Queensland Judgments
Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
  • sclq logo
  1. Caselaw
  2. QDC
  3. 2012
  4. Roe v Link-up (Qld) Aboriginal Corporation - [2012] QDC 36

Authorised Reports & Unreported Judgments
Exit Distraction Free Reading Mode
  • Unreported Judgment

Roe v Link-up (Qld) Aboriginal Corporation[2012] QDC 36

Roe v Link-up (Qld) Aboriginal Corporation[2012] QDC 36

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Roe v Link-up (Qld) Aboriginal Corporation [2012] QDC 36

PARTIES:

DELMA ROE

(Applicant/Plaintiff)

AND

LINK-UP (QLD) ABORIGINAL CORPORATION ABN 36 073 956 496

(Respondent/Defendant)

FILE NO/S:

1920/11

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

14 March 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Maroochydore

HEARING DATE:

21 December 2011

JUDGE:

Long SC, DCJ

ORDER:

The application is dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – PLEADINGS – Application by the Plaintiff for further and better particulars - Whether through a Reply filed by the Plaintiff there has been a deemed admission by operation of UCPR 166 – Whether the application should fail even if there is no deemed admission.

LEGISLATION:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r 150, 157, 161, 166

Worker's Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, s 318C

CASES:

Ballesteros v Chidlow & Anor No 2 [2005] QSC 285.

Melco Engineering Pty Ltd v Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 198.

Thiess Pty Ltd v FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209.

COUNSEL:

C. Newton on behalf of the Applicant/Plaintiff.
G. Diehm SC on behalf of the Respondent/Defendant.

SOLICITORS:

Maurice Blackburn Lawyers on behalf of the Applicant/Plaintiff.

Gadens Lawyers on behalf of the Respondent/Defendant.

Introduction

  1. [1]
    In this matter the Plaintiff applies for further and better particulars of paragraph 9(a) of the Defence filed in these proceedings.
  1. [2]
    On 3 June 2011, the Plaintiff filed a Claim for damages for psychiatric injury alleged to have been occasioned to her in the course of her employment with the Defendant.
  1. [3]
    For present purposes, it is sufficient to note a description given by the Defendant’s counsel as to the effect of the Statement of Claim as having:

“… as its core allegations that the plaintiff was improperly treated by the defendant or representatives of it, in particular with respect to the appointment process of a director of the corporation, the employment of persons in relationships with directors of it, a confrontation between a director and another staff member on the one part and the plaintiff on the other part, the non-responsiveness of the Chairman of the Board to the plaintiff’s complaints about that confrontation and the decision by the defendant to conduct an audit of certain aspects of its finances.”[1]

  1. [4]
    In order to put the competing arguments raised on the application in some proper context, it is necessary to have regard to some particular aspects of the pleadings.
  1. [5]
    In paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff pleads as follows:

“6. The injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant, particulars of which allegation are as follows:

  1. (a)
    failing to provide a safe place of work;
  1. (b)
    failing to provide a safe system of work;
  1. (c)
    failing to support her as the CEO, particularly by Watson, when a Board member, Lui, was behaving inappropriately;
  1. (d)
    failing by its directors and in particular Watson and Lui to comply with its own HR Policy;
  1. (e)
    failing by its directors to comply with its own rule book in marginalising the plaintiff when she tried to deal with these problems;
  1. (f)
    by its director, Lui, threatening, assaulting and intimidating the plaintiff in her office in front of other staff;
  1. (g)
    by its director, Lui, involving a then staff member, Hollas, in threatening and intimidating the plaintiff;
  1. (h)
    by its director, Watson, failing to provide any or any proper support and assistance for the plaintiff when she complained about the behaviour of Lui;
  1. (i)
    by Watson and Lui together with staff, or ex-staff, Tatten and Hollas confronting and threatening and intimidating the plaintiff in the Link-Up office;
  1. (j)
    by Watson continuing to make unreasonable email demands when he knew the plaintiff was on WorkCover stress leave.”
  1. [6]
    On 30 June 2011, the Defendant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend and Defence.  In the Defence, the response to paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim was as follows:

“9. The defendant denies paragraphs 6(a) to (j) of the statement of claim and says it was not negligent and the plaintiff did not suffer any injury as a result of the negligence on the part of the defendant. The defendant further says:

  1. (a)
    it put in place appropriate systems of work for its employees;
  1. (b)
    it provided a safe place of work for its employees;
  1. (c)
    it provided a safe system of work for its employees;
  1. (d)
    that it was not informed by the plaintiff of any incident which was likely to cause her any injury while undertaking her duties of employment.”
  1. [7]
    In addition, the Defence, by paragraph 10, alleged contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff.
  1. [8]
    On 19 July 2011 the Plaintiff filed a Reply.  That pleading makes no direct response to paragraph 9 of the Defence and there is no express reference made to paragraph 9 of the Defence, despite there being specific reference made to a number of other paragraphs and subparagraphs of that Defence.  The Reply was made as follows:

“The plaintiff relies on the following facts in reply to the defence of the defendant filed 30 June 2011:-

  1. The plaintiff adopts the admissions to the extent made in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14 and 15(d) of the Defence. 
  1. With reference to paragraph 6 of the Defence, the Plaintiff denies the same is responsive because the HR Policy is identified as that adopted by the board in about September ’08 as alleged in paragraph 2(c) of the Statement of Claim.
  1. With particular reference to paragraph 7 and 8 of the Defence, the Plaintiff denies the same are responsive because it is patiently (sic) clear that the information is information within the knowledge of the Defendant concerning as it does, substantially, allegations about the conduct of its board members and staff.
  1. With particular reference to paragraph 10 of the Defence, the Plaintiff denies that she contributed to her injury but cannot better respond pending further and better particulars of the allegations therein.
  1. Save as aforesaid the Plaintiff joins issue with the Defendant on its Defence and repeats and relies upon the allegations of fact contained in the Statement of Claim filed 3 June 2011.”
  1. [9]
    Together with the Reply, the Plaintiff filed a request for further and better particulars as to paragraph 9(a) of the Defence and each of the subparagraphs of paragraph 10 of that Defence.  The request in respect of subparagraph 9(a) of the Defence was as follows:

“1. Further particulars of paragraph 9(a) of the Defence including:

  1. (a)
    particulars of each appropriate system of work put in place;
  1. (b)
    particulars of when each such system was put in place;
  1. (c)
    particulars of how each such system was disclosed to employees.”
  1. [10]
    By a document dated 3 October 2011, the Defendant provided further and better particulars of subparagraphs 10(a) and (b) of the Defence and indicated that subparagraphs 10(c) and (d) of the Defence were abandoned.  However, the response in relation to the request for further and better particulars of subparagraph 9(a) of the Defence was as follows:

“1. No further particulars are required to be provided by the Defendant of paragraph 9(a) of the Defence on the grounds that the allegation is deemed to have been admitted by virtue of the Plaintiff not having pleaded to paragraph 9(a) of the Defence in the Reply.”

