Langerak v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 327 for the proposition that particulars to a complaint are within the complaint for the purposes of determining power to proceed with disciplinary action.
  11. [130]
    Again, that decision was in the context of a specific statutory framework but does recognise that the starting point is a proper understanding of what is required under the particular statute. 
  12. [131]
    Accordingly, the starting point here is to identify the allegations stated in the discipline application which are to be heard and decided by the Tribunal.  
  13. [132]
    In the current discipline application, the LSC has raised the allegations to be heard and determined. This includes the Identified Paragraphs as part of the particulars and supporting evidence. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and decide those allegations.  
  14. [133]
    Accordingly, there is no basis to exclude the Identified Paragraphs on the basis that they are outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
  15. [134]
    It is then necessary to consider whether there is any basis to strikeout the Identified Paragraphs on the basis that the paragraphs are frivolous, vexatious or misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process.
  16. [135]
    On a proper understanding of the statutory framework under the LP Act, the matters raised in the Identified Paragraphs are clearly relevant to:
    1. The factual matrix or context which led to the undertaking being given and to the matter being before the Tribunal.
    2. Each of the alleged breaches of the undertaking and whether they constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct and/or professional misconduct.
    3. Identifying the appropriate orders (if a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct and/or professional misconduct is made).
  17. [136]
    In particular, the factual circumstances giving rise to an undertaking are relevant to the seriousness of the giving, and the acceptance, of the undertaking.  This goes to both the characterisation of the breach conduct and the appropriate penalty.
  18. [137]
    This is evident from the consideration of some of the authorities considering disciplinary proceedings arising out of breaches of undertakings.
  19. [138]
    In Legal Services Commissioner v Bui, Daubney J considered charges including a charge of failure to honour an undertaking.  The relevant facts in the reasons were taken from an agreed statement of facts but it can be inferred that it was likely that these constituted the particulars of the charge. This included a QLS investigation into the law practice which culminated in an undertaking being given to provide information to the QLS.
  20. [139]
    These facts were relevant in that they assisted the Tribunal in the task of properly characterising the conduct of the legal practitioner and also in evaluating the conduct against the range of potential seriousness for similar conduct.  In that case, Daubney J concluded that the conduct was not at the lesser end of the range and amounted to profession misconduct rather than unsatisfactory professional conduct.
  21. [140]
    In Council of the Law Society (NSW) v Fisher [2021] NSWCATOD 73, the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal was required to apply a two-step process under the relevant statute and at the liability stage to determine whether the respondent was guilty of professional misconduct, including a charge of failing to comply with an undertaking.
  22. [141]
    Relevantly, the reasons identify factors going to the consideration of whether the conduct constituted professional misconduct:
    1. Where an undertaking is given to the Law Society the non-compliance is particularly serious and is more serious than an undertaking to a fellow practitioner.[36]
    2. The undertaking is to be construed in context.  The context included the matters set out in the particulars.[37]
    3. “In the absence of countervailing considerations, a breach of a solicitor’s undertaking will usually be treated as professional misconduct”.[38]
    4. A consideration of the factors that go to an alternative finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct.[39]
    5. It was concluded at [146] that “on the facts of this case” there were not countervailing considerations to justify the alternative finding.
  23. [142]
    In Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214 the Court of Appeal of Western Australia considered an application for leave to appeal in respect of penalty in disciplinary proceedings.  The Court observed:
    1. The circumstances in which undertakings are given and relied upon are many and varied.[40]
    2. Failure of a legal practitioner to perform the obligation in an undertaking will generally be regarded as professional misconduct, and depending on the circumstances, will often be regarded as serious professional misconduct.[41]
    3. At [59]:

“… As might be expected, the cases cover a broad range of circumstances in which undertakings were given by practitioners, and an equally broad range of circumstances in which they were breached, with differing consequences.  The breadth of the range of circumstances in which undertakings are proffered by legal practitioners is such that it is neither desirable nor possible to postulate any general proposition with respect to the appropriate penalty imposed for professional misconduct in the form of failure to perform such an undertaking. … The appropriate penalty to be imposed in any particular case will naturally depend upon the evaluation of the particular facts and circumstances in the context of the general importance of legal practitioners performing undertakings which they have given”.

