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Frost v State of Queensland[2020] QCATA 144

Frost v State of Queensland[2020] QCATA 144

QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

CITATION:

Frost v the State of Queensland & Ors [2020] QCATA 144

PARTIES:

JULIE FROST

(applicant/appellant)

v

THE STATE OF Queensland

CHRISTOPHER DONOVAN

STEPHEN HAYNES

SAMANTHA SANDERSON

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL227-20

ORIGINATING

APPLICATION NO/S:

ADL040-19

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

31 August 2020

HEARING DATE:

19 August 2020

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Senior Member Howard

ORDERS:

  1. The application to stay a decision filed on 3August2020 is refused.
  2. Publication of the written reasons for the decision to any person other than to parties to the proceeding is prohibited until the day that is 21 days after the date of these orders.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – STAY OF PROCEEDINGs – GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO GRANT OR REFUSAL – where interlocutory directions made for consideration of strike-out or dismissal – whether interlocutory directions should be stayed pending appeal – where no final decision under appeal – where non-publication order made – where allegations made against third parties – where serious allegations made – whether non-publication order should be stayed pending appeal

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 28, s 45, s 47, s 58, s 66, s 145

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Breezeway Developments Pty Ltd v ADG Hydraulics Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 69

Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman [2011] QCATA 226

Day v Humphrey [2017] QCA 104

Gough v State of Queensland [2013] QCAT 320

Hessey-Tenny v Jones [2018] QCATA 131

McGrath v Scott [2012] QCATA 57

State of Queensland v Aigner [2013] QCATA 151

APPEARANCES &

REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

Respondents:

IP Fraser, Senior Legal Officer, Queensland Police Service Legal Unit

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. [1]
    Julie Frost has an anti-discrimination complaint before the Tribunal. It has made slow progress since it was referred by the Queensland Anti‑Discrimination Commission, now known as the Queensland Human Rights Commission (QHRC), on 8July2019.
  2. [2]
    Following a hearing on 8 May 2020, on 28 July 2020, a Member of the Tribunal made orders and directions as follows:

THE TRIBUNAL DIRECTS THAT:

  1. Compliance with directions made 5September2019 is stayed pending further directions.
  2. Julie Frost must file two (2) copies in the Tribunal and give to Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson, Stephen Haynes and the State of Queensland one (1) copy of submissions:
  1. (a)
    setting out why her application should not be struck out on one of the grounds set out in section 47(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (Qld); and
  1. (b)
    including any submissions which address the matters set out in the directions made 5September2019, by:

4:00pm on 20 August 2020.

  1. Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson, Stephen Haynes and the State of Queensland must file in the Tribunal two (2) copies and give to Julie Frost one (1) copy of their submissions:
  1. (a)
    addressing whether Julie Frost’s application in this matter should be struck out on one of the grounds set out in section 47(1) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Act 2009 (Qld); and
  1. (b)
    providing any response they wish to make to Julie Frost’s submissions, by:

4:00pm on 3 September 2020.

  1. Julie Frost must file two (2) copies in the Tribunal and give to Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson, Stephen Haynes and the State of Queensland one (1) copy of submissions in reply, limited to matters raised by Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson, Stephen Haynes and the State of Queensland, by:

4:00pm on 17 September 2020.

  1. The matter to be determined on the papers on a date not before:

4:00pm on 17 September 2020.

IT IS THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL THAT:

  1. The application to join parties filed 10 February 2020 is dismissed.
  1. The application to strike out allegations in the respondents’ submissions filed 4October2019 is dismissed.
  1. The applications seeking disclosure and production of documents filed 7August2019 and 9September2019 are dismissed.
  1. The application for miscellaneous matters filed 18 February 2019 is dismissed with respect to all matters except the issue of recusal which will be the subject of separate decisions.
  1. Publication is prohibited of material in ADL040-19, including this decision. The prohibition does not apply to the parties or their legal representatives.
  1. [3]
    The learned Member gave written reasons for her decision. In the reasons for decision, she traversed the history of the complaint and referral before determining the applications for joinder of additional parties and disclosure of documents and making her other orders and directions.
  2. [4]
    Ms Frost subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal or appeal the decision and an application for a stay order.
  3. [5]
    Both parties made written submissions about the stay application. An oral hearing was also scheduled in respect of the stay application on Ms Frost’s request. I heard the stay application and reserved my decision.
  4. [6]
    Ms Frost confirmed at the oral hearing, as her written submissions seemed to suggest, that her application for a stay order relates only to the non-publication order and the directions made concerning the determination to be made by the Tribunal whether her complaint should be struck out pursuant to s 47 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act).
  5. [7]
    The application for a stay order is refused for the reasons explained below.