  1. [11]
    On 25 October 2011 and after correspondence pursuant to UCPR 444 and 445, the Plaintiff filed an Application for orders pursuant to UCPR 161, that the Respondent provide the particulars that had been sought in respect of paragraph 9(a) of the Defence and for the Respondent to pay the Applicant’s costs of and incidental to the Application.
  1. [12]
    That Application has been opposed by the Defendant, primarily by maintaining its contention that there has been a deemed admission pursuant to the operation of the UCPR 166.  The Plaintiff accepts that if that is the conclusion of the court, then its Application must fail.  However, as I understand the argument put by the Defendant, it need not necessarily follow that the Application should succeed if that point is decided against the Defendant’s argument, having regard to considerations of the utility of any particulars that might be ordered to be provided.
  1. [13]
    The Defendant’s contention proceeds as follows:
  1. (a)
    first by asserting that the matters in the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim are pleaded as particulars; and
  1. (b)
    accordingly, it is submitted that the Defendant was not obliged to plead in the Defence, to those sub-paragraphs[2] but the Defendant, having pleaded as it does in subparagraph 9(a) and the Plaintiff having filed a Reply, the contention is that unless UCPR 166 is satisfied in respect of the allegation made in subparagraph 9(a) of the Defence, then there is a deemed admission in respect of that allegation.
  1. [14]
    As the Defendant submits, this issue must be considered in the full context of the requirements of the UCPR and with an understanding of the extent to which the introduction of the UCPR changed the practices of pleading.[3]  The Defendant seeks to distinguish the decision of Dutney J in Metco Engineering v Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd,[4] which is a decision relied upon by the Plaintiff.
  1. [15]
    Further, the Defendant argues that the allegation in issue is a response to a particular (provided in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim) which is directed at the causation of injury by the breach of the “commonly recognised” duty or obligation of an employer “to establish and maintain a ‘safe and proper system of work’.”[5]  Further, it is contended that these are matters upon which the Plaintiff bears the onus of proof.  The further submission is that having regard to the state of the pleadings, even if the Defendant were now to provide particulars as to what it says were the appropriate systems of work put in place for its employees, the parties and the Court “would be no better informed as to what the Plaintiff will assert was the absence of a safe and proper system of work and that caused her injury”. 

A Deemed Admission?

  1. [16]
    I am not satisfied that the effect of the rules, in the circumstances of this case, is to deem that the Plaintiff has admitted that the Defendant had “put in place appropriate systems of work for its employees”.
  1. [17]
    Subparagraph 9(a) of the Defence can be seen as part of a direct response to subparagraphs (a) – (j) of paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim.[6]
  1. [18]
    In paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim those matters are expressed to be particulars of the allegation that the Plaintiff’s injury[7] was caused by the negligence of the Defendant.  As such they are expressed in broader rather than more specific terms and as a result, the response in paragraph 9 of the Defence, is also broadly expressed.[8]
  1. [19]
    In respect of its own position, the Defendant points to the observation of White J in Ballesteros v Chidlow No 2:[9]

“[21] Not only need there be an understanding of the difference between material facts and the evidence by which they are to be proved but also material facts and particulars of those facts. Although particulars are part of the pleading and may be struck out for the same reason, r 162, it is a well-established principle of pleading that particulars are not to be pleaded to, Turnover v Bulletin Newspaper Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 60 at 80 per Barwick CJ. His Honour said

‘The defendant by not canvassing the particulars does not admit them, nor does he admit their relevance to the establishment of a cause of action or any part of it.’”

  1. [20]
    In this regard it can be noted that the obligation stated that in UCPR r 157 is that:

“A party must include in a pleading particulars necessary to –

  1. (a)
    define the issues for, and prevent surprise at, the trial; and
  1. (b)
    enable the opposite party to plead; and
  1. (c)
    support a matter specifically pleaded under r 150.”
  1. [21]
    Here, the matter the subject of specific reference in UCPR 150 is the matter of negligence.[10]  It is necessary to note that UCPR 150(2) requires:

“(2) Also, any fact from which any of the matters mentioned in subrule (1) is claimed to be an inference must be specifically pleaded.”

  1. [22]
    Further, these requirements are to be viewed in the context of the requirements stated in rule 149:

“149 (1) Each pleading must –

  1. (a)
    be as brief as the nature of the case permits; and
  1. (b)
    contain a statement of all the material facts on which the party relies but not the evidence by which the facts are to be proved; and
  1. (c)
    state specifically any matter that if not stated specifically may take another party by surprise; and
  1. (d)
    subject to r 156, state specifically any relief the party claims; and
  1. (e)
    if a claim or defence under an Act is relied on – identify the specific provision under the Act.
  1. (2)
    In a pleading, a party may plead a conclusion of law or raise a point of law if the party also pleads the material facts in support of the conclusion or point.”
  1. [23]
    Further, it is necessary to have regard to the following principles, also stated by White J in Ballesteros v Chidlow & Anor No 2:[11]

“[35] The function of pleadings is to state with sufficient clarity the case that must be met, Gould v Mt Oxide Mines Ltd (In Liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490 at 517. The Rules of Court exist to bring that about and r 166(4) in particular has been beneficial in achieving that object. Pleadings define the issues and make clear that which is in issue for proof at trial. Nonetheless, the overriding philosophy of the UCPR set out in r 5 must not be overlooked – “the rules are to be applied with the objective of avoiding ... technicality and facilitating the purpose” of the rules. ...”