  1. This requires consideration of “those facts and circumstances … pertinent to the evaluation of the seriousness of [the] misconduct”.[42] 
  2. This includes that the undertaking was given in a context in which it was plainly of importance to the party to whom it was proffered.[43]
  1. [143]
    It is clear from the analysis of these cases as examples, that the proper characterisation of the conduct and considering the appropriate penalty goes beyond just merely identifying the undertaking and the breach as submitted by the Respondent.  The factual context is relevant and a necessary part of the statutory task.
  2. [144]
    Further, contrary to the Respondent’s submission, the Identified Paragraphs could rationally affect the consideration of the breaches of the undertaking at both the characterisation of the conduct stage and penalty, as identified in the review of the cases above.[44]
  3. [145]
    Having concluded that the Identified Paragraphs form part of the allegations which the Tribunal is to hear and decide, that they are relevant to both the characterisation of the conduct and penalty, it is difficult to see how there can be any remaining basis to conclude that the Identified Paragraphs should be struck out as being frivolous, vexatious or misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process.
  4. [146]
    Ultimately, the matters set out in the allegations will need to be substantiated at the hearing and the Tribunal’s task at that stage is to hear and decide those allegations. 
  5. [147]
    At this stage, there is no basis to conclude that the allegations are, to the extent of the Identified Paragraphs, frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or lacking in substance to warrant striking out the Identified Paragraphs.  The allegations are appropriate to be heard and determined at the hearing of the discipline application.
  6. [148]
    Further, the Respondent’s submission that to allow the discipline application to proceed with the Identified Paragraphs included would be an abuse of process and bring the administration of justice into disrepute is not made out.  
  7. [149]
    The statutory task of the Tribunal is to hear and decide allegations raised by the LSC in a discipline application.   The LSC has raised matters relevant to the factual context and the issue of characterisation of the conduct and penalty.
  8. [150]
    In these circumstances, there is no basis for the criticism made of the LSC including the Identified Paragraphs in the discipline application and the supporting affidavit.
  9. [151]
    Accordingly, the Respondent’s application to strike out the Identified Paragraphs must fail.

What further orders are appropriate?

  1. [152]
    The Respondent’s Application also seeks other orders to secure the effectiveness of the strikeout component of the Respondent’s Application, namely that:
    1. The discipline application be placed in a sealed envelope marked “not to be opened except by order of a judicial member of the Tribunal”. 
    2. The LSC file an amended disciplinary application with paragraphs 1.4 to 1.11, 1.13 to 1.14 redacted.[45]
    3. The affidavit of Craig Smiley be uplifted from the Tribunal file, with liberty for the LSC to file a further affidavit excluding paragraphs 8 to 25 (including the relevant parts of the exhibit).
    4. These reasons for decision in respect of the Respondent’s Application should be anonymised and not mention the specifics of the Identified Paragraphs pursuant to s 66 of the QCAT Act.
    5. The substantive proceeding be heard by another judicial member of the Tribunal.
  2. [153]
    In respect of the non-publication orders sought in (a), (b), (c) and (d) above, the LSC submits that they are not necessary if the strikeout component of the Respondent’s Application is dismissed.
  3. [154]
    Otherwise, the LSC makes submissions on the relevant principles to be considered, including:
    1. Section 66 of the QCAT Act, being a discretion that may be exercised only if the Tribunal consider that the order is necessary to avoid one of the matters in s 66(2).  The potentially relevant matters here are those outlined in s 66(2)(a) and (e).
    2. The discretion is informed by the principle of open justice.
    3. The fact that publication may cause “embarrassment or unfortunate financial effects” is ordinarily not sufficient, especially if the names have already been published.[46]
    4. The discretion is not to be exercised lightly and the Respondent has not shown any special circumstance justifying the making of an order.
  4. [155]
    In respect of the order sought at (e) above, the LSC submits that there is no basis for the order sought.  It is akin to an apprehended or actual bias application and no proper basis has been articulated.  Further, it is submitted that consideration of this relief is premature where the matter has not yet been set down for final hearing.
  5. [156]
    In response, the Respondent submits that:
    1. Irrelevant and scandalous material that is a serious attack on character amounting to an abuse of the process of the Tribunal is of such a nature to justify the making of a non-publication order.
    2. This is so particularly where the person making the allegations is the regulator and once the material is on the public record it may come to the attention of the trial judge. 
    3. The order in (e) above seeks to secure the effectiveness of the other orders and is not akin to an application of apprehended or actual bias.  It is to avoid the risk of being influenced by material which ought not to be before the Tribunal.