The relevant principles for deciding the stay application

  1. [8]
    Section 145(1) of the QCAT provides that starting an appeal does not affect the operation of the decision appealed. Section 145(2) however provides that the tribunal may make an order staying the operation of the order pending the determination of the appeal. Section 58 provides for the making of interim orders, relevantly as follows:

58Interim orders

  1. (1)
    Before making a final decision in a proceeding, the tribunal may make an interim order it considers appropriate in the interests of justice, including, for example-
  1. (a)
    to protect a party’s position for the duration of the proceeding; or

…

  1. [9]
    The President of QCAT held in Hessey-Tenny v Jones,[1] that in circumstances when leave to appeal is required, s 145(2) of the QCAT Act does not provide power to order a stay of the operation of the decision sought to be appealed. However, he further held that s 58(1) is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal to allow a stay of a primary order where leave to appeal has not yet been granted. He considered that if a stay order is made pending determination of an application for leave to appeal pursuant to s 58, exceptional circumstances must exist. Whether there are exceptional circumstances must be considered in addition to the conventional principles for the granting of a stay order.
  2. [10]
    The conventional principles were recently restated in Day v Humphrey.[2] Essentially, an applicant must have a good arguable case of error in the appeal proceeding and the balance of convenience must favour the applicant. That is, the applicant for a stay must demonstrate disadvantage if the stay is not granted and that disadvantage outweighs any disadvantage to the other party.

Should the operation of the Tribunal’s directions be stayed?

  1. [11]
    Section 47 of the QCAT Act provides inter alia that the tribunal may order that a proceeding, or part of it, be dismissed or struck out if the tribunal considers it is ‘frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or lacking in substance; or otherwise an abuse of process.’ The learned Member directed Ms Frost to file and serve written submissions as to why her anti-discrimination complaint should not be struck out on one of the grounds specified in s 47(1) of the QCAT Act, including any submissions addressing the matters set out in the directions made on 5 September 2019.
  2. [12]
    The directions made on 5 September 2019 relevantly include the following:

DISCRIMINATION

  1. Julie Frost must file in the Tribunal two (2) copies and give to the State of Queensland, Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson and Stephen Haynes one (1) copy of a Statement of Contentions, no more than five (5) pages, which sets out:

a.What attribute is the basis for the complaint;

b.Who or what is the comparator;

i.If the comparator is a real person, who that person is and why they are an appropriate comparator.

ii.If the comparator is hypothetical, a description of that person.

c.Whether the discrimination is direct, indirect or both,

i.If the complaint is of direct discrimination, how Julie Frost was treated less favourably,

ii.If the complaint is of indirect discrimination, what was the term that Julie Frost could not comply with, or was more difficult to comply with, why it was more difficult to comply with that term, how it is that a higher proportion of people without the attribute can comply with the term, and why the term was not reasonable,

d.What orders Julie Frost wants the Tribunal to make, by:

4:00pm on 3 October 2019.

  1. The State of Queensland, Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson and Stephen Haynes must file in the Tribunal two (2) copies and give to Julie Frost one (1) copy of their response to the Statement of Contentions, by:

4:00pm on 31 October 2019.

VICTIMISATION

  1. Julie Frost must file in the Tribunal two (2) copies and give to the State of Queensland, Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson and Stephen Haynes one (1) copy of a Statement of Contentions, of no more than five (5) pages, which sets out:
  1. (a)
    the alleged act of victimisation, or threat to do an act of victimisation, made to Julie Frost;
  1. (b)
    particulars of the way in which the alleged act of victimisation, or threat to do an act of victimisation, is to the detriment of Julie Frost;
  1. (c)
    the reason for the alleged act of victimisation, or threat to do an act of victimisation, to the detriment of Julie Frost, by reference to s 130(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (‘the Act’). In particular, setting out whether it is because Julie Frost, or a person associated with or related to Julie Frost either:
  1. (i)
    refused to do an act that would amount to a contravention of the Act, specifying the act and the section/s of the Act that would be contravened; OR
  1. (ii)
    alleged or intended to allege that a person committed an act that would amount to a contravention of the Act, setting out:
  • how/why the allegation or intention to make the allegation is in good faith;
  • the allegation;
  • whether the allegation was made or how an intention to make the allegation was conveyed to Christopher Donovan,