  1. [24]
    It may accordingly be seen that the matters set out in sub-paragraphs 6(a) to (j) and expressly described as particulars, are set out in terms generally descriptive of the failings or omissions of the Defendants, as arising out of the more specific facts and circumstances set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Statement of Claim.[12]
  1. [25]
    As far as the requirements of a defence or later pleading is concerned, UCPR 150(4) provides:

“(4) In a defence or a pleading after a defence, a party must specifically plead a matter that –

  1. (a)
    the party alleges makes a claim or defence of the opposite party not maintainable; or
  1. (b)
    shows a transaction is void or voidable; or
  1. (c)
    if not specifically pleaded might take the other party by surprise; or
  1. (d)
    raises a question of fact not arising out of a previous pleading.”
  1. [26]
    Accordingly, some care is necessary in the application of the principle referred to in Ballesteros v Chidlow & Anor No 2 and referred to in paragraph [19], above.  This is because of the need to note the differences of expression in the UCPR in reference to requirements to plead “matters”, “material facts” and “facts” and the specific requirement set out in UCPR 157, as to the inclusion of particulars in pleadings.  In this regard, it may be necessary to consider the application of particular rules in respect of specific parts of the pleadings.
  1. [27]
    The UCPR does not mandate that there must be a pleading in reply to a defence and UCPR 164(2) by providing for a time limit for “any reply” appears to contemplate that there may not be a reply. In practice, the necessity for a reply will be dictated by the content of a defence and the consequences of not replying. In this regard UCPR 168(1) provides that:

“(1) Every allegation of fact made in the last pleading filed and served before the pleadings close is taken to be the subject of a non-admission and r 165(2) then applies.”

Rule 165(2) provides that:

“(2) A party who pleads a non-admission may not give or call evidence in relation to a fact not admitted, unless the evidence relates to another part of the party’s pleading.”

  1. [28]
    In these circumstances, the Defendant contends that UCPR 166(1) and/or 166(4) and (5) have effect to deem an admission of fact. UCPR 166 relevantly provides:

“(1) An allegation of fact made by a party in a pleading is taken to be admitted by an opposite party required to plead to the pleading unless –

  1. (a)
    The allegation is denied or stated to be not admitted by the opposite party in a pleading; or
  1. (b)
    rule 168 applies.

…..