Consideration

  1. [157]
    Given the conclusion reached above in respect of the Respondent’s Application to the extent of the application to strike out the Identified Paragraphs, the balance of the Respondent’s Application does not strictly need to be determined.
  2. [158]
    However, it is appropriate to deal with one matter raised in submissions.
  3. [159]
    The submissions identify s 66 of the QCAT Act as giving the Tribunal to make the non-publication orders sought.  It is, however, necessary to consider the issue of power further.
  4. [160]
    Section 656D of the LP Act states:

“656D Prohibited publication about hearing of a discipline application

  1. The tribunal, either before, during or immediately after a hearing, may make an order prohibiting the publication of information stated in the order that relates to the discipline application, the hearing or an order of the tribunal.
  2. A person must not contravene an order under subsection (1). Maximum penalty—200 penalty units.
  3. A person must not publish or allow someone else to publish—
  1. a question disallowed by the tribunal at the hearing; or
  2. an answer given to a question disallowed by the tribunal at the hearing.

Maximum penalty—200 penalty units.

  1. Also, the tribunal may make an order prohibiting—
    1. the issue of the entire or part of a copy of the record made under the Recording of Evidence Act 1962; or
    2. the publication of the entire or part of a copy of the record made under that Act.
  2. A person must not contravene an order under subsection (4).

Maximum penalty—200 penalty units.

  1. In this section—

publish includes publish on radio, television or the internet.

record includes an audio recording.”

  1. [161]
    Section 656D of the LP Act provides a discretion that is not limited to defined bases as in s 66 of the QCAT Act.  
  2. [162]
    The case of Legal Services Commissioner v XBV [2018] QCAT 332 considered the interaction between s 66 of the QCAT Act and s 656D of the LP Act, and the effect of s 7 of the QCAT Act.  The Tribunal:
    1. Observed at [29] that “it seems clear, both from the language of s 6(7)(b) of the QCAT Act, and one of the examples for that provision, that s 656D is the type of provision to which s 7 might apply”.  
    2. Found that the inconsistency may be found in that s 66 of the QCAT Act may only be exercised in specified circumstances and that is not the case for s 656D of the LP Act.
    3. Concluded at [29] that the “relevant power is found in s 656D of the LP Act”.
    4. Further concluded at [36] that:

“… the power conferred by s 656D is not subject to the same constraints as a court’s inherent jurisdiction to make a non-publication order at common law.  Inevitably, the exercise of that power will be informed by the considerations which lie behind the open court principle; though they will not have the same paramountcy as they are given at common law.”

  1. [163]
    The Tribunal accepts the reasoning in XBV.  Accordingly, the proper basis for the Tribunal’s power to make a non-publication order is s 656D of the LP Act.
  2. [164]
    In light of the conclusion that the Respondent’s Application to the extent of the strikeout of the Identified Paragraphs must fail, the Respondent has not made out any basis for the non-publication orders or the other orders sought.  
  3. [165]
    Accordingly, the Respondent’s Application is dismissed.

Costs

  1. [166]
    The Respondent sought an order as to costs of the Respondent’s Application as the Tribunal considers appropriate.  As it is not a final hearing, the costs consequences in s 462 of the LP Act do not arise.
  2. [167]
    At the hearing:
    1. The Respondent submitted that if she succeeds on the application the Respondent should be awarded costs.
    2. The LSC submitted that costs should be reserved.
  3. [168]
    In light of these reasons for decision, the Tribunal will hear further from the parties in respect of costs.