Samantha Sanderson

Stephen Haynes

State of Queensland;

  • the nature of the act or threat to do the act;
  • what section of the Act would be contravened; OR
  1. (iii)
    is or has been or intends to be involved in a proceeding under the Act against any person, stating the nature of the involvement including by reference to s 130(2) of the Act; OR
  1. (iv)
    the basis upon which it is alleged that the State of Queensland Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson and Stephen Haynes believe/s that Julie Frost or a person associated with, or related to Julie Frost is doing, has done, or intends to do one of the things mentioned in (i), (ii) or (iii) above, setting out the basis for that belief; and
  1. (d)
    The orders Julie Frost wants the Tribunal to make, by:

4:00pm on 3 October 2019.

  1. The State of Queensland, Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson and Stephen Haynes must file in the Tribunal two (2) copies and give to Julie Frost one (1) copy of a response to the Statement of Contentions, of no more than five (5) pages, by:

4:00pm on 31 October 2019.

PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE REPRISAL

  1. Julie Frost must file in the Tribunal two (2) copies and give to the State of Queensland Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson and Stephen Haynes and one (1) copy of a Statement of Contentions, of no more than five (5) pages, which sets out:
  1. (a)
    the “public interest disclosure”, including what it was about and who it was made to;
  1. (b)
    the detriment that was allegedly caused or intended to be caused to you by the disclosure (the reprisal), including the date of the reprisal and who did it;
  1. (c)
    the basis upon which it is alleged that the detriment was caused or intended to be caused because you made the public interest disclosure, by

4:00pm on 3 October 2019.

  1. The State of Queensland, Christopher Donovan, Samantha Sanderson and Stephen Haynes must file in the Tribunal two (2) copies and give to Julie Frost one (1) copy of a response to the Statement of Contentions, of no more than five (5) pages, by:

4:00pm on 31 October 2019.

  1. [13]
    Ms Frost submits that by its directions dated 28 July 2020 requiring that she file submissions about why her complaint should not be struck out pursuant to s 47, the Tribunal is trying to stop her from having a hearing on the merits of her complaint, and that being so, there needs to be a clear case against her. She says that the directions effectively put ‘the victim on trial’ and that she ought not have to justify why she should be able to have a hearing. She submits that in seeking to stop her from having a hearing, the circumstances are exceptional. Ms Frost says that she doesn’t understand the ‘allegations’ being made against her by the Tribunal in its decision; what the criticism is of what she has done; and what she needs to do. Iunderstand the submission to be to the effect that she cannot identify from the Tribunal’s decision and reasons for decision, the basis upon which it initiated an application to consider whether to strike out Ms Frost’s complaint on the grounds set out in s 47 of the QCAT Act. On that basis, she submits that the operation of the directions should be stayed pending the determination of this appeal proceeding.
  2. [14]
    MsFrost says that the tribunal has said that anti-discrimination claims should not be too readily dismissed.[3]
  3. [15]
    If the operation of the directions is not stayed pending the determination of her application for leave to appeal, it could be said that MsFrost may be disadvantaged because the Tribunal-initiated application pursuant to s 47 may be determined against her interests.
  4. [16]
    Although it is not for me to reach final conclusions about the merits in deciding whether there is a good arguable case, it is useful to outline some aspects of the Member’s reasons for decision in making a preliminary assessment about Ms Frost’s prospects of success. If the prospects of success are poor, this weighs against granting a stay order.
  5. [17]
    The learned Member says:

[110]The complaints made by Ms Frost set out in her emails to the QHRC and in her communications with this Tribunal extracted in this decision suggest that Ms Frost’s application in this matter is:

  1. (a)
    frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or
  1. (b)
    lacking in substance; or
  1. (c)
    otherwise an abuse of process.
  1. [18]
    The learned Member set out, in paragraphs [1] to [51] of her reasons for decision, an analysis of the matter ‘in order to determine the best way to manage the proceeding’,[4] observing that ‘there is a lack of clarity about the facts and contentions on which Ms Frost relies...’.[5] In particular, she notes Ms Frost’s position that ‘she will articulate her complaints once she is satisfied that she has been provided with all of the relevant documents.’[6]
  2. [19]
    The complaint accepted by the QHRC and referred to the Tribunal was accepted on the grounds of alleged impairment discrimination; victimisation; and reprisal for a public interest disclosure (PID) as set out in specified emails.[7] The learned Member considered in some detail the complaints made to the QHRC by Ms Frost as set out in various and numerous emails,[8] and an apparently failed attempt by the QHRC, before the referral to the Tribunal, to have Ms Frost articulate her complaints of PID reprisal with some degree of particularity.[9] In particular, at [13]-[39] the learned Member extracts essential details from the emails concerned. I do not need to repeat them here, but a reading of the paragraphs and the emails themselves suggests Ms Frost seeks to make a broad-ranging complaint about a considerable number of persons for many alleged acts, some of which would constitute serious criminal behaviour, that are not against the named respondents, although Ms Frost may consider them a related sequence of events.
  3. [20]
    The learned Member observed in her reasons for decision that the QHRC has not sought to characterise the complaints or to say what part of the emails constitute the accepted complaint,[10] but that allegations in the emails are made against not only the named respondents, but many other named and unnamed persons, and that those allegations are not addressed by the QHRC.[11]
  4. [21]
    The learned Member further observed that Ms Frost’s ‘draft pleading’ filed on 3October2019, in response to the Tribunal’s direction dated 5 September 2019 to file a statement of contentions setting out the basis for her claims of discrimination, victimisation and PID reprisal, references her emails to the QHRC and is difficult to understand.[12] The Tribunal observed that, although the named respondents provided a response to the ‘draft pleading’ in which they appear to construe Ms Frost’s claims on the basis of their points of contact with her, Ms Frost’s allegations are ‘much broader and different allegations.’[13] The learned Member concludes that there is not a clear statement of Ms Frost’s complaint sufficient for the proceeding to be heard.[14]
  5. [22]
    It is in the context of this detailed analysis that the Tribunal concluded that the complaint as set out in the emails to the QHRC may be frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or lacking in substance; or otherwise an abuse of process.
  6. [23]
    The objects of the QCAT Act include having the tribunal deal with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, informal and quick. As a corollary, each party is also obliged to act quickly in any dealing relevant to the proceeding.[15] Parties must take responsibility for acting in their own interest in proceedings having regard to the public interest in the efficient use of court and tribunal resources.[16] The procedure for a proceeding is at the discretion of the tribunal, subject to the QCAT Act, an enabling Act and the rules.[17] All parties are entitled to natural justice.[18]
  7. [24]
    The Tribunal is empowered to make directions at any time in a proceeding and do whatever may be necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of proceedings.[19] A party must comply with directions in the time frames allowed[20] and must act quickly in any dealing relevant to the proceeding.[21] Directions may be made requiring, for example, the filing of a statement of contentions which explains and/or clarifies a claim made by a party; holding of a compulsory conference for purposes including identifying and clarifying the issues in dispute in a proceeding; and directions about disclosure of documents between parties.
  8. [25]
    The Tribunal has power bring an early end to proceedings in prescribed circumstances. These include to dismiss or strike out unjustified proceedings (or part of them) if considered frivolous; vexatious; misconceived; or lacking in substance; or otherwise an abuse of process.[22] It also has power to dismiss or strike out proceedings if a party is acting in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party, for example, by failing to comply with a tribunal order or directions without reasonable excuse.[23]
  9. [26]
    In managing and progressing an apparently broad-ranging complaint which, in many aspects, does not appear to relate to the named respondents against whom the complaint was referred by QHRC and where clarification of the claims sought to be advanced by an applicant against named respondents is not forthcoming, it is open to the tribunal to consider whether the claim should be struck out pursuant to s 47 of the QCAT Act.
  10. [27]