  1. (4)
    A party’s denial or non admission of an allegation of fact must be accompanied by a direct explanation for the party’s belief that the allegation is untrue or cannot be admitted.
  1. (5)
    If a party’s denial or non-admission of an allegation does not comply with sub-rule (4), the party is taken to have admitted the allegation. …”
  1. [29]
    However it can be noted that sub-rules 166(4) and (5) only have application where there has been a denial or non-admission. Primarily, the Defendant’s contention is that there has been neither, in that the general traverse in the Plaintiff’s Reply does not amount to either a denial or non-admission as to sub-paragraph 9(a) of the Defence. But the further contention is that even if there is a denial or non-admission it does not satisfy UCPR 166(4) and is therefore, by virtue of UCPR 166(5), deemed to be an admitted allegation.
  1. [30]
    The first thing to note is that sub-rule 166(1) only applies where there is an obligation or requirement to plead. Also, it was not contended that the principle in relation to the absence of requirement or necessity to plead in response to particulars, was not also applicable to the circumstances of the Plaintiff’s Reply to the Defence.
  1. [31]
    One difference to note is that the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 9 of the Defence are, unlike those of paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim, not expressed to be particulars. Logically that may be because they are an extrapolation of denials that the Defendant was negligent and thereby caused injury to the Plaintiff. However they are part of a direct response to and largely counterpoint the express particulars provided in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim.[13]
  1. [32]
    It is not clear as to what the Defendant contends would be the effect of a deemed admission that it had “put in place appropriate systems of work for its employees” in the context of the issues otherwise raised on the pleadings. However, this is particularly where the potential flow-on effect to the sub-paragraphs 9(b) and (c) and therefore in respect of the issue of providing a safe place and system of work, can be noted. Sub-paragraphs 9(b) and (c) are a direct response to the terms of particulars of the allegations of negligence made by the Plaintiff and expressly pick up the terms of sub-paragraphs 6(a) and (b) of the Statement of Claim.
  1. [33]
    Although sub-paragraph 9(a) is not expressed in terms directly referrable to any of the particularised allegations made in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim, it can only sensibly and contextually be regarded as a general response as to an effect of the particularised allegations of the Plaintiff.[14]
  1. [34]
    Moreover, there is not the same requirement in the UCPR for a reply as there is for a responsive defence. The necessity for a reply will be dictated by practical considerations and particularly by the content of the defence. To the extent that there may be a requirement to reply, that will primarily arise from UCPR 150(4), in the context of the contents of the defence.
  1. [35]
    The sub-paragraph in contention here: 9(a), is expressed more as a conclusion than an assertion of the facts upon which a conclusion that the Defendant had “put in place appropriate systems of work for its employees”, would be based.[15]  Accordingly, there is difficulty in regarding the assertion in sub-paragraph 9(a) as an allegation of fact, such as to be within the purview of UCPR 166(1).  It is to be properly regarded as a form of refutation of the particulars provided in the paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim and in that sense, a particular of the express denials of negligence and causation.
  1. [36]
    Here, the primarily relevant matter or questions of fact are those relating to the Plaintiff’s assertion of breach of an employer’s duty to provide and maintain a safe system of work. That matter is the subject of pleading, as to relevant facts, in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Statement of Claim and therefore, it could not be said that the Defendant could be taken by surprise or that such facts do not arise out of a previous pleading. The general traverse in paragraph 5 of the Reply and which makes express reference to reliance upon “the allegations of fact contained in the Statement of Claim filed 3 June 2011”, is to be considered in that context and in the full context of the Reply.[16]
  1. [37]
    Another way of examining the situation is to consider it on the assumption that sub-paragraph 9(a) of the Defence does allege a material fact and that there was no Reply (therefore also leaving aside considerations in respect of other issues arising from the Defence, such as that relating to contributory negligence). In that situation, there would be a need to look to the effect of UCPR 168(1) and 165(2) and it would appear inconceivable that the Plaintiff could or would be prevented from giving or calling evidence in respect of the breach of duty she has pleaded in her Statement of Claim.
  1. [38]
    Further and notwithstanding these conclusions, I would otherwise conclude that the effect of the sub-paragraph 9(a), in context, was not such as to raise any new matters that make the Plaintiff’s claim not maintainable or any question of fact not arising out of the Statement of Claim.
  1. [39]
    Although the determination in Melco Engineering Pty Ltd v Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd[17] obviously depended on the particular circumstances of that case, the following general observations of Dutney J are apposite[18]:

“[17] I am not persuaded that rule 150(4) of the UCPR requires a party to re-plead facts it has asserted in an earlier pleading.  The purpose of the Defence as a document is to set out the basis on which the plaintiff’s claim is not maintainable.  Having set that out there is no obligation on the plaintiff to reassert the original facts in its statement of claim.  A reply is necessary only where the defence raises new matters by reasons of which the claim of the other party is said to be not maintainable or where facts are alleged which otherwise fall within sub-rule 151(4).  In any case, the plaintiff has incorporated the SOC into the RAA as part of its general reply to the defence and answer to the counter-claim.  Where something has already been pleaded, I can see no reason why it cannot be adopted into a subsequent pleading by reference.”