Orders

  1. [169]
    The Tribunal orders that:
    1. The Respondent’s Application is dismissed.
    2. The Tribunal will hear further from the parties in respect of costs.

Footnotes

[1]The Application for Miscellaneous matters dated 6 June 2023 is an amended version of the Application for Miscellaneous Matters dated 5 May 2023. Further [6a] of the 6 June 2023 application was not pressed at the hearing on 7 September 2023.

[2]It is anticipated this will address some issues raised by the LSC in submissions.

[3]See, for example, the discussion of the application of the Briginshaw principles in Polglaze v The Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW [2010] NSWCA 4.

[4]Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 CLR 370 at [2].

[5]R v Deputy Industrial Industries Cmr; Ex parte Moore [1965] All ER 81 at 94 (per Lord Diplock).

[6]Reading the Charge as separate to the particulars.

[7]The undertaking was given on 21 June 2019 to the QLS. The Respondent’s submission at [6] incorrectly refers to undertakings (plural) – but it is the same undertaking for each charge.

[8]At 393.

[9][1982] AC 529, at 536.

[10]See [17] of the Respondent’s written submissions.

[11]See the comments of Hasluck J in Solomon v Psychologists Board of Western Australia [2000] WASCA 266 at para [39].

[12]The reference to the “earlier passage” is a reference to [5] of the decision which refers to [31] of the Court of Appeal reasons where the Court of Appeal states “… While it is not necessary for us, in order to dispose of this appeal, to come to a view as to whether Mr Puryer misled Daubney J, we must record our concern … there are, we think, grounds for the investigation by the Legal Services Commissioner of Mr Puryer’s conduct before Daubney J.”

[13]This case is also relied upon at [60(a)] of the LSC’s substantive submissions dated 24 March 2023 as an example of where a breach of an undertaking may constitute professional misconduct where a practitioner has failed to honour an undertaking given to a professional body.

[14]At [12].

[15]Hodson LJ, with whom Ormerord LJ and Willmer LJ agreed.

[16]Mummery v Irving Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99 and R v Trifyllis [1998] QCA 416 at [18].

[17]Leave was granted to read and file these further submissions.

[18](2010) 239 CLR 531.

[19]See Madden at [88] and [83].

[20]Pursuant to s 456 LP Act.

[21]At [72]-[73], [77] and [93]. Section 610 of the LP Act was repealed after Madden was determined, at the time of the establishment of QCAT. The equivalent of s 601 is now in s 10(1)(1)(b) of the QCAT Act, operating together with ss 452 and 453 of the LP Act, which are unchanged.

[22]See s 456(1) of the LP Act.

[23]See third sentence of [93].

[24]Being the amended version on which the hearing proceeded.

[25]Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214 at [54]; Council of the Law Society (NSW) v Fisher [2021] NSWCATOD 73 at [65]; illustrated in Legal Services Commissioner v Bui [2018] QCAT 424.

[26]See [11] of the affidavit of Xiaoyu Li sworn 31 January 2023.

[27]Legal Services Commissioner v Madden [2009] 1 Qd R 149 at [89]-[91].

[28]Legal Services Commissioner v Madden [2009] 1 Qd R 149 at [80].

[29]McCarthy v Law Society of New South Wales (1997) 43 NSWLR 42 at 58.

[30]At [74].

[31]See [26] of the Respondent’s written submissions dated 6 June 2023.

[32]Page 40 of exhibit “BF-1” to the affidavit of Bradley Fitzgerald sworn 22 May 2023.

[33]At [7].

[34]Kirk may be of greater assistance in considering the consequence of lack of particulars.

[35]At [31].

[36]At [65] and [139].

[37]At [110].

[38]At [144].

[39]At [145].

[40]At [48].

[41]At [54].

[42]At [60].

[43]At [65].

[44]On the Respondent’s own analysis of the approach to the discipline application, in respect of at least the issues summarised at [46](c) and (d) above, the matters in the Identified Paragraphs would be relevant and, to the extent that the matters are substantiated at the hearing, may logically and rationally affect the conclusions on these issues.

[45]Health Ombudsman v Shemer (No 2) [2019] QCAT 54 at [6]. See also J v L & A Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Qd R 10.