    The issue raised by Ms Frost is whether the Tribunal has sufficiently identified why it considers her complaint should be considered pursuant to s 47. It was suggested that the Tribunal should have specified those matters to be addressed in its directions (as Ms Frost observes has been done in some other proceedings in which she is involved), it seems, rather than in its reasons for decision.
  11. [28]
    Had the Tribunal made its directions without giving reasons for decision, as it could have done, there may be some force in the arguments raised by Ms Frost that she doesn’t understand what she needs to address. However, the Tribunal here gave what appear to be considered and detailed reasons for its decision, including for the making of the directions that Ms Frost seeks a stay order in respect of. The QHRC referred only Ms Frost’s complaint to the Tribunal against the named respondents, albeit without specificity, even though Ms Frost’s material provided to QHRC potentially raised a myriad of other issues. Ms Frost was directed by the Tribunal on 5 September 2019 to file a statement of contentions outlining her claims. The ‘draft pleading’ provided refers back to the email material and refers to many serious allegations over an extended period of time against many other named and unnamed persons who are not respondents to the referred complaint.
  12. [29]
    Although the named respondents have sought to respond on a limited basis, Ms Frost’s contentions as currently framed by her are more in the nature of a wide-ranging inquiry rather than the apparently limited anti-discrimination complaint that the QHRC referred to the Tribunal against the named respondents.
  13. [30]
    By the directions dated 28 July 2020, Ms Frost was directed to file submissions, including addressing the matters referred to in the Tribunal’s directions dated 5September2019. Ms Frost says that she should be allowed to file the evidence she would rely upon at hearing, as I understand the submission, because the case for dismissal should be clear before it is exercised. Of course, the power to bring the proceedings to an early end by striking it out or dismissing it pursuant to s 47 of the QCAT Act has not been exercised at this point in time.
  14. [31]
    On a preliminary assessment, it appears that the learned Member has explained her concerns about the complaint based on the material filed to date and Ms Frost’s current statement of contentions. In extending the direction for Ms Frost to file submissions about whether the complaint should be dismissed to include making submissions addressing the matters referred to in the Tribunal’s directions dated 5 September 2019, in effect, the Tribunal has given her a further opportunity to articulate the basis of her complaint against the named respondents. However, the Tribunal has also put Ms Frost on notice that, depending on the submissions she provides, if she does not satisfy the Tribunal as to a proper basis and scope for her claims, it may decide to exercise its power pursuant to s 47 of the QCAT Act.
  15. [32]
    In relation to Ms Frost’s submission relevant to the application for leave to appeal to the effect that she should be allowed to file all of her evidence before such a course is considered, it is apposite to observe that if that course was adopted, if the Tribunal is correct in its assessment of Ms Frost’s intended complaint as being significantly more broad than has been referred by the QHRC in light of its referral against the named respondents, a direction to Ms Frost to file her evidence may result in the filing of a large volume of evidence irrespective whether the complaint has a proper basis, and which may be irrelevant to the complaint referred to the Tribunal for determination. Further, consideration of the evidence filed may involve the expending of significant tribunal resources, as well as considerable effort and cost for Ms Frost and the named respondents in preparing it and responding to it respectively. If there is not a proper basis for the claims, or any of them, then this can be avoided if identified early.
  16. [33]
    As the High Court has observed, court (and tribunal) resources are for the benefit not only of the parties to proceedings but the public at large.[24] It would be an inefficient use of tribunal resources to allow claims identified early in their course to hearing as, for example, potentially misconceived, or lacking in substance, to proceed.
  17. [34]
    For the reasons explained, on my preliminary assessment, the application for leave to appeal appears to have limited prospects of success. This weighs against the making of a stay order.
  18. [35]
    Further, in my view, there is at this stage no relevant disadvantage to Ms Frost in allowing the directions to operate, save and except at this stage more time should be allowed for the parties to file the submissions directed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has explained its concerns about the scope and basis of her intended complaint having regard to her statement of contentions and the material with the referral in some detail. Ms Frost has the opportunity to make submissions about her complaint and the basis for it and to explain why her complaint should not be dismissed or struck out pursuant to s 47. If she takes that opportunity and satisfies the Tribunal accordingly, the proceeding will no doubt continue.
  19. [36]
    In any event, I cannot identify any exceptional circumstances such that a stay of the directions is warranted.