  1. [40]
    It may be accepted that UCPR 166 has general application to all pleadings subsequent to an initiating pleading. Also, the general considerations noted by White J in Ballesteros and Thiess,[19] that the effect of UCPR 166 is to address the mischief of evasive denials and non-admissions and to change the practice under the prior rules which allowed general denials and which was well understood to have had an affect of allowing trials to come on for hearing without sufficient identification of the matters in controversy, are also of general application. However, those particular statements were made in reference to asserted deficiencies in the pleading of defences.
  1. [41]
    As it is understood, a point made by Dutney J in Melco, is that different considerations may arise in respect of a reply, particularly where no new or additional matters or facts are pleaded in a defence.

Further and Better Particulars?

  1. [42]
    There remains the question as to whether the Defendant should be ordered to provide further and better particulars of sub paragraph 9(a) of the Defence. Having regard to the reasons already expressed, no such order is warranted or should be made.
  1. [43]
    UCPR 161 enables an application for such an order but the touchstone is UCPR 157, which (as has already been noted) requires that:

“157 A party must include in a pleading particulars necessary to -

  1. (a)
    define the issues for, and prevent surprise at, the trial; and
  1. (b)
    enable the opposite party to plead; and
  1. (c)
    support a matter specifically pleaded under rule 150.”
  1. [44]
    As has also been noted, a broad issue raised on the pleadings is as to whether, as the Plaintiff alleges, there has been a breach of the employer’s duty of care, described in terms of the obligation to provide and maintain a safe system of work.[20]  There is no onus upon the employer to establish any aspect of “appropriateness” of its system of work.  However a defendant may need to respond to a plaintiff’s specific allegations of breach of duty.
  1. [45]
    There is certainly nothing to be gained or expected in respect of any general outline of the “appropriateness” of the employer’s system of work.[21]  That lack of utility is exemplified by the breadth of the expressed request for further and better particulars as extending to “each appropriate system put in place”.
  1. [46]
    To the extent that it was contended that there may be utility in ordering particulars in order to have the Defendant clarify its Defence and therefore the issues for trial, it would appear that the real difficulty in terms of properly defining the issues for trial, may be the Defendant’s lack of response to paragraphs 2(c), 3, 4 and 5 of the Statement of Claim. The only response is in paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 of the Defence, as follows:

“4.  In regard to paragraph 2(c) of the statement of claim, the defendant admits that it had a human resources policy but denies the allegation further as the human resources policy is not capable of being identified to allow the defendant to plead further to the allegation.

  1. As to the allegations in paragraph 3(a) to (e) of the statement of claim the defendant refers to and relies upon paragraph 4 of the defence.
  1. As to the allegations in paragraph 4(a)-(h) of the statement of claim the defendant does not admit the allegations therein as:
  1. (a)
    It does not know from its own means and sources of knowledge if the allegations are true or false;
  1. (b)
    Those circumstances are solely within the knowledge of the plaintiff.
  1. As to the allegations in paragraph 5(a)-(l) of the statement of claim, the defendant does not admit the allegations therein as:
  1. (a)
    It does not know from its own means and sources of knowledge if the allegations are true or false;
  1. (b)
    Those circumstances are solely within the knowledge of the plaintiff.”[22]
  1. [47]
    Although this appears to be an unsatisfactory state of affairs and issue is taken with it in the Reply[23] that is not before me for any resolution.[24]

Costs

  1. [48]
    As accepted by the parties, the question of the costs of this Application is governed by s 318C of the Worker's Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 and the Defendant conceded that, should the Application be dismissed, there could, as a result, be no award of costs in its favour.
  1. [49]
    There is therefore no need to consider the alternative position taken by the Plaintiff (on the assumption that its application succeeded), except to note that the submission faced the obvious hurdle of having to demonstrate that “the application was the result of unreasonable delay”, which appears to encompass something more than the Defendant unsuccessfully taking a point, which has resulted in some delay in the progress of the matter.

Conclusion

  1. [50]
    Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

Footnotes

[1]  This is understood to be a précis of the effect of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Statement of Claim, in particular.