[46]Cutbush v Team Maree Property Services (No 3) [2010] QCATA 89 at [10].

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Legal Services Commissioner v Li

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Legal Services Commissioner v Li

  • MNC:

    [2023] QCAT 383

  • Court:

    QCAT

  • Judge(s):

    Williams J

  • Date:

    03 Oct 2023

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Broadbent v Medical Board of Australia [2019] QCA 139
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCA 139
Cite 2 - [2019] QCA 139
Cavill Business Solutions Pty Ltd v Jackson [2005] WASC 138
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] WASC 138
Cite 2 - [2005] WASC 138
Council of the Law Society (NSW) v Fisher [2021] NSWCATOD 73
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73
Cite 2 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73
Cite 3 - [2021] NSWCATOD 73
Cutbush v Team Maree Property Service (No 3) [2010] QCATA 89
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCATA 89
Cite 2 - [2010] QCATA 89
Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 CLR 370
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2002) 190 CLR 370
Health Ombudsman v Shemer (No 2) [2019] QCAT 54
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2019] QCAT 54
Cite 2 - [2019] QCAT 54
Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police (1982) AC 529
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1982) AC 529
J v L & A Services Pty Ltd[1995] 2 Qd R 10; [1993] QCA 12
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1995] 2 Qd R 10
Cite 2 - [1995] 2 Qd R 10
Karimbla Construction Services Pty Ltd v President of the Industrial Court of Queensland [2014] QSC 56
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2014] QSC 56
Cite 2 - [2014] QSC 56
Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531
5 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2010) 239 CLR 531
Cite 2 - (2010) 239 CLR 531
Cite 3 - (2010) 239 CLR 531
Cite 4 - (2010) 239 CLR 531
Cite 5 - (2010) 239 CLR 531
Langerak v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 327
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2022] QIRC 327
Cite 2 - [2022] QIRC 327
Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 214
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] WASCA 214
Cite 2 - [2012] WASCA 214
Cite 3 - [2012] WASCA 214
Legal Services Commissioner v Bui [2018] QCAT 424
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCAT 424
Cite 2 - [2018] QCAT 424
Cite 3 - [2018] QCAT 424
Cite 4 - [2018] QCAT 424
Legal Services Commissioner v CBD [2012] QCA 69
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCA 69
Cite 2 - [2012] QCA 69
Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2)[2009] 1 Qd R 149; [2008] QCA 301
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2009] 1 Qd R 149
Cite 2 - [2009] 1 Qd R 149
Cite 3 - [2009] 1 Qd R 149
Cite 4 - [2009] 1 Qd R 149
Legal Services Commissioner v Puryer [2010] QCAT 411
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCAT 411
Cite 2 - [2010] QCAT 411
Cite 3 - [2010] QCAT 411
LSC v XBV [2018] QCAT 332
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCAT 332
Cite 2 - [2018] QCAT 332
McCarthy v Law Society of New South Wales (1997) 43 NSWLR 42
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1997) 43 NSWLR 42
Cite 2 - (1997) 43 NSWLR 42
Mummery v Irvings Pty Ltd (1956) 96 CLR 99
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1956) 96 CLR 99
Polglaze v The Veterinary Practitioners Board of NSW [2010] NSWCA 4
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] NSWCA 4
R v Deputy Industrial Industries Cmr; Ex parte Moore [1965] All ER 81
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1965] All ER 81
R v Triffyllis [1998] QCA 416
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1998] QCA 416
Rossage v Rossage and Others [1960] 1 All E.R. 600
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [1960] 1 All E.R. 600
Cite 2 - [1960] 1 All E.R. 600
Solomon v Psychologists Board of Western Australia [2000] WASCA 266
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2000] WASCA 266
The Sands Gold Coast Pty Ltd v Body Corporate for the Sands [2016] QCAT 69
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2016] QCAT 69
Cite 2 - [2016] QCAT 69
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1993) 177 CLR 378
Cite 2 - (1993) 177 CLR 378

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Legal Services Commissioner v Healy [2025] QCAT 1712 citations
Legal Services Commissioner v Li [2024] QCAT 4443 citations
1

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