Should the operation of the non-publication order be stayed?

  1. [37]
    Section 66 of the QCAT Act provides for the tribunal to make a non-publication order in a proceeding. The tribunal made an order on its own initiative in the terms discussed above.
  2. [38]
    In the oral hearing, Ms Frost, while pressing the stay application in respect of the non-publication order made by the Tribunal on the basis that open justice is an important requirement given her role as a ‘Human Rights advocate’ or ‘public interest advocate’ and in light of her allegations of ‘crimes of moral turpitude’, seemed to concede that although she would ultimately be concerned if the non-publication order remained in place, she did not oppose it being in effect ‘until the end of proceedings.’ She also submits that the allegations are already in the public domain.
  3. [39]
    The submissions for the named respondents were to the effect that, because nothing had been proven against the three named police officers (who are not accused of the serious crimes alleged), they are entitled to the protection of their reputations under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and that therefore, the balance of convenience did not favour a stay order being made.
  4. [40]
    Here, while I accept that may be an arguable case, there is no disadvantage to Ms Frost in the non-publication order continuing to operate pending a determination of the appeal proceeding. Conversely, I accept that the police officers concerned are arguably entitled to the protection of their reputations pending the determination.
  5. [41]
    As an aside, although the non-publication order is expressed as a final order, I make the observation that it is open to either party to make application in the tribunal proceedings for a variation of the existing order.

Orders

  1. [42]
    For the reasons explained, the application for a stay order is refused.
  2. [43]
    I will refer a copy of these reasons for decision to the tribunal in ADL040-19 so that it may make directions extending the time for the parties to provide submissions in accordance with its directions numbered 2 to 4 dated 28 July 2020.
  3. [44]
    In dealing with this application, it has not been necessary for me to traverse in detail all of the allegations made in the anti-discrimination proceedings. Nor is the voluminous material contained in it in the appeal file. I have considered whether, to preserve the efficacy of the non-publication order in ADL040-19, it is appropriate that I make an order that, pending the determination of the application for leave to appeal or appeal, these reasons for decision be published in de-identified format only. However, I am not, at this stage satisfied that I should do so.
  4. [45]
    That said, I will direct that these reasons for decision may not be published to any person other than the parties to the proceeding for 21 days from the date of my orders. If the respondents wish to apply for a non-publication order in the appeal proceeding, they should do so in that period. Otherwise the reasons for decision will be published on the Supreme Court website in the usual way.

Footnotes

[1] [2018] QCATA 131.

[2] [2017] QCA 104.

[3] Ms Frost refers to and relies upon Gough v State of Queensland [2013] QCAT 320 & Aigner v State of Queensland [2013] QCATA 151.

[4] Reasons for decision dated 28July2020 in ADL040-19, [1] (RFD).

[5] Ibid [4].

[6] Ibid [4].

[7] Ibid [9], [41].

[8] Ibid [22]-[39].

[9] Ibid [43].

[10] Ibid [40].

[11] Ibid [13], [45]

[12] Ibid [47].

[13] Ibid [48]-[50].

[14] Ibid [51].

[15] QCAT Act s 45.

[16] Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175, 127 (Aon v ANU); Breezeway Developments Pty Ltd v ADG Hydraulics Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 69, [10], [12]; McGrath v Scott [201] QCATA 57, [12]-[13], [26]; Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman [2011] QCATA 226, [13], [15].

[17] QCAT Act s 28(1).

[18] Ibid s 28(3)(a).

[19] QCAT Act s 62(1).

[20] QCAT Act s 62(4).

[21] QCAT Act s 45.

[22] QCAT Act s 47.

[23] QCAT Act s 48.

[24] Aon v ANU, 127.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Frost v the State of Queensland & Ors

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Frost v State of Queensland

  • MNC:

    [2020] QCATA 144

  • Court:

    QCATA

  • Judge(s):

    Senior Member Howard

  • Date:

    31 Aug 2020

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2009) 239 CLR 175
Cite 2 - (2009) 239 CLR 175
Breezeway Developments Pty Ltd v ADG Hydraulics Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 69
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2010] QCATA 69
Cite 2 - [2010] QCATA 69
Creek v Raine & Horne Real Estate Mossman [2011] QCATA 226
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCATA 226
Cite 2 - [2011] QCATA 226
Day v Humphrey [2017] QCA 104
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2017] QCA 104
Cite 2 - [2017] QCA 104
Gough v State of Queensland [2013] QCAT 320
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCAT 320
Cite 2 - [2013] QCAT 320
Hessey-Tenny v Jones [2018] QCATA 131
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2018] QCATA 131
Cite 2 - [2018] QCATA 131
McGrath v Scott [2012] QCATA 57
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2012] QCATA 57
Cite 2 - [2012] QCATA 57
State of Queensland & Anor v Aigner [2013] QCATA 151
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2013] QCATA 151
Cite 2 - [2013] QCATA 151

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Marigliano v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2022] QCATA 751 citation
1

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