[2]  In support of that proposition, the Defendant cites the decision of White J in Ballesteros v Chidlow & Anor No 2 [2005] QSC 285 at [21].

[3]  As discussed by White J in Ballesteros v Chidlow No 2, supra at [18] – [20] and [35] and in Thiess Pty Ltd v FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [112] – [116].

[4]  [2007] QSC 198.

[5]  It can be noted that the word “negligence” is used in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim and that UCPR 150(1)(l) requires this to be a matter specifically pleaded.

[6]  It can therefore be noted that there may also be application by logical extension to any of the other allegations contained in sub-paragraphs 9(b), (c) and (d) of the Defence.  However, the Application relates specifically only to sub-paragraph 9(a).

[7]  Which is to be taken to be her claimed psychological impairment, rather than workplace events, notwithstanding that the pleading itself seeks to define those events as “the injury”, in paragraph 5.

[8]  The exception may be the assertion in sub-paragraph 9(d) but that sub-paragraph is not the direct subject of the application.

[9]  Supra at [21].

[10]  See UCPR 150(1)(l).

[11]  Supra at [35].

[12]  And as generally described in the extract set out in paragraph [3], above. 

[13]  As already noted, sub-paragraph 9(d) may be the exception.

[14]  That is not to say that it need necessarily be regarded as an adequate response from the point of view of clarification of the real issues in contention. 

[15]  A similar observation could also be made in respect of sub-paragraphs 9(b) and (c).

[16]  See paragraph [8] above.

[17]  [2007] QSC 198.

[18]  [2007] QSC 198 at [17].

[19]  See footnote 2, above.

[20]  Here, to be assessed in terms of unreasonable or unnecessary risk of psychological harm arising from interactions with the employer and others, in respect of and concerning the Plaintiff’s employment; eg, see: Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44.

[21]  Any such attempt might be regarded as unnecessary and therefore susceptible of being struck out either pursuant to UCPR 162(1)(b) or 171(1)(c): see Barr Rock Pty Ltd v Blast Ice Creams Ltd & Ors [2011] QCA 252 at [28].

[22]  Some of those paragraphs are the subject of the response at paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Reply but they are not the subject of any request for further and better particulars.

[23]  Specifically in respect of paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Defence.

[24]  It may be that some consideration of the effect of the UCPR 166 (and particularly UCPR 166(4), (5) and (6)) might be necessary in respect of this state of affairs.

Close

Editorial Notes

  • Published Case Name:

    Delma Roe v Link-up (Qld) Aboriginal Corporation

  • Shortened Case Name:

    Roe v Link-up (Qld) Aboriginal Corporation

  • MNC:

    [2012] QDC 36

  • Court:

    QDC

  • Judge(s):

    Long DCJ

  • Date:

    14 Mar 2012

Appeal Status

Please note, appeal data is presently unavailable for this judgment. This judgment may have been the subject of an appeal.

Cases Cited

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Ballesteros v Chidlow No 2 [2005] QSC 285
3 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2005] QSC 285
Cite 2 - [2005] QSC 285
Cite 3 - [2005] QSC 285
Barr Rock Pty Ltd v Blast Ice Creams Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 252
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2011] QCA 252
Gould & Birbeck & Bacon v Mt Oxide Mines (in liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1916) 22 CLR 490
Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (2005) 222 CLR 44
Melco Engineering Pty Ltd v Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 198
4 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] QSC 198
Cite 2 - [2007] QSC 198
Cite 3 - [2007] QSC 198
Cite 4 - [2007] QSC 198
Thiess Pty Ltd v FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209
2 citations
Jump To
Cite 1 - [2007] QSC 209
Cite 2 - [2007] QSC 209
Turnover v Bulletin Newspaper Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 60
1 citation
Jump To
Cite 1 - (1974) 131 CLR 60

Cases Citing

Case NameFull CitationFrequency
Young v State of Queensland [2025] QDC 1001 citation
1

Require Technical Assistance?

Message sent!

Thanks for reaching out! Someone from our team will get back to you soon.

Message not sent!

Something went wrong. Please try again.